CABLE REFERENCE ID: #04TRIPOLI27

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate



Reference id	04TRIPOLI27 aka Wikileaks id #23944 ?
Subject	(C) BULGARIAN MEDICS UPDATE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Dec 2004 00:10 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04TRIPOLI27.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 130010Z DEC 04
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0028
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
EU MEMBER STATES
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000027

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , BU *[Bulgaria]* , LY *[Libya]* , XA *[Africa]* , XF *[Middle East]* , XI *[North Africa]*
SUBJECT: (C) BULGARIAN MEDICS UPDATE

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, USLO, Tripoli. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Status of Medics: The five Bulgarian medics sentenced to death for infecting over 400 Libyan children with HIV-tainted blood in a Benghazi hospital are being kept relatively secluded, the Bulgarian Embassy's Dimitar Dimitrov told us December 7. Dimitrov personally speculates this is because members of a Committee on Prison Reform (possibly part of a Libyan initiative to review internal procedures in a number of areas, including prisons) have been visiting the prison and the prison authorities do not want committee members to have contact with the Bulgarians. Libyan authorities turned Dimitrov away on December 7 when he tried to visit the medics; in the past, prison authorities had allowed Dimitrov to visit more or less whenever he wished. Meanwhile, the Palestinian doctor who also received the death sentence has been moved to newer area of the Abu Salim Prison where all six are being held. Libyan authorities allowed his family (four sisters and mother) to visit him within the past few days; his mother had not seen him for some time, since a prison guard insulted her and she refused to return to the prison.

¶2. (C) State of Appeal: The medics' appeal case is now pending

with the Neeaba Office (which means "prosecution"), a consultative body within the Supreme Court that reviews all the evidence for a trial and appeal, examines the case profile, and prepares a report that is presented to judges for review, Dimitrov reported. Libyan prosecutors are still protesting the acquittal of one of the Bulgarians, a doctor who is married to one of the convicted medics. According to Dimitrov, the acquitted doctor could be asked to return to prison, which could cause serious problems since he is currently living in the Bulgarian Embassy in Tripoli. (Note: The doctor remains in Tripoli because of his wife, and because Libyan authorities have refused to grant him an exit visa to leave Libya pending the outcome of the appeal. End note.)

¶3. (C) Bulgarian Embassy Reaction to Recent Libyan Public Statements: The Bulgarian government was surprised by the December 5 news reports of Libyan FM Shalgam's statement that Libya would review the death penalty for the Bulgarian medics if Bulgaria provides compensation to the victim's families, Dimitrov said. He reiterated Bulgaria's position that payment of compensation is not an option, since Bulgaria will not agree to deal directly with the families, and because it is an admission of guilt. The Bulgarians view Qadhafi son Saif al-Islam's statement in a December 9 New York Times article that "no one is going to execute anyone" as unofficial.

¶4. (C) Libyan Demands to EU: Ramadan Al Fituri, head of the association representing the families of the 426 HIV-infected children, presented settlement demands to the European Commission representatives currently visiting Libya. According to Dimitrov, the families want the Bulgarian government to build a hospital and provide compensation, medical care and full support for the children for the rest of their lives. Dimitrov says the Bulgarian government did not directly receive a copy of the letter.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #04TRIPOLI28

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	04TRIPOLI28 aka Wikileaks id #24024 ?
Subject	(C) U.S. OIL COMPANIES PERSEVERE IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 14 Dec 2004 09:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04TRIPOLI28.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 140949Z DEC 04
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0029
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000028

LONDON FOR GOLDRICH
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014
TAGS: EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: (C) U.S. OIL COMPANIES PERSEVERE IN LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 0026

¶1. (C) Oasis/Oxy Update: The oil majors were in Tripoli the week of December 6 for yet another Libyan economic conference (reftel). The former Oasis partners (Marathon, Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips) are continuing their negotiations with the NOC for re-entry into the Libyan oil market, as is Occidental. ConocoPhillips told us that they have initialed an agreement with the Libyans for re-entry to the Libyan oil market based on the arrangement they had before pulling out in 1986. Conoco characterized the agreement as "not good," but said the company views it as "dues-paying" in order to return to the Libyan market. Occidental, on the other hand, seems to be hanging tougher with the Libyans. In a November meeting in Libya, Occidental CEO Ray Irani told Libyan PM Shukri Ghanem that the agreement proposed by the Libyans would cost Occidental USD 200 million, something he could not justify to the shareholders. Occidental has offered an alternative to the Libyans; although it has received no response so far, Oxy seems willing to wait it out for a while. Marathon, like ConocoPhillips, appears more willing to pay a price for re-entry into the Libyan oil market.

¶2. (C) EPSA IV Update: Meanwhile, American and non-American oil companies are awaiting the results of the first EPSA IV bid round. Winning bids are supposed to be announced on January 19, but there are rumors that the announcement could be delayed (NFI). Tariq Hassan-Beck, director of planning for the National Oil Company (NOC), has said publicly that the NOC is already working on the round two bidding package, which could take place in the first half of 2005. "We're learning from round one," he commented; but provided no details. Shortly thereafter, Poe Legette, partner, described some of the legal problems encountered in the EPSA IV process, including the fact that contracts must be approved by the General People's Committee and overall uncertainty about which laws apply under which circumstances.

¶3. (C) Azzam Messalatti, chairman of the NOC's upstream negotiation committee, mentioned that the NOC is also working on Development and Production Sharing Agreements (DPSAs) which would be similar to the EPSAs, but focused on development rather than exploration. This is the first that we and some of the American companies have heard of this. Messalatti also briefly mentioned a Libyan "Gas Master Plan," which he said has been approved in response to an increase in demand for natural gas. The plan includes upgrading facilities and developing fields.

¶4. (C) COMMENT: The U.S. oil companies are clearly looking at Libya as a place where they expect to be doing business in the future. ConocoPhillips already has an office here; Amerada Hess, Chevron-Texaco, and Exxon-Mobil are all in the process of signing leases for office space in downtown Tripoli and are bringing in country managers for Libya. Some of the U.S. oil companies commented privately (as they have in the past) that it's not clear that the way the EPSA IV round was run will result in the best foreign partners for Libya. According to them, the process doesn't really allow for consideration of the bidder's experience and quality of technology. The only time such factors could have been considered was in the qualifying round, but given that 68 out of 120 companies qualified, some companies wonder how much weight was given to those aspects of the bidding process. Of course, the U.S. companies have a personal interest in cutting down the amount of competition, and their edge is clearly in the experience and technology they can bring to development of Libyan oil fields, not necessarily in being the ones offering the sweetest financial deal to the GOL. END COMMENT.

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #04TRIPOLI31

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	04TRIPOLI31 aka Wikileaks id #24174 ?
Subject	(C) CHIRAC VISIT TO LIBYA MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL, BUT NOT HAPPY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 16 Dec 2004 10:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2004/12/04TRIPOLI31.html
History	First published on Fri, 25 Mar 2011 01:53 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
O 161036Z DEC 04
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0037
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CARACAS IMMEDIATE
EU MEMBER STATES
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L  TRIPOLI 000031


E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/16/2014
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , FR [France; Corsica] , LY [Libya] , VE
[Venezuela]
SUBJECT: (C) CHIRAC VISIT TO LIBYA MODESTLY SUCCESSFUL, BUT NOT
HAPPY

REF: PARIS 8864

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, U.S. Liaison
Office, Tripoli, Libya.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1.    (C) Summary:  French Embassy DCM Maurice Dabdoush (please
protect) December 15 confirmed rumors circulating around Tripoli
that Jacques Chirac's November 24-25 visit to Libya was not a
happy experience.  While the French President accomplished his
most important goal - that of simply showing up here, as his UK,
Spanish, Italian, and German counterparts have done in the past
year - there were no major breakthroughs in foreign policy or
business contracts.  Libyan "game-playing", including a surprise
welcome ceremony in front of Qadhafi's bombed-out house from the
1986 raids and trying to invite Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez
along to the state dinner, irritated Chirac and cost a certain
amount of good-will, Dabdoush said.  End summary.

The Rumors
----------
```

¶2. (C) Dabdoush and newly-arrived French Ambassador to Libya both departed Libya within hours of Chirac. By then Tripoli was abuzz with rumors that the visit had gone poorly. The take of many here, including the British embassy, was that Chirac's efforts to "ingratiate" himself with the Libyans after the coolness of recent years and the ill grace with which the UTA dispute was resolved had failed. The diplomatic community and the media interpreted the fact that Chirac's welcoming ceremony was held at Qadhafi's former house in the Bab al-Azizia barracks, which suffered a direct hit in the U.S. 1986 bombing and is now a shrine to the 1986 "martyrs of imperial aggression", as a slap in the face to the U.S. by both the Libyans and French. Many were also scratching their heads over the November 24 state dinner, which the Libyans advertised as a double bill in honor of both Chirac and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, who was also in town, but which only Chirac attended.

The Irritations

¶3. (C) When we finally caught up with Dabdoush December 15, he confirmed that neither he nor his ambassador had been recalled, as some here had speculated, but instead had returned to France to recuperate from the stress of the visit. From the GOF's standpoint, the visit was a moderate success, Dabdoush said; Chirac can now say he's visited Libya, as so many of his European counterparts have done recently, and spent quality time with Qadhafi, as reported reftel. However, disorganization and constant Libyan "game-playing" with the schedule irritated Chirac and cast a pall over the visit. Notable irritations included:

-- Qadhafi gave an interview to Le Figaro the day before Chirac's arrival, in which he criticized Libyan actions in Cote d'Ivoire, infuriating Chirac.

-- On the morning of Chirac's arrival, Libyan Protocol invited diplomatic heads of mission to a state dinner in honor of both Chirac and Chavez. This was news to the Chirac's advance party, who passed it the President before his departure. Chirac categorically refused, stating that he would have a quiet dinner with the Ambassador "over a bottle of wine" in that case (note: alcohol is illegal in Libya). The Libyans disinvited Chavez, but Dabdoush told us that Chavez's security guards later got into a shoving match with some French ministers in the elevator of the Mehari Hotel, where the dinner took place.

-- Chirac had no intention of visiting the 1986 bombed-out house, according to Dabdoush. The French advance team had agreed that the welcoming ceremony would take place in the Bab al-Azizia barracks so that Qadhafi would attend, but the ceremony was supposed to happen in another part of the barracks, Dabdoush asserted, showing us the initial site scenario diagrams to illustrate his point. Chirac felt ambushed, and made his displeasure felt by his icy demeanor during the ceremony and his subsequent refusal to put an inscription in the guest book, where other heads of state, mostly African, have gone on for pages about the injustice done to the Libyans in 1986.

-- The Libyans ambushed Chirac again on November 24 by trying to get him to lay a wreath at a monument for victims of 1986; Chirac refused.

What Was Accomplished

¶4. (C) Besides actually showing up, not much, according to Dabdoush; the five cooperation agreements signed during the visit were merely window dressing, and no significant business contracts were concluded. Although Qadhafi made his now-standard plea for military sales, the GOF will respond with caution. Dabdoush predicted; while the EU arms embargo has been

caution, Dabdoush predicted; while the EU arms embargo has been lifted, certain sales are still tightly controlled under the so-called "toolbox" arrangement. France will stick to these prohibitions. Notably, the subject of Abdullah Sanoussi did not come up; Dabdoush said that the Libyans "know better now" than to press for clemency, which he believes Chirac is not inclined to give in any case. (Note: Sanousi was convicted to life in prison in abstentia for the UTA bombing; the French were enraged when Qadhafi rehabilitated him, after years spent under house arrest, and made him chief of military intelligence.) Dabdoush thought the Libyans have done a "fair" job in keeping Sanoussi out of the public eye, as they have requested.

Chirac and Qadhafi

¶5. (C) Chirac and Qadhafi do not enjoy warm relations, Dabdoush said. They first met in 1976; to Dabdoush's knowledge, the last time they saw each other was during the Five Plus Five Meeting in 2003 in Tunis, when Chirac was irritated (again) after Qadhafi fell asleep during Chirac's speech.

Comment

¶6. (C) Chirac's visit brought to mind, as so often here, a phrase that has become almost a technical term in the diplomatic corp: Libya's unmatched "wackiness factor." The Canadians are awaiting PM Martin's visit with some trepidation, especially after Saif al-Islam demanded an apology for Canada's participation in international sanctions on Libya in the 1980s and '90s. End comment.

BERRY

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI209

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	05TRIPOLI209 aka Wikileaks id #38551 ?
Subject	LIBYANS PLEASED WITH SAUDI DECISION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 15 Aug 2005 07:30 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05TRIPOLI209.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 150730Z AUG 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0355
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASH DC
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
EUCOM FWD
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000209

COMMERCE FOR DAVID ROTH, USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/10/2015
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , SA *[Saudi Arabia]*
SUBJECT: LIBYANS PLEASED WITH SAUDI DECISION

REF: RIYADH 5509

CLASSIFIED BY: GREGORY L. BERRY, CHIEF OF MISSION, U.S. LIAISON OFFICE TRIPOLI, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) August 10 COM spoke at some length with Ambassador to the UK Mohammad al-Zway and his colleagues about the Saudi decision to pardon and expel three Libyans accused of an assassination plot again then-Crown Prince Abdullah (reftel). Zway had just returned from Sirte; he flew there August 8 to talk with Qadhafi immediately after learning of the Saudi decision. At our urging and that of the British, the Libyans' official reaction on August 9 had been restrained (they refused official comment to the press, though someone on background pointed out that a pardon implied a conviction, which had not taken place -- probably on balance the best we could hope for).

¶2. (C) In the August 10 meeting, which included External Security Organizations Chief Musa Kusa, Internal Security Organizations Chief Abdullah Sanussi, MFA America's Director

Ibrahim Dridi and Qadhafi's personal interpreter Fuad Zlitni, Zway described the Saudi announcment as a positve and good step. Giving a uniquely Libyan spin to the statement, Zway said that it was positive news, even though there had never been a real problem between the two countries; "at most it was a personal misunderstanding." According to Zway, the personal matter only escalated because the Saudis withdrew their Ambassador from Tripoli. In the Libyan version of events, they did not respond to this petty action, and didn't withdraw their Ambassador from Riyadh until they were forced to do so under Saudi pressure.

¶3. (C) "Qadhafi never supported the Libyan opposition," said Zway. He believed that the Saudis have now acknowleged that truth and responded appropriately to the Libyan overtures, so that the situation will now move forward. Referring to U.S. requests for guarantees, Zway said that the Libyans are the ones who were justified in asking for guarantees. From the Libyan point of view, the Saudis are a wealthier nation with more resources at their disposal, and therefore the Saudis are obliged to take the initiative in improving relations from now on. Zway pointed out that in his analysis, the Saudi opposition is self-generated as a result of Wahabi fanaticism. Since Libya stands firmly against Wahabi extremism, it can't align with the Saudis. He also said that the Libyan opposition derives from radical Islam, implying that the Saudis were to blame for inciting trouble in Libya. Zway asked for the U.S. to intervene with the Saudis and ask them to rein in the Islamists and cut out "the root of terrorism."

¶4. (S/NF) Abdullah Sanussi urged that we specify a timeline for moving foward now that "the Saudi issue is out of the way" (in his view). He also took the opportunity to point out that the U.S. is the party responsible for the pause in progress in the bilateral relationship, since Musa Kusa is waiting for a coordinated list of intelligence questions from the Washington interagency community. (In passing, he suggested that any meeting with A/S Welch take place in Tripoli rather than Europe, since that, "would allow for higher-level participation.")

¶5. (C) Musa Kusa expressed appreciation for the efforts of the U.S. and UK, but emphasized that Libya had put forth the most effort in making the Saudi decision possible and deserved recognition for its initiative. He highlighted the three day mourning period and telegram of condolences as "extraordinary" steps (see para. 8 for text of condolences). Kusa repeated again that Libya had never had a problem with the Saudis -- any misunderstandings were created when the Saudis withdrew their Ambassador from Tripoli. Looking forward, Kusa warned that the Saudis must pay close attention to their relations with Libyans abroad at the risk of creating new difficulties that, "would involve more than three or four countries."

¶6. (C) All of the Libyans emphasized that, "the file should be closed forever; we anticipate a new chapter." In answer to this repeated point, COM agreed that the Saudi announcement should make it easier for us to find appropriate language for the assurances that the U.S. will need from Libya. That should be a topic for discussion in preparation for the next meeting between the Libyans and A/S Welch. Zway closed the meeting by reiterating Libya's common interest in working with the U.S. on counter terrorism efforts, saying, "we are working toward a common goal."

¶7. (C) COMMENT: Qadhafi's condolence message on the death of King Fahd and his dispatch of his son Saif al-Islam to represent Libya at the funeral were clearly intended as positive gestures. It is interesting, however, that the Libyan press has said nothing about Saif's role. There is a limit to how conciliatory Qadhafi is prepared to appear.

¶8. (U) NOTE. After King Fahd's death, the secretaries of the General People's Committee declared a three day mourning period and Qadhafi issued the following condolence message:

and Qadhafi issued the following condolence message:

To the family of the late Fahd Bin-Abd-al-Aziz,

We have learned with great sadness of the death of our brother King Fahd, and we would like to extend our sincere condolences and our sympathy to your fraternal family. We also pray God to forgive him and receive him with His abundant mercy. To God we belong and to Him we return.

Your brother Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi.

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI221

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	05TRIPOLI221 aka Wikileaks id #39538 ?
Subject	SENATOR LUGAR'S MEETING WITH QADHAFI AUGUST 20
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 31 Aug 2005 14:10 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/08/05TRIPOLI221.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 311410Z AUG 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0377
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000221

STATE FOR NEA/MAG,
PLEASE PASS TO SENATOR LUGAR
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2015
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]* , BU *[Bulgaria]*
SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR'S MEETING WITH QADHAFI AUGUST 20

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, COM, USLO, Tripoli.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a conversation with Senator Lugar on August 20, Colonel Qadhafi complained that Libya had not been properly recognized and rewarded for its decisions on WMD. He suggested that the most appropriate "rewards" would be defensive weapons to protect the country against the threat of emerging extremist regimes in its neighbors, and the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Qadhafi insisted that the greatest threat to the region came from religious extremism, which he regarded as inextricably linked to the Saudi regime. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C). Senator Richard Lugar, accompanied by NEA PDAS Gordon Gray, NSC Director Tim Pounds, Chief of Staff Ken Myers, Jr and professional staff members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Daniel Diller and Michael Phelan, traveled to Sirte on August 20 to meet with Libyan leader Qadhafi. USLO COM and Acting DCM escorted the delegation to Sirte. Qadhafi, swathed in an embroidered robe with a matching cap, greeted the entire delegation in his desert encampment at midday. Qadhafi's advisors said they had taken him from a day of rest and fasting to accommodate the delegation's tight schedule. Given the

intense noontime heat, Qadhafi's advisors arranged for a water truck to spray cooling mist in the immediate area in an attempt to lower the temperature. Qadhafi, initially distracted and swatting the air with his favorite prop, a branch of desert scrub brush, opened up the meeting by saying that the delegation's time in Libya was too short and the timing was difficult. Senator Lugar expressed appreciation for the Libyans' hospitality and said he hoped the countries would normalize relations. Lugar said he wanted to learn more about how to move the relationship forward. Lugar told Qadhafi that the U.S. appreciated Libya's decision to give up its WMD and noted its concern about the State Sponsors of Terrorism List. Lugar hoped that there would be more visitors to Libya, including student exchanges and scientific cooperation, particularly in the energy sector. Lugar expressed his concern about human rights, especially the Bulgarian and Palestinian medics and Fathi al-Jahmi.

¶3. (C) Qadhafi became more engaged as Senator Lugar thanked him for receiving members of Congress as part of the expanding bilateral relationship. Qadhafi replied that Libya's objective was improved relations. It was not Libya's wish for confrontation caused by a lack of communication. As a small, developing nation, Libya had no interest in hostilities with superpowers. Qadhafi made a case that the former hostility between the U.S. and Libya was perhaps due to occasional misunderstandings because of the circumstances of the Cold War and East/West blocs. He said that some parties had an interest in creating problems between the U.S. and Libya, but that now the enemies of yesterday are friends, noting, "Egypt is now a friend of the U.S., that is a big change in the region." Qadhafi also described the Palestinian/Israeli dialogue as a hopeful sign. Qadhafi said he wanted to avoid mistakes and a relapse in the relationship. "No one benefited from confrontation in the past; everyone lost." He continued, "we need to change our policies for mutual benefit."

¶4. (C) "Libya's steps are a service to world peace," said Qadhafi, as he moved deeper into his opening monologue. Qadhafi took credit for helping Bush and Blair win reelection and said Libya wanted to help the U.S. and the UK out of conviction and principle. Libya's assessment was that it didn't benefit from having a nuclear bomb, so it decided to abandon its programs. Qadhafi also claimed Libya was told it would be rewarded by Blair and Bush for its decision, but "Libya has not been rewarded." He said that Libya was urging North Korea and Iran to give up their WMD programs, but "they say Libya's experience is a bad example, and this is true." According to Qadhafi, the Libyans are disappointed that more rewards have not materialized; "the idea of shifting from military to peaceful use is made insignificant." Qadhafi said the U.S. should seriously reconsider its response.

¶5. (C) Qadhafi emphasized that Libya needs to guarantee its self protection. Libya was not asking for offensive, but rather defensive equipment in accordance with international law: "Libya has a right and a need to protect itself." He continued, "we were promised the U.S. would help, but there has been no action." The world needed to see that the peaceful uses of nuclear energy were more beneficial than military uses; it needed to see the direct impact on economic development for Libya. "We expected Japan, China, the UK and U.S. would reward Libya; we are sorry that we have been ignored; we are looking for reward from the whole world." Qadhafi reiterated that Libya took an unprecedented step to end its WMD program, a historic decision in service of world peace and security. Instead of being rewarded, Libya was attacked by the Muslim and Arab politicians and press. Libya was "called foolish for surrendering its power and advantage without any compensation," he said.

¶6. (C) Lugar responded that the U.S. worked to renew the relationship in stages; it recognized and appreciated the Libyan

relationship in stages, it recognized and appreciated the Libyan steps. Business opportunities and tourism had expanded for Libya and it was possible to cooperate on mutual defense. Lugar said, "we respect and want to enhance Libya's security; we understand your feelings and want to change the status quo to get Libya off the State Sponsors of Terrorism List." Lugar emphasized that with cooperation and a couple of key decisions, the U.S. believed removal from the list was close at hand. He also explained that when Qadhafi and Bush agreed to normalize the bilateral relationship, both the Senate and the U.S. citizens, would review President Bush's decision and Lugar hoped to hold a constructive and successful debate that would confirm the normalization. "Libya has other friends thanks to your reception of other congressmen," Lugar said. "It is an important moment for us; we want to have all the good news possible," he continued. While the friends of Libya want to advance the relationship, Lugar said, "we need help with visas for official visitors and the business community." He also pointed out the importance of prompt issuance of Libyan visas for teachers at the American school. Lugar offered "words of assurance that we are moving toward the finish line," and expressed gratitude for all the information shared by the Libyan officials who had met with the delegation.

¶7. (C) At that point of the discussion, Qadhafi decided to move into a private session with Senator Lugar and COM. In the smaller meeting, Qadhafi repeated his refrain that Libya had not been rewarded for giving up its WMD, acknowledging that some benefits had accrued, but "not what is requested; Libya is patiently waiting." He characterized student exchange, an American school and business activities in Libya as "welcome, but as good for the U.S. as for Libya." Senator Lugar asked Qadhafi what he specifically had in mind. After some byplay, Qadhafi focused on two points as appropriate "rewards." First, he wanted Libya to be able to defend itself with defensive weapons if, as he fears, extremist elements should take control in Algeria, Tunis, Egypt or Sudan (the world is "living on a volcano," with the risk of extremist explosions in many countries). Second, Qadhafi wanted to demonstrate the potential benefits of nuclear technology, as in desalination programs. He needed something to prove to the Libyan people that the world recognized the wisdom of Libya's decision on WMD.

¶8. (S) Turning then to the threat of terrorism, Qadhafi plunged into his now-familiar analysis of Wahhabism, which he sees as inextricably linked to the Saudi regime, and the dangers it poses for the region. The U.S. mistakenly has dismissed his concerns about the Saudis as nothing more than the result of a sour Libyan-Saudi bilateral relationship, Qadhafi said. In fact, his analysis has nothing to do with the personal disagreement between him and then-Crown Prince Abdullah. The fact is that, if the world wants to destroy terrorism root and branch, it must remove the base of terrorist activity and ideology by opposing Wahhabism. "A Libyan goes to the hajj and becomes indoctrinated," he said -- "thousands are being indoctrinated." The U.S. will pay a heavy price for its continued support for Saudi Arabia. The longer the present Saudi regime remains in power, the more likely it is to be replaced by religious extremists. (In passing, Qadhafi argued that a strong secular regime in Syria would continue to resist extremists inspired by Usama bin Laden, and the U.S. should adjust its policy toward Syria accordingly.) He stressed that he strongly opposed the use of force to change the regime in Saudi Arabia; instead, the U.S. should change its political position to support dedicated Saudi reformers. If we actively support "the Saudi people's right to self-determination," we would see the kingdom peacefully dissolve into its constituent provinces -- "the same thing that happened with the USSR." When Lugar asked skeptically how a moderate group would come to power if Saudi Arabia underwent a political transformation, Qadhafi insisted that it would be a natural process -- "the peoples would break off by themselves."

¶9. (C) Senator Lugar brought the conversation back to ongoing U.S.-Libyan cooperation on counterterrorism and non-proliferation, saying that we need to work together and need to be thoughtful about the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Qadhafi said that he would rely on the Senator to relay his message, but would also like to meet directly with President Bush. "Libya is still waiting," he said, for the promised benefits from its December 2003 decisions. He added that he would also like to talk with the President about Africa and "the new colonialism from the East" (i.e., growing Chinese and Indian influence in Africa). Qadhafi also suggested that Secretary Rice should visit Libya: "When she comes to the area but does not stop in Libya, people may say there's a boycott." At the close of the meeting, the Lugar delegation flew back to Tripoli and met with other senior Libyan officials (reported septel).

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI224

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	05TRIPOLI224 aka Wikileaks id #39795 ?
Subject	CELEBRATING 36 YEARS OF QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sat, 3 Sep 2005 13:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05TRIPOLI224.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

R 031317Z SEP 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0385
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
USLO TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000224

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/3/2015
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CELEBRATING 36 YEARS OF QADHAFI

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, COM, USLO, Tripoli.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A hundred thousand or more Libyans gathered on Martyrs Square in Tripoli August 31 to commemorate the 1969 revolution which brought Colonel Qadhafi to power. Qadhafi passed up the opportunity to address the multitude, but he appeared on the reviewing stand for half an hour to receive the adulation of the crowd and to study a written "declaration of loyalty from all Libyans." Apart from a cheering section supplied by the revolutionary committees, the crowd seemed mostly to have its mind elsewhere; the reaction to a spectacular fireworks display in particular was astonishingly tepid. Generally, outside observers saw in the event what they expected to see; to take one example, an Arab Ambassador who is disdainful of Qadhafi and all his works claimed that the crowd's indifference was a measure of the regime's isolation. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The government did whatever was necessary to get tens of thousands of supporters into the center of Tripoli for Revolution Day celebrations on August 31. Reportedly, government officials in the outlying areas of Libya were told to be in Tripoli for the celebration or risk losing their jobs. We heard rumors that each "shabbiat" (district) official was

ordered to be at the cermony along with a minimum of two other attendees. Universities and other institutions sent busloads of participants. USLO LES staff relayed rumors that the government would hand out 200 dinars to everyone in Green Square the afternoon of August 31. Transportation was a special challenge; there were many reports of security officers arbitrarily commandeering private vans and busses in the larger national interest. In the end, the regime got what it needed -- a large enough crowd to look impressive on television, but not so large as to overwhelm the carefully choreographed program. To judge from the result, officials had more trouble lining up the groups that were to parade in front of the reviewing stand; some of the noisier groups circulated through two or three times in a great circle to fill out the three-hour event.

¶3. (C) The centerpiece of the celebration was a spectacular fireworks display produced by a French company. (In a typically Libyan moment, the French coordinator of the show was visited by Libyan security on the morning of the event and told that the fireworks had been canceled because explosives were too dangerous. That edict was later reversed, and the show went ahead as planned.) Interestingly, while Western observers went to some lengths to find places to see the show, the Libyan crowd was largely indifferent. Many Libyans ignored the bright lights altogether, turning their backs on the display and chatting with friends. Cameramen from state television, who spent most of the evening broadcasting pictures of smiling children and solemn tribesmen, had trouble finding suitable shots during the fireworks. One young woman in particular was shown holding her ears and staring about in confusion when the explosions were at their loudest.

¶4. (C) Qadhafi appeared for about half an hour near the end of the event. When his face popped up on the video screens around the square, the security cordons dissolved, giving the impression that the tightly packed crowd was surging forward to be close to the leader. The cameras eventually zoomed in on Qadhafi, showing him studying a short document entitled "Pledge of Loyalty from the Libyan People" and containing what appeared to be a few pages of signatures. (One sardonic soul noted that, given the size of the document, there must be about a million signatures per page.) To the surprise of everyone, Qadhafi said nothing at all to the crowd; he was smiling and apparently relaxed, but gave the impression of someone who had done it all many, many times before.

COMMENT

¶5. (C) Outsiders generally saw what they expected to see. The Egyptian Ambassador -- bored, cranky, and no admirer of the regime in any event -- claimed the indifference of the crowd to the parade and spectacle was a sign of how feeble and out of touch the regime had become. Asked by a slightly startled colleague whether he was predicting that the regime was tottering, the Egyptian spread his hands wide and said, "Why knows? Something like this can glide for a long time before it crashes."

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI243

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	05TRIPOLI243 aka Wikileaks id #41474 ?
Subject	LIBYA SENDS OFFICIAL DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD TO EXPAND TIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 27 Sep 2005 14:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/09/05TRIPOLI243.html
Referenced by	05BAGHDAD4096
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 271452Z SEP 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0408
INFO AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY AMMAN
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000243

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/27/2015
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , IZ *[Iraq]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SENDS OFFICIAL DELEGATION TO BAGHDAD TO EXPAND TIES

REF: State 163365

CLASSIFIED BY: ETHAN GOLDRICH, CHARGE, U.S. LIAISON OFFICE TRIPOLI, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

(C) USLO COM met previously with Qadhafi advisors in advance of the Cairo Foreign Minister's Conference to urge that Libya send senior officials to Iraq. During a meeting on September 27, Qadhafi Senior Advisor Abdulati Obeidi told Charge that a Libyan delegation had just completed a visit to Baghdad to explore upgrading diplomatic ties. The purpose of the trip was also to offer condolences after the death of Shia pilgrims in the bridge stampede. Obeidi said that the Libyan delegation agreed to establish a consular relationship at this time. There is no specific timeline for sending an Ambassador to Baghdad, but they anticipate the relationship will continue to expand in other areas. Obeidi mentioned that Talabani and other senior Iraqi officials had visited Libya in the past. He also said that Qadhafi met with the Iraqi "ex-president" in Algeria (Note: we think he meant Allawi at the Arab summit). Libya wants to engage with the Iraqis and encourage them to end Sunni/Shia discord that the Libyans view as detrimental to Iraqi stability and the broader regional situation.

BERRY

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI285

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	05TRIPOLI285 aka Wikileaks id #46367 ?
Subject	GUANTANOMO DETAINEES: LIBYANS PROVIDE DIPNOTE RESPONSE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 30 Nov 2005 07:38 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/11/05TRIPOLI285.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

O R 300738Z NOV 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0465
INFO USLO TRIPOLI

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000285

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2015
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KAWC *[Atrocities and War Crimes]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GUANTANOMO DETAINEES: LIBYANS PROVIDE DIPNOTE RESPONSE

REF: A) TRIPOLI 623 B) STATE 194752

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan A. Goldrich, Deputy Principal Officer, USLO Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) We received a draft MOU in response to reftel dip note regarding the proposed transfer of Libyan national, Abdul Rauf Omar Mohammed Abu Al Qusin,also known as Abu Abdul Rauf Zalita to the exclusive custody and control of the Government of Libya, under circumstances satisfactorily confirmed in an exchange of diplomatic notes between the USG and Libyan government that will ensure he will not pose a continuing threat to the USG or the GOL. The MOU was provided in Arabic and the text of the USLO translation is in para 5.

¶2. (C) The draft MOU addresses USG concerns that the individual be treated humanely and in accordance with the laws and international obligations of Libya. It also addresses the issue of providing confirmation that the GOL is abiding by its commitments by referencing a "Watchdog Committee."

¶3. (C) However, it does not provide any of the other written guarantees the USG has requested. The draft MOU lacks any written guarantee that Libya will take necessary steps to ensure that the individual does not engage in or facilitate terrorist activity and thus continue to pose a threat to the international community, Libya and the United States. Neither does the draft MOU include any written guarantee that the USG would continue to

have access to the individual or any intelligence obtained during investigation, prosecution or surveillance of the individual. The Preamble to the draft MOU states that the guarantees are provided in the context of the global war on terrorism and intelligence exchanges, but this falls short of the written guarantees requested by the USG.

¶4. (S) On several occasions since November 14, we have asked the Libyan MFA (GPFLIC) to explain the deletion of language from the draft we provided on October 27. They eventually told us that COM may receive an explanation in an as yet unscheduled meeting with the head of the External Security Organization (ESO). We will report any further explanation we receive.

¶5. (C) Begin text of unofficial USLO translation of MOU and attached Note Verbale:

The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
The General People's Republic
For Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation
Note Verbale

The General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (General Office for the Americas) presents its compliments to the USLO in the Great Jamahiriya:

And has the honor to enclose herewith a draft Memorandum of Understanding between the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in the Great Jamahiriya and the US Department of State as regards with the assurances provided relating to the transferred people.

The General Office for the Americas requests from the esteemed USLO to relay the draft to the relevant entities in the US to examine and express their views thereof.

The General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (General Office for the Americas) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed USLO its highest considerations.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)

To: USLO
Tripoli: November 14, 2005

Draft Memorandum of Understanding
Between the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
And
The US Department of State
As regards the assurances provided relating to the transferred people.

Preamble:

Within the framework of combating terrorism, exchanging of security information between the Specialized Security Entities in both countries, and promoting the international efforts in the field of Global War waged by the world to put an end to

terrorism and terrorists wherever they are, and whatever their nationalities or their origins, and facilitating the process of exchange and handing over of individuals indicated in terrorist crimes or suspected of engaging in such crimes,

Both parties have agreed to the following:

Article One

Definitions:
1-Forwarding country: is the country which has a terrorist individual or suspect of having relations to terrorist actions, not of its nationals holding its citizenship, and who it wishes to deport outside its territories.

2-Receiving country: is the country which accepts to receive the deported individual - whether he/she holds its citizenship or not, or it is his/her place of residence - or any other national from another country both parties agreed to deport and receive.

3-Assurances: are the rights and commitments requested by the deporting country (forwarding country) from the receiving country for the benefit of the (deportee) as of treatment, accommodation, investigation, trials, arrest, imprisonment, enforcement of prison sentences, and the compliance with the human rights principles and so forth of rights that respect the humanity of the individual.

4-Requests: are the requirements presented by the forwarding country through its Department of State to the receiving country via its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, or what is covered through the diplomatic channels as usual in relation to the subject matter of this memorandum, and the written response from the receiving country to the forwarding country as regards the receipt of the (deportee) as soon as possible.

5-The Watchdog Committee: a group of people having qualifications in law, psychology and social fields of specialization to be chosen equally from both countries.

Article Two:
If the deported individual has been previously tried, indicted and sentenced in absentia by the receiving country, his/her judgment in absentia will be nullified as soon as he/she is deported and arrives at its territories. And procedures of his/her retrial is to be resumed.

Article Three:
The receiving country guarantees, within reach of its national laws, not to execute the capital punishment, if it was pronounced in a final verdict against the deportee.

Article Four:
When one of the entities (organs) of the receiving countries arrests the deportee, or commits him/her to jail, this will be done according to laws in vigor, and in locations where healthy conditions, and proper food are provided, and his/her treatment will be suitable and humane, in line with the international customary rules.

Article Five:
When one of the state organs arrests the deportee in the receiving country, he/she will be immediately notified as of the reason of his/her arrest, and the charges leveled against him/her. The arrested person shall have the right to contact his/her attorney immediately.

Article Six:
Any one of the State security organs that undertakes the arrest of the deportee, shall undertake to refer him/her to the specialized office of the attorney general within the limited period stipulated by the law.

Article Seven:
There shall be no constraints or obstacles for the deported person to use his/her right, in the receiving country, to contact the Watchdog Committee.

Article Eight:
The deportee shall have the right, in the receiving country, to practice his/her own religious rituals whether in confinement or

outside.

Article Nine:
Should the deportee be indicted in the receiving country with any criminal charges, he/she will be tried in front of the specialized courts and to provide him/her with all the necessary assurances (fair trial, public hearings, and an attorney to plead for him/her in case he/she does not have his/her own chosen attorney, and to allow him to prepare his/her challenges, to call his/her own witnesses, as well as to be informed about the contents of all the case files. And he/she shall have the right to appeal the verdicts and to repeal them up to the level of the Supreme Court).

Article Ten:
In the receiving country, verdicts in any criminal cases are pronounced against the deportee in public. Audience and media can be kept away from part or all of the court proceedings, and to prevent them from attendance, in observation of the public order, the public etiquette, and the national security.

Article Eleven:
Both countries shall have the right to withdraw from the present Memorandum, and in the time to be agreed upon when signing the provisions of this document. However, all the rights and assurances given to the deportee in the receiving country shall remain in vigor.

Article Twelve:
The present document is drafted into two copies having the same binding legal effect one in Arabic, the other in English, and both copies shall be signed by the entrusted people.

End Text.

BERRY

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI290

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	05TRIPOLI290 aka Wikileaks id #46505 ?
Subject	THE NORTH AFRICAN BRIGADE OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY FORCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 1 Dec 2005 11:12 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05TRIPOLI290.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
O 011112Z DEC 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0474
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000290

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2015
TAGS: MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EG *[Egypt]* , AG *[Algeria]* , MO *[Morocco]* , TS *[Tunisia]* , WI *[Western Sahara]* , CA *[Canada]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THE NORTH AFRICAN BRIGADE OF THE AFRICAN UNION PEACE AND SECURITY FORCE

CLASSIFIED BY: Greg Berry, Principal Officer, USLO Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) According to press reports, army chiefs of staff from Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and "the Western Sahara Republic," announced November 17 the creation of a joint military force. We obtained additional information about the agreement in November 29 meetings with the Egyptian Embassy and the visiting Canadian regional defense attache.

¶2. (S) The Canadian was well informed. He told us an agreement was indeed signed in Tripoli to create a North African Brigade for the African Union Peace and Security Council. Under the agreement, the Brigade would consist of two Algerian battalions, an Egyptian battalion, a Libyan battalion, an Egyptian headquarters element, and a Western Sahara reconnaissance unit (which in actuality would be run by the Algerians). Logistical bases may be located in Egypt and Algeria. The Brigade is supposed to be stood up by 2010, but both the Canadian, and the Egyptians were skeptical it will ever see the light of day. The Egyptians commented that they were in no hurry to move things forward, but confirmed that the HQ would be Egyptian.

Goldrich
BERRY

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI332

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	05TRIPOLI332 aka Wikileaks id #48552 ?
Subject	UNHCR OPERATIONS STRUGGLING IN LIBYA; BUT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 23 Dec 2005 13:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/12/05TRIPOLI332.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI506
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
R 231305Z DEC 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0524
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION COLLECTIVE
USMISSION GENEVA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY ATHENS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000332

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2015
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: UNHCR OPERATIONS STRUGGLING IN LIBYA; BUT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT FUTURE

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, Acting Principal Officer, USLO Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) During a series of meetings over the last three months, the Tripoli-based UNHCR representative, Mohamed Hantosh Alwash, has conveyed information about local operations and ongoing negotiations with the Libyan government to sign a Memorandum of Understanding. UNHCR's primary interlocutor in the Libyan government is Ramadan Irhiam, the Director of International Organizations at the People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA). During the last three years, UNHCR has tried without success to negotiate parameters for its local operation. Currently the Libyan government does not officially recognize the office; it will not accept note verbale or other communications from UNHCR and forces the operation to function as a subset of the UNDP office, contrary to the UN organization chart.

¶2. (C) Alwash believes the Libyans have not been able to

determine any benefit to having a UNHCR operation in the country. His goal is to use his contacts and local experience (Alwash worked at this UNHCR office in the 1980s and helped with the repatriation of Egyptians) to convince Libyans the UN exit strategies and voluntary repatriation solutions will solve its problem with a "revolving door" for sub-Saharan African economic migrants and other refugees. Alwash plans to give his MFA interlocutor, Irhiam, a draft paper outlining refugee problems faced by Libya, along with proposed solutions.

¶3. (U) UNHCR experiences visa problems similar to those of USLO and other missions. Alwash has one assigned staff member who has been waiting over seven months for permission to enter Libya. With his current roster of six employees (one stateless person, one Iraqi, one Sudanese, and three Eritrians), Alwash says he cannot begin to fulfill his portfolio of responsibilities for repatriation, protection and resettlement of refugees. He also said that UNHCR had been trying for over a year to send auditing teams to survey the local office's accounting, but the temporary duty travelers had not been granted visas. Alwash also said UNHCR tried to send a communications expert to set up computer operations, but the Libyans also denied a visa to the information specialist. The office, given the lack of cooperation from Libyan authorities, does not have much in terms of funding or other resources.

¶4. (U) An estimated 30,000 Palestinian refugees live in Libya according to Alwash. He said they don't have a "protection" problem. The Palestinians have trouble finding employment and housing or registering newborn children. Most of the Palestinians carry Jordanian, Syrian, Lebanese or Egyptian documentation that is difficult if not impossible to renew. The documentation is criticial to the refugees ability to find work, especially now that Libya institutes regular "sweeps" to deport illegal laborers. UNHCR concentrates its efforts on helping refugees work with local consulates to get new identity papers.

¶5. (U) Alwash said Libya's principal challenge was illegal immigrants, especially sub-Saharan Africans. His contacts reported that 590 illegal immigrants traveled from Libya to Malta during September, and great numbers also travel to Italy and other Mediterrean countries. The September figure is considered representative of an average monthly immigration flow. When Alwash has the cooperation of the Libyan authorities, he hopes to make arrangements for USCIS to visit and assess the refugee population. He thought that 2007 was the most likely time for a first USCIS trip to Libya. In the meantime, Alwash has said he might ask for USG assistance with one particular resettlement case. (Comment: We expect that any USCIS visit here would be preceded by a visit from the Regional Refugee Coordinator. End Comment)

¶6. (U) While it could takes months to finalize an MOU, Alwash is currently focusing on coordination with local "NGOs". The term is in quotes because the Libyan NGOs all report to the Jamarhiryah government bureaucracy at some level. Alwash utilizes the Al-Wahfa Society to implement some part of the UNHCR care and maintenance program for refugees. He is also trying to form a partnership with the Al-Qadhafi Foundation for Charitable Activiites (under the direction of Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam) and the Watasimo Foundation (under the direction of Qadhafi's daughter, Aisha). Alwash is also coordinating to some degree with the World Islamic Call Society (WICS), which he described as "generally helpful." Under the sponsorship of one of these organizations, Alwash plans to hold a conference on refugee issues during the second half of 2006.

¶7. (C) December 18, Alwash told USLO that he was optimistic about the future. Based on recent conversations with Libyan officials, Alwash doesn't think an MOU will be signed anytime soon, but he does get a sense that there is a general

"reconsidering" of their point of view.

¶8. (C) Biographic Note: Mohamed Hantosh Alwash, a Canadian citizen of Iraqi origin, in his forties, represents the UNHCR in Tripoli. He previously served in Tripoli during the 1980s, as well as in Geneva, Beirut and Amman. During his previous assignment in Tripoli, he worked on the repatriation issues dealing with Palestinians and Egyptians. He has two children enrolled in a French-language local school.

BERRY

NNNN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI4

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	05TRIPOLI4 aka Wikileaks id #25120 ?
Subject	LIBYA ON LINE POISED FOR GROWTH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 9 Jan 2005 09:32 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/01/05TRIPOLI4.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

O 090932Z JAN 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0062
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
USLO TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000004

STATE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR DAVID ROTH
USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/8/2015
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ON LINE POISED FOR GROWTH

REF: TRIPOLI 00036

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief Of Mission, USLO, Tripoli
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Director and Founder of Libya On Line (LOL), Moawiya Maghur, describes the genesis and fast growth of Libya's most weighty Internet portal, and estimates that more than 20 per cent of Libyans under the age of 35 access the Internet on a regular basis. LOL offers a range of products, from technical consulting and product design to online marketing and assistance with trade shows. LOL's sponsors include Coca Cola and British Airways, drawn by circulation figures that surpass those of local newspapers, and reach a more affluent audience. End Summary.

20% of Libyan Youth Are Connected

¶2. (C) Econoff met 1/6 with LOL's director, Moawiya Maghur, son of former Libyan Foreign Minister Kamal Maghur, at the Tripoli offices of Libya On-Line. Maghur's premises serve as combined company headquarters and Internet cafi, which LOL uses as a

marketing tool for its various services, including software development, networking, web hosting and domain name registration. Maghur says LOL, which employs 15 men and women (the majority of whom are young, female, and by Tripolitanian standards, extremely liberally-dressed), has registered 2000 domain names in 2004, and is currently hosting 600 sites. LOL employs two individuals whose job it is to read and provide English language translations of Libyan press and television programs. With regard to the Libyan cyber market as a whole, Maghur estimated that 5% of the total population uses the Internet, but that the figure was considerably higher, perhaps 20-25% among those under 35, and those living in Tripoli. "We even get a lot of older people, in their mid to late sixties, coming in here and chatting or video-conferencing with their children and grandchildren abroad," Maghur said. "Of course," he continued, "the Internet offers a way of livening up one's social life a bit. As was the case in Jordan in the early 90's, for example, many young people here use the Internet as a means to get to know each other without having to be seen in public." In addition to its Gargaresh location, LOL operates a cyber cafi at Tripoli International Airport. Maghur says that business is good, particularly in the area of networking services. LOL has run into some problems marketing, the same issues that plague most high-profile businesses in Tripoli: "We bought a 3000 LD (about 2500 USD) sign for the front, and they came and took it down. They said the sign needed to be in Arabic."

Libya On-Line: Libya's Principal Portal
---------- --

¶3. (C) The showpiece of LOL is its eponymous Internet portal, Libya On Line, which Maghur's brother started on a shoestring budget in Ottawa, Canada, as a means of introducing people in North America to Libya and its culture. Libya On-Line contains an impressive set of information on Libyan tourist sites, government institutions, and private businesses, as well as a "Yellow Pages" directory of 2000 contacts. Maghur says he originally worked with Libyan Chamber of Commerce to develop the directory, but that the Chamber was so difficult to work with that he pulled out of the agreement after a year, at a financial loss: "We entered into an agreement with them to organize a trade expo; we printed CDs and brochures for them, and even managed part of the event-then during the show, one of their employees came by and started screaming, demanding to know why we were stealing their name." Maghur expects to expand the directory using a database of business names collected from a friend at the Tripoli land registry, which keeps the names of most new Libyan businesses. LOL is sponsored by Coca Cola, Puma, British Airways, Afriqiya, and Libtra Tours, a member of the Hosni Bey Group (refcable). LOL gets about 45,000 hits a month, compared with 33,000 a month three years ago.

The Genesis of Libyan e-Commerce:

¶4. (C) While others scoff at the idea that there are any "e-businesses" in Libya, Majhur says it is no joke, that LOL, through its Canada parent Visions, has helped create e-commerce capabilities for a number of local firms and artists, using Canada-based payment systems. Maghur gave as case in point a website for a singer (Maghur wouldn't give us the name, but a reliable source indicates it is likely Sheb Jilani, the "most self-important" of rising Libyan musical talent), who wanted to sell his CDs direct to the international market. "We sold about 500 of these, and he came back to us a bit later and said he's worth a hundred times as many. We gave him back the CDs, and he tried to do it himself. Within a month, there were pirated copies of the CD all over Tripoli (one has to wonder if LOL had anything to do with this)." Maghur works with Libyan graphic artists to put their work on line, and is in the process of organizing a competition for Libyan singers, replete with internet voting and prizes. LOL also manages trade events, through affiliates. LOL will launch a sister site, "Tijara" (trade), in three months, focusing on providing useful information for foreign businesses, including Arabic

information for foreign businesses, including Arabic translations of foreign press (the portal is bilingual, Arabic-English).

¶5. (C) Comment: Moawiya Maghur is among perhaps a half-dozen private businessmen we have met whose projects and business sense have impressed us as "out of the ordinary". Some of the others include Buraq Air's CEO Mohammed Bubeida, Mohammed Gherwash, head of Winzrik Tours, and Hosni Bey, of the Hosni Bey Group (refcable). All of these individuals are foreign-educated. The personalities appear to be such that they would succeed in even a significantly more competitive market. End Comment.

--Cairo Please Post to Site--

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #05TRIPOLI51

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	05TRIPOLI51 aka Wikileaks id #27883 ?
Subject	(U) LIBYA - FIFTH ANNUAL TIP REPORT SUBMISSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Mar 2005 16:43 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2005/03/05TRIPOLI51.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

P R 011643Z MAR 05
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0138
INFO USLO TRIPOLI

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000051

STATE FOR NEA/MAG SBUTLER; NEA/MAG AWELLS; G/TIP FASSEFA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: (U) LIBYA - FIFTH ANNUAL TIP REPORT SUBMISSION

REF: STATE 273089

¶1. (U) The U.S. Government resumed direct bilateral relations with Libya on June 28, 2004, after a 24-year gap, following Libya's decision to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction programs and Missile Control Technology Regime-class missiles.

¶2. (U) Libya remains among the countries considered special cases because although press, media, and NGO reports indicate a significant human trafficking problem within its territory, the USG has not been able to verify these reports directly because of its long absence from Tripoli. During the reporting period, Libya engaged with affected countries, particularly in Europe, to combat illegal migration, smuggling and human trafficking. Until this reporting period, the Libyan Government had denied it had any problem with immigration and trafficking in persons.

¶3. (U) There are an estimated 1.5 million non-Libyans resident in Libya, most from North African and Sub-Saharan African nations. This intricately mixed migrant community makes identification of the various groups and the circumstances under which they arrived in Libya difficult. According to most reports, Libya is a transit country for men, women, and children from Africa and Asia who hope eventually to migrate illegally to Europe. A large number of Africans arrive via the arduous journey through the Sahara across Libya's porous borders with Chad, Niger, Sudan, and Egypt, although many reportedly die in the desert before reaching Libya. Libya's porous 1100-mile (1,770 km) coastline is a route also used by traffickers in

North African countries. Those attempting to reach Europe through Libya are exploited by smugglers who promise employment in Libya so that they can earn the $800-$1,000 per person fee to cross the Mediterranean. However, some may be forced to work as prostitutes, laborers, and beggars to pay the debt to traffickers because jobs are not readily available.

¶4. (U) African, Libyan and European smugglers reportedly operate much like an organized crime syndicate using deception to entice would-be migrants from their country of origin. Hundreds are reported to have perished in the waters of the Mediterranean when their boats, supplied by smugglers, capsized or when they were left afloat in boats that were in poor condition. In 2004, there were reports of thousands of Africans arriving into Italy each month by boat.

Government Action

¶5. (U) Due to lack of information, the extent of the Libyan Government's efforts to fight trafficking is not clear, but it has begun joint and active collaborations with other affected countries, particularly Italy, indicating that Libya recognizes it has a problem and is making an effort to fight human trafficking. In June 2004, the Libyan Government organized a conference of regional governments that are facing similar problems. In October, the Government invited the International Organization for Migration to Tripoli to discuss migration management. The Government considers all foreigners to be economic migrants and does not stipulate whether they are refugees, asylum seekers or trafficked persons.

¶6. (U) In February 2004, the Libyan Government extradited a major Eritrean human trafficker to Italy, after the Italian Government issued a warrant for her arrest. In 2004, the Nigerian police handed over 20 of its nationals to Nigerian anti-trafficking authorities for further investigations and prosecution. The victims were on their way to Libya via the Niger Republic.

Areas for Improvement

¶7. (U) The Government of Libya, given the extensive trafficking within its territory, should conduct research to determine the extent of the problem and continue cooperating with neighboring countries. It should work with source and destination countries on anti-trafficking efforts by sharing information as well as tracking and evaluating its anti-trafficking efforts. Libya should similarly combine forces with the International Organization for Migration and NGOs active in the fight against human trafficking.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI197

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	06TRIPOLI197 aka Wikileaks id #63416 ?
Subject	QADHAFI SONS SQUABBLE OVER COCA COLA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 May 2006 08:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06TRIPOLI197.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

R 100836Z MAY 06
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0826
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USLO TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000197

STATE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
USTR FOR DOUG BELL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2016
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI SONS SQUABBLE OVER COCA COLA

REF: Tripoli 53

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, USLO , Tripoli. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A lengthy standoff between the franchise-holder for Coca Cola-Libya, Ka'Mur Bottling Company-U.K., and two of Mu'ammar Qadhafi's sons, Mu'tassim and Mohammed, appears to have stabilized in the wake of a compromise agreement. The problem became public on December 28, 2005 as security troops controlled by Colonel Qadhafi's son Mu'tassim encamped at the Tripoli Coca-Cola plant, owned jointly by Ka'Mur Bottling Company and the Libyan Olympic Committee (LOC) through their joint venture, the Global Beverage Company (GBC). With the plant shut for more than three months, Colonel Qadhafi's daughter Aisha may have intervened to broker a compromise, according to which LOC would--at an unspecified future date--sell its shares in GBC to the Libyan Social Security Fund. Mu'tassim's men left the plant in late February, shortly after USLO sent a strongly-worded diplomatic note to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressing concern over the legality of the plant shutdown and urging a swift resolution to the conflict. Coca Cola's General Manager for Libya credits USLO support for helping keep the incident under control as Ka'Mur, GBC and Coca

Cola worked their own channels. End Summary.

Long-standing Qadhafi Family Interests Background to Conflict
---

¶2. (C) In the late 1990's, Coca Cola distributed its product in Libya under the supervision of the Office of Foreign Asset Control through Al Fursan, a Libyan distributor. At the time, Al Fursan bought product from Coca Cola's plant in Tunisia on consignment and distributed through channels in Tripoli and Benghazi. Mu'tassim may or may not have been directly involved in linking Al Fursan with Coca Cola through Ka'Mur. What seems more likely is that Ka'Mur attempted to build Al Fursan into a partner while the U.S. embargo was still in effect, then severed the relationship when Al Fursan demanded a greater piece of the action, including rights to the franchise. Ka'Mur (whose name is a mixture of "Kawther" and "Murina", two embargo-era Libyan soft drinks) then created the joint-venture between Ka'Mur and LOC, GBC. According to Husni Bey, Chairman of the Husni Bey Group (HBG), Mu'tassim was indeed responsible for bringing Ka'Mur into Libya. (Note: HBG is the agent for U.S. consumer products manufacturer Procter & Gamble). Bey believes Mu'tassim shut the plant down as revenge for Mohammed's "takeover" of Ka'Mur while he (Mu'tassim) was in Egypt, exiled for his role in an act of "insubordination" against his father in the late 1990's.

¶3. (C) Immediately after the formation of GBC, Al Fursan filed suit against Ka'Mur and Coca Cola for breach of contract, and sent correspondence to Coca Cola International claiming that Ka'Mur had stolen the franchise from them. Ka'Mur then filed a counter-suit with the Libyan Court of Appeals, which it won. Al Fursan demanded damages for lost business as well as restitution of the franchise; the company apparently lost on both counts. Ka'Mur claims it prepared a counter claim for more than the amount demanded by Al Fursan, for materials it says Al-Fursan bought from them prior to the rupture but never settled. Both Bey and Azza Maghur, Ka'Mur's attorney in the counter-suit against Al Fursan and the sister of a close associate of Mohammed Qadhafi, say it is likely that Al Fursan made the initial overture to Mu'tassim after legal efforts against Ka'Mur failed. Both claim Al Fursan's lawyer, Ibrahim Legwell, fabricated allegations against Ka'Mur and inaccurately described the situation and possible consequences Mu'tassim (Note: Maghur showed Econoff documents supporting this claim. As an aside, Legwell and Reema 'Ali, his U.S.-based partner, have been aggressive in courting U.S. corporate clients, even as they denounce U.S. companies as "tools of imperialism").

Threats, Clashes and Interventions

¶4. (C) Abdul Galil Besher, Chairman of the Board of the Coca Cola Bottling Company of Egypt and a member of Ka'Mur's board, requested a meeting with COM on January 19 to discuss an "issue" related to the Tripoli bottling plant. Besher indicated that on December 28, two weeks after the plant began production, "two military cars carrying armed personnel without clear identification illegally broke into the facility, asked the employees to leave the premises and shut down the plant." Kamal Shahata, a member of Ka'Mur's Managing Committee, told USLO during a follow-on meeting two weeks later that during altercations with Mu'tassim's forces, one expatriate worker was slightly injured and some plant materials were destroyed. Early in the crisis, armed men allowed plant managers to enter the premises singly or in pairs, but then barred Ka'Mur and Coca Cola employees completely. In the following weeks, various individuals described by Shahata as "freelancers" attempted to extort shareholdings and/or cash in return for a resolution of the conflict. On February 7, anonymous callers threatened three key Coca Cola employees, all Jordanian nationals, with

key Coca Cola employees, all Jordanian nationals, with "political problems" and direct bodily harm. Shehata indicated that Ka'Mur immediately filed complaints with the Shaabiyya (municipality) of Tripoli, the local police station as well as the equivalent of the District Attorney. Shehata and Besher complained that at no time did any Libyan authority offer a legal justification for the plant's shutdown. Shehata and Besher filed for "personal protection" with the Tripoli police and on February 8 visited Mohammed Qadhafi. They report Mohammed Qadhafi declined to get involved personally, yet encouraged Ka'Mur to do "everything within its power to resolve the matter according to Libyan law." Shehata returned to Tripoli the first week of February to meet with Rajab Shiglabu, Chairman of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB), under whose authority Ka'Mur began operation in Libya. On February 9, Besher and Shehata requested USLO's assistance in taking Ka'Mur's case to higher-level authorities, stressing the implications for other current and prospective U.S. investors. He insisted the company would accept nothing less than a full and satisfactory legal settlement of the matter, as anything short would expose the company to further risks.

Rumors of Deal Brokering to Resolve Squabble

¶5. (C) On February 20, Econoff received a text message from Kamal Shehata, then abroad, saying that the Libyan authorities had given GBC the green light to re-start production. When Econoff met again with Shehata on February 24, he confirmed that the bottling plant re-opened and was operating at half-capacity. Shehata said that the restart followed a dramatic incident in which men loyal to Mu'tassim abducted and assaulted one of Mohammed Qadhafi's in-laws to "send a signal to The Engineer (Mohammed)." The incident allegedly took place at Mohammed's Gargaresh residence on the night of February 15. According to Shehata, Mu'tassim's associates arrived to Mohammed's residence and began shouting for him to come out. Receiving no response, they left in search of one of Mohammed's cousins, whom they stowed in the trunk of one of their cars and brought back to the residence. According to Shehata, one of Mohammed's associates, overhearing Mu'tassim raging earlier in the evening, called Ali Mehanna, the founder of Ka'Mur and one of GBC's board members, to urge him to "leave the city (Tripoli), immediately" as Mu'tassim's men were coming for him. "Because they could not find Ali (Mehanna), Mu'tassim's men grabbed Mohammed's cousin instead," said Shehata. Rumors circulated through the business community in the days following the alleged assault that Aisha Qadhafi had brokered a deal between the brothers, obligating Mohammed to sell LOC's shares in GBC, in return for Mu'tassim's leaving Ka'Mur and LBC alone. Shehata denies that Aisha was involved, instead crediting Mohammed with the decision to sell LOC's shares in GBC to the Social Security Fund as a means of lessening tensions with his brother. Shehata, who spoke with Econoff in hushed voice in the lobby of the Corinthia Hotel, said that although he had heard "stories" about doing business in Libya, he "never imagined" that what transpired was still possible here. "You know the movie, The Godfather? We've been living it for the last few months." On March 20, a mid-level manager at the Tripoli plant told Econ/Comm Assistant that Mu'tassim the night before assaulted one of Mohammed Qadhafi's cousins (on his Mother's side), a member of LOC, in an incident that he claimed is directly related to the plant closure. This individual, who spoke on condition of anonymity, said at that time the issue over Coca Cola remained "very much alive." On March 19, a mid-Level (Libyan) manager at the plant told the Econ/Comm Assistant that Mu'tassim had assaulted another of Mohammed Qadhafi's cousins, and that the "compromise" threatened to unravel.

Coca Cola Plant Operating at Capacity Since Mid-April

¶6. (C) Since mid-April, the Coca Cola plant is operating at pre-shutdown capacity. In a March 22 meeting, GBC's General Manager, Azem Yousef, looking visibly under stress, said that despite recent positive developments, he was "not optimistic" about a long-term solution to the dispute. He said the next milestone would be the transfer of shares from LOC to SSF, "hopefully this summer." At the moment, it is unclear who the losers and winners are in the so-called truce: Mohammed is to divest the shares of LOC, Ka'Mur apparently is being forced to accept a greater ownership stake in the company by the U.S. parent and Mu'tassim seems to have gotten nothing (which may be the source of his ongoing discontent). Coca Cola volunteered to participate as a sponsor of several USLO events in the recent Tripoli International Fair, held April 2-12. Yousef told Econoff that the only hope for a lasting solution rests with successful transfer of shares from LOC to SSF, perhaps in June. He added that as far as he was concerned, "Libya is not a place worth doing business." Shahata told Econoff in February that if Ka'Mur had known how much trouble Libya would be, the company would have never entered the market.

Advocacy Efforts on behalf of Coca Cola

¶7. (C) While unlawful seizure and shutdown of a foreign commercial enterprise in Libya is a violation of 1997 Law No. 5 for Foreign Investment, USLO was obliged to take into consideration when responding to Ka'Mur's original complaints the fact that Ka'Mur is not a U.S. entity. To protect the broad interests of a brand representing several million USD in annual sales to a U.S.-based company, USLO met Rajab Shiglabu, Chairman of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB) February 20 and asked that the matter be resolved. Shiglabu offered assurances that the case would be mediated through the Libyan justice system and that any dispute would end soon. USLO also met with Under Secretary of the General People's Committe for Economy and Trade on March 16 and was told that "the matter should not concern the U.S.; the Libyan government will determine who should hold the licenses." Two days before the plant re-opened, USLO sent a strongly-worded diplomatic note expressing serious concern over the plant closure and noting the growing risk of severe damage to U.S. investor confidence in Libya. Yousef, in his March 22 meeting with Econoff, said he was "very grateful" for USLO assistance, indicated that the diplomatic note likely did have a positive effect, and did not think that USLO could push further at this time.

¶8. (C) Comment: The Coca Cola incident is a case study in the involvement of Qadhafi family members directly influencing the flow, pace and nature of economic activity. Family members squabble over personal financial interests with little regard to the possible impact on foreign investors or international public opinion. In this incident, LFIB proved ineffective in enforcing provisions of the 1996 investment law it is charged to implement. Given the number of people who knew of some aspect of this dispute and the plant closure, it is also noteworthy that the news was kept out of the press, other than for a brief mention in the on-line, "dissident" internet website Libya Al-Yowm. All parties involved -- including the foreign companies -- had an interest in keeping things quiet as long as there seemed a possibility of a near-term solution. The Coca Cola squabble is typical of the power struggles likely to continue as the Qadhafi children and other regime elite continue to define (or re-define) their respective spheres of commercial influence (see Septel). The lesson learned for future USG advocacy is that pressure has to be applied to a variety of different entities, given the diffuse nature of the Libyan Jamahiriya ("state of the masses"), and it may be difficult to access information given a cultural bias towards resolving conflict through personal intervention. End Comment.

conflict through personal intervention. End comment.

BERRY

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI198

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	06TRIPOLI198 aka Wikileaks id #63423 ?
Subject	QADHAFI INCORPORATED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 May 2006 09:26 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/05/06TRIPOLI198.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI170 , 08TRIPOLI642
History	First published on Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30 UTC (original) Removed on Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:47 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Mon, 20 Dec 2010 07:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
R 100926Z MAY 06
FM USLO TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0829
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY ROME
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
USLO TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T  TRIPOLI 000198


DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/26/2016
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , PGOV
[Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI INCORPORATED

REF: TRIPOLI 33, 53

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1.    (C)  SUMMARY. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against
government corruption, but the politically-connected elite has
direct access to lucrative business deals.   This commercial
access can easily be cut off when individuals fall out of favor.
The Qadhafi family and other Jamahiriya political favorites
profit from being able to manipulate the multi-layered and
regularly shifting dynamics of governance mechanisms in Libya.
They have strong interests in the oil and gas sector,
telecommunications,  infrastructure development, hotels, media
distribution, and consumer goods distribution.  The financial
interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present both
opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya.  Any
reform is likely to be cyclical over the long-term.   END SUMMARY
```

Saif's Call For Freedom of the Press Equals Net Profit

¶2. (C) As with many other regimes, politically-connected members of the Libyan elite have direct access to lucrative business contracts. Qadhafi often speaks out publicly against government corruption and sometimes dismisses officials who are caught in gross improprieties. In some cases, it appears that falling out of favor politically can trigger the discovery of improprieties in business dealings that might not otherwise come to public attention. As reported reftel, Saif al-Islam's One-Nine group will reportedly start marketing foreign publications in Libya in the near future. The Qadhafi Foundation, Saif's quasi-NGO, is hailing the move as an example of freedom and reform in the Jamahiriya. At the same time, it is another example of how the Qadhafi family and other Jamahiriya political favorites profit from being able to manipulate the multi-layered and regularly shifting dynamics of governance mechanisms in Libya. The Qadhafi family will clearly accrue significant financial gains from having exclusive rights to distribute foreign press in Libya, as well as effective censorship over any troubling articles that might appear. The One-Nine group gets it name from the September 1, 1969 anniversary of the Muammar Qadhafi-led military coup that overthrew King Idris.

Oil and Gas Revenues Channeled to Qadhafis and Political Elite
---

¶3. (S) All of the Qadhafi children and favorites are supposed to have income streams from the National Oil Company and oil services subsidiaries. Saif is involved in oil services through One-Nine Petroleum and other Qadhafi family members and associates are believed to have large financial stakes in the Libyan Tamoil oil marketing company based in Europe and Oil Invest. AbdelMagid al-Mansuri, the former "director" of One-Nine Petroleum, was responsible for the ill-executed "U.S.-Libya Economic Forum" held at the Corinthia Hotel December 2004. The Forum was viewed as a blatant attempt to tie up lucrative percentage deals for Libyan elites looking for representative relationships with U.S. companies. During 2004, the internet-based publication Libya al-Yown distributed information tracing a large number of sweetheart deals to One-Nine's Oil and Gas division, as well as unnamed oil service companies in Scotland, home to a well-connected Libyan expatriate community. It is believed that millions of dollars are distributed to politically connected Libyans and Libyan expatriates via the oil services companies. Econoff met with al-Mansuri, who was publicly chastised by Saif during the December 2004 conference, in February 2006 and the former "director" was looking for new employment after the bungled deal making.

Aisha Competes with Saif on Charitable Activities and Broad Commercial Interests
---

¶4. (C) Dr. Aisha Muammar Al-Qadhafi, General Secretary of the Wa'atassemo Charity Society, is patron of the December 4-7, 2006 Infrastructure Libya: The International Exhibition and Forum for Libya's Infrastructure and Economic Development implemented by the UK conference organizer Montgomery and Associates. Also listed as cooperating organizations are the General People's Committee for Planning, the General Board of Infrastructure and Urban Development, and the Inspector General of Housing and Utilities. At the same time, there will be a U.S.-Libya Oil, Gas and Energy Exhibition and Forum at the same International Fairgrounds, also under Wa'atassemo sponsorship, and coordinated by U.S. company Nathan and Associates. Until recently, Aisha

has been in the public eye based on charitable activities, sponsoring human rightsseminars and the situation in Iraq (with a distinct focus on the negative effects of the presence of U.S. and foreign troops), signing up for the international advisory board for Saddam Hussein's defense strategy, and promoting social welfare for women and children. She now appears to be branching out into areas that will give her more direct connections with the energy and construction sectors, especially since the government has announced that housing development will the major focus of the 2006 budget distributions. Nasser Nageh, a member of the Libyan Business Council and a Wa'atassemo event coordinator (also formerly an active member of a Revolutionary Committee) said that Aisha was actively looking to branch out into other areas, perhaps because of her recent marriage to a Qadhaf al-Dam with additional business interests. Aisha is also reported to have financial interests in the private St. James Clinic of Tripoli, one of the two most trustworthy medical facilities that supplement the unreliable health care available through public facilities. In addition to health care management and referrals to hospitals to Malta and elsewhere in Europe, the clinic has an extensive aesthetic surgery practice.

Competition Between Siblings led to Takeover of Coca Cola Plant
---

¶5. (C) The recent controversy over the Coca Cola plant in Tripoli also highlighted Qadhafi family involvement in commercial enterprise. While three different sons Saadi, Mohammed and Mutassim, were all rumored to be fighting at different points over who had the right to the representative license, the dispute was supposedly argued before the courts and resolved through mediation. The very twisted tale of the Coke franchise, reported in Tripoli 53, continues to confound the local business and diplomatic community attempts to ascertain exactly what interests are in play. One well-connected consumer goods distributor said that Qadhafi's son Mutassim was involved in setting-up the Coca-Cola franchise held by the Egyptian Ka'Mur group during the late 1990s. Some rumor that Mutassim was linked with a coup attempt around 2001 and informally exiled to Europe and Egypt, only allowed to return to Tripoli for short trips to visit his mother. Supposedly, Mutassim lost control of many of his personal Libyan business interests during the period of 2001 to 2005 when his brothers took advantage of his absence to put in place their own partnerships. Mutassim was recently spotted by Pol/Econ Chief arriving on a British Air flight at Tripoli International Airport, greeted by a small group of well wishers and protocol assistants with bouquets of flowers, then whisked off to the VIP arrivals lounge and into his vehicles without passing through customs or immigration. Qadhafi son Mohammed heads the Libyan Olympic Committee that now owns 40% of the Libyan Beverage Company, currently the Libyan joint venture Coca-Cola franchisee. The British Ambassador to Libya reported his sources attributed the resolution to a deal whereby Mohammed Al-Qadhafi was prevailed upon to relinquish his/Libyan Olympic Committee's share of the joint venture and sign it over to the Libyan Pensions Fund. Another Ambassador chimed in that he heard it was sister Aisha Al-Qadhafi who mediated the dispute between the two brothers and got Mohammed out of the soda business. If Libyan government officials are asked about the Coca Cola case, the standard response is that the government was making sure that all the proper licenses and registrations were in place.

Telecommunications Controlled by Mohammed

¶6. (S) Mohammed, who has plenty to keep him busy through his control of the General Post and Telecommunications Committee,

has major input over any telecomm or internet service. Frequent USLO requests over the last two years to meet with the GPTC have been ignored by the Libyan government, even requests for meetings with senior U.S. officials and Congressional delegations. Several U.S. companies are actively pursuing contracts to provide a much-needed upgrade to the local telecommunications network, but the Libyan government rejects any trade promotion activities for telecom through official government channels. Based on Colonel Qadhafi's experience overthrowing King Idris and the recognized importance of controlling radio broadcasts in 1969, and the role of mobile phone networking during the 2006 Benghazi riots, the family would definitely want to preserve its strong control over the telecom sector.

New City Planned by Saadi

¶7. (S) Saadi is also branching out into infrastructure development. His functionaries contacted USLO public affairs section for publications in Arabic language on economic and commercial issues. Saadi's staff then notified USLO that he planned to establish "a new city in the west of the country, in the area between Zwara and the Libyan-Tunisian border. The new city will be under the management and supervision of the Engineer al-Saadi al-Qadhafi." As Saadi's staffers frame the interest, "he wants information on how the U.S. can help with this matter." That general area of coastline has an island that has been slated for tourist development in the last couple years without any subsequent action, perhaps because a large oil processing facility mars the view from the island, and also because outside investors can not get liquor licenses for hotels populated by foreign tourists. The Qadhafi family is already in the tourism business through the large percentage of ownership in the Bab Africa Corinthia Hotel. Local business contacts claim the Qadhafi joint partnership with the Maltese Corinthia Group was the linchpin in acquiring prime real estate for the hotel venture. Saadi also keeps busy with his soccer teams, the Olympic Committee and his miltary career, as noted in the Coke dispute, sometimes using troops under his control to impact business deals.

Consumer Goods Distribution Controlled by Few Family Holding Groups
---

¶8. (C) Food distribution is also reportedly controlled by only four or five politically-connected families. There are no large western-style food markets in Libya. There is small western-style market in Tripoli and some smaller shops in the city that carry more imported items, but most of the neighborhood shops go to the distribution warehouses controlled by the people with strong government ties. The consumer products distribution are largely controlled by three merchants, including the Husni Bey Group, a diversified holding company that runs a range of operations under the direction of Husni Bey's children. Bey does not characterize his company as politically well-connected, but has learned to expand operations through key alliances and he knows how to work the system to his benefit. More importantly, he knows how to recover when his businesses get caught up in the financial interests of the more connected political elite. The Akida Group, run by the Akak family, is rumored to have close ties to the ruling regime and it runs a virtual monopoly over air conditioning equipment, heating units, and small appliances as the local LG agent.

¶9. (C) The government attempts during the 80s to instigate large socialist-style department stores failed; the shells of the state enterprises sit empty around Tripoli and other Libyan cities. (At least one is rumored to soon be rehabilitated as a modern shopping mall for privately owned stores.) Starting in

modern shopping mall for privately owned stores.) Starting in the mid 90s, people were once again allowed to open small businesses. During Eid holidays, Libyan families buy new clothing to wear during the celebration and treat children to toys and sweets from small stores. The men tend to wear traditional embroidered wool robes produced locally or in Egypt or Syria, while women may indulge in new fashions imported from European or Asian manufacturers. During the January 2006 Eid, local women complained that the clothing variety available in the local shops was limited. Rumors circulating in Tripoli claimed that Qadhafi's second wife, as well as his daughter Aisha, own or have financial interests in many of the new clothing stores opened in the post-sanctions era. The rumors also say that Qadhafi's wife told the customs authorities to release only the shipments consigned to her stores. The other clothing stores did not get their shipments cleared from customs until after the holiday shopping spree had ended. Most of the garments in local stores are imported from China, Malaysia and India. Small boutiques have a limited supply of expensive goods imported from Europe, and these enterprises in particular seem to have the financial backing of people with strong ties to the ruling elite.

Qadhafi Incorporated Lifestyle

¶10. (C) Qadhafi himself keeps a low profile in Tripoli. The Bab al-Azizia compound has facilities for banquets and other public events, but it is not lavish in any way compared with the ostentation of the Gulf oil state families or Hariri clan. Qadhafi's wife travels by chartered jet in Libya, with a motorcade of Mercedes waiting to pick her up at the airport and take her to the destination, but her movements are limited and discrete. She hosted a banquet for diplomatic women in the Bab al-Azizia compound on the occasion of the al-Fatah (Revolution) holiday in September that was festive but not extravagant. Since the family keeps a tight control on the media and most of the Qadhafi children spending excesses take place outside Libya, there is not much public reaction to the coffers of Qadhafi Inc. Compared to egregious pillaging of State coffers elsewhere in Africa, or the lavish spending of Gulf Arabs, the Libyans don't see much to complain about in their leader's lifestyle, as long as he does a good job of making sure other people get a piece of the pie. And when Libyans do complain, they are removed from access to financial rewards.

Comment

¶11. (S) The financial interests of Qadhafi and his key allies present opportunites and challenges for reform efforts in Libya. At a minimum, it seems safe to say that reform will have its ups and downs over the long-term, as individual, regime and national interests come into play. If and when foreign publications do become available in Libya, there will be a financial gain for Saif. At the same time, the family will still have control over monitoring what information is released to the public. Over the long term, demand for more outside information would inevitably create pressure for open access and more press freedom. Similarly, Libya has a stated commitment to moving forward with WTO accession and joining international financial organizations. But it is doing so on its own timetable, a slow timetable. Reported septel, the General People's Congress just passed in April 2006 new agency and representation rules that run counter to WTO principles. While the General General People's Committee for Economy and Trade has working groups actively revising legislation to prepare for WTO accession, it will take some time to reconcile all the different structures of the Jamahiriya government (translation: "State of the Masses"). Libyan government officials have been telling P/E Chief for 10 months that the WTO accession will be presented

in Geneva "in a few weeks, that only the translation has to be finished." Institutional development is very primitive and the Libyans have a cultural and social preference for elements of distributive economy, placing great value on financial rewards that flow from affiliation with regime leadership, security services etc. There was a shipment of BMWs delivered to the government in early 2006, for example, and it seems likely that the young men driving them around town got the vehicles "distributed" through their affilation with different government entities. With regard to reform partnership efforts, there are the greatest opportunities to promote positive change by engaging in the Central Bank's efforts to establish banking controls and standards, partnering with the General People's Committee for Manpower and Training on civil service reform, and cooperating with the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade in its WTO accession efforts.

BERRY
GOLDRICH

Media

- WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family’s Exploits - NYTimes.com
- WikiLeaks cables: Muammar Gaddafi – mercurial, phobic 'King of Culture' | World news | The Guardian
- Qaddafi's Son Is Bisexual and Other Things the New York Times Doesn't Want You to Know
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI358

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI358 aka Wikileaks id #72249 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PROSPECTS FOR BANKING PRIVITIZATION - TOUGH ROAD AHEAD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 23 Jul 2006 08:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI358.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

Libyan market under the current restrictions," was the assessment of the bank officer manager. Banks in Libya are simply custodians of salary payments; they are not able to fulfill most of the banking services. For example, a bank earns only 1.75% per annum on funds placed at the Central Bank. The interest doesn't even cover the expense of bank operations given the bloated employment rolls.
He estimated that more than 8000 families relied on salary payments from the commercial banks. In the case of Sahara Bank, it might currently have 3000 employees, but if run efficiently by professional managers, could operate with fewer than 1000 staff members. Queried about the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Finance (Finance Minister) position that foreign bank participation had to be delayed unless there were assurances the branches in remote locations of Libya would remain open, the banker responded, "what is the point of keeping those branches open when no services are offered? People would be better off buying gold that might appreciate in value since they earn so little interest on deposits. Money might as well be stuffed under the mattress." Regarding the sale of the Sahara Bank underway for a year, he said that at 10 dinars per share, the price was overstated and not a good value.

BANKING SUPERVISION LAGS IN PRACTICE

¶3. (C) Asked about anti-money laundering efforts in Libya, he said that banks were required to submit regular reports to their head offices, which in turn reported to the Central Bank. The weak link in the chain was implementation by poorly trained and poorly paid staff. While the international community has been developing standards and procedures, Libya has been trapped in the past and required total regeneration. He estimated the banking sector is at least 30 years behind. In his view, the effectiveness of attempts to freeze suspect accounts would always be hampered by innate problems with names, spellings and birthdates in the Arabic speaking world. He also believed that, despite the new AML law, there were still not enough safeguards in the system. He noted the ease of evading a blocking order through slight variations in the names on an account or through tip-offs from bank staff. Many bank personnel were very uncomfortable with the idea of reporting on clients.

¶4. (C) In terms of informal money exchange, he said that the gold souk was the best form of hawala and also the most accurate predictor of exchange rate levels. People used the gold merchants to transfer money out of Libya for both legitimate and illegitimate transactions. In general, Libyans prefer to "avoid the eyes of the government" and make informal payments whenever possible. He stressed the importance of not attracting attention to oneself - inevitably someone else decides they deserve a cut of the action or can set up a competing enterprise.

CONTRADICTORY, COMPLICATED POLICIES

¶5. (C) The Libyan government tried last year to inject more liquidity into the economy by reducing the interest rate on money banks deposited at the Central Bank to 1.75%. The Government hoped that the lower rates would force banks to offer more attractive financing to private businesses and thereby encourage private sector development. However, at the same time, the Central Bank required that private businesses pledge collateral worth 125% of the loan's face value in order to secure a loan. The collateral rule is extremely difficult for

most borrowers to meet. As an example, he cited a company that had acquired land worth $2 million dinars and imported millions of dinars worth of equipment, but the Libyan banks refused to provide any loans to expand and develop the business because of the 125 percent collateral rule, combined with many other regulatory burdens.

¶6. (C) In his estimation, Libyans don't take risk because they don't trust the government. There have been too many cases of favoritism in business deals and government rulings. He said, "the Bedouin mentality is still very strong. The tribal system predominates. Family ties and connections are a primary consideration in every decision. Deep seated priorities are

consideration in every decision. Deep seated priorities are access to water and livestock survival - there are parallels to modern business decisions." In addition, there is a deep seated distrust of the government and the reform effort. People know that the reform effort is being "managed" by Saif al-Islam and don't think that it will bring any real benefit to the public. They want assurances that their government salaries and subsidized goods and services will continue indefinitely. They have a tremendous sense of entitlement and deep seated belief that the government owes them a regular salary for minimal work. He also described that he sees as deep-seated resentment towards Libya's neighbors, especially Egypt and Tunisia. Libyans were forced to travel during sanctions and had bad experiences with border crossings, customs formalities. They felt disrespect from their neighbors and humiliation. There was particular resentment of smuggling rings that profited from Libya's isolation.

CREATIVE CASH TRANSFER BY LAUNCHING SUBSIDIZED TRACTORS

¶7. (C) In terms of smuggling, though, the Libyans seem equally creative at finding ways to get items across borders. At one point, the Libyan government was attempting to encourage agricultural production by giving subsidized tractors to farmers. The resourceful farmers made deals with smuggling rings on the other side of the border to take possession of the tractors in return for cash payments. In order to make the exchange without going through customs controls, the farmers would take the subsidized tractors with a full tank of subsidized petrol to a remote field, rig the machine so it would continue for miles in a straight line, and then launch the unmanned equipment in the direction of the border. The conspirators on the other side would eventually recover the tractor somewhere in Tunisia or Egypt and deliver cash back later. In the unlikely event a roving border patrol encountered the unmanned tractor, everyone involved had some degree of deniability: "I lost my tractor."

HOPE IS ON THE HORIZON
---

8. (C) A McKinsey employee stopped by the Embassy to inform us that they have been hired by an individual, "who can not be named," to prepare a comprehensive strategy for implementing bank privatization in Libya. McKinsey planned to spend a week interviewing all the Libyan bank officials, both state and private, then return to Tripoli in several weeks for a second round of meetings after the initial assessment. McKinsey's mandate is to come up with a plan that can get foreign banks into Libya in the near term, while at the same time formulating a plan for dealing with the state banks and their unwieldy payrolls of public employees as well as their nonperforming loans.

¶9. (C) Embassy Comment. It is just another example of the "state of the masses" that the Jamahiriya is not able to reach consensus within its many committee structures to move forward with a banking privatization plan on its own, or even to reach consensus to hire experts to make recommendations. Similar to the National Economic Strategy funded by Saif al-Islam, launched with great acclaim, but still without any activity associated with it, the challenge will be getting the McKinsey bank privatization plans actually implemented.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI360

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI360 aka Wikileaks id #72391 ?
Subject	VOLUNTARY VISITOR PROGRAM TO INCREASE LIBYAN TRAINING CAPACITY IN THE WATER SECTOR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 24 Jul 2006 18:49 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI360.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:32:33 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00360

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: PA
    INFO:   POL ECON DCM AMB MGT IPS

DISSEMINATION: PA
CHARGE: ICAS

VZCZCCRO017
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0360/01 2051849
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 241849Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1028
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0009
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0376
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0495
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1155
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000360

SIPDIS

FOR ECA/PE/V/F/E; NEA/MAG WJORDAN, JGAVIT; NEA/REA CLAWSON;
NEA/PPD AFERNANDEZ, RSMITH

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OEXC [Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations] , SCUL [Cultural Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: VOLUNTARY VISITOR PROGRAM TO INCREASE LIBYAN TRAINING
CAPACITY IN THE WATER SECTOR

¶1.       SUMMARY: PAs tripoli requests a two-week voluntary
visitor study tour with escort interpreter(s) in the U.S. for a
```

small group of decision makers in Libya's water sector to introduce them to a range of U.S. government, ACADEMIC and professional water institutions and organizations.

¶2. BACKGROUND/justification: The Government of Libya has identified water management as one of its key strategic priorities. In October 2004, the U.S. and UK organized a water management and desalination workshop under the auspices of the Scientist Engagement program. That workshop culminated in the development of cooperative projects to help Libya improve its capacity in seawater desalination, impaired water treatment, groundwater management, and analytical water chemistry. In July 2005, Libyan Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training, and Employment Matug Mohamed Matug expressed interest in expanding U.S.-Libya cooperation in the water sector. In response, USG officials held additional detailed discussions with Libyan water officials and experts and developed a joint water action plan that will guide U.S.-Libya water cooperation over the next 18 months. While Libya has a core cadre of competent water experts, those experts have worked under relatively isolated conditions over the last two decades and need updated training in current water science and engineering techniques and applications. This program is designed to introduce a small group (8-10 participants) of decision makers in Libya's water sector to a range of U.S. government, academic, and professional water institutions and organizations that would help inform the development of a Libyan national water training needs assessment and the establishment of Libyan training institutions in the water sector. The program also will help expand our bilateral relationship with Libya by promoting further U.S.-Libya cooperation.

¶3. Overview: Our vision for the program is a two week study tour that will demonstrate how the United States trains its professional corps of water experts. Within the U.S., water training is carried out by federal, state, and local government agencies; public and private universities; and professional associations. The Libyan participants will meet with representatives from these groups. The U.S. institutions will explain and discuss their short-, medium-, and long-term training needs; and how they determine and meet those needs.

¶4. Participants: The group should include Libyan decision makers and technical experts from government agencies involved in water training, an academic water expert, and an expert from a professional water association, if one exists. We will draw of the following agencies and institutions:

General People's Committee for Manpower, Training, and Employment

National Bureau of Research and Development

General Water Authority

Renewable Energy and Water Desalination Research Center

Great Man Made River Authority

General Environment Authority

Agriculture Authority

Planning Committee

Al Fatah University

¶5. Schedule: Notionally, the schedule would include stops in Washington DC, Chicago, Denver, and northern California (probably the Sacramento area), starting on a Monday as follows:

Days 1, 2, and AM of 3 - Meetings in DC

Department of State

Department of the Interior

Geological Survey

Bureau of Reclamation

Department of Agriculture

Foreign Agriculture Service
Agricultural Research Service

Army Corps of Engineers

Water Research Institute

Environmental Protection Agency

American Society of Civil Engineers

Water Environment Federation

PM of Day 3 - Fly to Chicago

Days 4 and 5 - In Chicago

Argonne National Laboratory Integrated Water Management Group

Purdue University-Calumet Water Institute

Metropolitan Water and Reclamation District of Chicago

Environmental Protection Agency

Days 6 and 7 - Weekend - Fly to Denver

Days 8 and 9 - In Denver

Geological Survey Training Center

Bureau of Reclamation

Colorado State University

American Water Works Association

AM of Day 10 - Fly to California

PM of Day 10, and Days 11 and 12 - In California

California Dept of Water Resources

University of California at Davis

Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Day 13 and 14 - Weekend - Fly to DC for onward trip to Libya

¶6. Biodata of participants will be sent septels.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

(Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI361

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI361 aka Wikileaks id #72489 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ECONOMY AND TRADE OFFICIALS REVIEW BILATERAL COOPERATION WITH COMMERCE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAMPSON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 25 Jul 2006 12:23 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI361.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:32:16 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00361

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO244
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0361/01 2061223
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251223Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1030
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0011
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0378
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1157
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000361

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPR, T, G, OES,

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/25/2016
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade] , ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] , EINT [Economic and Commercial Internet] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ECONOMY AND TRADE OFFICIALS REVIEW BILATERAL
COOPERATION WITH COMMERCE DEPUTY SECRETARY SAMPSON
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Greg Berry, Charge d'Affaires, USLO, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: Greg Berry, CDA, EMBASSY TRIPOLI, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (B) (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On July 11, 2006, Deputy Secretary of Commerce David Sampson, accompanied by DCM met with Taher Sarkez, the Under Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade (Economics Ministry). Looking forward, Sarkez hoped that more U.S. companies would register in Libya, especially in the healthcare and infrastructure development fields. Overall, Libya requested more training and technical assistance. Referring to his own fondly-remembered travel experiences in the U.S., he called for more exchange visits and increased tourism on both sides, especially professional and educational exchanges. His staff also shared information about the new commercial agency law and company registration process. END SUMMARY.

LIBYA'S REFORM PLANS

¶2. (U) Under Secretary for the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade (Economics Ministry), Taher Sarkez, welcomed Deputy Secretary of Commerce David Sampson to Libya and presented a broad overview of Libya's economic strategy. He said the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade (GPCET) had pursued improved relations between our two countries for a long time and now hoped to stress trade opportunities. He said Libya was trying to develop its private sector and attract foreign investment, adding that a free trade zone was announced this year, the stock market was in the planning stages and an export board was operational. He claimed that Libya was in the final stages of preparing a memorandum requesting WTO membership. Looking forward, he hoped that more U.S. companies would register in Libya, especially in the healthcare and infrastructure development fields. Overall, Libya requested more training and technical assistance. Referring to his own fondly-remembered travel experiences in the U.S., he called for more exchange visits and increased tourism on both sides, especially professional and educational exchanges.

U.S. CALLS FOR OPENNESS AND TRANSPARENCY

¶3. (C) Deputy Secretary Sampson said he would focus on demonstrable activities resulting from the meetings. He thanked Libya for its strategic, significant steps and hoped that his visit would lead to expanded prosperity for both countries. Noting the Libyan aim to diversify beyond the oil sector, Deputy Secretary Sampson called for more commercial and legal

SIPDIS
transparency in the Libyan system that would be conducive to attracting investment and expanding opportunity. He described small business expansion as the engine of growth for the U.S. economy and advised the Libyans that business incubators and government contracting access for small business were important programs. He called for resolution of any difficulties with visa issuances on both sides to help open new markets.

¶4. (C) Since the free flow of trade and investment is critical to economic development, Deputy Secretary Sampson offered cooperation on Libya's planned WTO accession and noted that export controls would gradually be eased. At the same time, he urged Libya to remove any prohibitive boycott language from

contracts. He also announced that export licenses were granted for Boeing aircraft purchased by Buraq Air, and that he hoped to see more purchases of U.S. aircraft by Libya in the future.

¶5. (U) The head of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board, Rajab Shigbalu, reviewed some of the many agreements Libya signed with other countries. Referring to the proposed OPIC agreement pending since last year, he said any proposed agreements offer reciprocal treatment to both parties. Pointing out that the OPIC draft did not offer any protection for Libyan funds in the U.S., he did not offer any indication that the proposal might move forward.

¶6. (U) A representative of the Libyan Export Promotion Board, established one month ago, struck a positive note saying, "our first call was from a businessman exporting to the U.S." Emphasizing that Libya needed to export more than oil to gain hard currency he said, "Libya suffers from Dutch Disease," and that he sought contact with the U.S. Department of Commerce to plan joint events or sign a cooperative memorandum. He also requested training and technical assistance. Deputy Secretary Sampson advised that the U.S. National Export Strategy might serve as a helpful template for new Board's efforts.

¶7. (U) Encouraging more U.S. businesses to open in Libya, the commercial registration manager said that all citizens could start companies, as opposed to former practices that limited fields of activity. Mr. Daouki said that 620 foreign companies were registered in Libya specializing in construction, oil, communications, and medical services. He claimed that registration files could be processed in ten days. In addition, he said the new commercial agencies law, for which implementing regulations are being determined by the General People's Congress, was meant to expand opportunity. Giving more detail, he said 60 percent of the companies could be owned by the "founders" while 40 percent of the company had to be open to public participation. The goal was to broaden participation by all Libyans in commercial activities since there was a perception that some people with special connections dominated the import market in the past. "Companies requiring significant capital to build showrooms, warehouses, workshops, and equipment must provide a way for all Libyans to invest in the enterprises," said Daouki. Libya doesn't want individuals to import expensive equipment without ensuring the associated agency can provide support and maintenance over the long-term. In the GPCET analysis, company registrations were low because people didn't have the capital required. It is trying to put in place legislative mechanisms and regulations to distribute work and opportunity equally. Daouki noted that there was a "grace period" until August 17 for existing agents to legalize their operations under the new regulations. "During the sanctions period," Daouki said, "non-Libyans, especially Egyptians, Tunisians, and Maltese exercised agency control and this is now prohibited under Libyan law."

¶8. (U) Deputy Secretary Sampson agreed to return to the GPCET on July 13 for an informal question and answer session with the Libyan press to expand on plans for future cooperation. He also invited Under Secretary Sarkez for a reciprocal visit at the Department of Commerce in the U.S.

¶9. (U) The U.S. meeting participants included:

Dr. David Sampson, Deputy Secretary of the Department of Commerce
Ms. Aimee Strudwick, Chief of Staff to the Deputy Secretary of Commerce
Ethan Goldrich, DCM
Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief

The Libyan Participants included:

Taher Sarkez, Under Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade
Milaud Daouki, Manager of Commercial Registration

Mohammed Hassan Ayyab, Americas Desk Officer at the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison
Rajab Shiglabu, Secretary of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board
Ali Asawi, General Director of the Export Promotion Board
Faraj al Masdur, Chief of Financial Administration
Jumaa al-Humaa, Head of the Foreign Trade Department
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI363

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI363 aka Wikileaks id #72624 ?
Subject	LIBYAN REACTION TO ONGOING VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST CAREFULLY MANAGED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Jul 2006 10:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI363.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:31:55 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00363

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   DCM DAO CONS AMB AID RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS
            ECON DEA

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO721
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0363/01 2071038
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 261038Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1033
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0094
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1160
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000363

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/24/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN REACTION TO ONGOING VIOLENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
CAREFULLY MANAGED

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United
States Embassy Tripoli, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary and Comment: Libyans with whom we are in contact have no sympathy for Hizballah, but are angry about the ongoing Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Gaza. After initially discouraging public demonstrations, the government has allowed a few carefully orchestrated and tightly controlled events to take place. Libyan public statements have been muted and aimed more at criticizing fellow Arab states than anyone else. Comment: In this opaque society, the wishes and anxieties of the majority of Libyans are often difficult to gauge. However, Libyans seldom miss an opportunity under any circumstances to express their opposition to U.S. policy on Israel and the Palestinians. Under the present dramatic circumstances in the region -- to judge from what we are told by Libyan officials, businesspeople, students and others -- that opposition is fueling intense popular anger and frustration, which does not have much meaningful political outlet. Libyan officials tell us they are paying a price in domestic and international public opinion for the relatively low profile they are maintaining during the Israeli operation. They hope we have taken note that they are avoiding undue criticism of the U.S. during the crisis. End Summary and Comment.

¶2. (C) Libyans we've encountered have little sympathy for Hizballah, whom they blame for creating a problem that has distracted world attention from Gaza, but they are angry at the cost in lives and property of the Israeli operation in Lebanon. Satellite dishes are ubiquitous in Libya and the images of dead and wounded tend to be far more vivid than what appears on western television. The Libyan government is carefully managing local reaction. The Government prevented demonstrations July 14, instead channeling people's energy into mosque prayers and sermons. A small demonstration was held at the Palestinian Embassy July 16. On Friday July 21 the conflict was again discussed in the Friday sermons and the government carefully orchestrated protests in Tripoli, Sebha and Garian as a controlled outlet.

¶3. (C) Embassy locally-employed staff in the vicinity of Tripoli's Green Square reported that Friday, July 21st, 2006, by 1425 hours, shortly after lunch time Friday prayer, the Qadhafi Foundation for Development's "Oppressed on Earth Society" organized a demonstration zone supplied with one fire brigade truck, four ambulance vehicles, six towing vehicles and numerous other ISO vehicles and personnel. In addition, a helicopter hovered over the area for the duration of the demonstration, along with heavy presence of Public Security troops outside UN facilities, the Embassies of Palestine and Lebanon and near the Peoples Congress Building at Liberty Square.

¶4. (C) Initially about 450 demonstrators gathered from the nearby Mosques in Green Square, known before the Qadhafi-led revolution as "Martys Square." After 1430 hours, more demonstrators arrived by bus from cities and villages ithi a 120mile r
ius of Tripoli. Each busload of demonstrators had preprinted signs designating what Peoples Committee they represented. The demonstrators were also supplied with Libyan, Lebanese and Palestinian flags. There were also preprinted signs, "please give blood," and "stop war in Lebanon and Palestine." By 1445 approximately 1500 to 2000 demonstrators were in Green Square, half estimated to be young, between 15 to 24 years old and the other half in their 30s and 40s. About 10 percent of the demonstrators were young girls, from 16 to 20 years old. At 1505 the demonstrators start moving to local UN offices, at 1520 they arrived at UN facility where they stayed until 1605 and then departed by bus.

¶5. (C) The official Jamahiriya News Agency reported that demonstrations were also organized in Gharian and Sebha. According to the government-run news website, "the demonstrators

According to the government run news website, "the demonstrators expressed in their slogans their condemnation and denunciation of the international community ignorance with its international institutions of the crimes perpetrated daily against children, women, and elderly in Palestine and Lebanon. They called on the lively force, people's activists, civil society and student and youth organizations to move using all means in defense of the Lebanese and Palestinian people and use pressure to stop the Israeli aggression." (Embassy Comment: Given the government-organized demonstrations in Benghazi that got out of control with tragic results in February, it does not appear that any protests were allowed in Benghazi last week. End Comment.)

¶6. (U) In addition, the Social People's Leadership in Great Jamahiriya issued a statement that "the worsening conditions of the current Arab state created by the Official Arab Regimes make the Arab Rulers bury their faces in dust in order not to see the anniversary of this revolution that passes at this bad times in the history of the Arabs." It continued, "what is going on in Lebanon, Iraq and Palestine is clear proof that the Arabs are under slow death while Arab Rulers sit on Ruins." (Embassy Comment: This is yet another jibe at the Saudis and other Gulf Arab rulers. End Comment.)

¶7. (U) The Libyan local press also highlighted that Palestinian president Mahmud Abbas phoned "the leader of the revolution" Friday night July 20 to "express gratitude to the leader for supporting the Palestinian people and their legitimate rights and for the support of the Libyan people to their Palestinian brothers."

¶8. (C) Libyan officials tell us they are paying a price in domestic and international public opinion for the relatively low profile they are maintaining during the Israeli operation. They hope we have taken note that they are avoiding undue criticism of the U.S. during the crisis.

¶9. (U) Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam, head of the Qadhafi International Charitable Foundation, also issued a public statement, "It is with great agony and concern that I followed the dramatic sad events going on in Lebanon and the cruelty of the Israeli aggression on both the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples amid international and Arab disgraceful abandonment." The additional text of the statement follows:

TEXT OF SAIF AL-ISLAM STATEMENT

On the occasion of the rumors relating to the calls to convene an Arab summit on the issue, we would like to tell the Arab leaders to dismiss the idea of convening such a summit and to save face, since their summit in case it convened will not be of any good, and will not be able to stop the tears, the blood, or the destruction going on in Lebanon and Palestine, and we think that the alternative to verbal support is to call for the following:

1- To convene an Arab summit, one whose results should be agreed upon in advance, and where the outcome would be to transfer the oil windfall resulting from rise of oil prices stemming from the shedding of Lebanese and Palestinian blood, or at least a part of it, to support both peoples materially.

2- To grant Lebanon the material and moral support it needs to strengthen its defensive capabilities so as to enable it to defend its land and people.

3- The Arabs have to legitimate the resistance in Lebanon and acknowledge it in view to back it politically and morally both internally and externally.

Only in such a case will the meeting be meaningful, and the summit fruitful, but any other buffoonery speeches should be avoided, and it would be better for everyone to stay home and watch the sad news on TV.

In light of these dramatic situations, Gaddafi Development Foundation, and the Libyan Red Crescent will fly air caravans to deliver food and health relief, and to install field hospitals in defiance to the Israeli barbaric air force. The GDF will also provide help to those who are willing to volunteer to help their brothers the Lebanese, and to transfer any humanitarian aids.

END TEXT OF SAIF AL-ISLAM STATEMENT

¶10. (C) Comment: End Comment.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI374

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI374 aka Wikileaks id #73055 ?
Subject	EUCOM J5 MG GRATION BEGINS MIL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 30 Jul 2006 11:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI374.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:31:33 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00374

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO314
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0374 2111125
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 301125Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1047
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC//USDP/ISA/NESA//
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0382
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0499
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0296
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0406
RUFGAID/USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1176
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000374

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG
EUCOM FOR J5
SECDEF FOR 0SD/ISA/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/17/2016
TAGS: MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , PREL [External Political Relations] , MASS [Military Assistance and
Sales] , LY [Libya]
```

SUBJECT: EUCOM J5 MG GRATION BEGINS MIL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: GREG BERRY, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: GREG BERRY, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) EUCOM J-5 MG Scott Gration became the first American general officer to visit Libya in over a quarter of a century during a low key July 8-12 visit. His visit was hosted by MG Ahmed Mahmoud Az-Zway, the nominal head of the Staff College and Bureau of Technical Coordination, and de facto Libyan military point man for
dealing with the USA (including on the WMD issues). He also met with MG Riffi Sharifi, the head of the Air Force, Dr. Ahmed Fituri, the MFA U/S for American Affairs, and paid a site visit to the Libyan Naval Academy, the American cemetery, and the ruins of Leptis Magna.

¶2. (C) Uppermost on the Libyan agenda were the eight C-130's in Georgia and the C-130's in Libya. The Libyans want both sets assessed and if possible refurbished for
Libya's use. The Libyans are also interested in refurbishing CH-47 helicopters, which they bought from the Italian company Augusta. Az-Zway also asked about help
from the U.S. in setting up English language labs, a battle simulation center and
improving Libya's coastal, border and air defense systems.

¶3. (C) MG Gration stressed a "crawl, walk, run" approach in which we should first
develop a common understanding and vision, then start exchanges and non-lethal
cooperation and then joint inter-operability. He explained where things stood on licensing an assessment of the C-130's in Georgia and thought a U.S. military team might be able to do an assessment of the planes in Libya. He also thought an assessment of the CH-47's might be possible, but pointed out logistical difficulties in getting spare parts to repair these older aircraft. He suggested we start with some professional training at NDU, and then technical training. He also invited Az-Zwayy to visit EUCOM. Az-Zwayy responded that he was more interested in visiting the U.S. Gration told post these early stages of the relationship should be handled through field grade mil-mil contacts. He would not recommend additional general officer visits until before the end of the year.

¶4. (C) In the closing meeting, Az-Zwayy provided the text of a draft MOU to
formalize the defense relationship. Gration thought formalized annual
or biannual meetings might be in order. They did not discuss the actual
MOU text. They did sign a set of minutes summarizing what was discussed. (Both texts faxed to State NEA/MAG.)

¶5. (C) This message was cleared with EUCOM J5.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI377

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI377 aka Wikileaks id #73139 ?
Subject	TFLE01: LIBYANS SUMMON P-5 COM'S TO DEMAND ACTION ON IMMEDIATE LEBANON CEASEFIRE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 31 Jul 2006 12:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI377.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI383
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:31:11 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00377

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   PA ORA RSO OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA CONS DCM AMB
            AID DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO715
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0377 2121242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 311242Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1050
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1179
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000377

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/31/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , LE [Lebanon] , IS [Israel] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: TFLE01:  LIBYANS SUMMON P-5 COM'S TO DEMAND ACTION ON
IMMEDIATE LEBANON CEASEFIRE


CLASSIFIED BY: GREG BERRY, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan MFA U/S Obeidi called in the P-5 Ambassadors and COM's July 31 to condemn the Israeli bombing in Qana and to call for an immediate ceasefire UNSCR. CDA responded by citing the Secretary's statement about an emerging consensus on the necessary elements of a ceasefire and lasting settlement. UK Ambassador said a UNSCR should address root causes of the conflict. French Ambassador said France was working for an immediate ceasefire. End Summary.

¶2. (C) General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA) Under Secretary for European Affairs (and Qadhafi advisor) Abdelati Al-Obeidi summoned the P-5 Ambassadors and Chiefs of Mission to hear Libya's urgent call for a ceasefire in Lebanon. Al-Obeidi was sent up from the alternate capital in Sirte, specially to deliver the demarche. He did so in two separate meetings with 1) the Russians and Chinese and 2) the U.S., UK and France.

¶3. (C) In our meeting, Al-Obeidi said that the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyya condemns the attack against civilians in Qana. He said there is no defense and no explanation under international law for what can only be seen as an act of state terrorism. He argued that the kidnapping of two soldiers does not justify the destruction of a country and its infrastructure and the killing of women and children. He noted that many countries have already condemned the attack and he requested an international investigation and a trial of the perpetrators. Targeting Hizballah fighters might have been expected, but not the targeting of infrastructure and civilians.

¶4. (C) He criticized the UN Security Council for failing to pass a resolution July 30 on the situation in Lebanon and for failing to condemn the killing of the four UN peacekeepers. He said the SC Presidential Statement was inadequate. The UNSC must take firm action to impose a ceasefire on both sides, including Hezbollah, he said. It is wrong to say that the time is not yet right for a ceasefire, when civilians are being killed, he added. "When will the time be right? After Lebanon is destroyed and all the civilians are dead?" he asked. Al-Obeidi said issues cannot be worked out under fire and therefore the ceasefire should be unconditional. He noted that the Israelis have unilaterally ceased fire for 48 hours and said that could easily be extended indefinitely.

¶5. (C) Al-Obeidi said people will lose faith in the UNSC as an institution if they see that it can only impose resolutions on places like Iran, Sudan, and North Korea, but not in this situation. He added that statements coming from Israel and "some members of the Security Council" are not encouraging. He cited recent Al-Qaeda statements, and said the absence of action by the Security Council will only encourage extremism. Even moderate individuals and governments are beginning to question their moderation, he said. He called on the UNSC to speak with one voice, act under Chapter VII and find a peaceful solution.

¶6. (C) CDA responded that the U.S. was deeply distressed by the images of suffering in the region, and was working for a sustained and genuine cessation of hostilities. He cited the Secretary's statement concerning an emerging consensus on the

SIPDIS
necessary elements of a ceasefire and lasting settlement. He noted that we are deeply engaged at the UNSC.

¶7. (C) The French Ambassador said France shared Libya's concern and was working for an immediate ceasefire resolution. The British Ambassador said the UK shares Libya's distress including on the killing of the four peacekeepers and was working for an early UNSCR to end the fighting and address its causes.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI378

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI378 aka Wikileaks id #73166 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL NEWS SUMMARY-JUNE/JULY, 2006
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 31 Jul 2006 14:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/07/06TRIPOLI378.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/07/2006 02:30:34 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00378

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   POL IPS FCS PA FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO813
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0378/01 2121416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 311416Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1051
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1180
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000378

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , LY [Libya] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs]
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL NEWS SUMMARY-JUNE/JULY, 2006


----------------------------

Oil and Gas Sector

----------------------------

¶1.  (SBU) Repsol said it will increase its production in Libya by
```

66%, reaching 415,000 barrels per day by 2010. Following the discovery of 21 wells in the last three years, Repsol's reserves in Libya will increase an estimated 10% over the next five years. Repsol, currently the biggest foreign company in Libya handling 15% of its oil production, is investing about 5 billion dollars in the country.(Source: http://www.akhbar-libya.com/HYPERLINK "http://www.akhbar-libya.com/"www.akhbar-liby a.com, 6/21)

¶2. (SBU) The CEO of the Italian ERG Group said that his company is hoping to increase its share of service stations in Italy and is expecting Libya to reach a decision regarding the sale of Tamoil in Europe by the end of this year. According to current market evaluation, Tamoil is worth about 2 billion dollars. (Source: Al Quds Al Arabi, 6/24)

¶3. (SBU) Shukri Ghanem, chairman of the National Oil Corporation, met with the French minister of Industry and Energy to discuss ongoing oil and gas cooperation between the two countries. The French minister stressed his country's wish to import gas from Libya to satisfy its growing needs. The role of French companies in the field of manufacture of petrochemicals and fertilizers was also discussed. (Source: http://www.manara.org/HYPERLINK "http://www.manara.org/"www.manara.org, 6/27)

¶4. (SBU) The Libyan government has given permission to Sirt Oil Company to complete the execution of two gas pipelines leading from Tripoli to Khums and Tripoli to Milleta via international bidding. The Tripoli-Khums line will provide 106 million cubic meters of gas per day to South Tripoli Electricity Power Station and to the Suk Elkhamis Cement Factory, as well as supply households in Tripoli with natural gas. The second pipeline aims to provide some 200 million cubic feet of gas per day to the Zawiya Power Station. (Source: Al Quds Al Arabi, 7/13)

Construction and Infrastructure Development

¶5. (SBU) The Libyan government announced plans to allocate 765 million dollars to develop the iron and steel industry over the next three years. The GOL plans to raise production capacity of the state-owned Misurata Iron & Steel Company to 2 million tons annually. New leadership may bring increased resources to the company, which underwent a failed attempt at privatization two years ago. (Source: http://www.aljazeera.net/HYPERLINK "http://www.aljazeera.net/"www.Aljazeera.net, 6/8)

¶6. (SBU) According to Maal & Amaal newspaper [Money & Business], Libya imported about 100,000 tons of cement in June. A source from the National Company for Development and Real Estate and Tourism Investment said that the company is executing a contract to import 4 million more tons of cement to cover a shortage in the market. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www.ljbc.net"www.ljbc.net, 6/18)

¶7. (SBU) Accompanied by a representative from the US based Valmont company, Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi toured Qararat al-Qataf in Wadi Sawf Ajeen, one of the agricultural investment areas cultivated through water of the Great Man-Made River Project (GMMRP). Valmont demonstrated its own technology being implemented at the GMMRP, including the use of axel irrigation equipment. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www.ljbc.net/"www.ljbc.net, 6/26)

¶8. (SBU) The Secretary of the People's Committee of the Railway Company signed a contract to construct 34 concrete bridges at a value of 40 million Libyan dinars to be built over 18 months from Tripoli to Misurata, covering 231 km. The contract was signed with the Turkish based Mitch Company. Libya is the only

signed with the Turkish based Mitch Company. Libya is the only North African country without a railway system. The designated routes are part of a planned network to link Libya to the rest of Africa. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www.akhbar-libya.com/"www.akhbar-liby a.com, 6/29).

¶9. (SBU) Several Libyan cabinet members visited the eastern region of the country and outlined plans to further develop its infrastructure. Highlights include the planned construction of a new port at Ras El-Hilal, additional pipe networks from desalinization plants, 10,000 new housing units, extending private loans worth up to 257 million Libyan dinars to start small businesses, construction of new bridges, and installation of a secondary runway at Tubrouk airport. (Source: http://www.manara.org/HYPERLINK "http://www.manara.org"www.manara.org, 7/02)

¶10. (SBU) The Assistant Secretary of the General People's Committee announced the planned construction of two new skyscrapers in Tripoli and Benghazi. The GPC created a committee to complete measures to incorporate the company that will execute the skyscrapers project, at an estimated cost of 500 million Libyan dinars. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www..net"www.ljbc.net, 7/24)

Foreign and US Investment

¶11. (SBU) The Libya General Post & Telecommunications Company (GPTC) organized its Second Annual Exhibition for Telecommunications & Information Technology in mid-July. IBM, NCR, Microsoft, Hewlett Packard, Oracle and Motorola were represented at the conference. A conversation with a senior manager from GPTC revealed that it has reached an agreement with Oracle after more than a year of negotiation, mainly due to Oracle's readiness to provide training to Libyans in the field. The source from GPTC also stated that it is their policy to engage companies bidding for projects or tenders including training. "The model will be adopted with anyone wishing to do business with GPTC."

¶12. (SBU) Afriqiya Airlines signed a memorandum of understanding to buy up to 14 A-320 and six A-330 airplanes in a deal worth 1.7 billion USD. The head of the Libyan African investment fund, Bashir Saleh, said that the aim is "to have a partnership with Europe to develop Africa in all sectors: aviation, construction and tourism. Our goal is development in Africa." The chairman of Afirqiya, Sabri Shadi, said that the purchase "is a new beginning for aviation and transportation in Libya, and I think we will see more demand for new airplanes from Airbus or Boeing." Delivery of the planes is set to start in 2007. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www.akhbar-libya.com"www.akhbar-libya .com, 7/18 -- See also Septel.)

¶13. (SBU) In an effort to increase foreign investment by streamlining the process for investors, the Secretary of Economy, Trade & Investment, Al-Tayeb Al-Safi, announced the creation of a "one window" policy where investors will be directed to the Foreign Investment Encouragement Board to finalize all of their paperwork. The Board will also serve as a "one-stop" source of information for those seeking to invest in Libya. Similar announcements have been made in the past on this issue. (Source: Libya Alyoum, 6/18)

Labor Market

---

14. (SBU) In a series of speeches broadcast on the official JANA news agency leading up to the commemoration of the 37th anniversary of the Al-Fatah Revolution, Qaddafi addressed professional organizations including economists, doctors, and engineers, announcing his objection to foreign employment in the private sector at the expense of the Libyan people. He underlined that the issue of employing Libyans is linked to the issues of social justice, freedom and dignity of Libyans. He specifically noted that future work on the Great Man-Made River Project, a $20 billion, 20-year-old venture to pump water from beneath the Sahara to northern cities, should be done almost exclusively by Libyans. "The new phase which starts as of today requires that nothing be built by foreigners, and whatever is built in Libya will be by Libyans, or else nothing would be built, because we do not want to deceive ourselves." It is important to watch for future GPC proclamations to study the true effect of the speech. In a speech this past January, Qaddafi called for the hiring foreign companies to build the country, allowing the opening of branches of foreign banks "because they have capital to invest" This speech also does not seem to coincide with recent government regulations to facilitate banking transactions and reduce foreign investors costs.

¶15. The GOL said it is taking steps to reorganize and reduce the number of employees in the public sector, which currently stands at 900,000. The government says it is planning to provide loans to public sector employees to set up private businesses as an incentive for early retirement. The government announced a re-distribution of the workforce within the public sector, with priority given to the tourism sector. (Source: HYPERLINK "http://www.ljbc.net"www.ljbc.net, 06/07)

¶16. The Secretary of Manpower, Training, and Employment, Matug Matug, officially announced the termination of Salary Law No.15, which placed strict salary caps on state employees in all sectors. The law, passed in early 1980s, has been gradually phased out over the passed several years in some institutions, such as Tripoli Medical Center, in an effort to keep qualified doctors in the country. Effective July 1, public companies can now officially set the wages of their employees. (Source: Tripoli Post, 6/24)

¶17. Libyan businessman in the tourism sector and officials from the GOL took part in a contentious meeting on foreign investment in tourism, led by the Secretary of the General People's Congress (Prime Minister), ElBaghdadi ElMahmoudi. Husni Bey, deputy chairman of the Libyan Businessmen Council, argued that government policies favored foreign investors, citing the fact that Libyan tour companies were barred from providing services to tourists during last March's eclipse event. The Secretary of Tourism, Ammar Eltayif, argued that Libyans should be given the same incentives as foreign companies such as tax and customs exemptions. He also emphasized the need for investment in the hotel sector, citing that only 2000 rooms in Tripoli are suitable for tourism lodging. He also pointed out that only 30% of the people working in the tourism industry are Libyan. (Source: Al Quds Al Arabi, 7/9)

Stock Market

¶18. The capital of the Libyan stock market has been set to 20 million Libyan dinars and 2 million shares. The value will be deducted from this year's annual budget. The Libyan government has made it mandatory for all public and private companies with a capital of more than 1 million dinars to offer their shares in the stock market. The Libyan stock market was established approximately two years ago through the Central Bank of Libya.

shares in a number of public companies were offered including the shares of the biggest cement company valued at 600 million dinars. (Source: Al Quds Al Arabi, 6/10)
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI383

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI383 aka Wikileaks id #73373 ?
Subject	GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA ANNOUNCES EFFORTS TO SUPPORT LEBANON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Aug 2006 15:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI383.html
References	06TRIPOLI377
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/06/2006 03:26:20 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00383

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO461
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0383/01 2131547
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011547Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1061
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1190
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000383

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]* , IS *[Israel]* , LE *[Lebanon]*
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA ANNOUNCES EFFORTS TO SUPPORT LEBANON

REF: TRIPOLI 377

¶1. (SBU) Summary and Comment. The Government of Libya announced on Monday a three-step initiative to express its solidarity with

the people of Lebanon and denounce Israeli attacks in the country. 1) The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation was instructed to hold a meeting with ambassadors from the P-5 countries Monday, calling for an immediate ceasefire and an investigation into alleged genocide against the people of Lebanon (reftel). 2) A Libyan-government sponsored daily cargo plane stocked with medical supplies and food will reportedly be sent to Lebanon via other Arab countries. 3) Local media are being asked to highlight the confrontation, and have been particularly praising leader Moammar Qaddafi's alleged prediction of the attacks during a speech ten years ago. Several relatively calm government-sanctioned demonstrations have taken place in Tripoli. Comment: The three-step initiative is clearly a low-cost attempt by the Libyan government to counter criticism it is facing on opposition websites and elsewhere, that it is not doing enough for the cause in Lebanon. End Summary and Comment.

¶2. (SBU) On Sunday, July 30, the General People's Committee (GPC - i.e. the Cabinet) held an emergency session to "support the steadfastness of the Lebanese brotherly people in facing the Israeli barbarous aggression taking place these days." After the meeting, the GPC ordered three steps to put these words into action, conveying to the Libyan public their commitment to supporting the Lebanese people. In carrying out the first step, the GPC for Foreign Liaison and International Co-operation (GPCFLIC, i.e. the MFA) called in the ambassadors from the P-5 countries to insist on an immediate stop to attacks in Lebanon (reftel). Television and newspapers highlighted the Charges d'affairs from the United States and China, along with ambassadors from Russia, Britain and France, meeting with GPCFLIC Secretary for European Affairs Obeidi, who in press accounts, called for an end to "state terrorism, unwarranted aggression, and war crime against the Lebanese people and genocide that require an international investigation." (See Reftel for a full report on the actual content of the meeting and Charge's response.)

3 (SBU) The second announced step is the commencement of an immediate "air bridge" between Libya and Lebanon to transport food and medical supplies via Jordan, Syria, and Cyprus. On Monday evening, local media reported that the first cargo plane of the air bridge, carrying 50 tons of medicine, medical equipment, food stuffs, and ambulances, took off from Mitiga International Airport. Daily relief flights are planned. The government also reported that Libyan medical teams are available to be deployed to Lebanon, and that injured Lebanese civilians are welcome for treatment in local hospitals. According to local media sources last week, the Qaddafi Foundation for Charity Societies, a quasi-NGO run by Qaddafi's son Seif Al-Islam, in conjunction with Libyan Red Crescent, announced separate plans to send air shipments of medical and health supplies to Lebanon.

¶4. (SBU) The GPC also announced that the state-run Libyan media has been called upon to "highlight the confrontation of the Lebanese people in face of the Israeli barbarous and brutal attacks and the war crimes committed against the people of Lebanon. " As in many newspapers in the region, the front page of all the daily newspapers report almost solely on the violence in Lebanon, many showing graphic photographs of dead Lebanese civilians, especially following the attacks in Qana. On the evening of the July 30 bombing in Qana, the state run news show highlighted leader Moammar Qaddafi "predicting" the attack in a May 1996 speech in which he said the April, 1996 "Grapes of Wrath" attack on Qana would not be the last. The station rebroadcast a clip of Qaddafi addressing an audience in Kano, Nigeria on May 9th, 1996, in which the leader encouraged people

to wear t-shirts with pictures of children who had died in the attack Qana that year. "... look at this high training of the Israeli airmen to target and kill infants and children. Look at the disgrace and shame. The world must look at this little girl, this is a photo, and this is an example of the Israeli terrorism and barbarism". The media broadcaster commented that the world should have listened to Qaddafi at the time, who predicted this week's attack.

¶5. (SBU) Editorials in state run newspapers echoed highly critical statements against the government of Israel and the western powers that back it. In an article from "Azzahaf Al-Akhdar" from July 31, 2006 "The Zionist hegemony is beyond description and goes unpunished just because it enjoys the protection of Great Powers." In "Ashames" on the same day, in an editorial entitled "Qana Again!", the author condemned Arab countries' silence towards the attacks in Qana. He also referred to Qaddafi's speech in Kano, Nigeria in 1996 warning of an Israeli "death train." A great deal of coverage has been devoted to Saturday's "New York Times" article about the expedited delivery of US produced precision-guided bombs to Israel. As a result of this article, some here have started referring to Secretary Rice as "Hamalat al Khatab," or "carrier of fire", a Quranic reference to the wife of the uncle of prophet Muhammad, who was known to be an instigator or a fire starter.

6. (SBU) Several government sanctioned demonstrations have been held since the commencement of the violence in Lebanon and Israeli. This weekend, following Friday prayers, demonstrators gathered in Green Square, the traditional spot for protests, chanting anti-Israeli slogans. Friday's broadcast sermon on state-sponsored television mainly focused on criticizing Israel, Jews and other Arab leaders. The imam particularly criticized wealthy oil states, which "should have power, but also stand by and do nothing." A pointed criticism of the US was also made for blocking the UN Security Council's attempt at a cease fire. On Monday, July 31, a separate demonstration composed mostly of youth, organized by Aisha Qaddafi's Watasimo Charity Organization, also took place in Green Square. The demonstrators, many of whom were affiliated with the Libyan version of the Boy Scouts, marched to the UN headquarters in Tripoli and delivered a letter condemning the attacks in Qana and praising the foresight of Moammar Qaddafi in forecasting this event years ago while in Kano, Nigeria. "Where is the UN? Where are its role, mission and charter called human rights? Where are the Security Council, and its resolutions regarding this terrible massacre?" Media reported approximately two thousand people took part in this demonstration, which was also televised extensively.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI394

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI394 aka Wikileaks id #73840 ?
Subject	TFLE01: DEMARCHE IN ADVANCE OF 8/7 ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 6 Aug 2006 13:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI394.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/09/2006 09:13:20 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00394

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO187
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0394 2181329
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061329Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1077
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1210
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000394

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA - CATHERINE ELDER

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/6/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , LE [Lebanon] , IS [Israel] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: TFLE01:  DEMARCHE IN ADVANCE OF 8/7 ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL

REF: STATE 128426

CLASSIFIED BY: GREG BERRY, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (SBU) Charge, accompanied by DCM, delivered reftel points verbally August 6 to General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) European Affairs Secretary/Qadhafi Advisor Abdelati Al-Obeidi. Obeidi has emerged as the GPCFLIC's lead official on the Lebanon crisis.

¶2. (C) Obeidi confirmed that GPCFLIC Secretary (FM-equivalent) Shalqam will be attending the August 7 Foreign Ministers meeting for Libya and that a detailed account of the U.S. presentation would be provided to him. Obeidi said Libya's goal is to give support to the Lebanese government. The Lebanese Government (including the Hizballah ministers) have agreed to a seven-point program, which the Libyan Government will support. Obeidi said the Lebanese Government is not supportive of the US-France draft UNSCR because it does not see the text as capable of stopping the destruction.

¶3. (C) While clearly implying that Libya shared Lebanon's lack of enthusiasm for the draft UNSCR, Obeidi went on to say that Libya strongly supported the Government of Lebanon and the extension of Lebanese Government control over all of the territory of Lebanon. "We don't agree with groups taking the authority of the state into their own hands," Obeidi said.

¶4. (C) Separately, on August 5 Obeidi contacted Charge to request U.S. assistance in setting up safe passage for Libyan humanitarian aid flights to Beirut International Airport. The flights were previously going into Latakia, but the aid can no longer be trans-shipped overland because of the destruction of the route. Charge explained that we are feeding the request into our Washington Task Force, but we need additional details. Obeidi assured him that the shipments are entirely humanitarian in nature, and that Libya understood that even after acting as a facilitator, the U.S. could not guarantee the safety of the shipments.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI410

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI410 aka Wikileaks id #74362 ?
Subject	THE VISA BLUES: TRIPOLI CONSULS SING IN UNISON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 10 Aug 2006 12:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI410.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/10/2006 05:16:07 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00410

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO096
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0410/01 2221247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101247Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1096
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0383
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1233
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000410

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , ODIP [U.S. Diplomatic Representation] , CMGT [Consular Administration and
Management] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: THE VISA BLUES: TRIPOLI CONSULS SING IN UNISON


¶1.  (SBU) Consular officers from fifteen foreign embassies with
representation in Libya gathered last week at the home of the
Pakistani consul to discuss common challenges faced in obtaining
```

visitor, business, and diplomatic visas to Libya. In addition to TDY Conoff/Econoff from Embassy Tripoli, consuls from the Philippines, Italy, Yemen, Poland, Russia, Korea, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Malaysia, India, Pakistan, Serbia, and South Africa attended the meeting. The meeting's goal was to formulate a common approach to working with the GOL on ameliorating the problems that all non-Arab nationals are having obtaining tourist, business, and diplomatic visas to Libya.

COMMON CHALLENGES

¶2. (SBU)

-----Diplomatic visas: Obtaining diplomatic visas in a timely manner continues to be a challenge for most of the countries represented. In an extreme example, the consul from the Embassy of Russia expressed frustration over waiting seven months for his visa, apparently linked to the fact that the Russians had denied a Libyan traveling on an official passport a visa because he was on their restricted security list. A diplomat from the Philippines easily obtained a visa in her home country due to a personal connection with the Libyan Embassy in Manila, but because it wasn't processed through the normal official channels, faced great difficulty in converting it to a residency permit here.

----- Business visas: Obtaining business visas is not an easy feat for most western nationals, due to the long list of requirements necessary to receive a visa. Most agreed that this could be partially intentional on the part of the government, but may also be in part a matter of organization as pre-approvals must be faxed to their embassies abroad from Tripoli, which can easily be lost or misplaced. For all countries facing this challenge, there is a trend for businesspeople to enter on tourist visas, which are relatively easy to obtain via well connected travel agencies.

-----Third Country Nationals: Employing third country nationals at foreign embassies is a growing difficulty. The Korean consul linked this to the Manpower Minister's supposed mandate to drastically reduce the Libyan unemployment rate. He also noted that Korean companies are having trouble obtaining work visas for many of their nationals who are slated to work at Korean companies based in Libya, the implication being that Libyans must be employed instead. The Pakistani consul's son was offered a job at Schlumberger, but his visa has been stalled, possibly for the same reason. The Italian consul was informed that effective last month, all visas that go through the protocol office will also be vetted through the manpower office, presumably to ensure that Libyans are being employed as often as possible.

SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT

¶3. (SBU)

-----Tourist visas: All nationalities, with the exception of the U.S., are having relative success obtaining tourist visas via travel agencies who set up package tours. Travel agencies with good connections in the government are said to have the highest success rate of obtaining tourist visas. Cruise ships stopping at Mediterranean destinations frequently disembark in Tripoli Harbor and unload several hundred tourists at a time. Short term visas upon generally granted upon arrival, though it takes one to two hours of processing.

-----Dip visas at the airport: Officials from the GOL told consuls from other Embassies that they are considering issuing visas to diplomats at the airport, though a pre-approval from the MFA would still be required.

FUTURE GOALS

¶4. (SBU) Consuls decided to hold monthly meetings to exchange information and share updates on visa issues. In addition, a steering committee composed of the Philippine, Pakistani, and Italian consuls was formed to draft a proposal to work on the following goals:

-----Visa Reciprocity: Engage with the Libyan authorities on dedicating themselves to enforcing visa reciprocity. Most countries represented at the meeting issue visas for Libyan nationals within seven to ten working days for all categories, but few were receiving similar treatment.

-----Ambassadorial Meeting: Discuss a possible effort to request some of our ambassadors collectively meet with GOL officials regularly on areas of common concern to foreign embassies regarding visa issues. While several in the group wanted the US to take an active leadership role in this initiative, Conoff explained that we might not be as persuasive a spokesman as other countries because we don't have visa issuing capability yet.

¶5. Comment. The GOL has told post repeatedly that until we establish full visa operations in Tripoli, they will reciprocate by limiting visa services to Americans. Once post begins issuing visas, we anticipate some relief to the additional challenges U.S. travelers face in obtaining Libyan visas. However, the experience of other foreign missions that have full visa issuance authority in Tripoli is far from perfect and indicates that visa difficulties are endemic to Libya's dealings with its foreign guests.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI438

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI438 aka Wikileaks id #76244 ?
Subject	AL MANAR: REQUEST FOR POST INPUT ON NEXT STEPS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 25 Aug 2006 17:21 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI438.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  08/27/2006 08:23:44 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00438

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO352
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0438 2371721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 251721Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1131
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0297
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0005
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0013
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0006
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0385
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0001
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0007
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0015
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0038
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0040
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1275
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000438

SIPDIS

NOFORN
```

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA FOR DANIELLE MONOSSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/25/2016
TAGS: ECPS *[Communications and Postal Systems]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , XF *[Middle East]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL MANAR: REQUEST FOR POST INPUT ON NEXT STEPS

REF: STATE 136056

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy Tripoli, Libya, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

(S) This is in response to the request in reftel. Libya has traditionally had few contacts with Hizballah because of friction over the Imam Musa Sadr issue. While Qadhafi and the rest of the senior Libyan leadership would probably not be eager to add to that friction by taking on al-Manar, our best argument would be any examples of al-Manar broadcasts calling into question the validity of the Libyan Jamahiriya. The Libyans have no use for the idea of private militias operating outside government control, and they are concerned about radical religious movements that would create instability. If USG demarches could include specific examples of al-Manar reporting that denounced or threatened Libyan or other North African governments, our request to have the Libyans take action to remove the channel from Arabsat might have more traction. However, we do not believe that, even then, Libya would sign on to any such effort, given the broad popular support in Libya for Hizballah's supposed "victory" in its confrontation with Israel, as well as Nasrallah's popular appeal.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI444

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI444 aka Wikileaks id #76537 ?
Subject	URGENT LIBYAN DEMARCHE ON DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 29 Aug 2006 14:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI444.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/05/2006 11:02:00 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00444

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO IPS ECON DEA DCM PA ORA DAO OMC LEGAT CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO521
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0444 2411408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291408Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1134
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0070
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0029
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0045
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0387
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA PRIORITY 0035
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0418
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1281
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000444

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/29/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , UN [United Nations] , LY [Libya] , SU [Sudan]
SUBJECT: URGENT LIBYAN DEMARCHE ON DARFUR


CLASSIFIED BY: Greg Berry, Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, State.
```

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) MFA Under Secretary for European Affairs Abdelati Obeidi called in the UK and U.S. Charges separately on August 29 to deliver an urgent demarche about discussions in New York about a draft UNSC resolution on Darfur. Obeidi noted that African members of the Security Council, the Arab League and the Islamic Conference had all expressed serious reservations about the substance of the draft resolution under discussion in the UNSC. The Libyans believe that an Article 7 resolution imposed on Sudan without its consent would be "a gift to al-Qaeda." In that regard, Obeidi cited Zawahiri's comments about Sudan in a recent broadcast.

¶2. (C) If intervention in Sudan from the outside is essential, Obeidi said, then the forces involved should be exclusively African -- "maybe with blue hats." "Foreign" (i.e., non-African) forces would be a cause of deep concern to countries in the region -- could in fact lead to "catastrophe." The Sudanese government is not in control of the situation ("Sudan is not Bashir"), and the insertion of outsiders could lead to civil war.

¶3. (C) Despite the depth of concern about the resolution as drafted, there is a readiness on the part of African governments and Arab League members to work toward consensus, Obeidi said. He invoked the UNSC's experience on Lebanon, when an Arab League delegation went to New York for consultations with UNSC members. The same kind of process may work in the Sudan case. Obeidi strongly urged that the U.S. and UK as cosponsors of the resolution consult closely with African members of the Security Council and take their concerns fully into account.

¶4. (C) The Charge recalled the many bilateral discussions we have had on this topic. Obeidi acknowledged that U.S.-Libyan policy differences on this issue have been evident for some time, but repeated Libya's view that a resolution "to be of use needs to be practical and implementable" -- that is, must be the product of consultations leading to consensus.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI453

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	06TRIPOLI453 aka Wikileaks id #76856 ?
Subject	CONGRESSMAN LANTOS STRESSES BILATERAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND REGIONAL CHALLENGES WITH LIBYAN OFFICIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 31 Aug 2006 15:02 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI453.html
History	First published on Mon, 27 Jun 2011 09:31 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/05/2006 08:56:35 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00453

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   FAS DCM AMB AID MGT PA POL IPS FCS

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO686
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0453/01 2431502
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311502Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1140
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0011
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1290
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000453

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/28/2016
TAGS: OREP [U.S. Congressional Travel] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PGOV
[Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CONGRESSMAN LANTOS STRESSES BILATERAL ACHIEVEMENTS AND
REGIONAL CHALLENGES WITH LIBYAN OFFICIALS
```

REF: A) TRIPOLI 11

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Liaison Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Liaison Office, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) In a series of meetings with senior Libyan officials during his August 22-24 trip to Libya, Congressman Tom Lantos, ranking Democrat on the House Foreign Relations Committee, reviewed bilateral achievements since his first visit to the country in January, 2004 and set new goals for enhanced future cooperation. The Congressman, accompanied by Charge Berry, House International Relations Committee (HIRC) Senior Professional Staff Member Alan Makovsky, HIRC Professional Staff Member Mike Beard, and Poloff, met with the Libyan Leader Moammar Qadhafi, Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation Seif Al-Islam Qadhafi, Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi, Director of the External Security Organization Musa Kusa, Secretary of the General Peoples Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Foreign Minister equivalent) Abdurrahman Shalgam, Secretary of American Affairs Ahmed Fatouri and Secretary for European Affairs Abdelati Obeidi of the General Peoples Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation. The Congressman's trip partially overlapped with visit of Senator Arlen Specter (septel) and several official meetings were combined.

¶2. (SBU) In all meetings with GOL interlocutors, the Congressman stressed that the two major goals that he set in January, 2004 on his first trip to Libya had been achieved: the removal of Libya from the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism list and the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations. His next goal is to increase the number of Libyan students studying in America from 150, the present figure, to 6,000 over the next three years. He also emphasized the need of the GOL to enhance its image and presence in the United States by either opening additional consulates in cities like New York and Los Angeles, or establishing honorary consulates. He used the Saudi Embassy in Washington as an example of a country that has successfully enhanced its image in America by investing considerable financial resources in its Embassy.

THE LEADER, ONCE AGAIN, STRESSES WAHABI EXTREMISM

¶3.(C) On August 22 in his desert encampment on the outskirts of Sirte, the Leader of the Revolution Moammar Qadhafi greeted the entire delegation, but dedicated the majority of time to an hour-long tjte-`-tjte with Representative Lantos focusing on Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, which has become one of his standard topics. The leader emphasized his anxiety over the spread of religious fundamentalism in the Kingdom, citing a recent supposed statement of the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia that Saudi students should be barred from attending university in the United States. He also berated the spread of Wahabist thought in mosques and schools inside and outside of the Kingdom. The leader urged the US to call for "self determination" for tribal groups of Saudi Arabia, who would presumably chose a government other than the present monarchy. Qadhafi also lobbied for support of his plan to create "Isratine" as the best solution for lasting peace in the Middle East. He did not bring up any aspects of the GOL's bilateral relationship with the US during the meeting.

¶4. (C) Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter were scheduled for separate meetings with Qadhafi in Sirte. While Specter's delegation traveled by U.S. military aircraft to Sirte, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the General People's Congress,

SIPDIS
Suleiman Shihumi, chartered a Air Libya plane from Mitiga International Airport for the Lantos delegation. Shihumi greeted Lantos warmly, facilitated the Qadhafi meeting, and arranged for a official banquet with General Peoples Committee delegates from the Sirte region. During the one-hour flight, an Egyptian movie entitled "The Leader" starring screen favorite Adel Imam was shown to the delegation and Libyan protocol officers. Security personnel and a local translator confirmed that many of the jokes in the movie, that obviously make fun of a Middle Eastern dictator, could be aimed at Qadhafi or Mubarak, including a scene showing disregard for members of the cabinet. (Embassy Ccomment: It is unclear if this was to show that the leader does in fact have a sense of humor about his monopoly on political power, or that a certain degree of toleration exists in Libya, or that the Libyans love a movie that pokes fun at Egyptian politics -- if in fact the Libyans intended any message at all. End Comment.)

CONCERNS OVER SAUDI WAHABISM AS SOURCE OF EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM REITERATED

¶5. (S) Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi held a joint meeting with Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter on August 23, calling for increased cooperation in all aspects of our relationship, specifically technology and knowledge transfer. In a theme similar to Representative Lantos' last meeting with Sanussi (ref A), he reiterated the leader's deep concern with Wahabism and the Saudi government's purported link to Al-Qaeda. Sanussi stated that after 9/11, the GOL was perplexed by US behavior as they expected a "judgment day" for Saudi Arabia, home to a majority of the highjackers, not an invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Sanussi also took credit for the GOL putting Osama bin Laden on an Interpol watch list in 1997, showing that they had an inkling of events to come far in advance of 9/11.

¶6. (S) When Senator Specter pressed Sanussi for solid proof linking Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to the Saudi government, Sanussi orchestrated a subsequent meeting between Congressman Lantos and Mohamed Ismail, the Libyan national who was imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for 10 months and charged with a plot to assassinate then Crown Prince Abdallah. Ismail, who speaks fluent English, is the son of a former Libyan diplomat, and was educated abroad. For several years, he worked at Seif Al-Islam's Qadhafi Development Foundation, on various projects such as negotiating the release of western hostages in the Philippines. Ismail claimed that he worked closely with Saudi opposition groups in London who tried to "create a free radio station in Saudi Arabia" but was arrested on trumped up charges. Ismail talked at length about "specialized treatment" that Wahabi detainees receive in Saudi prisons, claiming that they receive cash, and are being recruited to fight in Iraq. (Embassy Comment: Embassy notes that testimony in a US court differs considerably from this Libyan version of events. End Comment.)

SENIOR OFFICIALS GIVE OPINIONS ON NEW EMBASSY COMPOUND

¶7. (C) In meetings with Faturi, Obeidi, and FM Shalgam on August 23, Representative Lantos continuously pressed on the theme of a need for a secure, efficient US Embassy chancery, calling the lack of an Embassy his "biggest disappointment" with the state

lack of an Embassy his "biggest disappointment" with the state of our current relationship, especially because it impedes the issuance of visas. He stressed the need for "land with a clear title," adding his hopes for the Libyan Embassy in Washington to increase in size and scope. Shalgam expressed concern over proposed NEC sites because they are "such a long drive from downtown," instead arguing that a more proper place is the "Shaat Club" located in downtown. (The British, Italian, Turkish, and Egyptian Embassies are located in this area near the waterfront). In a separate meeting, ESO Chief Kusa echoed Shalgam's worries, asserting that the proposed NEC site in Farjan is "too open and vulnerable to attack. You should listen to my advice. Anyone could attack and run away". Kusa also argued for the idea of opening up a new Embassy in the Shaat Club area and was not keen on the idea of an entirely new Embassy compound. Per septel, Qadhafi expressed similar concerns over U.S. plans to build a large NEC.

REGIONAL EVENTS -- VIEWS EXCHANGED ON HIZBALLAH AND LEBANON

¶8. (C) Regional events in Lebanon and Israel accounted for much of the conversation in meetings with GOL interlocutors. Sanussi called Israel's "excessive reaction" to Hizballah attacks "the reason Nasrallah is a hero in the eyes of the people." Shalgam stressed that people in the region were "very impressed" with Hizballah's ability to withhold Israeli military might for 32 days. He also warned that in order for the cease fire to last, European nations must be willing to send more troops. Lantos stressed that Hizballah has the intent of destroying Israel and that the force employed by the Israeli army equaled the threat of Hizballah to the nation of Israel. Throughout his meetings, he repeatedly used the analogy that if a rebel force was operating out of Canada and threatened US security, we would clearly use heavy force in combating that threat.

IRAN MODEL VS LIBYA MODEL

¶9. (S) In an August 24 meeting with Director of External Security Musa Kusa, Lantos called the difference between Iran and Libya "monumental" and predicted that books will be written about the historic decision Qadhafi took in giving up its WMDs. While Kusa seemed to agree, he expressed worry over the imbalance that was created with the changes in Iraq, tipping the scales towards Iran. "Iran and Iraq used to balance each other out...now, there is no balance." He said the Libyans were "sure that the Iranians are enriching uranium and making a bomb," adding that events in Lebanon are really just an "Iranian-Syrian game". He also expressed a concern about the estimated 300 Libyans aiding the insurgency in Iraq: "We can't control our own children. We are doing our best, but we uncover a new cell everyday."

SOMALIA FALLING TO EXTREMISTS

¶10. (C) Both Sanussi and Shalgam expressed a growing concern with the deteriorating state of affairs in Somalia. Sanussi said that the Taliban is running Somalia and in a short while, it is bound to become another Afghanistan. Shalgam worried that Somalia is being hurled "back into the Middle Ages" by the current leadership and that the younger generation there is easily seduced by Muslim extremists: "We won't be able to convince younger generation that their leadership is wrong."

MUBARAK NOT PLEASED WITH YOUNG QADHAFI'S SPEECH

¶11. (C) Congressman Lantos began a meeting with Seif Al-Islam Qadhafi, director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation, by congratulating him on his speech earlier in the week that called for significant political and economic reform, including enhanced freedom of the press. "I am very proud of your speech,"

Lantos said of the two-hour monologue which was broadcast on every radio and television station in the country. Seif immediately noted that President Mubarak of Egypt called his father, the leader, to express his displeasure with the speech, saying it called for "too much change and too much freedom" and warning that the country should be more conservative in its approach to change. Seif claimed he does not know what his father's reply to Mubarak was. (Embassy Comment: Since the speech was broadcast widely on state-run media, it must have at least had the tacit blessing of the leader. End Comment). Seif added that the speech took about two or three years to develop and hinted that there may be another forthcoming speech, focusing more on politics and the creation of a constitution. He added that he intends to "close all pending human rights cases and start a new beginning for the country."

¶12. (S) Seif, who took a passive role during most of the meeting, then queried Lantos about Iran, stating that the Iranians are telling the GOL that "the Americans are playing a game with you" and will refuse allow replacement of Libya's SCUD missiles, instead stripping the GOL of its weaponry. "They have told us that the Americans will let us down." Representative Lantos countered that those assertions are untrue and that the USG truly appreciates what the GOL has done in abandoning its WMD program. Seif then asked about the disarmament of Hizballah, which Lantos replied is a "must" as all countries must be in control of their own borders: "Nasrallah has set the development of Lebanon back years." Lantos invited Seif to join him on his next trip to North Korea to share Libya's story of giving up WMDs, a "major gesture for peace globally."

US BUSINESS REPS TALK OIL AND VISAS

¶13. (SBU) Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter met with U.S. business leaders on August 23 representing Amerada Hess, Marathon Oil, Exxon-Mobil, Chevron-Texaco, Conoco-Philipps, and Occidental. The businessmen expressed optimism about increasing oil output in the coming years in Libya, but were frustrated by continued visa challenges. They cited the initial optimism that existed when bilateral relations were restored, but difficulties both in obtaining visas for Americans to come to Libya and in sending local and third country national employees to the United States have dampened that feeling to some degree. Still, on the big picture issues like personal security and government corruption, they see Libya as offering a relatively favorable operating environment compared to their counterparts working in Nigeria, Indonesia, Colombia and other oil-production states.

¶14. (SBU) Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter did not clear this cable before departing Tripoli.
BERRY

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI454

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI454 aka Wikileaks id #76857 ?
Subject	SENATOR SPECTER REVIEWS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SENIOR LIBYAN OFFICIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 31 Aug 2006 15:03 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/08/06TRIPOLI454.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI472
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/05/2006 08:56:52 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00454

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO689
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0454/01 2431503
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 311503Z AUG 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1143
INFO RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0014
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1293
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000454

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/ELA, NEA/IPA
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/28/2016
TAGS: OREP [U.S. Congressional Travel] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PGOV
[Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SENATOR SPECTER REVIEWS BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP WITH SENIOR
LIBYAN OFFICIALS

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United
States Liaison Office, DOS.
```

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) In a series of meetings with senior Libyan officials during his August 21-24 trip to Libya, Senator Arlen Spector, Chairman of the Senate Justice Committee, reviewed the bilateral relationship with senior Libyan officials and inquired about prospects for developing a "Libya model" that could be applied to North Korea or Iran. The Libyans continued to claim, almost reflexively, that they "gave up everything and got nothing in return." The Senator, accompanied by CDA, Legislative Assistant Christopher Bradish and P/E Chief, met with the Libyan Leader Moammar Qadhafi, Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the General Peoples Congress Suleiman Shihumi, Secretary of the General Peoples Committee of Justice Ali Hasnawi, Deputy Secretary of the General Peoples Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) Hafiana, and Secretary of the General Peoples Congress (Prime Minister

SIPDIS
equivalent) al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. The Senator's trip partially overlapped with the visit of Congressman Tom Lantos (septel) and several official meetings were combined.

QADHAFI OPINES LIBYA IS THE ONLY COUNTRY THAT ENJOYS DIRECT DEMOCRACY

¶2. (C) Senator Specter and Congressman Lantos were scheduled for separate meetings with Qadhafi August 22, both at a desert encampment in the Sirte governorate. The Specter delegation traveled by U.S. military aircraft to Sirte after all-night negotiations to get additional flight clearances for the plane to re-enter Libyan airspace and make the Tripoli-Sirte roundtrip segment. The Libyan in charge of the CODEL schedules, Secretary of Foreign Affairs of the General People's Congress Suleiman Shihumi, chartered an Air Libya plane from Mitiga International Airport for the Lantos delegation.

¶3. (S) Qadhafi met with the entire Specter delegation after taking a break for evening prayers at the conclusion of his meeting with Congressman Lantos. Qadhafi, clean-shaven and apparently in good health, exchanged pleasantries to open the session, but characteristically engaged in limited eye contact, focusing instead on the cement-lined pond with fountain located adjacent to his three-sided fabric tent while the Senator spoke. While relying on his personal interpreter to translate, Qadhafi at times interjected comments in English, indicating that he understood almost all of the Senator's remarks.

¶4. (S) Specter expressed his hope that as democracy spread throughout the world, citing recent elections in Egypt and Afghanistan, that there would be democracy in Libya in the future. Qadhafi, seemingly somewhat taken aback by this comment, launched into an extensive explanation of the Jamahiriya system of government, telling Senator Specter, "we are the sole country that enjoys direct democracy, we hope the U.S. becomes like Libya, it is the ultimate level of democracy where Libyans rule themselves instead of electing officials to represent them." Qadhafi posited that the U.S. system did not reflect the will of the people, citing U.S. popular opinion against the war in Iraq as a reflection of what Libyans view as a disconnect between U.S. citizens and U.S. government policy. He continued, "there is no ill will between the Libyans and the Americans, the government imposed enmity during the time of Reagan...the personality of the President affects foreign policy but is not a reflection of the people's will. Reagan attacked my house; killed my daughter and killed scores of Libyan people,

but this is not the will of the American people." Qadhafi told Senator Specter that he hoped basic peoples committees could be established in the U.S., as they had been in Libya. Senator Specter told Qadhafi that in his opinion President Reagan did not have any personal animus, but rather responded directly to the Berlin disco bombing. Qadhafi replied that he was turning a page and moving forward since international terrorism was now a common enemy, along with disease, environmental concerns, and other mutual interests.

QADHAFI -- NEW CHANCERY SHOULD NOT BE USED AS PLATFORM TO ENCOURAGE OPPOSITION

¶5. (S) Asked about the prospects for obtaining land to build an Embassy chancery, Qadhafi said, apparently half-seriously, "maybe the Libyans heard the Embassy will be a staging ground for opposition activities and counter-Libyan movements," and "maybe the Libyans don't want a big U.S. Embassy." He continued, "people know that chanceries are for cooperation between states and diplomats shouldn't interfere in internal affairs, but people see U.S. embassies all over the world from other angles." Charge challenged that view and highlighted that the Chancery was an important next step in the bilateral relationship. (As reported septel, in other meetings Libyan leaders told Congressman Lantos that they were looking at alternate properties for siting a new Chancery on lots in downtown Tripoli.) When the Senator enlisted Suleiman Shihumi's support for a new chancery so that U.S. citizens could visit Libya, help with job creation and re-energizing the Libyan economy, Shihumi replied, "we have survived for thirty years without U.S. money and had no problems."

LIBYA MODEL - WE GAVE UP EVERYTHING AND GOT NOTHING IN RETURN

¶6. (S) Senator Specter noted the dramatic shift in U.S.-Libyan relations from the 1980s to now and asked if there was a model that could be applied to the U.S.-Iran relationship. Qadhafi said that Libya urged both North Korea and Iran to give up their WMD programs, but that it had not convinced them because, "if you want Libya to be a model, Libya should get a reward." When the Senator pressed for more specifics, Qadhafi claimed "the U.S. promised the U.S. and Britain would provide peaceful nuclear energy and Libya would be the Japan of North Africa through technical transfers. But nothing happened. Supposedly the U.S., EU and China were going to build us nuclear power stations, this is the reward we were hoping for."

¶7. (S) In a thirty minute session with al-Baghdadi al-Mahmudi earlier in the day, Specter heard the continuing Libyan refrain that it could not serve as a model for continued engagement with North Korea and Iran to give up WMD programs. Al-Mahmudi claimed that the Iranians scorned the Libyans for "giving up everything and getting nothing in return." He called for more dialogue and cooperation, especially in terms of technology transfer. (Embassy Comment: This Libyan refrain has taken on aspects of a ritualistic incantation over the last two years and is usually a bid to put U.S. interlocutors at a disadvantage at the beginning of a conversation. End Comment.)

QADHAFI SEES WIDE RANGING TERRORIST THREAT

¶8. (S) Asked by Senator Specter about concerns regarding religious extremism, Qadhafi said that he was worried about terrorism worldwide -- from Somali religious courts, to Saudi-funded Wahabi movements spreading radicalism through the Horn of Africa all the way to Bali. When Senator Specter asked how we could deal effectively with terrorists, Qadhafi smiled and said, "On the contrary, you support them; you support the Saudi royal family that funds Wahabi fundamentalists." With regard to Somalia, Qadhafi referred to Libyan citizens who

regard to Somalia, Qadhafi referred to Libyan citizens who traveled to Saudi Arabia and were radicalized by the Wahabis and provided funding to start the Islamic Union Movement in Mogadishu.

¶9. (S) Qadhafi asked Specter, "why did the U.S. attack Iraq, when the basis of terrorism is the Saudis?" He claimed that Iraq only became a haven for terrorists after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, elaborating, "If Hussein were around then Zarqawi would not be able to operate." Continuing his recurrent theme of the Wahabi threat, Qadhafi argued that the Saudis had made a deal with al-Qaeda operatives "not to direct violence against their own country". He claimed that the Saudis offered support to al-Qaeda for its attacks on the U.S. and Israel if it would refrain from any further attacks in Saudi Arabia. As evidence, Qadhafi cited a recent prisoner escape in Yemen claiming that the Saudis must have arranged for the Yemenis to release the captives in a "staged escape" because the prisoners "could never have dug a tunnel that long". Qadhafi bolstered his claims by saying that the Saudis provided funding for the Bali bombings.

¶10. (S) Calling for the U.S. to stop engaging with the Saudi monarchy and to call for self-determination by the peoples of the Arabian Peninula, Qadhafi said, "don't go in militarily, but don't support the royal family." When Specter asked, "what if it becomes another Iran?", Qadhafi replied, "anything is better than the current regime." To follow up on this theme, Qadhafi's staff arranged for follow-on meetings for both Senator Spector and Congressman Lantos with Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi the next morning.

COUNTER TERRORISM COOPERATION HIGHLIGHTED BY MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

¶11. (S) Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi held a joint meeting with Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter on August 23, calling for increased cooperation in all aspects of our relationship, specifically technology and knowledge transfer. He reiterated Qadhafi's deep concern with Wahabism and the Saudi government's purported link to Al-Qaeda. Sanussi stated that after 9/11, the GOL was perplexed by US behavior as they expected a "judgment day" for Saudi Arabia, home to a majority of the highjackers, not an invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Sanussi also took credit for the GOL putting Osama bin Laden on an Interpol watch list in 1997, showing that they had an inkling of events to come far in advance of 9/11.

¶12. (S) When Senator Specter pressed Sanussi for solid proof linking Al-Qaeda and Osama bin Laden to the Saudi government, Sanussi orchestrated a subsequent meeting between Congressman Lantos and Mohamed Ismail, a Libyan national imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for 10 months, charged with a plot to assassinate then Crown Prince Abdullah. The Lantos-Ismail discussions are reported septel.

HASNAWI SAYS COURT CASES TO BE RESOLVED BY END OF YEAR

¶13. (C) Secretary Ali Hasnawi of the General Peoples Committee for Justice told Senator Specter that Libya hoped to resolve all outstanding court cases by the end of the year. He said that the lawyers were finalizing negotiations and he was optimistic about positive outcomes. Regarding Lockerbie and other cases, Hasnawi said, "if the courts are involved, we will abide by the courts' ruling." To the follow-up question, "how many will go to court and how many will settle," Hasnawi said that he hoped all the cases would be settled out of court. Regarding the Bulgarian medics case, Hasnawi highlighted the humanitarian needs of the HIV-infected Libyans as well as the judicial procedures. He speculated that it would take two or three

months for a verdict to be reached in the current trial, depending on the defense requests to present additional witnesses or evidence. (Embassy Comment: That timetable seems to have accelerated with the court's August 29 hearing, since subsequent sessions are now scheduled at only one-week intervals, for September 5 and 12.) Hasnawi assured Specter that the high-profile case was receiving the greatest attention by his legal experts and the Libyan leadership. Charge noted our deep concern for the Benghazi children, that the USG offered medical assistance, and was involved in ongoing humanitarian efforts, including the Benghazi International Support Fund.

¶14. (C) Asked for his opinion on the effectiveness of sanctions regimes, Hasnawi said that Libya suffered from isolation as communications with the outside world were reduced and air traffic was cut off. He noted the financial impact of sanctions, especially through lost economic opportunities. In terms of industrial capacity, he emphasized that the energy industry was not able to upgrade any of its facilities and major infrastructure investments were needed at this time. Specter questioned what factors made Libya willing to reconsider its positions and renounce its WMD program. Hasnawi, as did Libyan officials in other meetings, said it was Libya's aspiration to give its people a better way of life, a more secure future living in peace with other countries, that motivated the policy shift. Secretary of International Cooperation of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Mohammed Siala, on the margins of another meeting, told Specter that Libya paid compensation for the Lockerbie bombing "as the price of ending UN sanctions and being able to re-engage with the rest of the world because the settlement cost as less than the revenue losses under sanctions."

SHIHUMI CALLS FOR EXPANDING COMMON INTERESTS - BUT NO MEDDLING

¶15. (C) Secretary of the Foreign Relations Committee of the General Peoples Congress Suleiman Shihumi was the Libyan's official host for the Specter delegation. Shihumi hosted a welcoming dinner at a restaurant next to the historic Marcus Aurelius Arch in the old city. In his introductory meeting with the Senator, Shihumi emphasized that the Jamahiriya was a unique system of government suitable for the Libyan people; "it is not an easy system, but we are evolving and people participate at all levels." Anticipating Qadhafi's later comments about terrorism, Shihumi called for an international conference to identify the root causes and clarify the difference between terrorism and the right of people to defend themselves. He said that Libya was interested in developing broad ties with the U.S. based on common interests, but without any meddling in internal affairs.

LIBYANS DO NOT SEE THE U.S. AS AN UNBIASED PLAYER IN MIDDLE EAST

¶16. (C) Shihumi, in response to the Senator's presentations on U.S. policies and priorities in the region, said that "the scales the U.S. uses in the Middle East are not balanced," continuing, "the U.S. ignored the recent killings at Qana while complaining about other strikes in Israel." Shihumi gave the Libyan perspective that it would take dramatic steps to resolve the current Lebanese-Israeli conflict; "it has given radicals every incentive to act and will only create more Usama Bin Ladens." He claimed that Israel was able to act with impunity since "it has the support and political cover of the U.S. -- it is not looking for compromise solutions." Shihumi claimed that "all Muslims and Arabs" feel the same way. Senator Specter reviewed the many successful U.S. efforts in the interests of peace in the region and said that the U.S. was prepared to talk and listen to concerns. While the U.S. was involved in a wide range of initiatives and peace negotiations, Specter also called for Qadhafi and others to play a constructive role.

ADVOCACY FOR BOEING AIRCRAFT IN EVERY MEETING

¶17. (SBU) Senator Specter advocated on behalf of Boeing in each of his sessions, stressing the firm's competitive advantages. Most Libyan officials welcomed the U.S. interest in commercial aircraft sales, but did not offer any substantive response. (Embassy Comment: Mohammed Siala had previously told Embassy that he thought Libya will most likely purchase equipment from both Boeing and Airbus. End Comment.)

¶18. (SBU) Congressman Lantos and Senator Specter did not clear this cable before departing Tripoli.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI459

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI459 aka Wikileaks id #76973 ?
Subject	LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE ARE THE REWARDS?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 1 Sep 2006 14:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI459.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI472 , 06TRIPOLI478
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/05/2006 08:57:11 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00459

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CONS AMB RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS AID ECON DEA
            DCM DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO263
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0459/01 2441425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011425Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1149
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0388
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1300
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000459

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/31/2016
TAGS: CMGT [Consular Administration and Management] , OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders] ,
PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYANS DISCUSS NON-PROLIFERATION WITH AMB. SCHULTE - WHERE
ARE THE REWARDS?

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison
```

Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Ambassador Schulte conducted extensive discussions on non-proliferation with Libyan officials and the Jamahiriya press August 28-30. The Libyans agreed with our assessment that Iran was working on a weapons program and that it should comply with the IAEA, while stressing that confrontation and deadlines would set back negotiating efforts. Libya anticipates the Iran will use the NAM Summit in Havana to politicize the IAEA report due August 31. Libyans also vented their frustration that there wasn't a "Libya Model" for other countries to follow, based on Libyan perceptions that they have not received tangible rewards for deciding to comply with international norms. If pressed, interlocutors either acknowledge or dismiss our observations of the many advantages that have accrued to Libya since its December 2003 decision to end its WMD programs. Ambassador Schulte met with Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training and Employment (GPCMET) Matouq Matouq and Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, and academics from Al-Fateh University. Ambassador Schulte also held a roundtable discussion with Libyan-based journalists that highlighted U.S. support for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and international concerns over Iran's lack of cooperation with the IAEA. END SUMMARY.

LIBYANS CLAIM LIBYA MODEL DOES NOT OFFER ANY REWARDS

¶2. (C) In a 75 minute meeting with Matouq Matouq and his science advisors -- Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the National Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed Enami of the NBRD -- Ambassador Schulte heard the Libyan's standard opening gambit, " the Libyan case is not a good model for the rest of the world because Libya received no benefits from its decision to give up WMD programs." Matouq oversaw the Libyan WMD program before heading the GPCMET, and in his current position he oversees the related scientific activities under his very broad "employment" mandate. Matouq said, "I know we tell all the Americans the same thing in every meeting, but it is a basic fact that affects everything else we are trying to do." He told Schulte the Iranians "scorned" Libya for giving up something for nothing, and that within Libya, and especially the scientific community, there was an "internal feeling of resentment." He also described Libyan opposition groups in the U.S. and the UK that criticized the Libyan government for its decision to give up the WMD without negotiating for any concrete rewards. Schulte reminded Matouq that Libya reaped major benefits as sanctions were lifted, trade and investment opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession, and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of mutual interest.

¶3. (C) Asked for his assessment of the U.S.-Libyan cooperative activities up until this point, including the conversion of the Tajoura facility, Matouq said that the conversion was complete and successful. He hoped it would be fully operational by the end of September with even better performance than before. He was generally pleased with the on-going scientific engagement program focused on biological life sciences, environmental issues, water management, and mechanical engineering, but he and his colleagues were frustrated that there weren't any "deliverables" to show the Libyan people. While admittedly the Libyan priorities are technology transfer and training, they hoped for some specific, large projects that they could show the Libyan public as the "reward." They wanted the U.S. to build

Libya a nuclear powered plant to desalinate water or generate electricity, or they wanted the U.S. to build a radioactive isotope production facility at Tripoli Medical Center to support cancer research throughout Africa. Matouq's team has also asked for water management assistance, microsatellites for the Remote Sensing Center to work on environmental monitoring, solar energy technology for power generation or water desalination, and desertification prevention assistance.

¶4. (C) When Schulte reviewed the U.S. Global Energy Partnership framework, Matouq responded, "there can't be a double standard; technologies should be disseminated equally to all countries through the IAEA. The UNSC should engage in more outreach to identify and limit WMD capabilities of all countries, while at the same time encouraging more use of nuclear power as a clean and efficient fuel." Matouq, noting Libya's full compliance with IAEA inspections, called for universal, regular inspections by IAEA officials since human interaction was a critical component of building confidence and "cameras can be adjusted." Matouq said he would attend the IAEA General Conference and would press his views in that forum.

IRANIAN INTERNAL POLITICS AND PRESTIGE OF WMD PROGRAMS ARE MOTIVATION

¶5. (C) Matouq's primary concern regarding proliferation was the potential diversion of nuclear material rather than enrichment activities by Iran or other countries. He said, "political assurances are not enough given the regular changes in government leadership." In his view, Iran was determined to "use nuclear to its end," whatever that meant -- the end of its fuel cycle, the end of its destructive power? Matouq, while his science advisors nodded their concurrence, said that in Libya's opinion the Iranian actions added up to weapons program development. He believed that the Ayatollah originated the WMD program in the 1980s, following on whatever research programs might have been underway while the Shah ruled Iran. The WMD program was initially deemed critically important to counter Iraq, but now had taken on even greater significance.

¶6. (C) Ambassador Schulte pressed for Libya to make the point forcefully to Iran that moving forward with its WMD program would only lead to isolation and a lack of prestige. Matouq replied that Iranian internal politics were driving its decisions. Iranian dignity is now invested in its nuclear capability. He broadened the discussion to argue that the conflict in Gaza and the war between Israel and Lebanon only encouraged Iranian fanatics, made it easier for the Muslim Brotherhood to recruit members, and fostered the spread of Wahabi radicalism. Matouq said, "continued Israeli killings inflame public opinion; you must not underestimate how this enrages Muslims." Using graphic language, he continued, "Libyans see Israelis hunting human meat using high-tech U.S. weapons and we can not accept this." Ambassador Schulte replied that the leadership in Tehran was encouraging violence. He also recounted the striking coincidence that the Hezbollah kidnapping of Israeli soldiers and missile attacks on Israel happened directly after Iran rebuffed Solana and the negotiating proposals on non-proliferation. When Matouq countered that "if the Israel and Palestinian problems were resolved, Iran would have less room to maneuver," Schulte agreed and added, " we also need to reframe the issue beyond a U.S-Iran debate and reflect the concern of the entire international community.

¶7. (C) In a subsequent session with Libya's IAEA Governor and Secretary for European Affairs at the General People's Committee

SIPDIS

for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Abdulati Obeidi, Secretary for American Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Ahmed Fatouri, Acting Americas Director Mohammed Hassan Ayaab of

Ahmed Taboul, Acting Americas Director Mohammed Hassan Ayyad of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation and five academics from Al-Fateh University. As Libya's representative to the IAEA, Obeidi highlighted that Libya took the initiative to end its WMD program and had worked closely with the U.S. and UK since December 2003 to resolve any outstanding concerns.

HOW TO ENGAGE WITH IRAN - DEADLINES AND CONFRONTATION WON'T WORK

¶8. (C) Obeidi's message was that Libya is in full agreement that the international community must prevent the spread of WMD. It wants to show that differences can be solved through peaceful negotiation. However, Obeidi advised, UNSC resolutions would not lead Iran to give up its program. Pressure, confrontation and challenge only make the Iranians more likely to take a defiant stand in Obeidi's assessment. He believed that Iran would try to avert straightforward compliance requests by converting issues into a political debate about national rights in the NAM and other public fora. "Political groups like the NAM will support the Iranians' position without fully comprehending the technical aspects of the case," Obeidi continued.

¶9. (C) "We agree the Iranians are playing for time," Obeidi said, "but you are helping them; why can there be no discussions on enrichment?" Obeidi said that more realistic positions with specific next steps could gain support, whereas setting a date for sanctions implementation would only strengthen the Iranian defiance. He said Libya was ready to work closely with the U.S. and others at the General Conference and at the NAM to keep Iran moving in the right direction, but that deadlines would not help.

¶10. (C) Ambassador Schulte emphasized to Obeidi and the other participants that Iran was trying to shift the debate from substantive points to a "denial of rights" whereas nuclear power encompassed not only rights but also obligations. Anticipating that Iran would try to highjack the NAM summit in Havana, it was important for other countries to convince them that security, respect and prestige are assured through international cooperation. The U.S. looked to Libya and others to make that point, especially since Iran continued to delay access by IAEA inspectors. Obeidi said that he looked forward to working with Ambassador Schulte in Vienna.

LIBYANS FRUSTRATED AT DIFFICULTY OBTAINING U.S. VISAS

¶11. (C) Although the Libyans did not grant the Embassy permission to conduct public diplomacy at Al-Fateh University, the Americas Desk did arrange for five chemistry and engineering professors to sit in on the Obeidi meeting and then host Ambassador Schulte for lunch. The professors were not interested in discussing policy, but did make clear their desire for U.S. funded projects in the fields of science and technology. All but one of the professors studied in the U.S. during the 1960s and hoped that they would be able to visit there again and send more students for graduate work. They noted the extreme difficulty to obtain U.S. visas since most Libyans are unwilling to travel to Tunisia for interviews at the consulate. The academics also acknowledged that most younger Libyans had limited English language skills and might not pass the TOEFL requirements to enter a graduate program. Schulte's carefully crafted presentation resonated with the Libyan interlocutors, even the Al-Fateh University science professors who professed to have no interest in policy.

PRESS QUESTIONS U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

¶12. (C) Twenty Libya-based journalists and photographers attended a press roundtable with Ambassador Schulte for an hour-long session on nonproliferation issues. There were also many questions about U.S. policy in the Middle East and the U.S. role in the recent violence in Israel and Lebanon. One reporter queried, "why would Libya give up its relatively good relationship with Iran to align with the U.S. on this issue?" and Ambassador Schulte pointed out that it was not a U.S.-Iran issue, but a matter of grave concern to the international community. The IAEA had a clear position that reflected over three years of review. Several questions focused on the Israeli WMD program and questioned why the U.S. was not emphasizing the need for action against Israel -- with the response that the U.S. would support a Middle East free of nuclear weapons and that progress on the Middle East peace process was an important next step, along with the U.S. vision of two states living side by side in peace. As long as the leadership in Tehran opposes that vision and actively works against peace by trying to spark violence, it is deflecting attention from its lack of compliance with international obligations. Members of the Libyan press contacted Embassy staff after the roundtable to express their appreciation for the Ambassador's outreach efforts, commenting on his effective and thoughtful commentary.

¶13. (U) Ambassador Schulte did not have an opportunity to clear this message before his departure.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI466

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI466 aka Wikileaks id #77307 ?
Subject	LIBYAN VIEWS ON UNSC RESOLUTION 1695 -- "WE AGREE AND DON'T ENGAGE WITH NORTH KOREA"
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 6 Sep 2006 12:48 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI466.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/07/2006 02:50:19 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00466

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   DEA DCM DAO CONS AMB AID RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT
            IPS ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO361
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0466 2491248
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 061248Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1157
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0298
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0089
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0391
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0522
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0011
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0071
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0422
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0196
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0005
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1310
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000466

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, ISN/CPI, EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/6/2016
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , WMD, KNNP [Nuclear Non-
```

Proliferation] , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KN *[Korea (North)]* , KS *[Korea (South)]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN VIEWS ON UNSC RESOLUTION 1695 -- "WE AGREE AND DON'T ENGAGE WITH NORTH KOREA"

REF: STATE 146316

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. EMBASSY TRIPOLI, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
(C) September 6, Charge and P/E Chief delivered reftel points to Ambassador Abdulati Obeidi, Secretary of European Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent). Obeidi is also a primary interlocutor in the U.S.-Libyan bilateral relationship, Libya's representative to the IAEA Board of Governorsand and lead official on WMD issues. Obeidi said that Libya shared the concern of the international community and therefore was no longer engaged with North Korea. In response to our detailed list of actions that would stop North Korea from accessing material and financing for missile programs Obeidi replied, "speak with the Russians and the Chinese; we have no dealings with North Korea; we will cooperate with everyone to implement the resolution."

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI472

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	06TRIPOLI472 aka Wikileaks id #77376 ?
Subject	LIBYAN SCIENTISTS DETAIL PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 6 Sep 2006 17:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI472.html
References	06TRIPOLI454 , 06TRIPOLI459
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/07/2006 03:55:53 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00472

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   AID AMB DEA ECON IPS LEGAT CONS DAO DCM ORA PA
            OMC RSO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO696
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0472/01 2491753
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061753Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1174
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0405
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0004
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1328
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000472

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, VCI, PM, G, OES
CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDIONE
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/31/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , EAID [Foreign Economic
```

Assistance] , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SCIENTISTS DETAIL PRIORITIES FOR COOPERATIVE EFFORTS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 459 B) TRIPOLI 454 C) TRIPOLI 201

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Liaison Office, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Scientists working at the National Bureau for Research and Development, linked to the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training and Employment (GPCMET) headed by Matouq Matouq have used a number of recent meetings to detail the types of projects that they hoped would result from Libya's decision to give up its WMD program. They are focused on developing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and preparing Libya for the challenges it faces from an expanding population and dwindling water supply. During the recent visit of Ambassador Schulte, reported reftel (a), Matouq and his team asked for specific projects in the nuclear field as well as a cooperative agreement to provide an overarching framework. Qadhafi told Senator Specter during a meeting August 23, reported reftel (b), that he believed the U.S. had offered to build him nuclear powered facilities and help with technology transfer to "make Libya the Japan of North Africa." During a NASA cooperative effort on solar physics in March, Libyan scientists also conveyed their wish list of cooperative efforts, reported reftel (c). A recent meeting of the TSCC Nuclear Subcommittee also focused on the scope of scientific cooperation desired by Matouq's team (reported septel).

WHAT LIBYANS WOULD CONSIDER THE "REWARD" FOR GIVING UP WMD?

¶2. (C) Matouq Matouq and his science advisors, Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the National Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD) and Dr. Mohammed Enami of the NBRD , regularly harangue U.S. delegations that "the Libyan case is not a good model for the rest of the world because it received no benefits from its decision to give up WMD programs." If pressed, many interlocutors will acknowledge that Libya reaped significant benefits as sanctions were lifted: trade and investment opportunities flowed to Libya, Libya was offered WTO accession, and world leaders began to consult with Libya on matters of mutual interest. However, other interlocutors, including Qadhafi and officials at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation fixate on the "rewards" to open almost any conversation about bilateral relations. It seems that the Libyan leadership has determined they need some "deliverables" to show the Libyan people, especially to counter criticism of the Jamahiriya regime by Libyan opposition groups, other Arab countries and Iran. While the Libyan priorities are still primarily technology transfer and training, they hoped for some specific, large projects that they could show the Libyan public as the "reward."

¶3. (C) During the last few months, the Libyans have highlighted the following activities that they would consider "reward" for giving up WMD. In their view, if they had these tangible projects to show the rest of the world, they could then argue for a "Libya Model" that might apply to other countries. During a recent meeting with Senator Specter reported septel, Qadhafi said that he had been told the U.S. and other countries would build nuclear power plants in Libya and that his country would become the, "Japan of North Africa."

¶4. (C) The Libyans would like to see the following projects supported by the U.S. At times, different Libyan interlocutors have insisted that the U.S.G. should fund the activities as compensation of the value of the WMD equipment that we took back to U.S. In the August 29 meeting between Matouq and Ambassador

Schulte reported reftel (a), Matouq said that Libya had the funding needed for any of the projects, but it sought technical assistance and training.

THE LIST OF REWARDS

¶5. (C). As a first step, Matouq would like to see feasiblity studies conducted by U.S. firms for nuclear power generation in Libya. The list of project priorities also includes the following:

* nuclear power generation for Libya - possibly for exporting power to other countries

* nuclear powered water desalination plants

* a nuclear medicine center at the Tripoli Medical Center with the ability to develop radioactive isotopes.

* solar energy technology for power generation

* solar energy technology for water processing - both desalination and waste water management

* microsatellites for the Libyan Remote Sensing Center to use in urban planning and environmental monitoring. They also request licensing for high-resolution images received by U.S. satellites to further work in desertification studies and water resource management.

* technical and scientific training related to desertification prevention, sandstorm research, desert geology, disaster monitoring and meterorite studies

* water management projects

* an international project or bilateral project to build a new telescope in the Libyan desert.

¶6. (C) Matouq and his team are generally pleased with the ongoing scientific cooperation projects that are currently underway on biological life sciences, mechanical engineering, water management and nuclear medicine, but they are looking for "big-ticket" items that they can use to expand scientific research, generate employment, and counter criticism. Training activities and visitor programs to exchange information may be what the Libyans need, but it doesn't help them with their public perception problems. Although the U.S. is expending significant time and energy assisting with Libya's chemical weapons destruction program, Libyans do not consider that assistance as a "reward". On their balance sheet, the U.S. does not get credit for activities that we intitiate or fund - - paying for the removal of their dangerous materials, or helping convert their Tajoura facility from HEU to LEU, or offering a million dollar grant for Avian flu prevention, or any of our many other bilateral programs.

¶7. (C) The Libyan scientists are reaching out to the G8 countries, especially France, Japan, and Russia, to request assistance with the same list of projects. Both the French and Japanese have signed cooperative agreements that are non-specific but pledge future collaboration in these areas. When the Japanese Ambassador to Libya was describing his strategy, he acknowledged that some of the Libyan objectives are unrealistic. He said," we know that a radioactive isotope facility may not be cost effective for the Libyans or a good business model, but if they want it and are willing to pay for it, we will help them move forward. The cooperative effort between our two countries is more important than the final outcome; we will gain significant benefits from the process of working together even if the results are not a guaranteed success."

success.

¶8. (C) While post looks to the TSCC nuclear subcommittee (proceedings reported septel) to determine the appropriate scope of nuclear cooperation, as export license restrictions are being revised, hopefully some of the Libyan priorities will be able to move forward in the short term, particularly on solar energy applications. We appreciate NEA/RA and ISN efforts to continue the scientific engagement activities already underway. If OES organizes a delegation to visit Libya, U.S. officials should be prepared to address the Libyan priorities, along with clear guidance on whether or not an activity is feasible, and if so, what timelines are possible. If delegation members can provide ballpark cost estimates, Matouq and others in the Libyan leadership can begin working through their convoluted system to set aside funds for the activities. Post is also following up on the cooperation efforts explored with the General Peoples Committees during the Dobriansky delegation visit. Given the lack of coordination in the Libyan Jamahiriya (translate: state of the masses) government, we will attempt to ascertain the additional priority opportunities in health, agriculture and environment fields that are not reflected in the list presented by Matouq's group of scientists.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI475

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI475 aka Wikileaks id #77504 ?
Subject	LARGEST LIBYAN INVESTMENT COMPANY DEVOTES CAPITAL RESOURCES TO US FOR FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 7 Sep 2006 14:27 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI475.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/12/2006 01:59:07 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00475

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO012
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0475/01 2501427
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071427Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1178
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1332
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0408
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0096
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0197
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0525
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0299
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000475

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LARGEST LIBYAN INVESTMENT COMPANY DEVOTES CAPITAL RESOURCES
```

TO US FOR FIRST TIME IN 20 YEARS

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. The Chairman & General Manager of Libya's largest investment company, the Libyan Foreign Investment Company (LFICO), recently met with Econoff to discuss the company's history and future prospects for investment. LFICO, government owned and established in 1981, is moving away from its previous focus on investments in Africa and turning more towards the Middle East, Europe, and even the US. The company's portfolio, while diverse, has an emphasis on the hotel and agriculture industries, especially in neighboring Egypt. This month, LFICO, part owner of the Maltese-based Corinthia Hotel Group, formally announced its first major post-sanctions deal with a US company, Dallas based Wyndham Hotel Group, and is also investing in bio-diesel plants in Houston. END SUMMARY.

COMPANY BACKGROUND

¶2. (SBU) Econoff reviewed LFICO's current activities and future plans with General Manager and Chairman Abdulfatah Sharif on August 16th. Established in 1981 under the name Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company (LAFICO), the company is wholly owned by the General People's committee that serves as the equivalent of a Ministry of Trade and Economy and managed by a board of directors. The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank (LAFB), the parent of the LFICO, is controlled by Libya's central bank. Approximately 200 LFICO employees work in the company's headquarters in Gharyan, a desert town 80 miles south of Tripoli, while approximately 100 operate in overseas offices located in Cairo, Valletta, Rome and other capitals. LFICO operates in some ways like other Jamahiriya entities, with Libya based employees receiving a relatively modest government salary, while those posted abroad are compensated with higher wages in dollars or euros. Sharif, an economist by training, started with the company in the late 1980's and worked his way up to his present position. Sharif said the company, with a present capital of US 2 billion, is moving away from the trend of investing in African companies, a portfolio now being managed by its subsidiary, the Libyan African Investment Company.

EMPHASIS ON HOTEL AND AGRICULTURE INDUSTRIES

¶3.(SBU) Sharif described LFICO's investment portfolio as diverse, but primarily centered around the hotel and agriculture industries. In neighboring Egypt, where LFICO maintains 22 full time employees, the company as a heavy stake in the hotel industry, owning 15% of the Conrad, 20% of the Ramses Hilton, as well as shares in the Sheraton and JW Marriott. It recently purchased 100% of the high end Four Seasons Hotel in Sharm Al-Sheikh. Sharif characterizes the hotel industry as "less risky than manufacturing," a motivating factor in their investment strategy. The company also own approximately 30,000 acres of agricultural land in Egypt, mainly utilized for agricultural investment projects and cultivating fruits and vegetables. LFICO boasts an assortment of other investments throughout Europe, North Africa, and China, where it has invested in the textile and electronics industries. In Europe, much of its capital is focused on Italy, its former colonizer, where it purchased 2% of Fiat. In 2001, LFICO bought 7.5% of Italian soccer club Juventus, and Qadhafi's soccer aficionado son Al-Saadi sits on the board. LFICO also owns 15% of Tamoil Europe and has over 500 million USD worth of real estate investments in the UK.

US INVESTMENTS

¶4. (SBU) With the lifting of US sanctions on Libya, LFICO has started to reenter the US market, where its assets were frozen in 1986. In what Sharif characterizes as LFICO's most significant post-sanctions investment in the US, on August 10,

the Maltese based Corinthia Group of Companies, 47% owned by LFICO, announced an agreement with the Wyndham Hotel Group to jointly manage 15 existing Corinthia hotels under the Wyndham and Ramada brands in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa regions. According to the manager of the Corinthia in Tripoli, the location of the US Embassy, the details of the agreement have yet to be finalized, but many four-star Corithia Hotels in Europe and the Middle East will take on the Ramada name, while some five star hotels will take on the Wyndham logo. The companies will also start to merge hotel management services, sales and marketing teams. LFICO also recently purchased 50% of a bio-diesel plant from the Geogreen company operating out of Houston, Texas. According to Sharif, Geogreen and LFICO plan to open several new bio-diesel plants in Texas over the next two years. LFICO is also actively investing in the NYSE, NASDAQ, and Chicago Exchange Market.

¶5. (SBU) COMMENT. Prior to the ending of sanctions, company management had been elusive with western media about sharing information on its investment portfolio. Econoff provided Sharif with the contact information for appropriate interlocutors at the Department of Commerce, and encouraged him to get in touch with them regarding any inquiries they might have on investment in the US . END COMMENT.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI476

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI476 aka Wikileaks id #77523 ?
Subject	LIBYA SUBMITS GRANT APPLICATION FOR HHS ASSISTANCE IN PANDEMIC/AVIAN INFLUENZA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 7 Sep 2006 15:33 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI476.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI644
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/12/2006 01:59:35 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00476

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   AID MGT POL NAMRU IPS FAS DCM

DISSEMINATION: SCI
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO157
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0476/01 2501533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071533Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1180
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0410
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0014
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0527
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0301
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0098
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0199
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0436
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1334
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000476

SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG, GAVITO, NEA/RA, OES FOR SENSENEY; AMMAN FOR
WHITTLESLEY; HHS FOR JANE COURY, BILL STEIGER; CAIRO FOR
HARRINGTON, NAMRU-3 DR. MANSOUR, DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE, DR.
BRUCE BOYNTON
```

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO *[Biological and Medical Science]* , OSCI *[Science Grants]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SUBMITS GRANT APPLICATION FOR HHS ASSISTANCE IN PANDEMIC/AVIAN INFLUENZA

¶1. SUMMARY: On August 29-31, 2006 Dr. Mustafa Mansour of Navy Medical Research Unit -3 of Cairo, and ESTH officer met with Dr. Abduhafid Abudher of the Libyan National (African) Center for Infectious Disease Control to finalize a grant application for U.S. assistance to the Libyan Government in public health issues associated with influenza preparedness. The Libyans finalized a $1 Million grant application/request, as offered by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to the Libyan General People's Committee for Health and Environment (GPCHE) as a non-competitive grant award. The application was then locally approved and signed by Mr. Habeb Tamer, the Undersecretary of the GPCHE. Pending HHS approval, the application will fully obligate the funds in FY06 monies for use by the GPCHE in FY07. END SUMMARY.

HHS Grant Fulfills Cooperative Agreement Signed in July:

¶2. During HHS Deputy Secretary Alex Azar's July visit to Tripoli, Dr. Tamer and Mr. Azar signed an agreement to participate in a cooperative initiative for the development of public health and security, with particular reference to public health incidents related to influenza. Attached to this agreement was an offer by HHS to provide the GPCHE a non-competitive grant in the amount of USD$1 Million to foster this cooperation through continued partnerships in disease surveillance, preparedness and response capabilities. The grant application signed by Mr. Tamer and Dr. Mansour on August 31, 2006 aimed to fully obligate these funds to set up sentinel site staff and capabilities that integrated with Libya's existing disease surveillance infrastructure.

Libyan Application Structured to Address Three Pillars of Preparedness:

¶3. HHS provided Dr. Mansour with an outline of a desired format for the proposal with some suggested benchmarks and areas of consideration that would be included in such an application. Dr. Abudher reviewed this outline, and presented it to the combined Libyan Committee for Public Health which consists of representatives from the GPCHE and the General People's Committee for Agriculture (GPCA). The GPCA has dominion over the veterinary portion of disease surveillance and reporting. The group modified and completed the outline. The combined committee was concerned that the document would not reflect Libya's existing disease surveillance and reporting capabilities, and ensured that the language in the proposal stated the grant money would be used to strengthen existing institutions, not establish new ones. This was a very important point to both the GPCHE and GPCA leadership, and was reiterated several times to Dr. Mansour and ESTH Officer.

¶4. The application was titled: Surveillance and Response to Highly Pathogenic Avian and Pandemic Influenza in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, submitted in response to the RFP issued by the HHS Office of the Secretary, Office of Public Health and Science, Office of Global Health Affairs. The application includes measures to address the three pillars of pandemic preparedness: a) Preparedness and Communication, b) Surveillance and Detection, c) Response and Containment. Using these three pillars, a schedule of proposed activities through FY07 was established and agreed upon by the Libyans and Dr. Mansour. The

schedule outlined specific activities and the associated funding requested for each activity, as well as a separate section to allow for supplemental payments to sentinel and management staff that will be involved with the program.

Libyan Committed to Accountability and Achieving Benchmarks:

¶5. Dr. Abudher was very concerned about meeting the U.S. expectations for the application, and paid strict attention to how the monies were allocated. He asked how the grant would be dispensed, managed and accounted. He and Mr. Tamer recommended establishing an account with two to three guardians with access to the funds. They were open to suggestions from HHS, and welcomed any input in this matter. They were also concerned about how the program would be benchmarked or evaluated, and sought input on a means of accountability to the timeline and scheduled activities. They understood that the program was intended as a starting point for cooperation between U.S. and Libyan health communities, and were very excited about the opportunities for interaction that this program offered. They will be seeking increased U.S. participation in Libyan health issues beyond the initial influenza program, and believe the HHS initiative will foster the working level relationships necessary to broaden the scope of cooperation.

Next Steps:

¶6. HHS and the GPCHE will continue work on the specifics of the funds transfer, as well as the accountability to the schedule. Activities are planned in each of the three pillars that include either Libyan participation in regional workshops and programs, or visits to Libya by topical specialists. These activities will continue working level contact and develop further cooperation between the U.S. and Libya. Mr. Tamer and Dr. Abudher understand that this initial agreement is a framework for evaluating opportunities for further cooperation and establishing new programs. Pending approval from HHS of the grant application, the Libyans are ready to move on the planned schedule of activities. The only caveat to their eagerness is that the Ramadan season begins September 23, and this will certainly slow the initial progress of activities, but there is every opportunity to have the program fully functioning by the end of November.

¶7. U.S. travelers proposing grant-related travel to Libya should allow a minimum of eight weeks for visa approvals to be processed. Similarly, Libyans must travel to Embassy Tunis to apply for visas and interagency proposals. Follow-on activities should factor a minimum of eight weeks lead time if training in the U.S. is offered. Any planned workshops that can be arranged in Cairo at the NAMRU-3 facility, pending facility availability, should be considered to minimize issues related to visa restrictions for travelers.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI478

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI478 aka Wikileaks id #77882 ?
Subject	CHARGE REVIEWS IRAN-NAM, LEBANON-SCR 1701, AND DETAINEE TRANSFER WITH MFA U/S FOR AMERICAS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 11 Sep 2006 11:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI478.html
References	06TRIPOLI459
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/12/2006 02:08:17 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00478

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO436
OO RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0478 2541127
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111127Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1183
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0025
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1337
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000478

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, S/WCI, NEA/RA, NEA/ELA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/11/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes] , LE [Lebanon] , IR [Iran] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: CHARGE REVIEWS IRAN-NAM, LEBANON-SCR 1701, AND DETAINEE
TRANSFER WITH MFA U/S FOR AMERICAS

REF: A) STATE 148157  B) STATE 149133  C) STATE 149041  D) STATE 147086
```

NOTAL) E) Tripoli 459

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) During a September 10 meeting with General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA) Under Secretary for the Americas Ahmed Al-Fitouri, Charge discussed Ref A points urging Libyan support for the full implementation of UNSCR 1701, and Ref B points urging that Libya oppose development of a common NAM position in support of Iran's nuclear program. Per Refs C and D, Charge also ensured that GPCFLIC (MFA) was aware that Libyan national Abu Faraj Al-Libi was among the fourteen senior Al-Qaeda members transferred to DOD custody in Guantanomo and would receive the same standard of treatment as all other detainees in Guantanomo.

¶2. (C) On Lebanon, Fitouri replied that Libya was providing humanitarian contributions of food, medicine and housing construction in the south. Libya intends to channel its assistance to Lebanon through the Arab League, Fitouri said. Fitouri asked that the U.S. also look at how UNESCO World Heritage sights in Lebanon could be better protected from damage during hostilities.

¶3. (C) On Iran at the NAM, Fitouri noted that the GOL had taken note of similar points made by visiting UNVIE Ambassador Schulte during his August 28-30 visit here (Ref E).

¶4. (C) On Abu Faraj Al-Libi, Fitouri thanked us for the information and said he would ensure relevant authorities were aware of it.

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI487

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI487 aka Wikileaks id #78044 ?
Subject	PROPOSED COOPERATION WITH LIBYAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES IN TRAINING AND BOARD CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 12 Sep 2006 13:27 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI487.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/12/2006 06:26:57 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00487

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   POL NAMRU IPS FAS DCM AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: SCI
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO927
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0487/01 2551327
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121327Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1191
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1349
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0412
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0016
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0534
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0100
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0438
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000487

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG GAVITO, NEA/RA, OES FOR SENSENEY, HHS FOR
COURY AND STIEGER, CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE, NAMRU 3 FOR
DR. BOYNTON AND DR. MANSOUR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO [Biological and Medical Science] , OEXC [Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations] , LY [Libya]
```

SUBJECT: PROPOSED COOPERATION WITH LIBYAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES IN TRAINING AND BOARD CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES

¶1. SUMMARY: On August 30, 2006, ESTH officer and Dr. Mustafa Mansour of the Navy Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU 3) in Cairo, visited the Libyan Board of Medical Specialties to follow up on the July visit of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Deputy Secretary Alex Azar. DepSec Azar and the Board agreed to collaborate, expand and improve Libya's medical board certification process with particular attention to creating recognized certifications in sub-specialties. The Libyans were challenged by ESTH officer to determine what sort of cooperation or workshop programs would benefit the board, and they responded with two reasonable proposals. The first was a basic discussion on the benefits, feasibility and technology associated with a telemedicine program. The second proposal was for the Libyans to fully fund a series of workshop visits by U.S. physicians, capable of conducting sub-specialty focused workshops in a continuing education capacity, with a secondary goal of discussing and evaluating the board certification criteria in the relevant sub-specialty during the visit. END SUMMARY.

Medical Board Hopes for Sustained Mutual Cooperation

¶2. DepSec Azar met in July with President of the Libyan Board of Medical Specialties Dr. Mustafa M. Zaidi. Dr. Zaidi was not able to attend the August 30 Embassy coordination session, but his priorities were presented by the three following board members:

--Dr. Elhadi Hussein, Consultant of Urology and Andrology to Libyan Board of Medical Specialties
--Dr. Abdulhalim Shebani, Specialist Surgeon (ENT), Director of International Cooperation for Libyan Board
--Dr. Gasem Amar Baruni, Chairman of Examination Committee, Libyan Medical Board

The Board had retained a great deal of excitement from Mr. Azar's visit, and was adamant about not "letting the fire grow cold" on U.S. cooperation with the Libyan medical community. The group's proposals are focused and reasonable, but they are concerned that their practical efforts will be fruitless if they do not lead to institutional cooperation between the Libyan government and the U.S. government. They expressed their understanding of the importance of personal relationships in such cooperation, but showed an insightful knowledge of how sustained institutional / federal cooperation could enhance the board's capabilities and international standing.

Libyans Propose Enhancing Medical Board Certification Process
---

¶3. The board members proposed "concrete" programs to enhance Libya's medical board certification process, first, expanding Libya's ability to certify (with credibility) physicians in sub-specialties. Visiting U.S. physicians would be asked to conduct workshops with a secondary focus on examining and enhancing the Libyan Board's certification process for the relevant sub-specialty. The Libyans offered to fully fund the travel, lodging and expenses of the visiting physicians. A workshop on laparoscopic techniques is the boards first priority. ESTH officer asked if there were particular techniques or procedures in which they were interested, or if they were interested in a more general endoscopic workshop. The board restated that a general workshop on laparoscopic techniques was ideal, and that they preferred a U.S. physician capable of evaluating/improving their related sub-specialty board certification process. They were also open to any technological aspects that could be added to such a presentation

such as partnering with equipment manufacturers to demonstrate or provide equipment familiar to the visiting surgeon.

¶4. As a sample visit itinerary, the Libyan Board suggested the following:

--A one week visit to Tripoli fully funded (Travel, Lodging and Per Diem)
--Conduct workshop lectures in the Libyan Medical Board conference auditorium.
--Perform Rounds in a local hospital with the aim of discussing management practice and bedside manner
--Lead or observe a series of surgical procedures (at Physicians discretion)
--(ESTH Officer also recommended cadaver labs or animal labs if the surgeon so desired)
--Evaluate and discuss board certification procedures and examinations. Provide feedback and recommend areas for improvement.

Libyans Seek Assistance in Developing Telemedicine Program

¶5. In addition, the board members were interested in discussing medical information technology issues, with regard to developing a comprehensive telemedicine program for Libya. ESTH Officer is working with local medical IT providers and the Embassy Family Nurse Practitioner, a former telemedicine unit manager, to arrange a presentation to the board detailing hardware, software and hospital infrastructure requirements necessary for such a program.

¶6. The board mentioned several long term proposals that were in line with DepSec Azar's July discussions, including a visit for 4-6 of the board members to the U.S. to work toward strengthening their board evaluation and examination procedures. ESTH Officer agreed to pass the request to HHS and OES. Please advise department interest in pursuing such a program.

Next Steps:

¶7. ESTH Officer will meet with the Libyan Board again on the week of September 17-21 (before the beginning of Ramadan) to discuss the proposed cooperative programs. The Libyan Board made clear their desire to maintain the momentum generated by Mr. Azar's visit, and showed their good faith by offering to fund the travel of U.S. physicians/surgeons to conduct the workshops. Their proposed visit to the U.S. would provide an excellent opportunity for the board members to discuss their processes and procedures and observe, first-hand, U.S. evaluation and examination procedures. The trip would also engender a great deal of good-will within the Libyan health community. If OES, HHS or NAMRU 3 have additional insights or particular interest in participation in such programs, please notify Embassy Tripoli.

¶8. Although the Libyan Board has agreed to support visa issuance for travel related to their proposals, any U.S. travelers planning travel to Libya should allow a minimum of eight weeks for visa approvals to be processed. Similarly, Libyans must travel to Embassy Tunis to apply for visas, and any proposals for activities including Libyan travel to the U.S. should factor a minimum of eight weeks lead time for visa issuance.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI494

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI494 aka Wikileaks id #78379 ?
Subject	EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S EAC IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY DAMASCUS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 Sep 2006 12:58 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI494.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/19/2006 11:20:00 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00494

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: RSO
    INFO:   POL IPS DCM

DISSEMINATION: RSO
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO875
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0494/01 2571258
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 141258Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1201
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0414
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0543
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1361
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000494

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/OPO/FPD, NEA/EX

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/14/2016
TAGS: ASEC [Security] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S EAC IN RESPONSE TO ATTACK ON EMBASSY
DAMASCUS

REF: N/A

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, Charge', U.S. Embassy - Tripoli,
DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (g)
```

¶1. (SBU) Charge' convened an EAC to discuss Embassy Tripoli's current security stance in light of the September 12 attack on Embassy Damascus, and last week's attack near Embassy Kabul. Present at the EAC were CDA(A), MGT, MED, DAO, RMAS, POL/ECON, Consular and the Acting RSO.

¶2. (S/NF) RMAS and RSO advised the EAC on the information that they received from open sources regarding the attack in Damascus. RMAS reported that they did not have any credible threats directed towards Libya.

¶3. (S/NF) The RSO discussed the current security posture at post. He briefed on a meeting he and Charge' held earlier in the day with RSO's security contact (Libyan External Security Organization (ESO) Col. Nuri Mokhtar) to discuss post's unresolved security issues. (Note: Since ESO has responsibilities for diplomatic security in Libya, RSO is compelled to interface with them rather than Libyan law enforcement entities on phsyical security matters. End Note.)

¶4. (S/NF) Below is the detailed list of the issues discussed at the EAC, in the earlier meeting on the 12th and over the past 24 months. (Several of the issues were raised again with ESO Director Musa Kusa in a September 13 meeting, see para. 5.)

(a) The Embassy's villa annex (housing RMAS, IRM classified commo, and DAO classified commo.) is 8 kilometers from the Embassy and is housed in a villa at the end of a street terminating in a cul-de-sac. Five months ago, the Embassy installed a drop-arm device that would restrict access and afford 30 meters of set-back. The drop-arm was initially installed with an agreement from the ESO that it could be used and manned by Embassy staff. Once installed however, the ESO stated that neither Embassy staff, nor existing ESO guards at the site would be permitted to operate the drop bar. This vehicle barrier is currently in the "up" position leaving the annex vulnerable to a VBIED attack. Post and visiting delegations have repeatedly raised this problem since the drop arm's installation.

(b) Additional ESO/law enforcement support was requested for the annex and the Embassy (housed in the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel). The hotel and annex currently have one ESO vehicle each allotted for protection. The RSO has pointed out that the vehicle at the Embassy is over 100 yards away and practically useless in the event of an attack, particularly a building over-run. More often than not, this vehicle has unarmed guards without radios. Note: RSO does not consider the ESO to be adequate in the counterattack realm. The organization lacks doctrine, training and equipment with regards to countering an attack. The vehicle placed at the annex is a small Toyota Corolla and, often but not always, has been used as a blocking vehicle directly underneath the open drop bar. We pointed out that the vehicle is a blocking vehicle is a poor alternative to the purpose-built drop-arm.

(c) The closure of two driveways in front of the hotel (to afford additional setback for the embassy) was requested. Based on commercial concerns, the hotel management has been hesitant to agree to initiate security measures in the hotel. The hotel currently has three driveways in front of the property. The first allows vehicles to park directly in front of the hotel while the second and third driveways are approximately 20 and 40 meters away from the hotel. Last year, the hotel was willing to close the entrance (but not the exit) end of the first driveway. Therefore, all three driveways remain open to vehicles and VBIED attack. We reminded ESO that within 100 feet of the glass-fronted lobby (well within the first and second drive-way) a small amount of TNT, or equivalent, would cause devastating damage to the lobby portion of the hotel

damage to the lobby portion of the hotel.

(d) The Embassy is currently located on floors 5-8 in tower one of the hotel. An individual departing the common elevators can enter the Embassy with minimal restriction because for insurance reasons, the hotel requires that doors be kept open between the corridors and the elevator area. The Libyan government (GOL) had prohibited the Embassy from providing its guards with self-defense tools. Also, the ESO does little to restrict pedestrian entrance to the elevators. The RSO requested that all embassy doors be shut and a service elevator be blocked from reaching embassy floors. During a recent incident, a female EDP attempted to enter the embassy floors and speak with the Charge' and it took over twenty mintues to convince ESO to remove her. We explained to the ESO (and to the hotel management repeatedly over the past two years) that if the hallway doors were shut and locked, the embassy would have some security and access control. The RSO has also raised concerns that the hotel may be under surveillance.

(e) The ESO liaison officer's response to these requests were that they would "respond soon." This has been a common, oft heard response.

¶5. (S/NF) Charge' used a pre-existing September 14 meeting between visiting OBO Real Estate Director and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa to raise the aforementioned security issues at a higher level. RMAS Chief and RSOwee alo pesen. Kusa stated that he would review our requests. After expressing confidence that the Libyan authorities would never allow an attack to reach implementation, Kusa questioned the utility of the drop arm noting that while it would force a detonation further out toward the street, people would still die . He eventually allowed that if Libyans living behind the drop bar do not object, he will allow its operation. He asked ESO BG Muhammad Ajaj, to report back to him on our hotel-related requests.

¶6. (C) Charge also flagged our security concerns for MFA North America Director Mohammed Al-Ayyaib in a September 13 meeting. The Embassy will continue to work with the Libyan authorities to address these security issues.

¶7. (S/NF) The EAC also discussed the on-going development of post's Emergency Action Plan along with our current personal security, especially driving practices. The need to vary routes and times of embassy vehicles including school buses was discussed. The EAC also reviewed its motor vehicle policy regarding transporting EFM's during emergency situations.

¶8. (S/NF) Without more specific and credible information, the EAC agreed, that the embassy would remain operational and would not curtail any of its upcoming events. The EAC proposed that a meeting with the director of the ESO be requested.

¶9. (SBU) Post will re-convene the EAC should new information arise.

BERRY
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI497

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI497 aka Wikileaks id #78380 ?
Subject	POSSIBLE INCIDENT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EASTERN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 Sep 2006 13:00 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI497.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/14/2006 04:41:08 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00497

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: RSO
    INFO:   IPS DCM POL

DISSEMINATION: RSO
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO879
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0497 2571300
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 141300Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1205
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0303
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0417
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0545
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1365
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000497

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/NEA, DS/IP/ITA, NEA/EX, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/14/2016
TAGS: ASEC [Security] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE INCIDENT OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN EASTERN LIBYA

REF: N/A

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United
States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: On September 1, 2006, an unknown group of individuals threw stones at buses holding transporting the diplomatic corps to Libyan National Day celebrations in Beida, (eastern) Libya.

¶2. (C) September 1 is celebrated as National Day or Revolution Day. It commemorates Colonel Moamar Qadhafi and the Free Officers Movement's overthrow of King Idris in a 1969 military coup. The government generally picks a different town each year to hold large celebrations. This year, the celebration occurred in Beida, Libya, approximately 200 miles to the southeast of Benghazi. Note: The government of Libya faces more internal opposition in the eastern part of the country than it does elsewhere. Benghazi was the site of the February 2006 "Danish Cartoon" riots where reportedly over twelve people were killed and hundreds were injured in a clash with the local security forces.

¶3. (C) As part of the formal events hosted by the Libyan government in Beida, a group of Tripoli-based diplomats boarded two fifty-passenger buses to travel from an exhibition ground to a tented reception area on the other side of town. Approximately 12 blocks from the exhibition ground, away from the troops that protected the ceremonial area, several young men on the roadside threw stones at the the vehicles, creating dramatic noise and causing the diplomats to crouch down protectively in case the windows broke. None of the bus windows shattered, but the rocks left visible dents in windows and the side of the vehicle. The U.S. diplomat attendeding the event counted about 50 indentations in each bus. Libyan police did not escort the two buses transporting the diplomats. There were no injuries sustained nor were there any arrests made. The Libyan Protocol officer coordinating the diplomatic participation in the festivities tried to dismiss the incident as "two groups of boys playing roughly and the buses just got in the way." To the diplomats on board the bus, it appeared the young men were targeting the bus with clear intent.

¶4. (C) The RSO was informed of the incident on September 4. RSO will emphasize the importance of police protection for U.S. diplomats during these events.

¶5. (C) COMMENT. This appears to be another example of simmering resentment beneath the surface of the Libyan Jamahiriya or "state of the masses". As with the Benghazi riots in February, government-organized events, even those with security in place have the potential to become uncontrolled protests. In this case, police, security and military troops were extensively deployed around the ceremonial exhibition area to provide crowd control. Most of the attendees were young men bused in from around the country to represent their student groups or General People's Committees. Buses and mini-vans were packed closely all around the main exhibition ground to transport the visitors home at the end of the celebration. Away from the festivities, the town of Beida reflected the low level of economic development evident throughout Libya. The sense of celebration did not extend beyond the fairground. The rest of Beida consisted of drab apartment blocks with unemployed or underemployed residents going about their daily routine. The Beida rock throwers may have been acting out against the "outside" young men bused into their community, or acting out against buses carrying Libyan government dignitaries, or targeting diplomats in Libyan government buses. While we can't determine the exact motivation, it was clear from their angry

determine the exact motivation, it was clear from their angry faces and forceful stone throwing that they were trying to leave an impression. They succeeded. END COMMENT.

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI498

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI498 aka Wikileaks id #78382 ?
Subject	U.S./UK/LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, AUGUST 8-10, 2006
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 Sep 2006 13:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI498.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI991
History	First published on Sun, 10 Apr 2011 20:23 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/14/2006 04:41:27 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00498

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CONS RSO AMB AID PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA
            DCM DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO880
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0498/01 2571301
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 141301Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1206
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0418
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0440
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0018
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0102
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0304
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0546
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1366
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000498

SIPDIS

STATE NEA/MAG FOR GAVITO, CRITTENBERGER, VCI/BIO HAYESLIP; CAIRO
FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE, NAMRUY  FOR DR. BRUCE BOYNTON
```

FOR DR. MARIE MCGUIRK/NARMY FOR DR. BRUCE BOYNTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/14/2016
TAGS: CW *[Cook Islands]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AF *[Afghanistan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: U.S./UK/LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, AUGUST 8-10, 2006

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) Summary. The TSCC Biological Subcommittee met in Tripoli August 8-10, 2006. The two and one half day meeting included: a general discussion of progress made to date in implementing the "Roadmap for the Way Forward in Cooperative Engagement in the Life Sciences;" an update of the Roadmap; presentations on, and discussion of, BWC national implementation and pathogen security legislation; a visit to a military facility in Tajura; a visit to the Disease Surveillance Center based in Zliten City; a meeting with the Libyan delegation planning to visit London in September 2006; and a presentation by NAMRU-3 Director Dr. Bruce Boynton. The Libyans provided, under instructions, a copy of the inventory of the GHL equipment that has been moved and stored at the BTRC. U.S. and UK Reps expressed the hope that delays encountered to date in implementing the roadmap were of the past. The oft-postponed Disease Surveillance Workshop was tentatively scheduled for January 21, 2007 in conjuntion with a meeting of the SubCommittee, with venue and participation still to be determined. U.S. and UK members found the meeting productive and their Libyan counterparts enthusiastic and cooperative. End Summary.

August 8 / Opening of SubCommittee Meeting/Agreement on Agenda:

¶2. (U) After initial pleasantries, Dr. Mohamed M. Sharif, head of the Libyan National Committee on Bioetchics and Biosafety (LNCBB), provided, under instructions, a copy of the inventory of the GHL equipment that has been moved and stored at the BTRC, which had originally been requested during the January 2006 TSCC Bio Subcommittee meeting. U.S. and UK teams welcomed receipt of the long-delayed list. The U.S. side also expressed the hope that recent problems encountered, such as the Libyan's postponement of the London visit, were now behind us. UK expressed its satisfaction with arrangements for the meeting, and plans for the now-upcoming visit to London rescheduled for September 2006.

Review of Progress to Date:

¶3. (U) The SubCommittee reviewed progress in implementing the Roadmap and updated it (see para 12). Libya also reported on establishing institutional review boards (IRBs) at three Universities (Al Fatah, Garyounis, and Sabha), noting that they may wish to consult U.S. and UK experts on their implementation; U.S. and UK indicated their availability and interest. Collaborative progress to date has included the following:

--Two workshops in October 2004 and January 2005 (bioethics and biosafety);

--Submission by Libya of BWC CBMs in 2005 and again in 2006 (comment: although we understand Libya did provide CBMs to the UN for 2006 (the Libyans and UN contacts confirm this), we were unable to obtain a copy. Libyan counterparts said they would provide to us via the Embassy);

--Development and updating a draft roadmap for cooperative engagement in the life sciences;

--NAMRU-3 initiated (and is expanding) engagement with Libya, together with the World Health Organization;

--Participation by Libyan experts in two Conferences held in Cairo in February 2006 (one by FAO-ICARDA Conference on biotechnology and genetic engineering and one on HIV/AIDs);

--Participation by Libyan experts in a biosecurity workshop in Amman, Jordan in April 2006, coupled with a trip to the Field Epidemiology Training Program in Amman;

--An invitation from the American Biological Safety Association (ABSA) for six Libyan experts to participate in their annual meeting in Boston in October 2006 was forwarded to Dr. Sharif for the invitees in June 2006;

--A renewed invitation by the UK for Libyan experts to visit London for a visit focusing on cooperation in the life sciences in September 2006.

¶4. (U) August 9: Discussion of BWC National Implementation and Pathogen Security Legislation: The U.S. initiated discussion on legislation with a presentation on pathogen security covering definitions, the need to build a pathogen security program, how to develop risk assessment and management processes, and types of information that are required for implementation. A second U.S. presentation focused on national implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and related pathogen security legislation. U.S.-developed model legislation was used to discuss the differences between the U.S. approach and two draft Libyan laws provided earlier to U.S. experts on "Concerning the Manifestation and Handling of Extremely Dangerous Live Organisms in the Libyan Jamahiriyya and "Establishment of a Mechanism to Provide Early Warning Against the Spread of Diseases in the Libyan Jamahiriyya." A professor of international law from Al-Fatah University joined the Libyan side, which already included a lawyer from the Ministry of Justice, to participate in these discsussions. The UK commented that each national legislation differed slightly with respect to their respective national legal frameworks. The UK also highlighted and handed over information on the UK-based NGO Verficiation, Research, training, and Information Center (VERTIC) study that was examining national implementation and legislation related to the BWC and various nuclear treaties. U.S. agreed to provide an Arabic translation of the model legislation at the request of Libyan experts, who expressed the hope that it could be drawn upon it in their legislative drafting.

August 9: Visit to Military Facility in Tajura:

¶5. (S) SubCommittee members visited General El-Ghadi's defensive training facility in Tajura. (Comment. U.S. and UK experts visited El-Ghadi's facility and toured an NBC Defense School run by Col. Othmann, El-Gahdi's deputy, on February 16, 2004. This appears to be the same facility. See Ref: LTAG 014-2004, 031446Z MAR 04, DTRA-OSE 031446Z, para 4. End Comment.) They were met by Col. Othmann, the Head of the Libyan Nuclear and Chemical Defense School. After providing a tour of some of the facilities on the compound and answering questions, Othmann stated that the school trained military personnel only on nuclear and chemical defense and explained that they have no provision for training for biological defense, nor do they have plans to do so in the future at this facility. Rather, the military will rely on the Libyan public health service to provide medical aid if there was a disease outbreak. He also took the SubCommittee to a CW

a disease outbreak. He also took the SubCommittee to a CW defensive lab under construction, which he explained may take another year to complete. Equipment has been purchased for the lab and was on site. The classrooms and laboratory facility appear to comprise a fairly small portion of the military compound, and the U.S. and UK did not have the opportunity to view any buildings on the remainder of the compound. Of note, this occasion was the first time Libyan NCBB members had visited this facility.

¶6. (S) Comment. In his September 2005 meeting with the SubCommittee General El-Ghadi focused more on the chemical vice the biological defensive activities planned for his facility; however, he certainly implied that biological weapons defense would be a part of its mission. UK team notes, however, that Col. Othmann's comments were fully consistent with what they had heard before and that they had always understood the facility to focus on chemical and radiological defense. U.S. and UK experts were both told that a lab under construction at the facility wold be for chemical weapons defensive purposes; U.S. and UK explained that Libya might have to declare it to the OPCW. The lab U.S. and UK experts were taken to on August 9 is still under construction (old classroom section being refitted), includes an air handling system, an almost fully tiled "preparation room," and what appeared to be a "cold storage" room, all of which are consistent with a
lab that could be used for work with chemical and/or biological agents. Although the lab could easily be completed in a short time, Col Othmann and his staff estimated that it could take up to a year to finish construction. SubCommittee members did not ask to see the on-site equipment, but suggests that a future visit by CW experts might be useful to help determine the capabilities and purpose of the completed laboratory. End Comment.)

August 10: Visit to Disease Surveillance Center in Zliten City:

¶7. (U) SubCommittee members visited the National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control (NCIDC). Dr. Smeo, the hospitable and talkative head of the Center, provided a presentation on the activities of
the Center and a tour of the Center. Visitors were taken to one small lab space capable of biosafety level 2 work, and to a number of stations where computers were being used to enter data. The Center seemed to be well equipped and efficiently functioning. This occasion was the first visit to the Center by the Libyan NCBB members; in a private aside, Dr. Sharif mentioned to a U.S. colleague that he had expected "more" from the Center.

August 10: Meeting with Libyan Delegation to London Meeting:

¶8. (U) The UK provided an outline agenda for the visit, scheduled for September 7-15, 2006. They also provided suitable web sites for the delegation to obtain further information about each of the facilities
they would be visiting.

August 10: Presentation by NAMRU-3 Director on Cooperation with Libya
---

¶9. (U) Dr. Bruce Boynton, Director of NAMRU-3, outlined the NAMRU-3 Mission and its relationship with the World Health Organization. He described recently initiated collaborative scientific exchanges with Libyan
experts. The question and answer session proved to be useful in obtaining more information on endemic disease in Libya, which

will be helpful to NAMRU-3 in tailoring its collaborative efforts with Libya.

Participants in the Meeting:

¶10. (U) Libyan Participants:

Dr. Mohamed M. Sharif
Chairman of the National Committee for Bioethics and Biosafety,
Head of the BTRC

Dr. Abdurahman Tawil
Member of LNCBB
Faculty of Science, Al Fatah University

Dr. Abdulaziz M. El-Buni
Member of LNCBB
Faculty of Science, Al Fatah University

Dr. Mohamed A. Abaugalia
Member of LNCBB
Member of Military Ministry

Mr. Muftah Al-Hemali A. Ali
Member of the LNCBB
The General Administration for International Organizations at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

Dr. AbdulKader A. El-Maleh
Member of the LNCBB
Faculty of Agriculture
Omar al-Mukhtar University

Dr. Abdalgader Saleh Ali
Member of LNCBB
Faculty of Science
Sabha University
Dr. Abdussalam A. Masaud Amara
Member of LNCBB
Pharmacy School
Al Fatah University

Mr. Abdulaker Mohamed Alioah
Member of the LNCBB
The General Administration for Law at the General People's Committee for Justice

Dr. Milud A. Amru
Professor of International, Investment and Trade Law,
Al-Fatah University
Observer Member, UN Commission of International Law

¶11. (U) UK Participants

--Dr. Peter Biggins, UK TSCC Bio-Subcommittee CoChair
--Dr. Lorna Miller, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory, Porton Down

¶12. (U) U.S. Participants

--U.S. CoChair Katharine C. Crittenberger, U.S. Department of State
--Ms. Michelle Baker, U.S. Department of State
--Dr. Bruce Boynton, Director, NAMRU-3, Cairo, Egypt
--Mr. Marshall Brown, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State
--Mr. Christopher Eaves, Science and Technology Officer, Embassy Tripoli

--Mr. Shaun Hayeslip, U.S. Department of State
--Dr. Marie Ricciardone, Coordinator for the Libya Scientist Engagement Program, U.S. Department of State, Embassy Cairo (Egypt)
--Dr. Gregory Stewart, Senior Microbiologist, U.S. Department of State

---
Updated Draft Roadmap

¶13. (U) Updated Draft Roadmap for Way Forward in Cooperative Engagement in the Life Sciences (revised August 10, 2006)

August 2006

UK/Libya

--UK to provide information to facilitate Libyan Participation in a Workshop on "Approaches to National Legislation for Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons Agreements", 29-30 August.

September 2006

U.S./UK/Libya

--Visit to UK, Video Conference
--Finalize plans for Human Infectious Disease Surveillance Workshop, including decisions on timing, venue, format, and participation
--Possible consultations on upcoming BWC Review Conference
--Additional consultations on legal issues

U.S./Libya

--Continue cooperative engagement with NAMRU-3

October 2006

Libya

--Attend annual meeting of American Biological Safety Association (Boston, MA)

November 2006

U.S./UK/Libya

--Attend Sixth Review of BWC (Nov 20-Dec 8)
January 2007
U.S./UK/Libya

--Meeting of TSCC Bio SubCommittee
--Disease Surveillance Workshop (Jan 21?)
--Identify Workshop follow up activities, i.e.:
--Animal Disease Surveillance Workshop
--Plant Disease Surveillance Workshop/GM Foods
--Training Track
--IRB Workshop

GOLDRICH
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI506

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI506 aka Wikileaks id #78574 ?
Subject	LIBYA WORKS TO FIND BALANCE ON LABOR AND MIGRATION ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 15 Sep 2006 12:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI506.html
References	05TRIPOLI332
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI671
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/19/2006 08:43:51 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00506

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   PA ORA IPS ECON DCM CONS AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: HUM
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO365
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0506/01 2581208
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151208Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1218
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0072
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1381
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000506

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, PRM, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/29/2016
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PREF [Refugees] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA WORKS TO FIND BALANCE ON LABOR AND MIGRATION ISSUES

REF: A) 05 TRIPOLI 332    B) TRIPOLI 373

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, Executive
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gregory L. Berry, Chief of Mission, Executive ; Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. The GOL is beginning to work with international partners such as UNHCR and IOM on facing their migration challenges, but there is still ample room for strengthening cooperation. A staggering 750,000 to one million migrant workers currently live within Libya's borders in addition to its local population of 5.5 million. Migrant workers from Africa and Egypt contribute to the economy and fill jobs that traditionally Libyans have not been willing to perform, especially menial and semi-skilled labor. Libya is trying to maintain a balance in stemming the tide of illegal migration from Africa, while still maintain its leading role in the continent. An upcoming UN conference on migration might be a platform to engage with the international community on combating illegal migration. While trying to secure its land borders, it also must grapple with the growing issue of foreign nationals using its coastline as a launching point for the dangerous boat journey to Europe. The Secretary of Labor, while recognizing the need for foreign labor

SIPDIS
sources, is under pressure to bring down the high unemployment rate for the country's young population. Clearly, the GOL is willing to work with international partners to a certain degree on its migrant worker challenges, but there is no clear timetable for doing so. END SUMMARY.

MIGRATION BY THE NUMBERS

¶2. (SBU) International organizations estimate there are 750,000 to one million migrants within Libyan borders, working mainly in the construction, oil, hotel and restaurant industries. In a country with a local population of only 5.5 million, their presence is highly apparent. Of these migrant workers, UNHCR believes that approximately 5% fall within their mandate, especially those from the Horn of Africa region. While migrants from most Arab countries can enter without a visa and stay for a period of up to six months, Africans have a difficult time obtaining visitor visas and many enter illegally through the almost 4500 km of desert land borders that Libya shares with its neighbors. Migrant workers without the proper documentation are subject to frequent deportations. According to a GOL contact at the General Peoples Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs equivalent), 50,000 illegal migrants were identified by the local law enforcement during just one month this summer, many of whom were sent to local detention centers and deported.

LOCAL UNHCR AND IOM OFFICES SAY COOPERATION STALLED, BUT POTENTIAL EXISTS

¶3. (C) The Chief of Mission at UNHCR in Tripoli, Mohamed Hantosh Alwash characterized his office's relationship with the GOL as "stalled", primarily on the issue of finalizing an official MOU with the government (ref A). In addition, the GOL still does not officially recognize the existence of refugees within their borders. "Migrant workers are seen as African brothers or Arab brothers, never people in need of help" says Alwash. Still, there are some encouraging signs of cooperation. Last month, the World Islamic Call Society, an adjunct organization funded by GOL to promote moderate Islamic thought, hosted World Refugee Day in conjunction with UNHCR. Alwash calls this a "step in the right direction" and hopes to follow up with a migration and asylum conference this November or December, with the blessing of the GOL. UNHCR is given informal access to Libyan detention centers to screen for refugees, and in some instances, migrants identified as refugees are given over to UNHCR custody. Alwash also is pleased with the recent formation a committee at the General People's Committee for Justice to draft a law on asylum.

¶4. (C) Laurence Hart, Chief of Mission at the International Organization For Migration, granted full status in August, 2005, listed the organization's priorities in Libya as "capacity building, assistance to migrants, research and border management." IOM hopes in the near future to conduct field research to get a better sense for migration patterns and numbers. Clearly, the GOL has to work with them to achieve this goal, but they too have seen positive developments recently, especially in the creation of an inter-ministerial committee on migration. Hart says that this committee may be able to give some consistency to immigration laws, which he characterizes as "vague and without clear implementation."

AFRICAN MIGRANTS IN LIBYA: A BIT LESS THAN WELCOME
---------- -----

¶5. (C) When strolling through crowded Abu Saleem market, located in Tripoli's suburbs, one steps out of the Middle East enters the heart of an African city--and a diverse one at that. Ethiopian run hair salons sit adjacent to Camerooni, Malian, and Sudanese restaurants in this basic market. The African community here is poor, but well established. Ten years ago, as part of an overall strategy to achieve of pan-African unity, Leader Moammar Qadhafi implemented an 'open door policy' for Africans interested in seeking jobs in Libya. More African migrants came than expected, however, and now most are required to obtain visitor visas to enter the country, a difficult task. Many Africans living in Libya entered illegally across a land border. The African community is subject to suspicion from locals. African migrants are often blamed for increasing crime in metropolitan areas. Five years ago, riots broke out in the African community when a Libyan family charged an African migrant with rape and retaliated against the man. The GOL deals with the community cautiously.

¶6. (C) While the Leader still sees himself as the father of the continent, the government has clearly reconsidered its open door policy and is making attempts to 'regularize' illegal migrants. Because African migrants are more easily recognizable compared to Arab migrants, they are subject to more frequent deportations. The GOL fully recognizes that, even if they wanted to, they do not have the means to deport all illegal migrants. "It is too expensive to deport all of them, to feed them and keep them in centers" said Ibrahim Dabbashi, a representative from the General People's Committee (GPC) for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) office of International Organizations. In addition to some sporadic deportations, the GOL's long-term strategy to stem the tide of African migrants is tied in with its pan-African ideology. According to Dabbashi, the GOL hopes to "stop the reason that people want to leave their countries by developing African nations from within" using various infrastructure and investment projects (ref B). If they receive U.S. visas in time to travel, the GOL hopes to send 25 representatives to the upcoming UN High Level Dialogue on Migration, and is looking to use the conference as a platform to engage with the international community on problem of illegal migrants. According to Dabbashi, it is difficult for the GOL to engage regionally with Africa on the issue of illegal migration because of a "conflict of interest"--Libya is a supplier of jobs that do to a certain degree help support African economies.

EGYPTIANS AND NORTH AFRICANS: ARAB BROTHERS HAVE MORE LEEWAY
---------- ---------------

¶7.(C) Egyptians, Tunisians, and Moroccans constitute a large percentage of migrant labor force in Libya, especially in the hotel and restaurant industries. Unlike African migrant laborers, they can enter legally without a visa and stay for up to 6 months. Many of them are able to find work within that period, but often work without an official contract. The Egyptian consul in Tripoli spends a lot of his time negotiating

Egyptian consul in Tripoli spends a lot of his time negotiating disputes between Libyan employers and Egyptian workers. He is frequently summoned to Rasheed Street, located near the Corinthia Hotel where the U.S. Embassy is working out of temporary space, when Libyan police arrest Egyptians who are perceived to be involved in the smuggling trade, which notoriously operates out of the low end hotels in the area. The GOL is making gestures to regularize the status of their "Arab brothers" as well. On July 18, the GPC for Manpower, Training, and Employment announced a law forbidding the hiring or employing any foreign worker without a contract between both parties. The law also called for the extradition of non-national manpower that has not been regularized. It is unclear exactly what steps are being taken to enforce this new regulation. According to the Egyptian consul, even those Egyptians who are deported for working illegally can easily reenter Libya along the 1100 km desert border that exists between the two nations, generally aided by the Awlad Ali tribe, notorious smugglers of people, weapons, and drugs.

DESTINATION: EUROPE

¶8.(C) While some migrants enter the country merely seeking to earn a living in Libya, others use it as base to get to far more attractive destinations in Europe. The 2000 km stretch of Libyan coastline is an ideal launching point for human smugglers, and the western cities of Zuwara and Misrauta are the most notorious points for embarkation. In July of this year, IOM statistics show that 3000 migrants landed in Lampedusa, a small island off the coast of Italy, from Libya. A majority of those landing are from Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt, with the remainder from western and central African countries. According to the Italian Consul, Italian authorities detained 14,000 migrants from Libya since January, 2006, representing just a fraction of those who have made the journey. International and local sources say smugglers charge between 1500 to 2500 USD for the dangerous trip, and those willing to pay the price are often carried in crowded boats containing upwards of 100 passengers and an uncertain future if they make it to Europe.

¶9.(C) The GOL has a large stake in breaking up smuggling rings and stemming the tide of illegal migration to Europe. Besides the negative PR aspect when would be migrants perish at sea, often reported in the international press, the GOL also has to expend a lot of resources to identify, shelter, and deport migrants caught trying to get to Europe. EU member nations, especially Italy, are working with Libya by providing additional border patrol equipment and constructing shelters for deportees. Endemic challenges exist, however. According to UNHCR, human smugglers can easily bribe local border police. The GOL is still defining just how much cooperation it is willing to have with the EU on border patrol. This week, the Libyan Ambassador in Malta announced the GOL's rejection of the idea of a joint naval patrol with Italy and Malta because it is "against international law", saying that the government prefers financial and technical aid to Libya and assistance with a long-term solution to the eradication of poverty in Africa.

EMPLOYMENT CRUNCH

¶10. (C) For years, migrant workers have filled jobs that Libyans refused to perform. While the mentality of Libyans is changing a bit on this front, there is clearly still a need for migrant laborers to fill menial and semi-skilled jobs. At the same time, the GOL is struggling to balance its need for migrant workers with a mandate from Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training, and Employment, to drastically reduce unemployment. Official figures pin unemployment at 13% out of local population of 5.5 million, almost half of whom are under 20 years old. The strategy to grapple with the challenge is a mixed bag, ranging from maintaining a bloated bureaucracy,

providing small loans to private citizens to open private businesses, as well as assorted attempts at job creation. There is also a large focus on ensuring that newly opened foreign businesses remain partially "Libyanized." Foreign companies and embassies operating in Libya must comply with government quotas to employee local workers. The government oftentimes will not issue residency visas to third country nationals looking to work at foreign companies. This poses a challenge to international institutions must draw from a fairly limited pool of English speaking Libyans and would often prefer to hire third country nationals who possess essential skills.

¶11. (C) According to the local IOM representative, the GOL must define exactly what needs exist in the labor market and set up agreements with source countries to recruit people with those skills. Post is aware of only one such pending agreement. According to the Filipino consul, during President Arroyo's visit last month to Libya, the two nations began negotiating long term contracts for Filipino nurses to fill staffing gaps in hospitals and train local staff on proper nursing practices.

HUMAN TRAFFICKING-POTENTIAL FOR COOPERATION WITH INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

¶12.(C) In an encouraging sign of cooperation with the international community, the GOL recently approached IOM officials in country and asked for assistance on what they see as a growing problem of international human trafficking. According to the IOM representative in country, the GOL wants assistance in dealing with the problem of Nigerian women who are trafficked for sex into Tripoli. While prostitution is not immediately apparent in this conservative country, clearly the government has detected, perhaps through raids in migrant neighborhoods, women who presumably brought here to service the almost all male migratory work force in the city. When Post has asked Libyan officials if there are opportunities for bilateral cooperation on trafficking issues, they have unanimously said that Libya would only work through international organizations.

¶13.(C) COMMENT. The GOL seems to be making serious efforts to control their border security as best as possible. Like the US, they face the challenge of a long and porous border, coupled with a true need in the economy for cheap migrant labor, especially in the construction industry. They have indicated a willingness to work with the international community on their migrant labor challenges. But, Qadhafi's ideology of pan-African unity will clearly influence how they address this issue. Libya will continue to shy away from projects that bring "outsiders to Libya" or are perceived to infringe on Libyan sovereignty, for example, the proposed joint Libyan-Maltese naval patrols to interdict illegal migrants. There are some promising signs that they are willing to engage on migration issues, but as in most subjects, it will be on their own, slow and convoluted, timeline. END COMMENT.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI511

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI511 aka Wikileaks id #78706 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ENVIRONMENT AUTHORITY: HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL PLANNING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 17 Sep 2006 19:45 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI511.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI979
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/19/2006 11:20:44 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00511

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   POL NAMRU IPS FAS DCM AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: SCI
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO990
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0511 2601945
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171945Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1226
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1389
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0425
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0447
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0553
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0023
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0107
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0309
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000511

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG GAVITO, OES FOR BOB SENSENEY; COMMERCE FOR
MASON; HHS FOR JANE
COURY, BILL STIEGER; CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE, NAMRU 3
```

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: TBIO *[Biological and Medical Science]* , UNEP *[UN Environment Program]* , EPA *[Environmental Protection Agency]* , HHS *[Department of Health and Human Services]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ENVIRONMENT AUTHORITY: HAZARDOUS WASTE DISPOSAL PLANNING

¶1. Summary: On September 13, 2006 ESTH Officer met with Dr. Abul-Hakim Al-Waer, Secretary of the Libyan Environment Authority (LEA), or as he joked with, "The EPA without the protection." The meeting took place on the margins of the ongoing NDF Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance Program. Dr. Waer mentioned specifically that the LEA had been charged with destroying/incinerating/neutralizing several caustic and hazardous agents/wastes in accordance with various environmental agreements to which they had either signed, or aspire to sign. These items for destruction included PCB's, transformer oil, pesticides left from Italian residents in the 1930's, and hazardous medical wastes. He inquired as to the utility of the CWD incinerator and neutralization equipment in such an operation. The incinerator and neutralization equipment being installed for the chemical weapon and precursor destruction activities is not technically sufficient to provide this sort of service. In addition, its proposed remote location in the Libyan desert would not lend itself as a practical solution to the LEA's responsibilities. Dr. Waer desires to establish a solution to the immediate problem of existing waste stockpiles, with additional consideration of disposing of future waste. Dr. Waer said he had a budget of LD 57 Million in 2007 funds to address this disposal problem, (including PCB's, Medical Waste and other hazardous wastes) and would be seeking solutions in 2007/2008. End Summary.

PCB's Deemed Toughest to Destroy

¶2. According to the NDF team's chemical experts attending the meeting, the PCB's are the toughest to destroy of the materials he listed. Dr. Waer mentioned the Government of Libya (GOL) might subcontract PCB disposal to a country with existing expertise. He cited that Libya routinely provided transit rights through its territorial waters to South Korean vessels carrying PCB's enroute to France for destruction. Considering South Korea's technical prowess, and the fact that they subcontract this work, Dr. Waer believed it would be fruitless to pursue such technologies internally.

Medical Waste First Priority

¶3. The medical waste, however, Libya intends to process locally. Dr. Waer discussed creating mobile station operations or establishing collection routes for a central disposal facility, but did not have a concrete idea as to how the LEA might establish such a program. Embassy requests any expression of interest in cooperating with the LEA on this issue. Dr. Waer indicated that Liquid Clinical Waste from medical facilities was the primary concern as the existing stores were a burden to contain and that this category of waste is continually generated.

Future Steps:

¶4. ESTH Officer requested a meeting with Dr. Waer to further discuss where the U.S. may be able to offer guidance either through assisting in establishing legislation on waste disposal (whether medical or industrial) or offering technical expertise in planning and/or funding. Pending HHS and OES interest in such a dialogue, Embassy will engage as appropriate.

GOLDRICH

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI527

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI527 aka Wikileaks id #79084 ?
Subject	LIBYA: UN RESREP ASSESSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 Sep 2006 11:05 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI527.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  09/24/2006 10:23:44 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00527

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   IPS FCS FAS DCM PA POL AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO084
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0527/01 2631105
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 201105Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1243
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0075
RUEHXX/GENEVA IO MISSIONS COLLECTIVE
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0310
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0427
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0555
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0293
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0108
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1408
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000527

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/MEPI, NEA/RA; AMMAN FOR WHITLESLEY; OES FOR SENSE
Y; HHS FOR COURY AND DR. STEIGER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREF [Refugees] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , LY [Libya]
```

SUBJECT: LIBYA: UN RESREP ASSESSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR BILATERAL COOPERATION

¶1. (U) SUMMARY: United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Resident Representative Julio Grieco told poloff September 17 that there were opportunities for the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) to expand on activities already underway in Libya that focus on education, financial sector reform, and gender. He urged, however, that MEPI consider expanding its focus to include healthcare, explaining that the public health system in Libya is in very poor condition and urgently needs assistance. Grieco, who concurrently serves as United Nations Resident Coordinator in Libya, also discussed UNDP's role in human rights promotion, including women's empowerment; UNDP's mandate and programs; and other UN agencies in Libya. END SUMMARY.

PLEA TO SUPPORT HEALTHCARE REFORM IN LIBYA

¶2. (U) Grieco explained that the USG can make an immediate impact in Libya by focusing on public health. While explaining that Libya needs better medical resources, professional training, and patient care, he noted a special need for improving the management of the health care system. UNDP's health-related programs, Grieco said, include an HIV-AIDS prevention program; upgrading of the orthopedic workshop and rehabilitation center for the disabled in Benghazi; drug abuse control and treatment; and eradication of the screw-worm.

UNDP HUMAN RIGHTS PROMOTION AND WOMEN'S EMPOWERMENT PROJECTS

¶3. (U) Grieco stressed that UNDP does not address human rights abuses through reporting or lobbying. The UN has an office in Geneva that addresses the human rights situation in Libya, Grieco said, adding that the UN does not take a "negative approach" in Libya, but rather seeks a constructive form of engagement. By cooperatively working with the Government of Libya (GOL) to develop awareness about human rights, Grieco asserted, UNDP balances the alienating impact on the GOL of reports of abuse of those rights. He explained that UNDP contributes to the promotion of respect for human rights through several of its development programs: (1) training judges, prosecutors and academics; (2) women's empowerment training; (3) training government and law enforcement officials to reduce demand for and supply of illicit drugs. Grieco noted that experts believe drug abuse to be the leading cause of the spread of HIV/AIDS in Libya.

¶4. (U) Grieco provided a formal, written report on UNDP's programs in Libya that included a description of its women's empowerment work. According to the report, UNDP has launched a project for "Advocacy and Capacity Building on Women's Empowerment" in Libya. The program draws on the UN's global effort to "mainstream gender into development activities." As part of the program, UNDP held a capacity-building seminar this year aimed at national and local authorities. UNDP organized the seminar in conjunction with the government-run organization Wa'atessemo and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM). UNDP has proposed to the GOL the development of four new projects that will, respectively: (1) support women entrepreneurs; (b) compile gender disaggregated statistics; (c) examine the impact on women of Libya's legal framework, and enhance women's participation in the development process; and (d) address the gender dimension of the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

UNDP'S MANDATE AND PROGRAMS

¶5. (U) UNDP has been in Libya since 1950, has a staff of 17, and receives its funding from the Libyan government, according to Grieco. It focuses on technical assistance to achieve national development goals. In addition to the programs listed above, UNDP has projects that address the following issues: agriculture, education, vocational training, meteorological services, millennium development goals, decentralization and local government, veterinary services, and water resources management. In the near future, UNDP will focus on information and communications technologies, and environmental capacity and strategies.

UN AGENCIES IN LIBYA

¶6. (U) Since Libya is a net contributing country to the UN, Grieco explained, it funds the UN's work in Libya. The UN agencies, however, Grieco claimed, operate by UN rules and make their own hiring and policy decisions. The following agencies currently operate in Libya (staff size in parentheses): Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) (1); United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (12); United Nations Information Centers (UNICs) (4); World Health Organization (WHO) (4); United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (2). The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) does not have a permanent presence in Libya, Grieco said, but UNESCO officials have visited Libya on several occasions to provide children with vaccinations. UNDP also receives funding from New York, Grieco said, without specifying the percentage of the budget that comes from New York. UNHCR receives all of its funding from Geneva, Grieco said, since it does not serve Libyan citizens.

BERRY

SIGNATURE
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI539

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI539 aka Wikileaks id #79476 ?
Subject	LIBYA TELLS EXIM - TRUST US, OUR CREDIT'S GOOD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 24 Sep 2006 14:21 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/09/06TRIPOLI539.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

null
Brooke F Adams 09/26/2006 10:16:02 AM From DB/Inbox: Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00539

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
ACTION: ECON
INFO: PA POL IPS CONS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO616
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0539/01 2671421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241421Z SEP 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1257
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1423
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0312
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0429
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0295
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0559
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0110
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0201

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000539

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
PLEASE PASS TO EXIM, OPIC, USTR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/20/2016
TAGS: EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* ,

LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA TELLS EXIM - TRUST US, OUR CREDIT'S GOOD

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) EXIM Bank conducted its first visit in over thirty years to Tripoli September 5-9. After an introductory session with Mohamed Siala, Secretary of International Cooperation, the rest of the week was marked by mixed success pursuing additional meetings with key GOL entities. EXIM's Vice President for International Business Development C. Michael Forgione and Africa Region Director John Richter ultimately met with a range of private, state-owned and multinational companies that all expressed a strong interest in developing U.S.-Libyan relations. However, apart from the Siala meeting, these contacts did not share specific GOL investment plans for the future, highlighting both the opportunities and frustrations of investing and operating in Libya. In addition, the EXIM team heard from both Siala and Foreign Investment Board Director Rajab Shiglabu that Libya would not sign an OPIC agreement, or any other proposed U.S. trade and investment agreements, unless they offered reciprocal opportunity.

EXIM Pitches Projects Backed by Sovereign Guarantee

¶2. (U) The EXIM team made a consistent pitch to its interlocutors during its week of meetings, stressing a desire to build a dialogue to educate both sides and increase comfort levels after a long hiatus of investment and business activity. VP Forgione emphasized that at this juncture, EXIM can only offer financing assistance to US business projects with government-owned entities in three areas: the aviation sector, project finance (requiring predictability and hard revenue streams) and projects backed by a GOL "sovereign guarantee" of loan repayment. The delegation stressed that US-Libyan relations are entering a new phase, that US interest in Libya is serious and long-term, and that the USG and private business community had the endurance to weather minor difficulties and frictions during the normalization process.

Familiar Frustrations - Libya Needs Economic Diversification

¶3. (U) Given that EXIM is currently restricted to supporting US export contracts with government-owned entities, the bulk of requested meetings were with the GOL. However, these appointments proved impossible to schedule in the end, and many of the EXIM team's top priority meetings therefore went unfilled during its stay in Tripoli. Appointments with the Foreign Investment Encouragement Board, the Libyan Foreign Bank, Afriqiyah Airways, Real Estate Investment Company and Chevron produced a reasonably broad range of discussions on the Libyan investment and business environment. Furthermore, the team's visit was welcomed by the local business community as a sign that relations were normalizing, albeit at a slow and measured pace.

¶4. (C) Secretary of International Cooperation Mohammed Siala, from the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation officially greeted the EXIM team and provided the most detailed briefing on the GOLs perspectives. Siala argued the EXIM and other lending organizations should not take account of international rating systems that according to him, "are affected by political considerations, or in the case of Italy, ongoing disputes over old debts." He said that Libya sought to use oil revenues to fund sustainable development outside the energy sector. He also highlighted that Libya was still "looking for the rewards" from its decision to give up the WMD program, particularly any economic benefits to be gained

WMD program, particularly any economic benefits to be gained from increased international trade and investment. Siala acknowledged the tension in Libya between those "who think the pace of reform is too fast and those who think it is too slow," but emphasized that the Jamahiriya system is adjusting quicker than anyone could have anticipated.

¶5. (C) In terms of economic diversification, Siala said he and other Libyan offficials were frustrated by international consultancies that focused on tourism for future growth. "Where is the added value from building hotels if the furniture is imported, the construction crews are foreign, the housekeeping staff and other laborers are foreign?" Siala continued. Libya would benefit more from manufacturing, agriculture and other areas that would create employment for Libyans. He mentioned the special tourism zone established under the direction of Saadi Qadhafi in the Zwara-Abukammash area, but without explaining more details, also said that the tourism zone would include a U.S. operated refinery. Despite Siala's point that Libya needed to expand beyond tourism and energy, the only other project he mentioned for prospective cooperation was a 5 billion power plant at Sirte. Siala said the Koreans won the tender with a proposal that used 80% Japanese equipment. He said that the Libyan's were not happy with that mix and might re-issue the tender. If so, he hoped Bechtel would give a turn-key offer that would include the plant and also the management of five or six other facilities.

Sovereign Guarantee? Trust Us, Our Credit's Good

¶6. (C) Asked what government entity was authorized to issue a sovereign guarantee, Siala demurred and said that the GOL tried to avoid that type of commitment. He claimed that Libya had never defaulted on any loans, "even paying all outstanding debts in advance when we became aware that our accounts would be frozen under the sanctions regime." He later qualified his statement and said that there were some private debts that couldn't be resolved due to a lack of documentation, but even in those cases the GOL was negotiating settlements to "split the difference" when amounts were in dispute. "Look at our history," Siala urged, "any lender should be anxious to do business here, especially since our foreign currency cash flow is encouraging." In the example of an entity like the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL), Siala claimed that the national budget was a guarantee. Any Libyan project that was in the budget had been voted on by the General People's Congress and the "cabinet" would have issued authority for a tender and for contract signing, therefore a defacto sovereign guarantee existed. When pressed, Siala also said that both the General People's Committee for Finance and the Central Bank could issue sovereign guarantees. But, "EXIM should have full confidence in any Libyan project that has government funding," Siala concluded.

Reciprocity Deemed More Important Than Meeting Libya's Immediate Investment Needs
---

¶7. (C) In Siala's opinion, the U.S. is not competitive in its trade and commercial activities, especially since the proposed OPIC agreement is not acceptable to the Libyan negotiators. He pointed out that Libya had already signed "agreements for the encouragement of investment" with many countries, as well as an agreement on double taxation with France. Libya expects reciprocity in trade agreements, and expects that since Libya is active in the U.S. stock market, that it should receive more encouragement in bilateral trade. In comparison, Siala cited his impression that Europeans and Asians are willing to invest in small, private ventures, exploring the Libyan free zones at Misurata and elsewhere, and taking advantage of the potential to access African consumers through Libya. Similarly, Rajab

Shiglabu, Director of the Libyan Foreign Investment Board, told the EXIM team in a separate meeting that Libya would not consider the pending OPIC agreement because it did not offer reciprocal treatment. Shiglabu said Libya would consider signing a broad bilateral investment treaty with reciprocal terms, and then addendums such as an OPIC agreement could be discussed later. When asked why Libya doesn't consider the OPIC agreement as a "seal of approval" or signal that "Libya is open for business" Shiglabu consistently argues that intrepid businesspeople will gain great rewards engaging with Libya under its own protections; they do not need or desire any additional assurances. (Embassy Note: the proposed Libyan agreement is with OPIC for further review. End Note.) Elaborating on European cooperation, Siala noted that disputed Libyan debt to Italy was being resolved as part of a "political package of compensation". He said that Italy was being asked to build a coastal road as compensation for its occupation of Libya, and that the Libyan debt to Italy would be subsumed within the joint cooperation.

Oil Companies' Concerns over Visa Issuances

¶8. (U) Chevron's local representative briefed the EXIM team on the difficulties of working in Libya, particularly due to visa issuance problems, both for getting Amcits into Libya and getting Libyans into the U.S. Oil companies are relatively better positioned, both for obtaining Libyan visas (thanks to NOC facilitation) and attracting qualified Libyans for employment, than other entities. Service providers to the oil companies and other firms face a far more difficult time obtaining Libyan visas, which in turn hinders business growth and personnel development. The Chevron representative also explained that U.S. companies suffer from a "generation gap" (due to the sanctions period) because Libyan employees did not have U.S. training in the 80s and 90s. Now, the companies face ongoing obstacles sending Libyans to the States for training.

Snapshots from the Visit

¶9. (SBU) During the EXIM team's meetings several tantalizing new developments emerged:

-- The Real Estate Investment Company (REIC) - a Libyan-owned company owned by the Central Bank and its five subsidiary banks - seeks to form a joint company with the Tennessee Development Corporation (TDC). This joint company would undertake a number of high-value construction projects around Tripoli totaling an estimated $700 million. EXIM may be approached to provide financing for some of these projects, although it is not clear that support would be forthcoming, absent a sovereign guarantee by the GOL. Also, the well-connected REIC is also working to import one million metric tons of cement via a Miami-based US company to fuel its construction and road-maintenance projects.

-- US company Delta Aluminum is apparently engaged in discussions to build an aluminum smelter, partnering with GECOL or a Libyan natural gas supplier. Libya is an attractive location for the smelter given low local fuel costs (energy needs constitute roughly 40% of the cost of aluminum production); raw materials would be imported from Latin American or Guinea. The estimated value of the project is 2-3 billion USD.

-- Dow Chemicals is in negotiations with the National Oil Company (NOC) to take-over an existing GOL petrochemical plant and double or triple its capacity.

-- The EXIM team urged the Financial Director of Afriqiyah

Airlines to consider the purchase of Boeing aircraft, but was informed that Afriqiyah intended to honor its July 2006 MOU with Airbus to purchase up to $1.9 billion USD worth of aircraft.

-- Up to three free trade zones are being planned for Misurata.

¶10. (U) The EXIM delegation did not clear on this cable before departing post.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI557

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI557 aka Wikileaks id #80270 ?
Subject	PROJECT LIBYA: EXHIBITION TO PROMOTE INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Oct 2006 13:43 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI557.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/02/2006 02:24:32 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00557

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: CONS
    INFO:   ECON IPS DCM

DISSEMINATION: CONS
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO549
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0557 2741343
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011343Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1278
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0298
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0563
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0315
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0432
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0113
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1447
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000557

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
DOE FOR GINA ERICKSON AND GEORGE PERSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CMGT [Consular Administration and Management] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EIND [Industry and
```

Manufacturing] , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: PROJECT LIBYA: EXHIBITION TO PROMOTE INFRASTRUCTURE AND ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

¶1. The 4-7 December Project Libya exhibition is underway following a well-attended press launch on September 17. Organizers Montgomery Libya and Sahara Expo Libya presided over a packed house of reporters, businessmen and local embassy staff at the Corinthia Hotel. Jeremy Sale, Montgomery Libya's Project Director for Libya, took the lead at the press conference, and reviewed both the expected participants in the project, and its politically-connected GOL backing. Hotel arrangements and visa support for attendees will be coordinated by Mr. Saleh Ben-Saleh of the Libya Businessman's Council. The Wa'atassemo Charity Society's Abdul Nasser Nageh, Chairman of the Conferences Committee also offered his assistance in addressing whatever issues arise. He told P/E Chief that Ali Aujali of the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in Washington agreed to expedite visa requests, although there would be a 100 Libyan dinar surcharge for any "airport" visas stamped in passports at Tripoli International Airport. He described a multi-step process, whereby exhibition participants would send an application via a designated U.S. travel agent to the Libyan Businessmen's Council. Then the Business Council will coordinate with the Wa'atessemo Society to issue letters of support to the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Relations Consular Department and Americas Department, as well as the Immigration Department. After the Immigration Department clears all the applications and issues approval numbers, the Libyan Businessmen's Council will convey that information to the designated U.S. travel agent, who will in turn contact the exhibition participant and coordinate submission of all the required paperwork to the Libyan People's Bureau. He acknowledged that there were many potential areas for a breakdown in communication and visa delays.

Lineup of GOL Committees Sponsoring the Exhibition

¶2. Project Libya will be hosted under the patronage of Dr. Aisha Muammar al-Qaddafi and her Wa'atassemo Foundation, and consist of two distinct exhibitions: Infrastructure Libya and Energy Libya (or the International Exhibition and Forum for Libya's Infrastructure and Economic Development and the Libyan International Oil, Gas, Power and Renewable Energy Exhibition and Forum), both to be held at the Tripoli International Fairground. The exhibition will be paired with a running series of parallel seminars covering a broad range of infrastructure and energy issues, and the organizers are still soliciting presenters for an anticipated forty-eight separate fora. The exhibitions boast a panoply of cooperating GOL entities, including the General People's Committee for Planning, General Board of Infrastructure and Urban Development, Inspector General of Housing and Utilities, General People's Committee for Industry, Electricity and Mines, National Oil Corporation (NOC) and General Electric Company of Libya (along with a dozens of supporting organizations). A representative for the NOC provided words of support at the event, noting Libya's plans to increase oil production and the massive foreign investment that endeavor will require.

~and Great Expectations For The International Crowd

¶3. Montgomery Libya highlighted the anticipated establishment of pavilions by the US, UK, Germany, Italy, Russia, Spain, Singapore, Canada, France, Malta, Turkey and South Korea. Pol/Econ Chief addressed the audience to emphasize the Commerce Department's certification of Project Libya and and U.S.

interest in expanding the bilateral economic and commercial relationship. Major corporations Chevron, Baker Hughes, Booz Allen Hamilton, Conoco Phillips, Halliburton, Marathon and Occidental were highlighted as key exhibitors and sponsors of the event.

¶4. The exhibition organizers request that the U.S. government consider providing speakers for the program, although at this time they do not have a list of planned seminars or topics. At this point, they are trying to encourage people to attend the event, and will plan workshops or speakers later. Nageh said that "networking" was the primary motivation for the event and that his goal was to get "buzz" by adding high-profile names to the promotional materials.

¶5. Looking ahead, next year's Project Libya has been booked at the Tripoli International Fairground from 3-6 December 2007.

BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI561

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI561 aka Wikileaks id #80407 ?
Subject	LIBYAN BANKING SECTOR REFORM: SLOW AND UNSTEADY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 2 Oct 2006 17:18 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI561.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI648
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

Foreign Banks Question Libyan Market Conditions

---------- --

¶3. (SBU) The McKinsey team assesses that the Libyan Central Bank's top priority is to draw in foreign banks to Libya, and there is moderate interest from abroad. However, prospective foreign entrants are immediately confronted by obstacles, including a dearth of data on the Libyan banking sector, uncertain terms and conditions for market entry, unclear regulatory standards and a highly politicized Central Bank with a history of policy reversals. Some foreign banks are starting to establish start-up offices in Tripoli (most recently Qatar National Bank). However, Wilson estimates that it will be at least 12-18 months before there is a significant foreign bank presence in Libya (i.e., movement beyond start-up offices). This timeframe could easily slip if the long-expected roll-out of a reformed Central Bank national payments program (now four years in the making) continues to languish. A number of foreign banks are reportedly awaiting this development before moving forward in Libya. The McKinsey team's assessment is that the current system is irretrievably broken. As an example of the "broke beyond repair" assessment, some bank managers are not facilitating a McKinsey audit ordered by the Central Bank senior leadership.

Property Rights and Other Laws Require Updating to Underpin Economic Reform

---

¶4. (SBU) The McKinsey team has been careful to conduct multiple rounds of syndications with GOL officials to solicit inputs and proposals for his study, and in order to avoid roadblocks down the road. Thus far, there have been no major obstacles thrown in the way of his findings. However, the McKinsey study will almost certainly recommend a major overhaul of the Central Bank's operations as one of its key recommendations, and the team is deeply skeptical that there is GOL appetite to implement real reform. Furthermore, Wilson estimates that at least fifty percent of the changes necessary for success lie well beyond the purview of the Central Bank. The greatest of these is the question of clear property rights. The lack of clear title for Libyan properties (due in part to the GOL's destruction of private title records in the late 1980s) greatly complicates work in the real estate, construction and tourism sectors, as well as all investment therein.

Training is the Essential Element of Any Proposed Reform

¶5. (SBU) Enhanced training will be at the heart of any successful reform effort. Training is direly needed in the whole range of relevant skills, as most employees lack basic competency in financial analysis, international accounting standards, utilization of balance sheets, and basic information technology skills. Even the small team of the Central Bank's "best and brightest" seconded to assist the McKinsey effort required additional language and technical training. Overall, regional training locations may emerge as the best options for Libyan banks, and the Central Bank is leaning towards a partnership with the Bahraini Monetary Agency toward this end. [Comment: Funding Libyan financial sector training in the GCC

and elsewhere, if allowable, could be an effective use of MEPI Economic Reform pillar funds. End Comment]

State-Run Bank Ownership Shifted From Central Bank to Development Fund

---

¶6. (SBU) Both interlocutors conveyed their genuine surprise

and unease at a recent GOL move to transfer the Central Bank's five state-run banks under the auspices of the state-run Economic and Social Development Fund. This change was, in their view, an attempt by the GOL to give the impression that these banks enjoy some measure of independence from the Central Bank. However, the team assesses that this was a "paper move" only, and its greatest practical effect will be to sow confusion among foreign banks interested in entering the Libyan market.

Aman Bank Judged Most Efficient

¶7. (SBU) One institution that has stood out during McKinsey's assessment work has been Aman Bank for Commerce and Investment (HYPERLINK "BLOCKED::http://bk.abci-ly.com/en/index.aspx "http://bk.abci-ly.com/en/index.aspx). Succinctly described as having "the look and feel of a real bank," privately-owned Aman Bank is far ahead of the competition in its provision of modern banking services. Its entire operation is computerized, and it has placed ATMs across Tripoli and into major cities countrywide. Aman bank also provides its staff with proper training, including English language training for all employees.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI563

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI563 aka Wikileaks id #80493 ?
Subject	LIBYA: COMMERCIAL ROUND UP, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2006
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Oct 2006 12:46 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI563.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/09/2006 03:13:08 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00563

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: FCS
    INFO:   AMB IPS ECON DCM

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO372
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0563/01 2761246
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031246Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1291
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0301
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0566
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0318
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0435
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0006
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0006
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 0001
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0114
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0206
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1460
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000563

SIPDIS

DEPTARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
```

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP *[Trade Expansion and Promotion]* , BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINT *[Economic and Commercial Internet]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: COMMERCIAL ROUND UP, AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 2006

Oil and Gas Sector

¶1. Sources indicate that the National Oil Corporation (NOC) plans to introduce measures to require foreign companies operating in Libya to offer Libyans salaries equal to those paid to non-Libyans. (Source: NOC, 8/21)

¶2. Libya and Japan signed a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the two countries in the fields of oil and gas, as well as nuclear and solar energy. The memo also calls for cooperation between the two countries in transportation, communications, tourism, environment and human resources. The two sides also discussed the possibility of financing an oil pipeline to link the south of Libya with the entrance to the Red Sea. (Source: Akhbar-Libya.com (quoting the Emirates News Agency), 8/20)

¶3. NOC has announced a third round for exploration and production of oil in Libya (EPSA-IV Round). The new round includes 14 areas and 41 sections, for a total area of approximately 100,000 square kilometers. NOC will announce the results on December 20, 2006. (Source: Almanara.org (quoting aljazeera.net), 8/15)

¶4. An official Libyan source announced August 14 that the executive manager of Chevron expressed his company's readiness to transfer oil technology to Libya through its oil projects in the country. He also stated that his company will work to make use of and to train the Libyan workforce. (Source: Almanara.org (quoting Alquds Alarabi Newspaper), 8/15)

Construction and Infrastructure Development

¶5. Ranhill Bhd secured a deal worth $2 billion to construct a new township in Tajura, near Tripoli. Sources familiar with the company said that the engineering group is also aggressively pursuing a similar contract in Libya worth $1.5 billion, in addition to exploring oil and gas opportunities and a railway contract. Under the Tajura township contract, Ranhill will build some 40,000 homes for a Libyan government housing agency. "It is a straightforward housing project, but one that would open further opportunities for Ranhill," one source reported. "The company is taking a holistic approach in bidding for jobs that all of its units can take part in." Sources also said that Ranhill expects to receive a start-up fund from the Libyan government of between 15% and 20% of the contract value. "Ranhill is making itself a preferred builder for the Libyan government," the source said, "and has the first right of refusal for several of the projects that the authorities have in the pipeline." One source explained that the American decision to lift sanctions on Libya has created opportunities for construction companies. (Source: The Edge Daily, 8/23)

¶6. Libyana Mobile Phone Service provider signed an agreement with the German D.T. Khun [transliteration] to develop services and management. The contract will last for two years. Libyana currently provides its services to more than a million subscribers. (Source: Khaleej Newspaper, 8/14)

Foreign and US Investment

¶7. The General People's Committee decided August 22 to establish a financial investment corporation. The establishment will have a capital of 250 million dollars and will report directly to the General People's Committee. The corporation is intended to diversify income resources and increase revenues to the Libyan treasury. (Source: LJBC.net, 8/23)

¶8. Libyan Secretary of Economy, Investment And Trade Tayyib Safi Tayyib confirmed his country's willingness to learn from the example of the United Arab Emirates in the management of ports and free zones. In a speech before the second conference on economic activities, Safi said that Libya must abandon the foreign investor complex and learn from the experiences of foreign companies and investors in transferring technology, especially in management and banking. He stressed the importance of exploiting Libya's high present level of oil income, and of finding alternative income sources for the progress of the country. (Source: Albayan Newspaper, 8/9)

¶9. Tameer Holding Co. announced August 9 a $20 billion project in Libya. The project represents the biggest investment in the Maghreb from the Gulf region. The contract was signed by Omar Ayesh from Tameer and Hamed Alarabi Alhudeiri from the Economic and Social Development Fund. (NOTE: Tameer and the Economic and Social Development Fund have formed a joint company, called Tadweer, or the Libya Real Estate Development Company. END NOTE.) The project will be located in the Wadi Sharki area on the outskirts of Tripoli. It covers a beachfront area of more than 40 square kilometers. It will consist of a complete city with commercial centers and tourist attractions, as well as schools and hospitals. Some of the buildings are designed to accommodate the most advanced technologies available. The city will serve a population of about half a million inhabitants. (Source: Libya-Alyoum.com, 8/10)

Tourism

¶10. Secretary of the General People's Committee Dr. Elbaghdadi Elmahmoudi and the General Manager of the Swiss holding company Piroco [transliteration] announced that they will begin building the Andalus Tourist Center in Tripoli. Libyan Tourism Secretary Ammar Iltayyif attended the ceremony, along with the Swiss Ambassador to Libya. The project is a joint venture between the Economic and Social Development Fund in Libya (30%) and the Swiss company (70%). The tourist resort will cover an area of four hectares and include a 600-bed, five-star hotel. The project will start in December, 2006 and is expected to require four years to finish. It will also include a harbor big enough for 250 yachts. The project, whose total value is 200 million euros, is expected to provide 1000 job opportunities to Libyan employees. The Swiss company's investment period will last 70 years. (Source: Almanara, 8/31)

Banking

¶11. Qatar National Bank announced August 29 that it has received official permission to open a representative office in Libya. (Source: Libya-Alyoum.com, 8/30)
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI565

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI565 aka Wikileaks id #80512 ?
Subject	BIS TEAM "CHECKS OUT" LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Oct 2006 14:00 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI565.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/09/2006 03:13:50 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00565

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   IPS FCS AMB AID MGT PA POL FAS DCM

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO393
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0565/01 2761400
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 031400Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1294
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1463
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0437
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0320
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0568
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0303
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0116
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0208
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000565

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/PI FOR KENT PATTON; COMMERCE FOR
NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
```

ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: BIS TEAM "CHECKS OUT" LIBYA

¶1. (U) Summary: The Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) completed a largely successful series of export license compliance checks September 9-19. BIS agents Scot Gonzales and Perry Davis completed dozens of checks during the BIS's first-ever visit to Libya. Levels of compliance were mixed, but the team set a baseline for future Commerce license checks and educated the GOL and local businesses about recent export rules changes germane to Libya. End summary.

First BIS visit to Libya Reviews End-Use Compliance

¶2. (U) Scot Gonzales and Perry Davis from the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) conducted the first-ever series of export license checks in Libya, September 9-19. They visited numerous sites in both Tripoli and Benghazi to review compliance with U.S. export regulations. The licensed commodities under review were "dual use" items which can have both civilian and military uses. The team ensured that the controlled items had been shipped to the proper end user and were utilized for the purpose stated on license applications. They took pains to explain the purpose of their visit to their interlocutors, emphasizing that BIS conducts end-use checks worldwide, and that a successful review of an entity's record can speed future license approvals.

¶3. (U) The BIS team's visit came on the heels of the August 31 amendment to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that apply to Libya. This change removed the requirement for a license to export or re-export items controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons. With the change, items such as most computers, software, telecommunications equipment and vehicles can be exported to Libya without a Commerce export license. The BIS team addressed questions about the EAR change, which put Libya on a par with most US export destinations, noting that many of the commodities being checked would no longer require licenses for export and re-export to Libya.

Installed Base Responsibilities Briefed to Interlocutors

¶4. (U) During their visit, the BIS team reminded interlocutors about their responsibilities in dealing with "installed base" items. Installed base refers to U.S. goods brought into the country during the sanctions period without appropriate licenses. U.S. citizens are prohibited from "ordering, buying, removing, concealing, storing, using, selling, loaning, disposing of, transferring, financing, forwarding, or otherwise servicing, in whole or part, any items that may have been originally illegally exported or reexported to Libya by third parties." Furthermore, US citizens are required by law to report such items to the Bureau of Industry and Security within 90 days of coming into contact with them. This includes commodities that no longer require a Commerce license following the August 31 amendment of the EAR as it relates to Libya. Installed base items are undoubtedly present in every sector of the Libyan economy, particularly in agriculture.

¶5. (SBU) The BIS team's license checks focused primarily on companies working in the petroleum sector, including Conoco Philips, Marathon, Schlumberger, Hess, and WesternGeco, among others. Two large Libyan government entities, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company and the Great Man-Made River Authority, were also visited. The quality of the license checks ranged widely. At the high end were impressive displays of corporate compliance, complete with PowerPoint slide shows, tidy binders of

complete with PowerPoint slide shows, tidy binders of appropriate paperwork and export compliance specialists flown in from abroad. In a few instances, equipment was pulled from the field (e.g., GPS units used by petroleum exploration crews operating deep in the Libyan desert) to be presented to the BIS team for inspection. Other checks were conducted without the benefit of a visual inspection of the licensed items, owing to their reported ongoing use in remote areas of the country.

Appointment Requests Encounter Stunning Bureaucratic Evasion

¶6. (SBU) One failed license check spoke volumes about the frustrations of operating in Libya. The BIS team, accompanied by Econoff and Econ Specialist, had flown to Benghazi to conduct several checks at GOL owned/operated facilities. Appointments set before departure dissolved by 9AM the following day, and the team was forced into a holding pattern. As required, a request for these USG-GOL meetings had been made in advance via diplomatic note, and approval had been granted by the Protocol Office of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation. However, this fact had not reached the Libyan entities, and it took more than a day of continuous phone calls to clarify the situation and commence office visits. However, the quasi-private Bank of Commerce and Development engaged in a stunning display of bureaucratic evasion tactics, and avoided a visit entirely. After much effort to contact him, our bank point of contact confirmed receipt of protocol's approval for the meeting, as well as his superior's approval of the meeting in principle. However, he staunchly and repeatedly refused a meeting, on the grounds that he had not personally received his supervisor's personal permission to hold the meeting. Alas, neither reason nor his supervisor could be reached, and the team's trip passed without a visit to the Bank of Commerce and Development. It is noteworthy that in Libya, even a visit to a "private" bank can require expediting by the Libyan Government Protocol Office, and the extra level of coordination does not guarantee success.

Check You Later

¶7. (U) The BIS team departed Libya having conducted dozens of end-use license checks, almost all of which produced solid evidence that end items were being utilized and controlled properly. With the amendment of the EAR, return of U.S. oil companies and the expansion of bilateral trade and investment ties, future Commerce license checks are likely to focus on a narrower, more sensitive range of commodities. Agents Gonzales and Davis did not clear this cable.
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI568

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI568 aka Wikileaks id #80531 ?
Subject	LIBYAN VIEWS ON REGIONAL AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI568.html
Referenced by	06TRIPOLI645
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/09/2006 03:14:36 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00568

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   PA ORA OMC RSO LEGAT IPS ECON DEA CONS AMB AID
            DCM DAO

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO414
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0568/01 2761505
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031505Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1298
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0279
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0036
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0046
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0322
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0031
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0030
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0005
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0013
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0441
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0453
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0053
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU 0009
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0305
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0210
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0570
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1469
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000568

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/2/2016
TAGS: PINS *[National Security]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , SU *[Sudan]* , SO *[Somalia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN VIEWS ON REGIONAL AFRICA DEVELOPMENTS

REF: A) STATE 164613 B) STATE 162369

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Ali Treki, Under Secretary of African Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (de facto MFA), called in Charge on October 1 for a discussion of regional African issues. Treki said that Foreign Minister Shalgam instructed him to reach out to the U.S., U.K. and France to learn more about their perspectives. Charge noted the Africa-related discussions between Secretary Rice and Shalgam at UNGA, and shared a copy of the Secretary's 9/27 speech at the Africa Society. Charge urged Treki to consider that a peacekeeping force under UN aegis could be comprised in a way that would not catalyze terrorist activity in central Africa. The Libyans continue to emphasize their belief that "rehatting" the AU troops could spark a terrorist threat against "non-Africans" involved in peacekeeping operations.

¶2. (C) Treki said that Libya continued to encourage strengthening of the AU forces and that the AU Peace and Security Council agreed to send a few thousand more troops, perhaps from Tanzania and Botswana. He also said Libya might give 70 million dollars in additional support, and that the UAE and Algeria had been approached for additional funding. "Don't apply too much pressure, the U.S.-Sudanese relationship must be carefully managed," Treki continued. The U.S. is in too much of a hurry to apply Chapter 7 and "we don't like that at all," Treki exclaimed, arguing that Chapter 6 could be used to persuade the Sudanese to take gradual steps.

¶3. (C) Noting the divisions within almost all groups and negotiating parties, Treki said that when delegations traveled to Tripoli, the Libyans encouraged them to implement the CPA. He said that the Libyans were trying to organize another round of Tripoli-based negotiations and mentioned receiving a letter from Mini Minawi the last week of September. Treki said that past Libyan engagement had significantly reduced cross-border tension between Chad and Sudan.

¶4. (C) Asked about recent developments in Somalia, Treki said that Sheikh Ibrahim visited Libya for the African Union Anniversary on 9/9 and stayed for 2-3 days. He characterized the Islamic Courts as controlling most of Somalia and "they are not fanatics, not linked to radical elements, they only want to end the crime and chaos brought about by the warlords." Treki believed that Ibrahim and his associates would continue dialogue with the TFIs and hold elections. According to Treki, Ibrahim and other Somalis strongly oppose Ethiopian troop presence, particularly given past history. He said he told PM Malas it would not be helpful to send troops.

¶5. (C) Referencing talks in Eastern Sudan, Treki said that Libya encouraged those negotiations. While Libya didn't have a representative participating, he believed "it shouldn't be difficult to reach agreement on how the government can development infrastructure and share power in Eastern Sudan." Acknowledging ongoing divisions among the negotiating parties,

he didn't feel that the talks in Eastern Sudan would exacerbate longstanding rivalries and was hopeful that it might help move forward other tracks.

¶6. (C) Treki asked Charge to relay a request to Washington that the U.S. government refrain from engaging with "subgroups" of the African continent. Citing a proposed November China-Africa Summit, Treki said the Libyans oppose this type of engagement as inappropriate and "humiliating". He said Libya was also against any proposed India-Africa, France-Africa activities since it was off balance to have one country in discussions with one continent. It would only be appropriate for summits to be held between the EU and the AU or similar regional organizations. He said Libya submitted a resolution to the AU calling for broad cooperation, noting that an AU summit with Latin American countries was in the planning stages. (COMMENT: Treki's comments are a variant on Libya's continuing rhetoric calling for Africans to reject outside influence and assistance programs. END COMMENT.)

¶7. (C) Similarly, Treki said diplomats at the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in Washington appreciated a recent State Department briefing on U.S. regional objectives in Africa. However, he urged reconsideration of geographical divisions; "Libya takes issue with subdividing Africa, we don't like the terminology North Africa or Sub-Saharan Africa." He said Libya would also present resolutions at international organizations to eliminate these distinctions. (NOTE: The Libyans have told senior-level Department visitors that they believe Libya, along with the rest of north Africa, should be included in an Africa-wide bureau instead of NEA. They feel the present arrangement treats them as separate from their African colleagues. END NOTE.)
BERRY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI569

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI569 aka Wikileaks id #80534 ?
Subject	SOUTH KOREAN PM VISITS TRIPOLI TO PROMOTE BILATERAL TRADE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Oct 2006 15:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI569.html
References	06SEOUL3378
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/09/2006 03:14:50 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00569

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: FCS
    INFO:   MGT IPS ECON DCM AMB

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO522
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0569/01 2761536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031536Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1300
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0324
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0015
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0443
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0455
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0281
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0307
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0118
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0006
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0033
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1471
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000569

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG
```

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/3/2016
TAGS: BEXP *[Trade Expansion and Promotion]* , BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , EINT *[Economic and Commercial Internet]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , TINT *[Internet Technology]* , TRSY *[Department of the Treasury]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , XI *[North Africa]* , XE *[East Asia]* , KS *[Korea (South)]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SOUTH KOREAN PM VISITS TRIPOLI TO PROMOTE BILATERAL TRADE

REF: SEOUL 3378

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) South Korean Prime Minister Her Excellency Han Myeong-sook visited Tripoli the week of September 17-21 in association with the "Korean Libyan Business Partnership Conference 2006." The conference was organized by the Korean International Trade Union and the Libyan General Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. At a lunch hosted by the conference organizers, PM Han addressed a crowd of 200 Libyan and Korean businessman, calling for "an acceleration of bilateral relations through business partnerships." She praised the Libyan Great Man Made River project as an example of successful cooperation between the two nations, and called for greater cooperation with particular emphasis on IT and communications equipment. She ended by expressing that "current cooperation confirms the potential for future cooperation," and that she hoped "future relations would be as smooth as the Korean cars she saw on the roads of Tripoli."

Content with Current Progress, but Still More Potential

¶2. (U) According to press accounts, PM Han recounted that she and Libyan leader Mu'anmar Qadhafi considered the Great Man Made River (GMMR) project to be the "eighth wonder of the world," and with continued cooperation she hoped Libya and Korea could eventually produce the ninth wonder of the world. The Koreans have a string of work encampments throughout Libya to support their construction projects and other contracts. Korean employees are typically supervising engineers who oversee the work of third country laborers. The Koreans tend to stay in Libya for six months, then return home for a one month leave period with their families. Many of these engineers have lived in Libya for ten years or longer, since their salaries of approximately double what they could earn at home.

¶3. (C) PM Han told the press that Korea would invite 1000 North Africans to Korea in the next three years to accelerate industry and infrastructure cooperation, and stated that Libya would be included in this program, and a part of any future North African initiatives. Korean Embassy Counselor for Political Affairs, Sang Jin Kim told P/E Chief that the Korean delegation of 121 people included 65 business representatives. He said that during the visit two agreements and four MOUs were signed. A training and information technology agreement was signed by Secretary of the General People's Committee (GPC) for Manpower, Training and Employment Matouq Matouq and the Korean Deputy FM. Kim said that the Koreans will send trainers to educate the Libyans in information technology (in English) after the Libyans provide a building for the training center. He said that the Libyans had asked for an agreement on technology transfer, with an emphasis on water desalination and power generation, and that the Koreans agreed to form a joint commission to conduct feasibility studies. (COMMENT: The Libyan's request tracks with their request made to the French, German, British and others - they are using the gambit, "show us the rewards for giving up our WMD" with all their interlocutors.

END COMMENT.) The Libyans broached peaceful uses of nuclear energy with the Koreans, but at this point there are no plans for nuclear cooperation.

¶4. (C) The other agreement was signed by the Under Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy, Trade and Investment, Taher Sarkez, for the promotion, guarantee and protection of investment. The MOUs focused on construction, export promotion, communications, and infrastructure development. Kim said that the Libyans complained that on the GMMR Project and other activities, the Koreans had imported too many foreign laborers "building and leaving." He said the Libyans, in every discussion, asked for more training and technology transfer. Matouq broached his proposal that in the future, Korean contractors maintain 50 percent Libyan laborers on their payrolls, with 50 percent from third countries like Bangladesh or other Islamic countries. Kim said that over the last year, Matouq's GPC staffers had presented Korean contractors with lists of employees "to be hired." He said that almost none of the proposed employement candidates were qualified, but that the Koreans hired them and "the people get a salary but they make no contributions, sometimes they don't even show up for work." During the bilateral meetings with the PM, the Koreans told Matouq that they would continue making a good faith effort to hire Libyans, but that the GPC had to allow time for Libyans to be trained and educated for specialized work before insisting on "Libyanization" of the work force.

Grand Plans, Without Any Planning To Support the Concept

¶5. (C) Kim also described Qadhafi's proposal to the PM that Koreans invest in a oil pipeline project routed from the Jamahiriya to Eritrea and Bab al-Medab so that Asian countries could access energy supplies from the Eastern coast of Africa. He said Qadhafi had a huge map in his Bab al- Azizia meeting room and traced off a proposed routing for the PM, but that the Koreans were totally unprepared to address the concept, especially since Qadhafi talked in generalities and did not offer any details, beyond his speculation that the Chinese and Indians would also offer up funding to build the pipeline.

¶6. (C) The protocol aspects of the visit were particularly challenging, according to Kim, who described trip planning with the Libyans as a "nightmare." He said that the Libyans refused to confirm any meetings in advance of the PM's arrival and that they only had a few minutes notice before the bilateral with Qadhafi. Since the Koreans were transported to their official meetings in Libyan-provided Protocol Office Mercedes convoy (as are all visiting delegations), they had no control over the schedule or motorcade movements. Despite telling their liaison contacts in advance of the visit that the PM would not visit any memorial sites, Kim said that at the conclusion of the Qadhafi bilateral, the PM was escorted to the memorial of the U.S. bombing on the Bab al-Azizia compound and asked to sign the guestbook. He said that she would not have agreed if asked to visit, but presented with the inevitable, she wrote an innocous statement at the memorial. He said that, reviewing other recent signatures, it appeared many African leaders had visited the memorial, as well as delegations from Pakistan and the Philippines.

¶7. (C) Embassy Comment: The logistical and protocolary problems which the Koreans faced are routine in Libya, and have bedeviled the French, British, Germans and many others. The Libyans are both unwilling and incapable of scheduling meetings in advance or performing other protocol functions considered standard operating procedure elsewhere. The Libyan requests to the Koreans for assistance with water desalination, power generation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy track with requests to the G8 countries and their other interlocutors. End comment.

Comment:

BERRY
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI573

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI573 aka Wikileaks id #80754 ?
Subject	BENGHAZI'S ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 5 Oct 2006 08:24 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI573.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/09/2006 03:15:05 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00573

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO312
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0573/01 2780824
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 050824Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1305
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0309
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0574
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0326
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0445
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0457
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0283
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0120
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0212
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1476
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000573

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/3/2016
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: BENGHAZI'S ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United
```

States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) Six months after a deadly riot at the Italian consulate that left more than a dozen killed, Econoff made a quick swing through Libya's downtrodden second city on September 13-14, accompanying a two-person team from the Commerce Department's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS).

¶2. (C) Upon arrival from Tripoli, one is immediately struck by Benghazi's slower pace. Benghazi doesn't appear to have the constant crush of cars common to Tripoli's streets, lending a relative quiet to the city. The disparity of wealth compared with Tripoli is obvious, and most clearly marked by the cars on the road. New black and white cabs are nearly impossible to find, and other vehicles are severely dilapidated and sand-blasted. State-funded infrastructure appears on a par with the Tripoli, and the streets are not as choked with rubbish. On the other hand, signs of new housing construction are deceiving. Contacts reported that work on several large apartment block developments has been on hiatus for many months; their cinderblock and rebar husks loom forlorn and half-finished. A major bridge connecting the city has been closed for years, with rumors of imminent repairs stretching to fill the time.

¶3. (C) A quick inspection of the Italian consulate, epicenter of the mid-February riots, made plain that it would not be opening for business anytime soon. Anti-Italian and anti-Danish graffiti remain on the walls, which are smoke-blackened and pock-marked. Most of the structure's windows remain broken, and the interior of the building is charred and filled with debris. The streets in the immediate vicinity of the consulate appear unblemished, with no signs of damage. The ravaged building was guarded by three uniformed military police officers (the only uniformed security presence visible on the streets during the two-day stay).

¶4. (U) Visits to both high-end (Dubai Street) and working-class (Eshreen Street) shopping districts highlighted the penchant for business commonly ascribed to the port city. Unlike Tripoli, billboard ads are plentiful, and smaller postings dot every major street. Many of the Dubai Street shops could be transplanted into Western European commercial districts and fit right in. Foot traffic on Eshreen Street was heavy, and the shops appeared well-stocked and orderly. A favorite of Econoff's, among the myriad clothiers featuring bridal gowns, was a second-floor shop's display window, in which the half-dozen lace-wrapped mannequins had their backs turned to the street for modesty.

¶5. (U) Econoff paid a visit to the "Small and Medium Projects Fair" being held in a small industrial park close to the city center. The exhibition was in its final day, but the full selection of eighty-odd vendors was still up and running. Intended to highlight Libyan private companies, the fair showcased about sixty Libyan private and public entities, with Egyptian companies making up the bulk of the remainder. Most booths hawked construction services and materials, oil industry support services and agricultural products. Agents for a handful of large foreign companies (Sanyo, LC, Bobcat) had displays, but the most eye-catching displays belonged to several Libyan manufacturers of Technicolor living room furniture molded out of open-cell foam.

¶6. (U) Exhibition organizers "International Jerma Expo for

¶6. (U) Exhibition organizers "International Jerma Expo for Exhibitions and Conferences" arranged for display booths in a long run of air conditioned storage containers, spruced up with carpeting, ceiling adornments and additional lighting. The event was well-organized, but sparsely attended - there were easily more booth attendants than visitors. Jerma Expo is also the organizer for a number of other exhibitions to be held in Tripoli over the coming months: an Agricultural Fair (11/27-30), Water and Sewage Equipment Fair (1/29/07-2/1/07), Small and Medium Project Fair (6/1-5), and Safety and Security Fair & Electronics Technical Fair (6/11/07).

¶7. (C) Embassy Comment: Benghazi has reportedly been calm and quiet since the Danish cartoon riots and killings in February 2006. As noted by Econoff, there are not signs of a security presence in the city that would indicate any lingering tension after the unrest of last winter. Benghazi natives resident in Tripoli frequently complain that Benghazi has second class status. While the Jamahiriya government does take care to maintain an appearance of equity in the distribution of government funds and projects, the city lacks vitality or hopefulness. While the General People's Congress (GPC) recently announced plans for a major commercial development in Benghazi, three major free zones are planned for the Misrata area that could potentially overshadow any revitalization in Benghazi. And the GPC also announced the creation of a large "special zone" under the direction of the Leader's son, Saadi Qadhafi, in the area of BuKammash west of Tripoli and Zwara. This special zone is rumored to be a new major tourism project, although (in classic Libyan contradiction) there are also rumors that it will include manufacturing and some aspects of energy production since it may have its own airport, customs officials and security force. Italian Embassy Political Counselor told P/C Chief on September 28 that the Italian consulate would not be reconstructed in the near future. They are concentrating their efforts on a major reconstruction of their Tripoli Embassy building. End comment.

GOLDRICH
SIGNATURE

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI586

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI586 aka Wikileaks id #81757 ?
Subject	RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA TEST ANNOUNCEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 13 Oct 2006 12:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI586.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/15/2006 03:51:00 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  ECPO

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00586

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO354
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0586 2861202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131202Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1319
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0328
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0447
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0312
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0579
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0078
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1493
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000586

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, ISN,EAP,IO

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/12/2016
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-
Proliferation] , KN [Korea (North)] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO NORTH KOREA TEST ANNOUNCEMENT

REF: STATE 169418
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Charge met with Ahmed Fitouri, Secretary of American Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) on October 12 and conveyed reftel talking points, stressing the need for swift and stern measures in response to the North Korean announcement. Fitouri questioned whether or not the nuclear test had actually taken place and asked if the U.S. had independently confirmed the North Korean's announcement.

¶2. (C) In response to the request for support of an UNSC Chapter VII resolution , Fitouri said, "Libya acknowledged how dangerous nuclear weapons can be; the Leader's initiative set a positive example for the entire world." He added that, while it was unclear what repercussions would be appropriate if the testing took place, "Libya will work to prevent any dangers to the world." He did not offer any response to the request that countries take firm actions, including financial measures, to freeze assets and transactions related to proliferation activities.

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI592

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI592 aka Wikileaks id #82180 ?
Subject	THE LIBYAN NATIONAL CENTRE FOR STANDARDIZATION AND METROLOGY - AN OVERVIEW
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 17 Oct 2006 14:40 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI592.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/19/2006 11:26:19 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00592

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: FCS
    INFO:   ECON IPS DCM AMB

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO696
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0592 2901440
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 171440Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1328
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0449
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0582
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0460
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0024
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0330
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1503
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000592

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG GAVITO, OES FOR SENSENEY; AMMAN FOR
WHITLESLEY; CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE;

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BBSR [Business Services Reporting] , BEXP [Trade Expansion and Promotion] , ECIN [Economic Integration and
Cooperation] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] , WTRO [World Trade Organization] , XI [North Africa] , LY
```

[Libya]
SUBJECT: THE LIBYAN NATIONAL CENTRE FOR STANDARDIZATION AND METROLOGY - AN OVERVIEW

¶1. SUMMARY: The Libyan National Centre for Standardization and Metrology (LNCSM) was established with the goal of bringing Libya into conformance with international trade standards, focusing on eventual accession of Libya to the World Trade Organization (WTO.) The current focus within the LNCSM is protecting the health and safety of Libya's citizens and environment by creating a valid national testing and conformity assessment system. The LNCSM monitors the trade climate within Libya to avoid creating unnecessary barriers to trade, harmonize the rules of competition, and avoid or remove non-tariff trade barriers. In addition, they maintain a focus on avoidance of putting measures in place that would be contrary to Libya's eventual obligations, if and when they can achieve membership in the WTO. The director general of the LNCSM, Dr. Ahmed Shembesh, in addition to seeking international acceptance of testing and reports generated within Libya, also seeks to create domestic confidence in Libya's testing procedures, as well as the bodies charged with undertaking those procedures. END SUMMARY.

The Current Program

¶2. Currently the market surveillance portion of the LNCSM charter is limited by poor communication resources, lack of established procedures and norms, lack of historical record keeping, and a nebulous market place that suffers from porous borders and IPR violations on every scale. The LNCSM recognizes these issues and focuses their current limited program of market surveillance and national conformity on the following areas:

--Protection of consumers from hazards posed by unsafe imported materials
--Facilitating the exchange of goods between local industries and enterprises
--Facilitating the export of local goods by ensuring that they bring a fair price
--Taking a special focus on export assistance to small and medium sized businesses

---
The Direction of the LNCSM

¶3. The LNCSM intends to be the driving force behind upgrading and establishing a functioning conformity assessment and consumer protection system in Libya's near future. They envision a system afforded appropriate laws, and protected by standards, measures and a quality infrastructure that will be in line with international guidelines. They are currently seeking assistance to achieve these goals in the following key areas:

--Awareness raising campaigns
--Personnel and institutional capacity building
--Analysis of training needs
--Seminars and Workshops
--Practical on-the-job training of specialists
--International study tours

Future Actions

¶4. During her proposed November 11-13, 2006 visit, Assistant Secretary McMurray of the Bureau of Oceans and International

SIPDIS

Environmental and Scientific Affairs and Dr. Hratch Smerjian of the National Institute for Standards and Technology are tentatively scheduled to meet with Dr. Shembesh of the LNCSM and discuss potential areas for U.S. cooperation with Libya in the fields of standardization and metrology.

SIGNATURE

BERRY

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI599

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI599 aka Wikileaks id #82488 ?
Subject	LIBYANS DEMUR ON INVITATION TO EXERCISE LEADING EDGE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Oct 2006 14:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI599.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/26/2006 11:55:22 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00599

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   CONS AMB RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS DCM DAO AID
            ECON DEA

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO569
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0599 2921442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191442Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1338
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0585
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0001
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0008
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0016
RUEHMS/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0001
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0002
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0008
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0450
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1513
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000599

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , TS *[Tunisia]* , LY *[Libya]*

SUBJECT: LIBYANS DEMUR ON INVITATION TO EXERCISE LEADING EDGE

REF: STATE 165179

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

(C) Charge met with Mohammed al-Ayaab, Americas Desk Director at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation on October 18. Al-Ayaab conveyed a verbal response from Secretary Shalgam to Reftel invitation to Exercise Leading Edge that had been conveyed as a diplomatic note to the Libyan government. "Shalgam thanks the U.S. for the invitation and acknowledges that this cooperation reflects the improvement in our relations," Ayaab said, "but, unfortunately the time is too short for planning our participation because of difficulties during the Ramadan period." He explained that the Libyans were trying to determine if there was anyone from the government they could send as an observer to Exercise Leading Edge, but he did not know if they could coordinate a response before the October 29 designated arrival date in Bahrain. He hoped that Libya could participate in future PSI exercises.

BERRY

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI600

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI600 aka Wikileaks id #82489 ?
Subject	LIBYAN NOC CHAIRMAN GHANEM'S VIEWS ON PETROLEUM ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Oct 2006 14:43 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI600.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

null
Brooke F Adams 10/26/2006 11:55:03 AM From DB/Inbox: Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00600

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
ACTION: ECON
INFO: FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT PA POL IPS

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO570
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0600/01 2921443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191443Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1339
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0316
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0586
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0331
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0451
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0003
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1514

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000600

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR MASON, ENERGY FOR PERSONS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2016
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN NOC CHAIRMAN GHANEM'S VIEWS ON PETROLEUM ISSUES

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Charge met with National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman (and former Prime Minister) Shukri Ghanem on October 15 to discuss US-Libyan energy sector cooperation. Ghanem expressed confidence in Libyan efforts to boost oil production and defended the establishment of the Cabinet-level National Energy Committee over the NOC. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Charge congratulated National Oil Company Chairman Shukri Ghanem on receiving the "Petroleum Executive of the Year" award at the 27th annual Oil and Money conference in London on September 18-19. Responding to the Charge's comments on his acceptance speech, "The End of Cheap Oil," Ghanem wryly noted that although oil prices have rebounded recently, he did not expect that trend to continue for long. In the near term, prices should dip following the announcement of a one million bbl/day OPEC production cut, the expected result from OPEC's October 19 meeting in Doha. Ghanem lamented the difficulty of accurately predicting fluctuations in world oil prices, and estimated that roughly $10-15 of the cost of a barrel of oil stems solely from market apprehension about war and political instability in the Middle East region.

Meeting Libyan Production Goals

¶3. (C) When asked for an update on Libya's efforts to boost petroleum production to three million bbl/day by 2010, Ghanem expressed optimism that this figure could be met on this timeline through the continued implementation of the NOC's two-prong plan. The first is the recent opening of Libya to exploration by foreign oil companies. Although the most recent concession awards will take 6-8 years to produce oil in quantity (if a sizable find is made), other new areas are due to come on-line in the next three years. The second, and likely more important factor for production increases in the short-term, will be the enhanced and improved oil recovery (EOR, IOR) operations being undertaken at Libya's mature fields. Ghanem stressed that the return of U.S. companies and expertise will be vital to this effort.

¶4. (C) Ghanem expressed satisfaction at the progress of the latest round of Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA). The NOC's review of 70 applying companies produced a list of 47 qualified bidders who will have the opportunity to bid on concession rights in 12 offshore blocks and 29 onshore areas. Multiple bids are expected from most of the qualified companies, so the total number of bids should number well over ¶100. Ghanem noted that oil company interest in Libya remains high, owing to its vast proven and potential reserves, past production history and advantageous geographic location. He confirmed recent meetings with top U.S. oil company executives from Occidental, Chevron, Exxon-Mobil, Conoco-Philips and Marathon, describing them as positive and routine.

The National Energy Council(NEC): "Not a bottleneck"

¶5. (C) Ghanem attempted to clarify the role of the recently-formed "National Energy Council" (NEC). (Note: This new government entity is composed of the Ministers of Industry, Planning, Economy, Finance, and Labor, as well as Ghanem and GPC Secretary or "Prime Minister" Al-Mahmoudi. Its formation has

SIPDIS
raised concerns among largely professional, technocratic operation would be become more politicized, or at the very least add an unnecessary bureaucratic layer over the GOL energy

add an unnecessary bureaucratic layer over the GOL energy sector. End Note). According to Ghanem, the new body will "not be as people think; it will be strictly consultative, not a bottleneck." Ghanem stressed this point several times, emphasizing that the NEC will produce efficiencies, rather than more bureaucracy. The NEC will be tasked by the full Cabinet to make energy sector decisions from time to time, and its select membership will help ensure that government laws and operations do not negatively impact the energy sector.

Trade Shows and Conferences

¶6. (C) Noting active USG and US company interest in, and support for, the upcoming Project Libya conference (December 4-7) Charge requested that Ghanem meet with visiting representatives of U.S. companies during that period. Ghanem was non-committal, but agreed to see what was possible if he was not traveling abroad. Charge noted the great proliferation of conferences in Libya, particularly those concerning the energy sector, and many of which made claims to sponsorship by GOL entities. In this vein, Charge inquired whether the NOC was supporting the November 21-22 "Libya Oil and Gas Show" (as indicated in the exhibition's promotional materials). In response, Ghanem conveyed measured exasperation at the number of exhibitions and conferences being staged across Libya, and his view that they detracted from "real work." He opined that many of them were primarily money-making operations staged by individuals with varying levels of government connections. Regarding the 21-22 November event, Ghanem recalled agreeing to authorize a NOC statement of support, but stated that the NOC did not plan to play an active role in the exhibition.

BERRY
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI614

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI614 aka Wikileaks id #83066 ?
Subject	PROJECTED COMMUNICATIONS OUTAGES IN LIBYA FOR DAY OF MOURNING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Oct 2006 15:49 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/10/06TRIPOLI614.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  10/26/2006 11:54:28 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00614

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: IMO
    INFO:   IPC ISC IPO ITC RIMC IPS MGT

DISSEMINATION: IMO
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO556
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0614 2981549
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251549Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1359
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1534
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0453
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0461
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000614

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S/ES-O
NEA/MAG, NEA/EX;DS/IP/NEA; DS COMMAND CTR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ACOA [Communication Operations and Administration] , AMGT [Management Operations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: PROJECTED COMMUNICATIONS OUTAGES IN LIBYA FOR DAY OF
MOURNING

In commemoration of the Libyan Day of Mourning, the GOL has
informed post that on Thursday, October 26, both internet,
international phone calls and international air travel will be
cut off nationwide from 6AM to 6 PM.   In practice, over the
past several years, communications outages have been limited to
several hours during the afternoon.  Post can be reached by
inmarsat: 881-676-31-5208.  The Day of Mourning commemorates an
outrage committed by Italy against Libya in 1911 during which
thousands of Libyans were deported from their country and never
seen again.  In addition to the cutoff from the outside world,
flags will be flown at half staff, television will be broadcast
in black and white and posters evoking the memory of the event
will appear in major cities.

GOLDRICH
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI623

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI623 aka Wikileaks id #83874 ?
Subject	NOVEMBER ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 1 Nov 2006 13:24 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI623.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI1055
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/02/2006 09:55:22 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00623

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   MGT AID AMB DCM FAS FCS IPS POL PA

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO021
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0623 3051324
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 011324Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1367
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1543
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000623

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/1/2016
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , PREL [External Political Relations] , IO [Chagos Archipelago; Diego Garcia; British
Indian Ocean Territory] , IS [Israel] , SY [Syria] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: NOVEMBER ARAB LEAGUE BOYCOTT MEETING

REF: STATE 180280

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United
States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

(C) Charge met October 31 with Mohammed al-Ayaib, Americas Desk Director at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA Equivalent) and delivered reftel talking points. Al-Ayaib said he would refer the matter to the appropriate officials for further consideration. Post continues to raise the Arab League Boycott issue in its meetings with the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade and the organization emphasizes that it does not enforce the boycott.

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI626

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI626 aka Wikileaks id #84014 ?
Subject	(S) DEMARCHE DELIVERED: CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION ASSISTANCE TO LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 2 Nov 2006 10:09 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI626.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/14/2006 11:39:01 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


S E C R E T        TRIPOLI 00626

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO408
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0626/01 3061009
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021009Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1370
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0456
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0027
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0026
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0462
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0025
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1546
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000626

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG GAVITO, OES/STC FOR SENSENEY, DSWMDR KEN WARD

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/1/2016
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , OPCW, CWC [Chemical Weapons
Convention] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: (S) DEMARCHE DELIVERED: CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
ASSISTANCE TO LIBYA
```

REF: STATE 176372

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Charge discussed Reftel points (concerning U.S. Chemical Weapons Destruction Assistance to Libya) with senior Qadhafi advisor and General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC) Secretary Abdulati al-Obeidi October 31. Their discussion

SIPDIS
followed Embassy ESTH officer's delivery of the points in non-paper form to Colonel Ahmed AbulHuda and the new GPCFLIC POC for OPCW matters, Adem Talah. Obeidi said the Libyans are examining the Embassy's revised Arabic translation of the contract, and planned to provide feedback before the OPCW meeting in the Hague. He reviewed ongoing Libyan objections to the termination notice section, as well as appropriations and foreign assistance-related restrictions on the program. The previous day Colonel AbulHuda stayed only for a moment, and left Talah and ESTH officer to continue discussions. (ESTH officer spoke with Colonel Huda on the phone earlier in the week and discussed the general issues outlined in reftel) Talah provided no official response, but received the points, and stated that he understood the contractual/financial issues associated with the November deadline for conclusion of the contract discussions. END SUMMARY.

Obeidi Reviews Concerns

¶2. (C) Following ESTH officer's delivery of the Arabic translation of the contract and Reftel points, (see below), Charge reiterated to Obeidi the need for an expeditious reply (preferably before the November 6-10 OPCW meeting at the Hague) and highlighted the November 25 contract bid expiration date. Obeidi responded that he would discuss our response with General Ahmed Mahmoud Ali Al-Zwayy November 1 and the Libyans would try to get back to us on our draft before the November 6 OPCW meeting, but reiterated that the Libyans have been unhappy since the early September discussions in Tripoli about three issues:

- Their perception that the U.S. committed to a 45 million dollar effort, but can only sign for $24,600,000. "This hampers our ability to budget and to provide proper assurance to the OPCW," Obeidi said. (Note: As in previous discussions Obeidi was not receptive to an explanation of the US appropriations process. End Note.)

- The removal of the equipment from Libya after conclusion of the contract; and

- The 30-day cancellation clause.

Upcoming Executive Council Meeting in The Hague

¶3. (U) ESTH officer discussed the U.S. desire to conclude contract negotiations, if possible, during the upcoming executive council session of the OPCW in The Hague. Talah and Colonel AbulHuda agreed that this would be a good opportunity as Talah and Dr. Ahmed Hesnawi would both be in attendance. (Background: Dr. Hesnawi is the Libyan lead technical representative in the discussions, and due to his proficiency in English, Arabic and the technical aspects of the munitions and precursors involved, is the de facto lead negotiator when General al-Azwaay is not in the room.) Although they understood this to be an opportunity to conclude negotiations, neither provided a solid commitment or deadline for completion

provided a solid commitment or deadline for completion.

COMMENT

¶4. (S) While the GOL is certainly committed to fulfilling their obligations with respect to the OPCW, there is still some resistance to complete the contractual negotiations. They understand what items/deliverables they need to provide to satisfy the U.S. government, but continue to drag their feet. Talah said plainly that the pace of the negotiations was moving along as fast as the Libyans "desired." Interestingly, the GOL sent Talah to Rome the week of October 22-28 to attend a conference on OPCW obligations to give him an insight into the organization's precepts, showing a continued desire to understand and adhere to their obligations. While the delay in part reflects the specific three concerns outlined by Obeidi, it also reflects the Libyans ongoing calls for a signficant "reward" that the government can show as the benefit of having renounced its WMD programs. They often complain that they gave up hundreds of millions of dollars to the U.S., and in return they expect that the U.S. will reward them with projects and equipment.

Next Steps:

¶5. (SBU) OES A/S Claudia McMurray plans to visit Tripoli on November 11-13 2006, and will have a chance to meet with Dr. El-Waer of the LEA. This will provide an opportunity to ask El-Waer for a definitive answer to Libyan interest in hazardous waste disposal, and what interest remains, if any, in retaining the incinerator/neutralization equipment after the destruction process. If the GOL does not provide its suggested language changes before the upcoming meeting in The Hague, the U.S. delegation will have an additional opportunity to press for the requested items, and/or the issues slowing negotiations.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI644

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	06TRIPOLI644 aka Wikileaks id #85195 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCMURRAY VISIT AND STATUS REPORT ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 9 Nov 2006 17:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI644.html
References	06TRIPOLI476
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/14/2006 11:38:21 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


UNCLAS        TRIPOLI 00644

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: FCS
    INFO:   IPS ECON DCM AMB

DISSEMINATION: FCS
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO123
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0644/01 3131716
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091716Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1394
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0029
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0460
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0597
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0335
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0473
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0214
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0320
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0287
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1573
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000644

SIPDIS

STATE NEA/MAG FOR GAVITO, OES FOR SENSENEY; AMMAN FOR WHITTLESLEY; HHS F
```

JANE
COURY;
CAIRO FOR DR. MARIE RICCIARDONE
NEA/RA FOR LAWSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BEXP *[Trade Expansion and Promotion]* , BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , EFIS *[Commercial Fishing and Fish Processing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , OSCI *[Science Grants]* , SENV *[Environmental Affairs]* , TBIO *[Biological and Medical Science]* , TP *[Sao Tome and Principe]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MCMURRAY VISIT AND STATUS REPORT ON SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION WITH LIBYA

REF: STATE 184185, TRIPOLI 476

¶1. Post warmly welcomes the visit of Assistant Secretary of State for the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs McMurray. The following background information is provided in anticipation of your visit to Tripoli on November 11-13, 2006. Our scientific engagement program is the most active segment of bilateral cooperation, with ongoing work in biological life sciences, mechanical engineering, water management, nuclear medicine, radioactive waste management and other areas. As with all other delegations, the meeting schedule has not been confirmed at this time. Typically, schedule changes take place up until minutes before a meeting commences. Post anticipates that you will have meetings the evening of Saturday, November 11 with physicians at the Libyan Board of Medical Specialities to discuss telemedicine and sub-speciality training . The morning of Sunday, November 12, we are trying to confirm a meeting with Ahmed Fitouri, the Secretary of American Affairs at the General People's Committee

SIPDIS
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) . In addition, you tentatively have meetings scheduled with Matouq Matouq, the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Training, and Employment and Ahmed Shembesh, the Director of the Libyan National Center for Standardization and Metrology. The afternoon of November 12, there may be meetings at the Libyan General Water Authority, the Libyan Environment Authority and the Libyan Renewable Energy Center. Since the actual order of the schedule will vary considerably, and as a follow up to the July 2006 agreement signed by the U.S. and Libya concerning science and technology cooperation, this cable follows the format of the signed agreement, and the two should be read in tandem. You will be briefed upon arrival with the latest version of the schedule.

HEALTH

See sub topics of Avian Influenza, African Center for Infectious Disease Control, NAMRU-3, Bio-Ethics, and Libyan Board of Medical Specialities.

AVIAN INFLUENZA
---

2. During the July 11-13 2006 visit of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Deputy Secretary Alex Azar, an agreement was signed with the General People's Committee for Health and Environment (GPCHE) to participate in a cooperative initiative for the development of public health and security, with particular reference to public health incidents related to influenza. Attached to this agreement was an offer by HHS to provide the GPCHE a non-competitive grant in the amount of USD$1 Million to foster this cooperation through continued partnerships in disease surveillance, preparedness and response capabilities. The grant was authorized on August 29th 2006, and filed with Health and Human Services. Jane Coury of HHS is

finalizing the contract and delivering the monies to the Libyans, and will be returning to Libya on November 11-13 to continue discussions with Dr. AbduHafid Abudher of the Libyan (African) Center for Infectious Disease Control (ACIDC.) For further details, please reference TRIPOLI 476 , dated September 07, 2006. Key staff of the GPCHE: Secretary Dr. Mohamed Rashed, Under Secretary Mr. Habeb Tamer.

AFRICAN CENTER FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASE CONTROL:
---

3. The scientific engagement program has facilitated continuing contact with the African Center for Infectious Disease Control (ACIDC) and its various offices and personnel. The ACIDC is also the technical point of contact in implementing the HHS Pandemic Influenza Assistance (USD 1 Million.) The main point of contact within the ACIDC is Dr. Abduhafid Abudher. Dr. Abudher also oversees the Tripoli tuberculosis screening center, and Tripoli regional ACIDC center.

NAMRU-3:
---
4. The Navy Medical Research Unit number 3 (NAMRU-3) based in Cairo, Egypt has been instrumental in engaging the Libyan Biological Life Sciences community. NAMRU-3 invited several Libyan biological scientists to study pathogen handling techniques, sampling techniques disease surveillance workshops and other valuable technical and scientific training programs. They are now routinely hosting teams of 2-5 Libyan scientists at their Cairo based facility for courses runing ne-furweek. In dition, the staff of NAMRU-3 have made themselves available to assist in other medical / bio programs within Libya. Dr. Bruce Boynton visited Tripoli as part of the Trilateral Steering Committee Biological Subcommittee, and Dr. Mustafa Mansour, a dual Egyptian/U.S. citizen has made himself available in the proposal submission for the HHS Pandemic Influenza program. In addition, Dr. Marie Ricciardone, a former NAMRU-3 scientist, and current NP/PTR officer provides continuity and follow up for the Libyan biological science community through the scientist engagement program.

BIO-ETHICS, BIO-SAFETY:
---

5. The Trilateral Steering Committee Biological Subcommittee, under the direction of Chair Catharine T. Crittenberger has been the chief engine for engagement of the Libyan biological science community. She routinely meets with the Libyan Permanent Committee on Bioethics and Biosafety (LPCBB) and is currently overseeing the Libyan establishment of a comprehensive Bioethics / Biosafety legislation. Her chief interlocutors are Dr. Mohamed Sharif, Manager of the LPCBB, and Dr. Abdurrahman Tawil, LPCBB board member.

LIBYAN BOARD OF MEDICAL SPECIALTIES / TELEMEDICINE:
---

6. On August 30, 2006, ESTH officer and Dr. Mustafa Mansour of the Navy Medical Research Unit 3 (NAMRU 3) in Cairo, visited the Libyan Board of Medical Specialties to follow up on the July visit of U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Deputy Secretary Alex Azar. DepSec Azar and the Board agreed to

SIPDIS
collaborate, expand and improve Libya's medical board certification process with particular attention to creating recognized certifications in sub-specialties. The Libyans were challenged by ESTH officer to determine what sort of cooperation

or workshop programs would benefit the board, and they responded with two reasonable proposals. The first was a basic discussion on the benefits, feasibility and technology associated with a telemedicine program. The second proposal was for the Libyans to fully fund a series of workshop visits by U.S. physicians, capable of conducting sub-specialty focused workshops in a continuing education capacity, with a secondary goal of discussing and evaluating the board certification criteria in the relevant sub-specialty during the visit. The Libyans have offered to provide funding for visiting physicians from the U.S. to both teach the local physician population, as well as evaluate the board process and certification criteria of medical sub-specialists. Meetings will be scheduled with Jane Coury and/or A/S McMurray as appropriate during their November 11-13 visit to Tripoli.

ENVIRONMENT / WATER

See subtopics of Libyan Environment Authority, Desalination Research, Nuclear Powered Desalination, Quality Monitoring and Education.

LIBYAN ENVIRONMENT AUTHORITY:
---

8. During the July 2006 visit of Under Secretary of State for Democracy and Global Affairs Paula Dobriansky, she and her delegation met with Dr. Abul-Hakim Al-Waer, Secretary of the Libyan Environment Authority (LEA). They discussed issues of water, general environment, fisheries and standards and metrology. In September 2006, Dr. Al-Waer approached the NDF chemical weapons destruction assistance team and indicated an interest/need for a program to destroy / incinerate / neutralize several caustic and hazardous agents/wastes in accordance with various environmental agreements to which they had either signed, or aspire to sign. These items for destruction included PCB's, transformer oil, pesticides left from Italian residents in the 1930's, and hazardous medical wastes. Dr. Waer desires to establish a solution to the immediate problem of existing waste stockpiles, with additional consideration of disposing of future waste. Dr. Waer said he had a budget of LD 57 Million in 2007 funds to address this disposal problem, (including PCB's, Medical Waste and other hazardous wastes) and would be seeking solutions in 2007/2008.

WATER: DESALINATION RESEARCH:
---

9. The National Bureau for Research and Development (NBRD), headed by Dr. Ali Gashut oversees the Renewable Energy and Water Desalination Research Center (REWDRC.) The REWDRC oversees research into various desalination technologies including filtration technologies membranes and reverse osmosis technologies and staging various thermal and filtering technologies. The center is currently focusing on the production of 1200 m3/day desalination units for use in Libya's rural communities not currently serviced by the Great Man Made River Authority, with the goal of eventually making these technologies the preferred method of water production/delivery.

WATER: NUCLEAR POWERED DESAL UNITS:
---

10. The means of powering desalination systems in Libya remains an interesting debate within and out of Libya. Engineer Matug Mohammed Matug, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employment and Training, as well as supervisor of the NBRD and REWDRC continues to request a nuclear powered water desalination unit as a long term solution for

powered water desalination unit as a long term solution for Libya's water requirements. Even though traditional combustion and turbomachinery techniques for powering desalination technologies are well within the grasp of the Libyans, and fuel supplies are virtually unlimited, they continue to raise this point as an area for potential cooperation with high-ranking U.S. delegations. Internally there is some debate about this method as well, in that the Libyan leadership does not want Libya to be the pioneer of this technology. Libya wants to see another country prove the concept's feasibility before it invests in the technology.

WATER: QUALITY MONITORING:
---

11. U.S. Specialists in water quality have been engaging the Libyans via the Libyan General Water Authority (GWA) and the NBRD water quality laboratories. These two entities oversee water quality testing at central laboratories with sampling sites spread throughout Libya. The current lab for the GWA is not well equipped, and one of the lead researchers recently deceased. Experts from Lawrence Livermore Laboratories and Sandia National Labs recently visited both lab facilities and are engaging in cooperation projects. The NBRD is building a new water quality laboratory, and the LLNL and Sandia Labs representatives are providing assistance in planning and construction of the facility.

WATER: EDUCATION:
---

12. Post is developing a "Water Capacity Building Study Tour" through the voluntary visitor program in cooperation with Dr. Ricciardone at Embassy Cairo and NEA/RA. The program is tentatively scheduled for February 2007. There are both environmental science and geology programs available at Al-Fateh University, and graduate programs in environment and water science available through the Academy for Graduate Studies (AGS). Dr. Saad Al-Ghariani, a former UC Davis student, and Staff Member of the AGS is a cooperative interlocutor concerning the state of Environmental and Water education, and is frequently available to discuss water and water policy with visiting delegations.

WATER: WHERE THE U.S. HAS NOT ENGAGED:
---

13. The many fact finding and technical delegations that have visited Libya have understandably been involved in programs focused primarily on enhanced engagement with Libyan scientists from nuclear, chemical and biological backgrounds. Other entities within Libya that have a focus on water and water legislation have not been as actively engaged such as the General People's Committee for Agriculture, Animals and Water Resources (GPCA), and the Great Man Made River Authority (GMMRA). Programming is not currently underway with the GMMRA, primarily as it is a well-funded and fairly self-sufficient entity. The GMMRA positions and input will become increasingly important, however, as Libya creeps toward a unified water policy. The GMMRA is naturally less interested in desalination technology than pumping from existing aquifers, but should be brought to the table to discuss Libya's larger strategy. The GPCA has not been engaged primarily because they are viewed as a customer or consumer. Again, as a unified policy on water management becomes a reality, the largest users/consumers are going to need to provide input.

COMMERCIAL/TRADE and TRANSPORTATION:

See subtopics of updated trade export restrictions, Boeing Commercial Advocacy, Civil Aviation, and Conferences.

UPDATED TRADE EXPORT RESTRICTIONS:
---

14. The U.S. Department of Commerce published an amendment to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) that apply to Libya. This change removed the requirement for a license to export or re-export items controlled for anti-terrorism (AT) reasons. With the change, items such as most computers, software, telecommunications equipment and vehicles can be exported to Libya without a Commerce export license. The BIS team addressed questions about the EAR change, which put Libya on a par with most US export destinations, noting that many of the commodities being checked would no longer require licenses for export and re-export to Libya.

BOEING COMMERCIAL ADVOCACY
---

15. Dr. David Sampson, Deputy Secretary for U.S. Department of Commerce visited the Libyan General People's Committee for Economy Trade and Investment (GPCETI) and discussed economic policy and trade issues. Among the issues discussed were the September 2006 restructuring of export restrictions to Libya, and the acquisition of Boeing passenger aircraft by Baraq Airlines in Libya. Boeing Advocacy also took place during a recent EXIM Bank and BIS visits.

¶16. Buraq received its first new Boeing aircraft, a medium-range airplane 737-800 dubbed "Tripoli" on October 30. This delivery marked the first brand new commercial aircraft purchased by any Libyan airline since 1979. A ceremony on the occasion of its arrival at Tripoli International Airport was held the evening of October 30, attended by the Charge and representatives from Boeing, Secretary of Cooperation Affairs at GPC for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Secretary of People's Committee for Civil Aviation Department, the Director of Tripoli International Airport, the Director of Air Transport Department and members of the press. A second 737-800 ("Benghazi") is due to be delivered on November 15, and a third is expected in early 2007. Buraq has options to purchase three more 737-800's, but is considering exchanging the options for one to purchase a wide body plane.

CIVIL AVIATION:

¶17. In addition to the GPCETI, DepSec Sampson met with Dr. Mohamed Schlebik, the Director General of the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority, under the General People's Committee for Post Transport and Telecommunications (GPCPTT). They discussed cooperation in air traffic control equipment, runway refinishing and unification of weather database and tracking systems. In September 2006, the regional manager for Raytheon in North Africa visited Dr. Schlebik and is engaging in ongoing discussions concerning civil aviation product sales to Libya. The door to the civil aviation market remains open to other U.S. manufacturers.

CONFERENCES PROMOTING COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES IN LIBYA 2006:

¶18. The second annual Libyan Aviation Exposition 2006 (LAVEX), scheduled for December 04-07 2006 in Tripoli's Ma'atiqa Airfield will provide opportunities for U.S. aerospace manufacturers to demonstrate U.S. equipment as well as broker introductions between U.S. manufacturers and Libyan decision makers. More

between U.S. manufacturers and Libyan decision makers. More than 35 Libyan and foreign companies are expected to participate, including U.S. firms Augusta, Africair and Raytheon. European defense firms are expected to make a strong showing at the exhibition, including Airbus, Eurocopter, Dassault Aviation, Thales, Warner Lewis, Safran, MBDA and sevaral Russian companies.

In addition, during the same dates, two simultaneous civilian / commercial expositions will take place in Tripoli:

--Project Libya Energy Exposition: An International Oil, Gas, Power and Renewable Energy Exhibition Forum sponsored by the GPC for Industry, Electricity and Mines, National Oil Corporation and the General Electric Company of Libya (GECOL).

--Project Libya Infrastructure Exhibition: An International Exhibition and Forum for Libya's Infrastructure sponsored by the GPC for Planning, the General Board of Infrastructure and Urban Development, and the Inspector General of Housing and Utilities.

The Project Libya exhibitions are sponsored by Dr. Aisha Muammar Al-Qadhafi through her Wa'atassemo Foundation (Aisha is the Daughter of the Libyan Leader Mu'anmmar al-Qadhafi.)
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI645

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI645 aka Wikileaks id #85252 ?
Subject	LIBYAN DEMARCHE ON CHINA SUMMIT WITH AFRICAN NATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 10 Nov 2006 14:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI645.html
References	06TRIPOLI568
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/14/2006 11:38:03 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00645

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO238
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0645 3141419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101419Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1399
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0017
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0602
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0325
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0465
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0340
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1578
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000645

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, AF

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/10/2016
TAGS: ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , PREL [External Political Relations] , AU
[Austria] , KECF [The U.S. Africa Economic Cooperation Forum] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN DEMARCHE ON CHINA SUMMIT WITH AFRICAN NATIONS
```

REF: a) TRIPOLI 84, b) TRIPOLI 568

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Ibrahim Dridi, Director of the Americas Office at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) requested a meeting on November 7 to convey a demarche regarding Libyan views on the China Summit with African nations. "I was instructed to raise our concern over China," said Dridi. Reiterating points made by Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treki reported reftel (b), Dridi said that Libya believed it was inappropriate for a single country, even one as large as China, to hold a summit with all African countries. As a reflection of the Libyan view, the GPCFLIC decided to send the relatively low-level Secretary for Asian Affairs, rather than considering participation by Qadhafi or the General Secretary of the GPCFLIC (Foreign Minister equivalent), AbdulRahman Shalgam.

¶2. (C) Dridi explained that Libya suspected China of ulterior motives in its economic assistance programs to African countries, saying, "Chinese hegemony over the continent may be behind all of the financial offers." He asked Charge for our views on the Chinese Summit. Dridi also said, "Libya wants to coordinate on Africa policy and asks what joint projects you suggest for development cooperation." He asked that we convey the message quietly since Libya didn't want its fears to be reported openly.

¶3. (C) Charge detailed for Dridi our continuing demarches on the need for international peacekeeping troops in Darfur and on facilitating international assistance. We also reminded Dridi that we had offered to set up a bilateral meeting between a senior U.S. trade representative and a Libyan official on the margins of a planned AU trade meeting (cancelled due to a schedule conflict with the Beijing event). Charge also noted the value of dialogue between the U.S. and Libya on African issues and our understanding that Libya was interested in a visit by Special Sudan Representative Andrew Natsios to Tripoli. Charge and Dridi recapped many of the points raised during Assistant Secretary Frazer's visit (reftel a). Dridi said that Libya was ready to receive Natsios or Assistant Secretary Frazer to discuss Africa policy at any time.

¶4. (U) We subsequently provided Dridi with public statements about Undersecretary Burn's recent travel to China, as well as Assistant Secretary Frazer's public remarks on African cooperation and background material on the AGOA program.

¶5. (C) Comment. Libyan interlocutors have continually pushed back on our demarches asking for their help convincing the Sudanese to allow international peacekeepers in the Darfur region, claiming that any outside influence would only act as a catalyst for terrorist activity in the region. Libya's stance is that Africa should take care of its own, with of course, Libya in a primary leadership role. Qadhafi promotes himself as the "Father" of the African Union, and sees the continent as his backyard. Now he must add China to the UN and the historical colonizers of Africa as potential rivals and interlopers. (Interestingly, the British Embassy here was not called in for demarche we received.) We find it fascinating that the Libyans have identified a fear of Chinese hegemony as a potential source of common interest with us. Inviting Secretary of African Affairs Ali Treki for consultations in Washington with Assistant Secretary Frazer and/or including Tripoli in future travel by Ambassador Natsios' might present an opportunity to exchange views on Libyan concerns over Chinese influence, and more importantly to press for a more helpful Libyan stance on Sudan.. End Comment.

GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI647

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI647 aka Wikileaks id #85256 ?
Subject	WAGE AND PENSION REFORM UNFOLDING IN LIBYA'S OWN STYLE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 10 Nov 2006 16:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI647.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/14/2006 11:37:47 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00647

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO243
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0647/01 3141606
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101606Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1402
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0326
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0341
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0603
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0466
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0123
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1581
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000647

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/10/2016
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: WAGE AND PENSION REFORM UNFOLDING IN LIBYA'S OWN STYLE
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOL sent mixed signals in recent months on wage and pension reform, raising expectations for a thaw in a long-standing freeze on government salaries and a substantial augmentation to state-provided pensions. These are hot-button issues in Libya, where the minimum monthly government salary has been fixed at 150 Libyan Dinars (L.D.) for twenty-five years under the terms of Law No. 15 of 1981 (Note: 150 L.D. is the equivalent of 115 USD at current exchange rates. End note). Wage stagnation affects a large number of Libyan families, since roughly a quarter of Libya's workforce is employed by the state. However, recent GOL moves have raised as many questions as incomes. End Summary.

Seif Makes Big Promises Regarding Wages and Pensions

¶2. (C) During the course of his much-ballyhooed August 20 speech before the First Forum of the National Organization of Libyan Youth (popularly known as the "From tomorrow" speech), Seif al-Islam al-Qadafi addressed the issue of a minimum salary for all employees, as well as a government pension. In his remarks, Seif al-Islam said that: "From tomorrow, it is supposed to have a minimal rate for the people who work in the government and the private sector. It is prohibited to have less than 200 L.D. per month. This means that the salary of 200 L.D. will be a history from tomorrow...The amount of 200 L.D. is the minimal rate of any salary." Regarding the possibility of a pension, he said: "It is clear that one wants the continuity of the contribution of the state concerning his retirement. He wants the state to give him that pension in cash and he will make his own insurance. Thus, there will be funds for a special kind of insurance. The employee will have his salaries for 13 months, not only 12 months...Everyone, who does not want the state to contribute in his pension, will not have the contribution of the state. But he will have the salaries of 13 months instead of 12 months."

In the State of the Masses (Libyan Jamahiriya) You Can Never Have Too Many Committees
---

¶3. (C) Post has been monitoring developments since Seif al-Islam's speech to see if there has been any GOL follow-through on his statements (Note: Although Seif does not have any formal role in the government structure, his statements are often viewed as having at least the tacit blessing of his father, and tangible results have sometimes resulted from his policy pronouncements. (End Note). GOL follow-up to the speech thus far has been a study in Libyan consensus-building/decision-making. In early September, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee announced the

SIPDIS
formation of three special committees, which would:

-- Revise the legislation related to remuneration against work, prepare a legal paper on the issue and propose necessary amendments to relevant legislation;

-- Study the economic affects of the amendment and movement of salaries;

-- Prepare a paper on the accompanying procedures for amendment of minimum remuneration for work.

Membership on the three committees was set at a high-level, to include the Secretaries of the General People's Committees for

include the Secretaries of the General People's Committees for Justice, Planning, Economy, Finance, Tourism and Manpower, and the Governor of the Central Bank. All these committees were to submit a weekly progress reports to the Secretariat of the General People's Committee.

¶4. (C) To date, post has not seen any tangible outcomes stem from the formation of these committees, and there has been no official mention of addressing the issue of a government pension. However, the government did announce a bonus of between 200 and 280 L.D. for all government employees upon the occasion of Eid al-Fitr last month. Rumor has it that this one-time bonus represents the "13th month" of salary referred to in Seif al-Islam's speech, and is being touted in some circles as the fulfillment of his pledge to augment the national pension system.

A Windfall That Wasn't

¶5. (C) Adding to the confusion is a September 24 official letter from the Secretary of the GPC for Finance to the Central Bank Governor which requests that 300 million L.D. be made immediately available for "financial renumeration." These funds were to be allocated to various GOL entities (e.g., Social Security Fund, Armed Forces) for the distribution of lump sum gratutities to individuals on their payrolls. A subsequent edict from the GPC Secretariat stated that payments were to range from 150-230 L.D., with the larger sums accruing to workers at the bottom of the salary pool. Stipends were also due to families "deprived of wealth," although these recipients would only be determined following the completion of a "social survey." Workers in "productive projects" and "national companies" were also due a bonus, a stipulation that caused great consternation among foreign companies, particularly in the energy sector. Local legal interpreation differed on the GPC ruling, resulting in some companies paying the gratuity and others refusing. In the end, the GPC appears to have quietly pulled-back from this initative, and GOL payments were never made. The rationale behind this reversal remains unclear, as does the intent of the initiative.

¶6. (U) In a sign that this issue will keep evolving in the near term, the Secretariat of GPC approved a resolution on November 4 on the salaries of national employees in public companies and establishments. The resolution provides for a review of the salaries of those employees without reference to the provisions of law (15) for 1981, authorizing general assemblies of different public companies, contracting and insurance companies to set their own salaries for these employees in accordance with their activities and financial positions. Post will continue to monitor these developments to gauge their applicability and impact on U.S. companies in particular.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI648

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI648 aka Wikileaks id #85257 ?
Subject	LIBYAN CENTRAL BANK ESTABLISHING NEW TRAINING INSTITUTE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 10 Nov 2006 16:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI648.html
References	06TRIPOLI561
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/14/2006 11:37:14 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00648

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   PA POL IPS FCS FAS DCM AMB AID MGT

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO247
RR RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0648/01 3141607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 101607Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1404
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1583
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0009
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0002
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0343
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0468
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0605
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0328
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0008
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0478
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0292
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000648

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR DAN HARRIS, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI
```

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2016
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN CENTRAL BANK ESTABLISHING NEW TRAINING INSTITUTE

REF: TRIPOLI 561

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) See action request, Para. 7.

¶2. (U) The Libyan Central Bank is launching a new training center to improve employee skills throughout the banking sector, and its director is open to U.S. offers of assistance. Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff met with the Libyan Central Bank on the afternoon of November 6 to discuss the scope and direction of Central Bank training initiatives and offer appropriate U.S. assistance. Dr. Omar Bushallah, General Manager of the nascent Institute of Banking and Financial Studies was joined by Saleh Keshlaf, Director of the Central Bank Governor's Office (chief of staff equivalent) for the discussion. Also present were two representatives from the McKinsey Group, which is currently engaged in a cooperative study with the Central Bank to upgrade and privatize the Libyan banking system (see Reftel).

¶3. (U) The Libyan Central Bank has just begun the process of standing up the Institute of Banking and Financial Studies, which was established by a decree from the General People's Committee Secretariat in late October. Although its bylaws are still being drafted, it has been decided that the Institute will replace the existing Central Bank Training Center. Dr. Bushallah is leading this effort at the Central Bank, and is developing a two-year training program encompassing three main skill areas: English language, computer science and industry-specific technical training. This comprehensive course of instruction is intended to be a mandatory certification program for all new employees of Libyan banks. Training programs for existing employees will also be developed in time. Dr. Bushallah declared that his Institute will be totally run by the Central Bank, in tandem with similar programs being developed by the General People's Committee for Finance or the General People's Committed for Manpower, Training and Employment.

An Institute "Matching Our Ambitions"

¶4. (U) Dr. Bushallah allowed that the current Central Bank training center was modest and functional, but he looked forward to being able to guide visitors through a brand-new facility that was "something matching our ambitions." He rejected a suggestion that Libyans could take advantage of excellent training programs already available in other Arabic-speaking countries. The current plan calls for the establishment of a training campus, complete with residence halls, sports facilities, auditoriums and housing for visiting trainers. Until that facility becomes reality, the Central Bank will begin the transition using existing infrastructure. In theory, all of Libya's state banks will be obligated to provide operational funding for the new Institute, their required share being determined based on the number of employees on staff. The Central Bank will also incorporate the national banks at a senior level, as their general managers will be required to serve on the Institute's advisory council. Dr. Bushallah noted that the Central Bank is already providing English language training to 500 banking sector employees, and hoped to expand this program. The Bank is currently employing six English language trainers contracted through Berlitz in Manchester, UK, placing them at its Tripoli, Benghazi and Sebha branch offices. Other part-time instructors have been culled from the Libyan university system.

Welcomes U.S. Government Cooperation and Other Training
Opportunities

¶5. (C) Dr. Bushallah noted that he intends to generally model the Institute on the efforts of the GCC states, developing a highly institutionalized, vice outsourced, national training model. He stressed that the Central Bank is open to the best ideas from around the world, and is not wedded to a single training model. However, while the Central Bank was open to new ideas, his intention is that all banking sector employees will be required to complete the Libyan course before being eligible for training overseas. Pol/Econ Chief described numerous U.S. training opportunities that were available to the Bank, highlighting the financial sector service reform programs available through MEPI and the December 11-13 conference at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York under the U.S.-Middle East/North Africa Private Sector Dialogue (U.S.-MENA PSD). Dr. Bushallah indicated that he was aware of the conference and agreed that it would be a good opportunity to explore new avenues of engagement and training (Note: While on the subject of conferences, Bushallah stated that the planned November 20-21 "Banking and Finance Libya" conference in Tripoli (hosted by Aisha Qaddafi's Waatasimo Foundation) had been canceled. End Note). He also said that he would consider any USG proposals for closer cooperation on sector reform. He mentioned that several other countries had extended offers for training assistance and that the Libyans would determine which proposals were most advantageous (Embassy note: the souk is open. End note). Asked if the Central Bank Institute could provide assistance in setting-up appropriate meetings, as well as the facilitation of visa issuance for a future financial sector service reform team visit, Dr. Bushallah said that he would welcome a team with training proposals.

¶6. (U) Following up on this positive discussion, post's PAO section is engaging with Dr. Bushallah to provide information on the full range of U.S. educational training and exchange programs available to the Central Bank over the coming year. Post has also reminded the Central Bank about the Federal Reserve Bank conference in New York, and has encouraged a quick decision Libyan participation.

¶7. (C) COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST: This may be another one in a continuing series of grandiose Libyan projects that are announced, but then falter during implementation due to the complex bureaucracy inherent in a "state of the masses" governing system. While Embassy has been pressing continually for an official government reception of a MEPI delegation, we are most likely to achieve our MEPI objectives if we help the Libyans achieve some basic comfort level with the scope of programming. This may be an opportunity to bring in a focused team of financial sector service reform experts to initiate programming as a good "foot in the door" project, that could also be combined with additional work through the Qadhafi Development Foundation's National Economic Strategy for maximum impact. Please advise if a financial reform specific visit might be possible in January or February 2007. END COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI671

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI671 aka Wikileaks id #86116 ?
Subject	LIBYA: TIP SPECIAL WATCH LIST ASSESSMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Nov 2006 13:30 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI671.html
References	06TRIPOLI506
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
null
Brooke F Adams  11/19/2006 09:02:10 AM  From  DB/Inbox:  Brooke F Adams

Cable
Text:


C O N F I D E N T I A L        TRIPOLI 00671

SIPDIS
CXCAIRO:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO PA ORA OMC LEGAT IPS ECON DEA DCM DAO CONS
            AMB AID

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

VZCZCCRO006
PP RUEHEG
DE RUEHTRO #0671/01 3211330
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171330Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1426
INFO RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 0005
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0477
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0033
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0221
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0055
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0345
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0330
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0012
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1612
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000671

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; GTIP FOR GAYATRI PATEL

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/2/2016
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , GTIP, LY [Libya]
```

SUBJECT: LIBYA: TIP SPECIAL WATCH LIST ASSESSMENT

REF: (A) STATE 175900, (B) TRIPOLI 506

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The most salient feature of trafficking in Libya is the lack of information about it. Governments, non-governmental organizations, inter-governmental organizations, and the media all appear to know very little about the phenomenon. While slightly more information is available about aspects of labor trafficking, the closed nature of Libyan society has prevented even local officials from estimating the true scope of trafficking for the purpose of either sexual or labor exploitation. Preliminary indications suggest that human trafficking does occur in Libya, although it is not yet possible to estimate its extent.

¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: Libya has long, porous borders and serves as a transit point for migrants desperately seeking access to continental Europe. Migrants currently comprise almost one quarter of Libya's approximately 7 million residents. International organizations have concluded that the institutions designed to protect Libya's 6,500 kilometers of borders and coastline suffer from corruption and gross mismanagement. Indicators of potential sex trafficking stem from individuals who claim that the majority of inmates in Tripoli's only prison for women are prostitutes from sub-Saharan Africa. Indications of labor trafficking derive from the reportedly common practice among Libyan employers to confiscate the passports of their foreign workers, and to fail to pay them. The government has expressed an openness to learning about trafficking in persons, but appears to lack even a rudimentary understanding of the phenomenon. Post has adopted a pro-active approach to two of the more immediate problems - lack of information in general and lack of skills among officials. The Public Affairs Officer awarded September 28 a grant of almost $60,000 to IOM to build capacity among local officials and law enforcement agencies. Through this project, IOM, post and the Government of Libya (GOL) hope to improve their understanding of trafficking in Libya and how best to respond to it. END SUMMARY.

SEX TRAFFICKING

¶3. (SBU) The Government of Libya (GOL) has not conducted research or produced reports about trafficking for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The government-controlled media has not published any articles. Independent, domestic, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are illegal and do not exist in the country. Foreign-based Libyan "NGO"s, such as those working in Geneva, have not reported about the problem. Semi-official local organizations, such as the Qadhafi International Development Foundation, have not investigated the phenomenon. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Amnesty International (AI), and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) all confessed to Poloff their ignorance about the extent and nature of the problem. In 2004 and 2005, respectively, AI and HRW visited Libya. They visited prisons and spoke extensively to foreign workers. HRW Director For The Middle East And North Africa Sarah Leah Whitson, HRW Researcher Frank Abrahams, and AI Researcher Phillip Luther told poloff, over the course of several conversations in September, that they produced no information about sex trafficking or sex workers during their trips to Libya. IOM has worked with the GOL since 2004, and signed an official status agreement in August. IOM's Tripoli Chief of Mission Laurence Hart admitted to poloff August 31 that

IOM has so far obtained very limited information about sex trafficking in Libya.

¶4. (C) Prostitution is illegal in Libya, and it is a very sensitive topic. In informal and off-the-record conversations, Libyan men have told Poloff that the majority of prostitutes in Libya used to come from Morocco, only to be replaced more recently by women from sub-Saharan Africa. Most men agreed that sub-Saharan Africans now outnumber Arab women. (See reftel for information about Libya's "open door to Africa" migration policy of the 1990s, and the resulting influx of African migrants and refugees.) Mansour El Mesalati, an IOM local hire who has studied in the U.S. and worked in the Ministry of the Interior, told Poloff that many prostitutes come from Nigeria and Ghana. Pastor Jean Clement Ali of the Union Church in Tripoli told poloff that he has visited Libyan prisons for the past six years, as part of an officially-sanctioned program run by the church. He reported that he has regularly visited the only women's prison in Tripoli, which he said contains about 300 inmates. The majority of women in the prison come from countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Ali claimed, adding that the majority of women in the prison have worked as prostitutes in Libya. Four Union Church council members and another Union Church pastor corroborated Ali's story. Ali blamed "deception" and "shattered dreams" for driving these women into poverty and then prostitution. Their smugglers led them to believe that they could work in Libya to make enough money for the passage to Europe, he said. Instead, Ali reported, these women learned when they arrived in Libya that they had been misled, and entered into a traumatic state of destitution and dislocation. Out of desperation, they turned to prostitution. Ali said that he did not know how many of these women had been coerced or deceived directly into working as prostitutes.

LABOR TRAFFICKING

¶5. (C) A population of about 5.5 million Libyan citizens has witnessed since the 1990s a dramatic increase in foreign residents, currently estimated at 1.6 million. Some of these migrants entered the country under the GOL's formerly liberal migration policy, and many entered illegally. Laurence Hart of IOM asserted that the majority of all migrants hail from Nigeria, Chad, Niger, Ghana, and Egypt. Most came to Libya to work. Sub-Saharan Africans constitute the majority of the migrants, and also those most vulnerable to labor trafficking, according to Hart. Hantush Al-Wash, United Nations High Commission on Refugees (UNHCR) Tripoli Chief of Mission, confirmed this assertion, and reported that he currently handles a caseload of about 12,000 asylum requests (reftel). Al-Wash told Poloff that his staff has been overwhelmed by the number of applicants. Asylum-seekers face an eight-month waiting list for an interview, he said. Al-Wash has met and interviewed a wide swathe of foreign workers since he arrived in November 2005. Professional smuggling to and through Libya, he said, "is a fact." He has been impressed by the planning carried out in Egypt. Many migrants transit Libya very rapidly, he said, in three to four days, and he reported that Egyptians comprised 51% of the people arrested last year in Lampedusa on their way to Italy.

¶6. (C) Al-Wash reported that migrants who remain to work in Libya most frequently complain about unpaid wages. "Every week workers tell me they're not getting paid," he said. He also said that employers commonly confiscate the passports of their foreign workers. "They have a practice of keeping the passports of their employees - mainly for security, to make sure employees will not do something wrong." The bureaucratic procedures required to hire workers legally from abroad are so cumbersome, Al-Wash said, that barely anyone uses official channels. "A farmer can request 10 workers from Sudan...but he will to pay taxes and be obliged to pay his workers," Al-Wash explained.

"The majority of Libyans avoid doing this." Recently, Al-Wash noted, a trend emerged with employers firing both legal and illegal workers, in order to find new employees at lower wages. Workers have no one in the government to whom they can address complaints or ask questions about their rights. "The administration in this country on this issue is close to zero," Al-Wash complained. "There are no institutions. It's up to the manager or director. Even if you ask what are the policies or guidelines, you won't have a satisfactory answer." Al-Wash noted, however, that he has not heard reports of employers refusing to return passports to their employees. "The employers take passports, but I have not heard that when they [foreign workers] finish work, the employer wouldn't give it back. Maybe it exists, but I haven't heard."

MANAGEMENT OF BORDERS AND CUSTOMS

¶7. (C) Libya has approximately 2,000 kilometers of Mediterranean coastline and shares a land border with six different countries that totals approximately 4,500 kilometers. GOL officials and state-run media outlets commonly cite these statistics in explaining the government's failure to stem the flow of migrants transiting through Libya to Europe. IOM Chief of Mission Laurence Hart told Poloff August 31 that GOL officials have also quietly acknowledged widespread corruption among customs and border officials, and they claim to have begun fighting it. The World Bank's July 2006 country economic report for Libya cited key flaws in the customs administration and border management currently employed by the Libyan government, which could permit human smuggling directly through the official points of entry. According to the report, the customs system does not have the capacity "to tackle the reportedly high levels of informal trade and smuggling that occur between Libya and neighboring countries." The report highlighted the lack of an integrated information technology system and its associated infrastructure. The current system relies completely on physical verification and is "entirely paper-based." Moreover, the report stated that the customs administration lacks detection technology and its officials lack professional skills and training. Customs officials do not currently monitor key statistics, such as the percentage of goods selected for physical verification, the results of these verifications, or the compliance record of individual traders. Most significantly, the customs administration does not coordinate with other key border agencies, such as agriculture and health officials. (COMMENT: The report did not mention whether customs officials consulted with border security officials. The report strongly suggests that they do not coordinate their efforts, and that vehicles smuggling human beings could readily slip through the poorly administered customs regime. END NOTE.)

GOVERNMENT ATTITUDE

¶8. (C) Laurence Hart and Mansour El Mesalati of IOM told Poloff September 11 that the GOL had approached them to help fight trafficking in persons. Hart and El Mesalati described Libyan government officials as open to learning about and addressing the problem. They reported that government officials know very little about the global phenomenon of trafficking in persons. El Mesalati, who previously worked in the Ministry of the Interior, admitted that he did not know the difference between human smuggling and human trafficking. He was unaware that women who came to Libya knowing they would serve as prostitutes could find themselves in conditions that constitute trafficking. He did not realize that employers could coerce migrants to work by confiscating their passports, withholding their wages, or threatening them with detention and deportation. Nor did he know that mediation fees charged by smugglers to transport

workers to Libya could place the workers in debt bondage to creditors in their countries of origin. El Mesalati explained that if he is unfamiliar with these basic facts about trafficking, then government officials and border guards certainly do not know them. Both Hart and El Mesalati said that Aliah Al Erishi, the new GOL Secretary for Expatriates, Migration and Refugees, has a vital role to play in Libya's fight against trafficking in persons. Hart said that Al Erishi has expressed a willingness to learn about and engage with the issue. Hart said that Al-Erishi has thus far demonstrated patience and intelligence. Al-Erishi reportedly told Hart that he rejected the first draft of Libya's new law on migration because, "I found it too primitive." (NOTE: Al-Erishi is a resident of Massachusetts who returns to Libya a few times a year. It is unclear to us how much of a player he is on issues, during the stretches of time when he is not here. End Note.)

EMBASSY APPROACH

¶9. (U) Post has identified the urgent need to bolster awareness and skills among local officials. The Public Diplomacy and Political/Economic Sections worked together with IOM to devise an eight-month project aimed at strengthening the capacity of government officials and law enforcement agencies to identify trafficking victims, prevent trafficking, and prosecute traffickers. On September 28, the Public Affairs Officer granted $59,850 to IOM to administer the project. IOM will implement it in close collaboration with the GOL and semi-official local organizations. Post intends to learn from more about the problem, and how best to counter it, through this capacity-building project. IOM is currently working with the GOL to develop a national strategy to combat illegal migration, and plans to include in the strategy lessons learned through this post-funded project. In addition, post has continually raised the issue with GOL counterparts, and has presented IOM with a formal request to help answer detailed questions about trafficking in Libya.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #06TRIPOLI686

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	06TRIPOLI686 aka Wikileaks id #86849 ?
Subject	QADHAFI ISSUES ANTI-CORRUPTION WARNING TO LIBYA'S WEALTHY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 23 Nov 2006 11:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2006/11/06TRIPOLI686.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI936
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
R 231125Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1456
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000686

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2016
TAGS: ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI ISSUES ANTI-CORRUPTION WARNING TO LIBYA'S WEALTHY

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, United States Embassy, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (U) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi recently issued a particularly stark warning against official corruption, calling on the wealthy to declare their holdings and income sources and "repent" for any ill-gotten gains. In a November 13 speech before the General Council for Planning broadcast live on state television, Qadhafi (known locally as, The Leader) used his self-declared position as a government "outsider" and leader of the Revolution to warn of a revolt by Libya's poor against the corrupt. He did so conjuring up vivid images of a popular uprising by Libya's underprivileged, complete with burning houses, farms and luxury automobiles. He warned that he was "still holding the safety valve, which if [he] let loose, it would lead to the country's explosion ~ They are only waiting a sign from me. If I tell them that I no longer hold the safety valve, you will see the country burning, and then we would not know when it [the fire] could be distinguished."

¶2. (U) Qadhafi's stark warning follows-on from his August 31 speech to mark the 37th anniversary of the coup d'etat that

brought him to power. During the course of that speech, Qadhafi set a deadline of December 31 for the disclosure of annual income and personal assets on the part of a broad, but non-specific swath of Libyan citizens, including leaders in government, public companies and private business. This exhortation directly resulted in the passage of GPC resolution 395 in September, which established the "Verification Committee of the Transparency Declaration." This special committee, chaired by the Chief of the Libyan Supreme Court, has reportedly held a number of publicized meetings to finalize the necessary declaration forms and prepare for their receipt and processing. Qadhafi's November 13 speech served as a pointed reminder that only six weeks remain until the anticipated conclusion of this probe.

¶3. (C) Embassy Comment: Despite the dramatic rhetoric, it remains to be seen if the Qadhafi edict will be meaningfully implemented, and what if any impact it will have on Libya's wealthy citizens, particularly privileged members of his inner circle. Qadhafi has maintained his control by periodically "removing from favor" people who threaten his interests, or the interests of those who serve his current needs. This transparency initiative under the guise of good governance may be a way to "knock down" people who are judged to have expanded beyond their intended sphere of influence -- or individuals who have made themselves a regime liability through greed. Some have speculated that the "Revolutionary Committees," who opposed Libya's post 2003 opening to the west may be the target of the anti-corruption campaign. The country still is trying to recover from the socialist policies of the 70s and 80s when property was confiscated and businesses were expropriated through the work of revolutionary committees. Post has not been able to identify or speak with any members of the special "transparency committee" but will continue to seek out information about its deliberations.

SIGNATURE

CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1026

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1026 aka Wikileaks id #133581 ?
Subject	ABDALLAH YEHIA IS "UNQUESTIONED LEADER" OF SLA/UNITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 10 Dec 2007 14:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1026.html
Referenced by	07KHARTOUM1965
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7871
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1026/01 3441447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101447Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2905
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3341
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001026

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations] , UN [United Nations] , AU-I, SU [Sudan]
SUBJECT: ABDALLAH YEHIA IS "UNQUESTIONED LEADER" OF SLA/UNITY

TRIPOLI 00001026  001.2 OF 002


¶1.    (SBU)  Summary.  Three SLA/Unity representatives visiting
Tripoli said December 9 that Abdallah Yehia is the unquestioned
leader of the Sudanese Liberation Army (SLA)/Unity branch and
that SLA/Unity is open to an agreement with the newly-formed
United Revolutionary Front (URF), though serious talks between
the two groups have yet to begin.  They dismissed any efforts to
bring the Fur into the predominantly Zaghawa URF and SLA/Unity
grouping, stressing that military strength on the ground should
determine representation in the peace talks.  End Summary.

¶2.    (SBU)  PolOff and P/E Chief met with three SLA/Unity
representatives currently in Tripoli - Osman Muhammad Busra (a
```

representatives currently in Tripoli - Osman Muhammad Bashir (a political rep of Abdullah Yehia who has been physically present in Libya since July), Mahjub Hussein (an SLA/Unity spokesman resident in London who's been in Libya since mid-November), and Abubakr Kadu (described as the senior SLA/Unity field commander). Kadu arrived in Tripoli on/about November 29 from Juba and departs for Darfur on/about December 13.

YEHIA IS CLEAR LEADER OF SLA/UNITY

¶3. (SBU) According to the SLA/Unity delegation, Abdallah Yehia is the unquestioned political leader of the SLA/Unity branch. Suleiman Jamous and Sharif Harir are "just members" of the SLA/Unity government council. They were dismissive of suggestions Jamous might be in direct contact with Justice and Equality / Collective (JEM/CL) leader Bahar Idriss Abu Gharda. Busra was vague on the status of talks between JEM/CL and SLA/Unity, implying that only after both groups returned to the field on/about December 13 would they consider talking about some form of "alliance." SLA/Unity will only consider an agreement with the URF that makes Abdallah Yehia the new group's leader. Kadu boasted that JEM/CL has only five percent of the fighters he has under his command.

SLA/UNITY DISMISSIVE OF TRIBAL DIMENSTIONS OF DARFUR CONFLICT

¶4. (SBU) All three dismissed the idea that there were tribal or ethnic dimensions to both the Darfur conflict and the UN/AU political process, and were similarly dismissive of any efforts to bring the Fur on board in any URF-SLA grouping. (Note: Although Hussein later bristled at the suggestion that he might be a member of the Zaghawa tribe, emphatically insisting that he was Nubian. End note.) "Any peace process with tribal underpinnings will fail," said Busra. They dismissed the idea that Fur leaders possess significant military strength; indeed, they described Abdulshafi and Diraige as militarily irrelevant. At the same time, they stressed SLA/Unity was inclusive of non-Zaghawa. Peace requires participation by forces with significant military strength (SLA/Unity and JEM/CL) and one delegation comprising both the IDPs and refugees.

KHALIL, NOT ABDULWAHID, NECESSARY FOR PEACE AGREEMENT

¶5. (SBU) The three spoke at length about Abdulwahid, characterizing him as a "historic" figure, but one who has ultimately not kept up with the changing situation on the ground. He continues to see himself as the new John Garang. Hussein said he was in Paris in November and refused to meet with Abdulwahid, whom he described as "a liar". While they conceded Abdulwahid has some support among youth in the IDP camps, he does not represent all of Darfur's marginalized people. All three said without hesitation that Abdulwahid's participation was not necessary for a meaningful peace agreement.

¶6. (SBU) By contrast, they assessed that Khalil Ibrahim's participation in the peace process is important, stressing that Khalil is still in a position to influence the security situation in Darfur (by contrast with Abdulwahid). They noted favorably that Khalil had sent a representative to Juba. All three had positive things to say about JEM/CL leader Bahar Abu Gharda, praising his commitment to people "in the field" and his attendance at the October 27 Sirte meeting. "Bahar is interested in cooperating with SLA/Unity," said Busra, noting an alliance between Yehia and Abu Gharda is "definitely possible."

SLA/UNITY EAGER TO "COOPERATE" WITH UNAMID

¶7. (SBU) Busra asked to deliver a three-part message to the USG: (1) the GOS is a dictatorial regime; (2) the US should therefore play a political as well as humanitarian role in Darfur (implying the USG should choose sides between the rebels and the GOS); and (3) SLA/Unity will not obstruct the UNAMID deployment and would like to "actively cooperate" with

international peacekeepers.

SATISFACTION WITH LIBYAN HOSTS

TRIPOLI 00001026 002.2 OF 002

¶8. (SBU) SLA/Unity is satisfied with Libya as a host of the UN/AU peace process and thinks Libya has generally been helpful. They conceded not all movements agree but refrained from comment on Libya's relationship with elements of the JEM leadership.

NO ROLE FOR MINAWI

¶9. (SBU) All three were emphatic that Minni Minawi has no place in the peace process except as a member of the GOS (they called it NCP) delegation. Hussein said it would be "impossible" for Minawi to join the UN/AU process at this late stage.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1030

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1030 aka Wikileaks id #133870 ?
Subject	SUDANESE DIPLOMAT ALLEGES LIBYAN OFFICIALS' COMPLICITY IN HUMAN SMUGGLING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Dec 2007 07:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1030.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9547
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1030 3460746
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120746Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2910
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0944
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0114
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0373
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0578
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0528
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0683
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0354
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0379
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0237
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3346
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 001030

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KTIP *[Trafficking in Persons]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SUDANESE DIPLOMAT ALLEGES LIBYAN OFFICIALS' COMPLICITY IN HUMAN SMUGGLING

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) The long-serving Sudanese DCM in Tripoli, Isaac Kenti, told CDA in a recent meeting that Sudanese criminal networks freely operate migration smuggling rings from Libya to Europe with the complicity of some Libyan officials. According to

Kenti, while the GOL provides border guards and police with free or subsidized apartments, cars, and food, the smugglers are able to provide the one thing the Libyan government does not -- cash. Laurence Hart, head of the International Organization for Migration's Tripoli office, confirmed separately that law enforcement and border officials are involved in facilitating illegal migration.

¶2. (C) Kenti bemoaned the fact that up to 80 percent of irregular migrants arrested in Europe after transiting from Libya claim Sudanese nationality to bolster their asylum applications. According to Kenti, only 20 percent of migrants smuggled or trafficked into Europe are actually Sudanese citizens. The rest claim Sudanese citizenship to decrease the chance that they will be repatriated. He estimated that there were currently about 500 Sudanese currently in detention in Malta after having made landfall there.

¶3. (C) Kenti said that 50 to 70 individuals from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, who are smuggled by Sudanese criminal networks to Europe, drown each month attempting to cross the Mediterranean. Sudanese diplomats in Libya privately estimate that between 300,000 and 400,000 Sudanese are resident and working in Libya at any given time, although the number of Sudanese in Libya has reportedly decreased with the levying of new, punitive school-registration fees for non-Libyan children this academic year.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1032

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1032 aka Wikileaks id #133871 ?
Subject	LIBYA CLOSES BORDER WITH EGYPT TO NON-EGYPTIAN IMPORTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Dec 2007 07:56 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1032.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9561
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1032/01 3460756
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 120756Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2916
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0945
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0374
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0579
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0529
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0238
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0380
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0684
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0050
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 0081
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA PRIORITY 0005
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3352
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001032

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/12/2017
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal
Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya] , EG [Egypt] , JO [Jordan] , SY [Syria] , TU [Turkey]
SUBJECT: LIBYA CLOSES BORDER WITH EGYPT TO NON-EGYPTIAN IMPORTS


CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)



¶1.  (C) Summary: Libya closed its land border with Egypt in
```

October to imports of non-Egyptian goods as part of an effort to encourage greater use of its eastern port in Benghazi. A desire to better regulate imports and tariffs, as well as to reduce importation of used vehicles, may have prompted the decision, which was not coordinated with Egypt and which has disrupted business. The badly coordinated measure underscores the continuing dissonance between senior political leaders' calls for economic reform and the adoption of policies that hinder, rather than help, business. End summary.

CLOSING THE EASTERN BORDER TO NON-EGYPTIAN IMPORTS

¶2. (C) Libyan businessman Husni Bey (protect) told Pol/Econ Chief November 6 that the GOL adopted new rules in early October to prevent importation of goods of non-Egyptian manufacture across the Egyptian-Libyan land border. Only products manufactured in Egypt may be imported overland from Egypt to Libya; products manufactured elsewhere that had previously been trans-shipped via Egypt to Libya were no longer permitted. (Note: Bey is the senior sibling of a family-owned holding company whose varied commercial interests include import/export and distribution under license of foreign-manufactured products. End note.) Bey complained that the new strictures, which were implemented without advance warning to businesses using the overland route, had seriously disrupted imports of consumer goods, contributing to shortages of some items during the several weeks it took companies to adjust their import and distribution networks.

EGYPT SURPRISED

¶3. (C) Egyptian DCM Ayman Musharafa confirmed November 9 that the new strictures were in place. Indicating that the GOL had given Egypt's government less than 24-hours notice that the new rules would go into effect, he attributed the measures to the GOL's desire to encourage greater use of the Benghazi port, ostensibly to facilitate better regulation of imports and tariffs on same. Conceding that the Egyptian-Libyan land border is porous, Musharafa said the GOL had complained for some time that it was unable to better regulate the flow of overland imports. Rumors over the summer to the effect that the GOL would seek to close the Egyptian-Libyan border to all imported goods had prompted a senior-level demarche by Egypt to the GOL protesting the proposal. Egypt's understanding was that the plan, to include bans on non-Egyptian products, had subsequently been dropped altogther; the October initiative came as a surprise.

BENGHAZI PORT THE NEW ENTREPOT

¶4. (C) Benghazi's port, which both Musharafa and Bey described as "the worst" in Libya, had recently undergone some physical and administrative refurbishment (NFI) and the GOL was keen to funnel imports through it. Despite the changes and the GOL's efforts to encourage its use, the Benghazi port remains so "chaotic" that some importers have preferred to incur additional expense to route their products through the better-run ports at the Misrata Free Trade Zone or Tripoli.

USED GAS GUZZLERS PART OF THE PROBLEM?

¶5. (C) Musharafa said the new measures were prompted in part by the GOL's desire to better regulate and limit importation of fuel inefficient used vehicles. The GOL discounts car prices as part of the basket of subsidies it provides to Libyans in exchange for political quiescence. Imports and sales of vehicles, many of them used, have increased dramatically in the last 18 months. Noting a recent, short-term gasoline shortage occasioned by delayed delivery of two tankerloads of gasoline (details septel), Musharafa said the GOL had belatedly realized that its gasoline import and distribution networks weren't sufficient to supply the newly enlarged fleet of Libyan cars.

TRIPOLI 00001032 002 OF 002

The GOL was particularly concerned about importation of used vehicles, many of which were purchased in bulk in Europe and shipped overland through Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Egypt to Libya. The GOL is reportedly also keen to limit imports of used vehicles from Tunisia.

¶6. (C) The relative porosity of land border crossings, together with less-developed customs and immigration systems at land border checkpoints, made it more difficult to police them. The move to encourage greater use of its ports was part of a broader GOL effort to better manage imports. Bey noted that funneling imports through the ports also limited the ability of individual border guards to solicit bribes, but potentially made it easier for more senior officials involved in port administration to do so. He indicated that corruption remained a greater problem at Benghazi than at Misrata or Tripoli.

¶7. (C) Comment: Bey was scathing in his criticism of the GOL's ill-considered and poorly implemented decision, citing it as a sign of what he characterized as a lack of commitment to and clarity about economic reform among senior GOL leaders. The measure highlights a continuing feature of the landscape here: the disconnect between senior-level rhetoric about the need for and commitment to economic reform and a series of decisions -- requiring Arabic-language translations of foreign passport biodata pages, increasingly stringent requirements that foreign companies employ Libyans who may or may not be qualified -- that hinder business at the practical level. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1033

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1033 aka Wikileaks id #133959 ?
Subject	QADHAFI'S TRAVEL TO SPAIN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Dec 2007 14:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1033.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI166 , 08TRIPOLI870 , 09TRIPOLI475
History	First published on Wed, 8 Dec 2010 14:14 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9894
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1033/01 3461407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 121407Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2918
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0007
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0382
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0686
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0947
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0376
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0581
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0531
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0240
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3354
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001033

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2017
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]* , SP *[Spain; Balearic Islands; Canary Islands; Mallorca]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI'S TRAVEL TO SPAIN

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Planning for Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's upcoming visit to Spain has been complicated by contradictory GOL requests for meetings and content. After initially saying

GOL requests for meetings and content. After initially saying the Leader did not want to sign bilateral agreements during his visit, the GOL has reversed course and the two sides are now scrambling to finalize language for a host of memoranda and treaties. The Libyan advance team's requirements for the Leader's lodging have prompted speculation about his health. End summary.

LACK OF CLARITY COMPLICATES PLANNING

¶2. (SBU) Spanish DCM Rafael-Maria Reig Sanchez told P/E Chief December 9 that planning for Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's mid-December visit to Spain had been problematic in both a logistical and substantive sense. Qadhafi originally wanted to visit Spain before the recent EU-African Union Summit in Lisbon; however, that wound up not being possible for scheduling reasons on both the Libyan and Spanish sides. It is now expected that Qadhafi will travel to Spain December 15-18 for a visit comprising both personal and official elements. Sanchez noted noted that the GOL has been unclear and at times contradictory about whether it wishes the visit to be considered official or unofficial.

¶3. (C) Confirming press accounts, Sanchez said Qadhafi will meet with Spanish PM Zapatero December 17; King Juan Carlos is also scheduled to host a luncheon in honor of the visiting Libyan leader. Finalizing protocol arrangements has been "incredibly difficult", in part because Qadhafi does not encumber an official position or carry official title, and because the GOL's advance team -- apparently responding to shifting dictates from its principal -- continues to change its requests for meetings and content. Spain's Ambassador to Tripoli, Joaquin Perez-Villanueva, told the DCM that Qadhafi's plans to visit Seville and nearby Islamic sites in Cordoba and Grenada have prompted concern about the nature of the remarks he may deliver at historic Islamic sites.

INITIALLY COY, GOL NOW WANTS TO SIGN BEVY OF AGREEMENTS

¶4. (C) After initially indicating it did not/not want to sign bilateral agreements during the visit, the GOL indicated late last week that it wished to quickly finalize language for an education and culture agreement, a defense cooperation agreement, a bilateral legal cooperation and extradition treaty, an investment security agreement and a double taxation-exemption agreement. Sanchez expressed frustration about the GOL's "wait and hurry up" approach, noting that Spain had tried for some time to finalize several of the agreements, but to no avail. According to Sanchez, the only document for which agreement on the language had been achieved was the education and culture agreement. He noted that GOL officials, referencing the recent denouement of the Bulgarian medics' case, had been particularly insistent that a bilateral legal cooperation and extradition treaty should preclude the possibility of immediate pardon for prisoners returned to their home country. Sanchez lamented that the rush to finalize agreements for signature in time for Qadhafi's visit had precluded meaningful bilateral discussions of what the two sides' understanding of those accords would mean and how they would be implemented. "The form is more important to the GOL than the substance", he said.

LODGING REQUESTS PROMPT SPECULATION ABOUT QADHAFI'S HEALTH

¶5. (C) Sanchez noted that Qadhafi's lodging requirements were also problematic. GOL officials insisted that the Leader not be housed above the first floor of the hotel in which he will stay, saying Qadhafi refuses to ride in elevators because of security considerations. In addition, GOL minders insisted that the hotel and room in which Qadhafi will stay should feature as few stairs as possible. Sanchez said that GOL officials, when pressed, conceded that Qadhafi has difficulty physically negotiating stairs (NFI). (Note: Post notes that Qadhafi appeared to be unwell in television footage of Lisbon's

TRIPOLI 00001033 002 OF 002

EU-African Union Summit. His gait was unsteady and he appeared to have difficulty turning his head, forcing him to turn his entire upper torso. There have been recent, unconfirmed reports that he may have suffered a stroke. End note.)

¶6. (C) Comment: Madrid's frustration with Qadhafi's advance team and the Leader's vascillating druthers echoe what we've heard from our French counterparts here regarding trip coordination for the Paris stop. The focus on securing a raft of bilateral agreements, regardless of content, is consistent with the GOL's desire for demonstrable symbols of Libya's re-integration into the international community. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1038

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1038 aka Wikileaks id #134226 ?
Subject	LIBYAN EPSA GAS BIDDING ROUND: INTERNATIONAL MAJORS' INTEREST IS TEMPERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Dec 2007 16:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1038.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI1066 , 08TRIPOLI319 , 08TRIPOLI321
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1075
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1038/01 3471618
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 131618Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2926
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3362
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0949
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0033
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0378
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0584
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0533
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0385
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0690
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0242
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0355
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 001038

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN EPSA GAS BIDDING ROUND: INTERNATIONAL MAJORS' INTEREST IS TEMPERED

REF: A) TRIPOLI 608, B) 06 TRIPOLI 775

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Four companies won exploration and production

rights for gas in the recently concluded fourth round of Libya's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) mechanism. Winning bids featured low production sharing percentages for the international oil companies (IOC's), but in a departure from past rounds, only Shell offered a signing bonus as part of its winning bid. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has publicly touted the results as being positive for Libya, but has privately conceded disappointment that more companies did not choose to bid. Opinions among IOC country managers in Libya differed as to the takeaway from this round. Some argued that the small number of bids signaled to the NOC dissatisfaction with increasingly stringent terms and operating conditions. Others maintained that the fact that terms for EPSA IV winners were consistent with previous rounds has reinforced the NOC's belief that -- despite grumbling -- IOC's remain willing to absorb thin production sharing margins and, in some cases, pay hefty signing bonuses to secure access and book reserves. End summary.

THE PLAYERS ...

¶2. (U) As forecast in ref A, Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) Organizing & Supervising Committee hosted an event December 9 at Tripoli's al-Mahari Hotel to announce results of recent bids for exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSA's) for onshore and offshore parcels. The event represented the fourth in a series of EPSA bid rounds (EPSA IV) held since August 2004; it was the first to focus on natural gas. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration, Libya has some 52 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves, fourth among all African countries. A dozen parcels comprising 41 separate blocks of territory were offered for bidding and generated 19 offers by 13 companies (from 11 different countries) for 10 of the 12 parcels. 35 companies had been pre-selected to bid for the contracts; only 19 chose to do so.

¶3. (C) Two offshore parcels comprising eight blocks only received bids by single companies; under the terms of the EPSA, the bids were not opened and will be examined privately by the NOC's management committee to determine whether they will be accepted. ExxonMobil Country Manager Phil Goss (protect) judged that significant projected exploration costs for the offshore areas (up to $100 million per test well) and tricky technical requirements (water as deep as 3,000 meters) that few companies have the ability to manage deterred most from bidding on offshore blocks.

... THE ACTION

¶4. (U) Four potentially lucrative gas EPSA contracts were awarded to Gazprom, Sonatrach, Shell and Polskie Gornictwo Naftowe i Gazownictwo (Polski). Russia's Gazprom beat back a competitive offer from French company Gaz de France for three blocks (area 64) comprising 3,936 square kilometers in the southern Ghadames basin. Despite earlier statements to the press by a Gaz de France official that the company was "very keen" to establish a presence in Libya, Gazprom's willingness to take a significantly smaller percentage of eventual production carried the day. Gazprom's commitments per its bid are: 1,500 square kilometers 2-D seismic imagery; 250 square kilometers 3-D seismic imagery, 4 wells, no signing bonus and a 9.8% share of gas produced. Gaz de France offered more seismic imagery and wells, but asked for a production allocation of 16.8%. Other bidders on area 64 were Polski, Japan's Inpex, Lukoil, British Gas and the Pakistan Oil and Gas Company.

¶5. (U) Algerian parastatal Sonatrach, in assocation with Oil India, won rights to four blocks (areas 95 and 96) comprising 6,934 square kilometers in the Ghadames area. Sonatrach's commitments per its bid are: 2,000 square kilometers 2-D seismic imagery, 600 square kilometers 3-D seismic imagery, 5 wells, no

signing bonus and a 13.0% share of gas produced. Germany's RWE submitted a strong bid that included 11 wells, but asked for a 19.0% production share. Other bidders were Gaz de France, Polski and British Gas.

¶6. (U) Anglo-Dutch Shell Company won two blocks (Area 89) comprising 1,790 square kilometers in the northern Sirte Basin. Shell's was the only bid on the day that carried a signing bonus, in the amount of $93 million, for the NOC. (Note: Next to production share, signing bonuses are the most heavily-weighted factor in a given bid. End note.) Shell's commitments per its bid are: 0 square kilometers of 2-D seismic imagery; 740 square kilometers of 3-D seismic imagery; 4 wells; USD 93 million signing bonus and a 15.0% share of gas produced. Other bidders were Sonatrach and PetroCanada.

¶7. (U) Polski won two blocks (area 113) in the southern Murzak Basin with a bid that committed it to the following: 0 square kilometers 2-D seismic imagery; 1,500 square kilometers 3-D seismic imagery; 4 wells, no signing bonus and an 11.8% share of gas produced. The other bidder was Gaz de France.

NOC PUBLICLY POSITIVE, PRIVATELY "A BIT DISAPPOINTED"

¶8. (C) Winning bid terms echoed those for the EPSA III round in December 2006 (ref B), with low production shares weighted heavily in the calculus for awarding points to each bid. Publicly, the NOC is touting the favorable terms of the four winners, with an emphasis on the high percentage of eventual production that will go to Libya. Privately, NOC Chairman Shukhri Ghanem told visiting Verenex Energy (Canada) CEO Jim McFarland (protect) December 11 that he was "a bit disappointed" that more companies had not chosen to bid. Ghanem subsequently told executives from Algeria's parastatal Sonatrach that the NOC, discouraged by the tempered ESPA IV bidding, will "take a break" from organizing further EPSA bid rounds. Ghanem's thinking, according to Sonatrach, is to allow time for production in parcels contracted in previous rounds to kick in. By allowing Libya's market to "settle" a bit, the NOC hopes to whet IOCs' appetite for further contracts.

MARGINS REMAIN TIGHT

¶9. (C) By contrast with earlier bid rounds, which featured hefty signing bonuses in addition to razor-thin production sharing margins of as little as 6.8%, no company save for Shell offered signing bonuses for EPSA IV gas contracts. BP Country Manager Tawfiq Hussein (protect) attributed that to the increased difficulty of realizing profitability under increasingly stringent EPSA terms, and to the fact that "the bloom has come off the rose a bit" with respect to the Libyan oil and gas market. Woodside Exploration Manager Sean Guest noted that low production sharing margins were critical in determining winning EPSA IV bids. Stringent terms, low production shares and lingering concerns about the difficulty of operating in Libya (visas and expat staffing remain significant problems) have given some pause. In addition, Libya's limited gas export infrastructure and the lack of clarity about whether EPSA IV winners will be able to exploit oil reserves discovered while searching for gas tempered enthusiasm. Marathon's Country Manager, Freddie Quintana (protect), told P/E Chief that the EPSA IV round was "a particularly difficult one" in which to bid because gas pricing is more complex than oil pricing and because Libya's gas export infrastructure remains limited.

MIXED SIGNALS

¶10. (C) Opinions differed at a meeting of IOC country managers December 12 as to the summary judgment of the EPSA IV round. Some argued that the relatively limited number of bids

constituted a message to the NOC that increasingly stringent terms and difficult operating conditions would discourage bids. Others maintained that contract terms for bid winners were consistent with previous bid rounds, confirming the NOC's belief that IOC's remain willing to take thin production sharing margins and, in Shell's case, pay hefty bonuses to gain access.

¶11. (C) Comment: Media reports have interpreted the EPSA IV

round results as a sign of diminished interest by IOC's in Libya's hydrocarbon sector in general, and in the gas end of the business in particular; however, the four winners (Gazprom, Sonatrach, Shell and Polski) are all major companies and proven gas producers. Although the latest EPSA round failed to attract as many bids as the NOC would have liked, the fact that serious first and high-second tier companies ultimately bid and won potentially augurs well for efficient exploitation of Libya's gas reserves, although serious investment in gas export infrastructure is needed. The broader message from this round is that while IOC's are still keen to establish a presence and book reserves, they are increasingly reluctant to pay large signing bonuses up-front to do so. End comment.

Shell only major IOC; Polski, Gazprom, Sonatrach reflect EPSA III results and trend towards highest bid despite quality of operator (for EPSA rounds); GOL has recently concluded non-EPSA contracts with BP and Exxon Mobil (reftel), and extended contracts with Eni and PetroCanada to lend some balance to mix. MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1039

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1039 aka Wikileaks id #134236 ?
Subject	LIBYA: FOLLOW-UP ON ACCESS TO RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Dec 2007 16:50 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1039.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI1066
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1120
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1039/01 3471650
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131650Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2929
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3365
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001039

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON, NARDI) AND S/WCI (GOREY, SHIN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2017
TAGS: KDRG *[Detainee Repatriation from Guantanamo Bay]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: FOLLOW-UP ON ACCESS TO RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES

REF: A) STATE 165729, B) STATE 127608, C) TRIPOLI 723, D) TRIPOLI 797

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Interlocutors at the MFA and quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation acknowledged to DCM and P/E Chief the GOL's commitment to provide Embassy access to returned Guantanamo Bay detainees. Attributing previous delays to bureaucratic snags vice political opposition, they agreed to quickly facilitate a follow-up visit with ISN 194 to determine the nature and extent of injuries that came to

to determine the nature and extent of injuries that came to light in a previous visit with him. They also agreed to arrange a first whereabouts and welfare visit with ISN 557. The tone was positive, and the desire to achieve positive movement before FM Shalgham's upcoming visit to Washington may help prompt quick action. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) DCM and P/E Chief met separately with MFA Americas Desk Officer Ahmed Aoun and Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani on December 13 to deliver ref A points. Aoun took on board the point that consideration of further involuntary transfers and the GOL's request for access to all Libyan citizens remaining in Guantanamo Bay would be viewed in light of whether we are/are not able to secure timely access to Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557). Underscoring that the MFA well understands the sensitivities involved, he attributed the GOL's failure to arrange a follow-up visit with ISN 194 per ref B to bureaucratic ineptitude rather than a deliberate unwillingness to facilitate access under the terms of the Watchdog Committee MOU.

¶3. (S/NF) Aoun conceded that delays in making good on previous commitments to arrange visits had created concerns about the transparency of the process and the GOL's credibility. He noted that MFA Secretary for the Americas (U/S-equivalent) Dr. Ahmed Fituri had contacted security officials regarding the U.S. request for a second visit with ISN 194 to clarify the nature and extent of his injuries (ref B). According to Aoun, the security officials who have physical custody of al-Rimi had no problem facilitating access. He implied, but did not state, that the QDF, which has been delegated authority by the MFA to coordinate Watchdog Committee activities, had not reached out to those security officials to arrange the visit. Stressing that the MFA "wants to help", he said he would follow up with the QDF to urge that visits with al-Rimi and Hamouda occur quickly.

¶4. (S/NF) In a subsequent meeting, the QDF's Dr. Sawani characterized access to the returned detainees as "a straightforward matter" and said he was "sure" visits with al-Rimi and Hamouda could be quickly arranged. He attributed previous delays in granting a follow-up visit with al-Rimi to feckless GOL employees, whom he claimed are so poorly paid that they have no incentive to carry out their instructions. (Note: Implying that they had actually been instructed to arrange a follow-up visit. End note.) Sawani noted that the QDF employee who liaises with security officials on detainee access is due back from leave in a few days, and said he would follow up with that individual immediately thereafter to ensure that meetings with al-Rimi and Hamouda were quickly arranged. Like Aoun, he understood that it would be better if the visits occurred before FM Shalgham's visit to Washington on January 3. (Note: The "Yom al-Arafa" and Eid al-Adha holidays fall on December 18-20, followed by the local weekend December 21-22, potentially complicating the requested visits).

¶5. (S/NF) Claiming there had been "no problem" scheduling the first visit with al-Rimi in August (ref C), he echoed Aoun's statement that subsequent delays in granting a follow-up visit were occasioned by bureaucratic indifference, not political intransigence. (Note: Visiting al-Rimi in mid-August was not as easy as Sawani claimed. As noted ref C, it required two and a half months of negotiation and ultimately, in Post's view, occurred because the GOL wanted to avoid having visiting NEA A/S David Welch raise the issue in his meetings with GOL officials. End note.)

¶6. (S/NF) Sawani also claimed that he passed copies of a written statement by al-Rimi describing the nature and extent of his arm and tooth injuries after the meeting detailed in ref D. P/E Chief noted that while Sawani had mentioned that al-Rimi would be willing to provide a signed, written statement to the effect

that he sustained injury to his arm during his time in U.S. custody, we had not received anything. Expressing surprise,

TRIPOLI 00001039 002 OF 002

Sawani said al-Rimi had indicated in his statement that his arm was injured during his U.S. detention, and that problems with his teeth pre-dated his capture. Sawani said he would forward a copy of the statement to the Embassy. Per agreement with Aoun, we called him after the meeting with Sawani to give him a brief readout. He indicated he would reach out separately to Sawani to urge him to move quickly on our request.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Both interlocutors said the right things, but we've been here before. As in August in the run-up to NEA A/S Welch's visit, the upcoming visit to Washington of FM Shalgham may help prompt quick action by the GOL. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1040

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	07TRIPOLI1040 aka Wikileaks id #134240 ?
Subject	GOL FURTHER PROTESTS PLANNED TRANSFER OF LIBYAN DETAINEE AT GTMO TO U.K.
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Dec 2007 17:07 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1040.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1165
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1040 3471707
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131707Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2931
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0693
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 0009
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3367
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001040

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON, NARDI) AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2032
TAGS: KDRG *[Detainee Repatriation from Guantanamo Bay]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL FURTHER PROTESTS PLANNED TRANSFER OF LIBYAN DETAINEE AT GTMO TO U.K.

REF: A) STATE 165729, B) TRIPOLI 1034, C) TRIPOLI 765

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

(S/NF) In a follow-up meeting regarding ref A demarche, MFA Americas Desk Officer Ahmed Aoun registered the GOL's "strong protest" of the planned transfer to the U.K. of Libyan national Omar Deghayes. Stressing that the GOL had been a good partner in the war against terror and noting excellent cooperation in GRPO liaison channels, he said the GOL opposed "in principle and in practice" the transfer of any Libyan national to a third country. He noted that MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi had personally discussed the issue with NEA A/S David Welch, and that the GOL had formally requested that Deghayes be returned to Libya (ref C). DCM reiterated that the USG's ability to return Libyan detainees to Libya depended in part on the GOL's honoring of its agreement to facilitate timely access to detainees returned previously. Aoun took the point on board regarding requested meetings with returned detainees al-Rimi (ISN 194) and Hamouda (ISN 557), and agreed to follow up (further details septel).

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1053

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1053 aka Wikileaks id #134813 ?
Subject	U.S. COMPANIES WIN $2 BILLION WORTH OF INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS AS REWARD FOR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 18 Dec 2007 08:55 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1053.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI166 , 09TRIPOLI63
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4219
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1053/01 3520855
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 180855Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2944
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0245
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0694
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0388
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3384
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 001053

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; TUNIS FOR SEAN COOPER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2017
TAGS: BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: U.S. COMPANIES WIN $2 BILLION WORTH OF INFRASTRUCTURE CONTRACTS AS REWARD FOR POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP

REF: TRIPOLI 1023

TRIPOLI 00001053 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. companies AECOM and the Tennessee Overseas Construction Company (TOCC) inked separate deals worth a total of $2.0 to $3.0 billion with Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board. AECOM is to provide project management for all infrastructure development under the HIB's auspices, and has committed to an ambitious U.S.-based training program for HIB executives and engineers. TOCC's agreement obliges the company to undertake high-profile infrastructure construction and refurbishment projects in Tripoli and Benghazi; the company envisages bringing up to 130 American employees to Libya in the coming year to help manage its projects. The GOL apparently awarded the contracts to U.S. firms for at least partly political purposes, telling company representatives that the deals symbolize the fact that U.S.-Libyan ties have moved beyond strictly security (i.e., WMD and counter-terrorism) concerns. The agreements underscore that the GOL continues to directly link commercial contracts to political relationships. The potential return to Libya of large numbers of non-official Americans has positive potential for people-to-people and cultural exchange, but could further anger Islamic militants already troubled by U.S.-Libyan reengagement.

AECOM TO MANAGE ALL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

¶2. (U) After nearly two months of negotiations, Houston-based company AECOM signed a mega-contract December 13 with Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB) to provide project management services. The contract guarantees two years of work for AECOM for $201 million, and provides for three additional option years for a potential total contract value of $574 million. AECOM is to lead the HIB's 250-member Program Management Department in its administering of all projects that fall within the GOL's $50 billion comprehensive housing and infrastructure development program, to include contracts with any third-country companies. The scope of the development program includes urban design and development, housing unit construction, road construction and upgrades, and development of wastewater management systems.

FOCUS ON TRAINING, HUMAN CAPACITY BUILDING

¶3. (C) Reflecting the GOL's continuing focus on capacity-building, the contract obliges AECOM to train over 100 HIB executives, engineers and technical specialists in project management at AECOM's Houston headquarters during the coming calendar year. Dr. Ibrahim Shukhri, head of HIB's Program Management Department, told P/E Chief December 16 that three senior HIB officials have already applied in Tunis for J-1 visas to undertake a year-long program management course in Houston. Additional tranches of HIB engineers -- currently envisaged as cohorts of 50, 25 and 25 -- are scheduled to undergo three month training courses in Houston beginning in March/April next year. Jim Thompson, President of AECOM subsidiary Turner Collie & Braden and AECOM's signatory on the contract, told P/E Chief December 13 that AECOM plans to send up to 30 American employees to Libya in the first half of 2008 to help manage a bevy of recently concluded housing and infrastructure contracts (reftel and previous).

TOCC WINS MEGA-CONTRACT FOR HOUSING, INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS

¶4. (U) Separately, the Tennessee Oveseas Construction Company (TOCC), in partnership with Washington Group International, signed a LD 1.5 billion (about $1.2 billion) agreement with the HIB December 16. (Note: It is believed that the agreement represents the largest single non-oil and gas deal for a U.S. company in Libya to date. End note.) The deal was concluded in a televised meeting of the HIB at which a total of over LD 6.85 billion (about $5.3 billion) worth of infrastructure contracts with companies from India, China, Korea, Turkey, Russia and Tunisia were signed. TOCC's agreement obliges the company to

undertake high-profile infrastructure construction and refurbishment projects in Tripoli and Benghazi, to include housing units, roads and wastewater management. The contract represents a framework agreement; individual contracts for specific projects envisaged in the framework agreement are to be negotiated separately. The agreement guarantees $1.2 billion

TRIPOLI 00001053 002.2 OF 003

worth of work, but TOCC's local office director, Selim Edes, told P/E Chief that it could be expanded to include a rainwater collection project in Benghazi, which could bring the total contract value to between $2.5 and $3.0 billion.

LARGE NUMBERS OF AMERICANS TO RETURN TO LIBYA?

¶5. (C) TOCC Finance Director Jennifer Windus (protect), who signed for the company, told the Charge that the company plans to send 50 American employees, up to a third of whom may come with families (about 15-20 children), to Libya in the next five months. TOCC envisages a total American employee presence of 100 within the coming calendar year, with a possible 30 additional employees in Benghazi if the rainwater collection project comes to fruition. She noted that obtaining Libyan visas and securing appropriate housing could significantly slow the dispatch of those employees. TOCC's Tripoli office currently comprises 15 locally-engaged staff.

AECOM, TOCC BENEFIT FROM GOL'S DESIRE TO SEND POLITICAL SIGNAL

¶6. (C) Windus told the Charge that Dorda and other HIB officials had stressed that they wanted to award the contract to a U.S. company as "a symbol" of the fact that the bilateral relationship had moved beyond strictly security (i.e., WMD and counter-terrorism) concerns. The fact that TOCC was a U.S. company was "critical" from the HIB's perspective. Windus telephoned P/E Chief later in the day seeking an Embassy quote for the company's press release; she said Dorda had counseled her to solicit remarks emphasizing the political, vice commercial, significance of the contract. (Note: Post's anodyne language welcomed news of the contract as a sign of the continuing development of U.S.-Libyan ties. End note.) Dorda reportedly underscored that the Charge's attendance at the contract signing was "an important symbol of the new relationship".

¶7. (C) Separately, AECOM's Jim Thompson (protect) shared with P/E Chief December 13 his impression that being an American company had been "extremely important" to securing the contract. He conceded that unnamed European firms had submitted bids that were in some respects more competitive, but the HIB's desire to "buy American" -- in part for purposes of political symbolism -- carried the day for AECOM.

HIB SEEKS GREATER U.S. COMPANY PARTICIPATION IN LIBYA'S INFRASTRUCTURE RENAISSANCE

¶8. (C) In a meeting with the Charge before the signing ceremony, HIB Chairman Abuzaid Dorda sounded a similar refrain, saying more U.S. companies should "focus on the future" and bid for lucrative GOL development contracts. Noting that some U.S. and European companies remain "hesitant" about doing business in Libya because of past contretemps, he reiterated the GOL's desire for greater participation by U.S. companies in large-scale infrastructure and development projects. Stressing the American angle, he noted that AECOM enjoyed the HIB's "full confidence" and said the HIB would sign a contract worth "hundreds of millions of dollars" (NFI) with U.S. company KBR on December 30 for infrastructure projects in Benghazi.

PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO ANTI-CORRUPTION ...

¶9. (U) In a subsequent televised meeting of the HIB that resembled nothing so much as a game show, Dorda continued sounding the American theme. TOCC's was the first contract signed on-air; Dr. Shukhri told P/E Chief that the decision had been deliberately designed to "emphasize American participation in the Jamahurriya's development". AECOM's deal also featured prominently in Dorda's remarks, even though the deal was signed several days earlier and no one from the company was present. In a somewhat bizarre lecture clearly crafted to appeal to viewers at home, Dorda chided winners to take seriously the transparency and anti-corruption clauses of their respective contracts. Noting that he had personally blacklisted three foreign companies for unspecified alleged acts of corruption in recent months (NFI), he cautioned contract winners that the GOL has "our methods" for "knowing what you are up to".

¶10. (C) Companies accused of paying bribes or engaging in other forms of graft would be assumed to be guilty unless able to prove otherwise, would be forced to forfeit their contracts and pay penalties, and would be summarily ejected from the country

and not allowed to bid on future GOL contracts. In a seeming contradiction with the "guilty until proven innocent" assumption, Dorda claimed there was "no excuse" for companies not to immediately report solicitations of bribes to the HIB. Once they had done so, it would "be the HIB's problem" to deal with.

... BUT OLD HABITS DIE HARD

¶11. (C) On the margins of the televised meeting, Brown & Root country director Richard Weeks (protect) told P/E Chief that the HIB delayed providing a copy of its putative Benghazi contract, and only did so on the morning of December 16. Seeking to inflate the figure for the total value of contracts concluded on the day, the HIB pressured KBR to sign the contract without having adequately reviewed it. Weeks said HIB officials took back the sole hard copy they'd been given when they determined that KBR would not sign without having their attorneys perform necessary due diligence. In a last-minute plea to Brown & Root, P/E Chief overheard an HIB official telling Weeks not to worry about the details of the contract because the contract itself was "meaningless". "What is important is that we trust you", the official said. Conceding that the remark confirmed the worst suspicions of some KBR executives about the GOL's approach to the sanctity of contracts, Weeks said he was wrestling with whether share it with his corporate management.

¶12. (C) Comment: While certainly good news for American business, AECOM and TOCC's wins underscore that the GOL, encouraged by its interactions with the French and Italians, continues to view commercial contracts as means by which to curry political favor. The new deals also represent a potentially significant evolution in the U.S. business presence in Libya. To date, U.S. companies -- with the notable exception of oil and gas concerns -- have largely focused on selling discrete products and services, a relatively straightforward exercise. Participation in performance-based contracts represents a markedly more complicated exercise in which the potential exposure to graft, delayed payment and breach of faith are greater. The potential return to Libya of non-official Americans in numbers not seen since the early 1970's also represents a mixed blessing. The people-to-people and cultural exchange potential are great and will likely be welcomed by many Libyans; however, increased numbers of Americans could constitute a further irritant to (and target for) Islamic militants already leery of U.S.-Libyan reengagement. End comment.
STEVENS

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1055

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1055 aka Wikileaks id #135501 ?
Subject	LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 23 Dec 2007 09:34 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1055.html
References	06TRIPOLI623 , 07TRIPOLI972
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8700
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1055 3570934
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 230934Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2948
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3388
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 001055

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/RA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KBCT *[Arab League Boycott]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , AL *[Albania]* , ABLD *[Buildings and Grounds]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , AMGT *[Management Operations]* , ASUP, AFIN *[Financial Management]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT

REF: A) STATE 166398, B) 06 TRIPOLI 623 , C) TRIPOLI 972

¶1. (SBU) The Government of Libya (GOL) does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Local firms are required by national law to comply with the boycott, and would therefore not be able to sign the required U.S. certification without exposing themselves to civil and/or criminal penalties. Post accordingly requests a waiver of of the Arab League boycott certification.

¶2. (SBU) Post continues to raise the Arab League boycott issue in its meetings with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Economy and Trade. Most recently, in the fall, the Charge' pressed the MFA's Secretary for the Americas on the issue, noting that AL boycott language in Libyan contracts would

undermine GOL efforts to attract U.S. business. The MFA official replied that the GOL and private entities are compelled by Libyan law stemming from the AL resolution to include language requiring compliance with the AL boycott

¶3. (SBU) The Ministry of Trade and Economy informed Post that the GOL does not enforce the boycott. While this may be GOL policy, as a practical matter boycott language continues to appear in contract language, and is sometimes enforced, sometimes not. As detailed ref C, for example, a U.S. company was presented with a draft contract by Libya's National Procurement Authority (NPA) containing language requiring the company to acknowledge that it observed a comprehensive boycott of Israel. The language was expansive, barring any business contact with or investment in Israel, and requiring the U.S. company to abide by all laws and decisions related to the AL's boycott action. Representatives of the U.S. company refused to sign the contract; the NPA subsequently removed the boycott-related language in its entirety. To reinforce the decision and avoid potential misunderstanding, the parties agreed on and signed an English-only iteration of the contract. In an additional example, two German firms were reportedly asked to sign letters attesting that they were in compliance with the anti-Israel boycott as a pre-condition for securing required GOL stamps on export documents from the Libyan People's Bureau in Berlin (Libyan Embassy-equivalent).

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1056

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1056 aka Wikileaks id #135502 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: EXPERIENCING GROWING PAINS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 23 Dec 2007 09:56 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1056.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8704
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1056/01 3570956
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 230956Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2949
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0957
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0384
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0587
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0536
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0248
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0358
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0697
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0391
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3389
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001056

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , KBIO, PINR [Intelligence] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: EXPERIENCING GROWING
PAINS

REF: TRIPOLI 432

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Libya's newly-constituted National Security Council continues to experience growing pains. A shortage of skilled staff, questions about its mandate, and friction between National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi and some senior GOL officials have limited the NSC's organizational effectiveness, although al-Qadhafi remains "ambitious" and continues to work to expand his area of influence. End summary.

STAFFING CHALLENGES

¶2. (S/NF) Dr. Hind Siala, Director of Libya's National Security Council (strictly protect), told P/E Chief that the NSC, formed earlier this year (reftel), was experiencing growing pains. Noting that the NSC's staff had grown in size, she cited a continuing shortage of skilled, trained individuals as an impediment to greater organizational effectiveness. The NSC had to date pulled most of its staff from other GOL entities, including the External Security Organization, Internal Security Organization, General People's Committee for Foreign Cooperation and International Liaison (MFA) and Ministry of Justice. Siala noted that training and skill sets among staff drawn from other organizations varied considerably.

¶3. (S/NF) Other organizations were initially more willing to provide staff, she said, in part because they feared repercussions if they refused requests from a son of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi; however, the NSC's policy of aggressively identifying and attempting to lure quality staff had begun to engender resentment and a sense that the NSC was pursuing its staffing needs at the expense of other GOL agencies. Siala mentioned that the MFA had successfully resisted an attempt in late November by the NSC to request that a well-regarded MFA employee be detailed to the NSC (NFI).

NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING ACADEMY IN THE WORKS?

¶4. (S/NF) Noting a lack of basic professional skills, Siala specifically mentioned a shortage of employees who could take notes in meetings and draft memoranda of conversations. Describing National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi as a "dynamic" individual given to holding many meetings, she complained that the dearth of qualified working-level employees meant that more senior staff members such as herself were often pressed into service as notetakers. She indicated that al-Qadhafi, responding to suggestions from his advisers, is moving to establish a National Security Training Academy that would train staff for the NSC and other GOL entities with national security and foreign policy equities. Pointing to the poor quality of Libya's educational system, she conceded that the NSC and other GOL entities were "suffering" from the fact that comparatively few Libyans were able to engage in critical thinking and writing of a sort that lent itself to more sophisticated exercises such as drafting analytical reports. (Note: We understand that the UK Embassy in Tripoli has discussed with her possible training opportunities in the UK for NSC terrorism analysts. End note.)

MUTASSIM'S AMBITION CREATES FRICTION WITH SOME

¶5. (S/NF) Siala noted that the NSC as an organization is still trying to define its role within the GOL. It remains "a bit unclear" whether the NSC is to serve as an interagency coordinating mechanism, or as a formulator and implementer of policy in its own right. Responding to a question about whether her principal's personality might have something to do with that, she conceded that Mutassim al-Qadhafi is "ambitious" and said he is still working to "create a space" in which to work cooperatively with other senior GOL officials. She implied that doubts among some senior members of the GOL's old guard about whether Mutassim was substantively qualified for his position,

TRIPOLI 00001056 002 OF 002

together with his increasingly obvious desire to grow his fiefdom, had created friction with unnamed others in the leadership. Indicating that the MFA and "some security organizations" had been particularly resistant to the NSC's attempts to expand its brief, she said the Ministry of Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent) and armed forces had been less recalcitrant.

¶6. (S/NF) According to Siala, the NSC's membership is as follows: PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (chairman); National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi; Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham; Minister of Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent) Rajib Saleh; Minister of Economy and Trade Essawi; Minister of Finance Muhammad Ali al-Hweij; and Chief of Defense Major General Abubakr Yunis Jafr. It is believed that Jafr encumbers the seat reserved for a "representative of the Temporary General People's Committee" per Law Number Four of 2007, which established the NSC.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Siala's suggestion that Mutassim's ambitions have caused friction with others in the leadership accords with the view of some local observers that Mutassim is an increasingly important player in the political firmament. Determining how he is perceived as a potential successor to his father, particularly by key members of his father's cohort of contemporaries, remains something of an open question, however. There are reports that putative heir apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi is out of favor with some segments of the leadership, due to his public participation in the messy denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, and his championing of economic reforms. End comment.

¶8. (U) Biographical note: Siala, who was trained as a pharmacist and previously served as Libya's ambassador to Valletta, serves as a combination of chief-of-staff and senior special assistant to Mutassim al-Qadhafi. She is married to a Libyan businessman who, somewhat unusually, is several years her junior. She is the niece of Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad Siala.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1058

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1058 aka Wikileaks id #135504 ?
Subject	UPDATING INFORMATION FOR TERRORISM FINANCE COORDINATION OFFICERS (TFCO)
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 23 Dec 2007 12:22 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1058.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8731
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1058 3571222
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 231222Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2952
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3392
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 001058

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EEB/ESC/TFS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] , PTER [Terrorists and
Terrorism] , KTFN [Terrorism Finance Traffic]
SUBJECT: UPDATING INFORMATION FOR TERRORISM FINANCE COORDINATION
OFFICERS (TFCO)

REF: STATE 164437

(U) Pef reftel, Embassy Tripoli's Terrorism Finance Coordination
Officer (TFCO) is Political/Economic Chief John Godfrey (phone:
218-91-220-3097, unclassified email: HYPERLINK
"mailto:godfreyjt@state.gov"godfreyjt@state.g ov; classified
email: HYPERLINK
"mailto:GodfreyJT@state.sgov.gov"GodfreyJT@state.sgov.gov).
Post's Deputy TFCO is Political Officer Joshua Harris (phone:
218-91-381-5926; unclassified email: HYPERLINK
"mailto:HarrisJM@state.gov"HarrisJM@state.gov ; classified email:
HYPERLINK
"mailto:HarrisJM@state.sgov.gov"HarrisJM@state.sgov.gov).

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1063

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1063 aka Wikileaks id #135719 ?
Subject	CORRECTED COPY - LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL: EXPERIENCING GROWING PAINS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 27 Dec 2007 15:50 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1063.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0341
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1063/01 3611550
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271550Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2957
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0961
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0386
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0589
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0538
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0250
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0360
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0699
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0393
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3397
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001063

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/23/2017
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , KBIO, PINR [Intelligence] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL:
EXPERIENCING GROWING PAINS

REF: TRIPOLI 432

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Libya's newly-constituted National Security Council continues to experience growing pains. A shortage of skilled staff, questions about its mandate, and friction between National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi and some senior GOL officials have limited the NSC's organizational effectiveness, although al-Qadhafi remains "ambitious" and continues to work to expand his area of influence. End summary.

STAFFING CHALLENGES

¶2. (S/NF) Dr. Hind Siala, Director of Libya's National Security Council (strictly protect), told P/E Chief that the NSC, formed earlier this year (reftel), was experiencing growing pains. Noting that the NSC's staff had grown in size, she cited a continuing shortage of skilled, trained individuals as an impediment to greater organizational effectiveness. The NSC had to date pulled most of its staff from other GOL entities, including the External Security Organization, Internal Security Organization, General People's Committee for Foreign Cooperation and International Liaison (MFA) and Ministry of Justice. Siala noted that training and skill sets among staff drawn from other organizations varied considerably.

¶3. (S/NF) Other organizations were initially more willing to provide staff, she said, in part because they feared repercussions if they refused requests from a son of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi; however, the NSC's policy of aggressively identifying and attempting to lure quality staff had begun to engender resentment and a sense that the NSC was pursuing its staffing needs at the expense of other GOL agencies. Siala mentioned that the MFA had successfully resisted an attempt in late November by the NSC to request that a well-regarded MFA employee be detailed to the NSC (NFI).

NATIONAL SECURITY TRAINING ACADEMY IN THE WORKS?

¶4. (S/NF) Noting a lack of basic professional skills, Siala specifically mentioned a shortage of employees who could take notes in meetings and draft memoranda of conversations. Describing National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi as a "dynamic" individual given to holding many meetings, she complained that the dearth of qualified working-level employees meant that more senior staff members such as herself were often pressed into service as notetakers. She indicated that al-Qadhafi, responding to suggestions from his advisers, is moving to establish a National Security Training Academy that would train staff for the NSC and other GOL entities with national security and foreign policy equities. Pointing to the poor quality of Libya's educational system, she conceded that the NSC and other GOL entities were "suffering" from the fact that comparatively few Libyans were able to engage in critical thinking and writing of a sort that lent itself to more sophisticated exercises such as drafting analytical reports. (Note: We understand that the UK Embassy in Tripoli has discussed with her possible training opportunities in the UK for NSC terrorism analysts. End note.)

MUTASSIM'S AMBITION CREATES FRICTION WITH SOME

¶5. (S/NF) Siala noted that the NSC as an organization is still trying to define its role within the GOL. It remains "a bit unclear" whether the NSC is to serve as an interagency coordinating mechanism, or as a formulator and implementer of policy in its own right. Responding to a question about whether her principal's personality might have something to do with that, she conceded that Mutassim al-Qadhafi is "ambitious" and said he is still working to "create a space" in which to work cooperatively with other senior GOL officials. She implied that doubts among some senior members of the GOL's old guard about

whether Mutassim was substantively qualified for his position, together with his increasingly obvious desire to grow his fiefdom, had created friction with unnamed others in the leadership. Indicating that the MFA and "some security organizations" had been particularly resistant to the NSC's attempts to expand its brief, she said the Ministry of Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent) and armed forces had been less recalcitrant.

¶6. (S/NF) According to Siala, the NSC's membership is as follows: PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (chairman); National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi; Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham; Minister of Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent) Rajib Saleh; Minister of Economy and Trade Essawi; Minister of Finance Muhammad Ali al-Hweij; and Chief of Defense Major General Abubakr Yunis Jafr. It is believed that Jafr encumbers the seat reserved for a "representative of the Temporary General People's Committee" per Law Number Four of 2007, which established the NSC.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Siala's suggestion that Mutassim's ambitions have caused friction with others in the leadership accords with the view of some local observers that Mutassim is an increasingly important player in the political firmament. Determining how he is perceived as a potential successor to his father, particularly by key members of his father's cohort of contemporaries, remains something of an open question, however. There are reports that putative heir apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi is out of favor with some segments of the leadership, due to his public participation in the messy denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, and his championing of economic reforms. End comment.

¶8. (U) Biographical note: Siala, who was trained as a pharmacist and previously served as Libya's ambassador to Valletta, serves as a combination of chief-of-staff and senior special assistant to Mutassim al-Qadhafi. She is married to a Libyan businessman who, somewhat unusually, is several years her junior. She is the niece of Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad Siala.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1065

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1065 aka Wikileaks id #135795 ?
Subject	CORRECTED COPY - DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TEAM FINALIZES HEU-LEU AGREEMENT LANGUAGE WITH GOL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 28 Dec 2007 10:07 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1065.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI696
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0932
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1065/01 3621007
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 281007Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2961
INFO RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0054
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0965
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0390
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0593
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0542
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0397
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0703
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0004
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0072
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3401
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001065

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, T/VCI (LOOK), ISN/CTR (MACDONALD), COPY TO
SENATOR LUGAR'S OFFICE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , TRGY [Energy Technology] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , IAEA
[International Atomic Energy Agency] , PINR [Intelligence] , TSPL [Science and Technology Policy] , TPHY [Physical
Sciences] , TNGD [Engineering Research and Development] , MCAP [Military Capabilities] ,
ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY - DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY TEAM FINALIZES HEU-LEU
AGREEMENT LANGUAGE WITH GOL

¶1.   (SBU) Summary: A visiting team of experts from the Department
of Energy (DOE) finalized language for a
```

government-to-government agreement providing for the return of highly-enriched uranium to Russia under the rubric of the tri-lateral agreement (TSCC) announced December 19, 2003 with the U.S., U.K. and Libya. The agreement also envisages cooperation in improving physical security at Libya's experimental Tajoura reactor facility and other sites, to include hospitals with radiological equipment and material. The two sides initialed English-language versions of the agreement; the GOL and the Department's Language Services staff are currently working to finalize Arabic language that conforms with the agreed English iteration. It is expected that a senior USG official will sign the agreement in conjunction with putative travel to Libya early next year. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) A team from the DOE's Office of Global Threat Reduction traveled to Libya December 9-12 to meet with Libyan science community counterparts to finalize language for a Highly-Enriched Uranium/Low-Enriched Uranium (HEU-LEU) agreement. The delegation, consisting of Kelly Cummins (Delegation Head), Phil Robinson (Country Officer), Diana Clarke (General Counsel), Igor Bolshinsky (Technical Lead) and Stan Moses (Technical Staff) met with Dr. Abdelkarem Mgeg, Director of the Tajoura Renewable Energies and Water Desalination Research Center, to resolve issues and finalize language for a related to a government-to-government agreement between the U.S. and GOL. The agreement would facilitate the return to Russia of 26 fuel assemblies comprising approximately 4.6 kilograms of HEU material. (Note: Technical Lead Bolshinsky confirmed December 9 that all HE material was still physically present at the Tajoura facility. End note.) The agreement would complete the process begun in March 2004, when the GOL returned to Russia 15 kilograms of HEU material.

¶3. (SBU) It is envisaged that the material would be transferred to Russia by air circa late 2009. In addition to fuel return, the agreement includes language detailing cooperation on nuclear and radiological security enhancements at the Tajoura site and other facilities in Libya, to include four hospitals in Benghazi, Sabratha and Tripoli (two facilities). Implementing additional security measures as the Tajoura site could occur 12-24 months after the agreement is signed; radiological/security upgrades at the hospitals could be made within several months of signing.

¶4. (SBU) Discussion on day one of the talks, which took place at the Tajoura facility, focused on resolving issues associated with the agreement. GOL officials initially expressed some concern that the agreement included language regarding enhancement of physical protection measures; however, a closer reading and explanation by the DOE's experts convinced them that the language was anodyne. Consensus was also achieved on language concerning audit and inspection protocols. DOE delegation head Cummins and Director Mgeg initialed the draft agreement to signal consensus on the language.

¶5. (SBU) Day two focused on finalizing language for a Basic Ordering Agreement (BOA) contract between the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Tajoura facility. After minor changes to the scope of the work at the GOL's request, the two sides achieved consensus on final language.

¶6. (SBU) The GOL agreed to provide an Arabic language translation of the agreement and the BOA; however, given concerns about how quickly the GOL would honor that commitment, post understands that NEA/MAG has asked Language Services to prepare treaty-ready translations. The GOL stressed that the agreement would have to be approved by the relevant ministries before it could be signed. (Note: It may also have to be blessed by the General People's Congress. End note.) Libyan interlocutors were optimistic that the agreement could be finalized on their side in time for a visit by a senior State Department official in early 2008. Following the negotiations, the DOE team learned that Dr. Ali Gashut, the senior Libyan

interlocutor on technical nuclear issues, had obtained a copy of the agreement and was working to obtain the requisite GOL

TRIPOLI 00001065 002 OF 002

approvals.

¶7. (SBU) Comment: In the DOE team's judgment, the meetings were positive and cooperative, suggesting that the GOL wants to quickly finalize and implement the agreement. The GOL ultimately insisted on only minor changes to the original draft agreement. Despite the enthusiasm of the Tajoura facility scientists and the avowed interest of other senior GOL officials in signing the agreement, obtaining approval from the appropriate ministries may be time-consuming and difficult. The fact that the GOL clearly expects that the agreement will be signed in connection with a putative senior-level visit early next year may help expedite the Libyan interagency process. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI1066

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI1066 aka Wikileaks id #135963 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION DIRECTOR SOUNDS WARNING ON TERRORIST THREAT, BILATERAL TIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 31 Dec 2007 11:53 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/12/07TRIPOLI1066.html
References	07TRIPOLI1038 , 07TRIPOLI1039
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2266
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1066/01 3651153
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 311153Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2963
INFO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0399
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0705
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0362
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0252
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0118
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3403
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 001066

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/31/2017
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] ,
PINR [Intelligence] , SOCI [Social Conditions] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] , SCUL [Cultural Affairs] , OEXC
[Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations] , KISL [Islamic Issues] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION DIRECTOR SOUNDS WARNING ON
TERRORIST THREAT, BILATERAL TIES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 1039 , B) TRIPOLI 1038

TRIPOLI 00001066  001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, State.
```

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) During a meeting with Qhadafi Development Foundation Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani (protect), Sawani described the trans-national terrorism threat (which he feels some GOL officials underestimate), the Libyan public's perception that U.S.-Libya bilateral ties are overly focused on security, the attendant risk that the GOL and USG will fail to capitalize on a window of opportunity to establish deeper cross-cultural understanding, and the economic and social failures of al-Qadhafi's political revolution. End summary.

TUAREG, TOUBOU GROUPS A POTENTIAL THREAT

¶2. (S/NF) DCM and P/E chief called on Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Sawani in mid-December to discuss the QDF's role in providing Embassy access to returned GTMO detainees (reported septel). Sawani took the opportunity to discuss counter-terrorism issues and the bilateral relationship more generally. Referencing recent attacks in Algiers, Sawani said most Libyans were "horrified and disgusted" by events such as those in Algiers, but the fact that such a small minority of Islamic fundamentalists could inflict such damage underscored the gravity of the threat. Sawani (who is not a security expert) expressed concern that al-Qaeda could seek to exploit the nationalist aspirations of Tuareg and Toubou ethnic minority groups in southern Libya to conduct operations inside Libya. The fact that at least a million sub-Saharan African guest workers were resident in Libya was "cause for concern"; the large number of Egyptian guest workers, some of whom were politically and religiously radical, was similarly troubling. (Note: Egyptian Embassy officials put the number of Egyptian workers at 700,000 to one million, depending on the season. End note.)

SOME GOL POLITICAL LEADERS UNDERESTIMATE FUNDAMENTALIST THREAT

¶3. (S/NF) The GOL lacked the capacity to deal with serious trans-national terrorist threats, said Sawani. Worse, some "senior political elements" -- he didn't specify who -- failed to realize how serious the threat really was. Those officials considered recent events to be Algerian or Tunisian problems, rather than symptoms of a broader regional threat dynamic. While Libya's security and intelligence services were "very serious" about blunting the ability of al-Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM) and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) as potential threats to the stability of Qadhafi's regime, they were less keenly focused on the broader trans-national terrorist threat. (Note: He did not reference the November 3 announcement of the AQIM-LIFG merger. End note.) In Sawani's view, the overweaning focus on preservation of the regime potentially left the GOL exposed by ignoring the fact that the terrorist threat had evolved and become less local and more dangerous.

U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP NEEDS TO BE FORWARD-LOOKING ...

¶4. (S/NF) Noting opposition in some Congressional quarters to Libya's reintegration into the international community, Sawani said he did not expect "substantial" developments in U.S.-Libya bilateral ties until after the upcoming U.S. presidential elections. Libya is "not that important" in the grand scheme of U.S. foreign policy interests; GOL officials "need to be patient", although not all senior GOL leaders realized that. Referencing earlier comments on extremists, he lamented that development of bilateral ties was slow by comparison with the quickly mounting terrorist threat. It was important that the relationship not be seen as being hostage to the Lockerbie bombing and other past contretemps. The GOL "needs to feel confident" that bilateral relations were moving forward; Libya wanted a "strategic alliance" with the U.S.

... AND HAS BEEN TOO FOCUSED ON SECURITY

¶5. (S/NF) At the same time, it was important that the USG realize the danger for Qadhafi's regime of overly emphasizing the security dimension of the bilateral relationship. The initial premise for re-establishment of diplomatic ties - WMD

TRIPOLI 00001066 002.2 OF 004

counter-proliferation and counter-terrorism cooperation - had been logical, but it was "too narrow" to sustain the relationship over time and bred a strong negative reaction among Libyan intellectuals, certain members of the old guard, and the public at large. Cooperation in other avenues would help mitigate the perception of a monolithic security relationship, creating a healthier relationship and contributing to better security in the long run. Serious mistrust of U.S. motivations for reestablishment of ties with Libya remain; the U.S. needs to engage different strata of the Libyan elite and public; otherwise else prospects for sustained, long-term improved bilateral ties will remain dim.

VISAS HINDER LIBYAN STUDENTS' WILLINGNESS TO STUDY IN U.S.

¶6. (C) Sawani specifically mentioned student visas as an area in which the U.S. is missing an opportunity. Echoing comments we've heard from other GOL interlocutors, he said that the QDF alone offers some 3,000 scholarships for Libyan students to study abroad. The GPC for Higher Education gave 7,000 scholarships to Libyan students to study abroad in 2007; according to Under Secretary for Higher Education, the GOL's goal is to send 2,000 of those to the U.S. next year. Many would choose to study in the U.S., but the fact that they currently must travel to Tunis twice to obtain a U.S. visa is a disincentive, he said.

¶7. (C) Libyans also have difficulty meeting English language requirements and navigating U.S. university application processes and timelines. Libyan students without sufficient English skills frequently enroll in intensive language classes in the U.S. prior to matriculating in graduate courses; the Libyans would prefer conditional acceptance at universities to their current practice of attending a language school and subsequently matriculating at a university. In addition, the U.S. university admissions schedule impedes disbursement of GOL scholarships. Scholarships are typically disbursed in autumn and students - who typically have not even begun researching U.S. universities and their application processes - must rush to meet application deadlines in January. An additional constraint is that the maximum validity for F and J student visas is one entry. If students were to travel home at any time during their studies, they must reapply for a visa in Tunis.

EDUCATIONAL, CULTURAL EXCHANGES KEY

¶8. (C) Consequently, Sawani concluded, most Libyan students prefer to study in Europe. Sawani expressed frustration that greater progress had not been made in establishing an interim U.S. Embassy facility with normal visa functions, saying the focus on security and CT cooperation to the exclusion of other equally aspects of bilateral cooperation meant that opportunities for genuine cultural dialogue and exchange were missed. Mentioning his own experiences as a student in the U.K., he said the greatest investment the U.S. could make in furthering long-term ties would be to find a way to get more Libyan students to the U.S. to study.

RISING ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT A REACTION TO U.S. POLICIES & FAILED REVOLUTION

¶9. (S/NF) Contrasting his own experience with multi-culturalism

and tolerance as a student in the U.K., he highlighted a growing sense of anti-American sentiment in the region. Libya had largely avoided the trend to date, but the continuing impact of Saudi Wahhabism, conservative satellite television programming, and radical Sudanese and Egyptian elements had begun to change that. Older Libyans still tended not to demonize the U.S., but there was a marked increase in anti-American sentiment among Libyan youth. Sawani ascribed that to U.S. policies, particularly the Iraq "occupation" and the public's perception of strong U.S. bias toward Israel vis-`-vis the Palestinians, and to the failure of al-Qadhafi's political revolution.

¶10. (S/NF) The GOL had "absolutely failed" to address the concerns (education, employment) of Libyan youth, fueling greater receptivity to anti-American and fundamentalist messages. He related a recent conversation in which his 16-year old son asked whether there would be elections after Leader Muammar Qadhafi departed from the political scene, or whether Saif al-Islam would inherit his father's mantle. In discussing

the question, Sawani referenced the Leader's early achievements, particularly in establishing a Libya free from colonial vestiges. Dismissing those as "ancient history", Sawani's son asked what the Leader had achieved more recently, demonstrating in Sawani's judgment just how far traditional revolutionary authority had eroded in Libya.

LIBYA A "FAILED STATE" ECONOMICALLY AND SOCIALLY

¶11. (S/NF) Claiming that Qadhafi's revolution had succeeded in some political respects, particularly as a catalyst for anti-imperialism, Sawani characterized Libya as "a failed state" in the economic and social sense. The lack of proper housing, infrastructure, education and health care in a hydrocarbon rich state galled Libyans. Noting that he had recently spent a month's salary to take his ailing wife to Tunis for medical care, he said no Libyan who could afford to would subject his family to the Libyan health care system.

¶12. (S/NF) Nonetheless, old revolutionary ideas "die hard". High oil prices and a concomitant windfall of petro-dollars have created "false pride" on the part of the National Oil Corporation (NOC) and certain senior GOL leaders, Sawani said. Suggesting that oil wealth was impermanent, he noted that the recently staged fourth round of Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement bidding (ref B) had only garnered about half the number of bids expected by the NOC.

LIBYA "IN DANGER OF BEING LOST"

¶13. (S/NF) Citing Israel's successful lobby in Washington, he lamented the GOL's failure to establish a more robust, effective apparatus to promote U.S.-Libya relations. Saying that bilateral ties were at a critical juncture, he claimed establishing such a capability now would require time neither side has; U.S.-Libya relations accordingly required action at "the top level". (Comment: A convenient line of thinking that accords with the GOL's preference for dramatic, high-level gestures a la Sarkozy's visit in July, as opposed to a more deliberate, phased engagement. End comment.) Cautioning that Libya was "in danger of being lost", he claimed the U.S. would then have to install a monarchy in Libya, which he characterized as a "dangerous" alternative.

¶14. (S/NF) Comment: Sawani, who is well-connected and enjoys the confidence of his boss and putative heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, typically rushes through agenda points and is careful in his remarks. That he made time for an extensive tour d' horizon on sensitive subjects suggests that he may have been conveying a message on behalf of other, more senior figures

conveying a message on behalf of other, more senior figures, perhaps in connection with Foreign Minister Shalgham's upcoming visit to Washington. While Sawani's access to information regarding the GOL's counter-terrorism operations is uncertain, his assertion that some senior GOL political leaders have underestimated the trans-national terrorist threat is troubling. We share his assessment that the relationship has in some respects focused on security and CT issues to the exclusion of other worthwhile areas of engagement. To be sure, a large part of the problem stems from the reluctance of Libyan elites to engage more broadly with the U.S., perhaps out of fear that the leadership will change its mind about the direction and pace of the bilateral relationship.

¶15. (S/NF) Comment (cont.): Sawani's comments on student visas reflect the prevailing perspective on difficulties Libyans encounter when contemplating study in the U.S. The biggest obstacle to increased numbers of Libyan student studying at U.S. universities is not obtaining visas, but the unwillingness of Libyan students to meet U.S. admissions requirements and the misguided belief that the USG can and should exempt them from those strictures. Dissatisfaction with U.S. admissions and student visas reflects the frustrations many Libyans feel more generally as they reintegrate with an international community in which standards obtain. Thirty-eight years of "Jamahurriya" thought, emphasizing decentralization and lack of accountability, have left many Libyans ill-equipped to participate in the broader world from which they have been isolated for so long. Some of the frustrations Sawani articulated regarding the bilateral relationship and student visas reflect the inevitable growing pains of a society and body politic struggling to come to grips with its place in the world.

TRIPOLI 00001066 004.2 OF 004

End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI169

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI169 aka Wikileaks id #97223 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S COGNITIVE DISSONANCE: HIV AWARENESS PROGRAMMING AND CONTINUING BLAME ON OUTSIDERS FOR AIDS OUTBREAK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 19 Feb 2007 16:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07TRIPOLI169.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

Libya, about its work in AIDS awareness education, Embassy was invited to a World Aids Day held at the Tripoli General People's Congress Hall on December 2 that was jointly sponsored by UNDP and Watassimo. Aisha Qadhafi did not attend, but was idolized in a slide show that depicted her in halo'ed photographs attending committee meetings and giving speeches.

¶3. (C) The sparsely-attended event had about 50 "boy scouts" and 30 "girl guides" in the audience, along with a dozen public health officials and the family members of the children performing a skit as part of the program. In the lobby, head-scarf covered women from Watassimo handed out promotional materials for a Quran memorization contest sponsored by Aisha Qadhafi, along with some basic informational materials about AIDS. The General People's Congress Hall, one of the largest government structures in Tripoli, features a large auditorium that could hold several hundred people on both the main and upper level seating areas. The building is decorated with two large murals - one is an outline of all the Arabic-speaking countries painted in green with the caption "All Arab Countries are One." On the opposite wall is an outline of the African continent in black, with only the Libyan territory highlighted in green, along with the caption, "Africa isn't just an entity, it is a message of future civilization."

¶4. (C) After a blessing from an Imam and introduction by the head of the Libyan Infectious Diseases Center (LIDC), Secretary of the General People's Committee for Health Dr. Mohamed Abu-Ujaylah Rashed gave an address that broadly outlined the scope of AIDS in a global context, but also commented in his remarks that children in Benghazi were deliberately infected with the AIDs virus. He told the audience that there were 7023 cases of AIDS in Libya and 6707 were Libyan citizens.

¶5. (C) There was also a brief presentation by a man, currently under treatment for AIDS, who urged the crowd to accept those with the illness and also called for the government to create a special center to provide free treatment and support for all people with AIDs. The man, wearing very conservative Islamic dress including a white robe, crocheted white skullcap, and facial hair worn by devout religious clerics, conveyed a sense of repentance for past misdeeds in his remarks. The audience reaction to the remarks was polite and reflective.

¶6. (C) More than half of the program was a play enacted by young schoolgirls describing how viruses (using the example of avian influenza, not HIV) could attack the body. The play explained the role of good nutrition in heath, and also the function of red and white blood cells in the body's immune

system. The schoolgirls representing white blood cells (the defender's of health) were dressed in copies of the white military uniform Colonel Qadhafi usually wears on Revolution Day, complete with gold-fringed epaulets just like the "Leader's" outfits. In keeping with the revolutionary mindset of the Jamahiriya (an Arabic word that translates as "the state of the masses"), the play included air raid sirens when the system was under attack by the virus, and the girls used toy rifles and handguns to attack back, accompanied by background sound effects simulating machine-gun fire.

¶7. (C) After the program, P/E Chief spoke with a doctor who lived in the U.S. for seven years and did post-graduate work in medicine at Tulane University. She now runs public health programs at the LIDC. Asked to confirm P/E Chief's understanding of the Health Secretary's remarks in Arabic, she said that yes, the children had been deliberately infected. Asked how she, as a health professional, knew the infections were deliberate, she said that the Libyan health authorities had conducted studies that proved the crime of the accused Bulgarians and Palestinian. She was not aware that the Libyan courts had rejected expert testimony from leading AIDS researchers from outside Libya. While earlier in the conversation, the doctor complained about Libya's abysmal state of public health, health education and service, when it came to the AIDS investigation, she insisted that Libyan doctors and equipment were world-class and capable of conducting a thorough investigation.

¶8. (C) Similarly, the head of the Tuberculosis prevention program for the General People's Committee of Health, a doctor who lived and studied in Budapest for seven years before

who lived and studied in Budapest for seven years before returning to Libya also said he believed the Benghazi HIV infections were deliberate. When P/E Chief ran through a list of medical reports issued by internationally-recognized experts, including Libyan expatriate medical specialists, and offered other explanations for the outbreak, the doctor was not receptive to any citations of scientific studies.

¶9. (C) Last year P/E Chief had dinner in Benghazi with a working-class family with one son in medical school. Asked about the case and local Benghazi opinion, the future doctor said that "everyone" in Benghazi knew the infections were deliberate and that if the medics were released it was a sign that the government was corrupt and bowing to pressure from the West.

¶10. (C) In late November the charge had a conversation with a Libyan doctor now living outside Libya but who returns from time to time to provide consultative services to the government. The doctor gave many examples of the declining quality of the education available in Libya's medical schools, and cited the absence of quality control in the educational system. He then told the charge that he had been asked to write a report about AIDS and its treatment, with reference to the Benghazi problem. At first his interlocutors had been reluctant to provide him requested data, and remained vague as to whether the report was to be read by specialists or by laymen or someone in between. After persistent questioning the doctor finally ascertained that the report was to be prepared for Muammar Qadhafi. The doctor concluded that Qadhafi was intensely interested in this technical issue and was following the Benghazi case closely. The doctor made it clear to the charge that he did not believe the Bulgarian nurses were guilty of intentionally infecting the children but it was not clear how much of this conclusion was conveyed in the report he wrote.

¶11. (C) COMMENT: The disconnect between the public rhetoric of health policy officials and the often privately-acknowledged admittance that the HIV infection was not a deliberate criminal act by the medics reflects the deep threat felt by the authoritarian regime. There are a number of factors influencing the government's current stance that outsiders are to blame for the HIV infections in Libya. Religious, social and cultural stigmas make it very difficult to admit that behaviors or practices that contribute to the spread of HIV may exist in Libya. The government also, given Benghazi perceptions that it receives less than a fair share of state resources, has to manage public opinion. It is not willing to accept responsibility for the lack of basic hygiene, sanitation, equipment or adequately trained staff in state-run facilities. The government's image problems became even more tangled after its initial attempts to blame the outbreak on outsiders, (at one time claiming U.S. and Israeli intelligence services were behind

TRIPOLI 00000169 003.2 OF 003

a plot to kill Libyan children). After 8 years of blaming outsiders, now the government also faces heavy criticism from oppositionist forces, especially conservative Islamic groups, who decry the government falling under the influence of western forces. While some Libyan officials acknowledge privately and confidentially that they know the HIV outbreak was not a deliberate, criminal conspiracy they have not found a way to manage the situation in a way that protects the Libyan regime from damaging criticism. The cognitive dissonance on HIV awareness makes it extremely difficult to manage public opinion that prevents a quick solution in the Medics case.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI170

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI170 aka Wikileaks id #97224 ?
Subject	LIBYA: AISHA GADHAFI IN THE BLACK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 19 Feb 2007 16:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/02/07TRIPOLI170.html
References	06TRIPOLI198
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1365
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0170/01 0501647
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191647Z FEB 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1847
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2097
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0428
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0653
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0564
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0142
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0310
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0147
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000170

SIPDIS
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/7/2017
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: AISHA GADHAFI IN THE BLACK

REF: 06 TRIPOLI 198

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, POL/ECON Counselor, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Despite claiming to be a charitable NGO that provides disaster assistance in sub-Saharan Africa and support to Libyan women while promoting traditional Islamic values, Dr. Aisha Muammar Al-Gadhafi's Wa'atassemo Charity Society is primarily an outlet for Gadhafi's oldest daughter to have her picture taken and pursue her own business interests (see reftel). Wa'atassemo's 12 employees appear to spend nearly all of their time organizing business conferences -- only some of which actually happen. Wa'atassemo sees itself as an intermediary between government and business and believes that by extracting concessions from foreign companies looking to do

business in Libya it can further Aisha Gadhafi's unclear development agenda. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) Wa'atassemo Foundation Director of Events Abdulnasser Al-Najah and Public Relations Manager Mohammed Al-Hawari met with Poloff on February 6 to discuss Waatasemo's current projects. Over the last two years, Emboffs have made repeated requests to meet with Waatasemo to learn more about civil society and propose cooperative activities promoting MEPI objectives. Until now, Embassy has never been granted a meeting and only was able to learn about Waatassemo projects after the fact. According to promotional literature, Aisha Gadhafi created the Wa'atassemo Foundation in 2002 as a charitable non-government organization (NGO) promoting traditional Islamic values that would provide disaster assistance in sub-Saharan Africa and also assistance to marginalized social groups, particularly women and children, within Libya. The Foundation employs 12 "active" employees, which apparently includes only event planning and support staff. (An additional 30 "inactive" employees are also on the Wa'atassemo payroll.) Aisha Gadhafi maintains an office at the Wa'atassemo headquarters but leaves the day-to-day running to Executive Director Ahmad Kajman. Kajman is the only Wa'atassemo staff member with any access to Aisha. Embassy believes that with a shift to add business development activities to the agenda, the organization is now more open to talking with us to learn about potential commercial partners. Asked what the word, "Wa'atassemo" meant, our interlocutors did not know the origin of the name. Subsequent research turned up the phrase, "Wat'asimu bihablillahi jami'un, wa la tararraqu," reportedly a well-known Quran quotation that translates as, "And cling to the rope of Allah, and do not divide," admonishing all Muslims to stand together. While in the past Aisha was known to dress western-style and dye her hair blonde, since forming Wa'atassemo she has appeared in public in conservative Islamic-style long, black robes with her dark hair covered by a scarf; literally in the black.

¶3. (C) Asked about Wa'atassemo's current projects, Al-Najah mentioned four business conferences scheduled for 2007, including a banking and finance conference for foreign executives in March. Al-Najah said Wa'atassemo acts as an intermediary between the GOL and the business community -- facilitating visas, planning conferences, and hosting events. It does not do any projects of its own. Al-Najah said Wa'atassemo promotes social development in Libya by stressing to foreign companies their own social responsibility requirements. Al-Najah was unable to connect Wa'atassemo's conference planning with charitable work of any kind. Asked specifically about charitable work, he showed Poloff numerous pictures of Aisha Gadhafi receiving awards for sponsoring a Quran memorization contest for Muslim women. (NOTE: Al-Najah is a former RevCom member who speaks proudly of his 12 years working in the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) Office of Protocol.)

¶4. (C) Both Al-Najah and Al-Hawari repeatedly mentioned that they could accomplish things in Libya for foreign business with the help of "Dr. Aisha" and her personal influence. Underscoring this point, Poloff ran into Al-Hawari on February 7 at the Libya Telecom and Technology headquarters. Al-Hawari said the Wa'atassemo office had a problem with its internet connection but that he insisted at first on fixing it "the right way" rather than by calling in his connections. However, after waiting for about three minutes, Al-Hawari's cell phone rang, he wrote down a name on a piece of paper, showed the paper to a receptionist, and smiled to Poloff as he was whisked into a back room, bypassing all the lines.

¶5. (C) COMMENT. Aisha last garnered international attention when she signed on to the legal consultancy supporting the defense of Saddam Hussein and she made remarks to the press denouncing the imprisonment and trial of Hussein (clearly,

seeing a deposed dictator put on trial hits close to home for her). In addition to using Wa'atassemo to promote her public profile and personal interests, Aisha Gadhafi continues to use Wa'atassemo to pursue her own business adventures. Wa'atassemo's 2007 conference schedule -- and therefore, Aisha's interest -- runs the gamut from banking to transportation to telecommunications to, of course, petroleum. Al-Najah's comments illustrate the easiest way for a well-connected Gadhafi to make money in Libya -- wring it out of legitimate foreign businesses trying to operate here through "facilitation" fees. With Aisha and Wa'atassemo focused squarely on business ventures, while dabbling at charitable work, Libya still suffers from a lack of legitimate NGOs. END COMMENT.

¶6. (U) Bio Note: Aisha, married to a the son of a regime insider in 2006, recently gave birth to a son. Embassy was invited to send a representative to a celebration hosted by Safia Qadhafi at the Bab al-Azizia compound in Tripoli for wives of Ambassadors and prominent Libyan families. Guests at the party reported that the child was born in London, although the exact date was unknown.

CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI397

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI397 aka Wikileaks id #105417 ?
Subject	BEARISH: LIBYAN STOCK MARKET LUMBERING ALONG SLOWLY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 23 Apr 2007 17:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/04/07TRIPOLI397.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI274
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4034
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0397/01 1131742
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231742Z APR 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2164
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0493
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0252
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0446
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0755
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0277
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0185
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2474
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000397

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: BEARISH: LIBYAN STOCK MARKET LUMBERING ALONG SLOWLY

¶1. (SBU) Last month Libyan authorities announced the launch of Libya's stock market (the Libyan Stock Exchange Market, or LSEM) on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the Jamahiriya (or "state of the masses") with the unveiling of Moammar al-Qadhafi's Green Book. This seemed an odd pairing, given that the cocktail of socialist economic admonitions found in the second volume of the Green Book ("The Economic Basis of the Third Universal Theory") are not obviously compatible with the form and function of stock markets. It was also yet another widely-hyped announcement for an entity which has been difficult to quantify since its purported formation in 2004, and subsequent "launching" announcements each year since. Adding to the confusion, conflicting official statements alternate the LSEM's headquarters location between Tripoli and Benghazi in different announcements.

different announcements.

"Like Starting a Stock Exchange on the Moon"

¶2. (SBU) In an effort to cut through the confusion, Econoff sat down on April 5 with a U.S. contractor who provides LSEM consulting support. This source, with twelve years of experience working as a consultant to numerous governments establishing their own stock markets, was just finishing his first visit to Libya. During his visit, he had delivered remarks at an Arab Stock Exchange conference in Benghazi, which he described as well attended and professionally organized.

¶3. (SBU) The LSEM intends to draw from regional models -- the stock markets in Egypt, Jordan and Morocco -- to develop its own set of procedures and regulations. Source described the LSEM's most pressing requirement as the selection and implementation of a computerized trading and settlement system, which will be issued as a tender to a select group of bidders in the coming months. There are currently no established rules and regulations for the LSEM, no set procedures for registering companies and no mechanism for issuing stocks. There are also no brokers or brokerage houses, and no companies are truly "listed" with the exchange (Note: Press reports and embassy contacts have indicated that a half-dozen companies were listed with the LSEM, but that seems to reflect planned, vice actual listings accessible to potential investors. End note). Reflecting on the challenges of starting a stock market from scratch in the Libyan operating environment, source commented that it was "like starting a stock exchange on the moon." Despite the daunting task, source noted that there was great enthusiasm on the part of the LSEM staff to set up an effective stock market that would compare favorably to others in the region.

How the LSEM Is Organized

¶4. (SBU) The LSEM currently falls under the auspices of the Secretary of the GPC for Economy, Trade and Investment, and is managed on a day-to-day basis by General Director Suleiman Salem al-Shahomy. It was formally established in Libyan law under General People's Committee Decree Number 34 of 2006. The LSEM currently occupies two facilities, one in Tripoli and the other in Benghazi. The fifteen employees at the Tripoli-based headquarters occupy a modern office located within the premises of the Tripoli International Fairgrounds. The Benghazi office employs about thirty people in brand-new office spaces, and the facilities in both cities conduct basic training on-site for their employees. Despite GOL announcements that the LSEM would be headquartered in Tripoli, Econoff's source surmised that the LSEM would ultimately be headquartered in Benghazi once fully operational. He estimated that it would take another full year until a limited launch of the LSEM, with two or three companies participating, was possible. The launch number might grow if Libyan authorities allow the LSEM to link-up with neighboring stock markets to generate cross-border trading and additional trading options.

¶5. (SBU) Post Comment: The LSEM launch is an integral part of the GOL's National Economic Strategy. It is closely linked with efforts to privatize state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and may become the preferred means by which to broaden the ownership base of hitherto government-owned companies. Saif al-Islam has announced that the government will create investment "portfolios" for Libyan citizens and some speculate that instead of giving people money, the government will give them shares of former SOEs. Comments made last month by the Secretary of the GPC for Economy, Trade and Investment revealed how the LSEM will attempt to bridge the socialist and free market inclinations of

the state. He noted that, "the establishment of the stock exchange market is part of the general restructuring of the Libyan economy...and most importantly, broadening the base of public ownership." The LSEM therefore appears to be a mechanism open Libya to the outside world, privatize SOEs, and serve the social aim of redistributing wealth internally. How well it performs each of these roles will directly impact the other, and the GOL's opaque economic reform process will likely make for continued slow going at the LSEM.

CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI420

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	07TRIPOLI420 aka Wikileaks id #106417 ?
Subject	TEST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 May 2007 09:04 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI420.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2133
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0420 1210904
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010904Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2507
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2192
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000420

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ACOA [Communication Operations and Administration] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism]
SUBJECT: TEST

This is a SIPDIS test cable for TRIPOLI

CECIL
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI421

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI421 aka Wikileaks id #106491 ?
Subject	QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR AFRICAN AND MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 2 May 2007 09:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI421.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

VZCZCXRO2924
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0421/01 1220916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020916Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2193
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2508

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000421

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/30/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR AFRICAN AND MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE IN LIBYA

TRIPOLI 00000421 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In two recent public appearances -- a March 27 Al Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal leaders in Agadez, Niger -- Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi continued his long drift away from the Arab world and worked to portray himself as a distinctly African leader. Speaking just after his decision not to attend the Arab League summit in Riyadh, Qadhafi dismissed Arab leaders as "headed for extinction," declaimed divisions in the Muslim world between Sunni and Shia camps, and called for the resurrection of the tenth century Fatimid Caliphate in North Africa. While better-educated Libyans dismiss Qadhafi's ramblings, many Libyans take the "brother Leader's" calls for Muslim unity seriously and link Qadhafi's comments to sectarian violence in

Iraq. Qadhafi's latest remarks should been seen as ongoing efforts to position himself as an African leader, while at the same time framing himself as a "pure" Muslim leader relentlessly criticizing other Arab governments. END SUMMARY.

QADHAFI LASHES OUT AGAINST ARABS AND CALLS FOR A NEW FATIMID STATE

¶2. (C) Qadhafi's recent public remarks -- a March 27 Al Jazeera interview and a March 31 speech to Tuareg tribal leaders in Agadez, Niger (commemorating the Prophet Muhammad's birthday) -- strongly criticized the Arab League for allowing the United States' to set its agenda and attempting to pit "Arabs against Persians." In addition, Qadhafi spoke out against the division of Muslims into Sunnis and Shiites as a "colonialist plot" to weaken Muslims' political power. Trying to set himself apart as a unifier, when other Muslim leaders focused on divisions, "the Caliphate has nothing to do with religion, and this is a worldly struggle for rule." At the same time, Qadhafi's comments served his continuing interest in trying to counter Saudi influence in Islamic affairs.

¶3. (C) The Agadez speech elaborated on Qadhafi's criticism of the "conspiracy of mobilizing Arabs against Persians" with a convoluted argument that African Muslims are really Shiites and that Africa, not Iran, is the true center of Shia power. Qadhafi claimed many Libyans have Shiite names (they do not) and celebrate Shia holidays, including Ashoura. (NOTE: Ashura is observed in Libya, but as a minor holiday focusing not, as in Iran on the martyrdom of Hussein, but rather on the Prophet Musa's parting of the Red Sea. Children wear costumes and carry effigees. Libyans with whom we have spoken are universally scornful of self-flagellation and other Shiite Ashura practices associated with the seventh century martyrdom of Hussein.) In addition, Qadhafi spoke nostalgically of the 260-year Fatimid reign in North Africa from the tenth to the thirteenth century, describing it as a halcyon period of African Muslim political unity. "The Shiites are North Africa. We will build the modern, second Fatimid state... on the condition that it be free of all the sectarian conflicts and the debate about the Imamate and religious rule" said Qadhafi.

QADHAFI'S CALLS FOR MUSLIM UNITY RESONATE WITH LIBYANS CONCERNED ABOUT IRAQ

¶4. (C) While it is difficult to find a chain of logic in any Qadhafi speech, and there are invariably inaccuracies or unique interpretations, there are always segments that strike a chord with his audience and the broader Libyan population. Though Qadhafi's remarks are easily dismissed in most parts of the Arab world and among most better-educated Libyans, his calls for Muslim and African unity strongly resonate among certain, less worldly segments of Libyan society. Describing the Al Jazeera interview, one Libyan (and LES mission employee) praised Qadhafi as a strong leader willing to stand up to imperialist powers and their Arab puppets. In contrast, an LES who spent much of his life outside Libya rolled his eyes and dismissed Qadhafi as a lunatic. A number of Libyans echoed Qadhafi's sentiment that Sunni-Shia divisions reduce the Muslim world's capacity to respond to foreign powers. However, we have also heard highly educated Libyans expressing visceral hatred for Shiism and recent efforts to project Iranian power into Iraq. Qadhafi's reminder that all Muslims share a single Qu'ran and should return to the text to find the true faith also falls on receptive ears.

¶5. (C) While most Libyans were confused by Qadhafi's comments that all African Arabs are really Shiites, none would criticize "the Leader" to Poloff, instead redirecting the conversation to a defense of Qadhafi's calls for Muslim unity. "Libyans did not know from Sunni and Shia before the U.S. killed Saddam Hussein," one bookstore owner told Poloff. While all Libyans

are (by Libyan government definition) Sunni, Saddam's death and continuing sectarian turmoil in Iraq have created a new awareness in Libya about sectarian division. One taxi driver told Poloff that he had never met a Shiite before Iraqi refugees began to arrive in Libya following the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq.

IMAM MUSA AL-SADR CASE STILL AN OBSTACLE FOR QADHAFI TO OVERCOME

¶6. (C) Libyan thoughts, official and un-official, about Muslim unity are further complicated by the case of Imam Musa al-Sadr, a Lebanese Shia cleric who disappeared in 1978 after traveling from Lebanon to Libya to seek funding from Qadhafi. Sadr's disappearance continues to cast a cloud over Libyan-Lebanese relations that has only slightly dissipated over time. Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri claimed publicly that the Libyan regime is responsible. The Lebanese Charge in Tripoli regularly bemoans being in the Libyan backwater with nothing to do since most Lebanese can not travel here unless they have Libyan sponsors using "wasta" to get exceptional visa issuances. U.S. government officials have inquired about the background and status of the case on numerous occasions and are given the standard response that Sadr departed Libya and disappeared in Italy. We understand that an Italian investigation of Sadr's disappearance was closed without any conclusive results. The Libyans also consider the Sadr issue "case closed" as long as the Lebanese or the Arab League don't put it on the agenda. The cold Libyan relationship warmed slightly during the summer 2006 war in Lebanon, when the Libyan public responded enthusiastically to Hizballah's "resistance" against Israel and the Government jumped on the bandwagon by trying to send humanitarian aid to the Lebanese people.

COMMENT: THE LATEST STEP IN A LONG DRIFT FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO AFRICA

¶7. (C) Qadhafi's latest remarks should be seen in the context of his long drift away from the Arab world and ongoing efforts to position himself as an African leader. His speeches were riddled with anti-Saudi rhetoric, ranging from thinly-veiled criticism of state-sponsored extremism (Wahhabism) to a line that the two holiest places in Islam are actually Mecca and Jerusalem rather than Mecca and Medina. While anti-Saudi sentiment has long been central to Qadhafi's worldview, King Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz's recent successes brokering a Hamas-Fatah power-sharing agreement in Palestine and hosting a productive Arab League summit have clearly rankled. While King Abdullah -- Qadhafi's self-styled nemesis -- has seen his star rise, Qadhafi's own efforts to unite Africans under his leadership are struggling. Qadhafi has been unable to implement a Chad-Sudan ceasefire signed in Tripoli in February 2006; promises to unite Darfur rebels as a step towards a political settlement have stalled, and Qadhafi's "Cen-Sad" organization continues to play a distant second fiddle to the African Union as a coordination mechanism for African foreign policy.

¶8. (C) Qadhafi's seeming defense of Iran in the wake of Arab League attempts to retool the Iraqi constitution in favor of Iraqi Sunnis may have more to do with personal antipathy towards Arab leaders than any great support for Iran. Though GOL interlocutors frequently claim that the United States did not appropriately reward Libya for renouncing WMD and terrorism, and therefore Iran has no incentive to dismantle its own nuclear program, Qadhafi's latest ramblings are more contemptuous of the Arab League than supportive of Iran's nuclear ambitions. END COMMENT.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI422

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI422 aka Wikileaks id #106492 ?
Subject	LIBYA ENACTS, THEN RETRACTS, BAN ON WOMEN TRAVELING ABROAD WITHOUT MALE ESCORT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 2 May 2007 09:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI422.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2929
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0422/01 1220916
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020916Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2195
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2510
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000422

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/2/2017
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KSOCI, KWMN *[Women Issues]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ENACTS, THEN RETRACTS, BAN ON WOMEN TRAVELING ABROAD
WITHOUT MALE ESCORT

TRIPOLI 00000422 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. SUMMARY. (C) In late February 2007, Libyans started talking about a new law that prohibited women under the age of 40 traveling abroad unless escorted by their husband, father or brother, although there was conflicting information about the source of the "law" or the scope of implementation. After a couple weeks, the government clarified that it was a regulation, not a law. After another short time, there was an announcement that the regulation was retracted. As a case study of Libyan governance, the ban demonstrated the shifting character of power structures and the way that citizens adapt to ambiguities and change. It also revealed the level of misinformation and misunderstanding that prevails in Libya at any time. SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) In late February, Libyans started talking about a new law that prohibited women under the age of 40 traveling abroad unless escorted by their husband, father or brother. Emboffs starting collecting information from friends and colleagues, but there was no consistent pattern among interlocutors' experiences. Some women reported they traveled through airport immigration with no problems, while other women reported that they were turned away at airport immigration and told they could not leave under a "new law." Some people said there was a law, some people said there was a regulation, and some people said government officials were acting on their own authority to impose personal beliefs. March 10, the Jamahiriya News Agency released information that the Secretariat of the General People's Committee (GPC) reported in its website that its decision banning Libyan women under the age of 40 from traveling abroad unless they are escorted by a close relative was a regulatory measure. "This measure aims at drafting the necessary regulations to avoid some negativity accompanied unnecessary Libyan girls travel who fell victims of criminal networks abroad," the GPC said. According to the Libyan press, "the GPC explained that the new procedure wasn't an obstacle to the travel of Libyan women who, recognized from all over the world, were leaders in judicial, legal and political professions." In yet more twisted logic, the Libyan rationale continued, "it doesn't affect freedom existing in the legislations." "It is like the control of Libyan officials to travel abroad or foreign nationals to enter Libya," the GPC elaborated. It is true that all Libyan officials, male or female, must have written approval to travel abroad. Embassy cooperative programming has faced long delays or cancellations as working level officials wait to get written approval from the Foreign Minister-equivalent for their participation in bilateral export control, scientific engagement or other activities.

¶3. (C) P/E Chief sent out emails to a broad range of women asking for their experiences and got back only two brief responses, one from a woman who just returned from an uneventful trip overseas, and another from a friend who said she had been asked to show authorization papers from her husband when trying to depart Libya via Tripoli International Airport. One contact wouldn't even respond to an email soliciting information on whether or not the press clip might be accurate. She knew that all emails were monitored and so showed up unannounced, without even phoning for an appointment, to try and put the prohibition in context. She was apologetic in tone, saying, "you must understand, we can't control these things." She then tried to rationalize that since Saudi Arabia and other Muslim countries had these restrictions and even more stringent laws about women's conduct in place for a long time, therefore the Libyan law was a natural and appropriate progression. Her response to the "two wrongs don't make a right" comeback was that she agreed personally that the law was wrong, but in Libya, no one had the power to initiate any change. She said she would comply with the regulation, as she chose to wear hijab, because she believed that it made her safer and in closer compliance with Islam as she interpreted the religion.

¶4. (C) In context of the Jamahiriya or "state of the masses" governance in Libya, in theory this law could not have been introduced without the participation of all women through their basic people's congresses, general people's committees and the General People's Congress. Most Libyans, when asked about the unexpected law, admitted that direct democracy did not really exist in Libya and the law had not been proposed, debated, or legislated by the General People's Congress. One Libyan said, "you have to understand, if any woman goes to a basic people's committee meeting she gets a bad reputation; women are not supposed to play an active role here." This analysis was from a highly educated, U.S. passport holder who has lived in America for a number of years and now works for a western company in Libya. She said, "women here do the best they can within constraints, they don't have any choice except to accept what

happens to them," Asked about the potential for civil society action, engagement in the political process, intercessions to influential policy makers, or advocacy through husbands, fathers and brothers, she said, "none of that will happen in Libya, but if outside countries forced Libya to change the law, women would be very grateful."

¶5. (C) Another contact took great pleasure in noting that Aisha Qadhafi, the "Leader's" daughter, traveled frequently outside Libya without a male family member when she was still single. A local lawyer said she heard of a group of Libyan business women traveling to a conference in Italy that were denied exit at passport control by Libyan officials. Asked on what authority they were denied permission to travel, the officials said they didn't have any specific citations, but they had "heard" it was no longer permissible for women to travel alone. As the rumor mill churned, there was endless speculation about why the regulation was enacted. Some people claimed that a prominent family's female relative had been assaulted at a Cairo nightclub, some claimed a group of Libyan women had engaged in "scandalous" behavior outside Libya that was embarassing to the regime and therefore more controls were put in place.

¶6. (C) As the prohibition continued to be a topic of local conversation, and the international press started printing stories, the origin and scope of the law/regulation became even more vague. Ahmed Fituri, the Secretary of American Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, when asked about the law said, "don't worry, this won't last, it will go away." Even senior Libyan government officials couldn't hold up the fig leaf of direct democracy, admitting that there was a disconnect somewhere and it would be fixed. Women who agreed that the "law" was wrong did not organize any bold actions to seek repeal. Rather than engaging directly to affect a change to the law, women used personal connections to avoid implementation. The word went out that the "law" was repealed, though the process was unclear.

¶7. (C) Embassy sponsored a reception at the end of March to celebrate International Women's Day and asked contacts what had happened to the "regulatory measure." It seems that a small group of women with legal practices or other professional positions had gathered in a local hotel conference room to plan how to lobby with senior Libyan officials through personal connections. They planned to use the international press to draw further attention to the disconnect between the Libyan theory of direct democracy and government practices. That information, conveyed directly to regime insiders through personal connections was enough to make the ban "go away," as Fituri predicted.

¶8. (C) COMMENT. Governance here truly is a Jamahiriya, or "state of the masses." It just depends on who among the masses has the ear of the leader (Qadhafi) or other key officials at any one time. As a case study, this example of governance revealed the level of misinformation and misunderstanding that prevails in Libya at anytime. It also demonstrates the shifting character of power structures and the way citizens adapt to ambiguities and change. People rely heavily on word-of-mouth for information; not even officials implementing the law or regulation seemed to have an authoritative source. At first, it was not even clear if the ban was a law or a regulation. Libyans are used to working the system, and women managed to find the right pressure points to achieve their objectives. As a start-up Embassy, our staff are also engaged in finding the right points of contact to implement our mission objectives. The level of misinformation and misunderstanding of issues presents another level of challenge as we pursue our

transformational diplomacy agenda. END COMMENT.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI426

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI426 aka Wikileaks id #106655 ?
Subject	DRAMATIC STATEMENTS ABOUT HIV INFECTIONS AND MEDICS TRIAL CONTINUE IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 May 2007 11:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI426.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI474
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

infections in Libya. Libyan papers continue to print "public opinion" pieces that have no attributions but express outrage against the foreign medical staff who allegedly injected over 400 Libyan children in a Benghazi hospital with the HIV virus in 1998. The accused Palestinian and Bulgarians are currently waiting for a Supreme Court decision on the appeal of the guilty verdict and death sentence in their trial. The decision is due before May 17, although an exact date is not determined, according to the Bulgarian Embassy. This is the second time they have been sentenced to death. The Supreme court overturned a previous death sentence and remanded the case for retrial. The press articles consistently blame the Palestinian doctor and Bulgarian nurses, along with foreign intelligence services including the CIA and Mossad, for deliberating infecting the children with HIV.

¶3. (SBU) Although international legal experts have grave concerns about the court process and quality of evidence, the Libyan press continues to insist that their judicial system is sacrosanct. The articles also claim that the international community's concern over the case reflects racism because they claim, if the children were American or European, no one would have questioned the court decision. The following quote is typical of most articles: "The West wants this case to be about the five Bulgarian nurses and not the hundreds of children. All this happened since no one cares about Arab children. The world, with its human rights, charitable and political organizations, is reduced to silence only because these children and mothers are Libyans and not Scandinavians or North Americans."

¶4. (SBU) Particularly inflammatory was an article in al-Jamahiriya newspaper that published pictures of many Libyan children infected with the HIV virus with the following headline, "our children did not come from Mars, and their blood isn't sewage water. Anyone trying to question this trial is guilty as well. The crime of injecting Libyan children with AIDS is a crime against humanity and not just a case of Bulgarian nurses." Many of the articles claim that anyone who questions the court's guilty verdict must have played an integral role in the crime. Some typical quotes include:

"Any entity or any country trying to raise doubts about this case is not innocent of this crime;"
"Intelligence services and parties involved in this crime are those who push for questioning justice in the case of those victim children;"
"Those objecting to the case are suspect characters who are loyal to the intelligence services of those countries involved in the case;" and

"Anyone trying to question this case is an active player in the crime and bears responsibility."

The "public opinion" pieces also claim consistently that it would only be fair for the families of the victims to seek proper compensation for the crime; that the deliberate infections are a crime against humanity that require blood money.

¶5. (C) While the Libyan government gives assurances that is is working to find a resolution to the case, and some officials admit in private that they know that infections were not a deliberate, criminal act, there are no public signs of trying to educate the Libyan population or shift public opinion. In contrast, there seems to be an effort to maximize public outrage to create nationalist sentiment against "outside influences." The Libyan government will have to use some twisted explanation when a settlement is finally reached. There are many precedents for unusual logic in Libya. In April, Qadhafi gave public remarks that could be interpreted to say that Libya did not really pay the Lockerbie settlement for the Pan-Am 103 bombing, but instead U.S. companies paid for the Lockerbie settlement by purchasing Libyan oil. Similarly, the official Libyan stance is that the Operation El Dorado Canyon air strikes on Libya in 1986 were a U.S. failure and that Libya won against the "American aggression" by surviving the bombing raid.

¶6. (C) One sign that there might be a shift in the Libyan insistence that the medical personnel are guilty and that compensation must be paid can be found in a recent press statement from the group representing the infected Libyans

statement from the group representing the infected Libyans. The statement of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Civil Society for the Care of the Infected Children organization was released via the internet and not through the local papers, so it would not have wide circulation in Libya. Therefore, the intended audience is the international community.

The statement says that the families of the Libyan victims value EU Commissioner for External Relations Ferrero's (sic) initiatives on behalf of the Benghazi children. It also expresses appreciation for the efforts by the German government as the current EU chair. It also noted that the UK, while acting as the EU chair, worked to set up the Benghazi International Support Fund and initiated a dialogue with the victim's families through the Qadhafi Development Foundation. It emphasizes its appreciation for "representatives of the international community that have shown all respect for the feelings of the families and understanding of what their children have suffered through this humanitarian tragedy and respect for the justice of their situation." Whereas most previous statements have focused strongly on compensation and retribution, this press release emphasizes appreciation for people who empathize with the infected children. The release is signed by Omar al-Kilani al-Mismari and Idris Hamad Lagha as "representatives of the families of the Libyan Child Victims of the AIDS Disaster."

¶7. (C) At the same time, the press statement calls attention to a scientific study issued in the U.S. It says, "the children's families appeal to the Arab and international scientific and legal community to take greater interest in the new scientific studies by specialists from the Biotechnology Center of South Carolina and from the American Calvin University which reveal more evidence about what happened in Benghazi Children's Hospital in 1998. Libyans are using the new study released in South Carolina to support their claim that the infections must have been deliberate. In contrast, world-renowned HIV experts dismiss the study as "scientific drivel", but unfortunately, the Libyans are claiming that since the study comes from the U.S. it must be authoritative proof of the medics' guilt. The Libyan Medical Board is particularly sensitive to criticism that the infections were spread by poor sanitation and medical practice. Since the South Carolina study concludes that it would be unusual for an infection to be spread by poor sanitation in only one hospital, the Libyans are using the study to exonerate themselves of accusations of poor sanitation across the board.

¶8. (C) COMMENT. We are not familiar with the "Biotechnology Center of South Carolina" or the "American Calvin University." If they exist and have issued such a study, it is unfortunate that the U.S. scientific community is being used by the Libyan medical establishment to refute independent studies by the world's leading HIV experts that the infections developed and spread through the patient population in a manner inconsistent with deliberate criminal intent, but similar to outbreaks in hospital populations in other countries such as Romania. That

only makes it more difficult to hope for a ruling by the Libyan appeals courts that the case should be thrown out based on scientific evidence. It is widely anticipated that the Supreme Court will confirm the guilty verdict and death sentence sometime before May 17. Embassy expects that there will be another upsurge of Libyan press statements dramatizing the suffering of the Libyans with HIV and AIDs at that time. At the same time, the ongoing defamation cases against the medics brought by the security officials schedule for another hearing about May 6. It is widely anticipated that the medics will be found guilty of defaming Libyan security by claiming that they were tortured while in police custody. If, as expected, the guilty verdicts in the infection case are upheld by the Supreme Court then the Libyan Higher Judicial Council will consider the verdicts. The Higher Judicial Council includes Libyan "cabinet" officials as well as judicial officers and would be the mechanism to arrange some way for the medics to depart Libya.
END COMMENT.
GOLDRICH

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI436

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI436 aka Wikileaks id #106832 ?
Subject	LIBYA: DARFUR CONFERENCE ATMOSPHERICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 4 May 2007 12:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI436.html
Referenced by	07NDJAMENA410
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5616
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0436/01 1241202
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041202Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2217
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2532
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000436

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/4/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: DARFUR CONFERENCE ATMOSPHERICS

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 417

TRIPOLI 00000436 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Ethan Goldrich, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A Libyan-organized conference on Darfur April 28-29 was a substantive success (Reftel), but the scheduling challenges posed by a last minute decision by the Leader to fly all delegates to Sirte to meet with him exemplify the capricious environment in which even Libya's most senior diplomats operate.
African Affairs Secretary Ali Treiki pulled out all stops, organizing the conference in Tripoli's most expensive venue, the Corinthia Hotel, and bedecking it with all the trappings (flags, signs, simultaneous translation in three languages etc.), but

had to smile his way through an eight hour delay in start time (from 3 p.m. to 11 p.m.) in order to fly all conferees to Sirte and back, with a lengthy delay in Sirt waiting for the Leader. Once the conference actually started, most delegations expressed satisfaction with Libya's role as host, though the Sirte misadventure and ever-shifting schedule could make many think twice before attending another conference in Libya. END SUMMARY.

CONFERENCE START DELAYED TO ACCOMMODATE SIRT DIVERSION

¶2. (C) Treki informed early-arriving delegates, including UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson and AU Representative Salim Ahmed Salim, on April 27 that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi had invited visiting delegations to Sirte the following day. Treki told delegates that buses would leave from the Corinthia Hotel for the airport at 1030. When buses showed up at 1115, Protocol had to scramble to find the approximately 100 delegates. Delegates left the hotel around 1145, arrived at Tripoli airport at 1215, and eventually boarded a chartered Libyan Airbus A-300 named "Qardabia." (Note: The airplane was named after an early 20th century battle with the Italians that was coincidentally being commemorated in Sirte that day and was the proximate reason for the Leader's absence from Tripoli. The delegates had time to reflect on this historical coincidence as the sat on the tarmac for another hour before finally arriving in Sirte around 1400. End Note.)

¶3. (C) In Sirte delegates were shown two reservoirs and a variety of pipes belonging to the Great Manmade River Project, before being fed a large lunch in a reservoir-side tent. After lunch delegates discovered that while the Great Man Made River has many pipes, none in the vicinity of the reservoir led to toilet facilities. They then endured an additional two hour wait until the Libyan Leader arrived and gave a twenty minute talk to the attendees.

QADHAFI LECTURES FOREIGN DELEGATIONS NOT TO OVEREMPHASIZE DARFUR

¶4. (C) Qadhafi stressed familiar themes during his 20 minute lecture to the delegates, claiming that there are more serious conflicts in the world than Darfur, and questioning the motives of the international community for drawing so much attention to it. African problems require African solutions, said the Libyan leader. Qadhafi cast scorn on the Darfur rebels as well as on UN peacekeeping troops, alluding to reports of their sexual misconduct in other countries. He concluded by thanking the delegates for their interest. UN Special Envoy Jan Eliasson presented a five-minute response on behalf of the international community in which he pointed out that the Darfur conflict threatens both regional and global security.

STRONG LEADERSHIP FROM DIPLOMAT TREKI KEEPS CONFERENCE ON TRACK

¶5. (C) Though the delegates were clearly annoyed and exhausted by the Sirte delay, once the conference finally began at 2300 in Tripoli most delegations expressed satisfaction at the professional caliber of the proceedings. (Comment: Had the conference started at 1500 as originally planned, they might actually have been impressed by the Libyans' ability to organize the event. Instead they were left with the mixed impression of professionals like Ali Treki trying to run a serious conference, even as the Libyan Leader undermined efforts by capriciously inserting himself into the event in as time-consuming a way as possible. End Comment.) A detailed discussion of conference proceedings is reported ref A.

LIBYAN PRESS: QADHAFI URGES RECALCITRANT LEADERS TO HELP AFRICA

¶6. (C) Libyan press did their best to spin the Sirt meeting as Qadhafi's valiant attempt to urge recalcitrant foreign leaders to do more to stop the violence in Darfur. Press accounts hailed Qadhafi's leadership in keeping foreign troops out of

Africa and criticized efforts by the international community to deploy UN peacekeepers to Darfur. The Libyan state-run press agency "quoted" a significantly mangled text of the conference

TRIPOLI 00000436 002.2 OF 002

conclusions, deleting a carefully negotiated mention of the transition to a UN/AU hybrid operation and adding repeated references to the international community's appreciation for "brother Leader's" leadership of the Africa dossier.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI474

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI474 aka Wikileaks id #108860 ?
Subject	LIBYA: MEDICS DEFAMATION CASE DECISION DUE MAY 27, SUPREME COURT APPEAL DECISION LIKELY TO BE DELAYED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 18 May 2007 14:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI474.html
References	07TRIPOLI426
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9820
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0474/01 1381434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181434Z MAY 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2252
INFO HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0625
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0133
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA 0124
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0044
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0764
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0259
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2577
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000474

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/9/2017
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , BU *[Bulgaria]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: MEDICS DEFAMATION CASE DECISION DUE MAY 27, SUPREME COURT APPEAL DECISION LIKELY TO BE DELAYED

REF: TRIPOLI 426

CLASSIFIED BY: Elizabeth Fritschle, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. All signs indicate the six foreign health workers accused of intentionally infecting over 400 Benghazi children with HIV/AIDS in 1999 will be convicted on May 27 of defaming two Libyan police officers they accused of torture (a

defaming two Libyan police officers they accused of torture (a separate case from the main criminal case). The Bulgarian Embassy reports that since the Supreme Court has yet to schedule a first hearing of the medics' appeal to their December 19, 2006 conviction in the criminal case, a Supreme Court verdict is still at least seven weeks away. (Libyan officials had originally predicted a Supreme Court decision by March.) The Bulgarian Embassy is cautiously optimistic that the Supreme Court delay coincided with a high-level May 10 EU meeting aimed at finding a political way for the medics to return home. The prosecution prepared a case file for Supreme Court review recommending the higher court confirm the guilty verdict, raise the court-ordered compensation for the victims' families, and order a new trial in the secondary charges of money laundering and alcohol consumption. Once the Supreme Court sets a date to hear the appeal, it can confirm or overturn the verdict or order a new criminal trial heard directly by the Supreme Court. Inflammatory press coverage continues and rose to a new level on May 9 when the GOL circulated a diplomatic note to foreign missions claiming that a Mossad agent developed a romantic relationship with one of the nurses and paid her to infect the children. END SUMMARY.

DEFAMATION VERDICT DELAYED UNTIL MAY 27

¶2. (C) Dmitar Dmitrov, point man on the nurses case for the Bulgarian Embassy in Tripoli told Poloff that Bulgaria expects a guilty verdict in the defamation case on May 27. (NOTE: This case is separate from the main criminal case against the medics.) Since two Libyan police officers filed suit in the Souq al-Juma'a municipal court in Tripoli on February 11 alleging that the medics intentionally made false statements accusing the officers of torture, the court has held seven hearings in the defamation case. All hearings have taken place at the maximum security Ayn Zara prison. (NOTE: The prison houses almost exclusively political prisoners. END NOTE.) At the latest May 6 hearing, the municipal court judge announced the court would delay its verdict on the defamation charges until May 27.

¶3. (C) While Bulgaria believes the police officers are at least partially concerned about their reputation, financial motives also underlie the defamation case. In addition, state prosecutors have successfully used the defamation case to introduce new evidence into the ongoing criminal trial; specifically, prosecutors have introduced a "Biotechnology Center of South Carolina" study reported reftel as new evidence of the medics' guilt in the criminal case.

¶4. (C) The five Bulgarian medics and Palestinian physician attended the first five defamation hearings; however, the medics were not provided with interpretation and were not allowed to address the court. At one point, the plaintiff's attorney asked the medics if they had intentionally lied that their confessions were obtained under torture. Several medics attempted to respond, but the judge quickly cut them off. Though the medics' defense attorney Othman Bizanti believes Libyan law requires the defendants to be present during a civil trial for the verdict to be valid, the court did not object to the medics' decision not to attend the last two hearings.

SUPREME COURT RULING AT LEAST SEVEN WEEKS AWAY

¶5. (C) According to Dmitrov, the Supreme Court ruling in the criminal case is at least seven weeks away. According to Libyan law, the prosecution must prepare a dossier for the Supreme Court containing arguments and evidence from the criminal trial, including statements from the prosecution, victims' families, and defendants. Once the prosecution completes the dossier, the Supreme Court will fix a date for a first hearing approximately three weeks later. During the hearing, lawyers for the prosecution, victims' families, and defendants will give oral arguments summarizing their cases but will not be allowed to

present new evidence or call witnesses. The Supreme Court will

then adjourn for four weeks to review the case.

¶6. (C) The Supreme Court can then accept the prosecution's recommendation and uphold the conviction, grant the medics' appeal and throw out the case, or order a new criminal trial at the Supreme Court level if it has any doubts about the prosecution's position. If the Supreme Court orders a new criminal trial, the Supreme Court would hear all the evidence and witnesses again, likely delaying the verdict for months. The Supreme Court does not have the legal authority to remand the case to a lower court.

¶7. (C) Dmitrov told Poloff the prosecution finished its dossier on April 15. The dossier contains the prosecution's recommendations to confirm the guilty verdict in the criminal case, increase the compensation figures to the victims' families noted in the December 19 verdict, and order a new trial on the secondary charges of money laundering and alcohol consumption. Almost a month has passed since the prosecution forwarded its document to the Supreme Court without the Court scheduling a hearing. Bulgaria sees the Supreme Court's delay as a positive sign that the GOL is waiting to see the outcome of ongoing high-level EU diplomatic efforts.

SUPREME COURT COULD RAISE COURT-ORDERED COMPENSATION PAYMENTS

¶8. (C) There are still two possible mechanisms for the victims' families to receive compensation -- a court-ordered judgment or an out-of-court settlement directly with the medics. The first option would see the Supreme Court, assuming it confirms the guilty verdict, either affirm or raise the compensation figures spelled out in the December 19 ruling. (NOTE: In its recommendation to the Supreme Court, which has not been made public, the prosecution recommends the Supreme Court revise upwards. END NOTE.) An out-of-court settlement between the defendants and the victims' families is also still possible. According to defense lawyer Othman Bizanti, Libyan criminal law allows for a "blood money" payment to reduce the medics' sentence from death to life in prison. The defendants' lawyer believes the law does not/not allow the medics to go free in exchange for blood money.

¶9. (C) According to Dmitrov, the criminal court's December 19 verdict specified compensation figures for 348 families, ranging from 350,000 LD to almost 1 million LD. Dmitrov estimates the total cost of the December 19 compensation package at 104 million LD -- a "reasonable figure" for Bulgaria and the EU to manage (i.e. via the Benghazi International Fund). While victims' families have at various points agreed to abide by court decisions on compensation, most families continue to campaign publicly for a larger settlement. They frequently cite the $10 million phased settlement to Lockerbie victims' families, although local press does not circulate information that the final tranche of the settlement was not paid when Libya was not removed from the State Sponsors of Terrorism List by the specified date.

BULGARIA UPBEAT ON EU DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS

¶10. (C) Bulgaria continues to hope for sustained, high-level EU pressure throughout the Supreme Court process. Dmitrov noted cautious optimism that the Supreme Court's refusal to set a date for its first hearing coincided with high-level talks sponsored by the EU Commission for External Relations on May 10. While the Bulgarian Embassy in Tripoli had no information about the specifics of the EU-led discussions, Bulgaria remains hopeful EU diplomatic efforts will find a political solution independent of the Supreme Court procedure. Nevertheless, Dmitrov noted

the Supreme Court procedure. Nevertheless, Dmitrov noted constant GOL indignation over allegations its judiciary is not fully independent, therefore suggesting the Supreme Court will likely proceed with a hearing irrespective of European progress on the political front. In addition, Dmitrov noted the EU resident representative in Tunis and the UK Ambassador in Tripoli (acting on behalf of the UK's EU Presidency) visited the medics in prison on May 6 in a quiet show of support. (NOTE: The UK Ambassador in Tripoli also attended the May 10 Brussels meeting. END NOTE.)

INFLAMMATORY PRESS COVERAGE GAINS NEW LEGITIMACY

¶11. (C) As reported reftel, inflammatory press coverage of the medics trial continues, linking the case with a foreign intelligence plot against Libya and threatening that anyone who questions the integrity of the Libyan judicial process shares

TRIPOLI 00000474 003 OF 003

the medics' guilt. Widely circulated conspiracy theories gained new legitimacy on May 9 when the GOL distributed a particularly vitriolic article to foreign Embassies under cover of a diplomatic note. The article, reportedly from the "Al Madar" weekly newspaper, alleges that Bulgarian intelligence services and Mossad collaborated to seduce one of the medics in an unnamed Mediterranean capital "not far from Libya." The article says that a Mossad agent developed a romantic relationship with the medic and paid her to infect the Benghazi children.

¶12. (C) According to the dipnote, "Al Madar" is a weekly Iraqi newspaper operating under British license but distributed in Syria. Ali Al Jafal, a "Shiite Iraqi," is listed at the newspaper's editor, while Syrian journalist Moeen Ibrahim is the managing editor. The dipnote also mentions two other names: "Mohamed al Miah, Shiite, he was formerly the Editorial Manager of the Iraqi Revolution Newspaper during Saddam Hussein era, and Abdul Mohsin Attiah, an Iraqi Journalist, Shiite." The note also states that the newspaper is "supportive to the Iraqi resistance."

BULGARIAN EMBASSY STRATEGY FOR DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

¶13. (C) Dmitrov advised that any visible U.S. role in the last weeks of the defamation case, including attendance at the May 27 verdict, would only allow the GOL to spin U.S. presence to bolster the trial's legitimacy. The Bulgarian Embassy expects the GOL might bus the diplomatic corps to the Supreme Court verdict as it did with the December 19 verdict announcement. Bulgaria said that the EU Ambassadors were supporting its efforts and noted UK Ambassador's May 6 visit official prison visit to the medics. Dmitrov asked for the U.S. to continue raising the medics case as part of its bilateral engagements with Libya.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI487

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	07TRIPOLI487 aka Wikileaks id #109656 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INFECTIOUS DISEASES WORKSHOP ATTEMPTS TO INJECT PROFESSIONALISM INTO HIV/AIDS DEBATE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 24 May 2007 15:33 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07TRIPOLI487.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

infection rate, including methods of prevention, treatment, and increasing education and awareness about the disease. While the UK-based moderators aimed to discuss a national plan of action, the session was highly unstructured and served to give participants a venue to voice any and all thoughts relating to HIV/AIDS, including views on the Bulgarian medics court case.

Intravenous Drug Use Identified As Primary Risk Factor Among Libyans

---

¶3. The more technical conference session, including a presentation from Al-Fateh University on the epidemiology of the HIV infection in Libya, was not as widely attended, with roughly 25 Libyans in the audience. The Faculty of Medicine of Tripoli's Al-Fateh University presented research conducted on 360 HIV patients receiving out-patient care at NCIDCP. Intravenous drug usage was found to be the primary risk factor in contracting HIV in Libya. Of the patients studied, 87 percent were males from 21-40 years of age. The study found that 89 percent of the 360 patients were tobacco smokers, 52 percent hashish smokers, and 45 percent of patients reported alcoholism. The research group concluded that social work is essential to HIV/AIDS patient care and should be implemented in Libyan hospitals.

¶4. NCIDCP's new website can be found at www.nidcc-idsc.org.

¶5. COMMENT. Aside from presentations on HIV/AIDS, the conference put on sessions related to practices of hygiene and sterilization in hospitals, tuberculosis, hepatitis, and avian influenza. The conference included a modest exhibition of medical equipment and a side workshop on human infectious disease surveillance put on by visiting Trilateral Steering and Cooperation Committee's Bio SubCommittee members (US, UK, and Libya). While conference proceedings were not highly-technical or well-attended outside of the Libyan health community, it was a professional first attempt at openly addressing issues of public health. END COMMENT.

CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI641

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI641 aka Wikileaks id #116764 ?
Subject	QADHAFI HOSTS SARKOZY FOLLOWING DEPARTURE OF BULGARIAN NURSES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Jul 2007 15:20 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07TRIPOLI641.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI664 , 07TRIPOLI949 , 08TRIPOLI566
History	First published on Fri, 25 Mar 2011 01:53 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000641
O 261520Z JUL 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2473
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 0150
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2831
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000641

SENSITIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI HOSTS SARKOZY FOLLOWING DEPARTURE OF BULGARIAN NURSES

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Just one day after six foreign health workers accused of intentionally spreading HIV left Libya for Bulgaria, French President Nicholas Sarkozy arrived in Tripoli on July 25 for wide-ranging discussions with Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi. Sarkozy and Qadhafi reportedly discussed construction of a nuclear water desalination plant, as well as enhanced cooperation in immigration, border security, health care, and defense procurement. Unconfirmed press reports claim the two leaders also broached the subject of Darfur. END SUMMARY.

LIBYA-FRANCE MEMORANDUM ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR POWER

¶2. (U) President Sarkozy arrived the day after six foreign medics accused of infecting over 400 Libyan children with HIV departed the country in a French jet accompanied by Mrs. Sarkozy, who reporteldy brokered their release. According to press accounts, Sarkozy and Qadhafi signed an MOU concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear power, committing France to finance construction of a long sought-after nuclear water desalination

construction of a long sought after nuclear water desalination plant in Libya. (NOTE: Senior GOL officials have long lobbied for U.S. financing for a similar project, arguing such a "tangible reward" is necessary to convince the Libyan people of the utility of Libya's renouncing its WMD program. Diplomatic sources in Tripoli say that the Libyans have approached many governments, including France, Russia, China, and South Korea, with requests for both a nuclear desalination plant and a nuclear medicine center. END NOTE.)

¶3. (U) In addition, the two reportedly discussed cooperation to limit the number of illegal migrants across the Mediterranean, including a head of state conference to be held in early 2008. Sarkozy and Qadhafi also discussed French assistance to Libya's health sector, echoing promises contained in a July 23 memorandum (signed by EC Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner) that the EU would upgrade a Benghazi hospital to a regional center of excellence.

¶4. (SBU) Libyan press also reported that Sarkozy and Qadhafi discussed Darfur, just days after Sarkozy reportedly dispatched FM Kouchner to New York to lobby for quicker UNSC action on peacekeeping deployment.

QADHAFI HOLDS MEETING AGAINST BACKDROP OF U.S.-DAMAGED TRIPOLI PALACE

¶5. (SBU) Qadhafi -- accompanied by Prime Minister Al-Mahmoudi, Foreign Minister Shalgham, U/S for European Affairs Obeidi, and U/S for African Affairs Treiki -- met for several hours with Sarkozy and his delegation (which included FM Kouchner and diplomatic adviser Levitte, but not Mrs. Sarkozy) at Qadhafi's Bab Azziziya compound in Tripoli. (NOTE: Part of the compound was damaged by U.S. fighter planes during the April 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon bombing campaign, and the GOL has kept it in its damaged state and erected a statue in front of it displaying a fist crushing a US fighter plane. Libyan media -- and Qadhafi himself -- refer to Operation El Dorado Canyon as "the failed U.S.-Atlantic aggression on the Great Jamahiriyah." END NOTE.) The GOL bussed foreign ambassadors to the compound to meet Qadhafi and Sarkozy and join the state dinner, which was held outside in front of the damaged building. Local papers gave front-page coverage to the Sarkozy visit, including one with the headline: "The Brother Leader Welcomes President Nicolas Sarkozy in front of the House that Remained Standing in the Face of the Failed American-NATO Enmity" (referring to the 1986 bombings of Tripoli). "

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI664

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI664 aka Wikileaks id #117740 ?
Subject	LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 3 Aug 2007 12:38 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/08/07TRIPOLI664.html
References	07TRIPOLI641
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI566
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramS E C R E T   TRIPOLI   00000664
VZCZCXRO0565
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0664/01 2151238
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031238Z AUG 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2505
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA PRIORITY 0153
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0338
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0144
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 2866
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000664

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR RAMCHAND

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/2/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , KPWR *[Power Support Program]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA, FRANCE CONCLUDE "VERY GENERAL" CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL

REF: TRIPOLI 641

TRIPOLI 00000664 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, POL/ECON Counselor, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: According to French diplomats, a civilian nuclear deal concluded between Libya and France during President Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli constitutes only a "very general" framework for future cooperation, with no clear financial commitment from the French side and little expectation from

commitment from the French side and little expectation from either the French or Libyan side that it will be completed soon. President Nicholas Sarkozy is sensitive to and fully engaged on non-proliferation concerns surrounding a nuclear desalinization project discussed within the framework of the MOU. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi focused on plans for a 2008 "Mediterranean Union" head of state conference during two private meetings with Sarkozy, and only briefly raised the case of the Bulgarian medics. High-level Libya-France consultations on Darfur will be reported septel. End summary.

CIVILIAN NUCLEAR MOU: A "VERY GENERAL" FRAMEWORK

¶2. (C) French PolCouns Pierre-Antoine Molina described a civilian nuclear MOU August 1, signed by FMs Kouchner and Shalgham July 25, as only a "very general" framework for future cooperation on civilian nuclear power programs. He stressed that the MOU is in line with previous French policies and emphasized that the impetus for the agreement came directly from President Sarkozy's office, with only marginal involvement by the French MFA. MFA Americas Desk Office Director Muhammad Matari echoed Molina's characterization in a meeting with Pol/Econ Chief August 1, saying the deal was "not very detailed" and provided only a "general roadmap" for cooperation on nuclear programs, to include a nuclear-fueled water desalinization plant.

¶3. (S) Molina described Sarkozy as actively engaged on non-proliferation concerns and recounted steps the French President took to ensure any French involvement in a nuclear-powered water desalinization plant could not be used to help reconstitute Libya's WMD program. Molina said no dual-use technology was under discussion and that the reactor France envisions powering the desalinization plant would include safeguards that prevent it from being reconfigured to produce plutonium. In addition, Sarkozy reportedly insisted on and received assurances that the reactor could be shut down remotely from France.

¶4. (S) Contrary to Libyan press reporting, Molina said the July 25 MOU does not/not commit France to fund construction of the nuclear desalinization facility. Details of France's financial commitment will be resolved during upcoming negotiations involving (on the French side) the MFA, energy officials, and the Areva company, the majority of which is French-owned. The French team does not yet know who will negotiate modalities on behalf of the GOL, although the MFA's Muhammad Matari said it would be MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi. The GOL expressed interest in completing the facility and initiating operations by 2009, but France views this timeline as unrealistic. (Note: 2009 will be the 40th anniversary of the 1969 revolution that brought Qadhafi to power. A slew of high profile infrastructure projects, including new power plants and a major overhaul of the Tripoli International Airport, are underway to help augment the visible benefits of the revolution. End note.) Privately, some GOL officials also acknowledge that completion by 2009 is overly ambitious. Matari conceded to Pol/Econ Chief that "no one realistically expects this to move very quickly." He noted that the deal is "a very complicated subject" that requires "much study" by both sides, and added that the GOL is aware that there are serious European sensitivities involved that could limit France's ability to deliver on the project.

¶5. (C) Molina acknowledged European concerns, chiefly German, about the nuclear agreement, but noted that France's understanding is that Siemens, a 28% stakeholder in Areva, does not have the authority to stop the investment from moving forward. He dismissed publicly-reported calls by German parliamentarians for Siemens to move to block the deal as "grandstanding," but conceded that the nuclear MOU had become a political issue for France and Germany that goes beyond the mechanics of the July 25 Libya-France deal.

QADHAFI, SARKOZY DISCUSS MEDITERRANEAN UNION, IGNORE BULGARIAN MEDICS

¶6. (C) According to Molina, Qadhafi and Sarkozy spent much of their time together discussing Sarkozy's plans to convene a Mediterranean head of state conference in spring 2008 to discuss migration and water management concerns (Reftel contains further details on Sarkozy's visit). The French delegation described Qadhafi as very interested in the Mediterranean Union proposal, but said he voiced serious reservations about inviting Israel's head of state to participate in the proposed conference. Beyond an opening line expressing "anger" at Bulgaria's decision to immediately pardon the six medics upon their return to Sofia July 24, Qadhafi did not discuss the case with Sarkozy. Claiming that the GOL considers the case of the medics to be closed, the MFA's Matari said the GOL tried to focus "exclusively on the positive" during Sarkozy's visit.

¶7. (C) Qadhafi and Sarkozy held two, separate meetings on the night of July 25-26 -- one at Qadhafi's Bab Azizia compound in Tripoli attended by Tripoli's diplomatic corps and a second, more private meeting the same evening at the Corinthia Hotel. According to French diplomats, Sarkozy decided on July 20 to visit Libya. Initially, the Libyans planned to host the visit in Sirt, Qadhafi's desert home about 400km east of Tripoli. The GOL changed the venue four times in five days between Tripoli and Sirt, greatly frustrating Sarkozy's 20-person security advance team.

¶8. (C) Comment: GOL interlocutors at all levels have routinely stressed that "average Libyans" need to see tangible rewards from the U.S. and Europe in response to Libya's 2003 decision to renounce WMD and terrorism. Most have focused on two infrastructure projects -- a nuclear-powered water desalinization plant and a regional nuclear medicine center. Last week's Libya-France agreement to move forward with the water desalinization project will allow the GOL to boast to its domestic audience that it has finally secured one of these long-sought "tangible rewards." Apart from a well-timed public relations coup, though, it remains unclear how much tangible benefit the GOL will actually garner from the agreement. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI834

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	07TRIPOLI834 aka Wikileaks id #123350 ?
Subject	NURSES GONE, BUT LIBYA'S HIV/AIDS WOES CONTINUE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 24 Sep 2007 13:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/09/07TRIPOLI834.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

ÐÏà¡±á>þÿ
þÿÿÿ

TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya] , BG [Bangladesh]
SUBJECT: NURSES GONE, BUT LIBYA'S HIV/AIDS WOES CONTINUE

TRIPOLI 00000834 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State..
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. A lavishly-funded treatment facility constructed exclusively for the 426 infected Benghazi children remains off limits to hundreds of other Libyans in Benghazi currently living with HIV/AIDS, according to a team of American HIV/AIDS experts who visited Libya in mid-September. Though Benghazi doctors are capable of providing a high level of medical care, years of GOL propaganda and an over reliance on treatment abroad have created a lack of public confidence in Libya's ability to treat HIV/AIDS cases at home. Most of the 426 infected Benghazi children have traveled abroad for European government-subsidized medical care, many in the months before the medics' departure as a way to "prevent [the families] from raising their voices." Benghazi professionals criticized Europe's handling of medical assistance, claiming they have offered nothing concrete to Libya's healthcare system and are not willing to work cooperatively with their Libyan counterparts. Most Benghazi doctors still stand by the belief that the six medics are guilty of intentionally infecting 426 children with HIV/AIDS in 1999. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (U) A team from the Baylor College of Medicine Pediatric AIDS Program -- Dr. Mark Kline, Dr. Mike Mizwa, Dr. Gordon Schultze, and NP Nancy Calles -- visited Tripoli and Benghazi on September 16-18 as part of Baylor's ongoing implementation of an MOU concluded with the GOL in 2006. Kline, the U.S. representative on the Benghazi International Fund, and Calles briefed DCM and Poloff on their visit on September 18.

GOOD TREATMENT -- IF YOU CAN GET IT

¶3. (C) According to Kline, a lavishly funded facility designed to provide state-of-the-art care to the 426 Benghazi children, the Benghazi Children's Center (BCC), operates in parallel to the city's health system. The facility houses diagnostic equipment on par with that available in better European hospitals. Medical staff, drawn largely from the larger Benghazi Medical Center or al-Fatah Children's Hospital, receive large GOL stipends to do weekly rounds at the BCC. The BCC's staff include specialists in dentistry and optometry -- disciplines unrelated to the HIV/AIDS cases -- because "other medical facilities have made it clear they won't take the Benghazi children," forcing them to seek all medical care in this high-quality yet segregated facility.

¶4. (C) Though Kline is optimistic that the 1999 Benghazi outbreak will eventually spark some positive spillovers into the larger medical community, there is little evidence to suggest such spillover yet. Access to the BCC is restricted to the 426 Benghazi children. An additional 420 individuals, including 20 children, known to be infected with HIV in Benghazi must seek treatment at the sub-standard Benghazi Medical Center. Asked about the HIV/AIDS situation in Tripoli, Benghazi medical professionals told Kline and Calles that HIV/AIDS in Tripoli stems primarily from intravenous drug use and that no one in the GOL has suggested either opening the BCC to patients nationwide or training doctors from Tripoli as part of U.S.-EU-Libya's ongoing medical cooperation. In Benghazi, they said, the virus has spread primarily through heterosexual contact, with the large number of sub-Saharan African immigrants playing a significant role.

RELIANCE ON EUROPEAN HOSPITALS BREEDS LACK OF CONFIDENCE IN BENGHAZI DOCTORS

¶5. (C) According to Kline, a lack of confidence in Libyan doctors to effectively manage HIV/AIDS cases is a major impediment. Victims' families, spurred on by GOL promises of "quality care" at European hospitals, have no confidence in Benghazi doctors' ability to treat the infected children. The Libyan doctors, frustrated with seven years of the families' doubts, have internalized a lack of self-confidence. Kline criticized European governments for emphasizing treatment in

European hospitals as part of the "compensation deal," noting that France and Italy especially have compelling commercial reasons (i.e., the prospect of lucrative contracts in the arms and petroleum sectors) to accept the Benghazi children for expensive, months-long stays with accompanying elaborate tests and drug therapies.

¶6. (C) He emphasized that all of the children could receive quality care in Benghazi if the families were willing to try -- but they are not. According to Baylor's Benghazi contacts, as

TRIPOLI 00000834 002.2 OF 002

many as 400 of the children, with GOL encouragement and financing, have sought medical care outside of Libya. They noted that from April to July 2007 -- in the run-up to the medics' departure -- several hundred families were sent off to Europe for months at a time to "prevent them from raising their voices" as the GOL worked to find a solution to the criminal case. On September 17, the Baylor team was scheduled to examine 50 patients at the BCC, but only 15 showed up. Hospital staff told the team the children's families had mostly left Libya since the July compensation payments (families received about USD $1 million for each infected child), some moving permanently to Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

¶7. (C) According to the Baylor team, Benghazi hospital staff were unusually critical of European efforts in Benghazi. Addressing three European representatives -- a British psychiatrist, an Italian physician, and a Dutch database management expert, the director of the BCC said, "You have done nothing for us." The director went on to praise Baylor for its concrete proposals and eagerness to work directly with the Benghazi medical community. The leader of the European team, UK psychiatrist Rafik Hosni, told Kline that the Europeans do not have an MOU analogous to Baylor's and have little clear direction for their medical engagement in Benghazi.

BENGHAZI DOCTORS STAND BY MEDICS' GUILT

¶8. (C) Kline noted that, almost without exception, Benghazi doctors refer to the 426 cases as the "injected children" rather than the "infected children." Though the Baylor team steered well clear of politics during their September 16-18 visit, every Benghazi doctor they spoke with maintains the Bulgarian medics were guilty of intentionally infecting the 426 children with the HIV virus in 1999.

STEVENS
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI909

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI909 aka Wikileaks id #127126 ?
Subject	ARAB DONORS' CONFERENCE ON DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 25 Oct 2007 12:26 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07TRIPOLI909.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9095
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHGI RUEHKUK RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0909 2981226
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251226Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2775
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0017
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3188
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000909

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , SU [Sudan] , AL [Albania] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: ARAB DONORS' CONFERENCE ON DARFUR

REF: STATE 148406

¶1.  (U) The Charge conveyed reftel points to MFA Secretary for
Americas Affairs Dr. Ahmed Fituri October 25, urging the GOL to
make contributions in a manner supportive of UN and Transitional
Darfur Regional Authority efforts in Darfur.  Fituri said
Ambassador to Khartoum Omar al-Hamdi would represent the GOL at
the conference and indicated that he had been authorized to
pledge a financial contribution to Darfur relief efforts (NFI on
the amount).

MILAM
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI912

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI912 aka Wikileaks id #127446 ?
Subject	A SUCCESS?: ENI'S DEAL WITH LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 26 Oct 2007 16:32 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07TRIPOLI912.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI949 , 07TRIPOLI967 , 07TRIPOLI979 , 08TRIPOLI474
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0686
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0912/01 2991632
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 261632Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2778
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0495
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0546
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0332
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0888
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0318
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0213
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3191
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000912

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: A SUCCESS?: ENI'S DEAL WITH LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION

¶1. Summary: Italian energy firm Eni has struck a major deal with Libya's National Oil Corporation that will significantly extend its concession contracts and launch an ambitious series of exploration and development activities. While trumpeted by Eni as a success, the deal carries serious negatives for the company, and may pave the way for the imposition of similar, not altogether positive arrangements with other foreign oil and gas concession holders. End Summary.

¶2. Leading Italian energy firm Eni announced a 25-year extension to its oil and gas contracts with Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) October 16. Press reports indicate that some of Eni's most important oil and gas concessions were to expire over the next two years; the new agreement extends all of its concessions until 2042 and 2047, respectively. Eni will invest $14 billion in related infrastructure (a total matched by the NOC for a total of $28 billion). Eni will also expend at least $800 million for additional exploration activities, a sum approaching the mammoth $900 million exploration plan unveiled following British Petroleum's May 2007 deal with the NOC. Eni and NOC will also reportedly embark on a limited program of enhanced oil recovery (EOR) in some of Eni's existing fields.

¶3. The new deal paves the way for a potential doubling of Libya's gas exporting capacity to 16 billion cubic meters (BCM). Eni is Libya's partner for the "Greenstream" gas pipeline, which runs from the Libyan coast to Sicily and which handles its extant gas export capacity. The new contract envisages expanding Greenstream's capacity to 11 billion BCM and constructing a new liquefied-natural-gas (LNG) plant at the Mellita gas export hub with a capacity of BCM a year.

STEEP HIDDEN COSTS

¶4. While cast in most press accounts as a triumph for the Italian firm, the deal also carries substantial costs. Eni officials are reportedly far from enthralled with the new arrangements. The terms of the new agreement take Eni out of a true concession agreement, under which they derived a relatively healthy margin on the product that they lifted (exported) from Libya, and into a production sharing agreement. Under its previous terms, Eni was responsible for tax and royalties on lifted product, but was compensated by the NOC for substantial portions of its exploration and development costs, including well-drilling. Under the new arrangements, which are governed by the general terms of the current round of Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA IV) agreements, Eni is responsible for all of these costs. Eni thus has a lower cost recovery factor in line with recent concession "winners" (who have won with bids as low as 7%). The result is that the NOC takes a larger cut of produced oil and Eni books a lower quantity of reserves, negatively affecting the company's share price. On top of this, Eni will reportedly pay a $1 billion bonus to NOC as part of the deal, and has agreed to retire an outstanding $500 million debt to the NOC by year's end.

A WORRYING SIGN OF THINGS TO COME?

¶5. Representatives of international oil companies (IOCs) operating in Libya have expressed grave doubts about the Eni deal. One executive described it as "scary," adding that it raised serious questions about NOC adherence to the sanctity of existing contracts. Post has learned that the NOC has approached several IOCs, including TOTAL (France), Wintershall (German) and Repsol (Spain), to explore renegotiating the terms of their current operations. There is widespread worry among the IOCs that the NOC may expand this effort and open discussions with other concession holders in an effort to extract more favorable terms. The use of the EPSA IV bidding round model of production sharing agreements would most damage companies operating under concession agreements, such as Wintershall. Those agreements were concluded during the sanctions period, when low spot market prices and Libya's limited options resulted in the granting of more favorable terms. The IOCs that have been approached about renegotiating are irked that the NOC is coming after them now, particularly since their companies took substantial risks to do business in Libya when UN sanctions were in place.

¶6. Comment: Post's contacts have expressed acute annoyance with Eni for conceding to the NOC's initiative, particularly given

Eni for conceding to the NOC's initiative, particularly given the company's past record of similar behavior. Contacts point to Eni's agreement on a $150 million "social development

TRIPOLI 00000912 002 OF 002

package" with the NOC in September 2006 as another example of the firm's having given in to pressure from the NOC. With Eni's new deal on the books, the NOC will now have greater leverage to force other companies to conclude similar agreements. At the same time, the quality of parcels offered under the auspices of Libya's latest EPSA rounds has been increasingly marginal in economic terms. The confluence of increasingly difficult hydrocarbon reservoirs and an increasingly avaricious NOC could curb further interest by major IOCs in new EPSA agreements, leading to greater participation by smaller, less capable operators in Libya's oil and gas sector. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI918

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI918 aka Wikileaks id #127628 ?
Subject	QADDAFI HOSTS SIGNING OF CHADIAN PEACE ACCORDS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 29 Oct 2007 15:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/10/07TRIPOLI918.html
References	07NDJAMENA792
Referenced by	07NDJAMENA877
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2034
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0918 3021506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 291506Z OCT 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2785
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0112
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0108
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0651
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0349
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0550
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0336
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0499
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3199
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000918

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2017
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]*
SUBJECT: QADDAFI HOSTS SIGNING OF CHADIAN PEACE ACCORDS

REF: NDJAMENA 792

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) On the eve of the Darfur peace conference, Libyan leader Mu'ammar Qaddafi presided over the signing of a separate peace agreement October 25 in Sirte between the Chadian

peace agreement October 25 in Sirte between the Chadian government and four Chadian rebel groups. The agreement was signed by chief Chadian negotiator (and Infrastructure Minister) Adam Younousmi and the leaders of rebel groups RFC, CNT, UFDD and UFDD Fondamentale, including the UFDD's Mahamat Nouri and the RFC's Timan Erdimi. Also witnessing the signing were the presidents of Chad and Sudan, delegations from their respective governments, about 100 individuals associated with the rebel groups, and P-5 heads of mission (DCM stood in for Charge', who was meeting S/E Natsios that day in Tripoli; the Chinese were invited but skipped the event).

¶2. (SBU) In a lengthy, extemporaneous speech after the signing, Qaddafi praised the rebel leaders for taking the path of peace, chastized them and other would-be rebels for resorting to violence ("I am your friend and brother but I am not with you if you take up arms"), asserted the right of sovereigns to forcefully quell uprisings (citing with approval the California National Guards' quelling of riots in Los Angeles in the early 1990s), and emphasized that it is in the interest of Africans and the world community that peace and unity prevail in Africa.

¶3. (C) Comment: It was apparent by virtue of the presence of international press and P-5 ambassadors that the GOL, particularly now that it has been voted onto the UN Security Council, wants to highlight its increasingly active diplomacy in Africa. The Libyans' key players on Africa were of course all present: the MFA's Ali Treiki, CEN-SAD's Madani, and intelligence chiefs Musa Kusa and Abdullah Sanussi. Despite recent rumors of health problems including a possible stroke, Qaddafi appeared healthy if somewhat slow-moving and delivered lengthy, coherent remarks without reference to notes.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI929

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI929 aka Wikileaks id #128592 ?
Subject	DARFUR TALKS STRUGGLE WITH POOR REBEL ATTENDANCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 4 Nov 2007 12:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI929.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7336
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0929/01 3081233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 041233Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2793
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3210
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000929

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , UN *[United Nations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DARFUR TALKS STRUGGLE WITH POOR REBEL ATTENDANCE

TRIPOLI 00000929 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: UN/AU-led Darfur mediation talks began as announced on October 27 in Sirte, Libya, even in the absence of major political and military leaders from the Darfur rebel movements. The UN/AU leadership is slowly proceeding with a plan to dispatch teams to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels not in attendance to sign a ceasefire agreement and move their internal consultations to Sirte. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's chilling comments that the international community should leave the Sudanese alone to resolve the Darfur crisis and affirming the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against

the Darfurians have encouraged some rebel groups to stay away from Sirte. While welcoming Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafie Ali Nafie's unilateral ceasefire declaration, international observers cautioned that a meaningful ceasefire agreement must include mechanisms to identify violations and delimit concrete penalties for parties that broach the ceasefire. With the Sirte meeting looking increasingly precarious, international observers cautioned the UN/AU against boxing themselves in with unrealistic timetables or overly optimistic projections that the Sirte meeting will conclude with a final political settlement for Darfur. End summary.

KEY PLAYERS BOYCOTT SIRTE MEETING

¶2. (U) Most key rebel leaders and military commanders, including SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, made good on their threats to boycott the Sirte meeting. Factions in attendance included JEM/Collective led by Bahar Idriss Abu Gharba and Abdullah Banda and SLA/Khamis Abdullah (although Khamis himself is not in attendance). An Arab faction led by Abu Sarra and Fur leader Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige also participated.

¶3. (U) By contrast to the movements, representation from the Government of Sudan and the international community was strong. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi and MFA Secretary for Africa Affairs Ali Treiki hosted the meeting. A large GOS delegation, headed by Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafi Ali Nafi and intelligence chief Salah Gosh, consisted entirely of top NCP officials and vowed to be the last delegation to leave the Sirte talks. SLM/Minawi did not attend -- the GOS vowed to block his participation unless he came as part of Nafi's GNU/GOS delegation. Special Envoys and top MFA officials from the U.S., U.K., France, China, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada, the European Union and Japan also participated. The three regional governments -- Egypt, Chad, and Eritrea -- were represented at the FM level. Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa also participated. Representatives from the SPLM's Taskforce on Darfur, Reverend Clement Janda and Edward Lino, were on hand in Sirte. Thirteen tribal and civil society representatives attended as well, but the GOS prevented 15 from attending who had been invited by the UN/AU.

NO CLEAR PLAN TO BOOST REBEL PARTICIPATION

¶4. (C) Recognition that the absence of major rebel leaders threatened serious discussions on either a ceasefire or a political settlement was widespread in all but the UN/AU camps, with UN S/E Eliasson characterizing the conference both publicly and privately as "off to a good start" and "relatively on schedule". The UN/AU leadership has been slow to entice key rebel figures into the Sirte meeting. In a meeting October 29 with international observers, UN S/E Eliasson announced, and international observers endorsed, plans to send mid-level teams to Juba and Darfur to encourage rebels to sign a draft ceasefire agreement as a confidence-building measure to facilitate forward movement of the political process. SPLM criticized the proposal, and two JEM splinter groups currently in Sirte threatened to walk out if the UN/AU dispatched the teams. By October 30, working level UN/AU staff conceded that UN/AU envoys were considering shifting the conference venue outside of Libya in the hope more rebels might attend if the conference were held at a less objectionable venue. Sources, however, indicate that UN SYG Ban is firm on continuing to hold the talks in Libya.

U.S. ENCOURAGES FLEXIBILITY IN THE SIRTE PROCESS

¶5. (C) S/E Natsios embraced the proposal to send out teams, encouraging the UN/AU to pursue the Darfur peace process in the field rather that at the 4,000-seat Sirte convention center if necessary. S/E Natsios encouraged the UN/AU to clearly define the endgame of the current meeting and suggested an enforceable ceasefire might be a more realistic short-term goal necessary to

ceasefire might be a more realistic short term goal necessary to

build confidence among the rebel movements before real political dialogue could begin. He cautioned the UN/AU not to box themselves in with an inflexible process and unmovable dates. Detailed written reports on progress every 2-3 weeks would help sustain support for UN/AU process in national capitals.

¶6. (U) In addition, in public remarks at the October 27 plenary session, S/E Natsios told delegates that a meaningful peace in Darfur requires both a robust peacekeeping force and an inclusive political settlement. Peacekeeping and the political track are mutually re-enforcing and should be pursued simultaneously. S/E Natsios stressed that preconditions for negotiations are illogical -- if everything has already been agreed upon, what would be the point of negotiations? There are five significant issues for discussion: security, disarmament, compensation, reconstruction / development, and land rights. A meaningful discussion on these issues requires participation by parties with significant military and political strength in Darfur. According to S/E Natsios, the Sirte meeting is the beginning of a process that will eventually lead to a political settlement. A cessation of hostilities would be a welcome first step.

QADHAFI HARANGUES INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN PEACE PROCESS

¶7. (C) In a rambling, 45-minute speech delivered in a monotone at the October 27 plenary session, Qadhafi told assembled rebel movements, Sudanese officials, international envoys, and a large press contingent that the absence of key rebel leaders in Sirte confirms that the international community, including Libya, should let the Sudanese and Darfurians resolve this conflict for themselves. He singled out Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur and Khalil Ibrahim as the "essential" leaders without whom "we cannot conclude a peace." Expressing disappointment that more rebel movements opted not to attend the Sirte talks, Qadhafi -- speaking several feet from UN S/E Eliasson -- said he had hoped "to salvage the prestige of the United Nations and the UN's efforts" to further the Darfur peace process.

¶8. (C) Qadhafi also referenced traditional Fur tribal hierarchies, claiming that "had the international community not gotten involved, the people of Darfur would have resolved the conflict already". Reiterating his view that the Darfur conflict is strictly tribal, the Libyan leader said the crisis has no implications for regional or international security and does not/not fall within the purview of a UN Chapter 7 intervention. In addition, Qadhafi gave an impassioned defense of the GOS's "sovereign right" to use violence against the Sudanese people, referring to a state's use of violence to quell perceived insurgency as "legal and legitimate". Qadhafi reietered his familiar refrain that the world faces "graver threats" than the Darfur crisis.

NICE CEASEFIRE -- IF THEY CAN KEEP IT

¶9. (C) Sudanese Presidential Advisor Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi announced (to polite applause) October 27 that the GOS declared a unilateral ceasefire in Darfur. "The Government of Sudan will not be the first to fire arms in Darfur", said Nafi. (Note: In an meeting October 30 reported septel, CEN-SAD Secretary-General Mohammad al-Madani told S/E Natsios that Nafi had agreed in consultations with the GOL to offer a longer list of concessions, only to revert to "the one thing (a ceasefire) they agreed on before he left Khartoum". End note.) Nafi reiterated that a sustainable peace in Darfur requires tackling poverty and underdevelopment in the region, calling on international observers to increase reconstruction assistance grants for Darfur. Nafi identified three obstacles to peace: the

impossibility of consulting with the rebel movements, limited international commitments to reconstruction, and the lack of clear punishments for individuals or movements who step outside the UN/AU peace process.

¶10. (C) Virtually all attendees in Sirte agreed that for a ceasefire to be credible, it must include a mechanism to identify and punish violators. In a private meeting on October 27, Treiki told S/E Natsios that Libya would consider a regional travel ban on rebel movements and individuals that signed a ceasefire and reneged. Treiki praised U.S. unilateral sanctions on JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim, but conceded U.S. sanctions are strictly symbolic and incapable of raising the political costs of violating the ceasefire. Though Treki offered to broach the subject with Chad and Eritrea, the Eritrean FM spoke publicly against the proposal later that day.

NON-MILITARY LOGISTICAL SUPPORT PROPOSAL

¶11. (C) S/E Natsios proposed a non-military logistical support

TRIPOLI 00000929 003.2 OF 003

package, involving both food and medical supplies, financed by international donations and aimed at those rebel groups and militias that signed and respected a cessation of hostilities, including SLM/Minawi. The U.K., the Netherlands, the European Union, and Norway endorsed the plan in principle and agreed to investigate logistics and funding options should the UN/AU choose to pursue the plan in the future. After international observers presented the plan to the UN/AU on October 29, UN S/E Eliasson asked for more time for internal UN deliberations about the non-military logistical support plan. The Italian delegation leader offered generous funding for the idea in a private conversation with S/E Natsios.

DISCUSSIONS UNDERWAY TO EXPEL ABDULWAHID FROM FRANCE

¶12. (C) Treiki told S/E Natsios on October 27 that French FM Bernard Kouchner said France is prepared to expel SLM faction leader Abdulwahid Mohammad al-Nur in December when his French residency permit expires. According to Treiki, Senegalese President Abdallah Wade is ready to accept Abdulwahid if France expels him. In a separate meeting October 30, CEN-SAD SYG al-Madani told S/E Natsios that both the French government and President Wade have spoken with Abdulwahid about relocating him to Senegal, but Abdulwahid refused. Al-Madani said it was "preferable to convince Abdulwahid to bless the peace or attend the talks" than to expel him from France, but acknowledged expulsion was a viable option. He recounted a meeting between Chadian President Idriss Deby and Abdulwahid in Paris in July in which Abdulwahid promised that he would attend the final UN/AU negotiations.

AN EMBARASSMENT FOR LIBYA

¶13. (C) Libya's failure to deliver major rebel leaders -- despite repeated promises to the UN and AU that "everyone except Abdulwahid" would come -- is a clear embarassment to the conference's hosts. A/S Treiki was conspicuously silent throughout the plenary sessions, often sitting in the audience alongside other international observers but refraining from any public comments throughout the Sirte meeting. In a private meeting with S/E Natsios, Treiki was clearly embarassed by Qadhafi's comments that the international community had no role in the resolution of the Darfur conflict and cautioned that Qadhafi's harsh message was "not what brother leader intended". The GOL's low profile throughout the conference suggests that, were the conference to collapse, Libya -- like the rest of the international community -- would lay the blame squarely at the UN/AU's doorstep.

¶14. (U) S/E Natsios cleared this message.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI930

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI930 aka Wikileaks id #128593 ?
Subject	(C) LIBYA EXTRACTS SUDANESE, ERITREAN PROMISES TO SUPPORT SIRTE MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 4 Nov 2007 12:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI930.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7339
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0930 3081233
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041233Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2796
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3213
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS AND AF/SPG
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR NEA/MAG
DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER AND DARFUR S/E NATSIOS; NSC FOR PITTMAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , UN *[United Nations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: (C) LIBYA EXTRACTS SUDANESE, ERITREAN PROMISES TO SUPPORT SIRTE MEETING

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In an October 30 meeting with S/E Andrew Natsios, Secretary-General of the Community of Sahal-Saharan States, Mohammad al-Madani, briefed S/E Natsios on Libyan efforts in support of the UN/AU Darfur political process, including extracting an agreement from Sudanese President Advisor Dr. Nafi Ali Nafi to announce concessions behind a ceasefire in his October 27 speech and securing a promise from

Eritrean President Isaias Aferwerki to support the UN/AU-led Sirte meeting. As in previous meetings, al-Madani praised U.S. involvement in the Darfur peace process at length. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) According to al-Madani, the GOL met with Sudanese Presidential Advisor Nafi Ali Nafi in Sirte prior to his October 27 speech announcing a unilateral ceasefire. Al-Madani said Nafi agreed on a range of unilateral concessions beyond the ceasefire that he would unveil in his speech to the plenary session, but subsequently ignored the discussion and only announced the ceasefire. Top NCP officials in the Sudanese Government, including Ali Othman Taha, Salah Gosh, and Nafi Ali Nafi "think themselves capable of deceiving the whole world," said al-Madani. Noting that he knew leading Sudanese personalities well, al-Madani said the GOL regularly encourages the NCP to stop lying to the international community.

¶3. (C) Al-Madani recounted two meetings with Eritrean President Isaias Aferwerki -- one during his October 8-9 visit to Tripoli and one during an October 20 visit to Sirte -- in which Aferwerki pledged to Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi that he would "support peace efforts [for Darfur] and the Sirte negotiations". Aferwerki also told Qadhafi October 20 that he would use his influence to encourage rebel movements to attend the Sirte talks. According to al-Madani, all groups supported by Aferwerki were in Juba by the October 20 meeting.

¶4. (C) Al-Madani again praised U.S. involvement in the Darfur peace process, acknowledging that coordinated international pressure on both the GOS and the rebel movements is necessary to move the process forward. The U.S., like all countries, has pressing humanitarian and economic interests in Darfur. Al-Madani encouraged the U.S. to continue following the Darfur portfolio as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and to eliminate all obstacles to peace in the region, including sanctions on parties to the conflict.

¶5. (U) S/E Natsios cleared this message.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI936

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI936 aka Wikileaks id #128870 ?
Subject	GOL OFFICIAL DENOUNCES TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 6 Nov 2007 11:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI936.html
References	06TRIPOLI686
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8973
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0936 3101127
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 061127Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2803
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0322
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3220
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0217
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000936

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/2017
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL OFFICIAL DENOUNCES TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL

REF: 06 TRIPOLI 686

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: At a recent GOL-hosted conference on management, Libya's Minister of Labor-equivalent Matuq Matuq sharply criticized a suggestion by one Libyan participant that international standards be used to measure the level of corruption in Libya, calling instead for Libyans to assess their own system on their own terms. His remarks are indicative of

both the pressure Libya's halting reform efforts are putting on some regime insiders and the opposition this inner circle is attempting to muster to block genuine reform. End summary.

¶2. (U) Deputy Prime Minister-equivalent Dr. Abdulhafid Zlitni hosted the first National Conference on Management Development in Tripoli October 29. Experts from Germany, Austria, Tunisia, Egypt, Syria and Libya took part in the event, along with the Arab Organization for Management Development and the Egyptian Central Authority for Management Organization.

¶3. (U) During the first session of the conference, Dr. Abubakr Bayyra, a professor at Benghazi's Garyounis University, presented a paper that touched on management training, modern international indicators and the way forward for the development of Libyan management skills. His recommendations focused on the need for accountability, rule of law, transparency and the will to fight corruption. The paper also offered a strategy to enhance Libya's anti-corruption efforts, focusing on the civil service and reforming the laws and policies that underpin the government system.

¶4. (U) According to a quasi-independent Libyan website (Libya-AlYoum), long-time Minister of Labor-equivalent Matuq Matuq rose and objected vehemently to the use of international indicators to assess Libya' record of management reform and anti-corruption efforts. He specifically rejected the findings of Transparency International as "unrealistic and unreal". (Note: In its 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index, Transparency International ranked Libya 131st in the world, placing it on par with Iran and slightly better than Syria. End note.) Matuq insisted that the Transparency International report be ignored and called for a special transparency report on Libya written by Libyans, whom he said alone possess the requisite perspective to comment on the local environment. He closed by stating that "no consideration should be given to issues such as corruption and good management, because they are irrelevant and unimportant to Libya".

¶5. (C) Comment: Matuq's outburst reportedly shocked the conference attendees and prompted speculation as to whether his comments represent GOL policy or only his own views. The highest echelons of GOL leadership, including Moammar al-Qadhafi (reftel) and his oldest son, Seif al-Islam, have frequently spoken publicly about the need to address corruption, albeit with little follow-up action. The exception in terms of follow-up has been the use of corruption charges to punish wealthy insiders who have fallen out of favor with the regime, a practice referred to locally as "the black hand". The Libyan public has viewed calls for anti-corruption efforts with skepticism, in part because the Qadhafi family and its fellow travelers are among the biggest beneficiaries of graft. Nonetheless, Matuq's intervention at the conference and his stature as a long-time crony of the Leader suggest that at least some of Libya's "old guard" feel threatened by the reformist camp and may seek to blunt any anti-corruption efforts. End comment.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI943

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI943 aka Wikileaks id #129012 ?
Subject	REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION OF RETURNED DETAINEE ARM DISABILITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 Nov 2007 09:14 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI943.html
References	07STATE135205
Referenced by	07STATE163961
History	First published on Wed, 1 Dec 2010 00:01 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0002
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0943 3110914
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 070914Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2806
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3227
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA DAS GRAY, NEA/MAG, S/WCI (SHIN, STAMILIO)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/6/2032
TAGS: PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PINS [National Security] , PINR [Intelligence] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR EXPLANATION OF RETURNED DETAINEE ARM DISABILITY

REF: A) STATE 135205 ; B) STATE 127608; C) JOHNSON-STEVENS/GODFREY E-MAIL 10/15/07; D)
TRIPOLI 797; E) TRIPOLI 723  AND PREVIOUS

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (c), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) Charge met November 1 with MFA Secretary for the
Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri and reiterated Post's request for
timely access to returned Guantanamo detainee ISN-194 (Muhammad
Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi) to follow up on ref A and B requests
for further information on when and how al-Rimi sustained an
injury to his left arm and suffered the loss of several teeth.
The CDA also requested access to ISN-557 (Ben Qumu Abu Sufian
Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda), who was returned to Libya September 26,
to assess his condition.
```

¶2. (S/NF) Fituri stressed that it has been made clear that the ostensibly non-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, has the lead on facilitating access to returned detainees. He implied that the MFA was not in a position to offer further assistance and recommended that the CDA contact directly the QDF's Executive Director, Dr. Yusuf Sawani, and possibly ESO Chief Musa Kusa to follow up on the request for access to ISN-194 and ISN-557. The CDA pushed back, acknowledging that while the QDF has been designated as the organization responsible for facilitating Watchdog Committee access to returned detainees, the GOL's MFA also has a role to play in helping to ensure that such access is granted. Fituri offered no substantive rejoinder. Post has not been successful in its subsequent attempts to reach Dr. Sawani or our other QDF interlocutors. (Note: Sawani and other Libyan contacts are typically only reached by mobile telephone as many of their offices lack functioning landlines. Post suspects, but cannot confirm, that Sawani and his QDF colleagues are not taking our numerous calls to avoid having to discuss this issue. End note.)

¶3. (S/NF) Comment: CDA met with Dr. Sawani in mid-September to request access to ISN-194 to follow up on ref B request for further information on the nature of his left hand disability and tooth loss. Sawani said QDF employees (NFI) conducted a "pre-interview" of ISN-194 in mid-September in anticipation of a second visit by Emboffs (first visit reported ref E) and were told by the detainee that he sustained an injury to his left arm during interrogation at GTMO. Post notes that the first (and only) visit to ISN-194 came after two and a half months of negotiation with the GOL and the QDF. Post notes that the GOL has expressed a strong desire for access to all/all Libyan national detainees remaining in GTMO (ref D), and recommends that such access be explicitly conditioned on the GOL's facilitation of the requested visits with ISN-194 and ISN-557. End comment.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI945

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI945 aka Wikileaks id #129127 ?
Subject	LIBYAN REACTION TO AQ-LIFG MERGER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 Nov 2007 16:15 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI945.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0530
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0945/01 3111615
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071615Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2810
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3231
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000945

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2017
TAGS: KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN REACTION TO AQ-LIFG MERGER

TRIPOLI 00000945 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Reaction to the November 3 announcement by al-Qaeda's second-in-command, Ayman al-Zawahri, that the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had joined forces with al-Qaeda (AQ) and was calling for the overthrow of Qadhafi's regime has been relatively muted. The GOL has not yet issued a public statement and its leadership is reportedly divided over the wisdom of doing so. Regime insiders are concerned that the

wisdom of doing so. Regime insiders are concerned that the LIFG/AQ announcement could presage a period of political violence that could hurt their personal economic interests, while the reaction of average Libyans has ranged from concern about instability and adverse economic consequences to enthusiasm for the merger. End summary.

GOL: NO PUBLIC REACTION (YET)

¶2. (C) In a conversation with P/E Chief November 4, MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri characterized the

SIPDIS
announcement as "a serious threat". He indicated that senior levels of the GOL's leadership, including FM Shalgham, ESO Chief Musa Kusa and Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, were discussing whether the GOL should issue a public statement reacting to the announcement. He suggested that there was disagreement within the GOL as to whether it was prudent to react publicly, saying some favored a statement while others feared it would lend further credibility to AQ-LIFG in the eyes of the Libyan people. Fituri expressed the belief that the GOL would ultimately issue a statement of some kind, but cautioned that it might not occur "right away".

ELITES CONCERNED ...

¶3. (S/NF) Mohamed Elobeidi (strictly protect), country manager for the Decameron hotel group and a well-connected insider from a prominent Benghazi tribe (his nephew is MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi), told P/E Chief November 5 that Libyans' reactions to the announcement varied depending on their socioeconomic status. The elite, he said, remember the LIFG's insurgency in the 1990's and its attempts to assassinate Moammar al-Qadhafi, and are concerned that a call to topple the regime premised on an explicitly religious message akin to that of Zawahri and LIFG leader Abu Laith al-Libi, would find a receptive audience among the many Libyans who have not benefited from recent economic liberalization and development, regardless of whether they share al-Qaeda and the LIFG's stated desire for an Islamic caliphate.

¶4. (S/NF) The elites' principal concern, according to Elobeidi, is to protect the sanctity of their personal economic fiefdoms in the event the LIFG makes a serious run at toppling al-Qadhafi's regime. Mentioning that he had been at a dinner party with Qadhafi's wife, Safia Farkash, the night after the AQ-LIFG announcement, he said she was "concerned" that economic reforms championed by her son and heir apparent, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, had exacerbated resentment of the Qadhafi family and other elites who had profited disproportionately from recent initiatives to open Libya's economy. Much of the dinner conversation apparently centered on how to balance calls for economic reform against the fact that attendant inflation and increased living costs were hurting average Libyans, many of whom depend on static state salaries.

... BROADER REACTION MORE VARIED

¶5. (S/NF) By contrast with the elite, who viewed news of the merger with concern, Elobeidi said "a significant number" of Libyans welcomed the announcement. He cautioned against interpreting such support as a sign that most Libyans are fundamentalist Muslims or are sympathetic to the idea of establishing an Islamic caliphate, although he conceded that more conservative iterations of Islam were enjoying a resurgence in Libya. Rather, the level of dissatisfaction with Qadhafi's family and regime is such that some Libyans are willing to support any alternative perceived to be viable in the hope that the next regime will be less oppressive. Elobeidi mentioned in particular the perceived hypocrisy between Qadhafi and Saif al-Islam's remarks condemning corruption and the fact that the Qadhafi family is the biggest beneficiary of graft in the

country.

¶6. (C) A sampling of non-elite Libyans revealed a variety of opinions. A hotel employee expressed concern that political violence would adversely affect Libya's oil and gas industry, impacting government revenues and the state's ability to pay its many public sector employees, and then whispered that Qadhafi's

TRIPOLI 00000945 002.2 OF 002

government was "terrible". A bus driver who plies inter-city routes and the Tripoli-Tunis run noted that while Qadhafi's regime had been the cause of "deprivation" for many Libyans for a long time, the economic situation -- particularly with respect to the availability of consumer goods -- had recently begun to improve. He expressed concern that an Islamist government under AQ-LIFG auspices would roll back recent economic changes, saying that while the (political) reasons would be different, the effect would be to drag Libya back to the stagnation of the sanctions era. The assistant imam at the Sidi Bou Kameisha mosque in the Abu Sita area of Tripoli, who declined to give his name, told P/E chief November 6 that the announced merger had been the subject of much discussion on the margins of prayer times. He would not offer his personal views on the news, but conceded that "some" (NFI) congregants had received word of the announcement "with enthusiasm".

¶7. (C) Comment: Like many things in Libya, reaction to news of the AQ-LIFG merger has been an exercise in slow-motion. While regime insiders are predictably concerned, the more varied reaction of average Libyans underscores the existence of a certain degree of support for AQ-LIFG. The more difficult question is the extent to which that support derives from genuine affinity for an Islamist agenda as opposed to a desire to be rid of Qadhafi's regime, whatever the cost. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI946

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI946 aka Wikileaks id #129128 ?
Subject	DESIGNATIONS OF IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 Nov 2007 16:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI946.html
References	07STATE148605
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0534
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0946 3111616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 071616Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2812
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0103
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3233
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000946

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN; T; TREASURY; EUR; EAP; NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , IR *[Iran]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]*
SUBJECT: DESIGNATIONS OF IRANIAN ENTITIES AND INDIVIDUALS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDERS

REF: STATE 148605

¶1. (U) The Charge delivered reftel demarche to MFA Secretary for Americas Affairs Dr. Ahmed Fituri November 1. Fituri offered no substantive response, but undertook to convey to the appropriate authorities the request that the GOL take parallel measures. Noting Libya's recent election to a non-permanent UNSC seat, Fituri stressed Libya's readiness to "do its international duty" with respect to such requests.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI949

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI949 aka Wikileaks id #129131 ?
Subject	SLOW PROGRESS ON ITALY-LIBYA COLONIAL COMPENSATION TREATY A SIGN OF GOL'S "CORSAIR MENTALITY"
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 Nov 2007 16:31 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI949.html
References	07TRIPOLI641 , 07TRIPOLI912
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Removed on Mon, 21 Feb 2011 17:31 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Mon, 21 Mar 2011 17:58 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0545
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0949/01 3111631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071631Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2815
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0326
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0656
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0353
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0150
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0901
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0552
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0504
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0342
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3236
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000949

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/7/2017
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions] ,
EINV [Foreign Investments] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , LY [Libya] , IT [Italy]
SUBJECT: SLOW PROGRESS ON ITALY-LIBYA COLONIAL COMPENSATION TREATY A
SIGN OF GOL'S "CORSAIR MENTALITY"

REF: A) TRIPOLI 912 ; B) Tripoli 641

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Recent media reports suggest that Rome may be close to finalizing an agreement to compensate Libya for damages incurred during Italy's colonization of the country; however, Italy's ambassador to Tripoli expressed doubt that such would occur soon. Pointing to the GOL's demands for compensation and its reluctance to consider Italy's requests for revised commercial/travel policies and resolution of sanctions-era debts to Italian companies, he criticized Libya for failing to adopt policies that would encourage the greater trade ties and foreign investment it claims to seek. In his view, Qadhafi and the GOL's senior leadership lack real strategic vision and instead do themselves a disservice by insisting on tactical linkages between "concessions" and "compensation". End summary.

¶2. (C) Open-source media reported October 29 remarks by Italian Foreign Minister Massimo D'Alema to the effect that Italy and Libya may be close to signing an agreement designed to settle the longstanding question of compensation for damages sustained by Libya during Italy's colonization of the country. Tripoli's rumor mill has been rife with speculation that movement towards an agreement, which has been under discussion for some time, was a Libyan pre-condition for granting Italy's Eni an ostensibly lucrative oil/gas exploration and production sharing agreement. (Note: Ref A reports on the deal, trumpeted by Eni as a success, and explains that drawbacks in details of the arrangement may have serious repercussions for other foreign oil and gas concession holders operating in Libya. End note.)

¶3. (C) In a conversation with P/E Chief November 4, Italy's Ambassador to Tripoli, Francesco Trupiano, dismissed the idea of a linkage between Eni's deal and the recent resurgence of interest in a colonial compensation agreement. Noting that Italian commercial interests were pressuring Rome to accommodate Libya's desire for symbolic remuneration, he offered that the agreement was further fueling what he described as the GOL's "inherently corsair mentality". In return for signing an agreement designed to bring the contentious issue of colonial-era abuses to a close, Libya has insisted that it is "owed" a highway that former Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi pledged to finance during a 2004 visit to Tripoli. The 1,900 kilometer highway, to be built to European standards, is to span Libya's coastline from the Tunisia-Libya border in the west to the Libya-Egypt border in the east.

¶4. (C) Trupiano said that some in the Italian government hope that Eni's deal will lend impetus to efforts to conclude a colonial compensation treaty to help facilitate trade, but cautioned that the GOL has balked at agreeing to Italy's three conditions. The first is facilitating easier registration of Italian companies by removing the requirement that the Libyan Prime Minister provide "political" approval to Italian entities seeking to do business in Libya in addition to the commercial approval that must be obtained from the Minister for Economy and Trade. Companies from other countries only have to obtain approval from the Minister of Economy; the requirement for political approval applies only to Italian firms. The second condition is revoking Libyan legislation that prohibits Italian "Fourth Shore" immigrants who resided in Cyrenaica and Tripolitania, and who were expelled in the early 1970's, from visiting Libya. Trupiano noted that some of those individuals had family ties that stretched back three generations or more by the time they were expelled from Libya and said the Italian government has received "numerous" requests for assistance in recent years from elderly Fourth Shore immigrants who were born in Libya and hope to visit again before they pass away. Italy's final stipulation for a colonial compensation treaty is resolving the issue of some 647 million Euros worth of payment for products and services owed to Italian companies by the GOL performed in the late 1980's and early 1990's in the early sanctions period.

sanctions period.

¶5. (C) Noting that the GOL and even the affected Italian companies were willing to demonstrate "considerable flexibility" on the issue of unpaid bills, Trupiano complained that the GOL

TRIPOLI 00000949 002 OF 002

has balked at lifting the political approval requirement for Italian companies and, more annoyingly, facilitating travel for "Fourth Shore" immigrants. On the latter, the GOL has proposed reviewing cases on a case-by-case basis, an arrangement Trupiano likened to an outright refusal in light of Libya's notoriously difficult visa practices. Trupiano attributed the GOL's "haughtiness" to soaring oil prices, its successful candidacy for a UNSC non-permanent seat and recent successes such as the slew of French-Libyan commercial agreements brokered during President Sarkozy's visit in connection with efforts to secure the release of Bulgarian medics accused of deliberately infecting Benghazi children with the AIDS virus (ref B and previous). The GOL complains that more European companies have not rushed to enter the Libyan market, he said, but consistently fails to take decisions that would facilitate greater commercial interest, let alone strike a grace note such as facilitating travel for Fourth Shore immigrants. He expressed pessimism about the possibility that an Italian-Libyan colonial compensation treaty would be finalized soon.

¶6. (C) Comment: Trupiano's frustration with the GOL's unwillingness to adopt policies that would invite the greater commercial interest and foreign investment it claims to seek is consistent with Post's observations. The GOL consistently expresses disappointment that more U.S. companies are not participating in Libya's current development efforts, but has been either unwilling or unable to make practical decisions on visa issuances or contract language that would help encourage greater U.S. commercial interest. Trupiano's summary judgment is that Qadhafi and senior GOL leadership lack real strategic vision on how to reestablish meaningful ties with the outside world in the wake of the lifting of sanctions, but instead approach issues from an inherently tactical perspective, directly linking each Libyan "concession" to "compensation". End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI964

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	07TRIPOLI964 aka Wikileaks id #129821 ?
Subject	LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ARB III NOTIFICATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 13 Nov 2007 16:42 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI964.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4947
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0964 3171642
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 131642Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2832
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3256
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0350
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY 0026
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA PRIORITY 0013
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0559
RUEHKU/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY 0013
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000964

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI (MUBANGU, HARMS) AND FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/13/2032
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ARB III NOTIFICATIONS

REF: A) STATE 86905, B) TRIPOLI 584

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Post conveyed ref A points June 27 requesting information concerning two Libyan national detainees (ISN 727 and ISN 761) scheduled for review in late July.

¶2. (S/NF) Post received a diplomatic note in response on

November 6 conveying biographical information about the two detainees. Text of the note follows:

(Customary greeting) ... and further to the Embassy's diplomatic note No. 515/07 dated June 27, 2007, as regards Omar Amer Taher Dghis (Omar A. Deghays - ISN 727) and Ibrahim Mahdi Zeidan (Ibrahim Mahdy - ISN 761), we wish to inform of the following (sic):

Omar Amer Taher Dghis,
DOB: 11/26/1969
Mother's name: Zohra Zwawi
Marital status: married to an Afghan woman named Mariam Hajji
Previous address: Tripoli Edhahra, Youssef Jaafari Street
Nationality: Libyan
He obtained asylum in Britain and his family lived in Brighton, in the south of Britain. This person has joined extremist groups (Islamic Fighting Group) and he has contacts and relationships with some elements of the previous Taliban government. He didn't get the British citizenship (sic) like the rest of his family members. During his stay in Pakistan and Afghanistan he used to move with (sic) the name: Shamikh Abubakr Souleiman. Pakistani authorities arrested him in Lahore, and then he was extradited to U.S. authorities and sent to Guantanamo.

Ibrahim Mahdi Zeidan was met by the committee that visited Guantanamo on September 9, 2004 and the committee learned that he is a Palestinian born in Libya.

(Customary closing/end of dipnote text).

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI967

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI967 aka Wikileaks id #130199 ?
Subject	GROWTH OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 15 Nov 2007 14:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI967.html
References	07TRIPOLI912
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 5 media items

```
VZCZCXRO7281
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0967/01 3191417
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 151417Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2836
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0511
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0560
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0352
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0912
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0222
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0335
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3260
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000967

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, EEB/ESC/IEC/EPC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/2017
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GROWTH OF RESOURCE NATIONALISM IN LIBYA

REF: A) STATE 150999, B) TRIPOLI 912

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (e)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya has a long history of resource nationalism linked to the policies and rhetoric of the Qadhafi regime. Beginning in the 1990's, many of these practices were scaled back; however, the removal of U.S. and UN sanctions and Libya's attendant opening to the world have prompted a resurgence of measures designed to increase the GOL's control over and share

measures designed to increase the GOL's control over and share of revenue from hydrocarbon resources. End Summary.

INVESTMENT SURGE ...

¶2. (C) With the lifting of UN and U.S. sanctions, foreign investment has surged back in to Libya over the past three years.

-- U.S. companies adopted a number of return strategies, from buying back old concessions (Marathon and ConocoPhillips), winning bids for new blocs (Chevron and ExxonMobil), or a combination of both (Amerada Hess and Oxy). Since January 2005, there have been three Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) rounds, in which exploration areas have been competitively bid to foreign companies. These steps have produced a flurry of new work, as the more than forty international oil companies (exclusive of oil service companies) toil to discover marketable quantities of oil and gas.

-- Several new "one-off" deals have also been concluded, including massive deals with Shell and British Petroleum, and a 25-year extension of Italian company ENI's oil and gas EPSA's.

-- The GOL has also shown a growing interest in developing its natural gas capabilities; an EPSA round for gas will come to a close this December.

... SPARKS NATIONALIST RHETORIC, POLICIES

¶3. (C) With this inflow of capital, and in particular the return of international oil companies (IOCs), there has been growing evidence of Libyan resource nationalism. The regime has made a point of putting companies on notice that "exploitative" behavior will not be tolerated. In his annual speech marking the founding of his regime, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi in 2006 said: "Oil companies are controlled by foreigners who have made millions from them -- now, Libyans must take their place to profit from this money." His son, Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, said in March 2007 that, "We will not tolerate a foreign company to make a profit at the expense of a Libyan citizen."

¶4. (C) Beyond the rhetoric, there are other signs of growing resource nationalism.

-- Some IOCs with local subsidiaries have been forced to adopt Libyan names this year, including TOTAL (now officially titled "Mabruk"), Repsol ("Akakoss"), ENI ("Mellita") and Veba ("Al-Hurruj"), although these names have yet to catch on.

-- The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) is currently in the process of reworking long-standing oil concessions with several different IOCs (Ref B), in an effort to wring more favorable terms. There is a growing concern in the IOC community that NOC, emboldened by soaring oil prices and the press of would-be suitors, will seek better terms on both concession and production-sharing agreements, even those signed very recently.

-- Libyan labor laws have also been amended to "Libyanize" the economy in several key sectors, and IOCs are now being forced to hire untrained Libyan employees. The Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) has recently begun insisting that deputy general managers, finance managers and human resource managers in local offices of IOC's be Libyan.

-- The enactment of Law #443 of 2006 obligated most foreign companies to form joint ventures with Libyan companies in order to operate in the country. (Note: This currently excludes IOCs, but includes all foreign oil and gas service companies. End Note).

¶5. (C) The latest EPSA rounds could well prove to be a testing ground for how far Libya will travel down this path. The

intense competition of the bid rounds led to winning bids that

are widely considered by hydrocarbon industry experts to be economically untenable. Chinese and Russian bids that allow companies to book only 7-10% of future production were hailed by NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem as "very good for us...and "[clearly] also good for the companies, since they submitted the offer".

HARMFUL TO LIBYA'S OWN INTERESTS?

¶6. (C) There is widespread concern among industry experts, however, that Libya's zeal for deriving maximum financial benefit from oil/gas concessions will adversely impact its energy resource development in the mid- to long-term, as low-bidding companies will under-invest, under-perform and under-produce. The expectation is that some of the companies that submitted unfeasible bids will be forced to abandon their concessions, further delaying the development of Libya's energy infrastructure.

COMMENT

¶7. (C) Libya needs to exploit its hydrocarbon resources to provide for its rapidly-growing, relatively young population. To do so, it requires extensive foreign investment and participation by credible IOCs. Reformist elements in the Libyan government and the small but growing private sector recognize this reality. But those who dominate Libya's political and economic leadership are pursuing increasingly nationalistic policies in the energy sector that could jeopardize efficient exploitation of Libya's extensive oil and gas reserves. Effective U.S. engagement on this issue should take the form of demonstrating the clear downsides to the GOL of pursuing this approach, particularly with respect to attracting participation by credible international oil companies in the oil/gas sector and foreign direct investment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- 'Noble' War In Libya - Part 1
- Three Little Words: WikiLeaks, Libya, Oil
- Crowdleaks: Libyaâ€™s oil industry suffers; incompetence of NOC revealed
- Conflict in Libya: U.S. oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold - The Washington Post
- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI972

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI972 aka Wikileaks id #130544 ?
Subject	ANTI-ISRAEL BOYCOTT INCIDENT WITH LIBYAN NATIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 18 Nov 2007 16:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI972.html
Referenced by	07TRIPOLI1055
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9302
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0972 3221611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 181611Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2840
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3266
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000972

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2017
TAGS: KBCT *[Arab League Boycott]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: ANTI-ISRAEL BOYCOTT INCIDENT WITH LIBYAN NATIONAL PROCUREMENT AUTHORITY

REF: 10/07 MILLER-MASON-DAVISON EMAILS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A U.S. company was recently presented with a Libyan government contract containing Israel boycott language. The U.S. company refused to sign the contract and ultimately succeeded in having the language removed, facilitating completion of the deal. End Summary.
¶2. (C) In the process of negotiating a multi-million dollar spare parts contract with U.S. company Oshkosh Trucks (of Oshkosh, WI), Libya's National Procurement Authority (NPA) presented a draft contract containing language requiring a comprehensive boycott of Israel. The language was expansive

comprehensive boycott of Israel. The language was expansive, barring any business contact with or investment in Israel, and calling on the U.S. company to abide by all laws and decisions related to the Arab League's (AL's) boycott action. Oshkosh representatives refused to sign the contract and walked away from the deal. After doing so, they contacted post and met with Econoff to discuss options. Econoff confirmed Oshkosh's judgment that it could not legally sign a contract containing such language, nor could it empower an agent do so on its behalf. Econoff also reminded Oshkosh of its obligation to report the incident to the Department of Commerce.

¶3. (C) In the end, Oshkosh's hard line did not scuttle the deal. Just hours before they were due to depart the country, the team was called back to the bargaining table by the NPA and was informed that the offensive language had been removed in its entirety. To reinforce the decision and avoid potential for subsequent misunderstanding, the parties agreed on and signed only an English-language version of the contract (i.e., without a signed Arabic translation).

¶4. (C) Charge d'Affaires subsequently raised the issue with MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri, stressing that such

SIPDIS

contract stipulations would undermine GOL efforts to attract U.S. business. (Note: Senior GOL officials have repeatedly expressed disappointment that more U.S. firms are not rushing to re-enter the Libyan market. End note.) Fituri responded that the GOL and private entities are compelled by Libyan law stemming from the AL resolution to include such language. Drawing a comparison between the "unilateral" American imposition of sanctions on Libya in the 1980's and 1990's, he argued that it would be "hypocritical" of the USG to insist that Arab states not enforce implementation of the anti-Israel boycott.

¶5. (C) Comment: This is the second instance of GOL boycott enforcement we have heard of in the past month. (The earlier case involved two German firms that were reportedly asked to sign letters attesting that they were in compliance with the Israel boycott as a pre-condition for securing required stamps on export documents from the Libyan People's Bureau in Berlin.) The fact that the Libyan government partner in the Oshkosh deal ultimately relented and removed the offensive language suggests that the GOL is willing to be pragmatic when seeking products or services that it deems to be particularly important. Post will continue to be alert to new incidents, and will remind U.S. companies of their obligations under U.S. law, as well as continue to impress upon the GOL the desirability of ending this practice.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI978

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI978 aka Wikileaks id #130880 ?
Subject	EXXONMOBIL ADDS NEW OFFSHORE ACREAGE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 20 Nov 2007 16:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI978.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1312
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0978 3241621
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201621Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2846
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0224
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0361
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0665
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0337
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3273
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000978

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR MASON; ENERGY FOR ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EXXONMOBIL ADDS NEW OFFSHORE ACREAGE

¶1. (SBU) ExxonMobil has clinched a deal with Libya's National Oil Corporation to increase its acreage in the country by about fifty percent. The soon-to-be announced deal is for a giant offshore bloc adjacent to another it secured in the December 2006 Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) bidding round. The latest move marks another step for ExxonMobil towards regaining a major share in the Libyan market, which it dominated before it left the country in 1986.

¶2. (SBU) Econoff learned on November 20 that ExxonMobil will announce soon that it was awarded today a vast new offshore area

to explore for hydrocarbon resources. The area in question covers more than 2.5 million square acres, and is located roughly 100 miles off the central Libyan coast. The new area is said to be in deep water, requiring world-class deepwater operations that are performed by only a handful of international oil companies. The parcel, referred to as Area 21, is adjacent to another identically-sized concession awarded to ExxonMobil as part of the Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) bid round process that concluded in December 2006. ExxonMobil had previously secured another large offshore parcel (area 44), located along the Egyptian-Libyan maritime border, in the EPSA bid round that concluded in October 2005.

¶3. (SBU) Post has learned that the workplan for this area will be substantial, to include 4,000km of 2D seismic, 2,000km of 3D seismic and the drilling of at least one well. Terms of a signing bonus, production share and other features of the deal were not disclosed.

¶4. (SBU) Comment: While significant, particularly in terms of the quantity of more labor-intensive and costly 3D seismic, this set of requirements is significantly smaller in scope than that attendant to ExxonMobil's winning bid in the most recent EPSA round in December 2006 (20,000km of 2D, 1,000km of 3D, 4 wells, and a $10 million signing bonus). The formal EPSA bid rounds have become increasingly competitive since they were inaugurated in January 2005. The less demanding requirements for the Area 21 deal underscore the potential advantages for IOC's of concluding deals outside the EPSA rubric. Securing Area 21also places ExxonMobil in the top tier of offshore operators in Libya and marks the company's return to the head of the pack in a market it first opened to oil and gas operations with the discovery of Libya's first viable oilfield in 1960. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI979

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI979 aka Wikileaks id #131017 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MARKET TESTS INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS COMPANIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 21 Nov 2007 11:29 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI979.html
References	06TRIPOLI511 , 07TRIPOLI912
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2265
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0979/01 3251129
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 211129Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2847
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0513
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0562
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0354
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0917
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0225
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0338
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0666
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0362
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3274
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000979

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, PARIS FOR ESPOSITO,
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MARKET TESTS INTERNATIONAL OIL AND GAS COMPANIES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 511 B) TRIPOLI 912

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Although an alluring market for the oil and gas industry, Libya is an exceptionally difficult place in which to operate. In their daily operations, international oil companies (IOC's) face numerous challenges on visas, staffing and taxation issues, and their profit margins are comparatively

and taxation issues, and their profit margins are comparatively narrow. The situation is likely to worsen in coming years, as Libyan authorities seek to extract additional concessions from energy companies operating in the country to maximize Libya's profits, even at the expense of continuing to attract further participation by reputable IOCs in the critical oil and gas sector that is the nation's lifeblood. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) The results of Libya's latest Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) bid round, which is focused on natural gas, are due to be released December 9, and the country appears to be moving ahead with plans to develop its oil and gas industry. The National Oil Corporation (NOC) has implemented three successful EPSA bid rounds since January 2005, and has also concluded lucrative one-off deals with major international oil companies (IOCs) to develop new territories (ref A). The third (i.e., most recent) EPSA round, has attracted almost 60 companies from more than 25 countries as operators and investors. With more than forty IOCs already operating in Libya and oil prices at record highs, it would seem that the sector is the place to be in Libya; however, IOCs describe it as an extremely challenging environment that consistently tests their patience and financial limits. What follows is a summary of some of the most pressing difficulties they face; Post will outline challenges faced by oil service companies septel.

NOC TAKES A HARD LINE

¶3. (SBU) In addition to renegotiating existing agreements to extract additional concessions (ref B), the NOC is taking a hard line in a number of other areas. The general sense in the GOL appears to be that the NOC holds all the cards. NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem put it a bit more diplomatically at the recent World Energy Congress in Rome, where he said the NOC is in a position to dictate policies that reflect "changing conditions" in energy markets. The fierce competition among IOCs to enter the Libyan market and book reserves has fed the NOC's perception that it is a seller's market. It has also led to the reality that Libya features some of the smallest profit margins in the world for IOCs. One senior IOC official, whose company produces oil in partnership with a state-run firm, recently said his firm makes the same profit in a neighboring country in which its production is only one-quarter that of its production in Libya. That dramatic difference underscores the comparatively high operating costs for oil/gas producers in Libya and raises grave doubts about the profitability of deals agreed in the last two EPSA bid rounds, which featured razor-thin production sharing factors, reportedly as low as 6.8 percent of future production in at least one case.

¶4. (SBU) The NOC appears to be actively looking for ways to extract additional concessions, or to cut services previously provided to the IOCs. Part of this may be the result of the fact that the NOC is unable to effectively stave off other players in the bureaucracy, particularly the powerful General People's Committee (GPC) for Manpower, Training and Employment. Led by long-time cabinet minister and regime insider Matug Matug, the ministry has been one of the most active in pressuring IOC's to hire greater numbers of Libyans, many of whom are unqualified, The NOC is striking hard bargains with thin profit margins at the same time that it is asking IOCs to absorb ever-increasing costs -- direct and indirect -- for work done in Libya. The end result is a substantially more difficult and less profitable operating environment that has given IOCs pause to consider how seriously they want to pursue further concessions.

HERE, HAVE A MANAGER ... BETTER YET, HAVE TWO

¶5. (SBU) The increasingly restrictive labor regulations for IOCs and service companies, mandated by the GPC for Manpower, Training and Employment are particularly onerous. The GPC for Manpower recently directed that for every new expatriate hired

by an IOC, one Libyan must be added to the company payroll as

well. It is required that certain key positions in IOCs' local offices - deputy country manager, finance manager and human resources manager - be staffed by Libyans. Companies have tried various ways to comply with these requirements, from hiring competent managers away from NOC-run companies to hiring and immediately marginalizing an "empty suit" employee. Other tactics include adding a lightly disguised expatriate layer atop the position encumbered by a Libyan and stalling with respect to encumbering positions designated for Libyan nationals. Expatriate IOC representatives consistently bemoan the time and training required to bring new Libyan hires up to speed; a lack of candidates with professional fluency in English and other basic skills is a persistent problem. IOC managers stress that they invest considerable time and resources training locally-engaged staff everywhere in the world; however, they describe Libyan employees as being less able upon hiring than most, necessitating longer, more costly training.

VISA WOES CONTINUE TO RANKLE

¶6. (SBU) At the heart of the IOCs' struggle to succeed in Libya's difficult operating environment is the constant difficulty of obtaining visas and work permits. The NOC has increasingly used visas and residency permits as a tool by which to enforce compliance with the "hire Libyan" policy, refusing to issue visas or residency permits to expatriates encumbering deputy manager, finance manager or HR manager slots. Expatriate employees often have to leave the country as their residency permit runs out and remain outside the country for weeks or months while their company works to get the permit renewed. Many companies are forced to use two-week business visas, which may be renewed twice, for up to six total weeks in country. The Byzantine visa requirements put a tremendous administrative burden on IOCs, which typically maintain up to a half-dozen locally-engaged employees to work on nothing but visas and residency permits. The GPC for Manpower's edict that a new Libyan employee be hired for each new expatriate hired has an additional, visa-related wrinkle: for each renewal of a one-year visa for an expatriate employee, an additional Libyan employee must be hired. An expatriate employee staying on for three years could be accountable for the addition of four Libyan employees (one counterpart at hiring plus one for each visa issued). The NOC reportedly opposes this requirement, but has been trumped by the GPC for Manpower.

THE TAX MAN COMETH

¶7. (SBU) Various arms of the Libyan government are also working to extract additional tax revenue from energy sector activities. This is reflected in the imposition of a two percent "Stamp Tax," which will be assessed on all contracts falling under the December EPSA round and all new contracts signed after that. This tax has been sporadically applied to other areas of the economy, specifically where foreign investment is involved, since it first appeared on the books in 1955. An effort by the Libyan Tax Authority to collect it on contracts under previous EPSA rounds was successfully contested by the affected companies, leading to the Tax Authority's announcement that all future contracts would be subject to it. There is also a move afoot to extract additional tax revenue from offshore exploration and drilling. The GOL had previously allowed the servicing of these activities out of Malta, but is now moving to curtail that and to require that they be based out of Libya. The relocation of onshore support services for offshore operations generates considerable income for the Tax Authority; offshore drilling operations can cost up to $750,000 per day for deep-water operations. In addition, the NOC recently decided it would no longer act as an intermediary between the IOCs and the

would no longer act as an intermediary between the IOCs and the Tax Authority. IOCs have been forced to hire additional staff and devote considerable resources to parsing through Libya's amorphous tax system to determine what their obligations are and how to meet them.

RISING SALARIES GUTTING STATE-RUN COMPANIES

¶8. (SBU) Libya's state-owned companies continue to protest what they consider to be unreasonably high rates for expatriate labor, and have attempted to hold a line at the rate schedule employed in 2002 during the sanctions period. Overall salaries

TRIPOLI 00000979 003 OF 003

have risen about ten percent for each of the past two years, but the state-owned operator oil companies (e.g., Waha, Zeuitina) still lag well behind the IOCs in terms of compensation. They are accordingly hemorrhaging seasoned workers, who are taking advantage of high international demand for oil/gas worker to leave Libya for more lucrative opportunities in the Gulf and elsewhere. As the state-run firms fail to offer competitive wages for expatriate workers, they are unable to fill current vacancies. An example is the state-run firm Waha, which has at least 100 expatriate vacancies at present, constituting roughly one third of its expatriate workforce. The situation affects not only these companies and the NOC, but also the IOCs that depend on state-run firms as operating partners. This is the arrangement for almost all companies engaged in production and export activities. The GOL's decision (under Law No. 43 of 2006) to pull back the NOC's procurement offices in London and Dusseldorf (Umm Jawaby and Medoil, respectively) also creates problems for state-run firms, which have had their supply lines interrupted by the disruption of a long-established logistics system and the ongoing movement of more than two hundred state employees from Europe back to Libya.

¶9. (SBU) Comment: Libya's oil and gas sector is in many respects the bellwether for the rest of its emerging economy. The fact that IOCs, which successfully operate in some of the most forbidding environments in the world, are having such a difficult time underscores how far the GOL has to go in terms of reform if it is to achieve its stated goal of attracting greater foreign investment and commercial interest to Libya. We consistently hear expressions of disappointment from senior GOL officials that more U.S. firms have not rushed to enter Libya's market since sanctions were lifted and Libya was removed from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Pernicious requirements such as the "one expat-one Libyan" hiring policy and capricious visa policies, however, do nothing to encourage other U.S. and foreign companies with less international experience than the IOCs to enter the Libyan market. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Crowdleaks: The fight over largest oil reserves in Africa
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI983

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI983 aka Wikileaks id #131070 ?
Subject	OXY EXTENDS FOR 25 YEARS IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 21 Nov 2007 14:23 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI983.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI563
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2511
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0983 3251423
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 211423Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2854
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0230
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0367
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0669
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0343
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3281
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000983

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR MASON; ENERGY FOR ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: OXY EXTENDS FOR 25 YEARS IN LIBYA

¶1. Summary: U.S. energy company Occidental Petroleum is set to announce a 25-year extension of its existing contracts in Libya. This deal will include more than $13 billion in capital investment, and solidifies Occidental's position as a major player and top acreage holder in country. End Summary.

¶2. In a bid to solidify control of its extensive acreage holdings in Libya, Occidential Petroleum (Oxy) is set to announce a 25-year extension to its contracts in Libya. Oxy's CEO is expected to travel to Tripoli during the week of November

CEO is expected to travel to Tripoli during the week of November 25 to sign the new deal with the National Oil Corporation (NOC). Under the terms of the extension, which has been under negotiation between Oxy and the NOC since January 2007, more than a dozen contracts set to expire in the 2009-10 timeframe will be extended for 25 years past 2007. Oxy has agreed to pour more than $13 billion into exploration, field development and infrastructure upgrades as part of this arrangement. Oxy will also reportedly gain additional production rights with its current NOC-owned partner Zuetina, as well as Sirte Basin production from another NOC company, the Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO). The general terms of the new agreement will follow the NOC template used in the most recent Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rounds, although there will reportedly be some flexibility on the terms of the production share of production that Oxy will receive from future discoveries.

¶3. This deal will solidify Oxy's position as one of the top, if not the top, international oil company (IOCs) in Libya. Oxy resumed operations in Libya in July 2005, nineteen years after departing the country following its conclusion of a "standstill" agreement with Libyan authorities. Thanks in part to its success in the January 2005 EPSA bid round (in which it won acreage in nine different areas), Oxy is the largest net total of oil and gas acreage in Libya, with a total exploration and production acreage in Libya of approximately 130,000 square kilometers. Oxy is both the largest holder of onshore acreage in Libya, with over 30 million acres, and also has whole or partial interest over more than 12 million acres of offshore territory, which it either controls outright or as a 35% shareholder in partnership with Australia's Woodside (55%) and UAE's Liwa (10%). Also, although it subcontracts all of its field operations, Oxy is one of the largest employers of American citizens in Libya, with anywhere from 15 to 20 employees at any given time. Libya is a critical market for Oxy. The company expended more than 70% of its worldwide exploration budget in Libya in 2006. The $13 billion work plan envisioned under this new deal will only increase Libya's importance to Oxy.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI984

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	07TRIPOLI984 aka Wikileaks id #131084 ?
Subject	SECRETARY'S INVITATION TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHALGHAM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 21 Nov 2007 14:56 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI984.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2553
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0984 3251456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 211456Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2855
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3282
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000984

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2017
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S INVITATION TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHALGHAM

REF: STATE 157561

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Post conveyed reftel invitation to the MFA via diplomatic note November 17 and P/E Chief followed up with MFA Secretary for the Americas, Dr. Ahmed Fituri, November 21. Fituri said Foreign Minister Shalgham is keen to accept the Secretary's offer and proposes to travel to the U.S. sometime during the period of December 15-20. Post requests guidance as to whether the Secretary's schedule would accommodate a visit by FM Shalgham at that time.

¶2. (C) Fituri also noted that Shalgham will be in Barcelona December 7-8 for the Euro-Africa Dialogue, and that he will travel directly from Barcelona to Paris, where he will accomany Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi on a visit to France

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external w eb sites by the ow ner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI989

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI989 aka Wikileaks id #131505 ?
Subject	LIBYA ESTABLISHES SPECIAL STATE SECURITY COURT TO TRY REGIME DISSIDENTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 26 Nov 2007 10:51 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI989.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5198
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0989/01 3301051
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261051Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2861
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0518
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0567
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0361
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0924
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0672
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0370
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0009
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3288
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000989

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/20/2017
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ESTABLISHES SPECIAL STATE SECURITY COURT TO TRY REGIME DISSIDENTS

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 158, (B) TRIPOLI 159, (C) TRIPOLI 160, (D) TRIPOLI 218, (E) TRIPOLI 657, (F) TRIPOLI 705

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The GOL quietly established a state security court of appeals on/about August 13, apparently for the short-term purpose of hearing the case of twelve self-described regime dissidents detained since February 16 for planning a peaceful demonstration in Tripoli calling for multiparty

elections. The new court held an additional hearing on the dissidents' case November 6. The dissidents, led by physician Idriss Boufayed, began a hunger strike on October 30 to protest their lengthy pre-trial detention. Opposition groups allege the twelve have faced "severe torture" in Libyan custody, including lengthy detention in small underground cells. End summary.

LIBYA ESTABLISHES STATE SECURITY COURT

¶2. (SBU) According to Libyan Human Rights Solidarity (LHRS), a Libyan opposition group operating in Europe that relies on the Internet to disseminate information inside Libya, the GOL-affiliated Higher Judicial Council announced the creation of a state security court of appeals on August 13. On October 17, LHRS posted on its site an apparently authentic order bearing the seal and letterhead of the Higher Judicial Council formally creating the state security court. According to the order, the court's bailiwick comprises hearing cases derived from three laws: a 1975 amendment to Law 80 of the penal code that introduced the death penalty for offences against the state; the 1972 law 71 which stipulates the death penalty for "any form of group activity based on a political ideology opposed to the principles of the September 1, 1969 revolution"; and a revolutionary committee decision from 1969 prohibiting peaceful instances of political opposition. According to LHRS, cases under the new court will be conducted in secret and lawyers will be denied access to clients before their trial. In a statement, LHRS likened the new court to the notorious People's Courts, an extra-judicial entity established to punish political crimes that was formally dismantled in 2005.

SECURITY COURT HEARS CASE OF TWELVE REGIME DISSIDENTS

¶3. (S) The state security court first heard the case against Idriss Boufayed, al-Mahdi Hameed, and ten other self-described regime dissidents November 6. As described ref A-D, the twelve dissidents were initially arrested on February 16 following a meeting with an officer at U.S. Embassy Tripoli and in advance of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli calling for multiparty elections. They face charges of advocating the overthrow of the government, illegal weapons possession, and illegal contact with a representative of a foreign government, each of which potentially carries the death penalty. The GOL formally protested, claiming that Emboff's meeting with the dissidents constituted "inappropriate" behavior (ref E - NOTAL, and previous).

¶4. (SBU) According to witnesses at the November 6 hearing, two defendants -- Juma'a Boufayed (believed to be the brother of group leader Idriss Boufayed) and Abdulrahman al-Qataywi -- did not appear in court. An earlier hearing scheduled for August 4 was postponed indefinitely by a Tripoli criminal court without explanation (ref F). According to Libyan opposition groups resident outside the country, the court allowed the defendents to attend an opening session of the hearing and allowed Idriss Boufayed to make a statement attesting to the defendents' "mistreatment" in Libyan detention. Following Boufayed's statement, the defendants and public were removed from the courtroom while the session continued. A follow-up hearing was scheduled for November 20.

DISSIDENTS GO ON HUNGER STRIKE

¶5. (SBU) Opposition groups also report that on/about October 30, Boufayed and his co-defendents, divided between the Ayn Zara and Jadida prisons in Tripoli, began a hunger strike. As of November 17, the hunger strike was reportedly still ongoing. The purpose of the hunger strike is to protest against repeated delays in convening a meaningful hearing in the case against the fourteen defendants. One defendant, the popular opposition writer Jamal al-Hajj, told a website based in London that he was refusing to eat "because I am innocent~ nothing in Libyan law

condemns me."

TRIPOLI 00000989 002 OF 002

OPPOSITION GROUPS CONTINUE TO ALLEGE TORTURE

¶6. (SBU) Opposition groups have continuously reported that the self-styled anti-Qadhafi dissidents have been tortured while in Libyan detention. On November 17, the popular UK-based opposition journal "Libya al-Mustaqbil" reported that the dissidents faced "severe torture" during the first five months (February to July 2007) of their detention, including being locked in pairs in extremely small (less than 4 cubic meters) underground cells.

¶7. (S) Comment: Apparently mindful of potential international condemnation of its imprisonment of peaceful dissidents, the GOL has sought to manage the trial quietly. An effort by the Swiss Ambassador in August to rally members of the diplomatic corps to press the GOL to allow foreign observers of the trial proceedings failed to gain traction, in part because the GOL strongly cautioned the diplomatic corps against pursuing such access. (Note: Idriss Boufayed is a Swiss permanent resident; one of the other detainees is a Danish-Libyan dual citizen. End note.) The GOL has generally refused to discuss the case with diplomats, claiming that it is a strictly internal matter. The regular Internet postings of LHRS and Libya al-Mustaqbil currently constitute the best source of information about developments in the case. The fact that LHRS was able to secure a copy of the presumably secret order establishing the state security court suggests that the dissident groups enjoy access to and the sympathies of at least some GOL officials. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI993

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI993 aka Wikileaks id #131574 ?
Subject	MINISTERIAL DELEGATIONS TO WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CONFERENCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 26 Nov 2007 15:28 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI993.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5514
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0993 3301528
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 261528Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2867
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3294
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000993

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR OES (HILL, SPECHT), NEA/MAG AND NEA/RA (LAWSON)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , SENV *[Environmental Affairs]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , KGHG *[Global Climate Change]* , KSCA *[Science Counselors and Attachés]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MINISTERIAL DELEGATIONS TO WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CONFERENCE

REF: A) STATE 138248, B) GODFREY-LAWSON E-MAIL 11/21/2007

Per reftel, Post requests that Libya be added to the list of invitees for the March 2008 Washington International Renewable Energy Conference (WIREC). The GOL has demonstrated keen interest in developing its renewable energy sector and could represent a sizeable market for renewable technologies in the future. In addition, scientific engagement and cooperation have constituted an important component of the re-establishment of formal U.S.-Libyan diplomatic ties; participation by the GOL in the WIREC 2008 event would represent another significant step in the re-establishment of regular government-to-government ties outside the strictly political sphere.

MILAM

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #07TRIPOLI999

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	07TRIPOLI999 aka Wikileaks id #131739 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ORGANIZATION ISSUES STATEMENT OPPOSING AFRICOM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 27 Nov 2007 15:20 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2007/11/07TRIPOLI999.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

P 271520Z NOV 07
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2875
INFO AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
OSD WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000999

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PMIL, PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ORGANIZATION ISSUES STATEMENT OPPOSING AFRICOM

¶1. On November 21, the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (Cen-Sad) issued a statement at its Tripoli headquarters "categorically rejecting" Africom and any foreign military presence in any Cen-Sad member country. The statement noted that Cen-Sad represents roughly half of Africa's territory and population. In the statement, Cen-Sad expressed its full support for a statement issued by the South African Minister of Defense rejecting any foreign military presence in Africa.

¶2. Comment: Created in the Libyan coastal town of Sirte in February 1998, Cen-Sad includes 25 members from Senegal to Somalia. Originally conceived to focus on infrastructure investments in northern Africa, Cen-Sad now serves as a Libyan-led political coordination mechanism operating in parallel to the African Union. Cen-Sad's opposition to Africom echoes long-standing GOL objections to the presence of foreign forces on the African continent and reflects Libya's experience under Italian occupation and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's attendant anti-foreign rhetoric. End comment.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI104

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI104 aka Wikileaks id #140528 ?
Subject	NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 8 Feb 2008 11:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI104.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

VZCZCXRO2945
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0104/01 0391105
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081105Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3056
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0990
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0381
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 0028
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0720
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3535

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

EMBASSIES ROME/BERLIN: PLS PASS TO NEA A/S WELCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/8/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEW DEVELOPMENTS ON FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: A) STATE 8768, B) STATE 10444, C) TRIPOLI 55, D) TRIPOLI 90, E) TRIPOLI 93, F) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 02/05/2008

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Echoing a letter posted on the Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) website, the QDF's Executive Director, Dr. Youssef Sawani, told CDA February 7 that Fathi el-Jahmi's (FAJ's) family could take him home for treatment (but had so far declined to do so) and that NGO Human Rights Watch and an international, independent medical team may travel to Libya to assess FAJ's condition. He also offered to facilitate a visit by U.S. Emboffs to FAJ. Sawani maintained that FAJ is

being held at the Tripoli Medical Center, where he receives "excellent" care, and is not/not being held at a prison detention facility. Sawani stressed that FAJ's brother, U.S.-based Mohammed el-Jahmi, has sought to exploit FAJ's case to embarrass the GOL. End summary.

¶2. (U) The Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Executive Director, Dr. Youssef Sawani, authored a response to a recent letter from NGO Human Rights Watch concerning Fathi el-Jahmi (FAJ), which was posted on the QDF's Arabic-language website February 6 (informal translation below at para 6). Main points of the letter are as follows:

- Contrary to media reports and allegations by some members of FAJ's family, FAJ has been held at the Tripoli Medical Center (not/not at a prison facility) since his conviction;

- The QDF has facilitated access to FAJ for members of his family, including a visit as recently as last week by his son, Mohammed;

- The QDF, pursuant to a personal suggestion by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, told the family FAJ could be taken from the hospital to his home for treatment;

- The family has not accepted the offer, allegedly because some members of FAJ's family " ... wanted to exploit the case for political purposes";

- The QDF disputes the accuracy of HRW's report and invites the organization to verify FAJ's condition directly (i.e., invites them to Libya to do so).

¶3. (C) In addition to inviting HRW to visit Libya, Sawani said in a subsequent telcon with the CDA February 7 that the GOL was prepared to arrange a visit by U.S. Embassy officers to FAJ in hospital, and to facilitate a visit by an independent international medical team to assess FAJ's condition. He cautioned that Emboffs should not make their affiliation clear to avoid having the visit "misused" by FAJ family members eager to exploit his case for political purposes.

¶4.(C) Comment: The QDF's invitation to HRW and independent physicians to visit FAJ in Libya is a positive step. It seems that Saif al-Islam has concluded that addressing this case in a transparent manner is a better course of action than continued stonewalling (which has been the GOL's response so far). Saif told us that he has discussed the matter with his father, and therefore he presumably has the Leader's support. A successful visit by HRW and/or PHR would result in FAJ's return to his family with appropriate medical care. It would also potentially lay the foundation for future cooperation between HRW/PHR and the QDF on Libyan human rights issues. On the other hand, it would be easy for HRW/PHR to burn bridges here, i.e., through strident or unsubstantiated public statements or some other action (Saif's chief of staff told CDA, for instance, that when PHR last visited, one of the physicians had taped a conversation with FAJ that contained a political message and tried to take it out of the country; PHR, therefore, may not be the optimal choice for a medical team). Given the QDF's offer to allow HRW and physicians to meet with FAJ and facilitate his return to his family, we would not recommend pursuing a visit by an embassy officer at this time, which may risk further politicizing the case to FAJ's detriment. End comment.

¶5. (U) Informal translation of QDF letter follows:

(Begin text) HR groups and media outlest have published much information over thepast few days on Fathi el-Jahmi. The QDF, to clarify, confirms that FAJ has not been sentenced to prison since his trial began, but rather has been living in a house with full medical care.

TRIPOLI 00000104 002 OF 002

QDF notes that Physicians for Human Rights and the World Federation of Health Organizations have visited el-Jahmi and examined him medically. These groups expressed their thanks to the QDF for facilitating the visits.

After the verdict against el-Jahmi, which confirmed that he was not mentally balanced, el-Jahmi was hospitalized in the Tripoli Medical Center on court order. He has been there since the verdict to the present.

The QDF is committed to humanitarian principles and, owing to human rights concerns, enabled one of el-Jahmi's sons, Mohammed, to visit him many times, most recently last week; however, the QDF went even further. The QDF offered to the family that el-Jahmi return to his family home under medical treatment, but the family did not accept this suggestion, especially because some members of el-Jahmi's family wanted to exploit the case for political purposes.

At a time in which the QDF has shown continued interest in FAJ's health and psychological condition and maintained a continuing relationship with FAJ's family, QDF was surprised by the recently published Human Rights Watch report (on January 30) stating that FAJ is seriously ill and required independent medical care.

The QDF stresses the inaccuracy of the HRW report and calls on HRW to verify its claims directly. (End text of letter)
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI106

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI106 aka Wikileaks id #140535 ?
Subject	LIBYAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAIR PREVIEWS UPCOMING PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SESSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 8 Feb 2008 11:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI106.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI166 , 09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI212
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2979
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0106/01 0391138
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081138Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3059
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0383
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0030
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0414
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0722
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0269
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0114
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3538
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000106

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN FOREIGN AFFAIRS CHAIR PREVIEWS UPCOMING PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SESSION

TRIPOLI 00000106 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The head of the foreign affairs committee of Libya's national parliament told CDA February 4 that he expects a "heated" debate during the General People's Congress' (GPC)

a "heated" debate during the General People's Congress' (GPC) upcoming annual session, scheduled for February 20 - March 1, focusing on public sector employment, teachers, and foreign policy. Acknowledging widespread reports that a cabinet shuffle is likely, the GPC's Secretary for Foreign Affairs Suleiman al-Shahumi spoke out strongly in defense of FM Shalgham, rumored to be among those who may lose his seat, and Shalgham's role promoting good relations with the United States. Shahumi also provided a detailed overview of how Libya's unusual government operates, noting the "theoretically democratic" system struggles with an under-educated populace and enduring tribal rivalries. He told CDA the U.S. should do more to push bilateral relations forward, starting with providing full consular services for Libyans in Tripoli. End Summary.

SHAHUMI EXPECTS A "HARD" GPC SESSION

¶2. (C) Shahumi previewed for CDA the annual meeting of the General People's Congress, tentatively scheduled for February 20 to March 1. He expected a "hard session" based on the quantity of proposals put forward by the 468 Basic People's Congresses (BPC's). (Note: the BPC's, which are local-level councils, convened in mid January and put forward their proposals late last month. End note.) He singled out the Manpower and Basic Education Ministries for particular criticism, noting that many BPCs had referred to the GPC complaints about senior-level appointments, reductions in the number of public sector jobs, and changes to teachers' requirements that have dramatically reduced the number of qualified teachers in Libya.

¶3. (C) On foreign policy, Shahumi said he expected a "heated debate" but spoke out strongly in defense of FM Abdurrahman Shalgham. Stressing that the MFA has no policy-making role, he said the MFA, under FM Shalgham, has "correctly" implemented Libya's foreign policy as envisioned by the GPC and, ultimately, "the people." "We are very happy with Shalgham's performance," he said. Shahumi noted that Shalgham alone cannot speed up development of the U.S.-Libya relationship, and said the U.S. should do more, such as allowing Libyans to apply for visas in Tripoli. CDA responded that the U.S. hopes to offer full consular services by January 2009 at a temporary embassy site currently under construction.

AN OVERVIEW OF LIBYA'S POLITICAL SYSTEM

¶4. (SBU) Shahumi also briefed CDA on Libya's system of cascading People's Congresses. A single, national General People's Congress (GPC) is the highest policy formation body in the country, he explained. Membership consists of the heads of 468 municipal Basic People's Congresses (BPCs). The GPC has two functions: it debates and implements recommendations of the 468 BPCs, and it appoints and evaluates the national executive authority, the General People's Committee (i.e., the cabinet).

¶5. (SBU) BPC meetings have been on-going throughout Libya since mid-January, he said. The BPCs are distributed based on population -- Tripoli has 35 -- and differ in appearance from community to community; however, all have common responsibilities to debate the national budget, propose new legislation, and review the conduct of the national executive authority, the General People's Committee. BPCs cannot make final decisions, but they can refer notes for consideration by the national GPC.

¶6. (SBU) Shahumi spoke at length on the GPC's role in evaluating cabinet officials to ensure they are appropriately implementing the GPC's policies. On the basis of notes assembled from the 468 BPCs, the GPC, acting as the "prosecution," questions cabinet officials on their performance. Officials are given an opportunity to respond and individual members of the GPC are allowed to ask follow-up questions. If the GPC accepts the cabinet official's justification for his conduct, the official may remain in his position with or without

some form of punishment short of termination. If not, the official can either resign or be involuntary terminated by the

GPC. Pressed by CDA, Shahumi clarified that the GPC does not actually vote on individual cabinet appointments but arrives at decisions by consensus.

¶7. (SBU) In addition, the GPC elects an eight-member Secretariat to perform GPC functions between annual meetings of

SIPDIS
the full Congress. The Secretariat consists of a Secretary-General (the head of state equivalent), a Deputy

SIPDIS
Secretary-General, a Secretary for Foreign Affairs (Shahumi), a

SIPDIS
Secretary for the People's Congresses, a Secretary for the

SIPDIS
People's Committee, a Secretary for Legal Affairs, a Secretary for Women's Affairs, and a Secretary for Trade Unions. The Secretariat oversees the conduct of the General People's

SIPDIS
Committee when the GPC is not in session.

ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES TO LIBYA'S UNUSUAL SYSTEM

¶8. (SBU) Shahumi conceded Libya's unusual system has both advantages and disadvantages. The GPC system is "theoretically democratic, but there are shortcomings," he said. Shahumi cited a lack of political education and enduring personal and tribal rivalries has obstacles to the smooth functioning of the People's Congresses. Referring to the U.S. presidential primary, Shahumi joked, "at least it's better than parties."

POLITICAL DIFFICULTIES REMAIN IN U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS

¶9. (C) On bilateral issues, Shahumi offered the GOL's familiar refrain that the U.S. has not sufficiently compensated Libya for its 2003 WMD renunciation; however, Libya had "exercised its sovereignty" in choosing to re-engage with the U.S. He said that, while political will within the Libyan leadership exists to move forward, "political difficulties" obstruct the restoration of "normal" relations. He cited the lack of full consular services for Libyan citizens in Tripoli, supposedly unfulfilled U.S. promises to support the treatment of HIV/AIDS, and the absence of major health equipment donations as examples of insufficient progress from the U.S. side. Shahumi opined that the GOL faces pressures from "inside and outside" (i.e., within Libyan political circles and from regional players) on the U.S.-Libya relationship and that it "shouldn't be this way;" however, he offered no further practical suggestions for improvement.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI113

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI113 aka Wikileaks id #141053 ?
Subject	REACTION TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 12 Feb 2008 16:29 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI113.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO6062
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0113/01 0431629
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121629Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3069
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3548
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000113

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSONSENSITIVE, SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: REACTION TO VICTIMS OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION

TRIPOLI 00000113 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Recent legislation making it easier for plaintiffs in terrorism-related lawsuits to seize foreign government-owned assets to satisfy U.S. court judgments has caused concern among U.S. firms partnered with Libyan companies (especially in the energy sector), and provoked a sharply negative reaction from the GOL. U.S. companies are attempting to clarify and reduce their potential exposure under section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (aka, "the Lautenberg Amendment"). The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) has informed American oil companies that it is "their

problem" to solve, and has begun requiring U.S. and other companies to conduct all operations in non-dollar denominations. A senior MFA official warned the CDA that this law could set back US-Libyan relations. The MFA has pressed European governments not to cooperate with U.S. judicial efforts to attach Libyan assets in Europe under the law. End summary.

OIL PRODUCING & OIL SERVICES COMPANIES AT GREATEST RISK

¶2. (SBU) U.S. companies participating in joint venture partnerships with Libyan national oil companies assess themselves as being at greatest risk under section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act. This list includes Occidental, ConocoPhillips, Marathon and Amerada Hess. These companies are involved in jointly developing Libyan oilfields and in extracting and lifting crude oil. The three U.S. partners in the Oasis Group (Marathon, ConocoPhillips and Amerada Hess, who are partnered with Libyan state firm Waha) pay $2 million/month to the GOL in operating fees, and $100 million/month in taxes and royalties. Company reps assess that these payments -- as well as jointly-held facilities and equipment -- would be exposed to court-ordered attachment and seizure under section 1083. U.S. oil service companies, such as Halliburton, may also be exposed, according to local company reps, and most service companies have frozen further expansion until the risks are clarified. Company reps have expressed concern to us that their GOL partner companies would view any U.S. court-ordered attachments of payments or equipment as a breach of contract, potentially leading to termination of their work in Libya.

¶3.(SBU) U.S. companies engaged exclusively in the exploration (as distinct from production), such as Chevron and ExxonMobil, assess themselves to be subject to less risk for the moment, since they make no regular payments to the GOL that would be subject to attachment (the signing bonuses agreed in connection with winning their Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) agreements have already been paid to the GOL, and day-to-day exploration work is contracted out to largely non-GOL entities). Nevertheless, company reps say that they are concerned about the longer-term impact of this legislation on their future plans in Libya.

NOC REACTS SWIFTLY

4 (SBU) Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) has instructed all international partner companies to cease conducting transactions in U.S. dollars. U.S. oil company contacts have privately told us that the NOC's intent was to reduce its exposure to U.S. courts, since dollar transactions are routed through the U.S. financial system. The edict has disrupted the payments system in the energy sector, which has traditionally used the dollar.

¶5. (SBU) The NOC's chairman, Shukri Ghanem, informed U.S. firms in late January that they were "on their own" to resolve the problems caused by the new legislation, hinting that the firms would suffer the consequences for any U.S. court-ordered disruption of their operations in Libya. U.S. company reps have told us that they believe that the NOC could find them in breach of their contractual obligations if U.S. courts disrupt their monthly payment of operational fees to the NOC.

GOL NOT PLEASED

¶6. (SBU) Senior MFA adviser Abdelati Obeidi told CDA that the GOL viewed the Act as a potentially serious setback to US-Libyan relations. He said the GOL understood that the initiative had come from the Congress, but did not understand why the Administration failed to block it, or at least its application to Libya, as it had done in the case of Iraq.

¶7. (SBU) Separately, according to European and ex-Soviet bloc diplomats in Tripoli, the GOL has pressed their governments not to cooperate with any U.S. judicial efforts to attachment Libyan

TRIPOLI 00000113 002.2 OF 002

assets in Europe under the Act. One European diplomat expressed surprise at the sharp edge of the Libyan demarche, noting that their GOL interlocutor had threatened unspecified consequences for the country's commercial interests in Libya if the country facilitated seizure of Libyan assets pursuant to U.S. claims.

¶8. (SBU) Comment: The enactment of section 1083, together with the mid-January $6 billion U.S. court judgment against Libya in the UTA airliner case, has caused deep concern among U.S. energy companies operating in Libya and consternation within the GOL. The companies are analyzing their exposure; the GOL is misinterpreting these developments as deliberate slights or, in the words of Obeidi, "a return to the era of sanctions." Both are waiting to see how section 1083 will be applied, hoping, of course, that it will not be. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Three Little Words: WikiLeaks, Libya, Oil
- Kickbacks between Libya and the west have helped Gaddafi cling to power
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI119

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI119 aka Wikileaks id #141473 ?
Subject	GOL POSTPONES ISN VISIT TO LIBYA'S RABTA SITE, TRILATERAL U.S.-U.K.-LIBYA TALKS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 Feb 2008 15:13 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI119.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI466
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8283
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0119 0451513
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141513Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3079
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0730
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0074
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3558
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000119

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/CBC (MAHLEY, FERGUSON), NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/14/2018
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya] , CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] , UK [United Kingdom]
SUBJECT: GOL POSTPONES ISN VISIT TO LIBYA'S RABTA SITE, TRILATERAL
U.S.-U.K.-LIBYA TALKS

REF: A) STATE 9463, B) GODFREY-FERGUSON EMAIL 02/12/08

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)



¶1.   (S) Per ref A, post has been working with the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) to coordinate ISN DAS Mahley's
proposed visit to Libya February 17-20, in conjunction with a
parallel visit by a U.K. team, to discuss chemical
weapons-related issues, including modification of the Rabta
plant conversion proposal, and missile issues related to
replacement of Libya's SCUD-B missile force.
```

replacement of Libya's SCUD B missile force.

¶2. (S) As reported ref B, post received a diplomatic note February 12 indicating the GOL's position that tri-lateral U.S.-U.K.-Libya talks undertaken during the visit be restricted to chemical weapons issues and not/not include discussions of missile issues. MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari subsequently called P/E Chief Feb 13 and said that MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi had instructed that the proposed visit to the Rabta site (which was to include U.S., U.K., Italian, French and Russian representatives) and related trilateral U.S.-U.K.-Libya talks be postponed altogether. Conveying points from Obeidi, Matari said the GOL's initial proposal had been for a site visit to Rabta; the GOL was "not ready" for discussions on other issues and preferred that DAS Mahley's be postponed. Post subsequently received a diplomatic note formally conveying the GOL's points (text below at para 5).

¶3. (S) U.K. Ambassador Sir Vincent Fean told CDA February 13 that in his meeting with Obeidi earlier the same day, Obeidi underscored that the GOL was "keen" to facilitate a technical visit focused on the Rabta facility and modification of the enclosure surrounding it. Obeidi told Fean the U.S. then requested that the scope of the visit be broadened to include other TSCC-related issues, which the GOL was not prepared to discuss at this time. (Note: The U.K. request to the GOL for trilateral meetings separate from the Rabta site visit actually pre-dated our request. End note.) Pressed by Fean, Obeidi said Libya was not ready to discuss WMD and missiles with the UK and U.S. "while other issues were still outstanding". Fean interpreted Obeidi's remark to be a reference to the terrorism-related legal claims against Libya in the United States and recent legislation (section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, aka the "Lautenberg amendment") making it easier for U.S. plaintiffs to seize Libyan government assets in such cases.

¶4. (S) Comment: The GOL's cancellation of the ISN visit and Obeidi's remarks to Fean are a clear signal of dissatisfaction with U.S. terrorism-related lawsuits against Libya (i.e., La Belle, UTA, Pan Am 103) and the passage and signing into law of the "Lautenberg amendment." End comment.

¶5. (S/NF) Begin text of diplomatic note:

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations Office) presents its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya and, referring to the Embassy's note #092/08 dated February 4, 2008 regarding a prospective visit to Libya by a U.S.-U.K. team February 17-19, 2008 to conduct trilateral talks on the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Prohibition Convention (CWPC) and to visit the Rabta plant, has the honor to inform the esteemed Embassy of the postponement of this visit to a later date that will be arranged in diplomatic channels.

The GPCFLIC avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed U.S. Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

Tripoli, Libya
February 13, 2008

End text of diplomatic note

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI12

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI12 aka Wikileaks id #136681 ?
Subject	GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES "IDENTICAL" VIEWS ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & LEBANON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 9 Jan 2008 09:57 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI12.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI231
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7625
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0012/01 0090957
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 090957Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2978
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0404
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0710
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3419
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/9/2028
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KTFN [Terrorism Finance Traffic] ,
KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] ,
EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , IR [Iran] , IZ [Iraq] , LE [Lebanon] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES
"IDENTICAL" VIEWS ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & LEBANON

REF: LONDON 0070

TRIPOLI 00000012  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: William B. Milam, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (S) Summary: An Iranian delegation led by First Vice-President Davoudi, the highest ranking Iranian official to visit in 25 years, recently concluded a number of cooperation agreements in Tripoli. In public remarks, GOL officials expressed support for a peaceful Iranian nuclear program and characterized Iranian and Libyan views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon as "identical", apparently contradicting what Foreign Minister Shalgham told interlocutors during his recent visit to Washington. Private readouts suggest that both Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham told Davoudi that the GOL opposes a third sanctions resolution on Iran, contradicting Shalgham's assurances to Washington interlocutors. Public and private readouts suggest Iran is particularly focused on joint investment activity and cooperation between the two sides' central banks, a potentially worrying development. End summary.

HIGHEST LEVEL IRANIAN VISIT IN 25 YEARS

¶2. (U) Iran's First Vice-President, Pervez Davoudi, headed a high-level Iranian delegation that visited Tripoli December 26-27 under the auspices of the twelth session of the joint Libya-Iran Economic Commission. Press reports indicate that Davoudi is the highest ranking Iranian official to visit Libya in 25 years. Iran's Minister for Housing and Urban Planning, Mohamed Saidi Kia, and Minister of Economy and Finance, Davoud Danesh-Jafari, accompanied Davoudi.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM; U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW FROM IRAQ

¶3. (SBU) Libya's state-controlled media focused on Iran's nuclear program - emphasizing its right to pursue peaceful uses of atomic energy - and economic cooperation. In his public remarks, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi stressed Libya's support for Iran's "legal and principled stands on its peaceful nuclear activities". Al-Mahmoudi noted publicly that Libya and Iran share the view that the U.S. "occupation" of Iraq has destabilized the region. Echoing Davoudi's remarks, he expressed support for Iraq's territorial integrity and its people and called for the prompt withdrawal of U.S. forces, a subject he said featured prominently in the two sides' private discussions. In remarks carried in the Libyan press, Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham said the GOL and Iran share "identical" views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon. (Note: Contradicting what we understand Shalgham conveyed to U/S Burns and NEA A/S Welch during his meetings with them January 3 in Washington. End note.)

QADHAFI FOCUSES ON UNSC SANCTIONS ON IRAN ...

¶4. (S) Citing a readout from Iranian DCM Mohammed Hossein Mirzaee, Egyptian Charge d'Affaires Ahmed Abdel-Halim told A/DCM January 6 that Davoudi's visit to Tripoli was a follow-on to Libyan PM al-Mahmoudi's stop in Tehran in May 2007. Mirzaee confirmed that Davoudi met with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, clarifying conflicting press accounts as to whether such had occurred. According to Mirzaee, al-Qadhafi and Davoudi discussed further possible sanctions on Iran in light of Libya's current UNSC Presidency. Al-Qadhafi reportedly assured Davoudi that Libya opposes a third sanctions resolution on Iran. According to Mirzaee, Shalgham took the same position in his discussions with Davoudi. (Note: Contradicting what we understand Shalgham told U/S Burns in Washington January 3, and agreeing with what we understand he told U.K. Foreign Secretary David Miliband in London January 7 (reftel). End note.)

¶5. (S) Mirzaee stressed to his Egyptian interlocutor that neither al-Qadhafi nor Shalgham had offered to play a role in mediating between Iran and the USG and international community on the nuclear file. (Note: Again, contradicting what we understand Shalgham told U/S Burns on January 3. End note.) According to Mirzaee, Libya's experience

is not analogous to Iran's because Libya had WMD aspirations, while Iran maintains that it only seeks civilian applications of nuclear technology.

... AND ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & IMAM MUSA SADR CASE

¶6. (C) Qadhafi reportedly spent considerable time denouncing the U.S. "occupation" of Iraq and continuing Israeli "aggression" against Palestinians. He apparently treated Davoudi to a lengthy discourse on his "Isratine" proposal for a one-state

TRIPOLI 00000012 002.2 OF 002

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Echoing Shalgham's public remarks, Qadhafi reportedly assured Davoudi that the GOL shares Iran's views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon.

¶7. (C) Qadhafi reportedly raised with Davoudi the case of Lebanese Shi'a cleric Imam Musa Sadr, who disappeared during a visit to Libya in August 1978. Qadhafi reportedly complained that Lebanese officials had recently raised the case again and asked for Iran's assistance in smoothing over the issue. (Note: Lebanese-Libyan official relations have remain strained since Sadr's disappearance. End note.) Noting that Iran and Libya have a "separate channel" for dealing with the contentious issue of Sadr's disappearance, Mirzaee stressed to Abdel-Halim that Iran tries to limit the extent to which the matter bears on bilateral Iran-Libya relations. Mirzaee complained that Lebanon's insistence on pursuing the matter has periodically led to Iranian-Lebanese contretemps.

10 AGREEMENTS SIGNED; JOINT BANKING, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS KEY

¶8. (U) During the visit, the two sides announced they would soon establish a joint political committee at the ministerial level and signed 10 agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOU's) covering investment, banking, higher education, maritime transport, fishing, tourism cultural exchanges and media cooperation. Two key MOU's provide a framework for cooperation between the central banks of Libya and Iran and the establishment of a joint investment entity by Libya's National Investment Promotion Office and its Iranian counterpart. Shalgham emphasized the expectation that the activities of the joint political committee would facilitate greater Iranian participation in Libya's economic development, particularly in the areas of finance and infrastructure development. Claiming that expansion of ties with African countries is a key Iranian foreign policy priority, Davoudi nonetheless stressed that economic and other, unspecified, Libyan-Iranian cooperation would also extend to Central Asia and Latin America.

INVESTMENT, FINANCE KEY FROM IRAN'S PERSPECTIVE

¶9. (C) Mirzaee told Abdel-Halim that from Iran's perspective the most significant agreement was that which established a joint Libyan-Iranian investment entity, to be capitalized with money via each country's central bank, for investments in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America. Iran also viewed increased cooperation between the two sides' central banks as an important development, in part because Iran's access to international banking and finance has become increasingly difficult.

¶10. (S) Comment: The apparent disconnect between Shalgham's public and private comments in Tripoli and what he said in Washington is troubling, the more so since the readout from his meeting with U.K. FS Miliband seems to corroborate reports here that the GOL opposes further sanctions against Iran. Iranian officials' emphasis on joint investment projects and central bank cooperation is an interesting and potentially worrying development that Post will continue to track. End comment.

MILAM

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI120

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI120 aka Wikileaks id #141633 ?
Subject	EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 15 Feb 2008 12:50 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI120.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI307 , 08TRIPOLI430 , 08TRIPOLI500 , 09TRIPOLI190
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO9451
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0120/01 0461250
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 151250Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3080
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0731
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0420
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0011
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3559
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000120

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/15/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , IZ *[Iraq]*
SUBJECT: EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA

TRIPOLI 00000120 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A U.S.-Libyan dual national who regularly visits family members in eastern Libya recently described for us

social, political and economic factors that have contributed to and facilitated participation by a disproportionately large number of eastern Libya's native sons in "martyrdom acts" and other insurgency operations in Libya and Iraq. A reportedly deliberate GOL policy to keep the east poor as a means by which to limit the potential political threat to Qadhafi's regime has helped fuel the perception among many young eastern Libyan men that they have nothing to lose by participating in extremist violence at home and in Iraq. The prospect of financial compensation for their impoverished families motivates some, but local pride in eastern Libya's historical role as a locus of opposition to occupying forces of various stripes is also an important factor. The fact that eastern Libyan mosques are more numerous and remote, together with tight local social networks, has reportedly circumscribed the ability of GOL security organizations to monitor and control the activities of radical imams as effectively as elsewhere in Libya. Unlike the rest of the country, sermons in eastern Libyan mosques are laced with phraseology urging worshippers to support jihad in Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation or financial contributions. While senior regime figures, including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, appear to have recognized that the east merits more attention and investment, the reported ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad despite GOL security organizations' efforts suggests that claims by senior GOL officials that the east is under control may be overstated. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) In a meeting February 5, U.S.-Libyan dual national Omar Turbi (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that eastern Libya remains a locus of extremist activity over which GOL security services have comparatively limited control. Turbi is a U.S.-based businessman who was born and raised in Libya, and who has visited Libya about a dozen times in each of the past four years. Much of his immediate and extended family live in and around Benghazi and Derna; he visited both cities four times during the past calendar year.

GOL KEEPS EAST POOR TO KEEP IT POLITICALLY DISENFRANCHISED ...

¶3. (S/NF) Turbi said eastern Libya suffers from a disproportionately high level of unemployment, particularly for young men between the ages of 18 and 34. "At least half" of the young men in that demographic are unemployed or only intermittently employed. The situation reflects in part the Qadhafi regime's belief that if it keeps the east poor enough, it will be unable to mount any serious political opposition to the regime. Explaining the rationale, he cited a Libyan proverb: "If you treat them like dogs, they will follow you like dogs".

... BUT RECENT VIOLENCE SUGGESTS GOL'S APPROACH FLAWED

¶4. (S/NF) Turbi said recent events in Benghazi and Derna suggest that the GOL's premise is flawed. Family members with whom he is in regular contact by email and telephone told him during his visit there in December that there were violent clashes between local extremists and GOL elements late last year. In one incident, extremists opened fire in proximity to a Benghazi hospital in connection with their attempts to secure medical assistance for a sick or injured comrade. In another, there was an explosion or an exchange of gunfire (accounts differed among his relatives) at a traffic circle in a Benghazi exurb in connection with an attempt by a police officer to stop a vehicle being used by extremists. (Note: Both incidents were reported late last year in other channels. This is the first mention we've heard of these events from other sources. End note.) Turbi's relatives also offered non-specific accounts of raids by extremists, whom they understood to be affiliated with the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, on police and military installations to secure weapons.

"NOTHING TO LOSE"

¶5. (S/NF) Citing conversations with relatives, Turbi said the unemployed, disenfranchised young men of eastern Libya "have nothing to lose" and are therefore "willing to sacrifice themselves" for something greater than themselves by engaging in

extremism in the name of religion. "Their lives mean nothing and they know it, so they seek to give meaning to their existence through their deaths", he said. The lack of jobs and dim prospects for future employment, together with increased costs of living, mean that many young men lack the means to marry, leaving them without a key measure of social status and stability in what remains a traditional society. As in parts of neighboring Egypt, the average age at which men marry has increased in many parts of eastern Libya. Many now marry in their early to mid-30's, which would have been considered "middle age" in the not too distant past.

COMPENSATION FOR MARTYRS' FAMILIES AN INCENTIVE FOR SOME

¶6. (S/NF) Turbi flatly stated that some young men, particularly those from more impoverished clans, are motivated by the promise of long-term financial compensation for their families should they complete "martyrdom acts" in Iraq or elsewhere. Noting that incomes in the east are low, he offered that extremist networks are able to incentivize young men to kill themselves by offering comparatively small payments of 150-200 Libyan dinar/month (approximately 120-160 USD/month) to families of "martyrs". (Note: As a point of reference, most government salaries range from 250 to 330 Libyan dinar per month. End note.)

"PERVERSE PRIDE" AS GEOGRAPHICAL LOCUS OF RESISTANCE A DRAW FOR OTHERS

¶7. (S/NF) The fact that the east has been comparatively disenfranchised, together with its historical role as a locus of opposition to the Ottoman and Italian occupations, contribute to a "perverse sense of pride" among eastern Libyans in their role as a main supplier of young men for jihad efforts in Iraq and elsewhere, Turbi said. He recounted a large dinner in Derna hosted by a family friend that he attended in summer 2007. Conversation among the mostly middle-aged male group of guests focused on news that two young men from Derna had recently killed themselves in suicide operations in Iraq. Dinner guests offered a mix of "condolences and congratulations" to the two young men's relatives.

¶8. (S/NF) Turbi said he was struck by the level sentiment against Coalition forces in Iraq, and by the obvious pride the dinner guests took in the fact that two of their native sons had "struck a blow" against "occupying Crusader forces in Iraq". He emphasized that the dinner was one of the relatively few occasions in Libya in which he felt uncomfortable by dint of having U.S. citizenship. In Turbi's view, eastern Libyans are not necessarily anti-American, but are strongly opposed to a U.S. military presence in Iraq or any other Muslim country. In the 1980's, the talk had been directed against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; now, it was focused on the U.S. presence in Iraq.

¶9. (S/NF) Noting that the leader of Libya's resistance against the Italian occupation in the early 20th century, national hero Omar Mukhtar, was from the eastern village of Janzour, Turbi cautioned that it would be a mistake to think that young men from Derna were motivated to undertake suicide operations in Iraq solely by unemployment and the chance to secure a stipend for their families The region had a long, proud history of opposing occupation forces of one stripe or another; its

residents took pride in their willingness to "fight for justice and their faith" despite their relative poverty.

IRAQ SEEN AS A "LOCAL" ISSUE FOR YOUNG EASTERN LIBYANS

¶10. (S/NF) Turbi noted that for many young eastern men, jihad in Iraq was perceived to be a local issue. Among the factors fueling that perception, he pointed to the proselytizing influence of Libyan fighters who had fought in Afghanistan and now recruited young eastern Libyans for operations in Iraq, the influence of Arabic-language satellite television broadcasts, use of the Internet to exchange information and coordinate logistics, and the comparative ease of travel to/from Iraq. During his last visit to the east in December, relatives and friends cited media reports to the effect that Libyans, most of them from Derna and points east, comprised the second largest cohort of foreign fighters identified in documents seized during last September's Objective Massey operation on the Syria-Iraq border. Turbi noted that a majority of those in Derna who raised the issue appeared to take pride in the fact that their small city had contributed disproportionately to the jihad against coalition forces in Iraq.

"CODED" MOSQUE SERMONS MORE RADICAL IN EAST

¶11. (S/NF) Turbi partly attributed the fierce mindset in Benghazi and Derna to the message preached by imams in eastern Libyan mosques, which he said is markedly more radical than that heard in other parts of the country. Turbi makes a point of frequenting mosques whenever he visits Libya as a means to connect with neighbors and relatives and take the political pulse. Sermons in eastern mosques, particularly the Friday 'khutba', are laced with "coded phrases" urging worshippers to support jihad in Iraq and elsewhere through direct participation or financial contributions. The language is often ambiguous enough to be plausibly denied, he said, but for devout Muslims it is clear, incendiary and unambiguously supportive of jihad. Direct and indirect references to "martyrdom operations" were not uncommon. By contrast with mosques in Tripoli and elsewhere in the country, where references to jihad are extremely rare, in Benghazi and Derna they are fairly frequent subjects.

ARCHITECTURE, GEOGRAPHY COMPLICATE GOL CONTROL OF EASTERN MOSQUES

¶12. (S/NF) Part of the difficulty for GOL authorities in controlling eastern mosques is that the most zealous imams tend to preach in small suburban and rural mosques. He mentioned the almost festive atmosphere of one trip, when relatives gathered to travel to a remote rural mosque to hear a "controversial" imam's sermon. Unlike Tripoli, mosques in the east tend to be smaller and more numerous, making it harder to monitor all of them. Architecture and local heritage also play a role: many mosques in the east don't physically resemble traditional mosques elsewhere in the country, reflecting in part the pseudo-secret tradition of the Sanussi lodges that evolved in eastern Libya in the mid-19th century. The fact that many eastern mosques are less readily identifiable make it harder for GOL security organizations to identify them and easier to hold unobserved meetings and sermons, Turbi said. He claimed that it is "widely known" in the east that mosques in town centers are more closely monitored by GOL security organizations; however, it has been more difficult for security organizations to monitor smaller, more remote mosques in exurbs and towns around Benghazi and Derna.

AS DO TIGHT FAMILY, SOCIAL CIRCLES

¶13. (S/NF) Citing conversations with relatives, Turbi said it is "common knowledge" that GOL security organizations attempt to

"common knowledge" that GOL security organizations attempt to monitor mosque sermons and activities, particularly Friday 'khutba' sermons. (Note: In Tripoli and other parts of the country, an officially-sanctioned Friday 'khutba' theme and talking point-equivalents are distributed to mosques, often by facsimile. End note.) In addition to the proliferation of smaller, less visible mosques, the ability of security organizations to effectively monitor eastern Libyan mosques is circumscribed by the comparatively tight social and familial structure. Communities in the east tend to be smaller and more tightly knit; outsiders are easier to spot and families "watch out" for members who may have been turned by GOL security organizations to report on the activities of their relatives and neighbors.

¶14. (S/NF) Turbi related the story of a young man from Derna who was recently suspected of reporting to GOL security organizations on who attended his local mosque and what was said there. The alleged informant was ostracized by his fellow worshippers, townsmen and even family members. After losing his job, reportedly in part because of his "treachery", he fled to Egypt and has not been heard from since.

¶15. (S/NF) Comment: Turbi's account affords a relatively rare insider's look at the social, political and economic factors in eastern Libya that have contributed to and facilitated participation by a disproportionately large number of its native sons in "martyrdom acts" and other insurgency operations in Iraq. Conventional wisdom holds that the east is poorer and more disenfranchised in part by deliberate design; however, senior GOL officials have recently made a point of spending more time and investing more effort there. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the regime's most public face of political and economic reform, chose to hold the first and second meetings of his annual Youth Forum in Benghazi in 2006 and 2007, and gave important addresses to large crowds there. In the run-up to both events, he spent considerable time in and around Benghazi, promoting economic and social development projects under the auspices of the ostensibly non-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation, which he heads. Among them was a billion dollar-plus "green" project for development of an environmentally-friendly tourism/business zone

adjacent to the Graeco-Roman ruins at Cyrene, near Benghazi. Work on an extensive renovation of Benghazi's port, designed to help rejuvenate shipping volume and create local jobs, also continues. The most troubling and difficult aspect of Turbi's account is the pride that many eastern Libyans, particularly those in and around Derna, appear to take in the role their native sons have played in the insurgency in Iraq. The reported ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad despite GOL security organizations' efforts suggests that claims by senior GOL officials that the east is under control may be overstated. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Few would weep for Colonel Gaddafi, but targeting him is wrong
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI122

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI122 aka Wikileaks id #141820 ?
Subject	KOSOVO: LIBYAN RESPONSE ON UNSC DELIBERATION DEMARCHE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 17 Feb 2008 11:11 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI122.html
References	08STATE16245
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0451
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0122 0481111
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 171111Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3091
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0121
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0022
RUEHZP/AMEMBASSY PANAMA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0735
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3570
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000122

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UN [United Nations] , PREL [External Political Relations] , YI [Yugoslavia] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: KOSOVO:  LIBYAN RESPONSE ON UNSC DELIBERATION DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 16245

(SBU) CDA delivered reftel points to the MFA's Acting Director
for International Organization Affairs February 17, who
responded that he understood the UNSC was deadlocked on Kosovo
and that further debate would not be useful.  He said he would
convey the US message to FM Shalgam.

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI126

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI126 aka Wikileaks id #141857 ?
Subject	WAHDA BANK PRIVATIZATION BID WON BY JORDAN-BASED ARAB BANK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 18 Feb 2008 19:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI126.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI230 , 08TRIPOLI584
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
Sent: Monday, February 18, 2008 9:42 PM
To: EACTTripoli(Main State Room 2530)
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000126 R UN 18-FEB-08 WAHDA BANK PRIVATIZATION BID
WON BY JORDAN-BASED ARAB BANK [7039621]

UNCLAS

VZCZCXRO0782
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0126 0491942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 181942Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3095
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0084
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0612
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0559
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0419
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1003
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0390
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0275
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0424
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0736
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3574
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000126

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , PGOV
[Internal Governmental Affairs] , JO [Jordan] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: WAHDA BANK PRIVATIZATION BID WON BY JORDAN-BASED ARAB BANK

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 885

¶1.  (SBU)  In a move that adds momentum to Libya's promising
```

¶1. (SBU) In a move that adds momentum to Libya's promising banking reform efforts, the Libyan Central Bank announced that the Jordan-based Arab Bank won the tendering process to buy 19 percent of Libya's Wahda Bank. According to press reports, Arab Bank's winning bid of 210 million euros ($310 million) easily outstripped the second highest bid of 121 million euros ($180 million) by Bahrain-based Arab Banking Corporation. Other short-listed bidders falling short of the mark were Morocco's Attijariwafa Bank, Italy's Intesa Sanpaolo. and French bank Societe Generale (Note: Societe Generale announced its withdrawal from the competition on February 12 for undisclosed reasons; Econoff subsequently learned the bank was uncomfortable with elements of the shareholding agreement. End Note). According to a fact sheet issued by Libya's Central Bank, Wahda Bank is the country's second largest commercial bank in terms of total loan portfolio, with a market share of over 20%. It is the fifth largest commercial bank in terms of total assets, with 1.7 billion euros ($2.6 billion) and 71 branches throughout the country.

¶2. (SBU) The shares obtained by Arab Bank were previously owned by the Libyan Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), which held 73 percent of Wahda before the sale. With this sale, the ESDF still has a majority stake of 54 percent, but Arab Bank will assume management control of Wahda. The remaining Wahda shares are currently held by the Libyan Central Bank (14 percent) and a collection of Libyan investors and companies (13 percent). Under the terms of its purchase, Arab Bank will have the right to eventually raise its stake in Wahda Bank to 51 percent over the next three to five years.

¶3. (SBU) Comment: This sale marks the second successful privatization of a Libyan commercial bank, following a similar deal struck with France's BNP Paribas in its purchase of a 19 percent stake in Sahara Bank in September 2007 (reftel). The Central Bank continues to draw on foreign expertise for pushing through its banking reform strategy, with McKinsey and Company (strategic advisor), Rothschild (financial advisor), Baker and McKenzie (legal) and KPMG (accountants) all playing substantial roles. With the privatizations of Wahda and Sahara well in hand, the next target for the Central Bank will be solidifying its December 2007 merger of the state-owned Jamahiriya and Umma Banks into a single entity, the Libyan Bank. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI12

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI12 aka Wikileaks id #136681 ?
Subject	GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES "IDENTICAL" VIEWS ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & LEBANON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 9 Jan 2008 09:57 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI12.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI231
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) **Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC** (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

SHOW DIFF
before
after
Toggle

```
VZCZCXRO7625
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0012/01 0090957
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 090957Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2978
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0404
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0710
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3419
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000012

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/9/2028
TAGS: PREL [[External Political Relations]], PGOV [[Internal Governmental Affairs]],
KTFN [[Terrorism Finance Traffic]], KNNP [[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]], PARM [[Arms
Controls and Disarmament]], ETTC [[Trade and Technology Controls]], EFIN [[Financial and
Monetary Affairs]], IR [[Iran]], IZ [[Iraq]], LE [[Lebanon]], LY [[Libya]]
SUBJECT: GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES
"IDENTICAL" VIEWS ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & LEBANON \n
 \n
REF: LONDON 0070 \n
 \n
TRIPOLI 00000012  001.2 OF 002 \n
 \n
 \n
CLASSIFIED BY: William B. Milam, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy \n
Tripoli, Dept of State. \n
REASON: 1.4 (b)  (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

\n¶1. (S) Summary: An Iranian delegation led by First \n
Vice-President Davoudi, the highest ranking Iranian official to \n
visit in 25 years, recently concluded a number of cooperation \n
agreements in Tripoli. In public remarks, GOL officials \n
expressed support for a peaceful Iranian nuclear program and \n
characterized Iranian and Libyan views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine \n
and Lebanon as "identical", apparently contradicting what \n
Foreign Minister Shalgham told interlocutors during his recent \n
visit to Washington. Private readouts suggest that both Leader \n
Muammar al-Qadhafi and Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham \n
told Davoudi that the GOL opposes a third sanctions resolution \n
on Iran, contradicting Shalgham's assurances to Washington \n
interlocutors. Public and private readouts suggest Iran is \n
particularly focused on joint investment activity and \n
cooperation between the two sides' central banks, a potentially \n
worrying development. End summary.

HIGHEST LEVEL IRANIAN VISIT IN 25 YEARS

¶2. (U) Iran's First Vice-President, Pervez Davoudi, headed a \n
high-level Iranian delegation that visited Tripoli December \n
26-27 under the auspices of the twelth session of the joint \n
Libya-Iran Economic Commission. Press reports indicate that \n
Davoudi is the highest ranking Iranian official to visit Libya \n
in 25 years. Iran's Minister for Housing and Urban Planning, \n
Mohamed Saidi Kia, and Minister of Economy and Finance, Davoud \n
Danesh-Jafari, accompanied Davoudi.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM; U.S. SHOULD WITHDRAW \n
FROM IRAQ

¶3. (SBU) Libya's state-controlled media focused on Iran's \n
nuclear program - emphasizing its right to pursue peaceful uses \n
of atomic energy - and economic cooperation. In his public \n
remarks, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi stressed Libya's \n
support for Iran's "legal and principled stands on its peaceful \n
nuclear activities". Al-Mahmoudi noted publicly that Libya and \n
Iran share the view that the U.S. "occupation" of Iraq has \n
destabilized the region. Echoing Davoudi's remarks, he \n
expressed support for Iraq's territorial integrity and its \n
people and called for the prompt withdrawal of U.S. forces, a \n
subject he said featured prominently in the two sides' private \n
discussions. In remarks carried in the Libyan press, Foreign \n
Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham said the GOL and Iran share \n
"identical" views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon. (Note: \n
Contradicting what we understand Shalgham conveyed to U/S Burns \n
and NEA A/S Welch during his meetings with them January 3 in \n
Washington. End note.)

QADHAFI FOCUSES ON UNSC SANCTIONS ON IRAN ...

¶4. (S) Citing a readout from Iranian DCM Mohammed Hossein \n
Mirzaee, Egyptian Charge d'Affaires Ahmed Abdel-Halim told A/DCM \n
January 6 that Davoudi's visit to Tripoli was a follow-on to \n
Libyan PM al-Mahmoudi's stop in Tehran in May 2007. Mirzaee \n
confirmed that Davoudi met with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, \n
clarifying conflicting press accounts as to whether such had \n
occurred. According to Mirzaee, al-Qadhafi and Davoudi \n
discussed further possible sanctions on Iran in light of Libya's \n
current UNSC Presidency. Al-Qadhafi reportedly assured Davoudi \n
that Libya opposes a third sanctions resolution on Iran. \n
According to Mirzaee, Shalgham took the same position in his \n
discussions with Davoudi. (Note: Contradicting what we \n
understand Shalgham told U/S Burns in Washington January 3, and \n
agreeing with what we understand he told U.K. Foreign Secretary \n
David Miliband in London January 7 (reftel). End note.)

¶5. (S) Mirzaee stressed to his Egyptian interlocutor that \n
neither al-Qadhafi nor Shalgham had offered to play a role in \n
mediating between Iran and the USG and international community \n
on the nuclear file. (Note: Again, contradicting what we \n
understand Shalgham told U/S Burns on January 3. End note.) \n

According to Mirzaee, Libya's experience \n
is not analogous to Iran's because Libya had WMD aspirations, \n
while Iran maintains that it only seeks civilian applications of \n
nuclear technology.

... AND ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & IMAM MUSA SADR CASE

¶6. (C) Qadhafi reportedly spent considerable time denouncing the \n
U.S. "occupation" of Iraq and continuing Israeli "aggression" \n
against Palestinians. He apparently treated Davoudi to a \n
lengthy discourse on his "Isratine" proposal for a one-state \n
\n
TRIPOLI 00000012 002.2 OF 002 \n
\n
\n
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Echoing \n
Shalgham's public remarks, Qadhafi reportedly assured Davoudi \n
that the GOL shares Iran's views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and \n
Lebanon.

¶7. (C) Qadhafi reportedly raised with Davoudi the case of \n
Lebanese Shi'a cleric Imam Musa Sadr, who disappeared during a \n
visit to Libya in August 1978. Qadhafi reportedly complained \n
that Lebanese officials had recently raised the case again and \n
asked for Iran's assistance in smoothing over the issue. (Note: \n
Lebanese-Libyan official relations have remain strained since \n
Sadr's disappearance. End note.) Noting that Iran and Libya \n
have a "separate channel" for dealing with the contentious issue \n
of Sadr's disappearance, Mirzaee stressed to Abdel-Halim that \n
Iran tries to limit the extent to which the matter bears on \n
bilateral Iran-Libya relations. Mirzaee complained that \n
Lebanon's insistence on pursuing the matter has periodically led \n
to Iranian-Lebanese contretemps.

10 AGREEMENTS SIGNED; JOINT BANKING, INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS KEY

¶8. (U) During the visit, the two sides announced they would soon \n
establish a joint political committee at the ministerial level \n
and signed 10 agreements and memoranda of understanding (MOU's) \n
covering investment, banking, higher education, maritime \n
transport, fishing, tourism cultural exchanges and media \n
cooperation. Two key MOU's provide a framework for cooperation \n
between the central banks of Libya and Iran and the \n
establishment of a joint investment entity by Libya's National \n
Investment Promotion Office and its Iranian counterpart. \n
Shalgham emphasized the expectation that the activities of the \n
joint political committee would facilitate greater Iranian \n
participation in Libya's economic development, particularly in \n
the areas of finance and infrastructure development. Claiming \n
that expansion of ties with African countries is a key Iranian \n
foreign policy priority, Davoudi nonetheless stressed that \n
economic and other, unspecified, Libyan-Iranian cooperation \n
would also extend to Central Asia and Latin America.

INVESTMENT, FINANCE KEY FROM IRAN'S PERSPECTIVE

¶9. (C) Mirzaee told Abdel-Halim that from Iran's perspective the \n
most significant agreement was that which established a joint \n
Libyan-Iranian investment entity, to be capitalized with money \n
via each country's central bank, for investments in Africa, \n
Central Asia and Latin America. Iran also viewed increased \n
cooperation between the two sides' central banks as an important \n
development, in part because Iran's access to international \n
banking and finance has become increasingly difficult.

¶10. (S) Comment: The apparent disconnect between Shalgham's \n
public and private comments in Tripoli and what he said in \n
Washington is troubling, the more so since the readout from his \n
meeting with U.K. FS Miliband seems to corroborate reports here \n
that the GOL opposes further sanctions against Iran. Iranian \n
officials' emphasis on joint investment projects and central \n
bank cooperation is an interesting and potentially worrying \n
development that Post will continue to track. End comment. \n

development that Post will continue to track. End comment. \n

MILAM 0 01/09/2008 7863 PREL,PGOV,KTFN,KNNP,PARM,ETTC,EFIN,IR,IZ,LE,LY GOL TELLS IRANIAN VP IT OPPOSES IRAN RESOLUTION, SHARES "IDENTICAL" VIEWS ON IRAQ, ISRAEL-PALESTINE & LEBANON An Iranian delegation led by First Vice-President Davoudi, the highest ranking Iranian official to visit in 25 years, recently concluded a number of cooperation agreements in Tripoli. In public remarks, GOL officials expressed support for a peaceful Iranian nuclear program and characterized Iranian and Libyan views on Iraq, Israel-Palestine and Lebanon as "identical", apparently contradicting what Foreign Minister Shalgham told interlocutors during his recent visit to Washington. Private readouts suggest that both Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham told Davoudi that the GOL opposes a third sanctions resolution on Iran, contradicting Shalgham's assurances to Washington interlocutors. Public and private readouts suggest Iran is particularly focused on joint investment activity and cooperation between the two sides' central banks, a potentially worrying development.

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI137

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI137 aka Wikileaks id #142140 ?
Subject	LIBYA: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO REPATRIATED GUANTANAMO DETAINEES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 Feb 2008 12:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI137.html
References	08STATE14270
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2425
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0137 0511201
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 201201Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3109
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3588
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000137

SIPDIS

SIPDIS, NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/20/2033
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINS *[National Security]* , KDDG, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: REQUEST FOR ACCESS TO REPATRIATED GUANTANAMO DETAINEES

REF: A) STATE 14270 , B) USG-GOL DETAINEE TRANSFER MOU DEC 11, 2006, C) TRIPOLI 1060, D) STATE 163691, E) TRIPOLI 723

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) The CDA and P/E Chief conveyed ref A points to Dr. Yusuf Sawani, Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation, February 19. CDA underscored that it is important that the GOL abide by the assurances it provided to the U.S. regarding treatment of and access to repatriated detainees under the rubric of the USG-GOL Detainee Transfer MOU (ref B).

¶2. (S/NF) Points below are keyed to ref A tasking points:

-- REGULAR VISITS: Citing the cultural difficulty of keeping any sort of regular schedule in Libya, Sawani threw cold water on the idea of establishing a schedule for regular visits. He stressed that Emboffs could meet with the two returned detainees (Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi , ISN 194 , and Ben Qumu Abu

(Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al Kimi, ISN 194, and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda, ISN 557) whenever it was "possible and appropriate". Clarifying, he assured the CDA that the QDF and GOL would facilitate timely access, claiming that visits could be arranged with as little as a day's notice.

-- FAMILY/COUNSEL ACCESS: Responding to the CDA's point encouraging access by counsel and family members to the detainees, Sawani noted that Hamouda (ISN 557) had enjoyed a lengthy family visit within 48 hours of the CDA's meeting with him in December (ref C).

-- LEGAL BASIS FOR DETENTION: Sawani said he was not sure what the legal basis for the continued incarceration of the returned detainees is. He explained that, in general, if a detainee was wanted on specific charges under Libyan law, he would be detained and debriefed by security organizations, and then transferred to judicial authorities to face legal charges. He suggested that if a detainee was not wanted on specific charges under Libyan law, he could be released. He agreed to request that designated Watchdog Committee counterpart Muhammad Tarnesh, Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya, follow up with security officials at the facility at which the detainees are being held to query them regarding the charges against them. He further suggested that P/E Chief, Post's Watchdog Committee representative, contact Tarnesh directly to coordinate follow up. Post is in contact with Tarnesh, who is working to coordinate a meeting with security officials.

-- S/WCI TEAM VISIT: Sawani's comments strongly suggest that dispatching a team to assist in discussions concerning routine access to detainees would not/not be helpful. Post does not recommend such a visit.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI14

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI14 aka Wikileaks id #136845 ?
Subject	QADHAFI TELLS MUBARAK HE "MAY" SEEK TO ATTEND UNSC IN NEW YORK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 10 Jan 2008 14:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI14.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8796
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0014/01 0101406
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 101406Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2981
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0107
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0712
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0406
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3422
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000014

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, AF/SPG; USUN FOR PHEE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , UN *[United Nations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SU *[Sudan]* , EG *[Egypt]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI TELLS MUBARAK HE "MAY" SEEK TO ATTEND UNSC IN NEW YORK

TRIPOLI 00000014 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During a visit to Cairo January 1, Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi reportedly discussed his recent trip to Paris and Madrid, Darfur, the repatriation of 24 Egyptians currently on death row in Libya, and the possibility that he may seek to

travel to New York to attend a session of the United Nations Security Council. End summary.

QADHAFI SEES EUROPEAN COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS AS POLITICAL SYMBOLS

¶2. (C) Egyptian Charge d'Affaires Ahmed Abdel-Halim told A/DCM January 6 that al-Qadhafi's visit was overdue, noting that President Mubarak had visited Libya three times in 2007 (in January, May and September) and three times in 2006. Qadhafi gave Mubarak a readout on his visits to Paris and Madrid in December. Abdel-Halim's information was that Qadhafi emphasized the importance of commercial contracts and agreements concluded during the trip, stressing their value as a tangible symbol of Libya's reintegration into the international community after the lifting of sanctions and removal from the list of state sponsors of terrorism.

DARFUR - INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT HINDERS RATHER THAN HELPS

¶3. (C) Mubarak and Qadhafi also discussed the situation in Darfur at length. Reading from an Egyptian MFA report on the trip, Abdel-Halim said Mubarak had tried to persuade al-Qadhafi that the latter's recent remarks criticizing the "internationalization" of the conflict (a reference to external mediation and deployment of the hybrid AU-UN peacekeeping force) were not helpful. Al-Qadhafi apparently maintained his argument that the conflict was "merely tribal" and could be resolved more quickly absent international mediation. Mubarak and al-Qadhafi reviewed 1,200 Egyptian troops set to deploy to Darfur to join the AU-UN hybrid peacekeeping force.

GOL DRAGS FEET ON REPATRIATING EGYPTIAN PRISONERS

¶4. (C) Mubarak asked that 24 Egyptians sentenced to death by Libyan courts for various crimes be repatriated to Egypt. Abdel-Halim explained that families of the victims of crimes perpetrated by the 24 had accepted "blood money". Under Libyan law, their death penalty sentences were commuted to 25-year prison sentences; Egyptian-Libyan bilateral legal cooperation agreements provided for the return of such prisoners to their home country to serve out their sentences, but the GOL had balked at effecting their transfer. Abdel-Halim said the issue has been widely covered in Egyptian press and is seen by the GOL as a bilateral irritant. Mubarak raised it during his September 2007 visit to Libya and was assured that the GOL would follow up; however, Qadhafi denied knowledge of the issue during his recent trip and asked for more time to "study" it, angering Mubarak. Abdel-Halim noted the GOE's irritation with increased Libyan "arrogance" in bilateral dealings, which it attributes to increased oil prices and the GOL's perception that its hand has been strengthened.

BROTHER LEADER TO VISIT THE BIG APPLE?

¶5. (C) Reading again from a report from Cairo, Abdel-Halim said Mubarak and al-Qadhafi discussed UNSC issues, particularly a possible third sanctions resolution against Iran (NFI). According to Abdel-Halim, al-Qadhafi told Mubarak he "may" seek to travel to New York this month to attend sessions of the UNSC during Libya's month-long presidency. Post understands from Embassy Cairo that Arab League Chief of Staff Hisham Yousef told Poloff there that AL SYG Moussa urged al-Qadhafi in their meeting on January 1 to use Libya's seat on the UNSC to advocate for and represent broader Arab interests in the way Qatar had successfully done. Hisham expressed doubt that Libya would prove to be as dependable as Qatar in this regard. (Note: Consistent with Qadhafi's shift of attention from Arab to African issues, the GOL has stressed that it intends to focus on African, vice Arab issues, and will represent African consensus views. End note.)

¶6. (C) Comment: Post heard a number of rumors in the immediate

aftermath of Qadhafi's visit to Cairo suggesting he might seek to travel to New York to attend sessions of the UNSC. Those seem to have diminished in the wake of Foreign Minister Shalgham's subsequent visit to Washington, suggesting that the

TRIPOLI 00000014 002.2 OF 002

mixed media reaction to Shalgham's visit may have given the GOL pause to consider whether now is really the right time for Qadhafi to seek to visit the U.S. End comment.
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI141

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI141 aka Wikileaks id #142287 ?
Subject	LIBYA LINKS POSITION ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE TO RUSSIAN ARMS SALES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 21 Feb 2008 08:04 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI141.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3356
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0141 0520804
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 210804Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3118
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0122
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHPS/USOFFICE PRISTINA IMMEDIATE 0002
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3597
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000141

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/UNP (GOLDRICH), NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , SR *[Serbia]* , EU *[Europa Island]* , YI *[Yugoslavia]* , UNMIK *[UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo]* , UN *[United Nations]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA LINKS POSITION ON KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE TO RUSSIAN ARMS SALES

REF: A) STATE 16319, B) TRIPOLI 118, C) TRIPOLI 112

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) In a meeting with MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari February 20, P/E Chief noted that there had so far been no official GOL reaction to Kosovo's recent announcement of independence and, echoing our previous demarches on the subject (refs B and C), urged the GOL to recognize Kosovo's independence. Matari confirmed that the GOL had made no public statement concerning Kosovo's independence. Matari said the GOL had deliberately delayed any public reaction, in part because Russia had, in its demarches on the subject (ref B), linked future cooperation on Russia-Libya arms sales to the GOL's position on Kosovo. (Comment: Russia is a major supplier of weapons to Libya. The GOL has often commented favorably on the ease with which it has been able to acquire Russian weapons systems by way of criticizing the comparatively labor-intensive process attendant to purchasing systems from the U.S. End comment.)

¶2. (U) Separately, Post translated into Arabic and forwarded to the MFA a copy of the White House press release containing the President's letter to the Kosovar president recognizing Kosovo's independence.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI142

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI142 aka Wikileaks id #142448 ?
Subject	EMBASSY VISITS HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 21 Feb 2008 18:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI142.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI183 , 08TRIPOLI220 , 08TRIPOLI223
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3975
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0142/01 0521802
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211802Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3119
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0423
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0616
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0562
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1009
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0739
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0427
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3598
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000142

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/21/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISITS HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 93, B) TRIPOLI 90, C) STATE 10444, D) STATE 8768

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: An Embassy officer met with Libyan human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi on February 20 at the government-run hospital in Tripoli where he has been held since July 2007. El-Jahmi said that he had suffered from a number of serious ailments when he was transferred from prison to the hospital

ailments when he was transferred from prison to the hospital, and that his condition began to improve markedly only after doctors began providing the full range of medical care he required in December 2007. In January 2008, his son was permitted to visit him on three occasions -- the first family visitation he had been allowed in four years. He said he was not aware of any offer to release him to the care of his family, and underscored that he would not agree to remain silent about his political views as a condition for his release. The Embassy visit was arranged by the Qadhafi Development Foundation. End summary.

¶2. (C) Following up on CDA's request earlier in the week for Embassy access to Fathi el-Jahmi, Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Youssef Sawani called a meeting with P/E Chief February 20 to inform the Embassy that it could have a "quick, discreet visit" with el-Jahmi later that day. Noting that the decision to facilitate Embassy access to el-Jahmi was hotly debated within the GOL, Sawani stressed that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, personally intervened to argue that it would constitute an important gesture to the USG. The visit should be interpreted as "a clear reflection" of Said al-Islam's desire to keep U.S.-Libya bilateral relations on a positive course, he said.

MEETING WITH EL-JAHMI

¶3. (C) P/E Chief, together with Muhammad Tarnesh, Executive Director of the QDF-affiliated Human Rights Society of Libya, met briefly with el-Jahmi's treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, and then spent nearly an hour with el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) February 20. (Note: The TMC is considered one of the best hospitals in the country. Care at the facility, which features better-trained physicians and more diagnostic and laboratory equipment than other hospitals, is good by comparison with the relatively low standards of other medical facilities in Libya. End note.) Present in the room with el-Jahmi were Tarnesh, Mehdy and an individual who was identified as his nurse, Abdullah Bashir.

¶4. (C) El-Jahmi is housed alone in a clean, single-bed room that features a wash basin and private toilet facilities. The room was located in what appeared to be a less heavily-trafficked section of the hospital; however, other than a lock on the room door, there were no guards or other visible indications of extra security. El-Jahmi said he had been in the same room since being admitted to the TMC in late July 2007. Other than trips to the lab and other diagnostic centers in the TMC, he has not been allowed to leave his room. Noting that he has not been allowed to raise the blinds in his room, he complained that he has not seen natural sunlight since his admission.

INITIAL MEDICAL CONDITION AND TREATMENT

¶5. (C) Dr. Mehdy indicated that the el-Jahmi's condition was "severe" when he was transferred from the Abu Salim prison facility on Tripoli's outskirts to the TMC in late July 2007. At that time, el-Jahmi was hypertensive, had congestive heart failure and severe difficulty breathing, suffered from severe edema and diabetes, and had urological complications attendant to prostitis. El-Jahmi was unable to lie down because of his breathing difficulties (he could only sleep in a sitting position) and could not urinate because his groin had swelled so much due to edema. Mehdy stressed that he performed diagnostic exams and prescribed treatment (catheterization to alleviate the urological problem) immediately after el-Jahmi's admission. El-Jahmi received no further treatment until late December/early January.

CURRENT MEDICAL CONDITION AND PROGNOSIS

¶6. (C) El-Jahmi was clear-eyed, alert and lucid during the meeting. While clearly advanced in age and somewhat limited by

his medical conditions (his breathing was observed to be a bit labored), he was animated and verbose. (Note: Muhammad

TRIPOLI 00000142 002 OF 003

el-Jahmi, Fathi's brother, described the latter as being virtually unable to speak during a family member's visit in January. End note.) El-Jahmi said treatment at the TMC, once administration of his prescribed medication commenced in late December/early January, had been very good and assessed that his condition had improved a great deal. Dr. Mehdy concurred, explaining that el-Jahmi's breathing has improved dramatically (he is now able to lie down), his edema has abated considerably (there is still some swelling in his legs), his blood sugar levels have normalized, and EKG tests show his heart function has improved significantly. (Note: Muhammad el-Jahmi, Fathi's brother, described the latter's legs as being extremely swollen during a family member's visit in January. End note.)

¶7. (C) Assessing el-Jahmi's prognosis, Dr. Mehdy said another EKG will be performed in several weeks to determine whether a coronary angiography will be needed to correct diminished capacity in the left ventricle of el-Jahmi's heart. He cautioned that el-Jahmi's overall condition, particularly his heart pumping capacity, is not strong enough at present for the procedure to be performed; at least two to three months of further treatment and recovery are needed. El-Jahmi is on a restricted, low-salt and low-sugar diet to moderate the effects of his diabetes; that condition appears to have stabilized but will require continued monitoring. Regarding el-Jahmi's urological issues, Dr. Mehdy has twice recommended to el-Jahmi that he have surgery for his prostate condition (once at the time of admission, and again in January). El-Jahmi has so far refused to consent to the procedure. (Note: Dr. Mehdy speculated that part of el-Jahmi's reluctance may be due to the fact that he has not been able to consult with his family. End note.) Dr. Mehdy clearly indicated that the TMC has the resources to provide all care needed to stabilize and/or treat el-Jahmi's conditions.

FAMILY VISITATION LIMITED

¶8. (C) El-Jahmi said he his eldest son had visited him three times on three consecutive days in January. Before that, it had been more than four years since his wife, four daughters and two other sons had been able to visit him. He complained that he does not have access to radio, television or reading materials, either at the prison at which he was previously detained or at the TMC. He complained that even his copy of the Koran had been confiscated in late January for reasons that were unclear to him.

LEGAL STATUS UNCERTAIN

¶9. (C) El-Jahmi said he had not been advised, formally or informally, that the GOL might release him to return home for further treatment, but said he "sensed" that the GOL's attitude concerning his case might be changing. (Comment: The QDF's Sawani emphasized to the CDA February 21 that the QDF has made it clear to the family that Fathi could be released to their care, but so far the family has not followed up on the offer, nor on the QDF's requests that they return to the hospital to visit Fathi. End comment.) El-Jahmi did not know whether the son who visited him or other family members have received any further information concerning his possible release. He did not know whether he would be able to travel abroad for treatment if he were released and noted that the GOL holds his passport. El-Jahmi said he understands he has been convicted under a Libyan law that criminalizes advocating a political position inconsistent with the 1969 revolution, and for defaming leader Muammar al-Qadhafi.

¶10. (C) Asked by P/E Chief whether [illegible] as has been suggested by

¶10. (C) Asked by P/E Chief whether -- as has been suggested by QDF -- he would be willing to agree to an "understanding" that he would remain silent about his detention or any political issues in exchange for the opportunity to return to his home, El-Jahmi repeatedly made it clear that he is not/not prepared to agree to that stipulation, or any other condition, to secure his release. He described himself as "a democratic man" and said he was unwilling to sacrifice his political beliefs to gain his release. Saying that his principal offense had been to criticize Qadhafi and his regime, he said the Libyan courts had ruled that he was mentally incompetent. Joking, he said the prevailing mentality in Libya is such that to criticize Qadhafi was considered the act of a madman.

COMMENT

¶11. (C) While we lack the expertise to comment on the adequacy of el-Jahmi's medical treatment, El-Jahmi himself reported that, at least as of December 2007, he has been receiving care that

has led to an improvement in his health. As for his future, El-Jahmi, who appeared to be in full possession of his mental faculties, clearly expressed his intention to reject any deal the GOL might offer to allow him to return home in exchange for his silence. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI157

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI157 aka Wikileaks id #143320 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE ON UNSC 1267 DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 27 Feb 2008 16:58 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI157.html
References	08STATE19145
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8883
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0157 0581658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 271658Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3147
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3626
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000157

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2018
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE ON UNSC 1267 DELIVERED

REF: STATE 19145

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) CDA delivered reftel demarche regarding the proposed US listing pursuant to UNSCR 1267 of Syria-based Badran al-Mazidih et al. to Deputy FM Mohamed Siala February 27. CDA requested that the GOL lift its hold on the US request, and asked for clarification of apparent GOL policy to place holds on any proposed listings with Arab names. Siala said the US request was clear, and took the point that a general GOL policy of placing holds in such cases would be odd, given that most al-Qaida-related listings would involve individuals with Arab names.

¶2. (C) Comment: Siala did not offer a substantive response to either request. We believe he will check with FM Shalgham, who is in Sirte this week in connection with the upcoming annual People's General Congress. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI166

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI166 aka Wikileaks id #143860 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PARLIAMENT CONVENES, CABINET CHANGES EXPECTED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI166.html
References	07TRIPOLI1033 , 07TRIPOLI1053 , 08TRIPOLI106
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI212
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2750
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0166/01 0630808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 030808Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3156
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3636
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000166

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PARLIAMENT CONVENES, CABINET CHANGES EXPECTED

REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 0071, B) 07 Tripoli 1033 , C) Tripoli 106 , D) 07 TRIPOLI 1053

TRIPOLI 00000166 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The results of this year's General People's Congress (Parliament-equivalent), which commenced in Sirte on March 2, will be closely watched for signs that the Libyan leadership remains committed to economic reform and reengagement with the international community. Observers will also carefully weigh the expected new government's composition to gauge the

relative positions of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his recently ascendant brother, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, the two sons of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi who are widely considered to be rivals to succeed their father. Among the cabinet officers rumored to be candidates for replacement are the Prime Minister, the Foreign Minister, and several ministers in charge of domestic portfolios. End summary.

¶2. (C) Public media reports and private speculation among observers in Tripoli have focused considerable attention on the annual session of the General People's Congress (GPC - Parliament-equivalent), which commenced in Sirte on March 2, and the cabinet change expected to be announced at the event's conclusion. Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi launched this year's session with a lengthy speech in which he directed strong criticism at the government for failing to address the needs of the people. The last cabinet change, in January 2007 (ref A), was the second such shuffle in less than a year and was perceived to have shifted reform-minded individuals into key positions.

ECONOMIC REFORM AND POLITICAL SUCCESSION KEY ISSUES

¶3. (C) While changes of government are common, the expected upcoming shuffle will be parsed closely for two principal reasons. First, it will be viewed as a sign of senior GOL leaders' commitment to economic and limited attendant political reform. Appointment of a cabinet perceived to be "reformist" (in the Libyan context) would be seen as an important signal that the leadership intends to support a program of reform and further reintegrating of Libya into the international community after two-plus decades of relative isolation. Second, the shape of the new government may help define the relative influence and position of two of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's sons - putative heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and recently appointed National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi - whom press reports and some contacts have argued are in de facto competition to succeed their father.

EASY ECONOMIC REFORM HAS BEEN DONE

¶4. (C) This year's annual GPC session comes at an important juncture. Initial announcements of economic initiatives and reform that followed Libya's December 2003 decision to abandon its WMD program and renounce terrorism have given way to the hard reality that considerable economic and administrative work remains to be done if Libya is to realize its development aspirations. A local business contact noted that the GOL has "already picked the low-hanging fruit" in terms of easy reform by allowing importation of more consumer products, privatizing banks, easing enforcement of draconian currency regulations and creating a legal framework (of sorts) for partnership with foreign investors and commercial entities.

PERCEIVED LACK OF REFORM COMMITMENT "KILLING" BUSINESS

¶5. (C) Recent developments like the imprisonment of well-connected businessmen last year, changes in commercial codes that effectively rolled back key reforms, and the increasingly apparent disconnect between the GOL's anti-corruption message and the business practices of senior apparatchiks have underscored the dissonance between the GOL's message and the reality on the ground. Husni Bey (strictly protect), scion of a leading business family, characterized the prevailing "confusion" among senior GOL officials about the country's direction as "a crisis" for the business community. The lack of clear commitment to and, critically, implementation of, announced reform measures were "killing" new projects while investors waited to see how the perceived reform struggle plays out.

QUESTIONS ABOUT SAIF'S COMMITMENT, INFLUENCE

¶6. (C) Much of the debate centers on the role of the reformist camp's public face and purported champion, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Basem Philip (strictly protect), Nestle's Country Manager, told P/E Chief in early January that events in the second half of 2007 had "seriously eroded" the business

TRIPOLI 00000166 002.2 OF 004

community's confidence in Saif as a serious proponent of reform, and had raised questions about the real extent of his influence. Referring to the case of the local BMW franchise holder, who was banned from importing vehicles last fall for several months in connection with murky tax issues, Philip said someone "very close to Saif" told the dealer in late January that he would have to give 40 percent of his profits to Saif al-Islam to "facilitate" the re-initiation of trouble-free vehicle imports. The case was seen as an important step backward after importers had made some progress earlier in 2007 in importing and distributing products without having to pay "exorbitant" bribes to Qadhafi family members and their affiliates.

THE OLD GUARD DIGS IN

¶7. (C) In addition, senior officials brought in by Saif al-Islam to help implement reform measures have encountered serious opposition from regime figures skeptical about the strategic decision to re-engage with the West (and particularly the U.S.) and concerned that their livelihoods, which depend on the old, kleptocratic way of doing business, will be directly threatened by reform. Dr. Mahmud Jibril, Chairman of the National Planning Council and head of the affiliated Economic Development Board, was personally wooed back to Libya by Saif al-Islam to help implement reforms recommended in a Monitor Group report developed under the direction of Harvard University's Dr. Michael Porter. (Note: Jibril holds a PhD from the University of Pittsburgh and owns a successful business consultancy firm with offices in Cairo and London. End note.) Omar Turbi (strictly protect), a U.S.-based, businessman with dual U.S.-Libyan nationality, told P/E Chief in early February that Jibril was "profoundly disappointed" by his limited ability to effect change and had submitted letters of resignation three times in the second half of 2007, but had been dissuaded from leaving.

LEADER'S HEALTH THROWS SPOTLIGHT ON SUCCESSION ISSUE

¶8. (C) As important as economic and reform equities is the political import of the expected cabinet shuffle. Media reports and local observers have dwelled in the past eight months on whether the perceived recent rise of Muatassim al-Qadhafi, Muammar al-Qadhafi's third son by his second wife, represents a threat to Saif al-Islam's previously uncontested role as heir-apparent. (Note: Saif al-Islam is Qadhafi's eldest son by his second wife. End note.) Citing conversations with unspecified members of Qadhafi's family, France's former Ambassador to Tripoli, Jean-Jacques Beaussou, told the CDA and P/E Chief in early December that Muammar al-Qadhafi suffered a series of strokes in May 2007, calling into question how much longer the Leader would be able to rule and focusing attention on the critical issue of succession (see ref B for further reporting on complications related to Qadhafi's reported stroke).

MUATASSIM & SAIF: RIVALS OR ALLIES?

¶9. (C) Zahri Muntasser (strictly protect), head of a wealthy, well-known family whose ancestral ranks include a former Prime Minister, told P/E Chief in early February that Qadhafi deliberately tapped Muatassim as National Security Adviser to create an alternate locus of power to Saif al-Islam and to "strategically stir the political pot". (Note: Muntasser is a close personal friend and business partner of Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent Muhammad Siala, whom he cited as the source

of some of his information. End note.) Muatassim can act as an ally to Saif al-Islam or, if he demonstrates sufficient capability, could emerge as a viable alternative successor.

MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI: HEDGING HIS "STRATEGIC BET"

¶10. (C) Saif al-Islam's publicly reformist message endears him to Western observers and would-be Libyan reformists, said Muntasser, while Muatassim is perceived to be a more traditional figure who appeals to important military and tribal leaders. By advancing both simultaneously and perpetuating ambiguity about their places in the pecking order, al-Qadhafi is able to better balance two key constituencies - pro-Western reformists and traditional old guard elements - while the struggle over reform and change plays out. The problem, Muntasser noted, is that al-Qadhafi's approach is fundamentally tactical and not strategic; in typical fashion, al-Qadhafi has effectively hedged his December 2003 "strategic bet" to give up WMD and terrorism by fostering the perception that a traditional "strong man" (Muatassim) may take the reins of power. Two influential, longtime members of the Revolutionary Committees - Khuwaydi al-Humeida and Mustafa Kharubi - who are peers of Muammar al-Qadhafi, recently told Muntasser they had been "extremely dissatisfied" with reforms attributed to Saif al-Islam, but were cautiously optimistic that Muatassim could become a leader they could live with.

HANDICAPPING THE FIELD

TRIPOLI 00000166 003.2 OF 004

¶11. (C) Among the cabinet officers, the Prime Minister-equivalent, Foreign Minister-equivalent, Secretary for Education, Secretary for Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent), Secretary for Economy, Trade and Investment and the Secretary for Manpower, Training and Employment are widely rumored as candidates for replacement. As reported ref C, a considerable portion of the GPC will be devoted to televised interrogation of cabinet officers by GPC members, who will ostensibly determine whether cabinet members have faithfully carried out the GPC's policies and effectively served the interest of the Jamahuriya. Recalling his experience as Prime Minister in 1979-1981, MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi told the CDA and P/E Chief on February 24 that the GPC usually "closely consulted" Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi about any proposed cabinet changes. Qadhafi -- ever Delphic -- sometimes, but not always, offered opinions about the proposals. Post notes that cabinet changes have in the past transpired in stages, with some positions left unencumbered and new appointments made in subsequent tranches.

PRIME MINISTER TO BE SACKED?

¶12. (C) There is wide consensus that al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Secretary of the GPC (Prime Minister-equivalent), will be

SIPDIS
removed and may face corruption charges immediately thereafter. Zahri Muntasser told P/E Chief that al-Mahmoudi's home was raided in early February as part of an effort to build a corruption case against him. In what some observers have interpreted as an attempt to bolster his popular image and blunt the GOL's ability to press charges, al-Mahmoudi recently toured the country and gave a number of public speeches. Speculation centers on three candidates to succeed him: AbuzaidDorda, Chairman of the Housing and Infrastructure Board; Dr. Mahmud Jibril, Chairman of the National Planning Council; and Dr. Muhammad Siala, Deputy Foreign Minister.

¶13. (C) A number of well-place contacts say Dorda is the leading candidate for the job. Dorda has been the very public face of

candidate for the job. Dorda has been the very public face of Libya's massive infrastructure development program, barnstorming provinces to announce housing and infrastructure programs. He is genuinely popular, so much so that Qadhafi - concerned that Dorda was becoming "too popular" - allegedly started rumors in December 2007 that he would lose his HIB position in the upcoming cabinet shuffle. A schoolteacher by training, Dorda is a longtime apparatchik who has ridden a reputation as an anti-corruption crusader up the ranks (see ref D for his remarks at a recent contract signing). Contact Omar Turbi, who has known Dorda since grammar school and considers him a friend, described him as "an unreconstructed socialist" who is "intrinsically suspicious" of capitalism. Former U.K. Commercial Counselor Trevor Hines characterized Dorda as being "among the worst" regime figures because he "claims to be supportive of economic reform and is forever announcing new reform measures, but in the end is as corrupt and obstructionist as any of them". Confident, popular and given to sanctimony, Dorda could be a difficult interlocutor for the U.S.

¶14. (C) Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi reportedly asked Dr. Mahmud Jibril in mid-December whether he would accept the position. Jibril, citing former PM and fellow would-be reformer Shukri Ghanem's disappointing experience as a cautionary tale, told Omar Turbi (whom he's known for 25 years) that he does not want the job; however, rumors persist that he'll be tapped as "window dressing" for the reformist camp. Explaining his reluctance, Jibril described the job as more titular than functional, and said the higher profile only brings greater risk. Zahri Muntasser dismissed the likelihood that Jibril would be named PM, saying it is understood that he "does not want it" and "is not committed enough" to do the job. Nonetheless, a member of Post's locally-engaged staff who was personally interviewed and hired by Jibril told the CDA on February 28 that Jibril would/would be tapped as next PM. Smart, cosmopolitan and one of the most strategic thinkers among Post's interlocutors, Jibril would be pro-reform and would likely favor continued re-engagement with the U.S.

¶15. (C) The names of Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammad Siala and Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi have also been connected with the PM's post. Zahri Muntasser describes his friend, Siala, as "a good man" and "an able technocrat", but says he is widely perceived as being "not strong enough" for the job. Rumors that Saif al-Islam could be tapped peaked late last year, but recent consensus has it that it would be "too early" for him and that he may be tapped to encumber a new, non-Cabinet level, economic development coordinator position.

FOREIGN MINISTER - TOUGH TO CALL

¶16. (C) Foreign Minister-equivalent Abdulrahman Shalgham has been widely rumored to be on the way out since last summer's

denouement of the long-running Bulgarian medics' case. There were reports after his early January visit to Washington that he had fallen further out of favor over the perception that he had been sufficiently tough in arguing Libya's position in his dealings with USG officials. Shalgham's departure could mean the departure of his pro-U.S. Secretary for the Americas, Dr. Ahmed Fituri. Fituri told the CDA recently that if Shalgham goes, he will, too. MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari told P/E Chief February 20 that perceptions of Shalgham's Washington trip were "mixed", but nonetheless argued that there was "a 90 percent chance" that Shalgham would remain as FM. Stressing the importance of the U.S. account, he said that if Secretary Rice had visited Libya before the GPC, as had been

SIPDIS
originally planned, it would be a certainty that Shalgham would

keep his job.

¶17. (C) If Shalgham goes, the consensus in most quarters is that Deputy FM Muhammad Siala would move up to take the FM post. Siala is a smart, cosmopolitan, technocrat who understands and appears to be genuinely committed to economic reform; he also favors reengagement with the U.S. and the West. Although not the politician that Shalgham is, he is in some respects more thoughtful and would likely be a capable and sympathetic interlocutor. Husni Bey told P/E chief in late December/early January that he had heard reports from unspecified senior RevComm members that External Security Organization Chief Musa Kusa could be moved up to become FM; however, more recently he said the idea seemed to have died and that Kusa could be sent abroad as ambassador to a large western country.

AND ROUNDING OUT THE FIELD ...

¶18. (C) On other portfolios, Zahri Muntasser told P/E Chief that if an associate of Saif al-Islam is tapped to be PM, Muatassim's camp could be given the position of Speaker of the Parliament, with RevComm figure Abdallah Othman replacing Ahmed Ibrahim. To balance out the RecComm cadres' influence, Secretary for Education Dr. Abd al-Kader al-Baghdadi, a RevComm fixture, would lose his seat. The Minister for Public Security, Brigadier General Salleh Muhammad Rajub al-Messmari, will almost certainly lose his seat thanks to the corruption and unseemly behavior of his adult son. He will likely be replaced by his deputy, Omran Hmeid, who has effectively been the acting Minister since al-Messmari fell from grace late last summer. Minister for Manpower, Training and Employment Matuq Matuq, a regime fixture who has held numerous cabinet positions and who has been the bane of international oil and gas companies - one contact described him as "a troglodyte" - may be pushed to the Housing and Infrastructure Board - technically a non-cabinet post - if Abuzaid Dorda moves up to become PM. Secretary for Economy, Trade and Investment Dr. Ali al-Essawi has been mentioned as being on the way out; however, reviews of his performance are mixed and we've heard no informed speculation as to who might replace him.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI167

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI167 aka Wikileaks id #143863 ?
Subject	LIBYA: NOTIFICATION OF ARB-IV PROCEEDINGS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:19 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI167.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2755
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0167 0630819
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 030819Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3160
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3640
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000167

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI (GOREY, MUBANGU) AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , KDRG *[Detainee Repatriation from Guantanamo Bay]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: NOTIFICATION OF ARB-IV PROCEEDINGS

REF: STATE 15647

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Post conveyed reftel points to the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) via diplomatic note February 26. P/E Chief followed up with MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayab February 27, underscoring that any information concerning Libyan nationals whose cases will be considered by the Administration Review Board at GTMO must be channeled through the GOL to Post. We also stressed that the GOL will be notified of the Designated Civilian Official's final determination concerning the two Libyan detainees scheduled for review.

¶2. (S) Ayab took our points on board, noting that Libya was familiar with the ARB rubric and stressing that the GOL is eager to have its nationals detained at GTMO repatriated to Libya.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI168

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI168 aka Wikileaks id #143864 ?
Subject	LIBYA: DEMARCHE IN PREPARATION FOR MAR 5-6 AL MINISTERIAL MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Mar 2008 08:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI168.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2756
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0168 0630820
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 030820Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3161
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3641
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000168

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/RA (PALLARES) AND NEA/MAG (JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AL *[Albania]* , IZ *[Iraq]* , KV *[Kosovo]* , LE *[Lebanon]* , SY *[Syria]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: DEMARCHE IN PREPARATION FOR MAR 5-6 AL MINISTERIAL MEETING

REF: STATE 19473

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

(C) P/E Chief delivered reftel demache points to MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayab February 28, stressing the need for positive movement to facilitate Lebanese presidential elections, early Arab League recognition of Kosovo's independence and pressuring Syria to take active steps to prevent foreign fighters from transiting its territory en route to Iraq. Ayab said he would convey the points to the Secretary for the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Foreign Minister-equivalent) Abdulrahman Shalgham. He said the GOL would refrain from any public statement on Kosovo's independence until the Arab League had made clear its position. (Comment: We have also heard that the GOL was waiting for the Organization of Islamic Conferences to pronounce on Kosovo. End comment.) Any further substantive response will be reported septel.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI182

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI182 aka Wikileaks id #144078 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR RELEASE OF LIFG MEMBERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 07:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI182.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI577 , 08TRIPOLI993
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4270
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0182 0640759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 040759Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3175
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3657
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000182

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INR (SWEET), S/CT, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2028
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION ON NEGOTIATIONS FOR RELEASE OF LIFG MEMBERS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Media reports and a statement posted on the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) website February 24 said Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, who heads the organization, had personally conducted negotiations with members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) about the possible release from prison of approximately one-third of the cohort of LIFG members currently imprisoned in Libya. In a meeting with P/E Chief March 3 on other issues, QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani confirmed the report, noting that negotiations had

Yusuf Sawani confirmed the report, noting that negotiations had been ongoing for more than a year. He attributed the impetus for the negotiations to a desire by the GOL to effect "genuine reconciliation" with those imprisoned members of the LIFG whom it judged to have undergone a "sincere ideological revision". Saying that "no one" wanted to see fellow Libyans incarcerated indefinitely, he claimed that reconciliation among former enemies was a "natural part" of Libya's tribal culture.

¶2. (C) Sawani put the total number of prisoners known to have LIFG affiliations at 93 and confirmed media reports that about one-third of those could be released if an agreement is reached. Saying further rounds of negotiation, with the personal involvement of Saif al-Islam, were expected to begin "soon", he stressed that the QDF and the GOL are keen "not to force unwelcome conditions" on the individuals being considered for release. Emphasizing that the individuals being considered had been judged to have "sincerely" renounced violence as a political adjunct, he said terms of monitoring and rehabilitation were key features of the negotiations. The shared goal of the QDF and GOL is to gain voluntary agreement by the prisoners to the terms of their release. It is expected that prisoners would return to their homes and resume their lives after release, Sawani said. There would be a program for monitoring their activities and the QDF would play "an active role" in promoting their reintegration into society; however, it is not envisioned that they would be under house arrest.

¶3.(C) Noting that the QDF realized the planned release will generate controversy in some quarters, including among foreign powers concerned about possible counter-terrorism implications, Sawani said the QDF understood it had to have "the highest degree of confidence" in the genuine ideological rehabilitation of those being considered for release. He stressed that candidates had been closely vetted over a considerable period of time before their names were added to the list used in Saif al-Islam's negotiations. He added that it had been agreed that those released would endorse a public statement renouncing political violence and disassociating themselves from the LIFG and al-Qaeda. (Note: The merger of the LIFG with al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM) was announced in November 2007. End note.)

STEVENS

Media

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI183

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI183 aka Wikileaks id #144081 ?
Subject	FOLLOW-UP ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 4 Mar 2008 08:01 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI183.html
References	08TRIPOLI142
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI220 , 08TRIPOLI223 , 08TRIPOLI229
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4271
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0183/01 0640801
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 040801Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3176
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0436
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0620
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0565
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1021
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0743
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0431
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3658
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000183

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2028
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FOLLOW-UP ON HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 142 , B) GRAY-CDA STEVENS EMAIL 3/02/08, C) TRIPOLI 93

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Dr. Youssef Sawani agreed to try to facilitate a second Embassy meeting with ailing human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi to help clarify the apparent dissonance between the QDF's characterization of el-Jahmi's condition and that of some members of his family. The specific goals of an Embassy visit would be to assess el-Jahmi's current medical condition, confirm

that his treating physicians believe he can safely return home, and solicit his views regarding options for his medical care were he to be released. Stressing that the GOL has "no interest" in seeing el-Jahmi's condition deteriorate, Sawani said el-Jahmi would not/not be under house arrest and would be able to seek medical treatment at any facility, which the QDF could, if needed, help facilitate. A complicating factor is el-Jahmi's family's refusal to take him back, despite repeated requests by the QDF and more recently GOL security personnel. Travel abroad for treatment was not an immediate possibility, but could be in the future if el-Jahmi honored a tacit agreement to remain silent after his release. Sawani said Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights would be allowed to visit Libya but the timing was still in question. End summary.

FOLLOW-ON VISIT FOR EMBASSY REQUESTED

¶2. (C) P/E Chief met with Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Dr. Youssef Sawani on March 3 to follow up on the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi. Thanking the QDF for its facilitation of the Embassy's visit to el-Jahmi February 20 (ref A) and a visit by el-Jahmi's family shortly thereafter, P/E Chief noted that there appeared to be some disagreement between the QDF's characterization of el-Jahmi's condition and that of some members of his family. After their visit, some members of his family had apparently communicated with USG officials in Washington, expressing concern that el-Jahmi's serious condition meant that his release could pose a threat to his medical prognosis. They also expressed concern that, if released, he might not enjoy access to medical care. A follow-on visit by Post to el-Jahmi in the near future - the goals of which would be to assess el-Jahmi's current medical condition, confirm that his treating physicians believe he can safely return home, and solicit his opinion regarding options for medical care - would be useful to help resolve conflicting accounts.

¶3. (C) Expressing "disappointment" with statements attributed to el-Jahmi's family in the wake of their recent visit, Sawani agreed that another visit by Post could be helpful and said he would try to arrange same with relevant GOL security organizations. He noted that recent statements by el-Jahmi's U.S.-based brother, Muhammad el-Jahmi, were viewed by some quarters of the GOL as evidence that he was motivated by "political opportunism"; the QDF's ability to secure Embassy access to el-Jahmi on short notice may have been circumscribed by that perception and by the fact that el-Jahmi's family had still not responded to the offer for them to take him home. (Note: Sawani phoned CDA later that night to convey a message from QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam to the USG that GOL security personnel had approached the family to request that they agree to take their father home, but the family had again refused. The QDF and the GOL, he said, were now at a loss as to what to do with him, for if they released him now and his family did not accept their responsibility to care for him, he could become destitute. Saif al-Islam asked that this message be conveyed to Senator Biden, as well, since he had written to Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi asking for the Leader's personal intervention to effect el-Jahmi's release from detention. End note.)

QDF, GOL HAVE "NO INTEREST" IN SEEING EL-JAHMI'S CONDITION WORSEN

¶4. (C) Responding to statements by international human rights NGO's to the effect that releasing el-Jahmi from the Tripoli Medical Center could pose a threat to his health, Sawani said the QDF had carefully assessed el-Jahmi's condition based on input from his treating physicians and had determined that he could now safely return home provided that he receive follow-on medical care. Such had not been the case earlier in the year, but el-Jahmi's condition continued to improve. Stressing that the QDF and GOL had "no interest" in seeing el-Jahmi's condition worsen, Sawani reiterated that a condition for el-Jahmi's release was an understanding that he would continue to receive

release was an understanding that he would continue to receive medical treatment after his release (see text of the QDF's letter, reported ref C).

"NO IMPEDIMENT" TO CARE AT OTHER LIBYAN MEDICAL FACILITIES

¶5. (C) Turning to treatment options, Sawani said he "did not

TRIPOLI 00000183 002 OF 003

foresee any impediment" to el-Jahmi receiving medical care at other medical facilities if he were released. The court did not formally sentence el-Jahmi during his 2004 trial; it found him mentally incompetent and recommended that he receive appropriate medical care. (Note: el-Jahmi told us his understanding was that he had/had been convicted under a Libyan law that criminalizeds advocating a postioin inconsistent with the 1969 revolution, and for defaming leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. End note.) El-Jahmi would not/not be subject to house arrest or its equivalent and there would be no restrictions against him seeking care at any medical facility if he were released. He would enjoy the rights "of any Libyan citizen" to come and go as he pleased, provided that he acceded to the tacit understanding that he would refrain from speaking about his detention or engaging in political discourse.

QDF MIGHT HELP FACILITATE ALTERNATIVE CARE

¶6. (C) Noting that some medical facilities, particularly private clinics, might be reluctant to provide care to el-Jahmi given sensitivities attendant to his case, P/E Chief asked whether treatment at facilities such as the private Libyan-Swiss Clinic and St. James Hospital would be possible, and whether the QDF might help facilitate same if such were necessary. Sawani agreed that the QDF might, if needed, play a positive intermediary role in facilitating care at those facilities or others. Saying the physician currently treating el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) had been el-Jahmi's physican for more than five years (pre-dating his trial and incarceration), Sawani suggested that an option could be continued treatment at the TMC on an outpatient basis. (Note: Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy and el-Jahmi both told P/E Chief during the latter's visit to the TMC that Mehdy had been el-Jahmi's physician for over five years. End note.) Conceding that local measures were perhaps wanting in some regards, Sawani noted that the TMC was nonetheless "a center of medical excellence" by Libyan standards.

TREATMENT ABROAD POSSIBLE "DOWN THE ROAD", WITH STIPULATIONS

¶7. (C) Asked whether el-Jahmi might travel abroad for treatment, Sawani said his understanding was that el-Jahmi does not currently possess a passport. Emphasizing that he was offering his "personal opinion", he said he believed that if el-Jahmi were released and honored the conditions for that release, he could be permitted to travel outside Libya for treatment "down the road". Pressed for clarity, Sawani demurred, saying his comment did not represent an "official position" on the issue of travel abroad, but was rather offering his sense of future possibilities based on conversations concerning el-Jahmi's case to which he had been privvy. Reitarating earlier points about the political sensitivies of Muhammad el-Jahmi's perceived exploitation of the case, he stressed that Fathi el-Jahmi and the family would need to demonstrate commitment to the agreement to refrain from public commentary for "a reasonable period of time" to secure permission for el-Jahmi to travel abroad for treatment, but said he believed such would be possible.

PHR/HRW VISIT

¶8. (C) Asked whether the QDF expected to be able to facilitate a visit on/about March 12 by Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) and

Human Rights Watch, Sawani conceded that he wasn't certain. He believed that the visit would happen, but remarks by the family after their recent visit to el-Jahmi, together with public statements by international human rights NGO's and the proposed visit's proximity to the General People's Congress (currently underway), had made it difficult for the QDF to push for the trip to happen in the immediate future. Pressed, he agreed to follow up on the issue with relevant GOL decision-makers to see whether there might still be some possibility of facilitating on/about March 12.

COMMENT

¶9. (C) Sawani clearly understands that the QDF and GOL face a potential credibility gap in terms of the dissonance between the QDF's characterization of the case and the family's purported observations (as reported by Muhammad el-Jahmi). His remarks concerning the GOL's neuralgia about Muhammad el-Jahmi's public statements and outreach to international human rights NGO's suggest that quiet engagement in the Embassy-QDF channel remains the best current option for maintaining positive momentum. Treatment abroad in the near term does not currently appear possible, but Sawani took pains to emphasize it could be in the future. The focus for now should be on assessing el-Jahmi's current medical condition, determining whether he wants to

TRIPOLI 00000183 003 OF 003

return home under the stipulated conditions and whether his family will agree to take him back and care for him, and ascertaining where and how he would obtain necessary medical treatment in future if he were released. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI204

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI204 aka Wikileaks id #144679 ?
Subject	ENGAGING THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 7 Mar 2008 08:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI204.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8056
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0204 0670827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 070827Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3199
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0623
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 0026
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0572
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0443
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3684
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000204

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/6/2018
TAGS: PINR *[Intelligence]* , PINS *[National Security]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , AG *[Algeria]* , LY *[Libya]* , MO *[Morocco]* , MR *[Mauritania]* , TS *[Tunisia]*
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE ARAB MAGHREB UNION

REF: STATE 21604

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) P/E Chief conveyed reftel invitation and message from NEA A/S David Welch to MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari March 6, stressing that a decision by Libya to participate in the U.S.-AMU technical working group on youth de-radicalization would be an important positive gesture. Matari said Foreign Minister Shalgam, in Cairo for the Arab League Ministerial meeting, was due back in Tripoli later that evening and that he would convey the invitation with him immediately with a recommendation that Libya send a delegation.

¶2. (C) Noting that many Libyan foreign fighters identified in last September's Objective Massey operation along the Syrian-Iraqi border were young men from eastern Libya, P/E Chief said GOL participants in the U.S.-AMU workshop should expect questions about what "soft power" measures might help blunt the appeal of extremist messages there. In that regard, it would be helpful if the GOL chose to include in their delegation officials conversant with the GOL's counter-ideological initiatives and efforts to de-radicalize youth through education and development programs. Matari took the point on board and said he would recommend to FM Shalgam that Libya's delegation include individuals empowered to speak to those issues.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI214

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI214 aka Wikileaks id #145395 ?
Subject	GOL STILL BRISTLING OVER VICTIMS OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION, UTA JUDGMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Mar 2008 09:57 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI214.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI584
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2483
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0214/01 0720957
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 120957Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3205
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0748
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0435
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3694
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000214

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/9/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] ,
ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GOL STILL BRISTLING OVER VICTIMS OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION,
UTA JUDGMENT

REF: A) TRIPOLI 199, B) TRIPOLI 149 (EXDIS)

TRIPOLI 00000214  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukri Ghanem and Deputy Foreign Minister Siala stressed to American interlocutors in recent meetings that the GOL views the recent confluence of the UTA bombing case judgment against Libya and a new U.S. law intended to assist victims of terrorism as serious threats that could jeopardize further development of U.S.-Libya bilateral ties and prompt Libya to expel U.S. oil and gas companies and reduce oil production. End summary.

U.S. OIL COMPANIES TREATED TO BROWBEATING

¶2. (C) ConocoPhillips CEO Jim Mulva was summoned to Sirte for a half-hour "browbeating" by Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi during his visit to Libya on/about February 24. Country manager Page Maxson told P/E Chief that the entire conversation focused on al-Qadhafi's "personal ire" about the so-called "Lautenberg Amendment" (section 1083 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008) and the USD 6 billion award against Libya in the UTA bombing case, and al-Qadhafi's view that Libya had not been sufficiently compensated for its decision to give up WMD and renounce terrorism. Al-Qadhafi passed a copy of his recent letter to the President on the subject (ref B) to Mulva. Telling Mulva that he and his fellow U.S. oil company CEOs needed to engage members of the U.S. Congress and the Administration on the matter, al-Qadhafi threatened to dramatically reduce Libya's oil production and/or expel out U.S. oil and gas companies. Al-Qadhafi claimed Libya would rather "keep its oil in the ground" and wait for a more favorable overseas investment climate than continue high levels of production in an environment in which sizeable portions of its oil-related assets could be seized.

¶3. (C) In a related development, Exxon-Mobil Country Manager Phil Goss told P/E Chief that Shukri Ghanem, Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation, had chastised him during a meeting on February 25 for nearly an hour on the "dire political signal" represented by the Lautenberg Amendment and the UTA judgment. Ghanem told Goss that U.S. oil and gas companies should "tell Washington" that Libya was serious in its threat to "significantly curtail" its oil production as a means to "penalize the U.S." for Lautenberg and UTA. According to Goss, Ghanem -- a U.S.-educated former Prime Minister -- was emotional in insisting that Libya "would not tolerate" Lautenberg and UTA without taking some retaliatory measures. Privately, Goss questioned whether the GOL could really afford to significantly curb oil output at a time when it is making massive investments in infrastructure as part of the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power on September 1, 2009. Stressing the erratic nature of decisionmaking in the GOL, Goss was careful not to rule out the possibility that Libya could choose "to do something stupid".

DFM SIALA: LAUTENBERG & UTA JUDGMENT "THREATEN EVERYTHING"

¶4. (C) In a meeting February 27 on other matters, Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent Muhammad Siala stressed to CDA the seriousness with which the GOL views the UTA bombing case damages judgment and Lautenberg Amendment. Siala expressed concern that the confluence of the two developments was " ... destroying everything the two sides have built since 2003". U.S. judicial and legislative branch decisions were "pushing Libya into a corner", forcing it to take measures to protect assets that could be exposed to seizure under the Lautenberg Amendment to satisfy terrorism-related claims such as that in the UTA bombing case. In addition, such actions bolstered the position of GOL elements suspicious of re-engagement with the United States.

¶5. (C) The GOL, Siala said, was urgently examining ways to

protect its oil revenues from seizure by U.S. plaintiffs. Claiming that payments to the GOL by U.S. oil and gas companies alone totaled $1 billion per month, Siala said the GOL recently decided to require that these payments be made in Euros rather

TRIPOLI 00000214 002.2 OF 002

than in dollars. (Note: ConocoPhillips country manager Page Maxson told P/E Chief total payments by U.S. companies were more likely in the range of $500-750 million per month. End note.) U.S. oil and gas company country managers confirmed that all payments for services must now be in non-dollar currencies; they must also pay their monthly revenue share to the GOL in Euros. In addition, Siala said the GOL was considering whether to require U.S. oil and gas companies to establish wholly-owned European subsidiaries through which financial transactions could be funneled, creating an additional firewall against asset seizure. Stressing that senior GOL leaders viewed Lautenberg and claims issues as "serious threats" to Libya, Siala cautioned that unless some mechanism for mitigating both issues were identified soon, Libya could be forced to slow its oil exports, likely prompting further price spikes in an already jumpy spot market.

¶6. (C) Siala said the GOL's understanding is that there are 26 outstanding cases before U.S. courts, including Pan Am 103, LaBelle and UTA. The GOL could not afford to be "bled" continuously by high-dollar awards in such cases. Unless the U.S. "took positive steps" to to resolve the Lautenberg and UTA judgment issues, Libya would be forced to divest itself of all investment and assets in the U.S. financial system. (Note: Mustafa Zarti, Deputy Chairman of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), Libya's sovereign wealth fund, subsequently told CDA and P/E Chief that the LIA had all but completely divested itself of U.S. holdings totaling some $9 billion. Conceding that it was difficult for any fund manager not to have a position in the U.S. market, he stressed that it made "no sense" for the LIA to continue to invest in the U.S. if its assets could be attached. End note.) Noting that he had personally played a key role in negotiating the release of Libyan assets frozen in U.S. banks in the sanctions era, Siala said Lautenberg was "much worse" because courts, not the executive branch, could seize assets and held them without paying interest. Because the Lautenberg Amendment provided for seizure before a final judgment had been reached, assets could be held for years without interest.

COMMENT

¶7. (C) Comment: Elements of the GOL remain convinced that the confluence of the Lautenberg Amendment and the UTA judgment constitute a political signal about limits on the bilateral relationship. There is genuine confusion among some about why such a signal would have been sent so soon after FM Abdulrahman Shalgam's January visit to Washington and in the course of a good patch of bilateral programmatic cooperation, with some perceiving the timing as a deliberate insult. The threat to curb oil production seems unlikely to be carried out in light of Libya's current budget obligations and absolute dependance on oil revenues. The regime has demonstrated in the past, however, that it is prepared to take sizeable risks and incur significant short- to mid-term costs if it feels it has been politically slighted. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Conflict in Libya: U.S. oil companies sit on sidelines as Gaddafi maintains hold - The Washington Post
- Three Little Words: WikiLeaks, Libya, Oil

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI220

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI220 aka Wikileaks id #145686 ?
Subject	DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 15:03 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI220.html
References	08TRIPOLI142 , 08TRIPOLI183
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4024
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0220/01 0731503
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131503Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3217
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0452
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0629
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0580
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1034
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0753
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0440
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3706
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000220

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"

REF: A) TRIPOLI 183 , B) TRIPOLI 142

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Reports by the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi was "released" to the custody of his family appear to be premature. Security officials continue to effectively control access to el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center. His family's access has improved but is not unconditional, and his ability to regularly leave his room for exercise and home visits remains the subject

leave his room for exercise and home visits remains the subject of negotiations with the QDF. According to his doctor, el-Jahmi's medical condition has improved and he could be released to his home for continuing treatment on an outpatient basis. El-Jahmi and his family are concerned that access to medical treatment might be curtailed if he were released from the hospital. Representatives of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights have arrived in Tripoli and are scheduled to visit el-Jahmi today for independent assessments of his status and medical condition. End summary.

FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"

¶2. (C) Citing statements by Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) human rights director Saleh Abdulsalam, international media reported on March 11 that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (FAJ) was "released", but remained at the Tripoli Medical Center for treatment. (Note: El-Jahmi has been in the GOL's custody since his re-arrest in early 2004. End note.) P/E Chief spoke with QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani on March 12. Sawani carefully stressed that el-Jahmi had been "transferred" from the custody of the GOL to the custody of his family, noting that since he had not been in detention (from the GOL's perspective), he could not have been "released". Referencing the el-Jahmi family's delay in responding to the QDF's earlier offers to allow el-Jahmi to return home (ref A), Sawani said the family had "finally" agreed to take custody of him. A March 12 Reuters report quoted el-Jahmi's son, Muhammad, as saying: "We ~ are very happy with the improvement in his health, particularly now that he can see us continuously. I am now responsible for his needs -- food, drink and everything."

BUT REMAINS AT TRIPOLI MEDICAL CENTER

¶3. (C) Sawani said the QDF had proposed transferring el-Jahmi to his family home in Tripoli or to a private clinic. The family told the QDF they could not accommodate el-Jahmi at home and raised concerns about the cost of private clinic care, suggesting the QDF underwrite those expenses. After consulting with FAJ's treating physicians at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) and, according to Sawani, with the family, it was decided that the best course of action was to keep el-Jahmi at the government-run TMC, where the state pays for his treatment "as it would with any Libyan citizen".

¶4. (C) Asked whether Emboffs could visit el-Jahmi, Sawani stressed that the GOL no longer has custody of FAJ. As such, neither the GOL nor the QDF had any mandate to facilitate access to el-Jahmi, who was ostensibly free to come and go as he pleased. Sawani cautioned that "as with any patient in hospital", Emboffs would have to coordinate a visit with el-Jahmi's family, who were now responsible for him. "It is for the family alone to decide whether a visit would be appropriate", he said.

FAMILY VISITS

¶5. (C) P/E Chief spoke by telephone March 12 with el-Jahmi's eldest son, Muhammad, and daughter, Lamia, who said access to el-Jahmi for the family had recently improved. A number of el-Jahmi's immediate family were able to visit about one week ago. In the last three days, Muhammad el-Jahmi and his mother visited daily for long periods (his wife stayed seven hours on March 11), and were able to bring him food and sundry items. Muhammad el-Jahmi said that on March 10 he had to coordinate their visit with the QDF; however, on March 11 and March 12 he and his mother only had to telephone the hospital before visiting. Muhammad asked the QDF on March 12 whether el-Jahmi could exit his room regularly for exercise to alleviate edema in his legs, and whether he might be able to make a visit home. The QDF "agreed in principle", but details of those arrangements are still being sorted out.

¶6. (C) Asked whether Emboffs could visit el-Jahmi, Muhammad and Lamia stressed that the family was not in a position to sanction or coordinate visits, and suggested that Post contact the QDF. Standing permission for access to him at this point extends only to Muhammad and his mother. The family had no objection to a

visit by Emboffs if the QDF agreed.

MINDERS STILL PRESENT

¶7. (C) P/E Chief visited el-Jahmi on March 12 in his TMC hospital room, located directly across from a nurse's station. When the duty nurse was asked which room el-Jahmi was in, two plainclothes security officers standing in front of el-Jahmi's room approached and asked who wanted to see him and why. The hospital's "security director," after determining that the visit had been coordinated with the QDF and the family, said P/E Chief could see al-Jahmi after el-Jahmi finished his evening prayers and supper.

TREATING PHYSICIAN SAYS IMPROVEMENT IN MEDICAL CONDITION CONTINUES

¶8. (C) While waiting, P/E Chief spoke by phone with el-Jahmi's treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, who said el-Jahmi's condition had continued to improve since Emboffs last visited el-Jahmi on February 20. El-Jahmi's EKG readings were close to normal, his breathing was less labored, he tired less easily and the edema in his legs had begun to ease. Mehdy said el-Jahmi could, in his judgment, be released from hospital immediately and could continue treatment on an outpatient basis with visits to clinic once every week or two, a significant improvement since just three weeks ago. El-Jahmi had undergone a complete battery of tests, to include EKG and CBC, blood sugar and lipids profile blood tests on March 12, and would undergo a sonogram on March 13. Doctors had discovered that el-Jahmi's vision had deteriorated when he was recently allowed reading material again; el-Jahmi's eyes were tested and new spectacles prescribed on March 12.

EL-JAHMI IN GOOD SPIRITS

¶9. (C) After a wait of about an hour, P/E Chief saw el-Jahmi, who was accompanied by his wife, son Muhammad and a man described as his nurse, Abdullah Bashir. El-Jahmi was visibly tired, but was alert and appeared to be in good spirits. He made his first walk of any distance earlier that day to have his eyes tested in a clinic located in a different wing of the hospital. Excited about having left his room for the first time in long while, he expressed frustration that the edema in his legs had not subsided more quickly. (Note: His physician said he had started el-Jahmi on a different analgesic medication about one week ago to help ease swelling in his legs, and that the initial signs were good. End note.)

¶10. (C) El-Jahmi said his condition had improved recently. He was permitted to raise the blinds in his room about one week ago, allowing him a view and some sunlight. His Koran had been returned to him, although reading had been difficult until his new spectacles had been prescribed. He had been allowed trips outside his room more regularly, and understood that he would be allowed to begin regular walks soon to help his heart and edema. Most importantly, his family had been able to visit regularly. Asked whether he needed anything, he stressed two things: continued medical treatment and his freedom. His medical condition had improved considerably since treatment began in December 2007; however, further treatment was needed. He and his family were concerned that access to treatment might be curtailed - directly or indirectly - if he were released from the hospital. Unbidden, el-Jahmi stressed that while he wants

the hospital. Unbidden, el-Jahmi stressed that while he wants to go home, he remains unwilling to enter into a tacit agreement to refrain from criticizing al-Qadhafi's regime or speaking publicly about his detention as the price for his release. He was unaware until told by P/E Chief that representatives of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) were, with the QDF's facilitation, scheduled to visit him in the coming days. He expressed relief that the international community remains focused on his case, saying he felt he had been "walking alone in the wilderness" for a long time.

¶11. (C) Comment: While we lack the expertise to comment authoritatively on el-Jahmi's medical condition, he appeared to have improved since our last visit with him in February (ref B). Unfettered access and, should he choose, the ability to: 1) leave his room, and: 2) leave the TMC are important measures of whether he has in fact been "transferred" from GOL custody to that of his family. Security officials remain outside his room and effectively control access to him, and his ability to leave his room regularly for exercise and/or home visits is apparently being negotiated with the QDF, suggesting he remains for practical purposes under GOL custody. The distinction between

el-Jahmi having been at the TMC in the GOL's custody and his being there now in the custody of his family is at best a subtle one. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the QDF's announcement of el-Jahmi's "release" was orchestrated as window dressing on the eve of the visit by HRW and PHR representatives. An important component of any agreement for his release will be specific agreement on the terms of his continued medical treatment. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI223

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI223 aka Wikileaks id #145714 ?
Subject	DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Mar 2008 16:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI223.html
References	08TRIPOLI142 , 08TRIPOLI183
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI229 , 08TRIPOLI266
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4169
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0223/01 0731636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131636Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3225
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0455
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0632
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0583
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1037
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0756
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0443
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3714
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000223

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"

REF: A) TRIPOLI 183 , B) TRIPOLI 142

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Reports by the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi was "released" to the custody of his family appear to be premature. Security officials continue to effectively control access to el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center. His family's access has improved but is not unconditional, and his ability to regularly leave his room for exercise and home visits remains the subject of negotiations with the QDF. According to his doctor

of negotiations with the QDF. According to his doctor, el-Jahmi's medical condition has improved and he could be released to his home for continuing treatment on an outpatient basis. El-Jahmi and his family are concerned that access to medical treatment might be curtailed if he were released from the hospital. Represenatives of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights have arrived in Tripoli and are scheduled to visit el-Jahmi today for independent assessments of his status and medical condition. End summary.

FATHI EL-JAHMI "RELEASED"

¶2. (C) Citing statements by Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) human rights director Saleh Abdulsalam, international media reported on March 11 that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (FAJ) was "released", but remained at the Tripoli Medical Center for treatment. (Note: El-Jahmi has been in the GOL's custody since his re-arrest in early 2004. End note.) P/E Chief spoke with QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani on March 12. Sawani carefully stressed that el-Jahmi had been "transferred" from the custody of the GOL to the custody of his family, noting that since he had not been in detention (from the GOL's perspective), he could not have been "released". Referencing the el-Jahmi family's delay in responding to the QDF's earlier offers to allow el-Jahmi to return home (ref A), Sawani said the family had "finally" agreed to take custody of him. A March 12 Reuters report quoted el-Jahmi's son, Muhammad, as saying: "We ~ are very happy with the improvement in his health, particularly now that he can see us continuously. I am now responsible for his needs -- food, drink and everything."

BUT REMAINS AT TRIPOLI MEDICAL CENTER

¶3. (C) Sawani said the QDF had proposed transferring el-Jahmi to his family home in Tripoli or to a private clinic. The family told the QDF they could not accommodate el-Jahmi at home and raised concerns about the cost of private clinic care, suggesting the QDF underwrite those expenses. After consulting with FAJ's treating physicians at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) and, according to Sawani, with the family, it was decided that the best course of action was to keep el-Jahmi at the government-run TMC, where the state pays for his treatment "as it would with any Libyan citizen".

¶4. (C) Asked whether Emboffs could visit el-Jahmi, Sawani stressed that the GOL no longer has custody of FAJ. As such, neither the GOL nor the QDF had any mandate to facilitate access to el-Jahmi, who was ostensibly free to come and go as he pleased. Sawani cautioned that "as with any patient in hospital", Emboffs would have to coordinate a visit with el-Jahmi's family, who were now responsible for him. "It is for the family alone to decide whether a visit would be appropriate", he said.

FAMILY VISITS

¶5. (C) P/E Chief spoke by telephone March 12 with el-Jahmi's eldest son, Muhammad, and daughter, Lamia, who said access to el-Jahmi for the family had recently improved. A number of el-Jahmi's immediate family were able to visit about one week ago. In the last three days, Muhammad el-Jahmi and his mother visited daily for long periods (his wife stayed seven hours on March 11), and were able to bring him food and sundry items. Muhammad el-Jahmi said that on March 10 he had to coordinate their visit with the QDF; however, on March 11 and March 12 he and his mother only had to telephone the hospital before visiting. Muhammad asked the QDF on March 12 whether el-Jahmi could exit his room regularly for exercise to alleviate edema in his legs, and whether he might be able to make a visit home. The QDF "agreed in principle", but details of those arrangements are still being sorted out.

¶6. (C) Asked whether Emboffs could visit el-Jahmi, Muhammad and

Lamia stressed that the family was not in a position to sanction or coordinate visits, and suggested that Post contact the QDF. Standing permission for access to him at this point extends only to Muhammad and his mother. The family had no objection to a

visit by Emboffs if the QDF agreed.

MINDERS STILL PRESENT

¶7. (C) P/E Chief visited el-Jahmi on March 12 in his TMC hospital room, located directly across from a nurse's station. When the duty nurse was asked which room el-Jahmi was in, two plainclothes security officers standing in front of el-Jahmi's room approached and asked who wanted to see him and why. The hospital's "security director," after determining that the visit had been coordinated with the QDF and the family, said P/E Chief could see al-Jahmi after el-Jahmi finished his evening prayers and supper.

TREATING PHYSICIAN SAYS IMPROVEMENT IN MEDICAL CONDITION CONTINUES

¶8. (C) While waiting, P/E Chief spoke by phone with el-Jahmi's treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, who said el-Jahmi's condition had continued to improve since Emboffs last visited el-Jahmi on February 20. El-Jahmi's EKG readings were close to normal, his breathing was less labored, he tired less easily and the edema in his legs had begun to ease. Mehdy said el-Jahmi could, in his judgment, be released from hospital immediately and could continue treatment on an outpatient basis with visits to clinic once every week or two, a significant improvement since just three weeks ago. El-Jahmi had undergone a complete battery of tests, to include EKG and CBC, blood sugar and lipids profile blood tests on March 12, and would undergo a sonogram on March 13. Doctors had discovered that el-Jahmi's vision had deteriorated when he was recently allowed reading material again; el-Jahmi's eyes were tested and new spectacles prescribed on March 12.

EL-JAHMI IN GOOD SPIRITS

¶9. (C) After a wait of about an hour, P/E Chief saw el-Jahmi, who was accompanied by his wife, son Muhammad and a man described as his nurse, Abdullah Bashir. El-Jahmi was visibly tired, but was alert and appeared to be in good spirits. He made his first walk of any distance earlier that day to have his eyes tested in a clinic located in a different wing of the hospital. Excited about having left his room for the first time in long while, he expressed frustration that the edema in his legs had not subsided more quickly. (Note: His physician said he had started el-Jahmi on a different analgesic medication about one week ago to help ease swelling in his legs, and that the initial signs were good. End note.)

¶10. (C) El-Jahmi said his condition had improved recently. He was permitted to raise the blinds in his room about one week ago, allowing him a view and some sunlight. His Koran had been returned to him, although reading had been difficult until his new spectacles had been prescribed. He had been allowed trips outside his room more regularly, and understood that he would be allowed to begin regular walks soon to help his heart and edema. Most importantly, his family had been able to visit regularly. Asked whether he needed anything, he stressed two things: continued medical treatment and his freedom. His medical condition had improved considerably since treatment began in December 2007; however, further treatment was needed. He and his family were concerned that access to treatment might be curtailed - directly or indirectly - if he were released from the hospital. Unbidden, el-Jahmi stressed that while he wants to go home, he remains unwilling to enter into a tacit agreement

to go home, he remains unwilling to enter into a tacit agreement to refrain from criticizing al-Qadhafi's regime or speaking publicly about his detention as the price for his release. He was unaware until told by P/E Chief that representatives of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) were, with the QDF's facilitation, scheduled to visit him in the coming days. He expressed relief that the international community remains focused on his case, saying he felt he had been "walking alone in the wilderness" for a long time.

¶11. (C) Comment: While we lack the expertise to comment authoritatively on el-Jahmi's medical condition, he appeared to have improved since our last visit with him in February (ref B). Unfettered access and, should he choose, the ability to: 1) leave his room, and: 2) leave the TMC are important measures of whether he has in fact been "transferred" from GOL custody to that of his family. Security officials remain outside his room and effectively control access to him, and his ability to leave his room regularly for exercise and/or home visits is apparently being negotiated with the QDF, suggesting he remains for practical purposes under GOL custody. The distinction between

el-Jahmi having been at the TMC in the GOL's custody and his being there now in the custody of his family is at best a subtle one. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the QDF's announcement of el-Jahmi's "release" was orchestrated as window dressing on the eve of the visit by HRW and PHR representatives. An important component of any agreement for his release will be specific agreement on the terms of his continued medical treatment. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI226

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI226 aka Wikileaks id #146078 ?
Subject	GOL PROPOSES GLOBAL SETTLEMENT TALKS ON TERRORIST-RELATED LEGAL CLAIMS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 08:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI226.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6591
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0226 0770847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170847Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3235
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3724
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000226

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO (WELCH, GRAY) AND L (SCHWARTZ)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , KLIG [Foreign Litigation] , PTER
[Terrorists and Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GOL PROPOSES GLOBAL SETTLEMENT TALKS ON TERRORIST-RELATED
LEGAL CLAIMS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) In a meeting on March 16, MFA U/S-equivalent for European
Affairs Abdulati Obeidi passed CDA and P/E Chief a copy of a
note proposing a meeting with USG officials "at the earliest
possible date" to begin discussions regarding a comprehensive
settlement of all legal claims pending in U.S. and Libyan
courts.  (Note: Post's translation is at para 4; original Arabic
language text has been scanned and sent to NEA/MAG via email.
End note.)  Noting that the Libyan proposal stemmed from
discussions in February in Europe between NEA A/S David Welch,
Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Obeidi, he said the GOL also
transmitted the note and instructions to Libya's CDA in
Washington, Ali Aujali, on March 15.  It was expected that
Aujali would convey the note to the Department on March 17. The
offer by the GOL to negotiate a comprehensive settlement
represented an important "political decision" by the GOL, he
```

said.

¶2. (C) Obeidi suggested that initial discussions could focus on the three major outstanding claims cases in U.S. venues: Pan Am 103, LaBelle, and UTA. Emphasizing his desire to avoid "surprises", he said that the GOL team would also raise judgments in Libyan courts related to the 1986 Operation El Dorado Canyon bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi. Obeidi said the Libyan team would consist of himself, Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent Dr. Muhammad Siala, attorney and head of the GOL's litigation committee Ahmed Mselati, attorney Azzam al-Dib, attorney Dr. Ali Dawi, attorney Azza al-Maghour, and Qadhafi Development Foundation official Munther Ramadan. (Note: DFM Siala's position was formally abolished, together with all deputy minister-equivalent positions, in the wake of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech to the General People's Congress; however, Siala remains in his office at the MFA. Obeidi said a "reorganization" would occur, but suggested Siala may remain at the MFA in some as-yet undetermined capacity. End note.) Obeidi said discussions to date on a comprehensive settlement had been at the political level; Obeidi suggested the time was now right for the two sides to include legal experts who could help formulate modalities of a possible settlement mechanism.

¶3. (C) Noting his understanding that positive movement on claims - particularly high-profile cases - could lend impetus to efforts to find a mechanism to mitigate the effects of section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the "Lautenberg Amendment"), Obeidi stressed that the GOL would like to meet with the U.S. team as quickly as possible. The GOL's preference is that the venue be either in Tripoli or in Europe (London, Rome and Geneva were suggested). Citing what he said was the decision of the U.S. judge in the Pan Am 103 case to suspend legal proceedings in the case while negotiations were underway, Obeidi said the GOL hoped proceedings could be similarly suspended in the LaBelle and UTA cases.

¶4. (C) Begin informal translation of note:

A Proposal to the U.S. State Department Regarding Settlement of Pending Issues Between the Two Countries

Recalling the cases filed against the Great Jamahiriya and a number of its nationals in U.S. courts and Amendment 1083 of the 2008 U.S. Defense Authorization bill, and recalling verdicts pronounced by Libyan courts for compensation of victims of the American raid on Libya in the year 1986 of the Christian calendar; and recalling the intensive contacts between the two sides at the political and legal levels regarding the desire to reach a comprehensive settlement of all pending issues.

We wish to inform you of our agreement to reach a settlement that would include all pending isues and would put a definitive end to all judicial disputes and permit forward movement in the development of bilateral relations in all areas of cooperation serving the interests of the two countries:

We therefore propose the following:

- Within the framework of implementing the above-referenced settlement, a fund shall be established for the purpose of compensating victims of both countries, to be funded directly or indirectly in accordance with a mutually agreed mechanism that is to be specified in detail within the framework of the proposed settlement.
- To suspend legal proceedings of cases currently before U.S. courts, to suspend implementation of verdicts issued in both countries and to commence negotiations regarding a comprehensive settlement.
- To hold an official meeting between representatives of both countries at the earliest possible date to discuss a comprehensive settlement agreement. We propose that the venue for such a meeting be either Tripoli or any European country.

Awaiting your reply, we offer assurances of our respect and highest consideration.

Date: March 11, 2008.

Signed: Abdulati Obeidi, Secretary for European Affairs, General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

STEVENS

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI227

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI227 aka Wikileaks id #146090 ?
Subject	BACK TO THE FUTURE? QADHAFI CALLS FOR DRAMATIC SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN GPC SPEECH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 10:09 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI227.html
References	08TRIPOLI166
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI402 , 08TRIPOLI564 , 08TRIPOLI565 , 08TRIPOLI584 , 08TRIPOLI679 , 08TRIPOLI827 , 08TRIPOLI842 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 08TRIPOLI917 , 09TRIPOLI17 , 09TRIPOLI191 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6649
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0227/01 0771009
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171009Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3236
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3725
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0759
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0446
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0016
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000227

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , ECON [Economic Conditions] ,
EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: BACK TO THE FUTURE?  QADHAFI CALLS FOR DRAMATIC
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHANGE IN GPC SPEECH

REF: TRIPOLI 166

TRIPOLI 00000227  001.2 OF 005


CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent speech given at the opening of the annual General People's Congress, Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi roundly criticized the existing Libyan government structure for having failed to distribute oil wealth to the Libyan people. Decrying inefficiency and corruption, he called for the system of General People's Committees that have formed the basis of government since the late 1970's to be completely dismantled by year's end and replaced with an as-yet undetermined structure. He also advocated the direct transfer of oil revenues - he suggested the amount of 5,000 Libyan dinar per month - to Libyan families and radical privatization. Virtually all social services - health care, education, pensions and retirement funds, and utilities - would be privatized, and government salaries would be eliminated. Qadhafi's plan for restructuring the GOL and privatizing the majority of state-owned and operated services could represent his most radical experiment in governance since the introduction of the GPC's and subsequent establishment of the Revolutionary Committees in the late 1970's. Business leaders, hopeful that the Congress would offer clear signs of the regime's commitment to continued economic reform, are troubled that the GOL is biting off more than it can chew by taking on wholesale structural reform in tandem with privatization. The proposed changes would strike a direct blow at the tacit pact - cradle-to-grave subsidies financed by oil revenues in exchange for political quiescence - that has undergirded the regime for decades and could signal political turbulence fomented by old guard elements already uneasy about the extent and pace of change in Libya. End summary.

OIL WEALTH A MIXED BLESSING THAT NECESSITATES CHANGE

¶2. (U) In a speech delivered on March 2 to the annual session of the General People's Congress in Sirte, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi decried the failure of the General People's Committees to effectively distribute Libya's oil wealth to its people. While the 1969 revolution was initially successful in reclaiming Libya's oil wealth for ordinary Libyans, widespread corruption and failed implementation at all levels of government had engendered widespread dissatisfaction with public services, especially education, health, and infrastructure development. Qadhafi, claiming Arab governments in oil-rich states that failed to fairly dispense oil wealth risk being toppled by their own people in the near future, said increased oil prices made the cost of the General People's Committees' (GPC's) failure to effectively distribute the nation's oil wealth increasingly untenable.

(ANOTHER) RADICAL RESTRUCTURING OF GOVERNMENT IN THE OFFING

¶3. (C) Qadhafi called on the Congress to abolish by year's end the system of the GPC's, which has constituted the de facto government structure since the late 1970's, and to instead directly transfer Libya's oil revenues "to the people". Contacts at the MFA and Central Bank recently told us that five GOL committees - responsible for the budget, economy, administrative structure, wealth distribution and legal reform - were quickly constituted after Qadhafi's speech to formulate plans for dismantling the GPC's, standing up alternate structures and implementing direct distribution of oil wealth. Final plans for shifting from the GPC's to an as-yet undetermined structure are due by September 1. Central Bank Governor Bengdara told the CDA March 12 that restructuring of the GOL would precede privatization of government-owned entities and services such as health, education and utilities.

SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY APPARATUS TO REMAIN UNCHANGED

¶4. (U) Citing common practice in other countries, Qadhafi identified five key authorities - defense, foreign affairs, interior, internal security and external security - that would remain unchanged, but should report directly to the head of state (formally the Secretary of the General People's Congress) instead of through the existing structure. He noted that, in

instead of through the existing structure. He noted that, in practice, the Libyan Prime Minister-equivalent does not and should not exercise oversight over these areas, proposing that they instead be considered as "sovereign ministries" that would report directly to the head of state and not/not through the GPC's and the Secretariat of the General People's Congress. He proposed an alternative form of military conscription in which all eligible Libyans would be required to do two-month rotations in the armed forces in lieu of maintaining a standing army.

DIRECT REDISTRIBUTION OF OIL WEALTH PROPOSED

¶5. (U) Citing the inability of GPC's to effectively distribute Libya's oil-generated wealth to its citizens, Qadhafi proposed a redistribution scheme by which half a million Libyan families, totaling some three million people, will receive monthly stipends representing their share of Libya's oil revenues. Subsidies for gasoline, food, commodities, health care and education would be eliminated. Qadhafi proposed a stipend figure of 5,000 Libyan dinar (LD) per month (about $4,000). Ironically, the GPC system whose elimination he advocated will be responsible for developing a mechanism to transfer oil wealth before its demise. The GPC's annual budget had steadily increased to a peak of $32 billion (37 billion LD) in 2007; budgets under the new distribution system should settle at about 30 billion LD per year according to Qadhafi. (Note: State-owned media subsequently reported that the 2008 budget would total 49 billion LD, about $39 billion. End note.) Saying he had advocated a similar reform package for years, the Libyan leader argued that if only the Libyan people had taken his advice in the past, they'd be rich already.

WITH CORRESPONDING PRIVATIZATION OF STATE-OWNED/OPERATED SERVICES

¶6. (U) Once the GPC system is dismantled, all spending decisions will devolve to the private sector. In lieu of the GPC structure, Qadhafi suggested the Libyan people would spontaneously establish "real committees" of around 100 individuals for the purpose of managing private sector economic activity. He cautioned that while oil prices are high now, they would not always remain so. While acknowledging that most Libyans would not do so, he encouraged them to save and invest some of their monthly allotment. Qadhafi called for the abolishment of all loans, criticizing the Libyan financial sector both for discriminatory lending practices based on personal and tribal affiliation and for a poor track record on non-performing loans. He hinted at the establishment of an individual income tax system. Qadhafi spoke at length about the ways in which he perceives the GOL to be oversized and overextended, citing services such as HIV/AIDS testing, avian bird flu detection and veterinary care as issues that are beyond the competence of most governments. He noted approvingly (and incorrectly) that the U.S. government does not fund cultural programs. He focused on radical privatization, stressing health care and education, as the means by which to trim the public sector bloat and further empower the private sector.

EDUCATION, HEALTH CARE ARE KEY AREAS

¶7. (U) Qadhafi spoke at length about education, saying Libyans will be solely responsible for financing their children's education, either within Libya (by funding school construction and paying teachers' salaries) or abroad. "No one [in the Libyan government] is responsible for [a child's] education, whether locally or abroad," he said. Lamenting the fact that most Libyan schools lack computers and sufficient numbers of psychiatrists and social workers, he suggested that privately-funded and operated schools might do better. He encouraged Libyans to pay for their children to study abroad if

their choice of career required specialized education. Qadhafi also said privatization of education would extend to religious education, opining that "you [the people] must run the madrassas~ you take those Quranic schools." On health care, the GOL had invested considerable sums to build hospitals and train medical personnel, but Libyans complained about the quality of care and traveled abroad whenever possible for medical care. By privatizing hospitals, they would now have a chance to directly improve the quality of medical care.

HOW TO KEEP LIBYANS WORKING?

¶8. (U) Complaining that annual outlays for government salaries are far too high, Qadhafi called for an end to public sector wages and the abolishment of government-funded pensions and retirement funds. (Note: The Central Bank Governor told the CDA salary outlays officially totaled about 10 billion LD, but suggested the real number is higher. End note.) He noted the Libyan people would "need to think about" how to create incentives for employees in key public functions, such as security and defense, to continue working if they're receiving the same monthly stipend as everyone else. He speculated that some security functions might eventually be filled with volunteers.

QADHAFI ROLLS THE DICE ... AGAIN

¶9. (C) Qadhafi's plan for restructuring the GOL and privatizing

the majority of state-owned and operated services could represent his most radical experiment in governance since the introduction of the GPC's and subsequent establishment of the Revolutionary Committees in the late 1970's. Conceding that the speech was "substantially different" than anything anyone expected (see reftel for Post's preview of the General People's Congress), Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani told P/E Chief March 3 that the "dramatic initiatives" were designed to "radically accelerate" government and economic reform, and to open further space for civil society actors. MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri told the CDA March 5 that Secretary of the GPC for Manpower, Employment and Training Matuq Matuq - a member of one of the implementing committees - called him shortly after Qadhafi's speech asking for details about the U.S. system of local, state and federal governance. Fituri said Qadhafi, frustrated by the "bulky and non-responsive" GOL, had suggested the U.S. system, including independent federal agencies such as the EPA, as a possible model. Fituri told the CDA he threw cold water on the idea in his conversation with Matuq, cautioning that the U.S. system was too complex to be effectively replicated in Libya.

MUCH ACTIVITY ...

¶10. (C) The Ministry of Economy and Trade's Director of Foreign Trade, Dia Hammouda, told Emboffs March 12 that the GOL's most senior leaders are focused on implementing the "drastic" plan. The five committees responsible for the budget, economy, government/administrative structure, wealth distribution and legal reform comprise the Secretary of the General People's Congress (head of state equivalent), his deputy, the Prime Minister-equivalent, his deputy and secretaries (minister equivalents) for the relevant General People's Committees. The committees have been meeting "continuously" since the March 2 speech to develop recommendations for implementing the plan. A session to review initial plans and recommendations is scheduled for early next week. Conceding that the changes represented a serious political gamble, Hammouda cited a Libyan proverb: "From Libya comes the new".

BUT HOW MUCH REAL MOVEMENT?

... BUT HOW MUCH REAL MOVEMENT?

¶11. (C) Nonetheless, it remains unclear how extensive the change will really be. Abdulati Obeidi, MFA Secretary for European Affairs, told the visiting Lord Mayor of London on March 8 that the biggest shift could be expanding the power of the Prime Minister-equivalent's office to include "subcommittees" for issues such as health, education and infrastructure that would create policy "at the strategic level". Various GOL contacts have speculated that the existing GPC structures could remain essentially intact, but under different names and under different lines of authority, with the power of a more formalized executive in the form of a strengthened PM-equivalent's office. Underscoring the fact that real change may be slower in coming than the impatient Qadhafi would like, Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent Muhammad Siala, whose position was summarily abolished along with all other deputy GPC secretary slots, remains in his office and is "carrying on as

SIPDIS
normal", at least for now.

"SOVEREIGN MINISTRIES" AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF REALITY

¶12. (C) MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari told P/E Chief that creating the proposed five "sovereign ministries" could greatly diminish the authority of the General People's Congress in foreign policy and security issues. The general who heads the Support Division of the Ministry of Interior-equivalent told P/E Chief on March 6 that establishing foreign affairs, defense and security services as exceptions to the new rule reflected the reality that the regime rests on "the pillar of security". It was fine to tinker with social engineering in civilian ministries, but "everyone" understood that at its core the regime depended on the foreign affairs, defense and security organizations because "Libya is not an inherently stable country".

5,000 LD ALLOTMENT "AN EXAMPLE"; CENTRAL BANK CONCERNED ABOUT INFLATION

¶13. (C) Noting that the figure of 5,000 LD was "an example" of the amount of direct oil wealth transfers that might be settled on, Central Bank Chairman Bengdara stressed to the CDA on March 11 concerns about inflation. He had instead proposed that stocks and shares in government-owned companies and investment funds comprise some or all of the distribution package. Citing

TRIPOLI 00000227 004.2 OF 005

Libyans' penchant for consumer spending and lack of financial discipline, he fretted that many Libyans would fail to save and invest, limiting non-oil sector economic growth and leaving many without cash reserves if oil prices and monthly allotments dropped. Libyans are "much more like Italians than like the British" in wanting to spend rather than save, he said. Stressing the enormity of the proposed changes, Bengdara said that while Qadhafi wanted changes implemented "very soon", a realistic timeline for implementation was 10 years. Overly rapid privatization would be disastrous; privatization would need to be carefully sequenced with government restructuring to be effective.

SITUATION REGARDING QADHAFI'S SONS UNCLEAR

¶14. (C) As reported ref A, observers hoped results of the Congress would signal the relative positions of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his recently ascendant brother, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, the two sons of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi widely considered to be rivals to succeed their father. In typical Qadhafi fashion, results of the Congress are unclear. Muatassim, as National Security Adviser, is the only Qadhafi son

formally represented on the new administrative structure committee, potentially the most important of the five committees tasked with restructuring the government. But two key members of the General People's Congress (Parliament-equivalent) viewed as Muatassim allies - former Secretary of the GPC Zanati Ahmed Zanati (Speaker of the Parliament-equivalent) and Deputy Secretary of the GPC Ahmed Ibrahim - lost their seats, calling

SIPDIS
into question how much Muatassim really gained.

¶15. (C) In addition, a Jordanian national with McKinsey Consulting who works with Libya's economic and financial sectors told EconOff March 11 that Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, head of the National Planning Commission, ally of Saif al-Islam and a leading advocate for economic reform, would play a key role on three of the five implementing committees - budget, economy and wealth distribution. Jibril, who as recently as early February was so frustrated by his inability to effect reform that he had submitted letters of resignation on three occasions, is reportedly now convinced that Qadhafi's commitment to dramatic change is sincere enough that he has agreed to stay on - for now.

¶16. (C) Basem Philip (strictly protect), Nestle's Country Manager, offered a different interpretation, telling the CDA that Qadhafi's proposed changes had effectively created areas in which the three leading sons (Saif al-Islam, Muatassim, and Khamis, an army officer) could play key roles. By differentiating between economic/social areas of governance (Saif al-Islam's purview) and "sovereign ministries" divided between security organizations (Muatassim) and defense (Khamis), Qadhafi had avoided signaling which son is the leading contender to succeed him. Reiterating remarks in the run-up to the Congress, businessman Zahri Muntasser told P/E Chief March 13 that the "changes" effectively extended Qadhafi's hedge of his December 2003 "strategic bet" to give up WMD and terrorism by fostering the perception that a traditional "strong man" (Muatassim or Khamis), vice the more reformist Saif al-Islam, could take - or at least share - the reins of power.

BUSINESS COMMUNITY CONFUSED

¶17. (C) Business figures concerned by contradictory signals in late 2007 about the GOL's commitment to economic reform and hopeful that the Congress would clarify the situation (reftel) similarly argue the situation is now more confused than before. Rather than proceeding with measured reform within the existing structure while solidifying economic reform, Qadhafi was trying to "change everything at once". Frustrated by what he perceived to be "juvenile impatience", leading businessman Husni Bey (strictly protect) decried to P/E Chief the idea that the GOL could undertake wholesale structural reform and simultaneously manage the massive infrastructure and development programs it is trying to complete in time for the 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009. Trying to undertake extensive political and economic reform simultaneously was "a recipe for disaster", he said. Muntasser told P/E Chief he had been "disappointed" by the speech and was inclined to continue waiting to see how the changes played out before deciding to undertake any further investment.

¶18. (C) Comment: This year's General People's Congress was closely watched for signs of the regime's commitment to economic and limited political reform. In classic fashion, Qadhafi

TRIPOLI 00000227 005.2 OF 005

surprised everyone with his call for a dramatic restructuring of Libya's existing political and economic system. His tone and language were petulant, reflecting clear frustration that the GPC system (of which he was the architect) had so demonstrably

GPC system (of which he was the architect) had so demonstrably failed, but also with the complaints of Libyan citizens about the Jamahiriya's shortcomings, particularly in the areas of education and health care. Reminded of the difficult days of the 1980's and early 1990's, when revolutionary zeal was at its peak, some contacts have expressed concern that the speech portends a return to the turbulent experimentalism of the past. The angry tone and specific proposals are more consistent with yesteryear Qadhafi offerings than with the philosopher-king image he has cultivated more recently. Businessman Zahri Muntasser flatly told the CDA that many Libyans found Qadhafi's remarks "un-statesmanlike".

¶19. (C) Comment (continued): More significant than the jarring tone was Qadhafi's seemingly contradictory mix of uber-libertarianism and old school revolutionary speak. Points blasting U.S.-style democracy as "falsifying the true will of the people" and lauding the Jamahiriya's "state of the masses" as a superior model came hard on the heels of remarks decrying the failure of the GPC's and a call for the complete privatization of Libya's socio-economic structure, a marked shift from the pseudo-socialist egalitarianism of old. Perhaps most importantly, the proposed changes would strike a direct blow at the tacit pact - cradle-to-grave subsidies financed by oil revenues in exchange for political quiescence - that has undergirded the regime for decades. Libyans' cautious optimism about receiving sizeable monthly allotments of oil revenues has been tempered by real concern about the practicalities of self-financing virtually every aspect of their lives. How aggressively the regime implements the proposed changes - it wouldn't be the first time Qadhafi's dramatic calls for change ended up being a tempest in a teacup - could determine how much more old guard elements already dissatisfied with what they perceive to be too much change are willing to take. The inclusion of more conservative individuals such as former Secretary for Manpower, Employment and Training Matuq Matuq and

SIPDIS
National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi on the key administrative structure committee charged with implementing government re-structuring suggests an attempt to balance competing reformist and traditional constituencies. In the end, Qadhafi's speech brings to mind the recent comment of an MFA official: "We don't have a government here ... we have something else". End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI229

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI229 aka Wikileaks id #146183 ?
Subject	HRW/PHR VISIT FATHI EL-JAHMI, EXPECT HIM TO RETURN HOME SOON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 16:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI229.html
References	08TRIPOLI183 , 08TRIPOLI223
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI266 , 08TRIPOLI401
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7079
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0229/01 0771647
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171647Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3242
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0458
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0635
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0586
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1040
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0764
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0398
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3731
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000229

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/17/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HRW/PHR VISIT FATHI EL-JAHMI, EXPECT HIM TO RETURN HOME SOON

REF: A) TRIPOLI 223 , B) TRIPOLI 183

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Representatives of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (HRW/PHR) visited Tripoli in mid-March to perform an independent medical assessment of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and discuss his

release with interlocutors from the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF). El-Jahmi is expected to be released from the hospital by late March in exchange for his tacit agreement to remain silent about his detention and refrain from making political statements. He is expected to convalesce initially in Tripoli for several weeks in lodging provided by the QDF, before traveling to either Benghazi for further recovery at his family home there, or to the U.S. for further diagnosis and treatment. The QDF has indicated that it does not oppose facilitating issuance of a passport to el-Jahmi or his travel abroad, provided that he honors the terms of the agreement for his release. El-Jahmi's medical condition remains serious but is essentially stable; PHR assesses that he is medically able to return home provided he receives needed ongoing care on an outpatient basis. El-Jahmi's family has expressed concern about underwriting such treatment; the QDF may help defray those expenses. HRW/PHR, which will likely issue a press statement coordinated with QDF today or tomorrow, believe the focus for the next several weeks should be on confirming el-Jahmi's safe return home, verifying his access to needed outpatient care and facilitating issuance of a passport and arranging travel abroad for further care. End summary.

¶2. (C) Human Rights Watch (HRW) Senior Emergencies Researcher Fred Abrahams and Acting Regional Relations Director Gasser Abdel Razzak gave P/E Chief a readout March 15 of their meetings in Tripoli with detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and his family. Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) representative Dr. Scott Allen, who accompanied Abrahams and Abdel Razzak and performed an independent medical assessment of el-Jahmi, had already departed Tripoli. Abrahams and Abdel Razzak conveyed the substance of his medical assessment. El-Jahmi's daugher, Najla, who lives in Benghazi, traveled to Tripoli to meet with HRW/PHR and discuss next steps in her father's case. El-Jahmi's son, Muhammad, and his wife also met with the HRW/PHR team.

EL-JAHMI FREE TO LEAVE HOSPITAL, IN FAMILY'S CUSTODY

¶3. (C) The Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Director, Saleh Abdulsalam, was the primary interlocutor for HRW/PHR; Abrahams and Allen also spoke by telephone with QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani, currently on travel outside the country. HRW/PHR described the QDF's cooperation as "superb, forthright and professional". Abdulsalam stressed that from the perspective of the GOL and the QDF, el-Jahmi's legal issues were "closed matters" and the GOL was "out of the picture". El-Jahmi had been free to return home since his "release" was announced on March 11; his family, who have legal custody of him now, may take him home at any time provided that his treating physician signs a medical release indicating it is medically safe to do so. (Note: El-Jahmi's treating physician told P/E Chief March 12 that in his professional opinion, el-Jahmi could safely leave hospital (ref A). He has since then indicated that el-Jahmi requires an additional one week to ten days in the hospital for "beta blockers" treatment for his heart. The Libyan doctor has consulted both the family and PHR's Allen regarding this recommended treatment, and the family is in agreement. End note.)

EL-JAHMI EXPECTED TO BE RELEASED BY LATE MARCH

¶4. (C) The family, led by daughter Najla, told HRW/PHR and the QDF they are prepared to take el-Jahmi home as soon as they can prepare his room in the family home in Tripoli. (Note: The home was ransacked and then occupied and damaged in 2004 when el-Jahmi, his wife and his son, Muhammad, were detained. The QDF has offered to provide a small house or apartment in Tripoli for el-Jahmi to stay in while the family's Tripoli home is being rennovated. End note.) The tacit condition for his release to his family is that he remain silent about his detention and refrain from making political statements. (Note: This is consistent with what Sawani told P/E Chief on March 3 (ref B).

consistent with what Sawani told P/E Chief on March 9 (ref B). End note.) El-Jahmi's daughter, Najla, reportedly played a key role in convincing her father that he should agree to remain quiet, stressing to him that his focus - for now - should be on recovering his health and protecting his family.

TRAVEL ABROAD FOR TREATMENT POSSIBLE, IF EL-JAHMI REMAINS QUIET

ABOUT DETENTION

¶5. (C) Conceding that HRW's preference would have been to physically escort el-Jahmi out of the hospital and to his home, Abrahams said the QDF flatly rejected that scenario, stressing the need to avoid the perception that HRW/PHR and/or the U.S. had "dictated" el-Jahmi's release to the GOL. The plan, coordinated with the QDF, is for el-Jahmi to convalesce for several weeks at the family home in Tripoli. After that, it is expected that he will fly either to Benghazi to continue convalescing at his family home there, or to Cairo and onward to the U.S. for further medical evaluation and treatment. Allen stressed that el-Jahmi will not be fit to travel by air for at least several weeks. Abdulsalam, confirming earlier remarks to Emboffs, told HRW/PHR that the QDF "is not opposed" to el-Jahmi traveling abroad for treatment, but stressed that he would need to honor the terms of his release in order for such to occur. HRW/PHR will engage with Abdulsalam in coming weeks to encourage the GOL to issue el-Jahmi a new passport so he may travel; Post will dual-track those efforts with Sawani.

HRW/PHR STATEMENT EXPECTED

¶6. (C) Allen and Abdel Razzak departed Tripoli on March 15; Abrahams is scheduled to depart today. HRW/PHR will remain in telephone and email contact with multiple members of el-Jahmi's family to confirm that he is eventually transferred home without complication. HRW/PHR intend to release a joint press statement, previewed with the QDF, on/about March 18. According to Abrahams, the statement will: 1) confirm el-Jahmi's release and welcome it as a positive development; 2) acknowledge the QDF's constructive role in securing el-Jahmi's release; 3) stress that el-Jahmi should not have been detained in the first place and express concern about the manner in which legal proceedings were conducted, and 4) note that while his medical care dramatically improved in the last two months, there is no question but that the net result of his detention and the delay in providing him treatment was a dramatic deterioration in his health. The QDF's Abdulsalam disputed the last point, asking how HRW/PHR could determine that el-Jahmi's deterioration resulted from conditions of his detention. Reprising arguments we've heard from Sawani, Abdulsalam claimed that many factors, including el-Jahmi's age (he's 66 years old) and the possibility that he had refused treatment, may have precipitated his medical complications. HRW/PHR pushed back and made it clear that the language will be included in the statement.

MEDICAL CONDITION: RELATIVELY STABLE (FOR NOW), BUT FURTHER CARE NEEDED

¶7. (C) HRW/PHR visited el-Jahmi several times at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC), where he remained as of March 15. Four to five plainclothes security officers were present. The man described as el-Jahmi's nurse, Abdullah Bashir, was also present and facilitated access to el-Jahmi. Allen reviewed el-Jahmi's case extensively with his treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, and performed an independent medical examination of el-Jahmi. Allen and Abdel Razzak were the only individuals in the room during the examination. Allen concurred in Mehdy's diagnosis and virtually all prescribed treatment, which he conveyed directly to el-Jahmi's family, as well as to Mehdy and the Qadhafi Development Foundation. (Note: There were

professional differences over the relative merits of different medications, but no other points of disagreement. End note.)

MARKED IMPROVEMENT IN CARDIAC CONDITION

¶8. (C) Allen assessed el-Jahmi's condition as being essentially stable, but noted that his heart condition is serious and that he is at some risk of heart attack "at any time". El-Jahmi was "not a well man" and had been "pushed, medically, to the edge" by the lack of treatment in 2007. Nonetheless, el-Jahmi's his treatment at the TMC - once initiated in late December/early January - was "good" and his health had improved "markedly". El-Jahmi was able to walk (with difficulty) and his heart efficiency rate improved from 17 percent in July 2007 to 38 percent in late February, and to 52 percent on March 14. Allen performed a basic cognitive awareness test and assessed that el-Jahmi did well considering his long period of isolated detention and lack of access to needed medication. He did show signs of short term memory loss; Abrahams and Abdel Razzak said there were points during their visit when el-Jahmi "wasn't there, mentally". Allen concurred with Mehdy's assessment that from a medical standpoint, el-Jahmi may be safely released from

the TMC and treated on an outpatient basis. Allen noted that given his current condition, el-Jahmi would have already been discharged from a western hospital to free up bed space.

FURTHER DIAGNOSTIC EXAMS NEEDED

¶9. (C) Nonetheless, el-Jahmi does have medical issues that will require ongoing care. Allen recommended that el-Jahmi undergo two procedures in the next several months: a biopsy of his enlarged prostate gland and a heart catheterization procedure to evaluate blockages and bloodflow. Both procedures are performed regularly at the TMC; Allen assessed the overall quality of care and the center's ability to safely perform the two procedures as good. El-Jahmi agreed to undergo the biopsy procedure; he has not yet consented to the heart catheterization. In addition, Allen assessed that the stent implanted in el-Jahmi's heart in Jordan in 1995 is likely nearing the end of its lifespan and will need to be replaced.

OUTPATIENT CARE CRITICAL

¶10. (C) Allen stressed to the family the need for proper outpatient care after el-Jahmi's expected release. The QDF clearly understands ongoing, outpatient treatment and access to prescribed medications and diagnostic exams will be needed, and agreed to help facilitate those. Per the QDF, there will be no restrictions on el-Jahmi's ability to return to the TMC for ongoing care on either an inpatient or outpatient basis; however, the family flatly stated they do not trust Dr. Mehdy and will seek another treating physician in consultation with Allen. The family believes it will not be a problem to identify a physician in Benghazi should el-Jahmi return there in future; however, they expressed concern about identifying an appropriate physician in Tripoli. HRW and PHR requested copies of el-Jahmi's full medical records, including treatment at the TMC and any treatment administered prior to his admission there.

FAMILY CONCERNED ABOUT FINANCING CARE, QDF MAY HELP

¶11. (C) Abrahams stressed the family's concern about how they will underwrite el-Jahmi's ongoing care. Family properties in Benghazi and Tripoli had been confiscated or damaged in connection with el-Jahmi's long-running criticism of the GOL; some properties were also sold to help make ends meet. (Note: El-Jahmi's contentious relationship with the GOL goes back more than two decades and has progressively worsened. End note.) The family asked HRW whether it could request compensation from

The family asked HRW whether it could request compensation from the QDF and/or GOL. Stressing that HRW would not/not be directly involved in such negotiations, Abrahams said QDF Human Rights Director Saleh Abdulsalam suggested the QDF could help defray el-Jahmi's medical expenses and explore the possibility of compensation. El-Jahmi's son, Muhammad, is to contact Abdulsalam directly to follow up on those issues.

NEXT STEPS

¶12. (C) Abrahams said that from the perspective of HRW/PHR, the focus in the next several weeks should be on: 1) confirming that el-Jahmi has safely returned home; 2) verifying access to appropriate outpatient care (to include resolving attendant financial issues), and 3) urging the QDF and GOL to issue el-Jahmi a passport and facilitate his travel abroad for further treatment. HRW/PHR may try to facilitate a visit by a cardiologist from Cairo or Tunis in approximately two weeks to assess el-Jahmi's condition and outpatient care.

13 (C) Comment: HRW/PHR believe that the QDF and GOL have an interest in seeing that el-Jahmi's health does not seriously deteriorate while he is in Libya and will therefore be likely to facilitate his travel abroad for care. We concur, but his physical security in the near-term remains a concern. Sawani told P/E Chief on March 3 that the QDF had to intevene in 2004 to pre-empt efforts by unspecified regime elements to kill el-Jahmi outright (rather than detain him) after he gave an interview to satellite television channel al-Hurra criticizing Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and the GOL. The presence of security officials outside el-Jahmi's room at the TMC is doubtless motivated in part by a desire to monitor his activities and visitors, but also by the GOL's interest in ensuring his physical safety. Post will remain in contact with el-Jahmi's family members and will visit him at home after his expected return to assess his condition there and arrangements for his outpatient treatment. We will also remain in contact with the QDF to urge issuance of el-Jahmi's passport and dispensation for

TRIPOLI 00000229 004 OF 004

him to travel abroad. Whether el-Jahmi honors the terms of the tacit agreement for his release will be critical in determining the extent to which we, the QDF and HRW/PHR are able to ensure his physical safety and facilitate issuance of a passport and travel abroad for treatment. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI230

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI230 aka Wikileaks id #146185 ?
Subject	LIBYA MAKES PROGRESS ON BANKING REFORM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 16:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI230.html
References	08TRIPOLI126
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI584
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
From: CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Monday, March 17, 2008 6:49 PM
To: EACTTripoli(Main State Room 2530)
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000230 R CO 17-MAR-08 LIBYA MAKES PROGRESS ON BANKING
REFORM [7168207]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO7088
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0230/01 0771653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171653Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3246
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0590
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0639
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0462
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1044
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0282
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0402
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0451
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0768
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3735
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000230

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/13/2018
TAGS: ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , IT
[Italy] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA MAKES PROGRESS ON BANKING REFORM

REF: TRIPOLI 126
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (e)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's banking reform program continues to make progress. Buoyed by the windfall that accompanied the February 13 sale of a share in state-run Wahda Bank to Jordan's Arab Bank, the Central Bank is pressing forward with its own restructuring and training programs. There may be opportunities for increased private sector cooperation with U.S. banks and opportunities for the USG to help train Libya's next generation of bankers. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Based on the assessment of Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengadara and the project director of the firm serving as his strategic advisor (McKinsey and Company), Libya's bank reform is making solid progress. CDA met with Bengadara on March 11 to discuss the Central Bank of Libya's (CBL) ongoing program of banking reform, and to solicit updates on its training programs and openness to U.S. assistance. Econoff met separately with the team leader for McKinsey and Company, a U.S. firm providing strategic guidance to the entire CBL reform program.

BANK PRIVATIZATIONS PROCEEDING APACE ...

¶3. (C) The CBL remains satisfied with its ongoing program of privatizations and mergers for Libya's state-run commercial banks. Jordan-based Arab Bank's successful $310 million bid for a 19 percent share of Wahda Bank (reftel) has bolstered the GOL's commitment to banking reform. The winning bid came in at almost ten times the estimated book value for Wahda Bank. (Note: Book value was computed by U.S. accounting firm KPMG, which is working with the CBL on its reform program. Arab Bank's branches in Libya were nationalized in 1970, fueling some speculation that its high bid was driven in part by a desire to "reclaim" its position in Libya. End Note). The high sale price has been interpreted in some GOL quarters as an expression of increased confidence in Libya by the international financial community. The successful three-stage bidding process (initial application, technical bid, financial bid) by which the sale was conducted has validated the transparent approach advocated by the CBL.

...DESPITE SOME HARDBALL, ITALIAN-STYLE

¶4. (C) In the weeks leading up to the announcement of Arab Bank's winning bid, two of five foreign banks interested in bidding pulled out. The most publicized decision was that of France-based Societe Generale, which cited "technical reasons" widely assumed (and privately confirmed to Econoff by a local McKinsey representative) to be linked to the bank's exposure to the sub-prime mortgage crunch and recent $10 billion losses incurred by a rogue trader. The less public withdrawal was by Italy-based Intessa, which sought to play hardball with the CBL by demanding ten changes in the way the transaction would be implemented. The CBL rejected Intessa's overture over concerns that the offer upset an otherwise level playing field for other bidders. Encouraged by McKinsey, the CBL chose to adhere to its three-tier bid process and international standards for transparency. In the end, despite offering one of the higher bids, Intessa was outstripped by Arab Bank's financial offer.

CENTRAL BANK INTERNAL REFORMS ONGOING

¶5. (C) The CBL is currently upgrading its monetary policy functions to better manage monetary policy functions. It is also seeking to develop more robust research and banking supervision departments, with the latter firmly fixed on making a transition to risk assessment, vice direct involvement in the transactions of its affiliated state-run banks. Drawing on foreign expertise from McKinsey, Oracle, KPMB and others, the CBL is also in the process of implementing upgrades to the structure of the entire banking system, to include new IT

structure of the entire banking system, to include new IT systems, a standardized loan application packet and a national payment system. CBL Governor Bengadara anticipates the process will take an additional three years to complete. The CBL is also in the process of creating a credit bureau, a project being implemented by U.S. firm Dunn and Bradstreet, with overall supervision by McKinsey.

¶6. (SBU) Bengadara bemoaned the fact that the CBL remains engaged in a number of activities more appropriately handled by the Ministry of Finance, including the national budget and the privatization of Libyan state-run banks. The CBL and MinFin are both currently working with the IMF on a restructuring program,

and the CBL anticipates agreeing on a separate reform program with the World Bank on the margins of the upcoming IMF/World Bank Spring meetings in Washington.

A FOCUS ON TRAINING

¶7. (SBU) The CBL has established the Tripoli-based "Banking and Financial Studies Center" in accordance with a October 2006 GPC decree. It currently offers short-term, general courses in computer skills and banking operations, and medium-term English language training. The CBL also sends students to the U.K. for English language training, and has 45 students there pursuing master's degrees in banking. (Note: At Bengadara's request, Post is following-up with CBL staff to provide information on U.S. universities that offer MBAs and MA's in commercial and central banking. End Note).

¶8. (SBU) As part of the training effort, the McKinsey team in Tripoli is focusing on requalifying the CBL's human resources staff, emphasizing recruitment and performance management skills training. Serious deficiencies in accounting standards persist throughout the banking system; the situation has not shown tangible signs of improvement. The dearth of reliable information on Libyan banks and companies continues to hinder economic growth, as Libyan savings continue to be spent abroad more than at home, and foreign companies are dissuaded from entering an opaque market.

ASSESSMENT TIME

¶9. (SBU) Standard & Poor's and Moody's, two of the top evaluators of credit risk, are expected to be invited to conduct an assessment of Libya sometime during the next six months. Excluding WB and IMF reports, this type of assessment has not been done previously in Libya. The GOL intends that the assessment signal to the international business community that Libya's banks are open for business, and to demonstrate interest in tapping the international bond market in a serious way.

¶10. (C) Comment: Bengadara impressed us as a credible, savvy interlocutor. Concerns about English language ability and technical skills below the CBL's uppermost echelons remain; however, he clearly signaled a willingness in principle to cooperate with the USG on training, to include counter-terrorism finance. Banking reform is moving ahead; we likely have a window of 18 to 24 months in which to contribute on the training and reform front. Post will work with Bengadara and his senior staff to gain support for critical training programs, particularly in CT finance. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI231

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI231 aka Wikileaks id #146190 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRAN BANKING MOU
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Mar 2008 17:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI231.html
References	08TRIPOLI12
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7112
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTRO #0231 0771708
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171708Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3248
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1046
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0464
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0641
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0592
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0059
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3737
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000231

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/16/2018
TAGS: KTFN *[Terrorism Finance Traffic]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]* , IR *[Iran]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR ON IRAN BANKING MOU

REF: TRIPOLI 0012

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) During a March 11 meeting with Farhat Bengadara, Governor of Libya's Central Bank, the CDA asked about press reports that Libya had signed a number of financial and economic agreements with Iran in December 2007 during the visit of Iranian First Vice President Davoudi to Tripoli (reftel). CDA

Iranian First Vice President Davoudi to Tripoli (refer). CDA noted in particular an MOU that the Libyan press had described as providing for "a framework for cooperation between the central banks of Libya and Iran" and asked how it was being implemented.

¶2. (C) Apparently sensing underlying concerns behind the CDA's question, Bengadara downplayed the significance of the MOU. Characterizing the MOU's language as "very standard", he stressed that the agreement lacked "substance or specifics" and did not mandate significant commitments from either party. Libya was "very careful" in its nascent engagement with Iran, and was not inclined to accelerate or deepen cooperation with Iran on banking or investment beyond the limited MOU's and agreements signed during Davoudi's visit. (Note: Previous reports suggested Iran was pressuring the GOL to sign more formal agreements and treaties on investment and trade immediately after Davoudi's visit. End note.) The U.S. "should not worry" about the the MOU, which did not provide for or extend to activities that would cause concern.

¶3. (C) Comment: Bengadara was keen to emphasize that the December 2007 MOU was more form than substance, a position at odds with what the Iranian DCM here has reportedly conveyed to other Tripoli-based diplomats. Given Libya's strained relations with Iran over Lebanon, its desire to improve relations with the United States and EU countries, we expect the GOL to move cautiously in its responding to Iranian overtures. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI248

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI248 aka Wikileaks id #146821 ?
Subject	SECURITY PROCEDURES AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 21 Mar 2008 09:11 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI248.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI500
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
From: CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Friday, March 21, 2008 11:08 AM
To: EACTTripoli(Main State Room 2530)
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000248 P SE 21-MAR-08 SECURITY PROCEDURES AND
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT [7245575]

SECRET

VZCZCXRO1198
PP RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0248/01 0810911
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 210911Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3263
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3755
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000248

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/6/2018
TAGS: PINS [National Security] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , EAIR [Civil
Aviation] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SECURITY PROCEDURES AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE AT TRIPOLI
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

TRIPOLI 00000248  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (S)  Summary.  Authority at Tripoli International Airport is
clearly divided between security services and civilian
authorities, General Youssef al-Jeribi, the airport's director,
told a visiting Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) team and Emboffs
on March 3.  Together with top security and intelligence
```

On March 3, together with top security and intelligence officials, al-Jeribi briefed the U.S. delegation on current airport security practices and explained competencies of the eight security services charged with protecting Tripoli's airport and its passengers. The Internal Security Organization (ISO) maintains a 70-member counterrorism "rapid response" team that can deploy to any crisis nation-wide within 60 minutes; in addition, an armed air marshall flies on all international and domestic flight in Libya. The airport leadership also briefed the U.S. team on the airport's emergency protocols and plans to expand with the construction of a new international passenger terminal. Libyan officials were forthcoming in their discussions of internal procedures, which potentially augurs well for further cooperation on airport security in the future. End summary.

¶2. (S) On March 3, Tripoli airport director General Youssef al-Jeribi briefed a visiting ATA assessment team and Emboffs on current security procedures at at Tripoli International Airport. The director of airport security, the assistant director of the airport, the chief of the Internal Security Organization (ISO) office at the airport, the chief of the External Security Organization (ESO) office at the airport, the chief of the airport's passport division, and the chief of the airport's uniformed police also participated in the meeting. C.B. Stevens, Director of North Africa Programs in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security's ATA office led the U.S. team, which also included representatives from POL/ECON, RSO, and RAO.

AUTHORITY DIVIDED BETWEEN SECURITY SERVICES AND CIVILIAN ENTITIES

¶3. (S) According to al-Jeribi, authority at Tripoli International Airport (TIP) is clearly divided between civilian authorities and security services. The director of airport security is responsible for coordinating activities of the eight independent security agencies working at the airport -- the Internal Security Organization (ISO), the External Security Organization (ESO), Customs, Passports/Immigration, the Office of the Director of the Port of Tripoli, the Office of the Director of Airport Security, the Civil Protection Department, and the uniformed police. As airport director, al-Jeribi is responsible for overseeing all civilian departments: the Departments of Finance, Legal Affairs, Administration, and Safety. In the event of a crisis requiring coordination between civilian and security authorities, Libyan agency representatives agreed (after some debate) that the airport director (al-Jeribi) is responsible for overseeing both services' response to the crisis. The Libyan military is not/not involved in airport security, nor would it be involved in any emergency response.

RESPONSIBILITIES OF SECURITY SERVICES WORKING AT TRIPOLI AIRPORT

¶4. (S) The Internal Security Organization (ISO) maintains the largest presence at the airport and is responsible for all physical and technical security at the airport facility. ISO employs technical surveillance to track all passengers entering the airport from curb-side, through check-in and passport control, until they board their out-going flight. All X-ray machines in TIP are operated by ISO officers. In addition, ISO is responsible for document control and passenger screening of all Libyan nationals traveling in or out of Tripoli International Airport. ISO showed the U.S. delegation a video control room, staffed by two ISO officers and a control room director, housing approximately 25 video monitors capturing live video from the airport's runways, terminal, baggage facilities, and roadways around the terminal building. The airport leadership mentioned without elaboration that ISO, along with ESO, captures still images of all travelers passing through document checks.

¶5. (S) In addition, ISO also oversees a 70-member anti-terrorist "rapid response" team based in Tripoli (not/not at the airport) that TIP's ISO Director can call on in the event

of an emergency. Libya hopes to create a group of anti-terrorist SWAT teams in line with international standards that can respond "like a surgeon" to any crisis, the airport's ISO director told the delegation. ISO also maintains a dedicated plane to transport the Tripoli-based anti-terrorist team to other locations in Libya. The airport's ISO Director said the ISO anti-terrorist team could arrive at any airport in Libya within 60 minutes of notification of an incident.

¶6. (S) The External Security Organization (ESO) is responsible for tracking all non-Libyans traveling through TIP airport. ESO maintains a watchlist of foreign nationals, focusing on

counterterrorism and preventing illegal migration, and uses the watchlist to screen all foreign passengers traveling to/from Libya. In addition, ESO is solely responsible for providing security to official delegations traveling to Tripoli. ESO officers, along with ISO officers, provide covert surveillance in all public areas of the airport. Finally, ESO is responsible for "facilitating travel by foreign diplomats". In practice, this means that ESO officers (not/not passport and immigration officials) perform document checks and baggage screening on foreign diplomats arriving at and departing from TIP airport.

¶7. (C) The uniformed police are responsible for providing overt security to the airport facility and surrounding areas. By contrast with ISO officials, police officers provide an "obvious, visible" presence. Police do not/not maintain any technical surveillance capabilities of the airport facility. The Chief of Police at the TIP airport told the U.S. delegation that police maintain an active presence on the roads surrounding the airport, the taxi rank in front of the passenger terminal, the airport's parking lots, and the tarmac. Police authority is generally limited and the ISO Director noted that ISO, not the uniformed police, would be responsible for any crisis response.

ARMED AIR MARSHALL ON ALL FLIGHTS

¶8. (S) Assistant Director of the TIP airport Ezzeddin told Poloff that an armed, Libyan air marshall travels on all international and domestic flights operated in and out of Tripoli's airport. He did not specify which security service provided the air marshalls. (Note: His remarks echo a January 24 remark by Libyan Arab Air General Director Tarek Arebi to CDA that Libyan security services provide armed air marshalls on all international and domestic flights. End note.)

EMERGENCY PLANNING

¶9. (C) Three authorities are charged with planning the TIP airport's response to a crisis: the National Committee for Aviation Security (NCAS), the Committee for Airport Security (CAS), and the ISO's Office for Prevention and Counterterrorism (OPC). The NCAS is a civilian authority that oversees current security practices at Libya's airports and recommends changes to extant security procedures. The CAS is a committee consisting of department heads from TIP's eight security departments and has the authority to respond in real-time to an incident at TIP airport. The OPC is responsible for overseeing the ISO's program to develop a team of counterrorism rapid response teams.

¶10. (C) In the event of an emergency (such as a hijacking), TIP airport maintains an ICAO-approved emergency plan that calls for all security and civilian services to cooperate within the CAS under the leadership of the Director al-Jeribi. During a crisis, al-Jeribi is solely responsible for communicating between the airport and civil aviation authorities. TIP airport has a dedicated location to be used in the event of a hijacked aircraft.

aircraft.

¶11. (C) According to al-Jeribi, Libya has already partnered with Italy, France, Jordan, and Egypt to provide security training to Libyan personnel working at TIP. Most training courses take place in Libya and are designed to enable Libya to better select "future leaders" for training abroad. He expressed his hope that some senior security officers could receive practical training in the United States.

AIRPORT DIRECTOR BRIEFS ON AIRPORT EXPANSION PLANS

¶12. (SBU) Al-Jeribi also briefed the U.S. delegation on plans to open a new passenger terminal capable of carrying up to 20 million passenger per year. He said the airport had not put out any procurement requests for security equipment at the new terminal, noting that TIP management plans to wait until the completion of terminal construction before acquiring new equipment. He said the GOL has a cadre of experts capable of selecting the necessary security equipment and that Libya will not/not require outside assistance in choosing which equipment to purchase. Al-Jeribi noted that the airport has received a number of unsolicited proposals for equipment sales from foreign companies, including American, British, French, German, and Chinese companies. Once the new passenger terminal opens, the current TIP international terminal will be used for domestic flights. Cargo operations will remain at Matiga Airport in Tripoli.

¶13. (C) Comment: Airport officials were forthcoming in their description of internal operations and protocols, and expressed strong interest in further U.S.-Libyan cooperation on airport security training. Post is currently working with the GOL to

facilitate an airport security training program under EXBS auspices, with a target date of May. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI266

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI266 aka Wikileaks id #147836 ?
Subject	GOL DELAYS RELEASING DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 31 Mar 2008 09:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08TRIPOLI266.html
References	08TRIPOLI223 , 08TRIPOLI229
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI275 , 08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI943 , 08TRIPOLI960
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8753
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0266/01 0910933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 310933Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3291
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0471
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0647
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0598
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1052
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0770
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0408
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3787
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000266

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL DELAYS RELEASING DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 223 , B) TRIPOLI 229

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: A pair of recent visits by Emboffs to detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, who remains at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) despite assurances he would be released in late March, suggest that the GOL and Qadhafi Development

Foundation (QDF) are using prostate complications attendant to a recent change in medication as a pretext to delay his discharge while they pressure his family to sign a written pledge that he will refrain from political statements or discussion of his detention after his release. The QDF subsequently told Post the requirement for a signed, written statement had been dropped, but the family claims this has not been conveyed to them. El-Jahmi's treating physician believes his prostate condition is not/not serious and says el-Jahmi's cardiac condition - the most serious of his medical issues - is stable enough that he may be safely discharged immediately. The physician is under considerable pressure to not/not discharge el-Jahmi and has suggested a mechanism by which Dr. Scott Allen of Physicians for Human Rights, who recently saw el-Jahmi, would recommend directly to the QDF that he be discharged. El-Jahmi asked that the Embassy explore the possibility of either transporting him from the TMC to his home in an Embassy vehicle or escorting him; he also requested political asylum in the U.S. (guidance request at para 13). End summary.

VISITS TO THE TMC

¶2. (C) P/E Chief visited el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) on March 27 and March 30. El-Jahmi's wife and sons, Muhammad and Ahmed, were present during both visits. His treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, was present for the second visit on March 30. Three plainclothes security officials, whom P/E Chief has seen before (ref A and previous) were present during the first visit, but not the second. Breaking with past practice, P/E Chief established a time for the second visit with el-Jahmi's son, Muhammad, by telephone. Muhammad said security officials, who are otherwise constantly present, vacated their posts about 30 minutes before P/E Chief arrived on March 30. He speculated that the GOL wanted to be able to claim that el-Jahmi was not in custody. The man described as el-Jahmi's "nurse", Abdullah Bashir, was not present during either visit.

EL-JAHMI'S CARDIAC CONDITION STABLE

¶3. (C) Dr. Mehdy described el-Jahmi's current medical condition as "stable and good"; however, a new beta blocker heart medication introduced after the recent visit of Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) had adversely interacted with one of el-Jahmi's medications for his prostate condition, causing his blood pressure to drop. The prostate medication was discontinued; el-Jahmi subsequently experienced a resurgence of prostate-related symptoms (burning during micturation and minor incontinence). Mehdy stressed those conditions were not/not serious and did not, in his opinion, prevent el-Jahmi from being discharged from hospital.

PROSTATE COMPLICATION NOT/NOT SERIOUS

¶4. (C) Clarifying contradictory reports from HRW and the media about proposed surgical intervention for el-Jahmi's prostate condition, Mehdy explained that the TMC's resident urologist, in Italy for a conference, would return to Tripoli April 2 and would assess el-Jahmi's condition on/about April 3. In his initial consultations with Mehdy, the urologist suggested his preference would be to remove el-Jahmi's prostate and subsequently biopsy it to determine whether any malignancy was present. (Note: It was unclear late last week whether the proposed procedure would be a biopsy or removal of el-Jahmi's prostate. End note.) Mehdy said another approach, believed to be that advocated by PHR's Dr. Scott Allen, who visited el-Jahmi circa March 12-14, would be to first biopsy el-Jahmi's prostate to determine whether it was necessary to remove it.

DOCTOR SAYS (PRIVATELY) THAT EL-JAHMI CAN BE RELEASED ...

¶5. (C) Mehdy said el-Jahmi's cardiac condition was, in his medical opinion, sufficiently stable that he could be safely

medical opinion, sufficiently stable that he could be safely discharged from the TMC, provided he received needed ongoing care on an outpatient basis. The typical observation period for the new beta blocker medication introduced after the HRW/PHR visit was two weeks. That period had already elapsed. A very conservative approach would call for a further four to five days of observation, but barring any change in condition el-Jahmi

could be released by about April 4. El-Jahmi's prostate condition was not/not serious enough to delay his discharge.

... BUT STRESSES HE IS UNDER PRESSURE NOT TO SIGN DISCHARGE PAPERS

¶6. (C) Having said el-Jahmi that, a visibly nervous Mehdy stressed that he must check with "the others" (later clarified as being a reference to the QDF and security officials) before signing el-Jahmi's discharge papers. After some verbal dancing, he told P/E Chief he was under "considerable pressure" and "could not bear the burden of the decision to discharge (el-Jahmi) alone". Saying it would help if the recommendation to discharge el-Jahmi was not seen to come from him, Mehdy suggested that a mechanism would be for the PHR's Dr. Allen to contact the QDF - either directly or through Post - to recommend el-Jahmi's discharge based on telephone consultations with the TMC. Mehdy would then either concur with - or at least not oppose - that recommendation.

QDF TELLS FAMILY THEY MUST SIGN PLEDGE TO KEEP EL-JAHMI QUIET

¶7. (C) El-Jahmi's family said they have all but completed repairs to the family home in Tripoli and would be ready to take el-Jahmi there directly from the TMC. Earlier discussions about the QDF providing a furnished flat or villa in which el-Jahmi could convalesce before his expected return to Benghazi had not born fruit. During P/E Chief's visit on March 27, Muhammad said QDF Human Rights Director Abdelsalem Saleh had stipulated that Muhammad and his mother sign a document as a condition for his discharge from hospital pledging that el-Jahmi would not "speak with anyone in any channel" about political issues or his experience in detention. The signed statement would make Muhammad and his mother responsible for keeping el-Jahmi quiet. Saleh told Muhammad that el-Jahmi and his family would "be directly affected" if el-Jahmi spoke with anyone after leaving hospital. QDF Executive Director Sawani subsequently called the CDA, asking that he convey to Washington that after consultation with the QDF's chairman (i.e., Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi), the requirement for a signed, written pledge had been dropped. El-Jahmi's wife and sons stressed to P/E Chief on March 30 that the QDF had not/not told them that the requirement for a signed statement had been dropped.

¶8. (C) El-Jahmi told P/E Chief on March 27 that he would not/not agree to any "formal conditions" in exchange for his discharge, and had told his wife and Muhammad that he did not/not consent to their signing the QDF's proposed pledge, either. As reported ref B, during HRW/PHR's visit, el-Jahmi agreed to abide by the tacit understanding that he would refrain from public statements about political issues or his detention. According to HRW/PHR, el-Jahmi's daughter, Najla, played a key role in convincing her father that he should agree to remain quite, stressing to him that his focus - for now - should be on recovering his health and protecting his family.

EL-JAHMI REQUESTS POLITICAL ASYLUM

¶9. (C) On March 27, el-Jahmi told P/E Chief he needed "international protection" and mentioned asylum. He asked that the Embassy explore the possibility of either transporting him from the TMC to his home in an Embassy vehicle or escorting him.

On March 30, he reiterated the request for protection and clarified his remarks on asylum, indicating that he was requesting political asylum from the U.S. Noting references to an asylum request in a media statement by el-Jahmi's brother, resident in the U.S., P/E Chief said he would convey the request. Given GOL sensitivities, P/E Chief noted that our ability to act on that request would depend in part on limiting public discussion of it. (Note: As reported ref B, the QDF indicated it was "not opposed" to facilitating issuance of a passport to el-Jahmi to travel abroad for treatment, provided he abided by the tacit understanding that he would refrain from speaking publicly about political issues or his experience in detention. End note.)

THE WAY AHEAD: COMMENT & GUIDANCE REQUEST

¶10. (C) Comment: It increasingly appears that the GOL, acting through the QDF, is using el-Jahmi's prostate complications as a pretext to delay releasing him while they pressure Muhammad and his mother to formally pledge that el-Jahmi will stay quiet after his discharge. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, who is personally involved, has a considerable personal stake in

TRIPOLI 00000266 003 OF 003

ensuring that el-Jahmi's release does not prompt adverse media reaction akin to that in the Bulgarian nurses case last summer. The QDF is in the delicate position of trying to facilitate el-Jahmi's release to respond positively to international pressure and assuring reluctant old guard regime elements that the GOL will not be embarrassed for its efforts. Post recommends that NEA/MAG contact Dr. Allen in the U.S. to: 1) pass el-Jahmi's latest test results (sent to NEA/MAG by email); 2) ask him to consult with Dr. Mehdy by telephone and, 3) explore whether Dr. Allen would be willing to recommend to the QDF - either directly or through Post - that el-Jahmi is fit to be discharged. (Note: Post is not in a position to have confidential conversations with Dr. Allen. End note.)

SIPDIS

¶11. (C) Comment (continued): Post notes that the QDF's Dr. Sawani is currently in Washington for a joint Green Book Society/Middle East Institute conference on Libya and Africa, scheduled to take place March 31. If the opportunity arises to engage Dr. Sawani while he is in Washington, Post suggests that the following points be conveyed to him: 1) our understanding is that there is no medical reason for keeping el-Jahmi in hospital; 2) el-Jahmi should be released from the TMC now; 3) there should be no formal conditions for el-Jahmi's release and, 4) it is expected that the QDF and GOL will ensure el-Jahmi's physical safety. Post would suggest the following points for any public statements on the case: 1) We welcome news that Fathi el-Jahmi's medical condition has improved since he began receiving treatement, and; 2) the embassy has visited el-Jahmi regularly to assess his medical condition and prognosis for his release, and has been in regular contact with el-Jahmi and his family. (Note: Post strongly recommends that the Department not/not disclose publicly or to HRW/PHR and others that el-Jahmi has requested asylum; our ability to successfully secure el-Jahmi's passport and dispensation to travel will depend in large measure on the extent to which our engagement and role remain quiet. End note.)

¶12. (C) Guidance Request: Post requests guidance on how to respond to el-Jahmi's request for political asylum. End comment & guidance request.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI275

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI275 aka Wikileaks id #148075 ?
Subject	MFA WEIGHS IN ON EL-JAHMI CASE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Apr 2008 13:37 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI275.html
References	08TRIPOLI266
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI280
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0089
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0275 0921337
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011337Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3300
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0474
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0650
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0601
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1055
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0773
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0453
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3796
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000275

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/1/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MFA WEIGHS IN ON EL-JAHMI CASE

REF: TRIPOLI 266

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In the course of a meeting on other issues, an MFA interlocutor cautioned that recent public remarks by USG officials on the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi had not been helpful and could be construed as interference in Libya's domestic affairs. Unspecified elements of the GOL were angered by public comments on el-Jahmi's case at

a conference on Libya in Washington. Post's channel for engagement on el-Jahmi has been restricted to the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation; the MFA's intervention potentially represents a new wrinkle. From the GOL's perspective, the fact that the remarks at the conference were public likely had as much to do with its adverse reaction as the substance of the intervention. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a meeting with the CDA and Poloff on April 1 on separate issues, MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayab asked the CDA for clarification on PDAS Feltman's March 31 remarks at a conference in Washington hosted by the Middle East Institute (MEI) and Libya's Green Book Society (GBS) calling for the immediate, unconditional release of detained human rights activist Fathi el Jahmi. Cautioning that such statements " ... will not help in building understanding", he added the GOL "hopes the U.S. will accurately understand the situation and avoid interference in Libya's domestic affairs". Reiterating points we've heard before from the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), he said el-Jahmi had been transferred to the custody of his family and remained at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) - under his family's supervision - for needed medical care. (Note: Reftel details Post's understanding of el-Jahmi's medical condition and issues preventing his discharge from the TMC. End note.) Feltman's remarks and U.S. involvement "could" be construed as interference in Libya's domestic affairs. (Note: Ayab did not appear to have a clear understanding of what the remarks actually were. End note.)

¶3. (C) Pushing back, the CDA reiterated points conveyed by NEA/MAG Director Elizabeth Hopkins to the QDF's Dr. Yusuf Sawani on the margins of the GBS/MEI conference: 1) our understanding is that there is no medical reason for keeping el-Jahmi in hospital; 2) el-Jahmi should be released from the TMC now; 3) there should be no formal conditions for el-Jahmi's release and, 4) it is expected that the QDF and GOL will ensure el-Jahmi's physical safety.

¶4. (C) Noting the use of the word "should", Ayab questioned whether the U.S. was dictating to the GOL that el-Jahmi must be released. The CDA clarified that at the conclusion of the Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights (HRW/PHR) visit in mid-March, there was a perceived common understanding between the QDF, HRW/PHR and the U.S. that el-Jahmi was expected to leave the TMC and return home on/about March 26. That had not occurred. Our position, based on our understanding of el-Jahmi's current condition - his cardiac condition was stable and his prostate condition was not serious - was that it was medically safe for the TMC to discharge him. Noting that el-Jahmi's case was the focus of considerable international attention, the CDA stressed that the Embassy had respected the QDF's preference for quiet engagement. The fact that we had commented publicly at the GBR/MEI conference underscored broad concern about the perception that the GOL and QDF were using el-Jahmi's prostate condition as a pretext to delay discharging him from hospital.

¶5. (C) Comment: Ayab's intervention on el-Jahmi's case represents a new development; post's communication since late last year on this issue has been restricted to QDF channels. Our principal interlocutor, the QDF's Dr. Yusuf Sawani, has been more measured in cautioning us against giving the appearance of meddling in an ostensibly internal Libyan matter. Ayab does not typically engage on these issues and did not appear to be fully briefed (his colleague, Muhammad Matari, typically handles such issues, but is in Washington for the GBR/MEI conference). Nonetheless, Ayab called the CDA after the meeting to stress that unspecified GOL elements were "angry" about Feltman's comments at the GBR/MEI conference. From the GOL's perspective, the fact that the remarks were public likely had as much to do with its adverse reaction as the substance of the intervention. End comment.

GODFREY

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI280

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI280 aka Wikileaks id #148478 ?
Subject	FATHI EL-JAHMI'S MEDICAL CONDITION DETERIORATES; ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL TIME MAY BE NEEDED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Apr 2008 18:09 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI280.html
References	08TRIPOLI266 , 08TRIPOLI275
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI401 , 08TRIPOLI919 , 08TRIPOLI920 , 08TRIPOLI943 , 08TRIPOLI960
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2728
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0280/01 0941809
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 031809Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3308
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0477
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0653
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0604
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1058
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0776
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0456
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3804
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000280

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/3/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FATHI EL-JAHMI'S MEDICAL CONDITION DETERIORATES; ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL TIME MAY BE NEEDED

REF: A) TRIPOLI 275 , B) HOPKINS-GODFREY EMAIL 4/01/08, TRIPOLI 275 , B) TRIPOLI 266

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The medical condition of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi appears to have taken a turn for the worse, necessitating - in the judgment of his treating physician

- an additional two to three weeks in hospital for observation and treatment. Should his condition improve, el-Jahmi refuses to consider acceding to a tacit agreement to refrain from political statements or comments about his experience in detention in exchange for his discharge from hospital. He walked back from his earlier request for political asylum, saying his preference is to remain in Libya with his family - provided that his physical security is assured - with the possibility of traveling abroad for medical treatment. He and his wife agreed that the next steps in his case should be: 1) ensuring that his medical condition stabilizes enough that he can be released; 2) securing the requisite signature on his discharge papers and ensuring his discharge from the TMC; 3) ensuring his physical safety after his return home; 4) ensuring access to needed outpatient care for his cardiac and prostate conditions, and; 5) later, securing his passport and dispensation from the GOL to travel abroad for medical care. An unexpected attempt by a camera crew to film Emboff visiting el-Jahmi underscores the GOL's sensitivity in the wake of public remarks on el-Jahmi's case by USG officials.
The deterioration in el-Jahmi's medical condition, while troubling, potentially affords a useful window of opportunity in which to allow what has become a neuralgic issue to settle, potentially facilitating more productive engagement. End summary.

DETERIORATION IN MEDICAL CONDITION

¶2. (C) P/E Chief visited Fathi el-Jahmi at the Tripoli Medical Center on April 3. El-Jahmi's wife, treating physician (Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy) and a man described as his nurse, Abdullah Bashir, were also present. An echocardiogram performed in P/E Chief's presence showed the el-Jahmi's blood ejection fraction had decreased from 52.5 percent on/about March 14 to 42 percent on April 3. Mehdy indicated that 52.5 percent had been at "the low end of normal"; 42 percent was below normal.
El-Jahmi's blood pressure remained at 100/60 to 120/70.
El-Jahmi appeared tired, disoriented and feeble, by contrast with his condition when P/E Chief visited him on March 30, when Mehdy indicated that el-Jahmi was medically fit to be discharged. (Note: As reported ref A, Mehdy indicated he was ready to sign el-Jahmi's discharge papers, but indicated he was under considerable pressure not to do so from the QDF and security officials. End note.)

EL-JAHMI NOT/NOT MEDICALLY FIT FOR DISCHARGE

¶3. (C) Mehdy said he believed a beta-blocker medication el-Jahmi began taking immediately after the visit of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (HRW/PHR) had precipitated the deterioration in el-Jahmi's cardiac condition. Mehdy indicated that el-Jahmi was not/not medically fit for release at the present time, and should remain in hospital for an additional two to three weeks for observation and to see whether his condition improves. Mehdy has been in regular telephone contact with PHR's Dr. Scott Allen, who visited and examined el-Jahmi on/about March 14, and HRW's Fred Abrahams. He spoke with both on April 2 and expected Allen to call him later today to discuss el-Jahmy's case.

EL-JAHMI REJECTS TACIT AGREEMENT TO REMAIN SILENT AS CONDITION OF RELEASE

¶4. (C) Per ref B, P/E Chief asked el-Jahmi whether he understood that the GOL and QDF were insisting that he accede to a tacit agreement to refrain from political statements and discussing his experiences in detention to secure his release. (Note: The QDF's Human Rights Director, Abdelsalem Saleh, had earlier pressured el-Jahmi's wife and son, Muhammad, to sign a statement pledging that el-Jahmi would not speak with anyone in any channel about political issues or his experience in detention. El-Jahmi refused to agree to any "formal conditions" for his discharge, and did not consent to his wife and son signing the

discharge, and did not consent to his wife and son signing the document. End note.) Asserting his right to free speech, he said that if released, he would not agree to avoid the press - but would not seek it out, either.

WALKS BACK ASYLUM REQUEST, WANTS TO REMAIN IN LIBYA

¶5. (C) Per ref B, P/E Chief asked el-Jahmi whether he understood

TRIPOLI 00000280 002 OF 002

what it meant to request asylum. If granted, he would forever leave his home and country, likely with only a few of his family members. El-Jahmi stressed that his preference "from the beginning of his quarrels with Qadhafi" was to remain in Libya, working to advance the cause of the Libyan people. Qadhafi had not respected that wish. Pressed on whether he wished to pursue formal asylum, el-Jahmi said he knows that he hasn't long to live, that he wants to remain in Libya with his family, and that he wants to be able to travel abroad for medical treatment. He stressed that he would need "protection" if he remained in Libya. P/E Chief made it clear that the Embassy is not/not in position to provide such security. El-Jahmi repeated several times that he "wants to live freely under the law".

NEXT STEPS

¶6. (C) It was agreed with el-Jahmi and his wife that the next steps should be:
- ensuring that his medical condition stabilizes enough that he can be released;
- securing the requisite signature on his discharge papers and ensuring his discharge from the TMC;
- ensuring his physical safety after his return home;
- ensuring access to needed outpatient care for his cardiac and prostate conditions, and;
- later, securing his passport and dispensation from the GOL to travel abroad - at some point in the future - for medical care.

MEDIA AMBUSH

¶7. (C) Shortly after P/E Chief's arrival, a camera crew burst into el-Jahmi's hospital room, shoved aside the doctor and began asking el-Jahmi questions about his medical condition, quality of care at the TMC, and whether he may receive "local and international" visitors. P/E Chief quietly ducked out of the room to avoid appearing on camera. A member of the team in the corridor said they were from a "European news channel", but refused to identify himself or show any credentials. The crew emerged from the room and asked P/E Chief to give remarks. He refused and re-entered el-Jahmi's room. The crew burst in a short while later, clearly distressing el-Jahmi, and again pressed P/E Chief for comment while filming. (Note: Mehdy later told P/E Chief the crew had pressed him and el-Jahmi to identify P/E Chief; he claimed neither did so. End note.)

¶8. (C) Comment: The reported deterioration in el-Jahmi's medical condition, while troubling, potentially affords a useful window of opportunity in which to allow what has become a neuralgic issue to settle, potentially facilitating more productive engagement. Recent public remarks by USG officials and the HRW/PHR statement of March 29 clearly hit a nerve, likely contributing to the decision to have the MFA convoke us on April 1 to register protest and the media stunt during today's hospital visit. The QDF and GOL believe we and others have not given them credit for steps already taken, and that we are seeking to embarrass the regime. We should seek to avoid that misperception by encouraging a return to quiet, measured engagement to secure progress on steps outlined in para 6. The biggest potential obstacle may be el-Jahmi's refusal to agree to honor a tacit agreement to remain quiet in exchange for his discharge. The QDF, in particular Chairman Saif al-Islam

al-Qadhafi, are anxious that this case should be resolved quickly and positively, particularly in light of the messy denouement of the Bulgarian medics case last summer. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI297

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI297 aka Wikileaks id #149009 ?
Subject	PUTIN VISIT TO LIBYA EXPECTED BY END OF APRIL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Apr 2008 13:57 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI297.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI319 , 08TRIPOLI321 , 08TRIPOLI340 , 08TRIPOLI480 , 08TRIPOLI829
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6358
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0297/01 0991357
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081357Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3326
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3824
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000297

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: PUTIN VISIT TO LIBYA EXPECTED BY END OF APRIL

TRIPOLI 00000297 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Although the Russian Embassy has received "nothing official" from Moscow, it expects Russian President Vladimir Putin to visit Libya by the end of April. Putin's projected travel to Libya is the "primary issue" in Libyan-Russian relations; in a recent meeting with Emboffs, the Russian DCM stressed that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has

Russian DCM stressed that Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has repeatedly made it clear he expects the visit to happen. During the visit, according to the Russian Embassy, Russia hopes to sign a general framework agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation, and military equipment sales will likely feature prominently in discussions. The Russian DCM also briefed Emboffs on a joint Russian-Libyan military cooperation council and ongoing Russian commercial ventures in the oil/gas and construction sectors. End summary.

PUTIN VISIT EXPECTED IN APRIL

¶2. (C) While the Russian Embassy in Tripoli has not received official notification from Moscow that outgoing President Vladimir Putin will travel to Libya, Russian DCM Anatoly Martinov and Poloff Evgeny Kozlov told P/E Chief and Poloff on April 3 that the Embassy expects a visit sometime in April, i.e., before Putin leaves office in May. Though a possible summit between Putin and Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi has been the "primary issue" in Libyan-Russian relations since 2003, Martinov said preparations have intensified since November 2007. Qadhafi and Putin have spoken by phone three times in the past few weeks. He characterized the two leaders as enjoying "relatively good" personal relations, and said Qadhafi made it clear to FM Lavrov during the latter's December 2007 visit to Tripoli that he expects a visit from "friend Putin" before his term of office expires. Separately, former Congressman Curt Weldon told P/E Chief on March 31 that Putin was expected to visit Libya circa mid-April. He cited as the source of his information a senior Rosoboroneksport official who said he would be part of the Russian presidential delegation.

A "GOLDEN OPPORTUNITY" FOR A NUCLEAR COOPERATION AGREEMENT

¶3. (C) According to Martinov, Russia intends to capitalize on a "golden opportunity" to sign a general framework agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation during Putin's April visit. Cooperation on atomic energy has to date been limited to sales of equipment for Libya's experimental reactor facility at Tajoura, including water management and fire suppression technology. Stressing that Russia "had no particular (civilian nuclear) projects in mind", Martinov said Russia is ready to sign a nuclear framework agreement that could facilitate future cooperation on power generation and desalinization projects. We've heard from other diplomatic contacts that the Russians hope to expoit the fact that French-Libyan civilian nuclear cooperation has not progressed to the GOL's satisfaction since a parallel agreement was signed during President Sarkozy's visit to Libya last summer (ref A).

QADHAFI'S SONS PARTICIPATED IN MILITARY EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE

¶4. (S/NF) In the late 1990s, Libya and Russia established a joint military cooperation council to manage training and equipment sales. Russia's senior representative on the council, noted Russian nuclear physicist and author Evgeny Abramyan, has visited Libya on half a dozen occasions during the past 10 years to discuss ongoing military cooperation. Top Libyan military officials, including two of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi's sons - Muatassim and Khamis - have studied in Moscow on GOR-financed MOD educational exchanges. (DAO comment: Khamis al-Qadhafi spent 14 months in a combined Russian staff college course especially designed for him and obtained a PhD in military sciences in 2007. DAO's contacts have told us that the Russian DAO's office expects Putin's visit soon, and that the Russians have threatened to cut off military spare parts sales to Libya if a major new contract is not signed during Putin's visit. End comment.) Stressing that defense cooperation occurs largely outside the purview of Russia's Embassy in Tripoli, Martinov characterized Libya-Russia defense cooperation as good and said the Libyans appeared "well pleased" with Russian military equipment. Former Congressman Weldon's Rosoboroneksport contact said that in addition to an expected civilian nuclear deal,

conventional arms sales would be a prominent issue for discussions between Putin and Qadhafi. Possible sales of tactical and strategic airlift aircraft and armor, and overhaul of Libyan naval vessels were specifically mentioned.

RUSSIAN COMPANIES ACTIVE IN OIL/GAS AND CONSTRUCTION

¶5. (SBU) Turning to commercial interests, Martinov noted that

TRIPOLI 00000297 002.2 OF 002

oil/gas exploration company Tatneft was moving ahead with seismic exploration of blocks in the Ghadames and Sirte basins that it secured in the December 2006 round of the National Oil Corporation's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) bid process. (Note: Tatneft won rights to blocks in area 82 and 98 in the Ghadames Basin, and area 69 in the Sirte Basin. As reported ref B, Gazprom won exploration and production rights in the December 2007 EPSA round for three blocks of area 64 in the Ghadames Basin. End note.) A private Russian company has been awarded a contract to renovate and provide new radar equipment to the Tobruk airport. A Russian company is also close to signing a contract to construct approximately 300km of a projected 2,000km coastal rail line that would span Libya from the Libyan-Tunisian border to the Libyan-Egyptian border.

KEY RUSSIAN POSITIONS VACANT DUE TO VISA PROBLEMS

¶6. (SBU) Kozlov noted that a number of key positions in the Russian Embassy in Tripoli have remained vacant due to difficulties in obtaining Libyan visas for PCS staff. The Political Counselor slot has been vacant since August 2007; the incoming PolCouns has been unable to obtain a visa. Kozlov characterized lengthy waits for Libyan visas as "routine" for Russian diplomatic staff.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI298

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI298 aka Wikileaks id #149043 ?
Subject	ASSASSINATION OF SECURITY OFFICER IN EASTERN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Apr 2008 16:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI298.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6524
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0298 0991608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 081608Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3328
INFO RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3826
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000298

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , KISL [Islamic Issues] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF SECURITY OFFICER IN EASTERN LIBYA

REF: TD-314/026364-08

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Websites al-Manara and Libya al-Youm reported on March 28
and 29, respectively, that a "senior security official" of the
Internal Security Organization (ISO) was assassinated on March
27 in the eastern Libyan city of Derna.  The sites identified
the officer as Ennaji 'Awami, and said he died after being shot
twice in the head by masked gunmen in front of the al-Qods
School.  According to website reports, the slain officer's
vehicle was subsequently found parked in the al-Qala' area of
Derna's Baab Shiha neighborhood. (Note: al-Qala' - "fortress" or
"castle" - is a reference to the historic fort located in that
area of town.  End note.)  According to website reports,
security officials mounted a campaign of arrests immediately
```

after 'Awami was killed, but failed to apprehend the perpetrators. They noted that 'Awami was well-known for his "severity and cruelty" and had received multiple death threats before he was killed.

¶2. (C) Italian, British and Egyptian diplomats told Emboffs April 5-7 that their missions confirmed that the killing had occurred. (Note: Italy and Egypt have consulates in Benghazi, the closest major city to Derna. End note.) Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdel Halim told P/E Chief on April 7 that the Egyptian Consulate in Benghazi confirmed reports that 'Awami was the victim and that he had been killed by gunfire. Their information was that he was shot in front of a Derna school while waiting to pick up his children. It was not/not clear to Egyptian officials whether the assassination was an act of terrorism perpetrated by Islamic extremists or a revenge killing, although Egyptian contacts in Derna took pains to characterize 'Awami as "a hard man" and "a bully". Noting the above-referenced web reports, Abdel Halim stressed that targeting security officials - a phenomenon with which Egypt has some experience - was "extremely rare" in Libya. If confirmed as a targeted killing perpetrated by Islamic extremists, it would represent a "very significant" development, he said.

¶3. (S/NF) Comment: Post notes that the information above is consistent with some information reported reftel on April 6. The al-Manara and Libya al-Youm websites feature significant reporting on events in eastern Libya. That al-Manara, a London-based site established in 2002, posted its report within a day of the shooting suggests close, well-established contact between eastern Libya and members of the Libyan diaspora in the U.K. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI307

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI307 aka Wikileaks id #149369 ?
Subject	MFA DISCOURAGES IDEA OF SOFT POWER PROGRAMMING IN EASTERN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 10 Apr 2008 13:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI307.html
References	08TRIPOLI120
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO8712
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0307/01 1011344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 101344Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3338
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3836
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000307

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]*
SUBJECT: MFA DISCOURAGES IDEA OF SOFT POWER PROGRAMMING IN EASTERN LIBYA

REF: A) TRIPOLI 120 , B) TRIPOLI 278

TRIPOLI 00000307 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A key MFA interlocutor discouraged the idea of U.S.-Libya cooperation on counter-ideological or "soft power" efforts to blunt the appeal of the extremist message in eastern Libya, arguing such efforts would be counterproductive. The GOL had recently undergone "an awakening" to the fact that there was a real problem with extremism in the east and was now making

a real problem with extremism in the east and was now making serious efforts to counter the threat; the best course for the U.S. would be to publicly "ignore" extremism in eastern Libya. The GOL's strategy appears to combine reliance on traditional efforts by security organizations to monitor and disrupt extremists' activities while engaging in significant development programs to improve socio-economic conditions enough to blunt the appeal of the extremist message. Absent agreement by the GOL to cooperate on counter-ideological or soft power programming, post's efforts have focused on expanding host government capacity through State, DHS and Treasury training and assistance programs, which are expected to bolster counter-terrorism efforts. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a pair of recent meetings on other issues, P/E Chief engaged with MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari in a discussion on the possibility of "soft power" programming in eastern Libya to help blunt the appeal of extremist messages and reduce the number of young men volunteering from the area to travel to Iraq to undertake operations against U.S. and coalition forces. Conceding that poor socio-economic conditions in the east, including poor public education and limited social outlets for young people, helped fuel the appeal of more extreme iterations of Islam used to justify jihad operations, Matari nonetheless threw cold water on the idea of soft power programming under the auspices of the USG or any other external entity. The GOL had recently undergone "an awakening" to the fact that there was a real problem with extremism in the east, and was now making "serious efforts" to counter that threat.

¶3. (C) Asked whether there was any possibility for U.S.-Libya cooperation on counter-ideological or soft power efforts, Matari counseled that the best course of action regarding eastern Libya was to "ignore it", claiming it would "go away". He strongly advocated against USG counter-ideological public diplomacy or soft power development efforts, arguing they could further legitimize extremism by: 1) showing the extremist message was successful enough that it merited public counter-action; 2) tacitly acknowledging that the GOL is unable to blunt the threat through "traditional, quiet" channels (i.e., through its security apparatus), and; 3) suggesting the GOL facilitated interference by the U.S. and others in what is widely regarded as an internal Libyan matter. On the latter point, Matari noted Libya's difficult experience under Ottoman and Italian colonial occupation, stressing that soft power programming could easily be equated with latter-day imperialist manipulation by extremists, and could prompt Libyans not otherwise inclined towards more extreme iterations of Islam to embrace extremism as a form of viable resistance to foreign meddling.

¶4. (C) Attributing much of the problem in eastern Libya to the unhelpful influence of extremists from Algeria and Egypt, Matari emphasized that cross-border influence from Egypt is particularly dangerous. Citing previous visits to Algiers and Cairo, Matari claimed part of the problem is the dearth of moderate literature compared to more readily available texts advocating more extreme iterations of Islam. An infusion of moderate literature, such as the writings of Jamal al-Banna, a comparatively moderate Egyptian theologian and younger brother of the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, would help. (Note: Jamal al-Banna, a consistent advocate of Islamic reform, has publicly disputed traditional Islamic teachings on treatment of women and jihad, and created the "Committee for the Defense of Victims of Terror Fatwas". End note.) But this was something for the GOL to do; it was "highly unlikely" that the GOL would sanction any USG-supported effort in counter-ideological programming. Referencing the Italian colonial occupation, he stressed that anything related to curriculum and political/religious messages is deemed to be "for the government (of Libya) alone to manage".

¶5. (C) As an alternative to counter-ideological programming, P/E Chief suggested the possibility of micro-enterprise and other

targeted development, possibly to be implemented by quasi-governmental NGO's such as the Qadhafi Development Foundation. Matari underscored the GOL's sensitivity concerning anything that appeared to be foreign assistance, suggesting "as a friend" that the U.S. recall that Libya's official position is that it is an oil-rich state that provides assistance to others not blessed with oil, particularly sub-Saharan African states. (Note: Several international oil companies tried soon after

TRIPOLI 00000307 002.2 OF 002

re-starting operations in 2004 to engage in targeted development under the auspices of their corporate outreach programs - soccer leagues, tutoring programs, micro-loan and micro-enterprise projects. The GOL categorically declined the oil companies' offer, telling them instead that they could pay for school construction or provide money to the GOL to implement programs. End note.) Unbidden, Matari offered that USAID would, for example, almost certainly not be welcome to undertake programming in the east or elsewhere in Libya.

¶6. (C) Comment: Matari, who holds a PhD from the University of Oregon, is one of our most sophisticated and sympathetic interlocutors. His remarks underscore continuing GOL neuralgia about any programming that implies the GOL is unable or unwilling to provide for its people. The GOL's "traditional, quiet" channels for dealing with extremism comprise security organizations and, more recently, an increase in macro-economic development projects in eastern Libya. The latter appears to reflect a belated realization that the policy of deliberately impoverishing the east to ensure political quiescence has not worked. The GOL's strategy appears to be to rely on security organizations to monitor eastern communities and mosques to contain the threat while engaging in significant infrastructure upgrades (Benghazi port renovation, Benghazi and Derna water and power upgrades) and development projects (the Green Mountain Eco-tourism project) to improve socio-economic conditions enough to blunt the appeal of extremist messages. As reported ref D, while senior regime figures appear to have recognized that the east merits more attention and investment, the reported ability of radical imams to propagate messages urging support for and participation in jihad despite security organizations' efforts suggests that claims by senior GOL officials that the east is under control may be overstated.

¶7. (C) Comment (continued): Post's efforts have focused on expanding host government CT capacity through State, DHS and Treasury programing in areas other than counter-ideology. These programs, in our view, hold more promise for gaining Libyan cooperation. It is expected that a successful recent Diplomatic Security/Anti-Terrorism Assistance (DS/ATA) visit (ref E) will presage a robust program of anti-terrorism, law enforcement and judicial training that will bolster counter-terrorism efforts. Continued customs and border security training akin to a port security program the Embassy recently facilitated will contribute to the GOL's ability to better control its borders and monitor travelers, directly benefitting efforts to control foreign fighter flows. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Few would weep for Colonel Gaddafi, but targeting him is wrong
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI308

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI308 aka Wikileaks id #149408 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PROPOSAL FOR MIL/MIL MOU
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 10 Apr 2008 15:13 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI308.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8880
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0308/01 1011513
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 101513Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3340
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3838
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000308

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PROPOSAL FOR MIL/MIL MOU

¶1. (SBU) Libyan MFA conveyed to Post via diplomatic note a draft MOU on military cooperation. While the Libyan proposal generally tracks with a proposed text conveyed by Deputy Secretary of Defense England to Libyan FM Abdulrahman Shalgham

SIPDIS
during the latter's January 2008 visit to Washington, the Libyan version makes significant changes to the preamble. The Libyan draft includes assertions that the U.S. will work through the UN Security Council in support of Libya's independence, territorial integrity, and its right to defend itself. The Libyan draft also adds language to the preamble committing the U.S. to acknowledge Libya's "voluntary renunciation of its WMD programs, its counterterrorism actions, and its prominent role in serving peace on the regional and international levels," and to "promote cooperation to enable Libya to realize its security and integrity."

¶2. (SBU) Embassy translation of the full text of the

diplomatic note accompanying the draft MOU follows.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Office) sends its compliments to the US Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya, and attaches herewith the draft Memorandum of Understanding between the General Interim Committee on Defense in the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the US Department of Defense as regards contacts and cooperation in the field of defense.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Office) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)

To: US Embassy

Tripoli: April 3, 2008

¶3. (SBU) The full text of the Libyan draft MOU follows.

Draft Memorandum of Understanding

Between

The General Interim Committee on Defense of the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

And

The U.S. Department of Defense

Regarding contacts and cooperation in the field of defense

PREAMBLE

The General Interim Committee on Defense in Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and the US Department of Defense in the United States (hereinafter "parties");

- Being determined to enhance the existing friendship ties between them, and acting on the spirit of partnership and cooperation;

- Approving the importance of the voluntary decision taken by Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya to renounce its WMD programs, they [the two parties] assert the commitment of the United States of America to work through the UN Security Council to support the independence of the Great Jamahiriya and

its territorial integrity, and to enable it to defend itself with conventional weapons and with the support of the United

Nations in return for its voluntary renunciation of its WMD programs, its counter terrorism actions and its prominent role in serving peace on the regional and international levels.

- And In response to both parties' joint commitment to promote cooperation in view to enable Great Socialist People's Arab Libyan Jamahiriya to realize its security and integrity;

In Witness whereof, the parties hereto have entered this Memorandum of Understanding as follows:

Section One: Cooperation Scope

Both parties intend to cooperate in the field of defense in accordance with the laws, regulations and policies in force in their countries.

1)- The purpose of this cooperation between both parties is to enhance international peace and stability.

2)- The greater purpose sought by both parties is to build a permanent defense relationship based on mutual respect that contributes to the security of each party, and enhances peace and security with other countries in the Mediterranean region, and with the African Union and its member nations.

Section Two: Cooperation Fields

Both parties can encourage and develop bilateral communications and cooperation in the filed of defense, and have agreed on the following:

a- Sharing of information concerning defense-related issues.

b- Mutual sharing of information as regards execution of national military approaches.

c- Sharing of information and expertise and news bulletins with respect to operating and maintenance of military equipment.

d- Sharing of information as regards promoting security with the Mediterranean states and the African Union and its member states.

e- Exchange of expertise in the fields of staff, leadership and control.

f- To provide specialized training for Libyan military officers at the military academies in the USA.

g- To train specialists in the military institutions, including linguistic training inside these facilities.

h- To provide assistance to research and development centers and to exchange visits and expertise among the members of these centers in both countries, and to provide them with the right knowledge.

i- To conduct talks in relation to the law governing armed disputes, and the relation between military and civil authorities, and other legal issues as regards military service.

j- Any other issues mutually agreed upon by both parties.

Section Three: Cooperation Planning

1- The two parties intend to set up a periodic cooperation plan, to be approved mutually, and that would specify the areas of cooperation in which they decide to proceed.

2- The two parties, whenever required, shall make more

detailed arrangements regarding specific areas of cooperation.

Section Four: Amendments

This MOU can be amended any time, upon written notification and through mutual agreement between both parties.

Section Five: Confidentiality

Each of the two parties shall commit that any information either party obtains from the other party by virtue of this agreement shall remain confidential and not to disclose it to any third party, except upon prior written approval from the party providing the information.

Section Six: Dispute Resolution

Any disputes that might arise between the two parties regarding the interpretation or the implementation of this MOU shall be resolved through negotiations between the two parties solely.

Section Nine: Entry into Force, its Scope and Termination

1- This MOU shall enter into force upon its signature by both parties.

2- This MOU does not include any provisions that entail

commitments under International Law

3- This MOU shall remain effective unless terminated by a mutual agreement, or by either party, upon 90-day written notice submitted in advance to the other party. Should this MOU be terminated, all activities related to it shall stop, and both parties shall enter into consultations with a view to solving any pending issues.

In Witness whereof, this memorandum is drafted today ~~~~.. 2008, in two versions: one in Arabic and the other in English. Both versions shall have the same validity and legal force.

(signatures)

End text.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI319

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI319 aka Wikileaks id #149949 ?
Subject	DEBT, ARMS, AND ENERGY ON AGENDA FOR QADHAFI-PUTIN MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 15 Apr 2008 15:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI319.html
References	07TRIPOLI1038 , 08TRIPOLI297
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8054
OO RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKUK
RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHTRO #0319/01 1061554
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 151554Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3350
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3851
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000319

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEBT, ARMS, AND ENERGY ON AGENDA FOR QADHAFI-PUTIN MEETING

REF: A) TRIPOLI 297 , B) 07 TRIPOLI 1038

TRIPOLI 00000319 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (C) Summary: With Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled to arrive on April 16 for an overnight visit, hundreds of Russian security and support staff have descended on Tripoli, filling the capital's major hotels, old city and shopping districts. Confirming media reports, Russian Embassy officials say Putin's agenda for meetings with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi will include rescheduling Soviet-era debt and discussing

will include rescheduling Soviet-era debt, and discussing military equipment sales, gas production and a possible civilian nuclear energy agreement. Officials from Rosoboroneksport and Gazprom will accompany Putin. End summary.

¶2. (C) Putin will overnight at Tripoli's sole (nominal) five-star venue, the Corinthia Baab Afriqiya Hotel (which also houses the US Embassy). Hundreds of busy Russian advance officials have managed to make time to tour Tripoli's Old City and to shop for inexpensive knock-off clothing and goods in adjacent markets. The Slovak Ambassador told the CDA that the Russian delegation comprises some 580 individuals arriving in Triopli on six to eight Russian aircraft.

¶3. (C) Russian Poloff Evgeny Kozlov told P/E Chief on April 14 that after fierce negotiations with the GOL over the venue for the visit, Putin will remain in Tripoli for meetings with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. It is not expected that Putin will travel to Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte, where he often prefers to host visiting heads of state. Confirming media reports, Kozlov said Putin's agenda for his meetings with Qadhafi consist of rescheduling Soviet-era debt and discussing conventional military equipment sales, natural gas production and a possible civilian nuclear energy agreement. Kozlov said finalizing a mechanism for settling Libya's debt, which he put at "several billion dollars", was a key priority for Putin. (Note: Media reports, citing Russia's 2007 budget, claim a figure of $3.5 billion. End note.) He conceded that a possibility was an arms-for-debt structure akin to that brokered by Russia with neighboring Algeria in 2006. In that deal, he said, Russia forgave Soviet-era debt and Algeria agreed to purchase Russian military equipment.

¶4. (C) Kozlov said an arms-for-debt deal had been under discussion for "several years" under the rubric of a joint Russian-Libyan military cooperation council established in the late 1990's (see ref B). Russian news agency Interfax reported April 14 that the deal would include $2.5 billion worth of anti-aircraft systems, MiG and Sukhoi tactical aircraft, helicopters, submarines and warships. Kozlov confirmed that officials from Rosoboroneksport were among Putin's delegation. (Note: As reported reftel, a Rosoboroneksport official told former Congressman Curt Weldon that sales of tactical and strategic airlift aircraft and armored vehicles, and overhaul of Libyan naval vessels, would be on the table. End note.)

¶5. (C) Confirming that Gazprom officials would also number among Putin's party, Kozlov said discussions with Qadhafi were expected to touch on greater involvement by Russian hydrocarbon giant Gazprom in projects in Libya in connection with Italian company Eni. Following a publicized meeting in Moscow last week between Eni chief executive Paolo Scaroni and Gazprom chief Alexei Miller, it was announced that Gazprom is in talks with Eni about a potential asset swap that would give Gazprom access to gas fields in Libya. As reported ref B, Gazprom won exploration and production rights in the December 2007 Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement bid round for three blocks of area 64 in the Ghadames Basin. Local oil and gas contacts say Gazprom is keen to expand its presence in Libya; media reports suggest the company's expansion into Libya is part of a deliberate strategy to further monopolize gas supplies for Europe's lucrative market.

¶6. (C) Although media attention to the issue has abated in the run-up to the visit, Kozlov reiterated remarks reported ref A that Russia intends to capitalize on a "golden opportunity" to sign a general framework agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation during Putin's visit. Other diplomatic contacts have reported that the Russians hope to exploit the fact that French-Libyan civilian nuclear cooperation has not progressed to the GOL's satisfaction since a parallel agreement was signed during President Sarkozy's visit to Libya last year. Kozlov suggested that a Russia-Libya civilian nuclear agreement

could/could also be linked to forgiving Libya's Soviet-era debt. (Note: It is unclear how this would work, since the civilian nuclear deal has been characterized to us as a general framework agreement, with commercial details to be negotiated and finalized in the future. End note.)

¶7. (C) Comment: Following in the tradition of Sarkozy's visit

TRIPOLI 00000319 002.2 OF 002

to Tripoli and Qadhafi's December 2007 stops in Paris and Madrid, Putin appears poised to engage in some high-stakes commercial diplomacy. The GOL traditionally uses high-value commercial contracts as expressions of its political goodwill, and is working to cast the visit as one more manifestation of its policy of successful engagement with European partners. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI321

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI321 aka Wikileaks id #150022 ?
Subject	DEBT, ARMS AND ENERGY ON AGENDA FOR QADHAFI-PUTIN MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 16 Apr 2008 09:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI321.html
References	07TRIPOLI1038 , 08TRIPOLI297
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI340 , 08TRIPOLI829
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9128
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0321/01 1070927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 160927Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3354
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3855
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000321

SIPDIS

(CORRECTED COPY)
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEBT, ARMS AND ENERGY ON AGENDA FOR QADHAFI-PUTIN MEETING

REF: A) TRIPOLI 297 , B) TRIPOLI 1038

TRIPOLI 00000321 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (SBU) Copy corrected to reflect correct overall classification of the cable.
¶2. (C) Summary: With Russian President Vladimir Putin scheduled to arrive on April 16 for an overnight visit, hundreds of Russian security and support staff have descended on Tripoli

Russian security and support staff have descended on Tripoli, filling the capital's major hotels, old city and shopping districts. Confirming media reports, Russian Embassy officials say Putin's agenda for meetings with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi will include rescheduling Soviet-era debt and discussing military equipment sales, gas production and a possible civilian nuclear energy agreement. Officials from Rosoboroneksport and Gazprom will accompany Putin. End summary.

¶3. (SBU) Putin will overnight at Tripoli's sole (nominal) five-star venue, the Corinthia Baab Afriqiya Hotel (which also houses the US Embassy). Hundreds of busy Russian advance officials have managed to make time to tour Tripoli's Old City and to shop for inexpensive knock-off clothing and goods in adjacent markets. The Slovak Ambassador told the CDA that the Russian delegation comprises some 580 individuals arriving in Triopli on six to eight Russian aircraft.

¶4. (C) Russian Poloff Evgeny Kozlov told P/E Chief on April 14 that after fierce negotiations with the GOL over the venue for the visit, Putin will remain in Tripoli for meetings with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. It is not expected that Putin will travel to Qadhafi's hometown of Sirte, where he often prefers to host visiting heads of state. Confirming media reports, Kozlov said Putin's agenda for his meetings with Qadhafi consist of rescheduling Soviet-era debt and discussing conventional military equipment sales, natural gas production and a possible civilian nuclear energy agreement. Kozlov said finalizing a mechanism for settling Libya's debt, which he put at "several billion dollars", was a key priority for Putin. (Note: Media reports, citing Russia's 2007 budget, claim a figure of $3.5 billion. End note.) He conceded that a possibility was an arms-for-debt structure akin to that brokered by Russia with neighboring Algeria in 2006. In that deal, he said, Russia forgave Soviet-era debt and Algeria agreed to purchase Russian military equipment.

¶5. (C) Kozlov said an arms-for-debt deal had been under discussion for "several years" under the rubric of a joint Russian-Libyan military cooperation council established in the late 1990's (see ref B). Russian news agency Interfax reported April 14 that the deal would include $2.5 billion worth of anti-aircraft systems, MiG and Sukhoi tactical aircraft, helicopters, submarines and warships. Kozlov confirmed that officials from Rosoboroneksport were among Putin's delegation. (Note: As reported ref A, a Rosoboroneksport official told former Congressman Curt Weldon that sales of tactical and strategic airlift aircraft and armored vehicles, and overhaul of Libyan naval vessels, would be on the table. End note.)

¶6. (C) Confirming that Gazprom officials would also number among Putin's party, Kozlov said discussions with Qadhafi were expected to touch on greater involvement by Russian hydrocarbon giant Gazprom in Libyan projects in connection with Italian company Eni. Following a publicized meeting in Moscow last week between Eni chief executive Paolo Scaroni and Gazprom chief Alexei Miller, it was announced that Gazprom is in talks with Eni about a potential asset swap that would give Gazprom access to gas fields in Libya. As reported ref B, Gazprom won exploration and production rights in the December 2007 Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement bid round for three blocks of area 64 in the Ghadames Basin. Local oil and gas contacts say Gazprom is keen to expand its presence in Libya; media reports suggest the company's expansion into Libya is part of a deliberate strategy to further monopolize gas supplies for Europe's lucrative market.

¶7. (C) Although media attention to the issue has abated in the run-up to the visit, Kozlov reiterated remarks reported ref A that Russia intends to capitalize on a "golden opportunity" to sign a general framework agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation during Putin's visit. Other diplomatic contacts have reported that the Russians hope to exploit the fact that French-Libyan civilian nuclear cooperation has not progressed to the GOL's satisfaction since a parallel agreement was signed during President Sarkozy's visit to Libya last year. Kozlov suggested that a Russia-Libya civilian nuclear agreement could/could also be linked to forgiving Libya's Soviet-era debt.

(Note: It is unclear how this would work, since the civilian nuclear deal has been characterized to us as a general framework agreement, with commercial details to be negotiated and finalized in the future. End note.)

¶8. (C) Comment: Following in the tradition of Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli and Qadhafi's December 2007 stops in Paris and Madrid, Putin appears poised to engage in some high-stakes commercial diplomacy. The GOL traditionally uses high-value commercial

TRIPOLI 00000321 002.2 OF 002

contracts as expressions of its political goodwill, and is working to cast the visit as one more manifestation of its policy of successful engagement with European partners. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI336

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI336 aka Wikileaks id #150786 ?
Subject	LIBYA PREPARED TO FINALIZE - BUT NOT SIGN - A TIFA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 22 Apr 2008 13:19 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI336.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4583
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0336/01 1131319
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 221319Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3367
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3871
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000336

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USTR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA PREPARED TO FINALIZE - BUT NOT SIGN - A TIFA

REF: MILLER-BURKHEAD EMAIL 4/20/2008

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Minister of Economy-equivalent said the GOL has resolved two key internal debates related to a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and is prepared to finalize the accord with the U.S., provided a final face-to-face meeting of technical experts - an important political exercise, from its perspective - occurs. While the GOL is prepared to finalize the text of the agreement, it will not be in a position to sign the agreement so long as Section 1083 (the so-called Lautenberg Amendment) of the U.S. 2008 National Defense Authorization Act applies to Libya. Separately, the GOL is continuing internal deliberations on how to implement a radical privatization and economic reform agenda recently proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi amid concerns the measures could exacerbate inflation and unemployment. End summary.

GOL READY TO FINALIZE TIFA, BUT WANTS FINAL FACE-TO-FACE MEETING

OF EXPERTS

¶2. (SBU) The CDA met with Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade (Minister of Economy-equivalent) Dr. Ali Abdullah Essawi on April 17 to discuss next steps on finalizing a U.S.-Libya Trade Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). Reiterating points made in an earlier meeting with Emboffs by Dia Hammuda, Director of the Ministry's Foreign Cooperation Office, Essawi stressed that while much progress has been made via email correspondence, from the GOL's perspective a face-to-face meeting between technical experts to review and finalize the language was necessary. An agreement of this kind represented an important political commitment; an in-person meeting to discuss the document was a significant and appropriate part of the process. (Note: Essawi's position reflects the Libyan perspective that the political intent behind an agreement is as important as the language of the document itself. End note.)

¶3. (SBU) Two issues were identified in Emboffs' earlier meeting to discuss the TIFA: 1) whether the GOL wanted the agreeement to come into effect upon signing or upon notification of ratification by the respective parties, and; 2) language for labor provisions in the agreement that had to be provided by the GOL's Labor Ministry-equivalent. Essawi told CDA the GOL had decided it would prefer that the agreement come into effect after notification of ratification. The Ministry of Economy had also received the language for the labor provisions, which would be forwarded to USTR this week via email. Essawi suggested that the technical experts try to meet sometime in May or June to finalize the document. Foreign Cooperation Office Director Hammuda will lead the GOL's delegation. (Note: The technical experts' meeting may help avoid GOL proposals for changes to the text of the agreement on the eve of signing, as occurred in January 2008 with a US-Libyan Science and Technology Agreement. End note.)

LIBYA WON'T SIGN AGREEMENT UNDER SHADOW OF LAUTENBERG AMENDMENT

¶4. (SBU) Essawi made it clear that while the GOL is prepared to finalize language for a TIFA, it would not be in a position to sign the agreement so long as Section 1083 (the so-called Lautenberg Amendment) of the U.S. 2008 National Defense Authorization Act applied to Libya. (Note: The Lautenberg Amendment potentially facilitates attachment of Libyan government assets to satisfy damages awarded by U.S. courts in terrorism-related cases. The GOL has taken significant measures to insulate its assets from potential seizure, to include divestiture of investments in U.S. financial markets by its sovereign wealth fund. End note.) Citing an Arabic expression, Essawi said signing a TIFA in the shadow of the Lautenberg Amendment would be just "ink on paper", mocking the intent of expanded economic and commercial ties.

GOVERNMENT WORKING TO IMPLEMENT QADHAFI'S VISION ...

¶5. (SBU) Responding to the CDA's question about implementation of economic reforms and radical privatization advocated by leader Muammar al-Qadhafi in a key speech on March 2, Essawi said the goals are to dramatically reduce the government's role in regulating economic activity while more efficiently distributing Libya's oil wealth to its people. The government believes radical reforms, to include ending subsidies for foodstuffs and commodities, as well as regulation of utilities, will encourage more rapid economic reform and privatization. Essawi is a member of two (the economic activities committee and the wealth distribution committee) of the five cabinet-level committees charged with implementing Qadhafi's vision. He indicated that the implementing committees' consultations were to be concluded by September, with final recommendations expected by year's end.

TRIPOLI 00000336 002 OF 002

... BUT IS CONCERNED ABOUT INFLATION, UNEMPLOYMENT

¶6. (SBU) Essawi conceded that achieving a balance between ending government subsidies and maintaining a politically palatable daily standard of living was "very difficult". Expressing concern that the measures could prompt inflation and greater unemployment, he carefully noted that Qadhafi's proposal that each family receive direct allotments of 5,000 Libyan dinar (about $4,200) per month was "an idea" for oil wealth distribution, and suggested that other forms of compensation such as shares in government funds might be an alternative. (Note: Qadhafi proposed eliminating virtually all state subsidies and radical privatization, to include the education and health care systems, in exchange for providing direct stipends to citizens, from which they would ostensibly pay for and collectively manage everything themselves. End note.) Essawi put the overall unemployment rate in Libya at 17 percent and the unemployment rate among "youth" aged 18-34 at 25 percent. (Note: A 2004 World Bank estimate put the overall unemployment rate at 30 percent. End note.) Growing the economy and creating jobs were key priorities, he said, noting that one-third of Libya's population is under the age of 18. (Note: The CIA's World FactBook estimates that 33.2 percent of Libya's citizens are under the age of 14. End note.)

¶7. (SBU) Comment: A sophisticated, forthcoming interlocutor, Essawi drew a clear line between potential signing of a TIFA and waiving application of the Lautenberg Amendment. His concerns about possible inflationary and unemployment pressures related to implementation of Qadhafi's privatization and economic reform scheme echo what we've heard from other contacts. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI340

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI340 aka Wikileaks id #151237 ?
Subject	DEBT, NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND GOLF CARTS: PUTIN VISITS LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 24 Apr 2008 16:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/04/08TRIPOLI340.html
References	08MOSCOW1133 , 08TRIPOLI297 , 08TRIPOLI321
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI374 , 08TRIPOLI829 , 08TRIPOLI870
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
O 241647Z APR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3372
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0490
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1076
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0659
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0610
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3876
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000340

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/24/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]* , RU *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]*
SUBJECT: DEBT, NUCLEAR ENERGY, AND GOLF CARTS: PUTIN VISITS LIBYA

REF: (A) MOSCOW 1133 , (B) TRIPOLI 321 , (C) TRIPOLI 297

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. After years of preparation, Russian President Vladimir Putin, accompanied by 400 assistants, journalists and business executives in six planes, visited Libya on April 16-17 primarily to secure an agreement on Libya's sizeable Soviet-era debt. Libya and Russia agreed to swap the $4.5 billion debt for a large railroad contract and several future contracts in housing construction and electricity development. At Libyan insistence, the two sides signed an MOU committing them in principle to formalize a civilian nuclear agreement by the end of 2008. While Russian diplomats in Tripoli maintain that Putin did not have a political agenda for his visit, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi used the opportunity to claim he opposes NATO expansion to Ukraine and Georgia and to advocate for his one-state solution to the Israel/Palestine problem. Putin also raised -- without success -- the case of a detained Russian

national and LUKoil employee who remains in pre-trial detention since his arrest under unclear circumstances in November 2007. End Summary.

¶2. (U) The Russian Ambassador to Libya briefed CDA on Putin's visit on April 23 and Poloff followed up in a separate meeting with Russian Poloff Evgeny Kozlov on April 24.

MARATHON, 26-HOUR MEETING ON LIBYA'S $4.5 BILLION DEBT

¶3. (C) Finalizing an agreement on Russian forgiveness of Libya's sizeable Soviet-era debt topped Russia's agenda for President Putin's April 16-17 visit to Tripoli. After a marathon, 26-hour meeting between Russian Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin and his Libyan counterpart, the two countries agreed that Russia would forgive Libya's $4.5 billion debt and, in exchange, Libya would sign commercial contracts on railways, housing construction, electricity development, and road construction. Libya opened the negotiations by stating that Libya did not recognize any debt to Russia and, instead, demanded that Russia offer financial compensation for Russia's role in passing and enforcing UN sanctions against Libya in the 1980s and 1990s.

¶4. (C) According to Kozlov, who was present throughout the negotiations, the two delegations "locked themselves in" the Libyan Ministry of Finance at 9 AM on April 16 and, with only a one-hour break from 18:30-19:30, did not emerge with an agreement until 11 AM on April 17 -- a half hour after Putin was scheduled to sign the debt agreement. Kozlov closely connected Putin's visit to the debt issue, noting that Putin made clear to Qadhafi that he did not engage in "political tourism" and would not leave without an agreement on the debt. Both Qadhafi and FM Abdulrahman Shalgham were in regular phone contact with the Libyan Finance Minister throughout the 26-hour negotiations.

LIBYA INSISTS ON INKING CIVILIAN NUCLEAR MOU

¶5. (C) During the visit, the two sides also signed -- at Libyan insistence -- an MOU committing both sides to side a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy by the end of 2008. Kozlov noted that Libya hoped to sign a formal civilian nuclear agreement during the visit; however, no language had been agreed to before the visit and Russia refused to sign without further consultations. Kozlov reiterated that the civilian nuclear agreement will establish a general framework for future cooperation and will not/not include any specific projects. Current Libyan-Russian cooperation on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- limited to a few Russian technical experts working at the Tajoura nuclear facility -- is based on an "outdated" Soviet-era agreement with Libya; according to Kozlov, Russia hopes to "modernize" the framework for nuclear cooperation. He added that the Libyans are chiefly interested in acquiring nuclear-powered water desalination technology and that Libya is stringing along several possible sellers, including France, before it decides what to buy. Noting Libyan dissatisfaction with slow progress on Libyan efforts to purchase civilian nuclear technology from France following President Sarkozy's July 2007 visit to Libya, Kozlov cautioned that the Russian side made clear that any Russian sales will not/not be quicker than the French deal.

RAILROAD CONTRACT ONLY COMMERCIAL DEAL SIGNED DURING VISIT

¶6. (C) The Russian Ambassador downplayed the value of commercial contracts to CDA in an April 23 briefing for select foreign diplomats. Russia only signed one contract during the visit -- a 2.2 billion euro, four-year contact for the construction of approximately 500km of railroad between Sirte and Benghazi. Despite press reports to the contrary, Russian diplomats maintain that no military contracts were signed during the visit. Kozlov anticipated that, in the near-term, Libya and Russia would also sign commercial contracts on housing

Russia would also sign commercial contracts on housing construction in Janzour and Zawiya, electricity line installation, road construction, and possibly an additional section of Libya's planned coastal railroad between Tunisia and Egypt. In addition, the two sides signed a general agreement on promotion of investments, an MOU on economic cooperation, an agreement on the protection of confidential commercial and military information, and three MOUs on oil/gas exploration between Gazprom and the Libyan authorities.

QADHAFI CLAIMS TO OPPOSE NATO EXPANSION

¶7. (C) In over six hours of private meetings on April 16-17, Qadhafi voiced his satisfaction that Russia's increased strength can serve as a necessary counterbalance to U.S. power, echoing the Libyan leader's frequent support for a more multi-polar international system. Qadhafi also raised the issue of NATO expantion to Ukraine and Georgia, assuring the Russian President that Libya opposes any further expansion of NATO. (Note: According to Kozlov, the Russian Embassy in Tripoli has learned that Qadhafi voiced strong support for Ukraine's NATO bid during Ukrainian President Aleksandr Yushchenko's April 2008 visit to Libya. End note.) The two leaders also discussed Qadhafi's vision for a one-state solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. The Libyan leader expressed luke-warm support for Russian plans to convene a Middle East peace conference in Moscow, reflecting Libya's long reluctance to participate in any meeting that advocates a two-state solution to the Israel/Palestine conflict. The two leaders did not/not discuss non-proliferation or Iran's nuclear ambitions.

PUTIN RAISES CASE OF DETAINED LUKOIL REP

¶8. (C) Putin also raised with Qadhafi the case of detained LUKoil Overseas representative Aleksandr Tsyganov. According to Kozlov, Libyan security services arrested Tsyganov, a Russian national, in November 2007. Despite repeated requests for an official explanation of the charges against Tsyganov, the Russian Embassy has received only an "informal explanation" that Tsyganov is charged with disclosing the "secret" location of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Noting that bribery allegations related to a contract tender have surfaced in the press, Kozlov said that the Libyan government had never mentioned bribery charges and instead told the Russians that Tsyganov's case had been referred to a state security court. (Note: Libyan security officials have indicated that he was arrested on suspicion of espionage. End note.) The Russian Ambassador and Consul have met "several times" with Tsyganov; however, Kozlov noted that arranging a meeting was exceedingly difficult and that the Ambassador had only been allowed to visit Tsyganov at the Bourj al-Fatah office building in Tripoli and not/not at Tsyganov's detention facility. Tsyganov remains in pre-trial detention at an unknown facility. According to Kozlov, as a result of Putin's failure to gain traction on the case during his visit, the Russians are prepared to "reciprocate" by arresting a Libyan businessman in Russia.

PROTOCOLARY SURPRISES

¶9. (C) Russian diplomats in Tripoli described Putin as "very patient" with Libya's unusual way of doing business. Upon Putin's arrival at Qadhafi's compound, Qadhafi drove up in a golf cart to meet Putin's motorcade and promptly abandoned Putin beside a large outdoor bonfire while the Libyan leader went to pray. On the morning of Putin's second day in Tripoli, Libya ordered Putin's motorcade redirected in the middle of the highway for a last-minute, private breakfast meeting with Qadhafi.

¶10. (C) The Russians were generally pleased with the performance of Libyan Protocol before and during the visit. After four meetings with Libyan Chief of Protocol (and Qadhafi confidant) Nuri al-Mismari in the run-up to the visit, Libya

consented -- for the first time ever -- to grant Russian security and Putin's advance team access to Qadhafi's Bab Azziziya compound in Tripoli before Putin's arrival. Though al-Mismari initially balked at the Russian side's refusal to allow Putin to travel in a Libyan Protocol vehicle, he eventually relented and allowed the Russians to fly in three presidential limosines for use during the visit. When the Russians informed al-Mismari that Putin would be accompanied at all times by an assistant carrying Russia's nuclear launch codes, al-Mismari blew up: "Libya has made a decision to get rid of its nuclear weapons. We will not let you bring your nuclear weapons here!" Russian diplomats explained to al-Mismari that Putin would be traveling with codes and not/not the nuclear weapons themselves.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI36

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI36 aka Wikileaks id #138184 ?
Subject	GOL SUGGESTS U.S.-LIBYAN BILATERAL TIES "GREATLY COMPLICATED" BY UTA CASE DAMAGES AWARD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 22 Jan 2008 17:40 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI36.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8075
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0036/01 0221740
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 221740Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3002
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0715
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0408
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0370
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY IMMEDIATE 0029
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0122
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3452
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000036

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND L (JSCHWARTZ)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL SUGGESTS U.S.-LIBYAN BILATERAL TIES "GREATLY COMPLICATED" BY UTA CASE DAMAGES AWARD

TRIPOLI 00000036 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, DCM, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: The recent decision by a U.S. judge to award roughly $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans

roughly $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans killed in Libya's 1989 bombing of a French-operated UTA passenger plane has apparently caught the GOL off-guard and angered elements within the GOL. The MFA told us the award would "greatly complicate" U.S.-Libya ties. In a letter to the Secretary (septel), Secretary of the General People's Committee

SIPDIS
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (FM-equivalent) Abdhurrahman Shalgham requested USG intervention in the case on behalf of the GOL, as well as intervention with the Congress to rescind a provision in the 2008 Defense Authorization Bill that would facilitate lawsuits against states accused of sponsoring terrorism. The GOL intends to send a legal team to the U.S. soon to discuss the UTA case and possibly other pending terrorism-related cases as well, according to the MFA. End summary.

THREE TIMES AS BIG AS PAN AM 103

¶2. (U) According to press reports, which also appeared in Arabic language media, U.S. District Court Judge Henry Kennedy January 15 awarded approximately $6 billion in damages to families of seven U.S. victims killed the September 1989 bombing of French-operated UTA flight 772. The $6 billion award, to be paid by the GOL and six Libyan intelligence officials convicted of involvement in executing the attack, is roughly three times the total compensation package in the case of Pan Am flight 103. The UTA 772 award represents the value of the aircraft, compensation for pain and suffering of the victims, compensation for the pain and suffering of the victims' families, compensation for expected earnings had the victims lived and interest backdated to the date of the bombing. The GOL has until February 25 to appeal Judge Kennedy's decision. As we understand it, if there is no appeal and/or negotiations on a settlement by February 25, claimants can attempt to seize Libyan government assets to satisfy the judgment.

JUDGMENT A "CONSIDERABLE SHOCK" FOR THE GOL ...

¶3. (C) Former French Ambassador to Tripoli, Jean-Jacques Beaussou, a consultant for the UTA 772 claimants' counsel, U.S. law firm Crowell & Moring, briefed the CDA and A/DCM January 16 on his efforts to engage the GOL on next steps in the case. He said the GOL's direct liability is approximately $1.5 billion; the remaining $4.5 billion is to be paid by the six convicted Libyan intelligence officers. Noting that the GOL decided last fall not to continue negotiations for an out-of-court settlement for UTA 772 involving a much smaller damages award, he said Judge Kennedy's decision was a "considerable shock" for the regime.

... WHICH IS SCRAMBLING TO FORMULATE A RESPONSE

¶4. (C) According to Beaussou, the GOL believed the proposed out-of-court settlement amount would have prompted families of French victims, who settled in 2004 for approximately $170 million, to ask for more compensation. It also cited concern about adverse Libyan public reaction to the proposed out-of-court settlement amount. Judge Kennedy's $6 billion damages award suggests the GOL's calculus was flawed, creating a political problem for the GOL and exposing the GOL's claims litigation committee headed by Ahmad Mesalati to criticism that it has bungled management of the case. Mesalati, who is typically able to meet Beaussou in person, declined January 16, saying he first had to consult with key regime figures, who were "surprised" by the award and were working to formulate a strategy.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

¶5. (C) Referencing conversations with counsel for the U.S. claimants, Beaussou speculated that the unanticipated size of

the judgment might constitute sufficient "shock therapy" to prompt the GOL to negotiate payment terms or, should it appeal, an out-of-court settlement. Beaussou sees four possible scenarios for the GOL: 1) pay the damages (not a likely outcome, in his view); 2) appeal the decision (also not likely in his view, as the GOL must deposit a sizeable portion of the award in

an escrow account pending outcome of the appeal); 3) refuse to pay and ignore the court's judgment (the most likely outcome in his view, and the most injurious to U.S.-Libyan relations); or 4) use the judgment as a pretext to work out a comprehensive compensation package covering all outstanding claims agains the GOL in U.S. courts. Beaussou noted that option three (non-payment and ignoring the judgment) could allow claimants to begin efforts to attach Libyan assets, including eight C-130 aircraft stored in Georgia, whose delivery to the GOL was blocked in the 1970's and which have been a neuralgic issue for the GOL. (Note: Further discussion of the C-130's during visiting AFRICOM General Herbert Altshuler's January 15-16 reported septel. End note.)

MFA: AWARD WILL "GREATLY COMPLICATE" BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

¶6. (S) An unusually sober Ahmed Fituri, MFA Secretary for the Americas, flatly told the CDA and A/DCM January 17 that the UTA 772 decision would "greatly complicate" relations. He noted that there were "several" senior-level GOL discussions January 16 that lasted all day and involved - by phone or in person - Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Foreign Minister Shalgham, Deputy External Security Organization Chief Abdullah Sanussi and MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi. (Note: The involvement of NSA Mutassim al-Qadhafi is potentially troublesome given his remarks in meetings last August and November with visiting NEA A/S Welch and S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey, respectively, to the effect that the GOL feels it has paid enough compensation in claims cases and that the U.S. Congress should adopt legislation preventing any further claims. End note.) Fituri added that another high-level meeting had been scheduled for late January 17 to continue discussions on how the GOL will respond.

¶7. (C) Fituri offered his "personal opinion" that the planned visit of musician Robert McNamara, who received a PAS grant to give guitar concerts and lead master classes in Benghazi and Tripoli in late January, was ill-timed in light of the UTA 772 decision and recommended that we postpone. The "Libyan people" would not view favorably the confluence of the UTA decision, McNamara's concerts and the upcoming General People's Congress (scheduled to open in mid-February), and would wonder why the GOL was facilitating cultural exchanges at a time when it had been "insulted" by the UTA 772 judgment. The CDA told Fituri we'd take his remarks under advisement; we subsequently learned that the MFA had rescinded McNamara's visa approval.

¶8. (C) In a follow-on January 21 meeting with CDA, Fituri said that the GOL response would comprise a letter from FM Shalgam to the Secretary requesting the Administration's intervention with the court to facilitate a GOL appeal of the judgment. According to Fituri, the court requires that the GOL make a large deposit upon appeal; the GOL would like to avoid making this payment by way of a USG guarantee to the court. Shalgam would also request that the Administration intevene with the Congress to rescind a provision in the 2008 Defense Authorization Act known as "the Lautenberg Amendment." This provision facilitates private lawsuits against states accused of sponsoring terrorism, in particular by making it easier for victorious claimants to seize foreign government assets. The GOL would also send a team of "three or four" lawyers to the U.S. to discuss the UTA case and perhaps other cases (i.e., Le Belle) with the claimants'

perhaps other cases (i.e., La Belle) with the claimants' lawyers. The team will be headed by litigation claims chair Mesalati, who is scheduled to travel to the U.S. on January 23.

COMMENT

¶9. (S) The Shalgam letter to Secretary Rice is vague as to what the GOL wants and intends. It does not specifically mention an appeal nor does it specifically state that the GOL is sending the team of lawyers. It remains unclear to the Embassy why the appeal option seems to be preferred if the same result -- delaying the day of judgment and negotiating a favorable payment -- could be attained by beginning a negotiation with the claimants' lawyers. This would elimiinate the need for a large deposit with the court. It may be that the GOL assesses that it can come to a more favorable out of court settlement with an appeal pending.

¶10. (S) After a four-month period of relatively good bilateral cooperation bracketed by NEA A/S Welch's August 2007 visit and FM Shalgham's January 2008 trip to Washington, we may be on the cusp of another downturn in relations, unless the GOL engages

TRIPOLI 00000036 003.2 OF 003

seriously on the UTA case. We made the point to Fituri that the thrust of FM Shalgham's recent visit to Washington and our senior-level discourse was to broaden and deepen bilateral ties in a way that made them more durable and less subject to lingering issues like the claims cases. Fituri was polite, but made it clear that the quarters of the GOL that really count continue to interpret developments such as the UTA 772 decision as political signals and may retaliate by putting the brakes on the kind of broader engagement we seek. This would not augur well for our efforts to move forward with education and economic reform programs, a human rights dialogue, counter-terrorism finance training and other forms of expanded cooperation.

STEVENS
MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI368

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI368 aka Wikileaks id #152692 ?
Subject	LIBYA: TOTAL'S OFFSHORE OIL WELL SHUT DOWN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 May 2008 07:24 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI368.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI676
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000368
R 070724Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3405
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0616
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0665
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0496
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1082
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0297
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0469
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0419
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0790
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3909
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000368

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: TOTAL'S OFFSHORE OIL WELL SHUT DOWN

¶1. (SBU) Summary: A recent drilling accident brought drilling and production operations in an offshore wellfield operated by French oil company TOTAL to a halt. Although there were no injuries or environmental damage, production (the field produces about 45,000 barrels/day) will likely be halted for several months until the wells can be repaired. Even if TOTAL subsequently surges production to recoup its losses, it will take several years to make up the lost production. End Summary.

DRILLING ACCIDENT

¶2. (SBU) In September 2003, French oil giant TOTAL started production in Libya's Al Jurf field, located about 100

production in Libya's Al Jurf field, located about 100 kilometers offshore in water averaging 90 meters in depth. The field consists of a platform with ten production wells connected to a floating production storage offloading (FPSO) vessel located roughly 3km from the producing platform. Total operates the block with a 37.5% interest (via its local operating company, Mabruk Oil Operations) and is partnered with German oil company Wintershall (12.5% interest) and Libya's National Oil Corporation (50% interest).

¶3. (SBU) A drilling accident occurred at the field on April 17, during work on a development well for gas injection. According to TOTAL's Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) manager, the drill went off-course and penetrated an adjacent production well at a depth of 650 feet beneath the seabed. Due in part to the safety precautions taken before the commencement of drilling, including the shut-down of all production wells, there was no oil spillage or injuries as a result of the accident. The entire platform was evacuated within 48 hours as an additional safety precaution against a well blowout, and production was suspended indefinitely in all ten wells in the field.

OFFLINE FOR MONTHS...AT GREAT COST

¶4. (SBU) TOTAL's locally-based emergency team was activated to secure the platform, and a specialized ten-member technical team has been flown in from France to assess the damage and recommend a course of repairs. Given the extent of the damage, the early assessment from the team is that the entire field will remain offline for at least two months. That best case scenario involves making repairs from the platform itself, rather than from a relief well, which would have to be drilled alongside the damaged one. If it becomes necessary to drill a relief well, the cost and timeline of needed repairs could expand considerably.

¶5. (SBU) The Al Jurf field is fairly large field, producing an average of 45,000 barrels/day. (Note: For sake of comparison, that is roughly the daily crude oil production of Turkey. End Note). Loss of production for several months will make a significant dent in TOTAL's bottom line in Libya, and the NOC will likely seek compensation for the shortfall in their projected revenues. TOTAL's HSE manager noted that once production is resumed, it could be surged to 52,000 barrels/day or more to compensate for the loss of production for several months. Even at that rate, the gap would only be closed after a couple of years of uninterrupted production at the higher level.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: Although TOTAL has ably handled the aftermath, this is a major accident and a blot on its record in Libya. Insurance will likely cover TOTAL for its losses in the short term and the continuing technical investigation may determine that repairs can be completed quickly; however, the tight market for offshore drilling ships could be a factor if it is determined that a relief well must be drilled to complete needed repairs. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI372

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI372 aka Wikileaks id #152897 ?
Subject	PD PROGRAMS FALL VICTIM TO BILATERAL TENSIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 8 May 2008 08:48 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI372.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI374
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8284
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0372/01 1290848
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080848Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3410
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0666
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0497
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0617
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1085
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0791
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3914
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000372

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR: NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, ECA D. IVES, K. WILSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , OIIP *[International Information Programs]* , OEXC *[Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]*
SUBJECT: PD PROGRAMS FALL VICTIM TO BILATERAL TENSIONS

REF: TRIPOLI 289

¶1. (U) Summary: Since January, Post has experienced increasing difficulties in obtaining visas for incoming Public Affairs Section visitors, both for educational and cultural programs. The Government of Libya (GOL) has canceled some programs outright, and has simply not approved visas for others. These recent difficulties appear to be the result of an intentional decision by elements within the GOL, rather than the routine difficulties of navigating the Libyan bureaucracy. End summary.

RECENT HISTORY OF CANCELED PROGRAMS

¶2. (U) Prior to January, Post experienced several months of relatively successful Public Affairs Section (PAS) programming, particularly educational programs. We brought in our first English Language Fellow, conducted successful English Language Specialist workshops, and gained routine access for the first time to students and faculty at Libyan public universities. However, since January several programs have been canceled by the GOL. While the Embassy has successfully secured visas for other visitors during the same time period, PAS visitors have been singled out for denial. Failure to issue visas to PAS visitors is not a reciprocity issue, as Post has expedited and issued more visas more quickly in response to Libyan official requests than the GOL has done for Embassy official requests (see reftel).

¶3. (U) In early January, DAS Tom Farrell, accompanied by other ECA staff and 4 representatives of American universities and higher education, planned to come to Libya to meet with representatives of Libyan universities and government officials. Despite prior agreement to the visit and assurances that visas would be approved, the visas were not approved. The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC, or MFA-equivalent) blamed the snafu on their internal bureaucracy.

¶4. (U) In mid-January, the GOL canceled the planned performance of a musician following a U.S. court decision awarding compensation to families of victims of the UTA bombing. The GPCFLIC told the CDA that it was not the right time for such performances, stating that it would be "confusing" for the GOL to facilitate concerts by a U.S. musician in the wake of the court decision, and suggesting that the U.S. postpone it. Shortly thereafter, the musician's visa, which had previously been approved, was canceled.

¶5. (U) In early February, the GOL abruptly canceled an event that the GPC for Higher Education (GPCHE) had requested of the Embassy - an information session for recipients of Libyan scholarships for post-graduate study in the United States. Expecting to brief several hundred students, CAO and visiting Regional Education Advising Coordinator were notified of the event's cancellation minutes before it was scheduled to begin. Despite Embassy efforts to provide information to scholarship recipients, PAS still frequently receives complaints about the Libyan students' lack of preparation for applying to and studying at U.S. universities.

¶6. (U) In mid-April, the GOL canceled the performance of a second musical group. PAS had taken precautionary steps to confirm that the musical performance would be permitted, and obtained approval from various government bodies. Our local partners had also obtained approval to host performances. In early April, our local partners contacted us to let us know they received instructions to cancel the scheduled performances, and were told that given the state of the bilateral relationship, such programs were not a priority for the Libyan government. In subsequent conversations, Libyan officials told the P/E Chief that public programming was not appropriate because the bilateral relationship was "not fully normalized".

¶7. (SBU) In April, Post expected an American Fulbright grantee to come to Libya to work with professors at Garyounis University. Despite written approval of the Program and numerous assurances, the visa has not been issued. The Head of the Protocol Office told a Post employee that he wished that Public Affairs programs would simply go away. (Comment: We believe that the Protocol Office has instructions not to issue visas to Embassy visitors who will engage the public, and that excuses blaming lack of visa issuance on bureaucratic snafus is merely a dodge. End comment.)

¶8. (U) In late April, Post expected the publishers of MEPI's My

Arabic Library program to come to Libya to meet with the GPC for

Basic Education to discuss implementation of the program, which Libyan authorities have approved. The visas were not approved, much to the disappointment of officials at the GPC for Basic Education, who, in addition to the My Arabic Library program, are eager to meet with American publishers to discuss using American textbooks in public schools.

¶9. (U) During the first week of May, Post planned to host Dr. Steve Morrison of SAIS. The Green Book Society, the National Center for Disease Control, and Al Fatah University Medical School had all agreed to host Dr. Morrison for events. His visa was not approved.

CONFLICTING MESSAGES

¶10. (U) It is clear that our Libyan education and cultural partners want Americans to come to Libya to implement joint programming. They are greatly disappointed when Americans do not receive their visas, and complain of conflicting points of view they hear behind the scenes. The GPC for Basic Education is tasked with finding the best textbooks possible, and has been advised by some government parties to use American textbooks. Without being able to host American publishers, however, they cannot find a way to practically implement that plan. Libyan universities are tasked by the highest levels to send their students to the U.S. for study. University administrators, however, are blocked from bringing American professors and representatives to Libya to establish the relationships necessary to achieve that objective.

¶11. (SBU) At a recent meeting at Al Fatah University Medical School, the dean complained about the inability of Libyan academic administrators to achieve the unrealistic and frequently contradictory goals of Libyan politicians. He described how "politicians" have told him that he has to send 2,000 students to the U.S., Canada, and Great Britain for medical school next year. When he explains that Libyan students will not be accepted into medical schools in those countries, he is viewed as a nay-sayer. When he introduces plans to improve the quality of Libya's medical education (such as bringing American medical school representatives here to discuss curriculum development and establishing joint programs, meeting American accreditation standards, and sending Libyan students to U.S. schools for undergraduate degrees followed by medical school), "the politicians" criticize him for his suggestions that will take too long to implement. (Note: A key part of a proposed Regional Nuclear Medicine Center project being implemented with USG assistance involves sending Libyans to U.S. medical schools for advanced training. End note.)

¶12. (SBU) The new Educational Attachi to the Libyan Embassy in Washington recently expressed to us his nervousness that the goals he is tasked with achieving are unattainable. While Libyan officials have repeatedly stressed that they want Libyan students to return to U.S. universities by the thousands, the Libyan bureaucracy, and to a large extent, Libyans themselves, remain intransigent in terms of their willingness to meet the requirements necessary to matriculate in U.S. schools.

MORE DIFFICULTIES AHEAD

¶13. (U) While for the past two years American universities have given Libyan students substantial benefit of the doubt in accepting them, there are already rumblings from those universities about Libyan students. Universities have recently remarked about the high level of complaining from Libyan students and the intense bureaucratic support they and their

families require. They also note that while some Libyan students have done exceptionally well academically, others are performing terribly. A number of GOL scholarship students reportedly have paid more than 1000 Libyan Dinars each to poorly-qualified local "educational agencies" for assistance in completing university admissions forms (typically Colorado State and Oklahoma State) and visa applications. The universities have found that many such admissions forms contain inaccurate information and essays they suspect the students themselves did not write. Universities are now reviewing applications from Libyans with more intense scrutiny to try to better screen them.

¶14. (U) In addition to more intense scrutiny by American universities, Libyan students hoping to study in the U.S. may also begin to experience more intense scrutiny during their visa interviews. Post's Consular Officer recently learned that at Oklahoma State University, 50% of Libyan students have applied for public benefits. It is not clear yet whether that indicates

TRIPOLI 00000372 003 OF 003

that GOL scholarship funds are insufficient, and/or that Libyan students budget such funds poorly. Another possibility is that Libyan students are seeking to inappropriately exploit public benefits, even if they have sufficient funds from other sources. (Note: Egyptian Embassy officials recently told P/E Chief that Libyan university students in Egypt, who number in the thousands, routinely abuse public benefits reserved for Egyptian students.)

¶15. (SBU) Comment: As the bilateral relationship has grown more tense during the past several months as a result of outstanding compensation issues and human rights issues, GOL officials who oppose reengagement with the U.S. have gained ground in putting a halt to PAS programs in Libya. While Libyan government officials still desire reengagement with the American academic community, their lack of understanding of the academic environment coupled with the recent trend of refusing American visitors prevents Libyan academic officials from achieving those goals. Post will continue to push in particular for educational programs and visitors. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI374

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI374 aka Wikileaks id #152970 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S NSC SOLICITS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR COOPERATION & LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 8 May 2008 14:11 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI374.html
References	08TRIPOLI340 , 08TRIPOLI372
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI487
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8607
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0374/01 1291411
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 081411Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3415
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0470
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0070
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0500
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0669
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0620
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1088
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3919
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000374

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/8/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , ETTC [Trade and Technology
Controls] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PINR [Intelligence] , TRGY
[Energy Technology] , LY [Libya] , RU [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , FR [France; Corsica]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S NSC SOLICITS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVILIAN NUCLEAR
COOPERATION & LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 340 , B) TRIPOLI 372

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d), (e)
```

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: A senior National Security Council official asked what the USG's views were on the possibility of U.S.-Libya civilian nuclear cooperation and on sales of lethal military equipment to Libya. Building a nuclear reactor for peaceful uses, principally power generation and water desalination, is a key GOL priority and Libya would prefer that a U.S. company and/or the USG provide technical guidance and/or undertake construction efforts. The official stressed that the GOL is anxious to resolve outstanding bilateral political irritants (terrorism-related claims in U.S. courts, the Lautenberg Amendment) before the current U.S. administration's term expires to ensure greater bilateral cooperation and U.S. commercial activity in Libya. It was not clear that the requests for the USG's views on civilian nuclear cooperation and lethal military equipment sales had been fully coordinated with other elements of the GOL. Please see guidance request at para 8. End summary.

GOL WANTS NUCLEAR REACTOR PLANT FOR CIVILIAN PURPOSES

¶2. (S/NF) In a meeting with the CDA on May 7, Dr. Hind Siala, Director of Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation at Libya's National Security Council (NSC), asked what the USG's views were on the possibility of U.S.-Libya civilian nuclear cooperation. Siala said building a nuclear reactor for peaceful uses, to include power generation and water desalination, is a GOL priority. According to Siala, the GOL would strongly prefer that U.S. companies, in concert with the USG, provide technical guidance and/or undertake construction. If U.S. companies and/or the USG are not interested in participating in such a project directly, the GOL wants assurances that the USG would approve Libya offering an international tender for construction of a civilian reactor by third-country parties.

CLAIMS U.S. NUCLEAR COOPERATION WOULD NOT CONTRADICT PARALLEL EFFORTS WITH FRANCE & RUSSIA

¶3. (S/NF) The CDA noted media reports claiming the GOL had signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreements with France during President Sarkozy's visit to Tripoli in July 2007, and with Russia during President Putin's visit in April. (Note: As reported ref A, at the GOL's insistence, Libya and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding committing them to finalization of a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy by the end of 2008. The GOL hoped to sign the formal agreement during Putin's visit; however, no language was agreed to before the visit and Russia refused to sign without further consultations. Russian contacts here claimed the formal agreement - if signed - would only establish a general framework for future cooperation and would not/not be keyed to any specific projects. End note.) Siala averred that U.S.-Libya civilian nuclear cooperation would complement, not contradict, parallel efforts with France and Libya. Conceding she is not fully briefed on Libya's nuclear aspirations, she did not know how many reactor plants the GOL envisages building; however, she reiterated that desalination was a primary goal.

USG'S POSITION ON POSSIBILITY OF LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT SALES SOUGHT

¶4. (S/NF) Siala next raised the possibility of U.S. sales of lethal military equipment. Noting that the issue had been raised during NEA Assistant Secretary David Welch's visit in August 2007, she stressed that "time is pressing" from the GOL's perspective. Libya understood that difficult bilateral issues such as outstanding terrorism-related claims in U.S. courts remained and that building trust took time; however, if there were "other political issues" that would prevent the U.S. from selling Libya lethal military equipment in the future, the GOL would prefer to know now so that it can pursue other options.

GOL ANXIOUS TO RESOLVE OUTSTANDING POLITICAL ISSUES BEFORE YEAR'S END

¶5. (S/NF) Drawing a line between concerns about potential nuclear and military cooperation and efforts to find a comprehensive settlement of terrorism-related claims in U.S. courts, Siala stressed the importance of resolving political issues before the current U.S. administration's term expires to

facilitate greater bilateral cooperation. Reiterating points we've heard before, she noted that European and other companies are heavily involved in Libya; the GOL would like to see more U.S. companies active here. Section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the so-called "Lautenberg Amendment") greatly complicated the business environment in Libya for U.S. companies, whose assets were potentially at risk of attachment. Expressing concern that a new U.S. administration might have different views about reengagement with Libya, she underscored the need to push ahead quickly with efforts to resolve claims cases and exempt Libya and U.S. companies from application of the Lautenberg Amendment. Siala solicited the CDA's views on the effectiveness of the Livingston Group, a lobbying organization hired to help burnish Libya's reputation in Washington, and asked about the status of proposed negotiations on outstanding claims.

¶6. (S/NF) On cooperation, Siala proposed the further and expanded exchange of senior visitors, even as efforts to resolve the claims and Lautenberg issues continue. Emphasizing our agreement with that approach, the CDA noted difficulties post had encountered in trying to bring in U.S. visitors for educational and cultural programs, referencing comments by MFA officials to the effect that such visits were inappropriate since U.S.-Libya relations were not "fully normalized" (ref B). Expressing surprise, Siala agreed to inform National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi to see if the NSC could help alleviate those problems.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Although she was clearly conveying points at the behest of her boss, NSA Muatassim al-Qadhafi, it struck us that the requests for the USG's views on civilian nuclear cooperation and lethal military equipment sales had not been fully coordinated with other elements of the GOL (the MOD and MFA equivalents, for example) that usually have a voice on those issues. We suspect that Muatassim may be seeking to explore the parameters of areas in which he can push for expanded bilateral cooperation. The questions nonetheless underscore the expectation in certain quarters of the GOL that bilateral cooperation will expand very rapidly - including in sensitive issue areas - if a comprehensive settlement of outstanding terrorism-related legal claims and the Lautenberg Amendment issue can be achieved. Bearing in mind the GOL's disappointment that assumptions about the depth of engagement immediately after its decision in December 2003 to abandon WMD aspirations and renounce terrorism were not met, we will need to temper its current expectations and carefully coordinate our response to requests for expansion of cooperation into sensitive areas. End comment.

¶8. (S/NF) Guidance request: Request Department guidance on whether and how Post should further respond to the request for the USG's views on possible civilian nuclear cooperation and lethal military equipment sales. End guidance request.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI375

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI375 aka Wikileaks id #152972 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 8 May 2008 14:23 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI375.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI401 , 09TRIPOLI679
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8623
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0375 1291423
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 081423Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3417
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0794
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0472
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0671
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0502
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1090
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3921
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000375

SIPDIS

NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION: FATHI EL-JAHMI HAS RETURNED TO HIS HOME

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Yussef Sawani informed the CDA on May 8 that Libyan human rights activist and regime critic Fathi el-Jahmi had been discharged from the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) and has returned to his home, where he is currently in the care of his family. Saying the QDF had "no objection" to the Embassy reaching out to el-Jahmi's family, he cautioned that one of el-Jahmi's sons had asked the QDF to convey to the Embassy that the family does not wish to be contacted or visited by Embassy officers, out of concern that such contact could "create problems." Sawani

concern that such contact could create problems. Sawani claimed that el-Jahmi's return to his home demonstrated that he had been "a free man" since his hospitalization at Tripoli Medical Center in summer 2007.

¶2. (C) Comment: Given the family's alleged desire not to be contacted by the Embassy, Post recommends Department seek confirmation of the report of el-Jahmi's release from his U.S.-based brother, Muhammad el-Jahmi. Sawani did not indicate which family home el-Jahmi had returned to (the family maintains residences in Tripoli and Benghazi), nor did he indicate whether there were any conditions attached to el-Jahmi's discharge from the TMC. Other questions include whether arrangements for needed outpatient medical care have been made and whether the family in fact requested that the Embassy not contact them. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI381

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI381 aka Wikileaks id #153426 ?
Subject	LIBYA URGED TO SUPPORT FRENCH UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 May 2008 12:15 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI381.html
References	08STATE49813
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1711
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0381 1331215
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 121215Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3423
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0128
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3927
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000381

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/UNP (WICKBERG) AND EAP/MLS (COPE); USUN FOR RENEAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/12/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , BM *[Burma]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA URGED TO SUPPORT FRENCH UNSC RESOLUTION ON BURMA

REF: STATE 49813

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Pol/Econ Chief, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) P/E Chief conveyed reftel points and the draft resolution text on May 12 to Tajouri al-Sheradi, Senior Political Adviser in the MFA-equivalant's International Organizations Department, urging that Libya support a French resolution calling on Burma to facilitate the expeditious delivery of humanitarian assistance to cyclone victims. Agreeing that the situation in Burma was dire and that the Burmese regime's response had been "confusing", al-Sheradi indicated the GOL had not seen the text. He agreed to immediately convey it to Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham and said the GOL would coordinate its position through its UN delegation. Al-Sheradi reiterated the GOL's usual aversion to "interfering" in other states' domestic affairs, but (unusually) conceded that the humanitarian need in Burma was so exigent that "extraordinary measures" might be called for.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI382

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI382 aka Wikileaks id #153497 ?
Subject	DEATH OF KEY LIBYAN OFFICIAL HAMPERS COUNTER-MIGRATION EFFORTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 May 2008 16:14 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI382.html
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO3268
PP RUEHBW RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0382/01 1331614
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 121614Z MAY 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3424
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0298
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0503
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0672
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1091
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3928
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000382

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PRM AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/8/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , LY *[Libya]* , IT *[Italy]* , MT *[Malta]*
SUBJECT: DEATH OF KEY LIBYAN OFFICIAL HAMPERS COUNTER-MIGRATION EFFORTS

REF: TRIPOLI 0050

TRIPOLI 00000382 001.4 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: High season for illegal migrants departing Libya for European shores continues; more than half of a group of 70 migrants that made landfall in Malta during a recent 48-hour window claimed to have departed from Libya. The unexpected death of a key Libyan official has set back Malta's

campaign to improve Libya's performance in its search and rescue area and efforts to finalize training and repatriation agreements. End summary.

HIGH SEASON FOR ILLEGAL MIGRANTS

¶2. (SBU) Maltese Ambassador Joseph Cassar pulled P/E Chief aside for a conversation on illegal migration as the latter penned a message in the condolences book for the recently deceased Sir Anthony Mamo, the first President of Malta. Saying it had been "a bad week", Cassar noted that more than 70 illegal migrants had made landfall and requested asylum in Malta during a single 48-hour period earlier this week. More than half of the 70 individuals claimed to have departed from Libya's coast, prompting Valletta to task its embassy in Tripoli to reiterate requests that the GOL increase patrols in its Search and Rescue area (SAR). Cassar noted that more vessels transporting illegal migrants appear to be calling via satellite telephones to claim distress and request assistance immediately after entering Malta's SAR. He suggested that they did so to mitigate the chance that they would founder before being rescued.

KEY OFFICIAL'S DEATH DIMINISHES LIBYA'S RESPONSIVENESS

¶3. (SBU) Cassar said the GOL's response to the Maltese demarche had been "disappointing". He noted that the unexpected death six weeks ago of Engineer Fawzi Ghariba, former Director of International Cooperation for Libya's Port Authority-equivalent and a key interlocutor on counter-migration efforts, had negatively impacted the GOL's responsiveness on illegal migration issues at a critical time. (Note: Launches from Libya of vessels transporting illegal migrants typically increase in spring/summer months to take advantage of improved weather and sea conditions. End note.) Describing Ghariba's operating style as "American", he said the late official played a key role in finalizing recent Malta-Libya and Italy-Malta bilateral cooperation agreements on migration issues (reftel). More importantly, Ghariba was an energetic and efficient operator and one of the only GOL officials who approached illegal migration with any sense of urgency. In several cases, Ghariba had galvanized the GOL to deal with migration issues and prompted disparate GOL entities to coordinate their efforts through the force of his personality. On instructions from Valletta, Cassar has asked the GOL several times when a successor to Ghariba might be identified; however, the GOL has demurred, saying it would be unseemly to rush to appoint a replacement.

BROADER EFFORTS ON TRAINING, READMISSION AGREEMENTS ALSO IMPACTED

¶4. (C) Cassar said Malta has focused on enhancing training for Libyan CG officials patrolling Libya's SAR area. He said efforts to finalize an agreement to provide such training, as well as a readmission agreement under which migrants found to have entered Malta illegally could be returned to their country of departure (Libya) rather than their countries of origin, had been frozen since Ghariba's death. (Comment: A number of European countries have been pursuing similar readmission agreements with the GOL. All have encountered significant difficulty in attempting to finalize those, suggesting that factors other than Ghariba's death may bear on Malta's efforts. End comment.) He encouraged the U.S. to continue focusing on training and material assistance for Libya's CG. (Note: Two Libyan CG officers are scheduled to participate in upcoming training programs at a facility in Malta that uses a U.S. Coast Guard curriculum. End note.) Suggesting that he did not agree with Valletta's position that equipment donations [i.e., by wealthier EU countries like Italy] to Libya to combat illegal migration be predicated on the GOL "taking greater responsibility" for its SAR, Cassar described the Libyan CG's equipment needs as "considerable".

¶5. (C) Comment: The dramatic impact of the death of a single

official underscores the severely limited capacity of many quarters of the GOL. Some of the lack of coordination likely reflects the persistence of differing views within the GOL as to how to address the problem. Some GOL officials maintain that illegal migration is a purely external phenomena of which Libya is a victim; they argue that Libya's responsibility for managing

TRIPOLI 00000382 002.4 OF 002

the trend is limited and that European states in particular should devote greater resources to economic development and other aid in sub-Saharan Africa to reduce migrant outflows. End comment.STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI390

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI390 aka Wikileaks id #153897 ?
Subject	LIBYA: PRE-NOTIFICATION OF UPCOMING UNSCR 1267 REQUEST FOR THREE INDIVIDUALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 14 May 2008 15:47 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI390.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4366
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0390 1351547
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 141547Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3437
INFO RUCNSTF/TERRORISM FINANCE PRE NOTIFICATION COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA IMMEDIATE 0012
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA IMMEDIATE 0005
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 0030
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0129
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 0003
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3941
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000390

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EEB/ESC/TFS (JALLORINA), NEA/ARP (JACKSON FARRIER),
S/CT (ANDERSON), TREASURY/TFFC (HARRIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/13/2018
TAGS: KTFN [Terrorism Finance Traffic] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PINR [Intelligence] , EFIN [Financial and
Monetary Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , BA [Bahrain] , QA [Qatar]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: PRE-NOTIFICATION OF UPCOMING UNSCR 1267 REQUEST FOR
THREE INDIVIDUALS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
(S) P/E Chief conveyed reftel points on May 12 to Tajouri
al-Sheradi, Senior Political Adviser in the MFA-equivalant's
International Organizations Department, stressing that the U.S.
would appreciate co-sponsorship and suggesting further
coordination between Libya's UN mission and USUN.  Al-Sheradi
indicated the GOL would consider the request for co-sponsorship
and coordinate its position with its UN mission.  Post will
follow up with al-Sheradi and report any further substantive
response septel.

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI391

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI391 aka Wikileaks id #153898 ?
Subject	SIBLING RIVALRY EMERGING OVER RIGHT TO "FACILITATE" FOREIGN COMPANIES' INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 14 May 2008 15:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI391.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4377
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0391 1351550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 141550Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3438
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0506
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0675
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0623
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1094
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0473
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0795
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3942
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000391

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR (SWEET, HOFSTETTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SIBLING RIVALRY EMERGING OVER RIGHT TO "FACILITATE" FOREIGN COMPANIES' INVOLVEMENT IN LIBYA?

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) At a reception for a nascent U.S. business group on May 6, PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC) Senior Partner Mohamed Ghattour (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (son of Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi) appeared to be moving to play a larger role in commercial contracts with foreign companies, a bailiwick largely reserved for his brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, until now. Ghattour said PWC's Dubai-based Senior Partner for the Middle East paid a quiet visit in early April to Tripoli, where he met for nearly

four hours with Muatassim. The purpose of the meeting, which was orchestrated through Ghattour at Muatassim's request, was to review the merits of specific multi-national companies that the Government of Libya (GOL) and National Security Council (NSC) were considering for various projects. Muatassim requested that PWC rank-order companies (one through three for the top tier, plus an additional tranche of five rank-ordered alternates) for each project.

¶2. (C) Ghattour was reluctant to divulge specifics about the companies under consideration or the putative projects, but did say that a number of U.S. companies were included on the lists. He added that while some of the projects appeared to be defense-related, the majority appeared to be strictly commercial in nature. He expressed surprise at the latter, noting that he had expected most of the discussion to center on defense and security-related projects, which seemed to fall more naturally within what he understood to be Muatassim's brief as National Security Adviser. Muatassim stressed to Ghattour and his principal that they should not share widely the fact that they had met with Muatassim or the substance of the discussion, and expressed particular concern that they make no mention of their call at the NSC during a subsequent meeting with unspecified representatives at the National Engineering Services and Supply Company (NESSCO). (Note: It is widely believed that NESSCO is a holding company for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's many business interests. NESSCO is headed by Abdulrahman Karfakh, a close confidante and reported business partner of and fixer for Saif al-Islam. End note.)

¶3. (C) Comment: We have previously heard reports to the effect that Muatassim was seeking to expand his involvement in dealings with foreign companies, perceived to be a prestigious endeavor, as part of a broader campaign to bolster his position in the regime. It is an article of faith among expatriate businesspeople in Tripoli that any contract of appreciable size involving foreign companies winds up being "facilitated" and blessed by NESSCO - for a price. Saif al-Islam, through Karfakh, has reportedly amassed a sizeable personal fortune, partly because he has since the lifting of sanctions largely monopolized the lucrative niche market in facilitating the entry of foreign companies into Libya. There are widespread rumors of a de facto contest for power - and potentially the right to succeed their father - between Muatassim and Saif al-Islam. A move by Muatassim to challenge his older brother's primacy with respect to dealings with foreign companies could significantly complicate that fraternal dynamic. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI4

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI4 aka Wikileaks id #136177 ?
Subject	LIBYA: FAMILY VISIT FOR RETURNED GTMO DETAINEE CONFIRMED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jan 2008 09:17 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI4.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI829
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3731
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0004 0030917
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 030917Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2971
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3411
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000004

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/3/2028
TAGS: KDRG [Detainee Repatriation from Guantanamo Bay] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PREL [External Political
Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PINR [Intelligence] , PINS [National Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: FAMILY VISIT FOR RETURNED GTMO DETAINEE CONFIRMED

REF: A) TRIPOLI 1060; B) JOHNSON-GODFREY EMAIL 12/27/07

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)



¶1.  (S/NF) ISN 557 (Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda)
was voluntarily repatriated to Libya in September 2007.  As of
December 25, the date on which a whereabouts and welfare visit
occurred under the Watchdog Committee rubric (ref A), ISN 557
claimed to have not had a family visit.  A security officer who
helped facilitate the December 25 visit indicated at the
conclusion of the meeting that a family visit for ISN 557 had
been scheduled for December 27.
```

¶2. (S/NF) A/DCM spoke with Watchdog Committee counterpart Muhammad Tarnish January 2. Tarnish said ISN 557 had a seven-hour visit with members of his immediate and extended family on December 27 at the facility in which he is detained. Tarnish said he was physically present for much of the visit. ISN 557's relatives were able to bring some food, clothes, personal hygiene items and reading materials to him. Tarnish described ISN 557's physical condition and spirits as "very good" and indicated that security officials at the facility at which ISN 557 is detained had allowed the family to stay with him for a few extra hours in light of the impending New Year's holiday.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI401

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI401 aka Wikileaks id #154075 ?
Subject	FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 15 May 2008 14:57 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI401.html
References	08TRIPOLI229 , 08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI375
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI411 , 08TRIPOLI506
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5284
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0401/01 1361457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 151457Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3448
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0507
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0676
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0624
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1095
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0796
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0474
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3952
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000401

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL (KWIRAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FATHI EL-JAHMI REMAINS IN HOSPITAL, DESPITE REPORTS OF HIS RELEASE

REF: A) JOHNSON-STEVENS EMAIL 05/12/2008, B) TRIPOLI 375 , C) TRIPOLI 229 , D) TRIPOLI 280

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Contrary to claims by the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi was discharged from hospital on/about May 8 and returned to his family home in Tripoli, el-Jahmi remains at the Tripoli Medical Center and his current medical condition is

uncertain. Family members visited him on May 14 -- their first visit in over one month -- and expressed concern to P/E Chief for their safety and unease with Embassy involvement in the case. End comment.

FINDING EL-JAHMI

¶2. (C) Per ref A instructions, the CDA called QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani on May 13 to inform him that an Emboff would visit the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) on May 14 in an effort to confirm that detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi had in fact been discharged from hospital and returned to his family home in Tripoli. CDA noted that the Embassy had been unable to reach the family to ascertain el-Jahmi's whereabouts. (Note: As reported ref B, Sawani informed the CDA on May 8 that el-Jahmi had been discharged from the TMC and had returned to his home to recuperate. End note.) Sawani phoned the CDA the following day, May 14, and said that the QDF had no objection to a hospital visit, but repeated that el-Jahmi had returned to his home in Tripoli. Pressed by the CDA as to whether el-Jahmi was at the TMC or at his home in Tripoli, Sawani equivocated, saying he "believed" el-Jahmi was at his home, adding that he "may" have returned to the TMC because of his heart condition.

¶3. (C) On May 14, P/E Chief visited the room at the TMC in which el-Jahmi had been previously been housed. Five plainclothes security officials encountered on previous visits were in and around the room. El-Jahmi was not in the room; the senior security official told P/E Chief el-Jahmi was in another wing undergoing x-rays and other undefined diagnostic procedures. Staff at the nurses' station located directly across from el-Jahmi's room, clearly nervous about being seen to speak with P/E Chief, declined to state whether el-Jahmi had ever been discharged from the TMC as claimed by Sawani on May 8. P/E Chief overheard security officials placing numerous telephone calls, including several to the QDF.

¶4. (C) After waiting for approximately an hour and a half, three members of el-Jahmi's family -- eldest son Muhammad, daughter Lamia and daughter Hana -- appeared. Muhammad el-Jahmi, clearly unhappy that an Emboff was present, declined to speak with P/E Chief. In a brief conversation, Lamia el-Jahmi told P/E Chief that Fathi el-Jahmi had never been discharged from the TMC as claimed by the QDF. No member of el-Jahmi's family had been able to visit him since April 3, the last day P/E Chief visited him. The last information the el-Jahmi family had received about their father's medical condition came in a telephone conversation with a man identified as el-Jahmi's nurse, Abdullah Bashir, more than three weeks ago. Separately, el-Jahmi's relatives in Benghazi told an Embassy contact on May 14 that el-Jahmi remained in hospital and had never been discharged from the TMC.

EL-JAHMI'S FAMILY UNDER PRESSURE & THREATENED

¶5. (C) Lamia el-Jahmi said her brother, Muhammad, was under "tremendous pressure" from officials of the GOL and QDF and believed contact with Emboffs was "very dangerous" for the family. Explaining Muhammad's refusal to speak with P/E Chief, Lamia said he had been working for several weeks to orchestrate a visit to their father, and had been anxious to avoid giving the appearance that the family's request was coordinated with the Embassy. After weeks of waiting, the family had been hastily summoned a short time earlier that day to the TMC. She said el-Jahmi family members in Benghazi and Tripoli are under continuous, close observation by security officials, and are "very afraid". Asked whether the family had received any threats, she became visibly uncomfortable, nodded her head, and declined to say anything further. About five minutes after their arrival, Muhammad summoned his two sisters and they left the wing without having seen their father. (Note: According to Fathi el-Jahmi's U.S.-based brother, Muhammad, the family was allowed to see Fathi after P/E Chief left the hospital. End note.)

¶6. (C) Shortly after el-Jahmi's family departed, the senior security official told P/E Chief it would be better if he returned on another day to visit el-Jahmi. Emphasizing that he was not preventing access to el-Jahmi, he said he had just

was not preventing access to el-Jahmi, he said he had just spoken with the man described as el-Jahmi's nurse, Abdullah Bashir, who indicated that the diagnostic procedures would take at least another hour, and that el-Jahmi would be too tired after they were completed to meet with P/E Chief. (Note: P/E Chief had attempted to call Bashir before el-Jahmi's family

TRIPOLI 00000401 002 OF 002

arrived; Bashir did not take the calls. End note.) The security official pressed P/E Chief hard to specify the date and time he intended to return to visit el-Jahmi; he declined to do so.

¶7. (C) Comment: We strongly suspect the "coincidence" of P/E Chief's visit and that of el-Jahmi's family members was coordinated. While the QDF has insisted since May 8 on the fiction that el-Jahmi has been in his family's custody and not/not that of the GOL, it is not clear what the QDF and/or GOL hoped to gain by dissembling about the fact that el-Jahmi had been discharged from hospital and returned to his family home in Tripoli. From our perspective, the QDF was either misinformed by elements of the GOL or, more likely, was a witting participant in the effort to deceive us about el-Jahmi's whereabouts. Either way, until his family saw him on May 14, el-Jahmi had effectively been in incommunicado detention for 41 days. His present medical condition is uncertain. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI402

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI402 aka Wikileaks id #154269 ?
Subject	POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM, JAMAHIRIYA-STYLE Q: A) TRIPOLI 199, B) TRIPOLI 227
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 16 May 2008 13:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI402.html
References	08TRIPOLI227
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Wed, 2 Feb 2011 21:12 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6257
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0402/01 1371312
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 161312Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3450
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0476
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0798
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3954
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000402

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR (SWEET, HOFSTETTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , KBIO, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM, JAMAHIRIYA-STYLE
Q: A) TRIPOLI 199, B) TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000402 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A private sector interlocutor involved in Libya's chambers of commerce described dramatic calls for reform in a recent speech by Colonel al-Qadhafi as "a return to the natural order of things" that existed before the 1969 military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power and inaugurated thirty plus years of revolutionary governance and economic

thirty-plus years of revolutionary governance and economic experimentation. By the 1990's, it was clear that the ill-defined "Jamahiriya" system of governance was incapable of effectively distributing oil wealth or diversifying the economy; U.S.-led sanctions delayed meaningful economic reform for a further decade. Government ministers tasked with effecting al-Qadhafi's plan for radical privatization are ill-suited to the task (they typically carry out orders rather than formulate and implement policy), and are confused and uneasy. The private sector is concerned that overly rapid privatization, in tandem with more direct distribution of oil wealth and proposed restructuring of the government, could prompt significant economic disruptions, including inflation, and has counseled a more gradual approach. There is concern that old guard elements resistant to economic and political change could seize on inflation as a pretext to roll back reforms. Trimming a corrupt, inefficient public sector, defining and protecting property ownership laws, and revising the commercial and tax codes are other key areas of concern for the private sector. Our interlocutor's comments suggest that a shift may be underway towards a healthier balance between a centralized, suspicious government and an increasingly robust, organized and vocal private sector that is willing and - to an extent at least - able to advocate for issues of common concern. End summary.

¶2. (C) In a meeting with Pol/Econ Chief and EconOff on May 4, Dr. Giuma al-Usta (strictly protect), head of Libya's unified chamber of commerce and the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce, discussed the context of Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech to the General People's Congress, in which he called for radical privatization and restructuring of Libya's government. As discussed in reftels, al-Qadhafi called for the system of General People's Committees (GPC's) that have formed the basis of government since the late 1970's to be completely dismantled by year's end and replaced with an as-yet undetermined structure. He also advocated the direct transfer of oil revenues - he suggested the amount of 5,000 Libyan dinar per month - to Libyan families in tandem with privatization of most public services, to include education and health care. There have been serious concerns in the business community about the capacitQthe GOL to effect simultaneous, broad political and economic reforms.

A RETURN TO THE NATURAL (ECONOMIC) ORDER OF THINGS

¶3. (C) Conceding that al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech had been "surprising" in its scope, al-Usta described proposed privatization measures as "a return to the natural order of things" that existed before the 1969 military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power and inaugurated thirty-plus years of revolutionary governance and economic experimentation. (Note: The coup is described as a people's revolution that prompted development of the "Jamahiriya", an invented term translated to mean "a state of the masses". End note.) In the period immediately after the revolution, there was a heavy focus on the government as the guarantor of social and economic justice; however, the success of Western capitalism and failure of the former Soviet Union and other statist economies underscored the shortcomings of that approach, according to al-Usta. Referencing al-Qadhafi's political-economic treatise, The Green Book, he noted that state structures were not intended to play a central role in politics or economics. Al-Qadhafi's speech was best understood as representing a shift in philosophy over a period of many years, as opposed to a sudden about-face.

JAMAHIRIYA NOT UP TO TASK OF GOVERNING ECONOMY

¶4. (C) Calling for privatization and government restructuring was a return to the principles of early revolutionary thought, al-Usta argued. Law Number 9 of 1992, which relaxed strictures against private property ownership and rolled back more pernicious aspects of Jamahiriya thought, represented the key juncture at which the thinking of al-Qadhafi and influential

quarters of the regime had changed. Faced with the fact that Jamahiriya thought was ill-suited to diversification and modification of Libya's state-dominated, hydrocarbon dependant economy, the regime realized in the early 1990's that a new approach was needed, but U.S.-led international sanctions against Libya in the 1990's delayed economic reform efforts because the country was "on an emergency footing".

CONFUSION & CONCERN AMONG THOSE TASKED WITH IMPLEMENTING AL-QADHAFI'S VISION

¶5. (C) Al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech "created considerable confusion" within the government and private sector, al-Usta said. The initial shock had worn off and skittish investors had taken initial comfort in the fact that the existing system of GPC's had not been dismantled overnight; however, chaos continues to reign in the GPC's and in the five committees tasked with recommending how to implement al-Qadhafi's plan. (Note: As reported ref B, contacts at the MFA and Central Bank told us that five committees - responsible for the budget, economy, administrative structure, wealth distribution and legal reform - were constituted after Qadhafi's speech to formulate plans for dismantling the GPC's, standing up alternate structures and implementing direct distribution of oil wealth. Final plans are reportedly due by September 1. End note.) After years of having only to implement plans made by others in Libya's highly centralized power structure, ministries are now being asked to formulate plans and policies that they themselves will have to implement. Unused to planning and possessed of limited human capacity, senior officials in the ministries are "very nervous", he said.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES MAY LACK CAPACITY TO UNDERTAKE REFORMS

¶6. (C) Careful to avoid blaming al-Qadhafi - who has historically combined rhetorical calls for decentralization with a practical approach that features monopolization of real decision-making authority - al-Usta blamed ministers themselves for the government's lack of capacity and current difficulty in implementing al-Qadhafi's vision as expressed in the March 2 speech. The speech represented not just a change in law and structure, but a shift of responsibility for governance. With his "Zuwarah Statement" in 1975, al-Qadhafi suspended then-extant laws and government structures; in 1977 he established the GPC's and the first General People's Congress convened. Now, he was tacitly conceding the failure of the GPC structure he effectively designed and was calling for a new, as-yet undefined substitute. The General People's Congress of 2008 had assessed the failure of the GPC's to distribute and manage Libya's oil-generated wealth; the GPC's now had to focus on policy formulation (effectively how to dismantle their own organizations and spin off their functions to as-yet undetermined bureaucratic structures) and implementation (actually dismantling the GPC's). Responding to P/E Chief's question as to whether the GPC's were up to the task of simultaneously undertaking radical privatization and government restructuring, he conceded there "could be" problems with lack of government capacity.

INFLATION, CORRUPTION & PROPERTY PROTECTION ARE PRIVATE SECTOR'S KEY CONCERNS

¶7. (C) Al-Usta said the private sector in Libya agrees that there are three main economic challenges at present: managing inflationary pressures; a bloated civil service resistant to privatization; and defining and protecting property ownership. Distribution of oil wealth and privatization are cornerstones of al-Qadhafi's new vision; however, undertaking both

simultaneously - and as the government potentially radically restructures and relinquishes centralized control - could foster significant inflationary pressures. The government needs to encourage production and incentivize and reward economic success as counterweights to inflation. Al-Usta agreed with the concern the Minister of Economy recently shared with us that many Libyans would simply choose not to work if they received a direct monthly stipend from oil revenues. Concerned that significant inflation could prompt old guard regime elements to roll back economic reforms, the private sector has recommended more modest wealth distribution through tax holidays, customs exemptions, and vouchers for education and health care. (Note: al-Usta strongly criticized al-Qadhafi's call for total privatization of education and health care, flatly stating that "Libyans just aren't ready for that kind of responsibility after 30 years of a state-dominated system." End note.)

RENT-SEEKING BUREAUCRATS WORRIED

¶8. (C) A problem, according to al-Osta, is that the majority of Libya's public sector employees are essentially political creatures used to only carrying out orders, vice technocrats who are responsible for thinking issues through and recommending policies. Noting that there is "a big difference between making changes under martial law and in a more natural economic and

political environment", al-Usta said private sector actors are pressuring officials to carefully consider the pace and scope of reform. A key problem is that Libya's bloated civil service fundamentally distrusts the private sector and views any privatization as a threat, in large part because of concerns that their ability to extract rents and other "commissions" would be threatened. Al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech was designed in part to address the problem of a corrupt, bloated bureaucracy; however, members of the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce and other chambers in Libya are concerned that rushing privatization and government restructuring (al-Usta was dismissive of "shock therapy" approaches advocated by U.S. economist Jeffrey Sachs) could create serious economic disruptions and have counseled the five implementing committees to take a more measured approach.

PRIVATE OWNERSHIP, TAXATION & COMMERCIAL CODE ARE KEYS TO FURTHER REFORM

¶9. (C) A critical issue in which corrupt, ineffective public sector employees have prevented further reform is in defining and protecting property ownership. Establishing a legal and regulatory framework that defines and protects ownership of private ventures is a major impediment to further meaningful economic reform, he said. In other states, a businessperson's stature grows as he becomes richer; however, in Libya, greater wealth only makes that individual a bigger target for corrupt officials seeking rents. Noting that "there should be no limits to the aspirations of businesspeople in Libya", he stressed that a goal of al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech is to "unleash private entrepeneurship". Al-Usta said a new, integrated commercial code under consideration contains - in its current iteration - clearer, stronger property protection provisions. (Note: Libyan commercial law currently comprises a confusing and sometimes contradictory patchwork of laws, regulations and edicts, some of which date to the 1950's. End note.) A revised tax system - separate from the commercial code effort - is also under consideration and government officials have pledged to al-Usta and other senior private sector actors that private businesses will receive a five-year tax holiday as part of the package of privatization incentives proposed in line with al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech.

¶10. (C) Comment: Intelligent, well-spoken, thoughtful and

¶10. (C) Comment: Intelligent, well spoken, thoughtful and urbane, al-Usta is one of the more insightful Libyan interlocutors we've dealt with, and is certainly more candid in his analyses and criticism of the existing system than most. He receives no compensation for his work with the Tripoli Chamber of Commerce and the unified chambers; his private business interests include serving as the registered agent and distributor for electronics and appliances company Phillips. His comments likening al-Qadhafi's call for privatization and government restructuring to a return to the natural (pre-revolutionary) order of things are among the most forward-leaning we've heard. Like some western scholars of Libya, he essentially believes that by the early 1990's, it had become apparent that the ill-defined Jamahiriya system of governance had failed to manage oil wealth or diversify the economy beyond hydrocarbons. His description of profound unease and confusion among government ministers and members of the committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision for reform accords with the consensus here. Perhaps most significant was the extent to which al-Usta and other senior private sector actors appear to be engaging the government on issues of economic reform, to include implementation of al-Qadhafi's March 2 speech and tax and commercial code reform. That they are doing so suggests a shift towards a healthier balance between a centralized, suspicious government and an increasingly robust, organized and vocal private sector that is willing and - to an extent at least - able to advocate for issues of common concern. Al-Usta's remarks criticizing a bloated, corrupt public sector and the need for better property protection laws are consistent with other observers' insights. His analysis of the possibility for significant inflation and of the old guard's potential to exploit that issue to roll back reform efforts was a new line of thinking that will bear further tracking on this end. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI411

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI411 aka Wikileaks id #155095 ?
Subject	EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 22 May 2008 14:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/05/08TRIPOLI411.html
References	08TRIPOLI401
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI467 , 08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI506
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO1007
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0411 1431445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221445Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3466
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0509
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0678
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0626
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1097
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0805
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0483
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3970
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000411

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON) AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EMBASSY DENIED ACCESS TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: TRIPOLI 401

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)
¶1. (C) Summary: An Embassy officer was prevented by security officials from entering the hospital room in which detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi had previously been housed. Those officials refused to confirm whether el-Jahmi was still at the Tripoli Medical Center, and instructed medical staff not to give any information about el-Jahmi's whereabouts. Our

Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) interlocutor claimed that we had come outside visiting hours and recommended that we only visit if accompanied by an el-Jahmi family member (a new requirement). He claimed that whether we visited was a matter for the Embassy, family and the hospital's administration to decide, and said that the QDF no longer desired to play a role. Post has scheduled a meeting on May 26 with the Tripoli Medical Center's chief administrator to follow up. End summary.

¶2. (C) Following an earlier unsuccessful attempt to visit detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (reftel), P/E Chief on May 22 visited the room in the cardiac ward at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) where el-Jahmi had previously been housed. Plainclothes security officials physically barred P/E Chief from entering the room, claiming el-Jahmi was no longer there, and instructed medical staff at the adjacent nurses' station not to give P/E Chief any information regarding el-Jahmi's whereabouts. They refused to confirm whether el-Jahmi was still in the cardiac ward, or whether he was at the TMC. (Note: A glimpse through the door suggested el-Jahmi was not/not in the room; however, the door to an adjacent room in which el-Jahmi has sometimes been housed was closed and locked. End note.)

¶3. (C) P/E Chief telephoned Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani to express concern that Post was being denied access to el-Jahmi. The QDF previously told us that el-Jahmi was no longer the responsibility of the QDF or the GOL, but was in the custody of his family, which could determine who could visit him. P/E Chief said that it was curious that individuals apparently unaffiliated with his family barred us from entering el-Jahmi's room and prevented us from engaging with hospital staff to determine his whereabouts. Sawani had no response, but called back a short time later, saying the TMC's visiting hours began at 4:00 p.m. (P/E Chief had arrived at 10:30 a.m.), and that hospital regulations must be observed. (Note: P/E Chief has successfully visited el-Jahmi at various times of day on previous occasions. A number of other patients in the ward were receiving visitors at the time our attempted visit; if visiting hours are delimited, they do not appear to be closely observed. End note.) He further recommended that P/E Chief only visit el-Jahmi if accompanied by a member of el-Jahmi's family. (Note: This is a new requirement. We have previously only been required to "coordinate" our visits with the family. End note.) Sawani claimed el-Jahmi's family was uneasy with the Embassy's involvement in the case and would prefer that we not visit el-Jahmi. Regardless, Sawani said, whether we visited el-Jahmi was "between you (the Embassy), the family and the hospital's administration". Reiterating phraseology we've heard before, he said the QDF and GOL had "washed their hands" of el-Jahmi's case, stressing that he "had much more important matters to attend to than Fathi el-Jahmi".

¶4. (C) P/E Chief subsequently visited the office of the TMC's chief administrator, Dr. Omran Shammam. Shamman was unavailable, but his office director, Taher al-Bakush, scheduled an appointment for P/E Chief to meet with Shammam on May 26 and said he would attempt to confirm whether el-Jahmi is at the TMC.

¶5. (C) Comment: Having been caught in an apparent lie - claiming el-Jahmi had been discharged and returned to his family home - the QDF and GOL appear to be stalling for time. Having made the family wary of engaging with the Embassy and requiring us to be accompanied by a family member, the QDF and GOL have given themselves (from their perspective) a potential fig leaf for denying us access. Post will visit Dr. Shammam on May 26 in an attempt to confirm that el-Jahmi remains at the TMC and gather information about his medical condition. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI430

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI430 aka Wikileaks id #156421 ?
Subject	DIE HARD IN DERNA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 2 Jun 2008 16:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI430.html
References	08TRIPOLI120
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI500
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Removed on Mon, 21 Mar 2011 21:56 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Tue, 22 Mar 2011 14:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9119
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0430/01 1541659
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 021659Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3484
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0484
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0806
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0022
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3989
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000430

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]* , IZ *[Iraq]*
SUBJECT: DIE HARD IN DERNA

REF: TRIPOLI 120

TRIPOLI 00000430 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge Qadhafi's regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played important roles in Derna's development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq. Other factors include a dearth of social outlets for young people, local pride in Derna's history as a locus of fierce opposition to occupation, economic disenfranchisement among the town's young men. Depictions on satellite television of events in Iraq and Palestine fuel the widespread view that resistance to coalition forces is justified and necessary. One Libyan interlocutor likened young men in Derna to Bruce Willis' character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly refused to die quietly. For them, resistance against coalition forces in Iraq is an important act of 'jihad' and a last act of defiance against the Qadhafi regime. End summary.

¶2. (C) P/E Chief paid an unofficial visit to the eastern Libyan town of Derna in early May in conjunction with a trip to Benghazi and the ancient Graeco-Roman ruins of Cyrene. P/E Chief traveled from Benghazi in a rented car with a driver/guide. (Note: An apparent lapse in coordination between security officials in Tripoli and Benghazi led to what appeared to be a rare gap in surveillance by security organizations. End note.) Located along Libya's eastern littoral in an area bracketed with rocky hills, Derna's beautiful, if bleak, setting and Soviet-style poured concrete buildings evoke Tyre and Sidon in South Lebanon. While asking directions to the city's old fort, P/E Chief met local resident Nouri al-Mansuri (strictly protect), who happened to hail from the same tribe as P/E Chief's driver/guide. In typical fashion, al-Mansuri promptly dropped what he was doing and spent the next several hours accompanying us around Derna, a town of some 50,000 people. Asked about his livelihood, al-Mansuri described himself as "a free businessman", usually indicating someone who does not hold a full-time job, but instead gets by on a mix of odd jobs and commercial activities.

BAAB AL-SHIHA: WELLSPRING OF LIBYAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS

¶3. (C) P/E Chief visited the Baab al-Shiha neighborhood, site of the town's old fort (now all but gone) and the district from which a large number of the Libyan foreign fighters identified in documents captured during September's Objective Massey operation in Iraq had hailed. The lower-middle class neighborhood, comprising poured concrete homes crowded along largely unpaved streets, sits on a hill overlooking the town. Unbidden, al-Mansuri pointed out a number of small, discrete mosques tucked away in side alleys, noting that the profusion of "popular mosques" complicated effective monitoring by security forces. (Note: As reported reftel, another contact indicated previously that while mosques in town centers are closely monitored, it has been more difficult for secruity organizations to effectively monitor smaller, more remote mosques in exurbs and towns in eastern Libya. End note.)

¶4. (C) A number of residents were on the streets; however, they were visibly more wary and less friendly than in other Libyan towns. Al-Mansuri later noted that some residents were closely questioned by security officials after speaking with a visiting Newsweek reporter in April. Told P/E Chief was an American, al-Mansuri jokingly swore and said "there goes my evening". Clarifying, he said he had plans that night, but would likely be detained and questioned by security officials about his interactions with an Emboff. While P/E Chief had not obviously been followed, word would doubtless reach security officials' ears that foreigners had visited and inquiries would be made. He dismissed the idea of parting company to avoid creating problems for him, saying it was important that he, as a son of Derna, not bow down to the central government's authority. "They may have their boot on our throat, but it's important that

they know that we are still breathing and kicking", he said.

PERCEIVED U.S. SUPPORT FOR QADHAFI FUELS DESIRE TO FIGHT IN IRAQ

¶5. (C) Over lunch at a popular restaurant just off the waterfront, al-Mansuri and his business partner (who declined to give his name)discussed at length the local political-economic, cultural and religious scene, noting that it was "well-known" that a large number of suicide bombers (invariably described as "martyrs") and foreign fighters in Iraq hailed from Derna, a fact in which the town "takes great pride". Al-Mansuri stressed

the importance of the link between the domestic political situation in Libya and the flow of foreign fighters in Iraq. Residents of eastern Libya in general, and Derna in particular, view the al-Qadhafa clan as uneducated, uncouth interlopers from an inconsequential part of the country who have "stolen" the right to rule in Libya. (Note: Qadhafi's hometown, Sirte, is a remote spot located on the coast midway between the leading cities of Tripoli and Benghazi. End note.) Easterners had tried and failed to bring down Qadhafi's regime via the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group's (LIFG) insurgency in the 1990s.

¶6. (C) There was a strong perception, he said, that the U.S. had decided in the wake of Qadhafi's decision to abandon WMD aspirations and renounce terrorism to support the regime to secure counter-terrorism cooperation and ensure continued oil and natural gas production. Many easterners feared the U.S. would not allow Qadhafi's regime to fall and therefore viewed direct confrontation with the GOL in the near-term as a fool's errand. At the same time, sending young Libyans to fight in Iraq was "an embarrassment" to Qadhafi. Fighting against U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq represented a way for frustrated young radicals to strike a blow against both Qadhafi and against his perceived American backers. Dismissing P/E Chief's argument that we have privately pressed the GOL to adopt further political and economic reforms, al-Mansuri noted that human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (who hails from Benghazi), remained in detention. The U.S. surely had the wherewithal to secure el-Jahmi's release if it really cared about human rights; the fact that el-Jahmi remained in detention was viewed as one sign that the U.S. tacitly supported Qadhafi, regardless of his actions. (Note: We heard a similar line of reasoning from Libyan contacts in Benghazi. End note.)

TARGETED IDEOLOGICAL CAMPAIGN IN EASTERN LIBYA

¶7. (C) Rejecting the idea that Derna was uniformly extremist, al-Mansuri and his business partner described the town as being divided between religiously conservative and secular residents. A "large number" of Derna's citizens were not happy about the increasingly conservative religious atmosphere that had prevailed since the 1980's, he claimed. Elaborating, al-Mansuri attributed adherence to more extreme iterations of Islam to "unnatural foreign influences" on religious practices in Derna. A number of Libyans who had fought and in some cases undergone "religious and ideological training" in Afghanistan, Lebanon and the West Bank in the late 1970's and early 1980's had returned to eastern Libya, including Derna, in the mid to late 1980's. Claiming their return was "not coincidental", he described a deliberate, coordinated campaign to propagate more conservative iterations of Islam, in part to prepare the ground for the eventual overthrow by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) of Muammar Qadhafi's regime, which is "hated" by conservative Islamists. (Note: After taking pains to curry favor with the 'ulema' in Libya in the years immediately after the 1969 revolution, Qadhafi broke with them in the late 1970's, criticizing aspects of Islam as "un-revolutionary". Although he renewed efforts to cultivate Muslim leaders in the 1990's, deep suspicions remain. The LIFG waged a successful low-level

suspicions remain. The LIFG waged a successful low level guerrilla insurgency in the early to mid-1990's, specializing in robbery and raids on remote military garrisons to sustain itself. End note.)

¶8. (C) According to al-Mansuri, these returned former fighters deliberately targeted towns and areas known to be less heavily surveilled and controlled by government security officials. Many of those were located in eastern Libya, where authorities have since Ottoman times experienced difficulty extending the writ of the central government. Al-Mansuri mentioned a small group of Libyans who had reportedly fought in Afghanistan, subsequently undergone religious training in northern Syria and Lebanon, and then returned to Derna in the late 1980's as having been particularly instrumental in steering the community in a more conservative direction. Stressing their conservatism, he said they had spearheaded campaigns against many aspects of daily life, such as smoking cigarettes, which they deemed "un-Islamic". He pointed out the large number of religiously-themed audio cassettes and DVDs on offer in Derna's markets. Many featured sermons and speeches by conservative imams in Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and Egypt.

LIMITED SOCIAL OUTLETS CREATE FERTILE ENVIRONMENT; SATELLITE TV FOSTERS "HARD VIEW"

¶9. (C) A dearth of social outlets for young people in Derna "created space" for the message of returned fighters and conservative imams, who deliberately sought to eliminate the few social activities on offer for young people to monopolize the social and cultural environment. While Derna's social life had never been robust, there had been public cinemas, sports leagues and some youth activities organized outside the auspices of mosques. Virtually all of those had petered out in the late 1980's and 1990's, in part because of a campaign to label such activities as "un-Islamic". He cited a popular youth theater group that had staged up to half a dozen productions a year, including western plays. Clerics criticized "un-Islamic" themes and the fact that boys and girls were cast together in some productions; the resulting social stigmatization of families whose children had participated led to the group's demise in the late 1980's.

¶10. (C) The fact that Derna's educational system was weak had also enabled conservative clerics. Al-Mansuri described a situation in which mosques and imams effectively offered the only alternative to schools, sports leagues and after-school activities. A heavy influx of Arabic-language satellite television - a phenomenon that dated to the late-1990's - also fostered a "hard view" of the world, al-Mansuri said. Most young men watched a mix of al-Jazeera news, religious sermons and western action films on English language satellite channels broadcast from the Gulf. The result was a heady mixture of violence, religious conservatism and hatred of U.S. policy in Iraq and Palestine. The consensus view in Derna is that the U.S. blindly supports Israel and has invaded Iraq to secure oil reserves and position itself to attack Iran, he said. He dismissed P/E Chief's attempts to clarify U.S. policy, stressing that most people base their judgments on information they receive from satellite television and at the mosque.

PRIDE IN DERNA'S HISTORY AS A TOWN OF FIGHTERS

¶11. (C) Al-Mansuri attributed the flow of foreign fighters from Derna in part to local pride in the town's reputation as a historical locus of resistance to occupation. While many of the town's citizens were uncomfortable with the town's increasingly conservative Islamist bent, the fact that young men from Derna traveled to Iraq in disproportionate numbers to fight against

coalition forces was viewed through a different lens. Not everyone liked the "bearded ones" (a reference to conservative imams) or their message, al-Mansuri said, but the duty of a Muslim in general - and of a son of Derna in particular - was to resist occupation of Muslim lands through jihad. "It's jihad - it's our duty, and you're talking about people who don't have much else to be proud of." Derna's residents might take issue with attempts to ban smoking or restrict social activities, but there was consensus on "basic issues" like jihad. Depictions on al-Jazeera of events in Iraq and Palestine fueled the widely-held view in Derna that resistance to coalition forces was "correct and necessary". Referring to actor Bruce Willis' character in the action picture "Die Hard", who stubbornly refused to die quietly, he said many young men in Derna viewed resistance against Qadhafi's regime and against coalition forces in Iraq as an important last act of defiance.

¶12. (C) Claiming "most Libyans" shared that sentiment, al-Mansuri proudly said the difference was that Derna's sons actually acted on their beliefs. Derna had historically resisted "occupations of all kinds - Ottoman, Italian, American (a reference to the 1805 attack on Derna led by William Eaton), and Qadhafi's." Derna's role in opposing the Italian occupation in the early 20th century helped foster the near-deification of Libyan resistance leader Omar al-Mukhtar, who hailed from eastern Libya. A visit to the al-Sahab mosque near the town's center was telling. Large murals on the mosque's exterior (inaccurately) depicted Islamic warriors besting what appeared to be Roman soldiers. The mosque's imam showed P/E Chief a series of small shrines to medieval holy men and a small cemetery filled with graves of "martyrs" who had resisted Ottoman and Italian occupation. Many of the markers were garlanded with flowers; al-Mansuri said families often come to picnic in the mosque's garden on holidays and pay their respects at the cemetery.

WEAK ECONOMY HURTS MARRIAGE PROSPECTS, FUELS FRUSTRATION

¶13. (C) As discussed reftel, al-Mansuri drew a direct line between the parlous local economy and the willingness of Derna's

sons to travel to Iraq for jihad. A military base in Derna closed in the early 1990's, taking with it a large number of jobs (cooks, washerwomen, auto mechanics, electricians, etc.) who helped support the base. Derna has a small fishing and maritime transport industry; other economic activities are largely restricted to services and smuggling. While a military prison, located along the town's waterfront, remains open, the closure of the base hit the town hard and ushered in a more difficult era of economic austerity. Unemployment, particularly among young men between the ages of 18 and 40, is high - al-Mansuri put the percentage of un- and under-employed men in that demographic at 60 to 70 percent. Dim employment prospects leave many young men in Derna without the means to marry - a key social anchor in what remains a traditional society - and the average age at which men marry has crept upwards. Asked about reports that many now marry in their early- to mid-30's (reftel), al-Mansuri said most of his friends and acquaintances actually did not marry until their mid-30's to early- 40's. He half-jokingly noted that the cumulative level of sexual frustration among Derna's young men was "a big problem".

¶14. (C) In addition, while Benghazi and other parts of eastern Libya had benefited in the last several years from increased government patronage, Derna continued to "suffer from neglect". Citing an indeterminate grudge between Libya's former monarch, King Idriss al-Sanussi, and leading citizens of Derna, al-Mansuri claimed that Derna had long been the victim of a deliberate government campaign to keep it poor. He compared Derna's plight to the fortunes of another conservative eastern

Derna's plight to the fortunes of another conservative eastern Libyan town, Bayda. While Bayda had been the summer retreat for King Idriss and was initially shunned in the early years of Qadhafi's rule, its fortunes changed after Qadhafi married Sadia Farkhis, daughter of a prominent citizen of the town. The government subsequently established the Omar al-Mukhtar University in what had been the royal palace and sited a number of government-owned enterprises there. By contrast, Derna had not benefited from any such measures.

¶15. (C) Comment: Al-Mansuri's remarks suggest that frustration at the inability of eastern Libyans to effectively challenge Qadhafi's regime, together with a concerted ideological campaign by returned Libyan fighters from earlier conflicts, have played an important role in in Derna's development as a wellspring of Libyan foreign fighters in Iraq. The GOL's limited ability to extend its writ in eastern Libya - along with limited social outlets, dim economic prospects and the town's historical role as a center of resistance - have fostered a landscape in which Derna's angry young men view the conflict in Iraq through the lens of dissatisfaction with their government and with the USG's perceived support of it. Observations of the town, together with information reported reftel, strongly suggest that comments by senior GOL officials to the effect that the east is under control are exaggerated. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI442

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI442 aka Wikileaks id #157377 ?
Subject	MEETING OF AMU HEADS OF STATE - MINUS ONE - IN TRIPOLI; RELATED VISITS BY ASAD AND POSSIBLY MUBARAK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Jun 2008 16:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI442.html
References	08RABAT532
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI453 , 08TRIPOLI457
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4657
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0442 1611634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091634Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3506
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0816
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0494
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4011
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000442

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/9/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya] , EG [Egypt] , SY
[Syria] , MR [Mauritania] , MO [Morocco] , TS [Tunisia] , AG [Algeria]
SUBJECT: MEETING OF AMU HEADS OF STATE - MINUS ONE - IN TRIPOLI;
RELATED VISITS BY ASAD AND POSSIBLY MUBARAK

REF: RABAT 532

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) GOL officials are hurriedly pulling together arrangements
for a meeting of heads of state from Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)
member states, scheduled to take place in Tripoli June 10-13.
MFA Secretary for European Affairs (U/S-equivalent) told the
U.K. Ambassador on June 7 that the presidents of Mauritania,
Algeria and Tunisia, together with Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas
el-Fassi, would arrive June 10 for a meeting of the AMU.
Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdel Halim told P/E Chief on June 9
```

that the Egyptian Embassy had received the same information regarding participants and the notional dates. Morocco has reportedly refused to be represented by King Muhammad VI because of ongoing disagreements with Algeria over the Western Sahara. (Note: Post's understanding is that a full quorum of AMU heads of state has not convened since 1994; the last senior-level meeting of the AMU, in mid-2005, was derailed in part by Morocco-Algeria contretemps. End note.) Echoing dynamics reported reftel, Abdel Halim said "there are concerns" that bad blood - between Algeria and Morocco, and between Libya and Mauritania (Mauritania has alleged Libyan complicity in an attempted coup in Nouakchott), among others - could derail what he described as "a Libyan initiative to reinvigorate the AMU".

¶2. (C) In typical fashion, the GOL has delayed finalizing preparations until the last minute. Guests in Tripoli's only five-star hotel, including several official USG travelers, were informed late on June 8 that they would have to check out not later than June 9 by order of the GOL to make room for senior AMU leaders and their retinues. Delegations are scheduled to begin arriving in Tripoli late on the afternoon of June 10. The event is scheduled to kick off that evening with a late night coffee 'majlis', with formal meetings to follow on June 11 and ¶12.

¶3. (C) Abdel Halim confirmed reports in the Arabic-language newspaper al-Hayat and elsewhere that a visit to Libya by Syrian President Bashar al-Asad would coincide with the AMU meeting (local reports differ as to whether it will be labeled a "summit" or not). Asad's arrival date had not been fixed, and the Egyptian Embassy's information was that it was still being decided whether he would participate in the AMU meeting as a guest observer, or would only make a cameo appearance and then have bilateral meetings with Muammar al-Qadhafi. The Egyptian Ambassador had been told that Asad's Tripoli visit was part of a follow-on to his recent tour of Gulf states, where he thanked Arab heads of state who attended the recent Arab League Summit in Damascus. Saying it was "expected" that Asad would have discussions with al-Qadhafi and other AMU leaders on the Middle East Peace Process and Syria's negotiations with Israel over the Golan, Abdel Halim said there was considerable confusion about what else might be on the agenda for the AMU meeting. Abdel Halim said the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli had not yet been informed whether Egyptian President Husni Mubarak would also travel to Tripoli to join the conclave, but noted that many GOL officials appeared to believe that Mubarak would come.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI443

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI443 aka Wikileaks id #157380 ?
Subject	LIBYA TO INCREASE PEACEKEEPING COHORT IN THE PHILIPPINES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Jun 2008 17:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI443.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4679
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0443 1611712
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 091712Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3507
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0817
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0495
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA PRIORITY 0001
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4012
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000443

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/9/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , RP *[Philippines]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA TO INCREASE PEACEKEEPING COHORT IN THE PHILIPPINES

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Media accounts on June 6 and 7 cited Philippine government sources in reporting that Libya and Brunei had pledged to increase their peacekeeping cohorts on the troubled southern Philippine island of Mindanao to 25 each. Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani told P/E Chief on June 9 that the QDF had "formally recommended" to the Government of Libya that it increase the number of its peacekeepers in Mindanao. That recommendation is currently being reviewed by the GOL; it was expected that it would be approved in coming days. Sawani confirmed reports that QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, was in Mindanao as recently as last month to help mediate between Philippine security forces and the rebel Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF), indicating that the increase in Libyan peacekeepers came out of meetings during that trip. Al-Qadhafi also hosted a meeting in Tripoli May 17-18 of leaders of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) - a rival group to the MILF - in which intra-MNLF leadership disputes were addressed and a commitment to "dialogue" with the MILF was agreed. (Note: Under the auspices of the QDF, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi has played a mediating role in a number of conflicts. End note.)

¶2. (C) Noting that the GOL's peacekeeping contingent has to date varied from "a handful" to "about 15", depending on circumstances, Sawani said a final figure for an expanded cohort was still being decided. He offered that the group would almost certainly include "some" individuals from the World Islamic Call Society (WICS), a GOL-funded, quasi-governmental entity that has as its mandate the propagation of more tolerant iterations of Islam. (Note: WICS pursues that goal primarily primarily through education of would-be imams from sub-Saharan Africa, who are given comprehensive scholarships to pursue undergraduate and graduate-level studies in liberal arts and Islamic studies at its well-appointed campus in Tripoli. End note.)

¶3. (C) Sawani demurred when asked for further details about which organizations in addition to WICS might contribute to an expanded Libyan peacekeeping contingent, saying P/E Chief would have to contact the Ministry of Foreign Affairs-equivalent for any "official information". For their part, officials at the MFA insisted that any inquiries concerning Libya's peacekeeping and mediation efforts in the Philippines would have to be addressed to the QDF.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI453

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI453 aka Wikileaks id #157703 ?
Subject	QADHAFI AND ASAD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 11 Jun 2008 13:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI453.html
References	08TRIPOLI442
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI457
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TelegramC O N F I D E N T I A L   TRIPOLI   00000453
VZCZCXRO6560
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0453 1631318
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 111318Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3517
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0635
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0688
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0521
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0066
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1111
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4023
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000453

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SY *[Syria]* , LE *[Lebanon]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI AND ASAD

REF: A) STATE 61438 B) TRIPOLI 442

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) In the absence of available GOL officials (who are busy hosting the Arab mini-summit), we queried the Egyptian and Lebanese embassies on Qadhafi's agenda with Syrian President Asad this week. Qadhafi's principal objective, they said, is to help Asad mend fences with Egypt and reduce tensions between Syria and other Arab states. They said that Qadhafi had fully aligned himself with Syria vis-a-vis Lebanon, and would be of no help in pressing ref A points with Asad.

¶2. (C) Qadhafi's position is largely based on ideology and his desire to stand with the forces of "resistance," according to

the Lebanese Charge' and the Egyptian DCM. The Leader traveled to Damascus in March to attend the Arab summit, but also to signal solidarity with Asad. (Asad's visit to Tripoli is reportedly intended in part to repay the Leader for that gesture.)

¶3. (C) There are also Lebanon-specific issues at play, the Charge' said. The Leader has very negative views on Lebanon, which he has publicly characterized as an artificial "Christian state" created by the French that should be merged into Greater Syria. Other factors contributing to Libya's strained relations with Lebanon are the 30-year-old dispute over Lebanese Imam Musa Sadr, who disappeared in Libya during an official visit in 1978; Lebanese parliament speaker Nabih Berri's public snubbing of a Libyan envoy three years ago in Beirut (Berri turned his back on the Libyan in a receiving line); and a Lebanese judge's summons of Qadhafi this year to testify in a lawsuit against Libya brought by the family of the missing Imam.

¶4. (C) The Egyptian DCM reported that Qadhafi had made numerous attempts to lure Egyptian President Mubarak to Tripoli to broker a "sulha", or truce, with Asad, but had failed to persuade the Egyptian leader to come, just as he had failed to persuade Mubarak to accompany him to Damascus for the Arab Summit.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI455

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI455 aka Wikileaks id #157749 ?
Subject	LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 11 Jun 2008 16:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI455.html
References	07STATE163961 , 08STATE14270
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI458 , 08TRIPOLI685 , 09TRIPOLI76
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6765
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0455/01 1631601
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 111601Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3519
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4025
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000455

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI (AMB. WILLIAMSON) AND NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/11/2018
TAGS: KBTR, PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU

REF: A) STATE 14270 , B) 07 TRIPOLI 1060, C) 07 STATE 163961 , D) 07 TRIPOLI 723, E) 07 STATE 77783, F) 07 STATE 163961

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, and the legal basis on which they are being detained in Libya. One detainee's trial has been completed and he is awaiting a verdict on the four charges he faces; the case of the second detainee is expected to go to trial in the next two to three months. End

summary.

¶2. (S/NF) At a June 10 meeting, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) per ref A instructions. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli, and was attended by a host government security official. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on December 25, 2007 (ref B).

ISN 194

¶3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. The security official explained that the Abu Salim prison is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Al-Rimi said he remains in solitary detention in a 15 foot by 15 foot cell and has not been mistreated. He is able to walk outside regularly, and is able to speak with other prisoners during exercise periods. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that members of his family have visited him three times since his return to Libya, most recently in March 2008. (Note: As reported ref D, their previous visits were in January and May 2007. End note.)

¶4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref D), al-Rimi said both were better. He repeated his earlier claim (ref A) that he sustained the injury to his arm in 2004 or 2005 during a scuffle with U.S. soldiers who entered his cell to punish him for allegedly instigating a disturbance among several other prisoners.

¶5. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi said he was questioned by the ESO and Internal Security Organization (ISO) officials between his return in December 2006 and February 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's office. His case has subsequently been been tried and is currently with a panel of judges, who are reviewing it. His understanding is that he faces four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. Al-Rimi has court-appointed legal counsel. The Prosecutor General's Office told al-Rimi and his attorney that the court was expected to render a verdict in his case on/about June 16. A verdict had been expected on/about May 5; however, the trial was delayed. Al-Rimi does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted of one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed his attorney told him he stood a good chance of being acquitted and released.

ISN 557

¶6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he had been detained at an ESO detention facility for three months and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. He currently remains at Abu Salim, but understands he may be transferred next month to the Jdeida prison, which houses common criminals, in Ain Zaraa. He has been held in solitary detention since his return - his biggest complaint - and said he has not been mistreated. (Note: The security official explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that

detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population for extremist activities. End note.) He is not able to exercise at the Abu Salim prison, but was able to do so at the ESO facility before he was transferred. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have

TRIPOLI 00000455 002 OF 002

access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been told he may be visited by a prison doctor if he is ill, but has not had need of one. Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law in January. He complained that his family had not visited since, but said he he did not know whether they had tried. (Note: He conceded that his wife had divorced him and remarried, and that relations between them were difficult; however, after the second visit, permission for further visits had to be obtained from the Prosecutor General's office, vice ISO. He speculated that the Prosecutor General's office may have been less efficient in processing visit requests. End note.)

¶7. (S/NF) Asked for his understanding of the legal basis on which he is being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against him, Hamouda said he was questioned by ESO and ISO officials between his return in August 2007 and May 2008, when his case was transferred to the Prosecutor General's Office. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. According to the security official, Hamouda escaped from prison and left Libya illegally in 1992 to travel to Sudan; he may/may face separate charges for escaping and leaving the country. Hamouda has no legal counsel, but said he does not want an attorney because he has committed no crimes. Claiming that if he were really a member of al-Qaeda " ~ the U.S. would have never returned me to Libya ~ ", he said his impression is that all of the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect. He has been told by the Prosecutor General that his trial may start in two to three months. Hamouda does not know how long his prison sentence could be if convicted for one or more of the charges he faces; however, he claimed that he had been granted a pardon by the Qadhafi Development Foundation for the original drug trafficking conviction and his subsequent escape from prison and illegal exit from Libya.
CECIL

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI457

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI457 aka Wikileaks id #157918 ?
Subject	QADHAFI WORKS TO MUSTER ARAB OPPOSITION TO SARKOZY'S MEDITERRANEAN UNION PROPOSAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 12 Jun 2008 14:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI457.html
References	08TRIPOLI442 , 08TRIPOLI453
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI567
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

VZCZCXRO7641
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0457/01 1641420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121420Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3521
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4027

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000457

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* ,
PBTS *[National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI WORKS TO MUSTER ARAB OPPOSITION TO SARKOZY'S
MEDITERRANEAN UNION PROPOSAL

REF: A) TRIPOLI 442 , B) TRIPOLI 453

TRIPOLI 00000457 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a strongly worded speech at what was
characterized as a mini-Arab League summit, Muammar al-Qadhafi
sharply criticized a French-backed Mediterranean Union proposal,
claiming that attempts to incentivize southern Mediterranean
states with investment schemes were insulting. Claiming that
the new entity would undermine Arab and African member states'
commitments to the Arab League (AL) and African Union (AU),

respectively, he suggested that an alternative could be formal EU cooperation with the AL and AU, to be coordinated through the headquarters of the latter two organizations. A visit to Tripoli by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair coincided with the mini-summit; al-Qadhafi reportedly told Blair he was concerned that the Mediterranean Union proposal represented an effort by southern European states to create a de facto North African bulwark against illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa, and to "further legitimize" Israel at the expense of Arab states. End summary.

¶2. (U) At a mini-Arab League (AL) summit meeting in Tripoli on June 10, Muammar al-Qadhafi made a strong case against a Mediterranean Union modeled on and linked to the European Union (EU), an idea championed by French President Nicholas Sarkozy that would comprise the 27 EU nations and a dozen non-EU countries located along the southern Mediterranean littoral. The meeting was attended by heads of state from Mauritania, Algeria, Tunis and Syria, and by Moroccan Prime Minister Abbas el-Fassi. Originally billed to some Arab diplomats in Tripoli as an Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) summit plus Syrian President Bashar al-Asad and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak (ref A), late innings controversy about the refusal of King Muhammad VI of Morocco to attend reportedly prompted the Government of Libya (GOL) to recast the event as a mini-AL summit.

¶3. (U) Orchestrated by al-Qadhafi, the Tripoli meeting was designed to muster Arab opposition to the Mediterranean Union proposal in advance of a broader gathering in Paris on July 13 to formally unveil the plan. In a strongly-worded opening address, al-Qadhafi characterized the French proposal as an attempt to undermine the unity of Arab League and African Union member states. Describing Sarkozy's proposal as "a passing fad", he likened it to the failed Barcelona Process initiated in 1995, and said attempts to incentivize AL and AU states to join the new union with large-scale investment proposals were "an insult". Striking a populist tone, he stressed that Arab and African states were "not hungry to this extent; we're not dogs that they can wave a bone in front of and we'll run after it". Arab and African unity "should not be sacrificed for transient investment projects". Emphasizing that member states' commitments to the extant AL and AU trumped those to any nascent Mediterranean Union, he suggested that a viable alternative to a new structure could be formal cooperation between the EU and AL and AU states, to be coordinated through AL headquarters in Cairo and AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. Al-Qadhafi's sarcastic references to "my dear Sarkozy" took observers by surprise and has left some wondering whether the bonhomie engendered by the latter's visit to Tripoli in July 2007 has begun to ebb. French diplomats in Tripoli offered no comment, noting only that they had not yet received instructions from Paris on whether or how to respond.

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi was the only leader to offer public remarks before the meeting adjourned to a reportedly heated session of principals plus one. Egyptian and Algerian diplomats told us Morocco was isolated in its support for the Mediterranean Union proposal and by the fact that it was represented at the PM, vice head of state, level. Libyan MFA interlocutors conceded that a closing statement had been expected and desired by al-Qadhafi; however, the group was unable to achieve consensus on its position concerning the union, let alone language for a summary statement. In a further sign of discord, President Mubarak ultimately did not attend (he cited a heavy schedule), despite persistent efforts by al-Qadhafi to lure him to Tripoli to broker a truce with Syrian President Bashar al-Asad. The Egyptian PolCouns told us al-Qadhafi called Mubarak twice - once while in the car with Asad on their way into town from the airport - to urge him to come to Tripoli (further details on Asad's visit were reported ref B)

¶5. (C) The mini-AL summit coincided with a visit to Tripoli on June 10 by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. U.K.

June 10 by former British Prime Minister Tony Blair. U.K.
Deputy Head of Mission Mark Matthews told P/E Chief June 11 that
al-Qadhafi stressed to Blair in their private meeting concern
that Sarkozy's proposal represented an effort by southern
European states to create a de facto North African bulwark
against illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa.
Recapitulating themes we've heard publicly here, al-Qadhafi
insisted the key to mitigating illegal migration flows to Europe

TRIPOLI 00000457 002.2 OF 002

was to reduce "push" factors by promoting greater development in
source countries. The two specifically discussed the
possibility of Libyan investment in Sierra Leone and Rwanda,
countries in which Blair's charitable foundation has a strong
interest (further details on Blair's visit septel). Al-Qadhafi
also voiced suspicion that the Mediterranean Union could be used
as a forum in which to encourage further Arab-Israeli
rapprochement as a means by which to "further legitimize" Israel
at the expense of the Arabs.

¶6. (C) Comment: Al-Qadhafi's speech offers a snapshot of Libya's
unique vision of overlapping pan-Arab and pan-African
aspirations. While striking vintage pan-Arab themes - "we are
fully committed to the Arab League, which we hope will one day
lead us to an eventual Arab union" - he was also careful to
stress that Arab Maghreb states were African and had
responsibilities to their sub-Saharan counterparts that trumped
any notional partnership with Europe. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI458

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI458 aka Wikileaks id #157921 ?
Subject	CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 12 Jun 2008 14:27 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI458.html
References	08TRIPOLI455
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO7647
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0458 1641427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 121427Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3523
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1112
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0522
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0689
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0636
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0820
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0498
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4029
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000458

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PINR
[Intelligence] , KBTS, LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CONDITIONS IN SECURITY DETENTION FACILITIES

REF: TRIPOLI 455

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) In the course of a meeting on June 10 separate issues
(reftel), two detainees returned from Guantanamo Bay expressed
to P/E Chief the fact that detention facilities run by Libya's
External Security Organization (ESO) were markedly better than
the Abu Salim prison.  ISN 194 and ISN 557 were held at an ESO
detention facility for approximately three months after their
```

detention facility for approximately three months after their return to Libya in December 2006 and August 2007, respectively. Both were then transferred to the Abu Salim prison, which is located in the suburbs of Tripoli. A security official who accompanied P/E Chief during his visit explained that Abu Salim is controlled and managed by military police; it is the facility at which terrorists, extremists and other individuals deemed to be particularly dangerous to state security are detained. Depending on the nature of their case, such individuals may be questioned by ESO before being transferred to the custody of the Internal Security Organization (ISO) for further questioning. While military police officials formally manage and guard Abu Salim prison, ISO officials play a large role in management of the facility because they bear primary responsibility for many of the prisoners there.

¶2. (S/NF) The two detainees said they were given regular opportunities to exercise outdoors during their time at the ESO-run facility. By comparison, opportunities for exercise at Abu Salim were more limited and access to outdoor exercise was less regular. Both detainees said separately that guards and officials at the ESO detention facility treated prisoners with greater respect than their counterparts in ISO. Food was better - both noted that they were able to get coffee at the ESO facility, while Abu Salim offered only tea - and they were given access to books, radio and television, which were not available at Abu Salim. Physical facilities were also better: ESO facilities were comparatively well-furnished and maintained, and often had windows, while cells in Abu Salim were dark, dank and in poor condition. ISN 194 noted that Muhammad Tarnesh, Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya, had been able to visit him on multiple occasions during his time at the ESO facility, but had not visited him at Abu Salim. Tarnesh subsequently told P/E Chief that he had sought several times to visit the detainees at Abu Salim, but had not yet obtained permission to do so.

¶3. (S/NF) A security official told P/E Chief that conditions at ESO detention facilities had dramatically improved some two years after the arrival of ESO Director Musa Kusa in 1994. Kusa, disturbed by consistent reports of inhumane treatment in ESO detention facilities, issued orders in 1996 directing that his officers immediately cease the abuse of detainees in their custody. ESO detention facilities were physically rehabilitated shortly thereafter. Other improvements included the quality and quantity of food, offering beverages other than water, allowing detainees to exercise regularly, and stopping what the official termed the "casual abuse" of detainees. The official said Kusa circulated a memorandum to his staff outlining the new procedures and making it clear that ESO officials who violated the new rules would be punished. Several officials were dismissed in 1996 and 1997, which the official credited with driving home the point that detainees in ESO custody were not to be abused. Commenting on the fact that both ISN 194 and ISN 557 expressed a desire to return from Abu Salim prison to the ESO facility, the security official said their comments were typical of detainees who are transferred from the custody of ESO to Abu Salim.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI466

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI466 aka Wikileaks id #158229 ?
Subject	CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 15 Jun 2008 15:48 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI466.html
References	08THEHAGUE482 , 08TRIPOLI119
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI574
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9780
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0466/01 1671548
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151548Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3530
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0078
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0822
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0500
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0429
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4036
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000466

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN (FERGUSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/15/2018
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CWC *[Chemical Weapons Convention]* , OPCW, CBW, CH *[China (Mainland)]* , JA *[Japan; Okinawa; Ryukyu Islands]* , IT *[Italy]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC): CONVERSION OF THE RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY

REF: A) STATE 58476, B) THE HAGUE 482 , C) TRIPOLI 119

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOL's lead interlocutor on CWC issues told us: 1) conversion of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility would not be completed until December 2009 (which the GOL appears to have known since early 2006), 2) the GOL would not submit a new National Paper at the upcoming June 24-27 Executive Committee meeting of the OPCW, 3) GOL Delreps would/would read an official statement into the record of the

EC's informal session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper; 4) the GOL was ready to facilitate a bilateral visit by U.S. technical experts at any time, and; 5) despite delays, the GOL expects to complete destruction of chemical agents well before the deadline it agreed to with States Parties. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) P/E Chief conveyed ref A demarche points and non-paper on June 12 to Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, who heads Libya's CWC compliance efforts, and Adel Ben Issa, who has the lead on CWC issues in the International Organization Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA/IO). Dr. Fathi Asseid, Technical Director of the General Company for the Manufacture of Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, which controls the Rabta facility and a related pharmaceutical packaging plant, also attended the meeting. Stressing the GOL's commitment to transparency in declaring its CWC-related equipment, implementing conversion of the Rabta facility and destroying chemical weapon precursors, Dr. Hesnawy thanked the U.S. and U.K. for their "robust" support for Libya's efforts to date. Per ref A, copies of the non-paper and an oral brief on the demarche points were conveyed to U.K. and Italian Embassy counterparts in Tripoli.

CONVERSION PROJECT

¶3. (SBU) On the points of the demarche, Hesnawy indicated the following:

- CONVERSION DELAY: Conversation of the Rabta chemical weapons production facility will not be completed before November/December 2009. The GOL signed an original contract with Italian company PharmaChem on February 11, 2002; an addendum to that contract, signed on June 1, 2006 (which Hesnawy showed P/E Chief), stipulated that PharmaChem's portion of conversion work at the Rabta facility would be completed by September 2009. The GOL, factoring in possible unexpected delays, added three months to the timeline, yielding an expected completion date of December 2009. Hesnawy did not respond when asked why Libya had not notified States Parties earlier that conversion would be delayed if it had known since February 2006 that the contract with PharmaChem stipulated a completion date in late 2009. He insisted that the GOL would complete the conversion project and initiate production of pharmaceuticals at Rabta by December 2009.

- NEW NATIONAL PAPER: Libya will not submit a new National Paper to the Executive Council (EC) meeting of the OPCW scheduled to begin on June 24. Noting that National Papers are to be submitted at least a month in advance of EC's for review by States Parties, Hesnawy pointed to the fact that the meeting was just ten days away and that there was not sufficient time for review. P/E Chief noted that we had asked since early May that the GOL immediately submit a new National Paper for review. Hesnawy had no response, but said Libya's delegation will instead submit an "official statement" during the Informal Session that would address all points stipulated in ref A non-paper. The informal statement would explain "completely" the reasons for missing the July 29, 2008 conversion deadline and the need for "a correction" to the conversion plan that would eliminate the requirement that a protective sandbag berm be removed.

- VISIT BY U.S. TECHNICAL EXPERTS: Hesnawy and his MFA/IO counterpart stressed that the GOL stands ready to facilitate a visit to the Rabta facility by U.S. Embassy officials and/or U.S. technical experts - the U.S. side is "welcome to visit at any time - we have nothing to hide". Such a visit could occur before the upcoming EC meeting or after it. The GOL has already extended invitations through the Italian and U.K. Embassies for their capitals to send teams of technical experts. (Note: The Italian Ambassador and DCM, but not/not Italian technical

experts visited Rabta on June 7. A U.K. technical team is notionally scheduled to visit July 6-9, 2008. End note.) Hesnawy stressed that the GOL was willing to accommodate a series of bilateral visits by technical experts, but was not/not willing to facilitate a visit by a combined team (i.e., of U.S. and U.K. experts) out of concern that the visit's agenda could be broadened.

TRIPOLI 00000466 002 OF 003

- NEXT STEPS: Hesnawy indicated that he clearly understood that U.S. support for a conversion plan correction to allow retention of a modified protective berm depended on a commitment to transparency and conduct of a site visit to Rabta. He said that the GOL might/might be amenable to submitting a new National Paper at the next EC after the upcoming meeting in late June, indicating that the GOL would premise its decision in part on conversations with Delreps at the June 24-27 EC meeting.

IRANIAN HARASSMENT DURING APRIL 2008 OPCW INSPECTION ALLEGED

¶4. (C) Referring to the April visit by an OPCW inspection team, Hesnawy complained that an Iranian inspector had raised issues with equipment in Building Number 3 and Building Number 4 that had since 2004 been mutually agreed to have been exclusively commercial in nature. According to Hesnawy, four previous tranches of OPCW inspectors had been informed of the equipment and assured the GOL that the equipment did not need to be declared. Referring to the GOL's decision to vote for a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a third tranche of sanctions against Iran because of its nuclear weapons program, Hesnawy said the Iranian inspector deliberately raised the issue of equipment in the commercial building to harass Libya in retaliation for its UNSC vote. Hesnawy claimed Iranian officials at the OPCW had conceded as much in conversations at The Hague with Libya's representative, Muhammad Gheton. "Libya feels it's being dragged back to 2004", Hesnawy complained, saying previous teams of inspectors should have raised the issue of the equipment earlier if it was indeed a subject of concern.

DESTRUCTION: STATUS OF ITALIAN CONTRACT & PROJECT TIMELINE

5. (C) Regarding ref B reports that the timetable for Libya's destruction program had slipped, Hesnawy conceded that there had been delays; however, he maintained that Libya would nonetheless meet the deadline of the States Parties. The GOL envisions the project in two phases: 1) Repackaging of the agent from existing polyethylene containers (which has resulted in diffusion, vice leakage, of the agent) into improved containers for the 800 km trip from the Ruwagha facility in al-Jufra to the Rabta facility; and 2) actual destruction of the material. Hesnawy said the GOL will rely on Italian company SIPSA Enginerring and Libyan civil contractors to complete the repackaging and destruction work. Contract negotiations with the Italian company had been "completed" and terms were mutually understood by the GOL and SIPSA; however, the contract itself had not yet been formally approved by "all relevant GOL entities", according to Hesnawy. Additional details, such as securing GOL approval to establish requisite bank accounts and authority for letters of credit were also still being worked out.

¶6. (C) Hesnawy offered the following schedule for the destruction program:

- January/February 2009: Repackaging of the agent takes place; agent is stored in Bunker 109 at al-Jufra until transport to Rabta in late 2009/early 2010;

- March 2009: Construction completed on destruction building at Rabta facility;

- March-October 2009: Destruction equipment installed in destruction building at Rabta facility;

- December 2009: Cold and hot tests of destruction equipment at Rabta destruction facility;

- Early February 2010: Commissioning of destruction facility at Rabta;

- May 1, 2010: 1% of agent destroyed per agreement with OPCW. Hesnawy offered that SIPSA and the GOL estimated that destruction of all of the agent would require only 25 calendar days once destruction commenced at the Rabta facility. He anticipated no difficulty meeting the deadline for destruction of the agent, and predicted that Libya would complete the project well in advance of the deadline.

¶7. (C) Comment: Animated and at times angry, Hesnawy repeatedly stressed the GOL's annoyance at what it perceives as an "endless" series of questions about details of its conversion and destruction plans. Stressing that dignity was more important than anything in Libya, Hesnawy offered that GOL officials had considered whether it would be better to destroy the Rabta facility altogether rather than allow it to be used as a pretext for criticism of the GOL's intentions and performance

TRIPOLI 00000466 003 OF 003

by "hostile international actors".
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI467

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI467 aka Wikileaks id #158266 ?
Subject	DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME CRITICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Jun 2008 08:08 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI467.html
References	08TRIPOLI411
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0052
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0467/01 1680808
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 160808Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3533
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0825
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0503
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4039
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000467

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME CRITICS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 158, B) TRIPOLI 218, C) TRIPOLI 161 (NODIS), D) TRIPOLI 165 (NODIS), E) TRIPOLI 332, F) TRIPOLI 411

TRIPOLI 00000467 001.2 OF 003

¶1. (C) Summary: Eleven members of a group of self-described dissidents were convicted on June 10 of planning to foment a rebellion against the "people's authority system" and of meeting with an official from a foreign government; sentences ranged from 6 to 25 years imprisonment. They were not/not convicted on related weapons possession charges. Two of the group were released on May 27 and June 10, respectively; the fourteenth individual has not been seen in prison or at court proceedings since his arrest last year. A human rights contact who is working with the convicted individuals on an appeal was optimistic that the sentences would be reduced; however, a

optimistic that the sentences would be reduced, however, a recent EU demarche to the GOL on the subject was ill-received by the GOL, which characterized the case as a strictly internal matter. European missions have received no further instructions on whether or how to further pursue the issue. One of the convicted men carries Danish citizenship; the Danish Consul General has been rebuffed in his attempts to seek access to him and admitted frankly that his efforts had been greatly complicated by the GOL's recent decision to ban the importation of Danish products and prohibit Danish companies from taking part in Libyan infrastructure projects in retaliation for the republishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers earlier this year. The GOL's strong response to the EU's demarche on the subject, together with Post's experience in the el-Jahmi case, suggests that it may be prudent to see how the appeal fares before making a formal intervention in this case. End summary.

JUMA'A BOUFAYED RELEASED

¶2. (C) Human Rights Watch (HRW) and London-based Libyan opposition website Libya al-Mustaqbal reported in late May that Juma'a Boufayed, brother of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, had been released. Muhammad Tarnesh (strictly protect), Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL - affiliated with the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation), confirmed to P/E Chief on June 2 that Juma'a Boufayed was released from the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli on/about May 27 and had returned to his family home in Ghariyan.

¶3. (C) Libyan security officials arrested Idriss Boufayed and eleven other individuals on February 16, 2007 to disrupt a demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square that had been scheduled for February 17, the first anniversary of riots in Benghazi. Opposition websites reported that Juma'a Boufayed was not involved in planning the protest, but was subsequently detained along with Abdulrahman al-Qutawi after he gave an interview about his brother's arrest. There had been concerns, prompted in part by reports on opposition websites, that Boufayed had died in detention. The fourteen faced three criminal charges, each of which potentially carried the death penalty: attempting to foment rebellion against the "people's authority system"; possession of weapons for the purpose of fomenting a rebellion; and conducting unauthorized communications with an official of a foreign government.

ADEL HUMAID RELEASED; ELEVEN OTHERS CONVICTED & SENTENCED

¶4. (C) HRW, parroting Libya al-Mustaqbal, reported June 12 that another detainee, Adel Humaid (five Humaid brothers were charged in the case), was released on June 10; the HRSL's Tarnesh confirmed the release to P/E Chief on June 12. Citing reports from two unidentified individuals who observed the courtroom proceedings in Tripoli, Libya al-Mustaqbal also said a state security court convicted 11 of the 14 men implicated in the case of planning to overthrow the government and of meeting with an official from a foreign government. (Note: As reported ref B, Idriss Boufayed and al-Mahid Humaid met with Poloff on February 12, 2007 to discuss the status of domestic opposition to al-Qadhafi's regime and plans to stage the February 17 demonstration. They were subsequently arrested and the Charge was convoked by the MFA to receive a strong warning against Post's contact with internal oppositionists and dissidents (refs C-D - NOTAL), a subject of ongoing friction with the GOL. Opposition websites have previously reported that Boufayed's Ghariyan-based family has been able to attend the court hearings and Post believes Boufayed's family is the single source of Libya al-Mustaqbal's reporting. End note.) The court acquitted the men of related weapons possession charges.

¶5. (C) The convictions were as follows: Dr. Idriss Boufayed - 25 years; al-Mahdi Humaid - 15 years; al-Sadiz Salih Humaid - 15

years; Faraj Humaid - 15 years; Ali Humaid - 15 years; Ahmad Yusef al-Ubaidi - 6 years; 'Alaa al-Dirsi - 6 years; Jamal al-Haji - 12 years; Farid al-Zuwi - 6 years; Bashir al-Haris - 6

years; and al-Sadiq Qashut - 6 years. At this point, two detainees have been released (Juma'a Boufayed and Adel Humaid), 11 have been sentenced (above) and one - Abdulrahman al-Qutawi - has not been seen in prison or at trial proceedings since he was arrested with Juma'a Boufayed.

APPEAL EFFORT UNDERWAY

¶6. (C) The HRSL's Tarnesh confirmed to P/E Chief June 12 that convictions had been handed down and that Adel Humaid had been released. Tarnesh, who was angry about the severity of the sentences, said he was assisting Idriss Boufayed and the other 11 convicted individuals with the process of appealing the verdicts and sentences. He was optimistic that the sentences would be reduced, noting that it was "culturally normal" for courts to reduce harsh sentences on appeal, and believed some of those who received lesser sentences might be released outright during the appeal process. It was not clear whether Tarnesh was assisting Boufayed and the others on their appeals in a personal capacity or as head of the HRSL. Tarnesh had no further information concerning the whereabouts of the missing fourteenth detainee, Abdulrahman al-Qutawi, but said he had continued to make inquiries.

¶7. (C) Tarnesh indicated that the HRSL and QDF were working to secure the release of Idriss Boufayed from the Sabratha Hospital, where he is reportedly undergoing treatment for advanced cancer (HRW reports that it is lung cancer), on humanitarian grounds. As reported ref E, the QDF claimed on April 6 in its first public statement on the case that it had facilitated Boufayed's transfer to Sabratha Hospital for "specialized treatment" through mediation with the Attorney General's office. A report in the pro-government al-Watan newspaper in late May had suggested that Boufayed had been released from hospital in late May on humanitarian grounds related to his illness; however, Tarnesh said Boufayed remained at Sabratha Hospital and that security officials remained outside his room. (Note: As reported ref F, Post has experienced a parallel dynamic in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, whom the GOL claimed to have released, but who remains in de facto detention at the Tripoli Medical Center, where security officials control access to his room. End note.) Tarnesh said the HRSL and QDF continued to work to secure the release of Boufayed, whose condition he described as "not critical, but requiring constant medical care". Explaining the severity of Boufayed's sentence, Tarnesh likened his case to that of Fathi el-Jahmi, saying security officials and other, unspecified elements of the GOL "hated" Boufayed because of his attempts to organize opposition to al-Qadhafi's regime. (Note: Tarnesh knows Boufayed personally and has visited his family several times in Ghariyan since his arrest last year. End note.)

EUROPEAN UNION DEMARCHES GOL ON BOUFAYED CASE, EL-JAHMI & DEATH PENALTY

¶8. (C) U.K. Poloff David Clay told P/E Chief June 15 that the European Union (EU) had demarched the GOL on June 1 concerning Idriss Boufayed, the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and to register opposition to the continued use of the death penalty in Libya. The French ambassador, representing Slovenia (which holds the EU Presidency, but does not have representation in Libya), delivered the EU's points to MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi on June 1. Stressing Libya's respect for the sovereignty of other states' internal affairs, Obeidi expressed "great surprise" that the EU

internal affairs, Obeidi expressed "great surprise" that the EU had raised the death penalty and the el-Jahmi and Boufayed cases. Describing those issues as "purely internal Libyan matters", he made it clear that the GOL considered the EU's intervention inappropriate and would not offer a further response. EU missions in Tripoli have received no further instructions on whether or how to pursue any of the three subjects of the demarche. Separately, Danish Honorary Consul General George Wallen told P/E Chief on June 11 that his efforts to secure access to Jamal al-Haji, a member of the Boufayed group who holds Danish citizenship, had been "greatly complicated" by the fact that the GOL recently imposed a ban on importation of Danish products and prohibited Danish companies from taking part in Libyan infrastructure projects in retaliation for the republishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers earlier this year. Wallen was strongly rebuffed in his initial efforts to see al-Haji and was awaiting further instructions from Copenhagen, which he candidly described as "confused" about whether to press the issue.

¶9. (C) Comment: That the individuals, after 16 months in mostly

TRIPOLI 00000467 003.2 OF 003

incommunicado detention, have been convicted for the "crime" of planning to stage a peaceful protest is reprehensible. Despite his analysis of the GOL's motivation for handing down a harsh sentence against the ailing Boufayed, Tarnesh appeared relatively optimistic that the QDF would be able to push for his release on humanitarian grounds; however, Tarnesh offered no specifics for the other ten men. The GOL's strongly negative response to the EU's demarche on the subject, together with Post's experience in the el-Jahmi case, suggests that an intervention by the U.S. at this juncture - be it public or private - would likely hurt, rather than help, the effort to reduce the convicted mens' sentence or secure their release.
End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI470

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI470 aka Wikileaks id #158313 ?
Subject	OIL- AND GAS-RELATED POLLUTION IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Jun 2008 12:45 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI470.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000470
P 161245Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3539
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1114
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0523
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0690
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0637
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0043
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0828
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0506
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4045
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000470

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON;
ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , SENV
[Environmental Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: OIL- AND GAS-RELATED POLLUTION IN LIBYA

¶1.  (SBU)  Summary. Libya is slowly acknowledging the need to
address the environmental impact of its oil and gas production.
Environmental issues are becoming more central to the Libyan oil
and gas industry, particularly with the influx of foreign
companies, which often have a corporate mandate to operate in an
environmentally-conscious manner, and the drive to expand
production.  In practical terms, though, the GOL's involvement
in and concern about environmental issues remain marginal.
Significant shortcomings in the regulatory framework and legal
system remain; spotty enforcement and a lack of environmental
remediation facilities are key issues.  End Summary

GOVERNMENT OVERSIGHT AND LEGAL FRAMEWORK

¶2.  (SBU)  Government of Libya (GOL) oversight of environmental
```

issues stems from several laws passed by the General People's Congress, which in turn tasked the General People's Committee (GPC) for Health and Environment with implementation. The GPC for Health and Environment in turn relies on the Libyan General Environmental Authority (EGA) to play the role of environmental watchdog and day-to-day implementer of these regulations. Unfortunately, the EGA is not an effective actor. Its staff has suffered considerable turnover, contributing to a lack of continuity and direction. (Note: Not an uncommon situation in GOL entities. End note.) The EGA takes a hands-off approach to its environmental oversight responsibilities. When energy companies wish to carry out environmental projects, EGA steers them into cooperative relationships with municipalities, universities, or other community-based organizations or associations, further diluting oversight and implementation.

¶3. (SBU) The EGA's role is complicated by the a confusing legal and regulatory framework. New decrees and amendments to existing laws are often adopted without repealing earlier legislation; in Libya's system, there is no effective mechanism for reconciling new legislation with previously existing statutes. Laws lack sufficient specificity to offer useful guidance. For the moment, GPC Law No. 15/2003 (regarding protection and improvement of the environment) is the most comprehensive and widely-implemented Libyan environmental law. However, law No. 7/1982, (regarding environmental protection) and law No. 8/1973 (regarding the prevention of oil pollution in the sea) remain on the books and have discrete sets of implementing regulations. Law No. 15 was added to the mix in 2003 without any corresponding implementing regulations; implementing regulations related to law 7 (1982) and law 8 (1973) have effectively been used to implement law 15. Given the confusing regulatory situation, most foreign energy companies do their best to comply with Libyan law, while also adhering to environmental standards established by their own companies, which reflect North American/European standards, in the hope that doing so will keep them out of trouble.

SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM

¶4. (SBU) Oil and natural gas production entail unique environmental issues. These include the need to properly handle waste and polluted water generated from drilling operations, residuals from oil tank farms, chemical wastes, naturally-occurring radioactive materials, oil pits, and spillages. This is a sizeable undertaking in a fully developed economy with a mature oil and gas sector; it is a significant challenge in an operating environment in which western producers were absent for 25 years and in which government oversight is uncoordinated and in some cases contradictory. A significant problem is the lack of proper facilities, principally well-run landfill sites and industrial waste incinerators, in Libya. There are a handful of Libyan and foreign companies currently attempting to establish viable operations here; however, none have enjoyed considerable success to date.

¶5. (SBU) The most significant issue is contamination from oil pits, storage facilities, refineries and the petrochemical and chemical plants associated with production and refining operations. Dumping is a common practice, particularly in the remote areas of the country in which most oil and natural gas wells and production facilities are located. Expatriate oil and gas contacts report that some local companies representing themselves as environmental service companies are known to regularly take custody of pollutants and simply relocate them to more remote locations in the middle of the desert. Some waste

is buried; some is left on the sand. According to foreign environmental remediation companies marketing their services in

Libya, more than five million tons of hydrocarbon production-related waste requiring special handling have accumulated throughout the country. Environmental studies conducted in populated areas, such as al-Zawiya (where the Zawiya refinery is located) and Tripoli (home to a number of storage facilities) have shown high levels of soil contamination.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: While there appears to be a growing awareness among some GOL actors of environmental issues and a desire to develop best practices in the oil and gas sector, opaque regulations and inconsistent implementation of existing laws suggest that the burden will remain on foreign companies to cobble together environmentally responsible operations based on a combination of Libyan and international standards. The good news is that North American and European oil and gas companies have generally adopted stringent internal guidelines and monitoring mechanisms to ensure hydrocarbon production is carried out in an environmentally-responsible fashion. Those firms are likely to produce a greater percentage of Libya's oil and gas as the country seeks to increase oil production to three million barrels/day from a current production level of 1.7 million barrels/day by 2013. Nonetheless, indigenous Libyan entities, particularly oilfield services companies, are playing an increasingly active role in oil and gas production. More concerted efforts by the GOL to govern those entities, particularly with respect to clarifying regulations and enforcing them, will be necessary if Libya is to adequately safeguard its environment. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI472

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI472 aka Wikileaks id #158372 ?
Subject	DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME CRITICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Jun 2008 16:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI472.html
References	08TRIPOLI411
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI541 , 08TRIPOLI819 , 08TRIPOLI882 , 08TRIPOLI919 , 08TRIPOLI920 , 08TRIPOLI925 , 08TRIPOLI943 , 08TRIPOLI969 , 09TRIPOLI227
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1349
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0472/01 1691428
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 161620Z JUN 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3542
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/DTS BASRAH
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0001
RUEHDE/DTS DUBAI
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0025
RUEHDE/IRAN RPO DUBAI
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0001
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0830
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0508
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4048
RUEHROV/DTS VATICAN
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0001
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000472

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - REVISED REFERENCES

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN CASE OF IDRISS BOUFAYED AND FELLOW REGIME CRITICS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 158, B) TRIPOLI 218, C) TRIPOLI 161, D) TRIPOLI 165, E) TRIPOLI 332, F) TRIPOLI 411

TRIPOLI 00000472 001.4 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Eleven members of a group of self-described dissidents were convicted on June 10 of planning to foment a rebellion against the "people's authority system" and of meeting with an official from a foreign government; sentences ranged from 6 to 25 years imprisonment. They were not/not convicted on related weapons possession charges. Two of the group were released on May 27 and June 10, respectively; the fourteenth individual has not been seen in prison or at court proceedings since his arrest last year. A human rights contact who is working with the convicted individuals on an appeal was optimistic that the sentences would be reduced; however, a recent EU demarche to the GOL on the subject was ill-received by the GOL, which characterized the case as a strictly internal matter. European missions have received no further instructions on whether or how to further pursue the issue. One of the convicted men carries Danish citizenship; the Danish Consul General has been rebuffed in his attempts to seek access to him and admitted frankly that his efforts had been greatly complicated by the GOL's recent decision to ban the importation of Danish products and prohibit Danish companies from taking part in Libyan infrastructure projects in retaliation for the republishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers earlier this year. The GOL's strong response to the EU's demarche on the subject, together with Post's experience in the el-Jahmi case, suggest that an intervention by the U.S. at this juncture would likely hurt, rather than help, the effort to reduce the convicted mens' sentence or secure their release. End summary.

JUMA'A BOUFAYED RELEASED

¶2. (C) Human Rights Watch (HRW) and London-based Libyan opposition website Libya al-Mustaqbal reported in late May that Juma'a Boufayed, brother of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, had been released. Muhammad Tarnesh (strictly protect), Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL - affiliated with the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation), confirmed to P/E Chief on June 2 that Juma'a Boufayed was released from the Abu Salim prison in Tripoli on/about May 27 and had returned to his family home in Ghariyan.

¶3. (C) Libyan security officials arrested Idriss Boufayed and eleven other individuals on February 16, 2007 to disrupt a demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square that had been scheduled for February 17, the first anniversary of riots in Benghazi. Opposition websites reported that Juma'a Boufayed was not involved in planning the protest, but was subsequently detained along with Abdulrahman al-Qutawi after he gave an interview about his brother's arrest. There had been concerns, prompted in part by reports on opposition websites, that Boufayed had died in detention. The fourteen faced three criminal charges, each of which potentially carried the death penalty: attempting to foment rebellion against the "people's authority system"; possession of weapons for the purpose of fomenting a rebellion; and conducting unauthorized communications with an official of a foreign government.

ADEL HUMAID RELEASED; ELEVEN OTHERS CONVICTED & SENTENCED

¶4. (C) HRW, parroting Libya al-Mustaqbal, reported June 12 that another detainee, Adel Humaid (five Humaid brothers were charged in the case), was released on June 10; the HRSL's Tarnesh confirmed the release to P/E Chief on June 12. Citing reports from two unidentified individuals who observed the courtroom proceedings in Tripoli, Libya al-Mustaqbal also said a state security court convicted 11 of the 14 men implicated in the case of planning to overthrow the government and of meeting with an official from a foreign government. (Note: As reported ref B, Idriss Boufayed and al-Mahid Humaid met with Poloff on February

12, 2007 to discuss the status of domestic opposition to al-Qadhafi's regime and plans to stage the February 17 demonstration. They were subsequently arrested and the Charge was convoked by the MFA to receive a strong warning against Post's contact with internal oppositionists and dissidents (refs

C-D - NOTAL), a subject of ongoing friction with the GOL. Opposition websites have previously reported that Boufayed's Ghariyan-based family has been able to attend the court hearings and Post believes Boufayed's family is the single source of Libya al-Mustaqbal's reporting. End note.) The court acquitted the men of related weapons possession charges.

¶5. (C) The convictions were as follows: Dr. Idriss Boufayed - 25 years; al-Mahdi Humaid - 15 years; al-Sadiz Salih Humaid - 15 years; Faraj Humaid - 15 years; Ali Humaid - 15 years; Ahmad Yusef al-Ubaidi - 6 years; 'Alaa al-Dirsi - 6 years; Jamal al-Haji - 12 years; Farid al-Zuwi - 6 years; Bashir al-Haris - 6 years; and al-Sadiq Qashut - 6 years. At this point, two detainees have been released (Juma'a Boufayed and Adel Humaid), 11 have been sentenced (above) and one - Abdulrahman al-Qutawi - has not been seen in prison or at trial proceedings since he was arrested with Juma'a Boufayed.

APPEAL EFFORT UNDERWAY

¶6. (C) The HRSL's Tarnesh confirmed to P/E Chief June 12 that convictions had been handed down and that Adel Humaid had been released. Tarnesh, who was angry about the severity of the sentences, said he was assisting Idriss Boufayed and the other 11 convicted individuals with the process of appealing the verdicts and sentences. He was optimistic that the sentences would be reduced, noting that it was "culturally normal" for courts to reduce harsh sentences on appeal, and believed some of those who received lesser sentences might be released outright during the appeal process. It was not clear whether Tarnesh was assisting Boufayed and the others on their appeals in a personal capacity or as head of the HRSL. Tarnesh had no further information concerning the whereabouts of the missing fourteenth detainee, Abdulrahman al-Qutawi, but said he had continued to make inquiries.

¶7. (C) Tarnesh indicated that the HRSL and QDF were working to secure the release of Idriss Boufayed from the Sabratha Hospital, where he is reportedly undergoing treatment for advanced cancer (HRW reports that it is lung cancer), on humanitarian grounds. As reported ref E, the QDF claimed on April 6 in its first public statement on the case that it had facilitated Boufayed's transfer to Sabratha Hospital for "specialized treatment" through mediation with the Attorney General's office. A report in the pro-government al-Watan newspaper in late May had suggested that Boufayed had been released from hospital in late May on humanitarian grounds related to his illness; however, Tarnesh said Boufayed remained at Sabratha Hospital and that security officials remained outside his room. (Note: As reported ref F, Post has experienced a parallel dynamic in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, whom the GOL claimed to have released, but who remains in de facto detention at the Tripoli Medical Center, where security officials control access to his room. End note.) Tarnesh said the HRSL and QDF continued to work to secure the release of Boufayed, whose condition he described as "not critical, but requiring constant medical care". Explaining the severity of Boufayed's sentence, Tarnesh likened his case to that of Fathi el-Jahmi, saying security officials and other, unspecified elements of the GOL "hated" Boufayed because of his attempts to organize opposition to al-Qadhafi's regime. (Note: Tarnesh knows Boufayed personally and has visited his family several times in Ghariyan since his arrest last year. End note.)

arrest last year. End note.)

EUROPEAN UNION DEMARCHES GOL ON BOUFAYED CASE, EL-JAHMI & DEATH PENALTY

¶8. (C) U.K. Poloff David Clay told P/E Chief June 15 that the European Union (EU) had demarched the GOL on June 1 concerning Idriss Boufayed, the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and to register opposition to the continued use of the death penalty in Libya. The French ambassador, representing Slovenia (which holds the EU Presidency, but does not have representation in Libya), delivered the EU's points to MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi on June 1.

TRIPOLI 00000472 003.4 OF 003

Stressing Libya's respect for the sovereignty of other states' internal affairs, Obeidi expressed "great surprise" that the EU had raised the death penalty and the el-Jahmi and Boufayed cases. Describing those issues as "purely internal Libyan matters", he made it clear that the GOL considered the EU's intervention inappropriate and would not offer a further response. EU missions in Tripoli have received no further instructions on whether or how to pursue any of the three subjects of the demarche. Separately, Danish Honorary Consul General George Wallen told P/E Chief on June 11 that his efforts to secure access to Jamal al-Haji, a member of the Boufayed group who holds Danish citizenship, had been "greatly complicated" by the fact that the GOL recently imposed a ban on importation of Danish products and prohibited Danish companies from taking part in Libyan infrastructure projects in retaliation for the republishing of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in Danish newspapers earlier this year. Wallen was strongly rebuffed in his initial efforts to see al-Haji and was awaiting further instructions from Copenhagen, which he candidly described as "confused" about whether to press the issue.

¶9. (C) Comment: That the individuals, after 16 months in mostly incommunicado detention, have been convicted for the "crime" of planning to stage a peaceful protest is reprehensible. Despite his analysis of the GOL's motivation for handing down a harsh sentence against the ailing Boufayed, Tarnesh appeared relatively optimistic that the QDF would be able to push for his release on humanitarian grounds; however, Tarnesh offered no specifics for the other ten men. The GOL's strongly negative response to the EU's demarche on the subject, together with Post's experience in the el-Jahmi case, suggests that an intervention by the U.S. at this juncture - be it public or private - would likely hurt, rather than help, the effort to reduce the convicted mens' sentence or secure their release. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI474

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI474 aka Wikileaks id #158472 ?
Subject	ENI'S OIL AND GAS DEAL EXTENDED, OTHER COMPANIES WORRY TERMS WILL SET A NEW (UNFAVORABLE) PRECEDENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 17 Jun 2008 10:53 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI474.html
References	07TRIPOLI912 , 08TRIPOLI912
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI498 , 08TRIPOLI745 , 09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000474
R 171053Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3547
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0692
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0639
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0525
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1116
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0310
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0432
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0511
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0833
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0045
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4053
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000474

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: ENI'S OIL AND GAS DEAL EXTENDED, OTHER COMPANIES WORRY TERMS WILL SET A NEW (UNFAVORABLE) PRECEDENT

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 912

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Soaring oil prices are allowing Libya to press for more stringent long-term contracts with foreign oil and gas producers. A twenty-five year extension for Italian firm Eni North Africa BV, which entailed a sizeable bonus payment and dramatically reduced the company's production share, was

recently ratified after lengthy negotiations. The potential impact of Eni's deal is significant. Local observers expect that the National Oil Company's (NOC) success in securing very favorable terms will embolden it to pursue renegotiation of existing contracts with other international oil companies (IOCs). Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOC's facing potentially long renegotiation periods and dramatically reduced production shares may choose to abandon production efforts in Libya. End summary.

EPSA MODEL TIME-TESTED

¶2. (SBU) Libya's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric has been the most widely used model for producers in Libya since 1974. Under these agreements, international oil companies (IOCs) receive a fixed percentage of output from the fields involved based on the terms of their bid to explore and develop Libyan acreage. The terms of these agreements, particularly the share of overall production retained by companies, have grown increasingly less favorable to IOCs. Intense competition among foreign oil and gas companies to book reserves in Libya, widely perceived to be one of the relatively few places in the world with significant unproven reserves of sweet, light crude and natural gas, has fueled the trend towards less profitable EPSA's.

¶3. (SBU) As a point of comparison, the standard production share allocation for IOCs in the latest EPSA round (EPSA IV) has been 10-12% of overall production, down from production share allocations of 20% or more that were typical in earlier EPSA rounds. IOC's have accepted stiffer terms based on their high expectations of Libya's hydrocarbon producing potential, the comparatively low cost of oil recovery in Libya, the generally high quality of Libyan crude, Libya's close proximity to European markets and rapidly rising oil and gas prices. Encouraged by the willingness of some IOC's to accept production shares as low as 7 percent under the EPSA IV framework, the NOC - led by former Prime Minister Shukhri Ghanem, reputedly a hard bargainer - has been pressing all IOC's to accept further reductions in their production share allocations to increase Libya's take. Striking a nationalist tone, Muammar al-Qadhafi explicitly referred in his June 11 speech on the occasion of the "evacuation" of U.S. and British military bases in Libya to efforts to renegotiate EPSA contracts as a manifestation of Libya's continued resolve to resist Western imperialism.

AT LONG LAST, ENI FINALIZES ITS CONTRACT EXTENSION

¶4. (SBU) In October 2007, ENI agreed with the NOC to convert its existing long-term production contracts, which were signed in the mid-1980s under EPSA III terms, to the most recent contractual model under EPSA-IV (reftel). That deal was submitted to Libya's General People's Congress for approval and ratification and was ratified on June 12. Under the new deal, Eni reduced its production share to 12% for oil (down from 35-50 percent for its various fields) and 40% for natural gas (down from 50 percent). The share for gas production will drop to 30% after 2018. In exchange, the NOC extended Eni's EPSA III contracts by 25 years, approved a 3 billion cubic meter (BCM) expansion to the Western Libya Gas Pipeline (WLGP), and the construction of a new 4 million tons per annum LNG facility at Mellitah. Eni accepted less attractive fiscal terms on its blocks (its overall portfolio has fallen by 42% due to lower production share figures), and made a $1 billion non-recoverable payment. Eni's licenses were converted to the EPSA IV model and will now expire in 2042 (for oil) and 2047 (for gas).

OTHER DEALS IN THE OFFING?

¶5. (SBU) Several other major extensions are anticipated in the coming months, including those involving U.S. firm Occidental

TRIPOLI 00000474 002 OF 002

Petroleum (along with Austrian partner OMV) and Petro-Canada. Those agreements were signed with the NOC in late 2007, but still require GPC ratification. It is possible the NOC will seek further concessions in light of its deal with Eni. Spain's Repsol and the NOC are renegotiating along the EPSA IV contractual model. The initial deal between Repsol YPF and NOC stipulated a 50-50 split of production; however, the NOC is now seeking a minimum production share of 72 percent.

¶6. (SBU) The NOC has approached numerous other IOCs about extensions, raising the possibility that it will reopen deals that were only concluded a few years ago. Even the U.S. Oasis Group (comprising Amerada-Hess, Marathon and ConocoPhillips), which paid $1.8 billion in December 2005 to return to acreage in Libya's Sirte Basin that it held before the suspension of U.S.-Libyan diplomatic ties and the imposition of U.S. and UN sanctions, may be affected. Libya's relatively modest 59.2 percent production share in that deal has generated preliminary probing by the NOC as to whether the Oasis Group would consider renegotiating, which it has so far successfully opposed.

¶7. (SBU) Comment: With ratification of its revised EPSA contract, Eni has secured a long-term position in Libya, but at a considerable price. Part of the calculus for Eni and other IOC's is the expectation that oil and gas prices are likely to remain high, making non-recoverable bonus payments and lesser production shares tenable from the standpoint of their projects' overall profitability. It is widely expected that the NOC will push hard to renegotiate other extant deals and extensions that involve reduced production shares for IOCs. Its confidence buoyed by favorable market conditions, Libya is playing hardball with the IOC's, sending a clear message that no deal is beyond renegotiation, no matter how recently concluded or how favorable the terms for the NOC. Libya and the IOC's have been here before: a spate of renegotiations and extensions occurred in the late-1960s and early 1970s, driven in part by the then-new al-Qadhafi regime to demonstrate to its people that it was a better steward of Libya's hydrocarbon resources than the Sanussi monarchy had been. As during that period, the current penchant for shifting the goalposts has not been well-received by the IOCs. Despite Libya's relatively unique position in terms of unproven reserves, high quality oil and low recovery costs, observers here expect that some IOCs facing potentially long renegotiation periods (and associated costs of idle personnel and materiel) and diminished production returns may choose to abandon altogether their production efforts in Libya. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI480

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI480 aka Wikileaks id #158692 ?
Subject	BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF PROMINENT LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI480.html
References	08TRIPOLI297
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI982
History	First published on Mon, 20 Dec 2010 07:24 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 21 Dec 2010 21:36 UTC (diff from original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 13:00 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 21:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2277
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0480/01 1701245
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 181245Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3556
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4062
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000480

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , KBCT *[Arab League Boycott]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: BUSINESS IS POLITICS: MARKS & SPENCER DRAMA TIED TO FATE OF PROMINENT LIBYAN BUSINESSMAN

REF: A) TRIPOLI 349, B) 07 TRIPOLI 297

TRIPOLI 00000480 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In Libya, major business deals are both political and personal. The ongoing drama surrounding efforts by the U.K. government and investors to keep open the Marks & Spencer retail store in Tripoli, and a campaign by some GOL officials to close it, affords a prime example. Libyan officials at the highest levels have publicly attacked a major

European retailer - damaging bilateral ties with the U.K. in the process - largely due to a personal grievance between the Prime Minister and the Libyan businessman at the center of the deal. The fate of the store and the businessman are closely intertwined, and the ensuing test of wills reportedly has the potential to end in violence. The U.K. Embassy, which is closely involved, has flatly told us they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End Summary.

THE TRAVAILS OF "MARKS & SPARKS" CONTINUE

¶2. (C) UK retailer Marks & Spencer (M&S), affectionately referred to in the U.K. as "Marks & Sparks", opened a location in Tripoli in April that has since been a magnet for controversy (ref A). The store has been closed by Libyan authorities on at least two occasions, and there is a very good chance that it will be shut permanently in coming months. According to a local business contact with good second-hand knowledge of the situation, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's office has become directly involved in the matter, and has directed that the franchise either be sold to unspecified government officials, or suffer an immediate freeze on further import of stock and be closed permanently by year's end. M&S employees have received close scrutiny by Libyan security officials, who have been used as a strongarm adjunct in this political play; employees were all taken in for a second round of questioning in early June.

GOL ADOPTS REPUGNANT ANTI-SEMITIC TACTICS

¶3. (C) The Libyan government's public narrative has taken the form of persistent anti-Semitic rhetoric alleging that the company is a "Zionist entity" with Jewish origins that supports Israel and "the killing of Palestinians". A strongly-worded statement released to Libyan media outlets in early June by the General Union of Chambers of Commerce and Industry (which ostensibly represents all private businesses in Libya, both Libyan and foreign) condemned the fact that the store was still open and called for its permanent closure. A well-placed contact with direct knowledge of the case told us that Giuma al-Usta, Chairman of the General Union of Chambers and author of the statement is being used by the Prime Minister as a proxy in the campaign against M&S. (Note: Al-Usta's personal fortune is reputed to have been made by dint of the fact that he is a political apparatchik with close ties to the Prime Minister. He holds the personal rank of Colonel in the Revolutionary Committee structure, a shadowy apparatus tasked with protecting the revolution, but which plays a role in everything from organizing networks of informants in residential neighborhoods to "facilitating" business deals. End Note).

¶4. (C) The Chamber also voiced its disapproval of a recent stop at the M&S store by the visiting U.K. Trade Minister. According to the statement, the visit violated the Libyan people's sensibilities, as it fell "on the eve of al-Nakba" (i.e., the date of the Israeli military victory in 1948 that created the modern state of Israel). The U.K. Commercial Counselor told us that M&S had been removed in 2007 from the Arab League's list of companies to be boycotted because of Jewish ownership or Israeli equities, and that both M&S and the U.K. Embassy had done careful vetting with the GOL before the Tripoli store opened in an attempt to preclude any related complications.

HOW DID IT COME TO THIS?

¶5. (C) In typical fashion, while the GOL's public criticism has comprised pseudo-populist rhetoric against "the forces of Zionism", the crux of the matter is in fact about personal relations and politics. The primary Libyan agent for the Marks & Spencer franchise in Libya is well-known businessman Husni Bey. Bey was arrested in March 2007 as part of a government

Bey. Bey was arrested in March 2007 as part of a government crack-down on several prominent businesspeople accused of illegally engaging in monopolistic business practices (ref B). He has since been subject to a travel ban on several occasions, most recently in April-May. His impressive personal fortune, prominent public profile and dominance over several categories of consumer goods in Libya gall government insiders and state-supported "men of commerce". His acrimonious relationship with Prime Minister Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi is well-known - as reported ref B, he derisively referred to al-Mahmoudi as "that

TRIPOLI 00000480 002.2 OF 002

man" in a meeting of the Libyan Businessmens' Council to discuss private sector reform. Another member of Libya's business elite described Bey as "dangerously candid", noting that he does not mask his general disdain for the GOL and its officials.

AND HOW DOES IT END?

¶6. (C) According to a well-placed embassy commercial contact, there is a genuine threat that state security officials may visit personal harm on Husni Bey (and others like him) at the direction of "old guard" regime figures. He conveyed to Econoff the substance of a meeting to which he was summoned in May to discuss Bey's situation. Our contact was called to the house of his uncle, a man with close ties to senior government officials, where he was questioned about Husni Bey by two senior security officials. The individuals pressed him hard to offer details on Bey's business dealings, indicating they were building a case against Bey. Telling our contact that "in the old days we would just arrest him", they offered that they would instead "clip him down to nothing" by dismantling his business empire piecemeal and undertaking a campaign to diminish his business influence. They then noted darkly that if those methods proved insufficient, they would see to it that Bey was involved in a fatal car accident.

¶7. (C) Comment: The ongoing drama of M&S illustrates the confluence of the personal and the political in a commercial climate in which senior regime officials have a direct stake in virtually anything worth owning or selling. The fact that a small number of business elites like Bey have managed to amass considerable fortunes without paying the tithe that senior regime officials consider to be their due rankles greatly. PM al-Mahmoudi's attack on M&S and Bey, motivated as far as most observers can tell solely by personal animus, has created friction with the U.K. and prompted questions by Libyan and foreign concerns about the extent to which the business and investment climate has actually improved. Some Libyan observers have expressed concern that M&S was allowed to open in the first place if the government's position was that it was a "Jewish-owned company" and therefore should not be allowed to operate in Libya. A prominent business contact told us that the travails of M&S served as a cautionary tale about the potential consequences for investors of the sheer lack of coordination and fecklessness in the GOL.
The public and ham-fisted manner in which the GOL is pursuing this matter has ensured that any action taken against M&S and/or Bey will quickly become common knowledge, which may give the GOL pause before it acts too rashly against either. U.K. Emboffs have flatly told us that they view the ultimate outcome of the case as an important bellwether of the investment climate in Libya and will advise potential U.K. investors accordingly. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph

- WikiLeaks cables: Libyan attacks aimed to force out 'Zionist' Marks & Spencer | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI481

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI481 aka Wikileaks id #158695 ?
Subject	GOL VIEWS ON DISPOSITION OF C-130'S IN GEORGIA AND POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF SPARE PARTS AND NEW AIRFRAMES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Jun 2008 12:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI481.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI505 , 08TRIPOLI992 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2288
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0481/01 1701253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 181253Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3558
INFO RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1119
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0835
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0513
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4064
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000481

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/10/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL VIEWS ON DISPOSITION OF C-130'S IN GEORGIA AND POSSIBLE PURCHASE OF SPARE PARTS AND NEW AIRFRAMES

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Representatives of Lockheed Martin and the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force traveled to Libya June 2-4 to meet with officials of the Government of Libya (GOL) to discuss the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft purchased by Libya in 1974, which were not granted export licences and remain in Georgia, and maintenance for the nine other C-130's that currently comprise Libya's fleet. The U.S. team met with GOL officials on June 3.

U.S. Participants:

- Costas Papadopolous, Vice President of Corporate Development for the Arabian Gulf, Libya and Pakistan, Lockheed Martin Corporation
- Captain John Schutte, Country Director, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force/IARM Middle East/Africa Division
- Colonel Kyle Carnahan, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli
- John Godfrey, Political and Economic Chief, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli

GOL Participants:

- Brigadier General Mahmoud Mustapha Ghasia, Strategic Airlift Commander, Libyan Air Force
- Colonel Muhammad Asur el-Ghawi, C-130 Maintenance Chief, Libyan Air Force
- Said Gseebat, Legal Adviser
- Muhammad Matari, Director of the Americas Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

U.S. POSITION

¶2. (C) The U.S. team stressed that the goal of the meeting was not/not to reach final agreement on the way ahead, but rather to identify issues about which the GOL had questions and to discuss possible solutions. Papadopolous underscored the preference of Lockheed Martin (LM) that further communications remain in a government-to-government channel to ensure full transparency for all actors involved in the process; LM would respond in writing through DOD and State to the questions and issues raised by GOL interlocutors. The GOL officials agreed to that formulation. The two sides agreed to address four main issues: 1) disposition of the eight C-130H's purchased by Libya in 1974, for which export licenses were not granted and which remain in Marietta, Georgia; 2) spare parts for Libya's extant fleet of 7 C-130H's and 2 C-130 L-100's; 3) the possibility of sending a U.S. Air Force-Lockheed Martin joint technical team to Libya to assess the C-130 fleet and identify logistics/maintenance needs, and; 4) the capabilities of the new C-130J variant and GOL interest in the possible purchase of that aircraft.

LIBYAN POSITION

¶3. (C) MFA Americas Desk Director Muhammad Matari stressed that GOL must see movement on resolution of the outstanding issue of the C-130H's in Georgia in order to facilitate movement on other issues. Characterizing the aircraft as "hostages" of USG policy, he stressed that it had been a political decision to block their export, despite the fact that the GOL had paid for the aircraft. Suggesting the GOL was limited in its ability to resolve the issue by domestic political constraints, he said that "at all levels - popular and political" in Libya there was the strong feeling that Libya should be "compensated" for the eight C-130H's. A key consideration for the GOL with respect to possibly repairing the C-130H's, procuring spare parts for Libya's current fleet, and purchasing new C-130J's was whether the USG would grant necessary export licenses. It would be "politically fatal" for senior GOL leaders if they pursued further purchases of parts and airframes and had those blocked again by the USG because of export license issues. The GOL had previously requested in connection with a June 2007 visit to inspect the aircraft an official statement of the USG's position on whether it would grant export licenses for the eight C-130H's in Georgia if/if they were repaired. It had also asked whether export licenses would be needed and forthcoming for purchases of spare parts for its current fleet. The GOL had not received answers to either question to date; a USG statement of position on those issues would be necessary to facilitate forward movement.

TAKEAWAYS

¶4. (C) After a lively but collegial discussion, the two sides

agreed on the following points for follow-up:

TRIPOLI 00000481 002 OF 003

- USG Position on Aircraft Disposition and Export Licenses: The USG, in coordination with LM, would ideally provide an official position to the GOL on aircraft disposition and compensation for the eight aircraft at Marietta. The position would include assurances that the export of potentially repaired C-130H's, spare parts, technical orders or future equipment purchases would not/not be blocked due to export license or other concerns.

- Compensation for C-130H's: The Libyan side stressed that if the eight aircraft are beyond repair, or if it is not economically feasible to repair them, they expect and would be amenable to "fair" compensation for the airframes. After initially insisting that such compensation should be equal to the amount of the original purchase price, the Libyan side conceded that some form of partial compensation would be acceptable. Matari stressed that it did not matter, from the GOL's perspective, whether the compensation came from LM or the USG; the critical point was that Libya must be compensated in some tangible way. The Libyan side suggested that a mechanism for such compensation could be a discount in the amount of a mutually-agreed dollar figure on the price of new C-130J aircraft.

- $2.7 Million "Residual" Owed to Libya: The Libyan side raised a payment of $2,775,000 it made to LM in the early stages of the contract for the eight C-130H's in Marietta. The GOL maintains that any valuation of compensation it would receive for the eight C-130H's should include that payment. Papadopolous noted that the figure likely represented the residual amount of money paid towards spare parts and training originally envisioned in the LM-GOL contract that were never delivered. It was agreed that Papadopolous would follow up with LM to determine what the $2,775,000 payment had been for and what the company's position was on whether it owed some or all of that amount to the GOL.

- Time & Material Contract and FMS Rubric: On the possibility of repairing the eight C-130H's at Marietta, Papadopolous noted the degraded nature of the airframes and stressed that repair work necessary to restore the aircraft to airworthiness would have to be performed under a "time and material contract" with no fixed contract value. LM's position was that such a contract would have to be performed under the auspices of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, as a government-to-government agreement. Explaining the FMS process, the DATT stressed the advantage of performing the work under a time and material contract under the FMS rubric. The Libyan side agreed that any future work and sales would best be completed under FMS auspices.

- Spare Parts: The Libyan side also agreed that any purchase of spare parts for its current fleet of C-130's should come through the FMS system. Libya has obtained some spare parts (NFI) since it submitted a Materials Requirement List (MRL) last year; it was agreed that the Libyan side would submit a new Letter of Request (LOR) through the DATT's office for a Letter of Availability (LOA) concerning requested spare parts. The Libyan side also requested updated technical manuals for its current fleet, valued at $2-3 million.

- Technical Team Visit: The GOL will set a date for a USAF technical team to visit Libya to inspect the current fleet; the DATT will coordinate with LM on possible participation by the company.

- The USG, in coordination with LM, needs to determine an appropriate resoluton of an outstanding sales and tax lien levied by the State of Georgia, which was assessed at $3.3 million in 1988 (plus monthly interest and penalties)

million in 1986 (plus monthly interest and penalties).

- The USG, in coordination with LM, need to address the second encumbrance on the eight C-130H's resulting from the court case Price & Frey v. Libya ($17.7 million claim, plus interest since July 2005).

- C-130J's: The briefing on the new aircraft was well-received; the Libyan side expressed interest in exploring the possibility of future purchases, provided that export license guarantees could be assured by the USG.

¶5. (C) Comment: The U.S. team assessed that the Libyan side was genuinely interested in resolving what for them is clearly a sensitive issue with considerable political equities. A key achievement was securing agreement from the Libyan side, which initially insisted that the issue of the eight C-130H's in

Marietta must be resolved before any other issues could be explored, that movement on the Marietta aircraft, spare parts requests and potential C-130J procurement could move in parallel. Nonetheless, the Libyan side remains wary. In a sidebar after the meeting, Matari told P/E Chief that Muammar al-Qadhafi had personally met with Libya's C-130 team to discuss their upcoming meeting with LM and USG officials. Matari said al-Qadhafi had stressed that any movement on resolving the C-130H's, procuring spares or purchasing new C-130J airframes) must/must be contingent on securing USG guarantees that export licenses would be granted for those items. There is considerable concern that U.S.-Libya engagement on C-130's is a deliberate ruse or an issue on which the USG will ultimately be unable to deliver because of opposition from Congress, either of which would greatly embarrass the regime. Matari stressed that conservative regime elements skeptical of the GOL's decision to re-engage with the U.S. would capitalize on another failure to secure export licenses for C-130's and spare parts to demonstrate U.S. ill will and argue against further re-engagement. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI494

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI494 aka Wikileaks id #159165 ?
Subject	JOURNALIST JAILED FOR CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT'S POORLY-COORDINATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 22 Jun 2008 08:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI494.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI487
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0354
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0494/01 1740852
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 220852Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3593
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1127
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0528
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0695
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0642
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0516
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0838
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4099
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000494

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: JOURNALIST JAILED FOR CRITICIZING GOVERNMENT'S POORLY-COORDINATED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A respected Libyan journalist was jailed on charges that a column he wrote criticizing the government's poorly-coordinated urban development efforts had incited negative public opinion and called into question the "people's authority". Released from prison pending trial after the intervention of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the case may stem from tension between Saif al-Islam and the Prime Minister, who has reportedly led the charge to try and sentence the journalist. End summary.

JOURNALIST JAILED

JOURNALIST JAILED

¶2. (C) Opposition websites reported in early May that Muhammad Tarnesh, a journalist and Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL - affiliated with the Qadhafi Development Foundation), was arrested and charged in connection with a column he wrote criticizing the fact that after twenty-five years of inactivity in the area of urban development, the Government of Libya (GOL) had undertaken a hasty, poorly coordinated campaign of housing and infrastructure development that featured as its primary accomplishment to date the seemingly random destruction of large numbers of residences and businesses. Lamenting the suffering caused by the widespread "'Izaala" campaign (a word that translates as "removal", and is written on buildings slated for destruction), Tarnesh's column pointedly asked readers whether anyone had seen the homes of government ministers destroyed.

¶3. (C) Tarnesh's column first appeared on April 1 in the "Maal wa A'mal" newspaper, published by al-Izdihar Press in Misurata. Tarnesh was subsequently arrested, the paper's editor-in-chief, Khalifa Muqattaf was questioned and al-Izdihar Press was closed by order of the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Information, Nuri Hmeidi. The column was subsequently posted in early May on the website "Libya al-Youm" ("Libya Today"). "Libya al-Youm" reported that a group of prominent Libyan journalists had met at the Journalists' League in Tripoli in early May to express solidarity with Tarnesh and Muqattaf and criticize the GOL's abuse of restrictive press laws to muzzle criticism.

CHARGES MAY STEM FROM PERSONAL ANIMUS BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND PRIME MINISTER

¶4. (C) Tarnesh told P/E Chief on May 28 that he was arrested on three charges in late April under Press Act 76 of 1972: 1) inciting negative public opinion; 2) criticizing the leaders of the Revolution, and; 3) casting doubt on the ability of secretaries of the General People's Committees (GPC's), and thereby questioning the "people's authority". Tarnesh was in custody for some 10 days during the initial part of the investigation. Officials from the Prosecutor General's office told him Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi had taken particular umbrage at Tarnesh's column, had orchestrated his arrest and had evinced a personal interest in seeing Tarnesh tried and sentenced. Al-Mahmoudi, who was widely rumored to have fallen from favor with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and was expected to have been sacked at the March session of the General People's Conference, is reportedly highly sensitive to criticism of development projects, in part because Housing and Infrastructure Board Chairman Dorda - a more charismatic figure - has received credit for the progress that has been made while al-Mahmoudi has born the brunt of criticism. Hoping to forestall criticism and possibly save his job, al-Mahmoudi undertook a poorly-received campaign of personal appearances and press availability sessions at a number of housing and infrastructure sights in the run-up to the March session of the General People's Congress. After officials from the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, intervened with the Prosecutor General's office, Tarnesh was ultimately released from prison pending his trial.

¶5. (C) Noting that officials from the Prosecutor General's office told him they believed the charges were frivolous and unlikely to stand up in court, Tarnesh offered that he would personally be less confident about his case if it were not for the personal interest of Saif al-Islam, who was following his case and who, according to QDF Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani, had personally raised it with al-Mahmoudi. (Note: Tarnesh told P/E Chief that Saif al-Islam had personally recruited him to head the HRSL because he was an avid reader of his columns and appreciated Tarnesh's willingness to openly

question GOL officials' competence. End note.) Al-Mahmoudi had persisted in his efforts to have Tarnesh re-incarcerated until

his trial, so far to no avail. Claiming it was well-known that al-Mahmoudi and Saif al-Islam didn't see eye-to-eye, Tarnesh said some had speculated that al-Mahmoudi orchestrated Tarnesh's prosecution to strike an oblique blow at Saif al-Islam. As it stood, Tarnesh believed he stood a good chance of being acquitted on all three charges; the next hearing is scheduled for late-June. Laughingly noting that there was "no such thing as justice in Libya", Tarnesh joked that it was fortunate for him that a son of the Leader with no official position (a reference to Saif al-Islam) could trump a Prime Minister.

ARTICLE STRIKES A CHORD

¶6. (C) Post spoke with a number of Libyans who had read Tarnesh's column. The broad consensus was that Tarnesh had given voice to commonly held frustration with what they view as an arbitrary and fruitless "development" program. (Note: Tarnesh is a regular columnist and is well and favorably known in Libya's sterile media environment as the author of articles that gently criticize and poke fun at government incompetence and inconsistencies. End note.) A young taxi driver who had until recently managed his family's clothing store on Djeraba Street complained bitterly that the GOL had given his family less than a week's notice that the store was slated for destruction, and had ultimately provided compensation for only one-tenth of its value. Noting that he had to delay his wedding because his family finances had suffered, he echoed comments by other Tripolitanians to the effect that the development projects and related destruction of existing structures had been badly coordinated by the GOL.

¶7. (C) Comment: Tarnesh's case underscores the personal and at times petty nature of intra-regime politics in Libya, where the limits of public discourse remain narrowly circumscribed. It is blatantly obvious to local observers that the rush to tear down old facades and put up new buildings as evidence of the revolution's benefits (keyed to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, which will fall on September 1, 2009) has placed a considerable burden on a system characterized by limited capacity. Libya, however, remains a place where one does not lightly tell the emperor he has no clothes. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI498

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI498 aka Wikileaks id #159437 ?
Subject	PETRO-CANADA SIGNS 30-YEAR PACT WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 24 Jun 2008 14:19 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI498.html
References	08TRIPOLI474
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI991 , 09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 28 Apr 2011 17:07 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000498
R 241419Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3596
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0644
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0697
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0530
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1129
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0312
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0434
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0518
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0840
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0023
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4104
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000498

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , CA *[Canada]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: PETRO-CANADA SIGNS 30-YEAR PACT WITH LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 474

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Petro-Canada has signed a series of 30-year contracts with Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), bringing its old agreements into line with Libya's preferred EPSA-IV contract standard. The new deals stem from Libya's ongoing efforts to secure tougher terms from foreign oil companies, and mark the growing importance of Libya to Petro-Canada. End Summary.

DONE DEAL - AT LAST

¶2. (SBU) On June 19, representatives from Petro-Canada and the NOC signed a total of six contracts covering all of Petro-Canada's acreage in Libya. The contracts were crafted under the NOC's EPSA IV agreement template, which has become the preferred framework for all international oil companies (IOCs) working in Libya (reftel). An agreement signed by the NOC and Petro-Canada in December 2007 was recently ratified by the General People's Congress, paving the way to sign the actual contracts.

¶3. (SBU) Under the new deals, Petro-Canada has committed to pay a $1 billion signing bonus and invest $3.5 billion in the redevelopment of several large producing fields, and $460 million in oil and gas exploration. Petro-Canada will pay 50% of all development costs and 100% of all exploration costs. The company had to accept a lower production share (a flat 12% for all six contracts, regardless of location), but hopes to double its current production levels to at least 200,000 barrels of oil per day over the next five to seven years.

LIBYA OF GROWING IMPORTANCE TO PETRO-CANADA

¶4. (SBU) As the latest company to renegotiate its presence in Libya, thereby extending its presence to 2038 (its existing deals were set to expire in 2015), Petro-Canada has now opened up new opportunities in both exploration and redevelopment projects, with a predominant focus in the prolific Sirte basin region. According to local contacts with the company, the renegotiation of the contracts is consistent with Petro-Canada's efforts to re-position itself globally. Petro-Canada had not previously regarded Libya as an area central to its operations, given the company's exposure stemming from its Alberta operations and gas production in Syria. This new deal elevates Libya to a priority area of operations for the company, with prospects for substantial growth.

¶5. (SBU) Comment: Petro-Canada's re-negotiation is the latest in an emerging trend of contract extensions/renegotiations (reftel). The NOC is waging a concerted campaign to re-negotiate or extend existing contracts under better terms, principally with respect to production share. For their part, international oil companies - mindful of the high price of oil and limited venues for new exploration and production - have so far swallowed hard and signed up. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI500

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI500 aka Wikileaks id #159578 ?
Subject	LIBYAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Jun 2008 12:51 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI500.html
References	08TRIPOLI120 , 08TRIPOLI248 , 08TRIPOLI430
History	First published on Mon, 27 Jun 2011 09:31 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2767
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0500 1771251
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 251251Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3598
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0032
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0031
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN PRIORITY 0004
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0841
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0072
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0024
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0519
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0435
RUEHVJ/AMEMBASSY SARAJEVO PRIORITY 0001
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM PRIORITY 0004
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0008
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0006
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0131
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0152
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4106
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000500

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , MCAP [Military Capabilities] , PREL
[External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF FOREIGN FIGHTERS TO IRAQ

REF: STATE 50900

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) Information below is keyed to questions in paras 4-6
of reftel tasker.
```

- OBJECTIVE MASSEY NAME TRACES: Names for Libyan foreign fighters recovered in the Objective Massey raid in September 2007 were passed in GRPO liaison channels to the External Security Organization (ESO). As of late November 2007, the ESO provided traces on those individuals (see TD-314/77022/07 for further details).

- COOPERATION WITH SYRIA: Post assesses that Libyan-Syrian cooperation has been robust and productive. The ESO maintains active channels of communication with its sister organizations in the Syrian Arab Republic concerning efforts to stop Syrian citizens from traveling to Iraq to conduct terrorist operations and to stop the transit of foreign fighters through Syria. See TD-314/69907-07 and TD-314/68798-07 for ESO Director Musa Kusa's assessment of Syria's efforts. Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) transferred 27 Libyan foreign fighters to the custody of the Government of Libya (GOL) in late December 2007 (see TD-314/82371-07 for further details). Information provided by ESO in liaison channels suggests that over 100 Libyan foreign fighters have been transferred from Syria to the custody of the GOL in the past two years.

- DOMESTIC ACTION TO STEM FOREIGN FIGHTER FLOWS: Libyan officials have expressed willingness to take greater domestic action and to cooperate in regional and multi-lateral efforts to prevent Libyan citizens from traveling to Iraq to engage in terrorist operations. Post's assessment is that the GOL has calculated that returning extremists pose a potentially serious threat to the regime's stability, and that efforts to stem the flow of Libyan foreign fighters to Iraq are in its strategic best interest. See TD-314/034705-08 for details on ESO's detention of all known Libyan Iraq veterans that returned to Libya in 2004 and 2005. The ESO's leadership has focused on counter-ideological measures, cooperation with neighboring states in the Sahara and Sahel region, and development of more stringent measures to sceen and track young men traveling to/from Libya. (See TD-314/69655-07 for details on combating extremist ideology; see TRIPOLI 120 and TRIPOLI 430 for analysis of factors enabling recruitment of eastern Libyans as foreign fighters; see TD-314/019998-08 and TD-314/019732-08 for details on ESO's cooperation with other North African states to combat foreign fighter flows; see TRIPOLI 248 for details on human and technical surveillance employed at airports by the Internal Security Organization (ISO) and ESO to prevent Libyans from traveling to Iraq and elsewhere to engage in terrorist operations.) Indicating that Libya intends to improve the safety of its travel documents, Libya's National Security Council requested from the Charge on May 7 a list of U.S. companies that produce passports and travel documents with advanced security features, which Post provided shortly thereafter. The GOL facilitated a port security training program under EXBS auspices in March 2008. A parallel training program for airport security (fraudulent document detection and passenger screening techniques) is scheduled for July 2008, and a follow-on training program for land border crossing points is expected to take place in fall 2008. Post's assessment is that the flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of veterans to Libya has diminished due to new procedures adopted by the GOL (see TD-314/027806-08 for further details).

STEVENS

Media

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI505

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI505 aka Wikileaks id #159815 ?
Subject	NEGOTIATIONS OVER MIL-MIL MOU CONTINUE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Jun 2008 16:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI505.html
References	08TRIPOLI481
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4026
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0505/01 1781605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261605Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3602
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4111
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000505

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , PBTS *[National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS OVER MIL-MIL MOU CONTINUE

REF: A) JACUBEC-CARNAHAN EMAIL 06/17/2008, B) TRIPOLI 481 , C) TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: After two days of negotiations to attempt to finalize language for a military-to-military memorandum of understanding (MOU), the U.S. and Libyan teams identified four areas of disagreement requiring further consultations with their respective capitals: 1) whether language referring to Libya's decision to abandon WMD could be modified; 2) whether language referring to Libya's decision to abandon state-sponsorship of terrorism could be deleted; 3) whether language providing security assurances to Libya could be amended or deleted, and; 4) whether there is flexibility with respect to including language that provides for reciprocal visits to weapons research

language that provides for reciprocal visits to weapons research & development facilities. The Libyan team, possibly reflecting direct guidance from Muammar al-Qadhafi, made it clear that unless security assurances are included, it could recommend postponing the signing of an MOU altogether until outstanding bilateral "political issues" - believed to be a reference to ongoing government-to-government negotiations for a comprehensive settlement of outstanding terrorism-related claims against Libya - are resolved. End summary.

¶2. (C) Representatives from several U.S. Department of Defense offices (Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Office of General Counsel and the Joint Staff) traveled to Libya to meet with officials of the Government of Libya (GOL) on June 22-23 to attempt to finalize language (ref A) for a military-to-military (mil-mil) memorandum of understanding (MOU).

U.S. Participants:

- Patricia Jacubec, Office of African Affairs, International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of Defense
- Linda Lourie, Office of General Counsel, U.S. Department of Defense
- Lt. Colonel Paul Estavillo, Joint Staff Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, U.S. Department of Defense
- Lt. Colonel Kyle Carnahan, Defense Attache, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli
- John Godfrey, Political and Economic Chief, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli
- Mabruk Bin Said, Interpreter

GOL Participants:

- General Ahmed al-Zwayy, Director of the Bureau of Technical Cooperation & the National Committee, Interim People's Committee for Defense
- Colonel Mukhtar Osman, Chief of Staff for General al-Zwayy
- Muhammad al-Suala, Legal Advisor, People's Interim Committee for Defense

U.S.: MOU USEFUL VEHICLE TO EXPAND MIL-MIL COOPERATION

¶3. (C) The U.S. team, led in its presentation by Jacubec, stressed that, from its perspective, the two sides were close to finalizing language for a mil-mil MOU, which it understood the Libyan Interim People's Committee for Defense (MOD) had stipulated as a requirement for expanded mil-mil engagement. The MOU would not be a formal treaty or agreement, but rather an MOU between the U.S. DOD and the Libyan MOD to expand bilateral military cooperation in areas of mutual interest. Jacubec also asked for the GOL's views on when, where and by whom the mil-mil MOU could be signed.

¶4. (C) The U.S. team then commented on specific points on which the two sides differed. The U.S. team indicated that the reference to Libya's decision to renounce terrorism as a political adjunct had been included since abandoning weapons of mass destruction programs and state-sponsored terrorism were the commitments that had facilitated the lifting of sanctions against Libya. On security assurances, the U.S. recognized that this was an important issue for the GOL; however, an informal MOU of the type envisioned was not an appropriate vehicle in which to articulate a commitment to guarantee Libya's sovereignty and security. The U.S. was interested in the possibility of discussing such issues in greater substance with the GOL, but the team was not in a position to address those issues in the context of an MOU. On assistance to development centers, the U.S. requested clarification as to the type of development centers the MOD wished to visit.

GOL: NO REFERENCE TO TERRORISM; SECURITY ASSURANCES "ESSENTIAL"

¶5. (C) General al-Zwayy offered a strong introductory statement.

(Note: al-Zwayy then left to attend other duties; the balance of the negotiations were conducted by Osman and al-Suala. End note.) Stressing his personal involvement in negotiations under the U.S.-U.K.-Libya Tri-lateral Steering and Coordination

TRIPOLI 00000505 002 OF 003

Committee (TSCC) that led to Libya's decision to abandon WMD, al-Zwayy said the GOL "rejected" including any reference in the preamble to Libya's decision to abandon state-sponsorship of terrorism. In addition, language referring to abandonment of WMD aspirations should be amended to read " ... [recognizing Libya's decision to] renounce voluntarily programs THAT COULD HAVE led to the production of weapons of mass destruction ... " to emphasize that Libya had not/not actually attained WMD.

¶6. (C) On security assurances, al-Zwayy adopted an even harder line. Reiterating arguments we've heard before, he complained that the U.S. had "given gifts" to Iran and North Korea in an attempt to persuade them to abandon their WMD programs. The U.S. had promised in the course of TSCC negotiations that it would help Libya acquire missiles and other conventional weapons to replace SCUD-C's and other weapons Libya surrendered; those promises had not, from the GOL's perspective, been met. The U.S. had persuaded Libya to abandon its WMD programs, which it had done voluntarily, and therefore "owed" Libya security assurances. The mil-mil MOU was, from the GOL's perspective, of a piece with earlier negotiations under the TSCC rubric; including in the MOU security assurances envisaged in the TSCC negotiations was therefore natural. Claiming that the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) had insisted on including language providing security assurances, al-Zwayy dismissed the distinction by the U.S. team between an MOU and a political agreement as a "meaningless bureaucratic reason". Characterizing the U.S. as "a great country" and stressing positive bilateral commercial ties, particularly in the oil and gas sector, al-Zwayy suggested that the U.S. was being petty by not offering assurances to Libya on "sensitive issues" such as security and defense.

¶7. (C) Continuing, al-Zwayy said a mil-mil MOU would be "meaningless" unless it contained security assurances. If/if the U.S. was not willing to offer such security assurances, the Libyan military "could" recommend postponing the signing of a mil-mil MOU altogether until "political issues were resolved" and the MOU was "complete", i.e., included security assurances. (Note: al-Zwayy's reference to "political issues" was believed to be a reference to ongoing government-to-government negotiations regarding a comprehensive settlement of outstanding terrorism-related claims against Libya in U.S. courts. End note.) Legal Advisor al-Suala echoed al-Zwayy, stressing that security assurances were "essential" to the spirit of the MOU and did not/not exceed the scope of the MOU from the GOL's perspective. Al-Zwayy and al-Suala rejected Jacubec's characterization of the MOU as a non-binding document that only encompassed a desire to cooperate in mutually-agreed areas.

LIBYA WANTS ACCESS TO U.S. WEAPONS R&D FACILITIES

¶8. (C) After considerable discussion concerning section two ("Areas of Cooperation") - assistance to and the exchange of visits between development centers - Osman and al-Suala clarified that, from the GOL's perspective, such language would encompass visits by Libyan military officers and scientists to U.S. weapons research and development (R&D) facilities, and reciprocal visits to Libyan facilities by U.S. officials. Carnahan explained that in the U.S., unlike in Europe, private companies perform a majority of weapons-related R&D. The USG could not instruct private U.S. companies to facilitate visits by foreign governments; however, the U.S. could agree to help

facilitate such visits, as it had for a recent visit by Libyan military officers to an American Motors Corporation facility at which military vehicles the GOL wishes to purchase are manufactured. Jacubec suggested that guaranteed visits to U.S. weapons R&D facilities would, from the U.S. perspective, necessitate a separate MOU with U.S. DOD elements responsible for weapons R&D; however, with concurrence from Washington, the U.S. could/could agree to reference interest in finalizing such an agreement in the mil-mil MOU. Claiming that the Libyan side had stressed its interest in R&D in all previous discussions with the U.S. on mil-mil cooperation, al-Suala and Osman stressed that the issue was "critical and essential" from the GOL's perspective, and pushed hard to amend the language to explicitly refer to reciprocal visits to weapons R&D facilities.

¶9. (C) The Libyan side offered no details on when, where and by whom the mil-mil MOU could be signed. At the conclusion of the negotiating sessions, the two teams agreed that further consultations with their respective capitals were needed to clarify positions on the following issues:

- Whether language in para three of the preamble referring to Libya's decision to abandon WMD programs could be amended to refer to a decision by Libya to " ... renounce voluntarily

TRIPOLI 00000505 003 OF 003

programs THAT COULD HAVE led to the production of weapons of mass destruction ... " to emphasize that Libya had not/not actually attained WMD (U.S. action);

- Whether the reference in para three of the preamble to Libya's decision to abandon state-sponsorship of terrorism could be deleted (U.S. action);

- Whether references in para three of the preamble affirming the commitment of the U.S. to ensure Libya's security and independence could be amended or deleted (U.S. and Libyan action);

- Whether there is flexibility with respect to including language that provides for reciprocal visits to weapons R&D facilities (U.S. and Libyan action)

¶10. (C) Comment: Al-Zwayy's inflexible stance on security assurances and removal of references to state-sponsorship of terrorism may have been approved at the highest levels of the regime. As reported ref B, we learned after recent discussions concerning the disposition of Libya's C-130 fleet that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally briefed the Libyan team before they met with their U.S. interlocutors and provided specific guidance on export license guarantees. It appears likely that al-Zwayy's warning that the Libyan side could postpone signing a mil-mil MOU until "political issues" had been resolved that would facilitate (from the GOL's perspective) including security assurances reflected his understanding of al-Qadhafi's marching orders. The position conveyed by al-Zwayy is consistent with a parallel message recently delivered by another senior regime official to the effect that political and military issues were, from the GOL's perspective, intricately intertwined and could not be addressed as discrete issues (ref C). Despite our efforts to delineate between an MOU to facilitate routine cooperation and a high-level political-military agreement that could incorporate security assurances, the regime appears to have calculated that the U.S. would be willing to consider including security assurances if/if a comprehensive settlement of outstanding terrorism-related claims is achieved. End comment.

¶11. (U) The DOD team did not have an opportunity to clear on this cable.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI506

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI506 aka Wikileaks id #159941 ?
Subject	FATHI EL-JAHMI'S SON ASKS EMBASSY TO STOP VISITING HIM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 27 Jun 2008 12:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/06/08TRIPOLI506.html
References	08TRIPOLI401 , 08TRIPOLI411
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI515
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4961
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0506 1791242
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271242Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3605
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0842
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0520
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4114
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000506

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FATHI EL-JAHMI'S SON ASKS EMBASSY TO STOP VISITING HIM

REF: A) TRIPOLI 401 , B) TRIPOLI 411 , C) TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Post received on June 23 a letter addressed to P/E Chief, which had been sent via Libya's domestic postal service. The handwritten letter (text below), dated May 22, was signed by Muhammad el-Jahmi, the eldest son of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi.

Begin text of letter:

Dear (P/E Chief):

If your visit is motivated by concern and care for the condition

of our father, Mr. Fathi el-Jahmi, we believe we are more concerned and care more for him than you. If your visits to him are merely to check on him and the status of his health, we members of his family visit him continuously and can inform you that he is in good health. I wish to inform you that your frequent visits to him in the hospital are causing us problems; I urge you stop visiting our father.

On behalf of Fathi el-Jahmi's family,

Muhammad el-Jahmi

End text of letter

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, P/E Chief attempted to visit Fathi el-Jahmi on May 14 to check on his welfare and whereabouts. P/E Chief encountered three members of el-Jahmi's family - son Muhammad and daughters Lamia and Hana. Muhammad el-Jahmi, clearly unhappy that an Emboff was present outside his father's room at the Tripoli Medical Center, declined to speak with P/E Chief. In a brief conversation, Lamia el-Jahmi told P/E Chief that the el-Jahmi family, and Muhammad in particular as the eldest son, were under "tremendous pressure" from officials of the Government of Libya (GOL) and the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF). The family believed contact with Emboffs was "very dangerous" for them and for Fathi el-Jahmi. The family's visit on May 14 had required several weeks to orchestrate. Muhammad had been particularly anxious to avoid giving the appearance that the family had coordinated its visits with the Embassy - something GOL and QDF officials had warned him against doing - and the coincidental visit by P/E Chief upset him greatly. Lamia confirmed that the family had received threats.

¶3. (C) Comment: Although Muhammad el-Jahmi made it clear on May 14 that he was unhappy that P/E Chief's attempted visit coincided with that of the family, it is not clear whether the letter above was written under duress. The letter refers to "continuous" visits by the family to Fathi el-Jahmi; however, before May 14, the family had been unable to visit el-Jahmi since April 3 and had in fact indirectly requested Post's assistance in facilitating a visit. Qadhafi Development Foundation Executive Director Dr. Yusuf Sawani and senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi used identical phraseology - " ... frequent visits ... " in complaining to Post that P/E Chief had visited el-Jahmi too often, warning that continued efforts to do so would have consequences for the broader bilateral U.S.-Libya relationship (refs B, C). Post suggests that NEA/MAG and/or DRL reach out to Fathi el-Jahmi's Boston-based brother, also named Muhammad el-Jahmi, to confirm whether son Muhammad was pressured to write the letter in an attempt by the GOL and QDF to forestall further visits. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI515

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI515 aka Wikileaks id #160334 ?
Subject	LIBYAN LEADER AUTHOR OF HARD LINE ON DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI515.html
References	08TRIPOLI506
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI541 , 08TRIPOLI588 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO7396
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0515 1831608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 011608Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3617
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0532
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0698
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0843
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0521
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4126
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000515

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/1/2018
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PINR
[Intelligence] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN LEADER AUTHOR OF HARD LINE ON DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS
ACTIVIST EL-JAHMI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL), B) TRIPOLI 506

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.   (C) In a meeting with MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr.
Ahmed Fituri on July 1, the CDA asked whether Fituri had pursued
discussions with key GOL elements about the possibility of
facilitating the release of detained human rights activist Fathi
el-Jahmi.  In an earlier meeting, Fituri had said he would
suggest that National Security Adviser Dr. Muatassim al-Qadhafi
(one of the Libyan leader's sons) endorse a plan to release
```

el-Jahmi and subsidize his travel outside Libya for needed medical treatment as a humanitarian gesture.

¶2. (S/NF) Fituri said he had broached the idea with Muatassim, who agreed with the logic of releasing el-Jahmi and agreed to take it up with other elements of the GOL's leadership. Muatassim later told Fituri that senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi had been "very tough" in his response to the suggestion. (Note: Sanussi summoned GRPO Chief to an unscheduled meeting on June 7 in which he conveyed messages on el-Jahmi and other issues (ref A). Sanussi was until 2007 the director of Libya's military intelligence organization (DMI). He continues to play a significant role as an adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, another son of the Leader. End note.)

¶3. (S/NF) According to Fituri, Sanussi told Muatassim that Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi was personally following el-Jahmi's case and was upset that the U.S. kept raising it. (Note: The Leader reportedly took great offense at el-Jahmi's public criticism of him and his stewardship of the country. El-Jahmi's much-publicized remarks led to his arrest and detention. End note.) Fituri said he would broach the issue with Muatassim again to see if there was any possibility that the idea of releasing el-Jahmi could be revisited.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: Muatassim's reported comments suggest that the message Sanussi delivered in early June was authored by al-Qadhafi himself. Persuading the GOL to release el-Jahmi will therefore probably entail persuading Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi himself that it is in Libya's interest to do so. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI517

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI517 aka Wikileaks id #160339 ?
Subject	LIBYA/UNSC: 1267, IRAN AND KOSOVO
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Jul 2008 16:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI517.html
References	08STATE66897 , 08STATE69339 , 08STATE69684
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7418
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0517 1831650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011650Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3620
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0132
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4129
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000517

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, INR, T, IO, AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/1/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , UN *[United Nations]* , LY *[Libya]* , KV *[Kosovo]* , IR *[Iran]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA/UNSC: 1267, IRAN AND KOSOVO

REF: (A) STATE 69684 , (B) STATE 66897 , (C) STATE 69339 , (D) STATE 69691

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The CDA met with the MFA Director of UN Security Council affairs on June 30 to press for Libyan support for improvements to the UNSCR 1267 sanctions regime, call for increased Libyan diligence with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), and reiterate strong U.S. support for Kosovo's independence. End summary.

1267 SANCTIONS PROCESS

¶2. (C) The CDA briefed MFA Director of UNSC affairs Tajouri al-Shiradi June 30 on U.S. support for a follow-on resolution to UNSCR 1735 designed to extend and improve the mandate of the 1267 sanctions regime against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and urged Libya to publicly support the resolution (refs A and B). Al-Shiradi expressed satisfaction that the U.S. shared Libya's

commitment to a "fair" 1267 sanctions procedure; however, he questioned the utility of releasing any information to the public regarding the basis for listing or de-listing entities. Governments, not/not the public, are best positioned to decide whether an individual or entity deserves to be sanctioned by the 1267 committee, he said.

IRISIL AND UNSCR 1803

¶3. (C) CDA raised U.S. concerns about recent attempts by the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) to avoid inspection and interdiction as envisioned by UNSCRs 1737, 1747, and 1803 (ref C). While al-Shiradi was unable to speak to concerns over IRISL directly, he said that Libya, a non-permanent UNSC member that joined with the U.S. to pass UNSCR 1803, was well aware of its international obligations. He said the GOL had recently circulated detailed information about its obligations under UNSCR 1803 to potentially effected Libyan entities, including shipping companies, maritime authorities, and banks.

KOSOVO

¶4. (C) CDA reiterated strong U.S. support for Kosovo's independence and repeated calls for Libya to recognize Kosovo's independence and consider participating in a July 11 donors' conference (ref D). Al-Shiradi said that Kosovo remains an issue of great importance to Russia and that there has been no change in Libya's position (which is not/not to recognize Kosovo's independence). As a result, participation in the donors' conference was not currently under consideration.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI526

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI526 aka Wikileaks id #160690 ?
Subject	LIBYA SEEKS TO BLACKMAIL EUROPEAN MISSIONS FOR VISAS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jul 2008 13:13 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI526.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9261
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0526 1851313
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031313Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3630
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0535
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0701
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0647
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1133
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0846
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0524
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0013
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0315
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0438
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0153
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4139
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000526

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/1/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SEEKS TO BLACKMAIL EUROPEAN MISSIONS FOR VISAS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In two recent cases, Government of Libya (GOL) officials have essentially blackmailed foreign embassies to issue visas to well-connected but unqualified Libyan visa applicants in exchange for routine diplomatic services. The experiences likely presage challenges Post will face as it expands the scope of its visa processing services in Tripoli. End summary.

¶2. (C) On June 29, Greek DHM Ioannis Stamatekos told Poloff

that the GOL officially informed Greek Embassy officials in Tripoli in a meeting at the MFA that they would not/not clear a shipment of diplomatic goods through Libyan customs unless Greece reversed its position on 12 visa cases of interest to the Libyan authorities. The shipment contains alcoholic beverages from a private Danish duty-free supplier to the Greek Embassy. (Note: The supplier, Peter-Justessen, is the sole company authorized by the GOL to ship alcohol to foreign diplomatic missions in Libya. End note.) According to Stamatekos, the Libyans blocked the shipment after the Greek Consul in Tripoli denied tourist visa applications for 12 "well-connected Libyans". He noted the visa applicants did not actually intend to travel to Greece, but wanted to obtain a Schengen visa from the Greek Embassy since Greece has not yet incorporated biometric requirements into its visa application procedure.

¶3. (C) On June 30, Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt told CDA that the Libyan authorities recently informed the Swiss Embassy that the Libyan Ministry of the Interior (equivalent) would not/not register the newly-arrived Swiss deputy chief of mission's vehicle and would not/not provide the vehicle with license plates unless Switzerland reversed its recent decision to deny a tourist visa to a well-connected Libyan. The Ambassador did not say how Switzerland reacted to the threat.

¶4. (C) Comment: The willingness of the GOL to extort other diplomatic missions to issue visas to prominent but unqualified Libyans reflects the extent to which politically-connected individuals are able to manipulate public institutions for their own benefit. In an opaque regime in which lines of authority are deliberately blurred to obscure power structures and mitigate accountability, corruption is pervasive. As Post moves to expand the scope of its visa processing services in Tripoli, we will likely face similar challenges. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI527

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI527 aka Wikileaks id #160691 ?
Subject	LIBYAN RESPONSE ON ARB-4 REVIEW PROCEEDINGS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jul 2008 13:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI527.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9263
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0527 1851316
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 031316Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3631
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4140
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000527

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/WCI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/3/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , KDRG *[Detainee Repatriation from Guantanamo Bay]* , KBTR, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN RESPONSE ON ARB-4 REVIEW PROCEEDINGS

REF: (A) STATE 61922, (B) TRIPOLI 497

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) On July 1, MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayab conveyed to P/E Chief a diplomatic note containing information the GOL wishes to convey to the Accountability Review Board (ARB) related to Omar Mahjoub (ISN 695) and Abu Faraj Libi (ISN 10017). Ayab said efforts were underway by unspecified elements of the GOL to contact relatives of the two men to advise them that the review proceedings were coming up and to solicit any written input the relatives might offer.

¶2. (SBU) The full text of the diplomatic note follows.

(begin text)

The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya
The General People's Committee
For Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

Note Verbale

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk) sends its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya and further to the Embassy's dipnote #08/502 dated June 18, 2008 related to the ARB proceedings intending to review the cases of two Libyan nationals, Omar Khalifa Abu Bakr Al-Mahjoub and Abu Faraj Allibi, in the Guantanamo Bay detention camp and wishes to inform the esteemed Embasy of the following.

- The investigation, indictment, and court proceedings of these nationals will be carried out vigorously in accordance with Libyan criminal law.
- If the individual is not indicted, cannot be indicted due to a lack of criminal evidence, or is acquitted, he will remain subject to the law. Any criminal act, even if not of a terrorist nature, will expose its perpetrator to the full force of criminal proceedings, as is the case for all Libyan citizens. We cannot tolerate such acts under the law.
- Law enforcement officers in our security services, as well as judges and the general prosecutors' office in the judicial system, have the authority and qualifications to carry out their tasks in terms of monitoring, detecting, collecting evidence, investigating, and ensuring a fair trial, in addition to implementing sentences.
- Legislation in our country related to prisons guarantees that a person serving a prison sentence has clear and straightforward rights. Prisoners are rehabilitated according to their capacities and qualifications. We have people [in prison] who are carrying on their studies in high school and university.
- Regarding the [detainees'] relatives, there is no doubt that they wish to meet them [the detainees] and even to see them released. We think that they [the relatives] have nothing to offer the detainees except their moral support.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed U.S. Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

(Seal)
To: U.S. Embassy Tripoli
July 1, 2008
(end text)

STEVENS

Media

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI528

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI528 aka Wikileaks id #160697 ?
Subject	GOL SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON WHETHER IT COULD CUT OIL PRODUCTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jul 2008 13:37 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI528.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9411
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0528 1851434
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 031337Z JUL 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3632
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBC/DTS BASRAH
RUEHBC/REO BASRAH 0002
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0033
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0154
RUEHDE/DTS DUBAI
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0028
RUEHKUK/DTS KIRKUK
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0002
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0847
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0525
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0439
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4141
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0058
RUEHROV/DTS VATICAN
RUEHROV/AMEMBASSY VATICAN 0002
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000528

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ZFR message will be resent under new

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON WHETHER IT COULD CUT OIL PRODUCTION

ZFR message will be resent under new MCN.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI530

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI530 aka Wikileaks id #160700 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S BERBER MINORITY STILL OUT IN THE COLD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jul 2008 13:54 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI530.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI588 , 08TRIPOLI921 , 09TRIPOLI198 , 09TRIPOLI22 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
O R 031354Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3637
INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000530

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ODIP *[U.S. Diplomatic Representation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S BERBER MINORITY STILL OUT IN THE COLD

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Despite some evidence in 2007 of a thaw in Libya's decades-long marginalization of its Berber minority, the Government of Libya (GOL) has recently renewed its vigorous denials that any ethno-linguistically distinct Berber communities exist on Libyan territory. In May, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi made an unprecedented visit to the Berber heartland to praise the "Arab belonging and destiny" of the Libyan people, and to decry "foreign intelligence plots" to fracture Libyans along ethnic or sectarian lines. Post's efforts to visit areas with significant Berber populations and to meet with government officials to discuss Libya's Berber heritage have met with angry GOL denials and accusations of "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs. The GOL took the unusual step of forbidding all Embassy personnel from visiting the town of Zuwara, a large Berber community. The GOL's hard line on Libya's Berber minority underscores that sectarian and ethnic identity remains a sensitive issue for

sectarian and ethnic identity remains a sensitive issue for influential elements of the regime. End summary.

DESPITE MELLOWING, OFFICIAL DENIAL THAT LIBYA IS ANYTHING BUT HOMOGENEOUS PERSIST

¶2. (C) In 2007, the GOL showed some evidence of mellowing its long-standing denials that any Berber community exists on Libyan territory. (Note: Post and other international observers estimate that 25,000 to 150,000 ethnic Berbers live in Libya. End note.) The GOL for the first time granted permission to the Amazigh (or Berber) World Congress to host a large gathering in Tripoli in August 2007. PM Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, Qadhafi's second oldest son and president of the Qadhafi Development Foundation, made high-profile visits in August and September 2007 to the predominantly Berber communities around Zuwara, Nalut, and Kabao to announce major infrastructure investments designed to revitalize Libya's historic Berber heartland.

¶3. (C) In May 2008, Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi himself made an unprecedented visit to meet with a number of obstensibly Berber tribes in Jadu; however, in contrast to Saif al-Islam's travels, Qadhafi used his May 17 visit to vigorously deny Libya's Berber history. According to accounts in state-owned media, representatives of prominent Berber communities, including the Berber centers of Nalut and Kabao, issued a statement on the occasion of Qadhafi's visit praising the "Arab belonging and destiny" of all Libyans and rejecting "claims propagated by the envious agents of the West and its intelligence bodies to divide~ [Libya] under false ethnic, sectarian, and tribal slogans". A contact of the Embassy whose family hails from the Jadu area said that Qadhafi had privately warned the leaders of the community that, "You can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes -- Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever -- but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes."

POST'S OUTREACH ON BERBER ISSUES DEEMED "UNACCEPTABLE INTERFERENCE" IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS

¶4. (C) In March, Post informed the GOL that an Emboff planned to travel to Zuwara (the unofficial capital of Libya's Berber community located approximately 100 km west of Tripoli) to meet with local officials to discuss Libya's Berber heritage. On April 1, MFA Americas Desk Officer Muhammad Ayad convoked A/DCM and Poloff to deny the existence of any Berber community in Libya and to accuse Post of "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs. All Libyans are Arabs who migrated to Libya from the Arabian Peninsula approximately 1,000 years ago, he explained, adding that no Libyans speak any language other than Arabic. Responding to a comment by A/DCM, he angrily insisted that the Berber language was "merely a dialect or accent" of Arabic, likening it to the difference between Maghrebi and Shami dialects of Arabic. Sharply criticizing Emboffs for "misunderstanding" Libya, Ayab cautioned Post "not to try to find obstacles" to better bilateral U.S.-Libya relations by intefering in purely local matters. He added that "this issue (the Berbers) is too sensitive for us (Libya) to discuss".

¶5. (C) Ayab also passed a diplomatic note articulating the GOL's objections (para 7); he called the next day to recall the first iteration of the note and pass a more sharply worded version (para 8) that denied permission for Emboffs to visit Zuwara and threatened that the GOL could not/not guarantee mission personnel's safety if they insisted on making the trip. The ostensible concern was that members of the Berber community would be angered by the implication that they were members of a minority group, an implication that the dipnote likened to depriving them of their citizenship, and could assault Emboffs. (Note: Emboffs have previously visited the Jebel Nafusa area and

Zuwara, where members of the Berber minority take great pride in their distinctive ethno-linguistic heritage and take pains to tell visitors that they are not/not Arab, prefer not to speak Arabic and do not inter-marry with Arabs. Zuwara is widely known for reverse discrimination: Berber inhabitants, who constitute the majority of the town's population, insist on speaking only the Berber language, even with members of the town's Arabic minority. End note.)
Following the Zuwara visit request, the Emboff identified in Post's notification of the planned travel and his spouse faced heightened surveillance and harassment. A senior Libyan official told CDA in early April that the proposed visit raised concerns within the security services about Post's efforts to report on political developments in Libya in general, and about Emboff's outreach to Libyans in particular.

¶6. (C) Comment: MFA officials and locally engaged staff who have seen the diplomatic notes are convinced that only a very senior regime figure, possibly Muammar al-Qadhafi himself, could have authored such sharply worded language in official correspondence. Whether al-Qadhafi actually authored the replies or not, the official rhetoric that attended his visit to Berber country, together with his remarks in Jadu, highlight the fact that for him and other senior elements of the GOL, anything suggesting that Libya's population is not ethnically and religiously homogeneous (there are also significant numbers of Tuareg in the southwest) is extremely sensitive. End comment.

¶7. (SBU) The full text of the MFA's first diplomatic note on the Zuwara visit follows.

(begin text)
Ref: 2008/515

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation sends its compliments to the US Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya, and further to the Embassy's dip note # 08/262 dated March 26, 2008, it wishes to inform of the following:

- In Great Jamahiriya, there is nothing called Berber community, and the use of this term denotes lack of true knowledge of the history of the region in general and Libya in particular, and does not reflect the reality and nature of the homogeneous Libyan society.
- All Libyans come from Arab origins; they came from the Arab Peninsula by land (Barr) and that's why some tribes that had arrived earlier in Libya are called "Barbar" (or Berber).
- This is interference in internal affairs, and it is not acceptable, and this is rejected by Libyans who have sacrificed more than 750 thousand martyrs for the sake of their sovereignty.
- The demographic structure in Libya is a homogenous one that belongs to Arab origins; their language is Arabic (with all the meanings this word may have) and there is nothing what we might call "community".
- This visit is not permitted for the said person or any other one, and therefore, we shall have no responsibility whatsoever for a visit of this kind.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)
(end text)

¶8. (SBU) The full text of the MFA's second diplomatic note on the Zuwara visit follows.

(begin text)
Ref: 2008/515

Ref: 2008/515

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation sends its compliments to the US Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya, and further to the Embassy's dip note # 08/262 dated March 26, 2008, sent to General Protocol requesting the GPC's assistance in arranging a visit by the US Embassy Political Attachi Mr. Joshua Harris to Zuwara city on April 9th, 2009, and the purpose of the visit according to the dip note is to learn about the Libya's Berber community, and requesting arranging meetings with (The Secretary of the Basic People's Committee of Zuwara/ An appropriate local official that works with the city's Berber community/ Representatives of the Zuwara Berber community, including any involved in teaching the Berber language).

While the General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation find this request unusual, it expresses its protest, and requests the Embassy to clarify what is the Berber community that you wish to visit? And who asked you to do so? And is this area you want to visit is inside the United States or in Libya? And can we inspect the minorities living in America such as (the blacks, the Red Indians, and the Chicano~)?

Libyans refuse such interference in their internal affairs and sovereignty for the sake of which they sacrificed more than 750 thousand martyrs, and you know well how they sacrificed and are still doing so for the sake of their Arab homeland, their nationalism and religion.

You know well how many Libyan citizens went to fight in Afghanistan and Iraq to defend the fatherland and religion and to resist foreign interference.

Therefore, we shall not be responsible for any assaults that might happen to any American that tries to interfere in the internal affairs of the country whatever was his capacity or his purposes, and we do not find assaults unusual from any group that might be destitute of its citizenship and called "community or colony" within its own country.

This request is therefore very unusual. We rejected it, and we request a response and an explanation for it.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)
(end text)

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI532

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI532 aka Wikileaks id #160711 ?
Subject	GOL SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON WHETHER IT COULD CUT OIL PRODUCTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Jul 2008 14:30 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI532.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI540
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9395
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0532/01 1851430
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 031430Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3641
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0855
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0533
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0036
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0444
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0157
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0061
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4150
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000532

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/3/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL SENDS MIXED SIGNALS ON WHETHER IT COULD CUT OIL PRODUCTION

TRIPOLI 00000532 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting, the head of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) reiterated that Libya could/could cut oil production as a response to U.S. legislation facilitating attachment of Libyan assets and lawsuits against it; however, other GOL sources cautioned that his remarks were targeted primarily at the domestic Libyan audience. He said GOL

leaders were "working hard" on issues related to resolving outstanding terrorism-related claims against Libya in U.S. courts and well understood the urgency of moving quickly to do so. Ghanem equivocated on whether a Development and Production Sharing (DePSA) bid round to foreign oil companies for re-working of existing fields would be necessary for Libya to produce 3 million barrels/day of oil by 2012, but made it clear that the NOC would not/not open a DePSA round unless and until it was broadly agreed among senior GOL officials that such a mechanism was politically palatable. Ghanem seemed eager to play a positive role in resolving the claims compensation issue; his remarks suggested that the GOL is using a model for contributions akin to that it ultimately adopted in the case of the Bulgarian medics. End summary.

¶2. (C) The CDA met with Dr. Shukri Ghanem, Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), on July 3 to discuss energy sector developments and U.S.-Libya cooperation. Ghanem was accompanied by Dr. Abdullah Ballut, Libya's OPEC Governor; P/E Chief attended as notetaker. The CDA asked Ghanem to clarify his remarks at the Jeddah Energy Conference on June 22 to the effect that Libya may/may effect a unilateral cut in oil production in response to Section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the so-called "Lautenberg Amendment"), adopted in January 2008, and the No Oil Producing or Exporting Cartels Act of 2008 (the so-called "NOPEC" bill), which was passed by the House in May and is now before the Senate. Ghanem's remarks in Jeddah suggested that while Libya has increased its oil production in recent years, the threat of potential asset seizure (under the Lautenberg Amendment) and exposure to lawsuits for price manipulation (under NOPEC) may drive the GOL to cut production despite the cost to the country's ambitious economic development program.

GHANEM REITERATES CLAIM THAT LIBYA MAY CUT OIL PRODUCTION

¶3. (C) Known for his candor, Ghanem explained that he meant what he said: Libya may choose to cut production as a reaction to what it perceives to be unfair U.S. Congressional legislation. He lamented the "illogical" damages award in a U.S. federal court of $6 billion in the UTA bombing case. With more than 20 other terrorism-related claims compensation cases in litigation in U.S. courts, Libya's exposure to other "overly harsh" judgments - motivated in his judgment by an irrational desire to make Libya pay for perceived past misdeeds - was considerable. Focusing on the potential seizure of Libyan assets under the Lautenberg Amendment, to include oil production-related payments involving U.S. and European companies, Ghanem asked how Libya could reasonably be expected to increase production in a political-economic environment in which the attendant profits were at considerable risk of attachment.

¶4. (C) Asked by P/E Chief why he had chosen to threaten a production cut in June and not earlier in the year after adoption of the Lautenberg Amendment, Ghanem declined to give a direct answer. When pressed, he said only that his remarks were motivated by both the Lautenberg Amendment and the proposed NOPEC bill. (Note: Ghanem himself has staunchly defended OPEC during his tenure as NOC Chairman, arguing that current production levels are sufficient and that price speculation and global political tension, to include inflammatory comments by world leaders, are to blame for high oil prices. End note.) In a separate meeting on July 1, MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri characterized Ghanem's remarks in Jeddah as having been made for domestic Libyan consumption and advised the CDA not to attach too much meaning to them.

¶5. (C) Noting that he well understood the consequences of high oil prices for the U.S. economy, Ghanem reprised themes from his Jeddah remarks in explaining spikes in oil prices. U.S. Congressional legislation in the 1980's to enforce sanctions

against Iran and Libya had limited needed investment in production and refining capacity, which involved long lead-times of 10-20 years. Absent such "reckless" legislation, he claimed

TRIPOLI 00000532 002.2 OF 003

Iranian and Libyan production would have been some 6 million barrels/day and 4 million barrels/day at present. (Note: Libya currently produces some 1.7 million barrels/day. End note.) More recently, U.S. Energy Secretary Bodman had warned the CEO of Italian energy giant Eni against investing in Iran, which was unhelpful. U.S. foreign policy decisions - he lambasted "blind" U.S. support for Israel and the decision to invade Iraq - and the reluctance to allow offshore drilling and production along U.S. coasts were among the factors that had brought to an end the era of cheap, easy oil. The market was now entering a period of "peak oil" in which demand was high and surplus production capacity limited. The devaluation of the dollar, speculation by investors about future oil prices and political uncertainty exacerbated price volatility.

GOL FOCUSED ON RESOLVING U.S. CLAIMS ISSUES

¶6. (C) Noting that senior GOL officials were working "very hard" on a mechanism for comprehensive settlement of all outstanding terrorism-related court cases in U.S. venues, Ghanem stressed that the GOL well understood that time was of the essence. It was impossible to overstate, he said, the impact the court cases and compensation claims could have on Libya in terms of oil production and its bilateral relations with the U.S. Referencing the UTA decision and decrying the independence of the U.S. judiciary, he said it was "inconceivable" that "a judge in some small village (sic)" could issue damages awards against Libya for billions of dollars. On reports that some GOL elements opposed to reaching a comprehensive claims settlement agreement, Ghanem conceded that certain senior regime figures who felt Libya had not been adequately compensated for its decision to abandon its WMD aspirations and renounce terrorism had strongly opposed any direct GOL contribution to a claims compensation fund, especially when they learned that the USG would not contribute, either.

U.S. COMPANIES EXPECTED TO DO WELL IN FUTURE EPSA BID ROUNDS

¶7. (C) Commenting on recent extensions of production contracts with Eni, Petro-Canada and Occidental Petroleum under terms markedly more favorable for Libya, Ghanem said the NOC had been "transparent and efficient" in negotiating contracts under its Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric. Libya had produced 3.7 million barrels/day in the early 1970's and would - all things political remaining relatively equal - hit 3 million barrels/day by 2012. Referencing the fact that they and many other senior GOL officials had studied in the U.S. during the 1970's at the high water mark of U.S.-Libya educational cooperation, Ghanem and Ballut stressed that they "had a soft spot" for American oil and gas companies, and expected U.S. companies to continue to fare well in securing EPSA contracts in Libya. Asked whether radical privatization and government restructuring proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi in his March 2 address to the General People's Congress would impact the NOC's operations, Ghanem laughingly said he didn't have a crystal ball and had no way of knowing. "Al-Qadhafi keeps the crystal ball in his desk" and only he (al-Qadhafi) really knew whether the proposed changes would amount to much.

NO DePSA CONTRACTS ABSENT LIBYAN POLITICAL CONSENSUS

¶8. (C) Asked whether substantial investment in the redevelopment of existing fields through enhanced oil recovery operations under a Development and Production Sharing (DePSA) bid round to foreign oil companies would be a key to reaching 3 million barrels/day, Ghanem equivocated. When pressed, he referred to

barrels/day, Ghanem equivocated. When pressed, he referred to Venezuela's negative experience in allocating DePSA contracts, when the Oil Minister was driven from office on related corruption charges. Libya had not yet developed a system for allocating DePSA contracts that provided sufficient political cover. Consequently, the NOC had adopted a dual approach: Libyan national oil companies were performing some DePSA work in the numerous smaller, scattered fields drilled since the 1960's while the NOC studied the two large fields - al-Haram and Entilat - in which foreign oil companies' expertise was clearly needed and developed a mechanism for obtaining political approval to give DePSA contracts to foreign companies. He conceded that the NOC had not yet determined how to resolve tension between international oil companies, who wanted production sharing arrangements rather than services contracts, and the GOL, which favored services contracts for DePSA work.

TRIPOLI 00000532 003.2 OF 003

¶9. (C) Ghanem was adamant that he would not endorse allocation of DePSA contracts without a "national consensus" involving approval by the General People's Congress and senior regime elements. Explaining the political sensitivities involved, he said that do otherwise would expose him to accusations that the NOC had given oil to the U.S., which would give it to Israel, which had cut fuel shipments to the Palestinian Authority. In the context of domestic Libyan politics, DePSA contracts could expose him to charges that he had been party to a mechanism that effectively aided Israel and hurt the Palestinians, which was tantamount to political suicide.

¶10. (C) Comment: This was the Embassy's first meeting with Ghanem, who has been elusive, since 2006. He seemed eager to play a positive role in resolving the claims compensation issue, and demonstrated acute appreciation of the need to move quickly to do so. Ghanem's comments on DePSA work highlight how politically sensitive oil and gas issues are in the domestic Libyan political context, and suggest that the NOC is not likely to determine whether and how to open a DePSA bid round to foreign companies soon. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI538

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI538 aka Wikileaks id #160997 ?
Subject	LIBYA FAVORS MORE TIME FOR AFRICAN MEDIATION IN ZIMBABWE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 7 Jul 2008 15:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI538.html
References	08STATE61842 , 08STATE70882
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1095
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0538/01 1891529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 071529Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3649
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0133
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 0126
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE 0134
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE 0020
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE IMMEDIATE 0012
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE 0059
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1139
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4158
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000538

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF, AF/C, AF/SPG, AF/SE, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/7/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ZI *[Zimbabwe]* , SU *[Sudan]* , CD *[Chad]* , UN *[United Nations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA FAVORS MORE TIME FOR AFRICAN MEDIATION IN ZIMBABWE

REF: A) STATE 70882 , B) TRIPOLI 473, C) TRIPOLI 406, D) STATE 61842

CLASSIFIED BY: John Godfrey, A/DCM, AmEmbassy Tripoli, State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. The GOL is "bound by the AU decision" to support a South Africa-led national reconciliation process in Zimbabwe and will not support a draft UNSC resolution calling for targeted sanctions on key Mugabe regime figures. Libya's top officials responsible for African affairs urged more time for African mediation efforts in Zimbabwe and bluntly told the U.S. not/not to get involved in the crisis. The GOL remains equally frustrated with both Chad and Sudan and has conditioned any future mediation on both countries' leaders offering a "real commitment" to a political settlement. End Summary.

¶2. (U) MFA Secretary for African Union Affairs Ali Treiki met with CDA on July 7. Libya's former ambassador to Zimbabwe, Mahmoud al-Azzabi, and Poloff also attended.

ZIMBABWE

¶3. (C) Responding to ref A demarche points, Treiki voiced displeasure with politically-motivated violence in connection with the June 27 elections in Zimbabwe, but stressed that Libya is "bound by the AU decision" to support a national reconciliation process mediated by South Africa. Libya will not/not support a draft UNSC resolution that called for an arms embargo and targeted sanctions on key Mugabe regime figures (ref A). Treiki urged more time -- "days and weeks" -- to allow African countries to mediate and reiterated his long-standing opposition to sanctions, which he called "unhelpful." UNSC sanctions on regime figures would only harden the regime and complicate African efforts to promote a national reconciliation.

¶4. (C) Treiki refused to offer his personal views on the AU's position on Zimbabwe but said that Libya has tried to support South Africa's mediation efforts. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi held a private meeting with Mugabe on the margins of the AU summit in Sharm El Sheikh. In the run-up to the presidential election, Treiki dispatched al-Azzabi, a top aide and former Libyan ambassador to Harare, to monitor the situation. Treiki voiced concerns that South African president Thabo Mbeki has a strained relationship with the Zimbabwe opposition. He criticized opposition leader Morgan Tsvangirai as "uneducated" and complained about his frequent reversals on whether or not to stand in the presidential elections.

¶5. (C) Using uncharacteristically blunt language, Treiki cautioned the U.S. not/not to get involved in the current Zimbabwe crisis: "really, do not get directly involved." He criticized Tsvangirai for seeking refuge in the Dutch Embassy in Harare in response to safety concerns rather than in a neighboring African country, noting, disapprovingly, that the opposition leader is seen as very "pro-Western."

CHAD / SUDAN

¶6. (C) Treiki reported that Chadian President Idriss Deby and Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir asked Qadhafi on the margins of the AU summit in Sharm El Sheikh to continue Libya's efforts to mediate in the on-going Chad-Sudan crisis (refs B and C). Treiki expressed frustration that both leaders "do not respect their agreements" and conditioned Libya's future efforts to mediate on a real commitment from both sides. Treiki was pessimistic on the future of the Dakar Accord Contact Group, describing the July 17 meeting in Dakar as "more show than substance" and noting that mediation would not be successful without a commitment from Deby and Bashir to a political settlement.

¶7. (C) Treiki voiced satisfaction with U.S. support for UNSC sanctions on JEM-affiliated individuals, including JEM faction leader Khalil Ibrahim (ref D). (Note: While Libya has consistently opposed sanctions on African governments, it has pushed for "consequences" for rebel leaders who refuse to participate in peaceful negotiations. End note.) Treiki offered lukewarm support to new UN/AU joint mediator Djibril Bassole, raising concerns about Bassole's lack of experience compared with former UN S/E Jan Eliasson and AU S/E Salim Salim.

¶8. (C) Treiki reiterated previous calls for Deby to make real concessions to opposition groups as part of a domestic political reconciliation. "Deby wants the opposition to surrender, not negotiate," he said. Deby is "not serious" about dialogue and refuses to accept that he cannot govern Chad from a Zaghawa

TRIPOLI 00000538 002 OF 002

tribal base that represents only 6% of the population. Libya remains concerned that Deby is still arming JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim while Sudan continually supports Chadian opposition groups.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI540

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI540 aka Wikileaks id #161181 ?
Subject	CHEVRON MAY QUIT LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Jul 2008 14:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI540.html
References	08TRIPOLI532
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TRIPOLI 00000540 P CO 08-JUL-08 CHEVRON MAY QUIT LIBYA [7759727]From: CBPC,
EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, July 08, 2008 9:22 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000540 P CO 08-JUL-08 CHEVRON MAY QUIT LIBYA [7759727]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO1934
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHTRO #0540 1901452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081452Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3652
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1141
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0541
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0707
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0653
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0858
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0536
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4161
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000540

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/7/2018
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ENRG [Energy
and Power] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CHEVRON MAY QUIT LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 532

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Acting CDA, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (e)
¶1.    (C)  Following up on rumors that Chevron had resigned itself
```

¶1. (C) Following up on rumors that Chevron had resigned itself to withdrawing from Libya in March 2010 after completion of its current exploration program, Econoff met with a local representative of the company on July 2 to discuss the company's future here. Chevron is currently conducting exploration of its lone Libyan concession - a parcel in the remote Marzuq Basin, located in the far southwest of the country - which it won in the March 2005 exploration and production sharing (EPSA) round. Chevron is one of six U.S. exploration and production (E&P) oil and gas companies active in Libya.

¶2. (C) Under the terms of its EPSA contract, Chevron is required to drill at least one well in its concession, which is considered to be a high-risk greenfield area (no exploration had previously been done there). Its program of seismic exploration and analysis has been completed; a subcontractor will begin drilling the first of two test wells in August. The wells will be drilled to further explore two sub-surface structures of interest, the only promising areas found following the collection and analysis of thousands of square kilometers worth of seismic data. Disappointing seismic results have generated a great deal of pessimism about the likelihood of a significant find. Given the parcel's remote of location, a very large discovery would be needed to make a field worth the cost of development and linkage to an existing pipeline network for export. Although Emboff's source demurred on the chances of success, other well-informed contacts in the oil and gas sector have characterized the prospects for the block as dim, estimating a 2-3% chance that sufficient reserves would be found upon drilling to make production commercially viable.

¶3. (C) Comment: While Chevron continues to assess new EPSA opportunities in Libya, the company has reportedly adopted a fairly conservative approach to bidding that would likely disadvantage the company's efforts to secure new acreage in future EPSA bidding rounds. Oil and gas contacts have noted Chevron's reluctance to adopt the prevailing "auction mentality" and accede to draconian EPSA terms, particularly low production shares, that the NOC is currently stipulating. Chevron's Houston headquarters is still hoping to obtain a "development resource opportunity" for acreage currently under production, likely under the rubric of a Development and Exploration Production Sharing Agreement (DePSA); however, recent remarks by NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem (reftel) suggest that a DePSA round isn't likely to occur anytime soon. Barring a major find in Marzuq, which seems unlikely, or a significant shift in the company's bidding philosophy, it appears that Chevron's window of opportunity in Libya may well be closing. End comment.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI541

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI541 aka Wikileaks id #161202 ?
Subject	EUROPEANS ENGAGE GOL ON BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Jul 2008 16:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI541.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI515
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI819
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2009
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0541/01 1901605
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 081605Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3653
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0542
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1142
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0708
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0654
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4162
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000541

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/8/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , DA *[Denmark]*
SUBJECT: EUROPEANS ENGAGE GOL ON BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASE

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 472 , (B) TRIPOLI 332, C) TRIPOLI 515

TRIPOLI 00000541 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: European Union (EU) governments remain concerned about the on-going detention cases of Idriss Boufayed, Jamal al-Hajj, and nine co-defendants following the group's June 10 conviction on charges related to their plans to stage a peaceful public demonstration in Tripoli (ref A). European missions are focused on securing humanitarian release for Boufayed, who is terminally ill with cancer, and obtaining consular access to al-Hajj, a Danish citizen; however, they do

not/not intend to raise the cases of the other nine detainees. France, on behalf of the EU presidency, is keen to press the case through quiet diplomacy with the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) and remains open to coordination with the U.S. End summary.

¶2. (C) French Ambassador Francois Gouyette chaired a meeting of EU ambassadors in Tripoli on June 17 to discuss a coordinated European response to the recent conviction and continued detention of Idriss Boufayed, Jamal al-Hajj, and nine other self-described regime critics. (Note: France represented the EU presidency in Libya on behalf of Slovenia, which does not have representation here, in the first half of 2008 and retains the presidency through the end of the year in its own right. End note.) The eleven individuals were convicted on June 10 of planning to foment a rebellion against the "people's authority system" and of meeting with an official from a foreign government; sentences ranged
from 6 to 25 years imprisonment. Ambassador Gouyette had unsuccessfully approached MFA U/S for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi about the case in early June. EU ambassadors agreed on June 17 that they would not/not raise the case again with the MFA. EU diplomats in Tripoli report that the Europeans have two principal interests in the case: 1) securing humanitarian parole for Idriss Boufayed, who is currently undergoing treatment for advanced lung cancer in Sabratha General Hospital (ref B and previous), and; 2) obtaining consular access to Jamal al-Hajj, who holds Danish citizenship. EU missions do not/not plan to raise the case of the nine other convicted individuals who remain in detention.

¶3. (C) The French and Swiss Ambassadors reportedly maintain an active dialogue with Abdulsalem Salah, Director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee and a key interlocutor on the Bulgarian medics case, on the Boufayed case. Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt told the CDA on June 30 that he was "confident" Salah would be able to arrange Boufayed's release on humanitarian grounds; however, he conceded European diplomats had not/not approached Saleh concerning the other ten detainees (including Jamal al-Hajj). Saleh reportedly promised to facilitate a three-way meeting between von Muralt, the QDF, and Boufayed's attorney to discuss the case. Von Muralt said he plans to use the meeting with Boufayed's lawyer to ask Boufayed if he wants Switzerland to push the QDF to allow him to seek medical care abroad. Both the French and Swiss Embassies in Tripoli say they are open to coordination with the U.S. on any future approach to the Libyans on the Boufayed case.

¶4. (C) While EU Ambassadors plan to continue lobbying for Boufayed's release through the QDF, the French Ambassador intends to push for consular access to Jamal al-Hajj through the MFA Department of Consular Affairs. French diplomats have noted that repeated requests for consular access by Denmark have been denied; however, they remain optimistic that a recent personnel change in the MFA's consular office might prompt a reversal. Danish Honorary-Consul George Wallen told us his efforts to secure consular access, most recenlty in mid-June, had been flatly rejected by the GOL, which in its latest meeting with him justified its unwillingness to facilitate access to al-Hajj case to the re-publication in February 2008 of cartoons in Danish print media depicting the Prophet Muhammad. French Poloff Pierre-Antoine Molina privately conceded that the legal case behind the EU's request for consular access was weak since al-Hajj also has Libyan citizenship - France would not/not provide consular access to a dual Libyan-French national in a reciprocal situation.

¶5. (C) Comment: Post does not share the Europeans' optimism that the QDF will be able to facilitate the quick release of the ailing Idriss Boufayed, or that the MFA's consular office will ultimately provide access to Jamal al-Hajj; however, there are few viable alternatives to the EU's quiet diplomatic overtures. The QDF's involvement in the case has so far been limited to

facilitating Idriss Boufayed's "release" from prison to a hospital for medical care on humanitarian grounds; however, in a striking parallel with the ongoing detention of human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (ref C and previous), opposition websites report that Boufayed remains under heavy guard at the Sabratha Hospital. While he has received family visits, he is not able to leave the hospital. By contrast with the el-Jahmi

TRIPOLI 00000541 002.2 OF 002

case, in which European missions have expressed little interest, the EU's focus on the Boufayed case is high. European missions have historically avoided engaging with the GOL on human rights issues - their willingess to pursue a collective approach in the Boufayed case is a potentially hopeful sign. Post will continue to closely follow the EU's efforts on the Boufayed case; it is not clear that more direct U.S. engagement on this case would be helpful at this time. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI554

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI554 aka Wikileaks id #161406 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MEASURES TO CHECK RISING FOOD COSTS AND ACQUIRE 'VIRTUAL WATER'
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 9 Jul 2008 16:12 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI554.html
References	08STATE39410
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
P R 091612Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3666
INFO DEPT OF AGRICULTURE USD FAS WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000554


E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry] , EAID [Foreign
Economic Assistance] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MEASURES TO CHECK RISING FOOD COSTS AND ACQUIRE
'VIRTUAL WATER'

REF: TRIPOLI 438, STATE 39410


¶1.  (U)  On July 7th, the Political/Economic Assistants met with
the Resident Representative of the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), Dr. Saad Elmedani
Ahmed.  According to Dr. Ahmed, the Libyan government (GOL) has
generally taken prudent steps to protect Libyans from the
worldwide foodstuffs shortages by continuing subsidization of
essential staples while reducing fees and taxes on the import
and distribution of food supplies in general.

¶2.  (U)  According to Dr. Ahmed, the General People's Committee
for Economy, Trade and Investment has recently taken steps to
mitigate the effects of worldwide increases in food prices by
boosting the purchasing power of ordinary citizens.  These
include: production, consumption, and import service tax
exemptions for basic commodities; production tax exemptions for
locally-produced products used in the production of other goods;
production and consumption tax exemptions of production and
operation tools; a 75% fee reduction for laboratory analysis of
```

operation tools; a 75% fee reduction for laboratory analysis of imported goods; a 50% reduction of fees for handling, storage and port processing of imported produce; and the establishment of a fund to achieve an equilibrium between prices and the average citizens' incomes to maintain their purchasing power and protect Libya's consumer economy from international prices fluctuations.

¶3. (U) Dr. Ahmed also mentioned Libyan efforts to use "virtual water" as a solution to its agricultural problems. He described "virtual water" as a mechanism by which water-poor states can achieve water and food security by purchasing water-intensive agricultural commodities from water-rich states that produce a natural surplus of these products. Libya is developing partnerships with countries like Mali and Sudan in the field of virtual water trade; Libya invests in irrigated agriculture in those countries in exchange for the right to purchase all of the crops produced in those areas in which Libya has invested. The produce is then bought by the GOL at a below-market price, offsetting the initial investment costs. According to Dr. Ahmed, the scheme benefits both countries: Libya gets water-rich, high-quality agricultural products for its market and Sudan and Mali are able to provide employment and a steady export market to more farmers.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI563

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI563 aka Wikileaks id #161857 ?
Subject	OXY'S 30-YEAR EXTENSION IN LIBYA AND WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR OTHER IOCS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 13 Jul 2008 14:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI563.html
References	07TRIPOLI983
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TRIPOLI 00000563 P CO 13-JUL-08 OXY'S 30-YEAR EXTENSION IN LIBYA AND WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR OTHER IOCS
[7783536]From:
CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Sunday, July 13, 2008 4:06 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000563 P CO 13-JUL-08 OXY'S 30-YEAR EXTENSION IN LIBYA AND
WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR OTHER IOCS [7783536]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO5774
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHTRO #0563/01 1951416
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131416Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3677
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0660
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0548
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0714
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1148
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0321
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0450
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0540
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0859
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4186
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000563

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/13/2018
TAGS: ENRG [Energy and Power] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] ,
ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: OXY'S 30-YEAR EXTENSION IN LIBYA AND WHAT LIES AHEAD FOR
```

OTHER IOCS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 555 B) 2007 TRIPOLI 983

TRIPOLI 00000563 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The long-awaited ratification of Oxy's contract extension in Libya has solidified its position as one of Libya's leading oil and gas players. The process by which the contract was finalized has shed light on what lies ahead for other foreign companies, all of whom are expected to be approached soon to sign similar deals. The extensions contain considerable benefits, including higher profits, anti-corruption measures and less state company obstructionism; however, they contain lower production shares and reduced bookable reserve levels, and mandate a heavy reliance on the thinly-stretched National Oil Corporation. Given projections for steadily rising global energy costs, it remains to be seen how long the new contracts will remain in place without amendment. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Following the well-publicized announcement of Occidental Petroleum's (Oxy) extension in Libya (Ref A), post's Econoff and Econ/Commercial Assistant sat down with John Winterman (protect), Oxy's Country Manager for Libya, to discuss the negotiation process and contract terms, and assess the playing field for other international oil companies (IOCs) active in Libya. Winterman's experience in his current position and former tenure as Oxy's Worldwide Exploration Manager for 7 years makes him one of the most knowledgeable observers of Libya's energy sector.

DONE DEAL - AT LAST

¶3. (C) Winterman confirmed the general contract terms outlined in press reports. Oxy and its partner OMV (Austria) signed a total of five Exploration and Production Sharing (EPSA) contracts with Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) on June ¶23. The contracts were based on terms of a "Heads of Agreement" memoranda signed between Oxy's Chairman and NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem on November 24, 2007 (ref B). As reported in the press, Oxy paid a $1 billion signature bonus as part of the deal, and has committed to $2.5 billion (split 75/25 for Oxy/OMV) investment plan, with the NOC matching an equal amount for investment. Oxy intends to drill some 400 wells starting in 2011, requiring a minimum of 12-15 rigs working full-time. The contract extension allows them to bring in 50 additional staff, including 16 Amcits, all of whom already have their visas and residency permits.

¶4. (C) A two-person NOC negotiating team worked on all three agreements (Eni, Petro-Canada and Oxy). The NOC's driving force behind the negotiation process was Assam Ali Elmessallati, who bears the title Committee Member for Investment and Joint Venture Follow-Up. According to Winterman, Elmessallati stalled negotiations with Eni (the first of the three agreements that the NOC tackled), pulling a near-final agreement off the table in order to conduct further "internal reviews". According to Winterman, Elmessallati conducted "an internal socialization process" in which he circulated the agreement broadly to get as many Libyan government "fingerprints" on the deal as possible. His past role as architect of the EPSA IV process likely informed the effort, which garnered enough buy-in for the deal to move forward without the threat of last-minute opposition from parties who would have gone unconsulted absent his efforts. Winterman also noted that it was vital that these new EPSA deals be presented General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent) as "extensions" verses, as opposed to new deals that would have to be re-bid from scratch.

NEW TERMS ARE BROADLY BENEFICIAL

¶5. (C) The IOCs' previous deals were based on a fixed margin, meaning that companies were somewhat insulated from fluxuations in the market price of oil by receiving a fixed price for every barrel produced. The new EPSA deals, while resulting in a lower overall production share for the IOCs, removes that fixed margin, allowing companies to reap higher profits per barrel when oil prices are high. That, together with the fact that the NOC will now cover the costs for all taxes, royalties and fees, results in the IOCs making a great deal more money per barrel of oil produced. Winterman assesses that the IOCs will get their money back (i.e. signature bonuses and investment requirements) very quickly under the new EPSA deals, as greater revenue driven by high oil prices will generate rapid reimbursement of their outlays.

TRIPOLI 00000563 002.2 OF 003

¶6. (C) An additional element of the new terms is that the ties between the IOCs and their local Libyan operating partners (Zuetina in Oxy/OMV's case) are less direct, in two distinct ways. Development plans for existing fields are now no longer run through the Libyan operators, but have been negotiated directly with the NOC under the new agreements. This means that traditional Libyan national company resistance to new investment and technologies (i.e., the much lamented tendency to keep things "the old way") have been swept aside, paving the way (with NOC approval) for more ambitious field development that should boost Libya's national production much more quickly. (Note: The NOC claims it will increase national production from a current level of 1.75 million bbl/day to 3 million bbl/day figure by 2012-15. End note.). The new EPSA framework has a substantial new anti-corruption measure that will prevent state-run companies (infamous for skimming off the top of contracts) from being involved in the tendering process. The new tendering arrangement will be between IOC and NOC representatives only, so the state-run companies have been frozen out entirely. This new arrangement creates "Joint Project Teams" that should reduce the potential for graft, while at the same time allowing for faster work rates through a streamlined decision-making and tendering process. Finally, the EPSA agreements incorporate robust IOC-provided training programs for Libyan nationals, which should help to ensure the creation of Libya's next generation of energy sector experts.

TWO SHORTCOMINGS: BOOKED RESERVES SHARE SMALLER .

¶7. (C) The new contracts, which feature lower production shares (now in the 10-12% range, down from 20% or higher), mean that companies can no longer "book reserves" (i.e., demonstrate to stockholders that they are contractually guaranteed to have access to a proven quantity of oil and gas) to the degree that they have in the past. This creates a new paradigm for Libya that is playing out worldwide in a growing number of oil-producing countries where the state and its energy authority are demanding tough terms for in-country IOCs. Winterman assesses that this trade-off between booked reserves and profit is creating a new system where the old rules no longer apply; the thinking of IOCs' stockholders will have to evolve to reflect the fact that their companies' stock values should be evaluated differently in an environment where reserves are harder to replace. Because this new way of thinking is still evolving, lowered production shares have the potential to hurt companies' stock prices in the short term.

¶8. (C) An additional consideration in this regard is the recent surge of interest in Libya on the part of non-Western IOCs (particularly from India, Japan, Russia and China), who have won the bulk of concessions in the NOC's recent acreage bid rounds.

These government-owned companies are driven by the desire to book reserves to assure supply to their domestic markets in the years to come. Assuming that their exploration of Libyan acreage bears fruit in the discovery of exploitable reserves, they may find that NOC terms allow them to book less in reserves that they had hoped. With that prospect in the offing, the interest of companies primarily concerned with booking reserves may wane as they consider making the jump to producing entities.

..AND GREATER NOC INVOLVEMENT NOT A PANACEA

¶9. (C) Although the new agreements carry substantial benefits, the more central involvement of the NOC does not by itself guarantee more efficient operations. Winterman stressed that the NOC is still more concerned with "price over performance," and can often be a difficult sell when it comes to using the latest (more expensive) technologies to generate efficiencies and augment output. He also questioned whether the NOC would be willing and able to hold up its end of the investment burden, as it has shown reluctance to make the kind of substantial re-investments in existing fields that their $2.5 billion commitment under the Oxy deal requires. Delays are likely, particularly given the NOC's haphazard budgeting process. For example, the NOC only received approval for the current year's budget in June, and even that approval only resulted in flatlined spending along the same lines as the previous year. Also, although the NOC retains many skilled technocrats with long experience and educational ties to the U.S., that group represents a dying breed (nearing retirement age), and the NOC's

bench strength is being rapidly depleted as many of its best personnel take more lucrative opportunities in the private sector in Libya and abroad. The fact that the Eni, Petro-Canada and Oxy deals were hammered out using a common text reinforces the notion that the NOC is seeking to simplify the terms under which companies operate, in part because of its own limited institutional capacity.

NEXT ON THE BLOCK: EVERYONE ELSE

¶10. (C) Winterman was confident in predicting that Repsol (Spain), Wintershall (Germany) and TOTAL (France) were the next IOCs who would be forced to extend their presence in Libya via the signing of new EPSA agreements. After that, the next major set of operators will be the companies of the Oasis Group, composed of U.S. firms ConocoPhillips, Marathon and Hess. This NOC approach is reportedly on the horizon, despite the fact that the Oasis companies paid $1.8 billion in December 2005 to reclaim their former Sirte basin acreage in concert with local operator Waha (the eponymous Libyan state-run oil company that took over the fields when they left) following two years of negotiations with the NOC. The Waha-Oasis group currently produces about 350,000 bbl/day, roughly one-fifth of Libya's total oil output. Econoff has been told separately by the Country Managers of both ConocoPhillips and Marathon that senior NOC officials have hinted that a new deal with the Oasis group should be negotiated soon.

¶11. (C) This will present a unique challenge for the Oasis group, as the two major shareholders (CP and Marathon) reportedly have very different corporate priorities in Libya. For Marathon, whose booked Libyan production accounts for some 60% of the company's worldwide total, a reduction in production rate under an EPSA could have serious repercussions for the company's share price. On the other hand, ConocoPhillips is judged to have sufficient worldwide booked reserves that a drop in its production share would not be such a major blow, and its overall size puts it in a better position to reinvest the greater financial returns stemming from a new deal. Both would

greater financial returns stemming from a new deal. Both would benefit from being freed from the intransigence to change shown by their counterparts in Waha (who routinely deflect their proposals for field development projects), but it may prove difficult for the Oasis partners to adopt a shared approach when the NOC begins to press in earnest for a extension of their presence.

¶12. (C) COMMENT: Although the concession extensions carry some positive aspects, the fact that the NOC may be prepared to reopen negotiations with the Oasis group is troubling. If the Waha consortium is forced to renegotiate after cementing a deal less than three years ago at a cost of $1.8 billion, can it - or any other IOC operating in Libya - reasonably expect that the new agreements will stand the test of time? Given the GOL's political approach to economic policymaking, as well as its penchant for extracting maximum concessions for production of its hydrocarbon resources, how long would revenue from oil that could hit $175 or $200/bbl oil be allowed to accrue to foreign companies before the GOL would (again) seek a larger cut? While the answer to that question remains to be seen, it is clear is that the recent contract extensions have set Eni, Petro-Canada and Oxy apart as leaders in the Libyan energy sector. It is expected that they will account for at least 55% of Libya's total oil production if the terms of their contracts are fulfilled. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI564

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI564 aka Wikileaks id #161858 ?
Subject	NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO RESIGN SOON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 13 Jul 2008 14:25 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI564.html
References	08TRIPOLI227
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI765 , 09TRIPOLI99
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO5782
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0564/01 1951425
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 131425Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3680
INFO RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0862
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0543
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4189
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000564

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/11/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO RESIGN SOON

REF: TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000564 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: A close friend of National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Shukri Ghanem told us that Ghanem is under pressure to provide $1.2 billion in cash or oil shipments to

National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi), and may seek to resign soon out of fear that Muatassim or his confederates could seek revenge if the funds are not forthcoming. Muatassim reportedly intended to use some of the funds to establish a military/security unit and to support unspecified security upgrades he wanted to make in his capacity as National Security Adviser. Muammar al-Qadhafi, anxious to give the appearance of a pro-reform agenda, had recently asked Ghanem whether he would consider serving again as Prime Minister (a post he occupied in 2004-2006) after a government shake-up later this year. Frustrated by the efforts of conservative regime elements to block needed economic and political reforms - Ghanem does not assess that meaningful economic and political reform are possible until al-Qadhafi passes from the political scene - Ghanem did not accept and is looking for a way to politely decline without offending al-Qadhafi. Speculation about whose star is waxing or waning is a favorite subject of Tripoli's chattering classes and it remains to be seen whether Ghanem makes good on intention to step down; however, it appears there may be something to the claim that Muatassim approached him for a substantial sum of cash. The reported attempts by al-Qadhafi's sons to use the NOC as a personal bank, together with Ghanem's pessimism about the prospects for meaningful reform, suggest that the regime remains unchanged with respect to the way it conducts key elements of its business. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Ibrahim el-Meyet (strictly protect), a prominent Tripoli-based attorney and business consultant, told CDA on July 10 that Dr. Shukri Ghanem, Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) intends to tender his resignation to Muammar al-Qadhafi soon, perhaps as early as the coming week. (Note: el-Meyet was a Libyan MFA official during the pre-revolutionary period of the Sanussi monarchy; his assignments included London, Paris, Cairo and New York, where he was a member of Libya's UN delegation. End note.) El-Meyet has known Ghanem for more than forty years and considers him a close friend. The two lived in London during the same period in the early 1970's, and their families socialize together at least once a week. El-Meyet spoke with Ghanem on July 5.

AN INDECENT PROPOSAL

¶3. (S/NF) El-Meyet said Ghanem felt compelled to resign because National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, had approached him in late June with a request for $1.2 billion. Muatassim suggested that if Ghanem could not quickly generate such a large sum in cash, he would be willing to accept oil allotments that he could sell privately as an alternative way to generated the funds. (Note: El-Meyet said other sons of al-Qadhafi (NFI) had recently levied demands for oil allotments that they could sell privately as well. End note.) Muatassim refused to say what the money would be used for, but el-Meyet said Ghanem had learned from another well-connected source that Muatassim intended to use some of the funds to establish a military/security unit akin to that of his younger brother, Khamis, and to defray the expense of unspecified "security upgrades" he wanted to make in his capacity as National Security Adviser.

AL-QADHAFI'S SONS - "UNDISCIPLINED THUGS"

¶4. (S/NF) Ghanem informed Muammar al-Qadhafi in early July about Muatassim's request. Al-Qadhafi laughingly dismissed it and flatly told Ghanem to ignore it; however, according to el-Meyet, Ghanem is "genuinely concerned" that Muatassim or his confederates could seek revenge against Ghanem or his family if Muatassim does not receive the funds and/or learns that his father was informed of the request. The courtly el-Meyet was unusually blunt in assessing al-Qadhafi's children as "undisciplined thugs", noting that "no one can cross or refuse such people (the al-Qadhafi family) without suffering consequences, particularly when the matter is to do with money".

consequences, particularly when the matter is to do with money.

¶5. (S/NF) In a long conversation with el-Meyet on July 5, Ghanem said that given the potential danger to him and his family stemming from Muatassim's request, he sees little choice but to resign. He had already drafted a letter of resignation and was waiting for al-Qadhafi to get through visits by Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos (who was in town July 10) and the Union for

the Mediterranean summit in Paris (on July 13) before submitting it. Noting that Ghanem was "the only real reformer left" in the GOL, el-Meyet expressed concern that Ghanem's resignation would seriously impact the GOL at a critical time. Ghanem is a comparatively well-respected technocrat who enjoys a reputation as one of the only senior GOL officials who can speak candidly, and at times openly contradict, Muammar al-Qadhafi. At a time when Libya is trying to push ahead limited economic reforms and oil prices are at a historically unprecedented high, losing Ghanem would be a serious blow.

NO MEANINGFUL REFORM POSSIBLE IN AL-QADHAFI'S LIFETIME

¶6. (S/NF) In their conversation on July 5, Ghanem expressed frustration to el-Meyet about the difficulty of implementing meaningful reforms in Libya as another reason for resigning. (Note: Ghanem pushed for reform during his stint as Prime Minister in 2004-2006; resistance from conservative regime elements to those changes ultimately prompted al-Qadhafi to replace Ghanem with al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who is widely viewed as being a more traditional figure with whom the old guard is more comfortable. End note.)

¶7. (S/NF) After several years worth of discussion during their family's weekly get-togethers, el-Meyet and Ghanem have concluded that there will be no real economic or political reform in Libya until al-Qadhafi passes from the political scene. Al-Qadhafi is focused on giving the appearance of reform - and is particularly mindful of U.S. perceptions of Libya's efforts in that regard - and therefore wants a PM with a reformist image. According to el-Meyet, al-Qadhafi asked Ghanem in mid-May whether he would serve again as Prime Minister if al-Mahmoudi leaves office later this year. El-Meyet said Ghanem did not say no - "no one - not even Shukri Ghanem - flatly tells the Leader no" - but did not express enthusiasm and was trying to find a pretext for declining that would not anger al-Qadhafi. (Note: Ghanem was among those reportedly being considered for the PM position in the run-up to the March session of the General People's Congress, at which it was expected that al-Mahmoudi would be sacked. El-Meyet said al-Qadhafi had in fact originally intended to replace al-Mahmoudi in March, but thought such a move would be too disruptive if taken in concert with the proposed radical privatization and government restructuring (details reftel) he called for in his GPC address. End note.)

¶8. (S/NF) Despite the rhetoric, el-Meyet said he and Ghanem believe that al-Qadhafi is not genuinely ready "in his heart and in his bones" to implement change, for two reasons. First, real change would entail undoing economic fiefdoms of regime loyalists whose profitability derives from political connections and who would be unable to successfully compete in an economy characterized by transparency and rule of law. Second, genuine reform would be a tacit admission that the Jamahiriya system, of which al-Qadhafi himself was the author, had failed. Al-Qadhafi perceives himself as "a superman of history" and is not able to admit fault or weakness. Cosmetic attempts at economic reform are acceptable and help advance al-Qadhafi's goal of reingratiating Libya with the West, but the shared assessment of Ghanem and el-Meyet is that meaningful economic and political reform will not occur while al-Qadhafi is alive.

¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Speculation about which senior GOL official's star is waxing or waning is a favorite subject of the chattering classes in Tripoli and we've heard reports before that Ghanem was unhappy with repeated intervention by old guard elements in his reform efforts and could resign. Whether Ghanem makes good on his stated intention to bow out remains to be seen, but the fact that el-Meyet is a sober-minded observer and enjoys a close relationship with Ghanem suggests that there may be something to the claim that Muatassim approached Ghanem for a substantial sum of cash. The reported attempts by al-Qadhafi's sons to use the NOC as a personal bank, together with the pessimism of el-Meyet and Ghanem about the prospects for meaningful reform, suggest that despite occasional rhetorical flourishes, the underlying dynamic of the regime remains unchanged in some key respects. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI565

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI565 aka Wikileaks id #161860 ?
Subject	NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO RESIGN SOON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 13 Jul 2008 14:47 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI565.html
References	08TRIPOLI227
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5791
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0565/01 1951447
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 131447Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3682
INFO RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0864
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0545
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4191
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000565

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION CHAIRMAN SHUKRI GHANEM MAY SEEK TO RESIGN SOON

REF: TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000565 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: A close friend of National Oil Corporation (NOC) Chairman Shukri Ghanem told us that Ghanem is under pressure to provide $1.2 billion in cash or oil shipments to National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi), and may seek to resign soon out of fear that Muatassim or his confederates could seek revenge if the funds are not forthcoming. Muatassim reportedly intended to use some

of the funds to establish a military/security unit and to support unspecified security upgrades he wanted to make in his capacity as National Security Adviser. Muammar al-Qadhafi, anxious to give the appearance of a pro-reform agenda, had recently asked Ghanem whether he would consider serving again as Prime Minister (a post he occupied in 2004-2006) after a government shake-up later this year. Frustrated by the efforts of conservative regime elements to block needed economic and political reforms - Ghanem does not assess that meaningful economic and political reform are possible until al-Qadhafi passes from the political scene - Ghanem did not accept and is looking for a way to politely decline without offending al-Qadhafi. Speculation about whose star is waxing or waning is a favorite subject of Tripoli's chattering classes and it remains to be seen whether Ghanem makes good on intention to step down; however, it appears there may be something to the claim that Muatassim approached him for a substantial sum of cash. The reported attempts by al-Qadhafi's sons to use the NOC as a personal bank, together with Ghanem's pessimism about the prospects for meaningful reform, suggest that the regime remains unchanged with respect to the way it conducts key elements of its business. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Ibrahim el-Meyet (strictly protect), a prominent Tripoli-based attorney and business consultant, told CDA on July 10 that Dr. Shukri Ghanem, Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) intends to tender his resignation to Muammar al-Qadhafi soon, perhaps as early as the coming week. (Note: el-Meyet was a Libyan MFA official during the pre-revolutionary period of the Sanussi monarchy; his assignments included London, Paris, Cairo and New York, where he was a member of Libya's UN delegation. End note.) El-Meyet has known Ghanem for more than forty years and considers him a close friend. The two lived in London during the same period in the early 1970's, and their families socialize together at least once a week. El-Meyet spoke with Ghanem on July 5.

AN INDECENT PROPOSAL

¶3. (S/NF) El-Meyet said Ghanem felt compelled to resign because National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, had approached him in late June with a request for $1.2 billion. Muatassim suggested that if Ghanem could not quickly generate such a large sum in cash, he would be willing to accept oil allotments that he could sell privately as an alternative way to generated the funds. (Note: El-Meyet said other sons of al-Qadhafi (NFI) had recently levied demands for oil allotments that they could sell privately as well. End note.) Muatassim refused to say what the money would be used for, but el-Meyet said Ghanem had learned from another well-connected source that Muatassim intended to use some of the funds to establish a military/security unit akin to that of his younger brother, Khamis, and to defray the expense of unspecified "security upgrades" he wanted to make in his capacity as National Security Adviser.

AL-QADHAFI'S SONS - "UNDISCIPLINED THUGS"

¶4. (S/NF) Ghanem informed Muammar al-Qadhafi in early July about Muatassim's request. Al-Qadhafi laughingly dismissed it and flatly told Ghanem to ignore it; however, according to el-Meyet, Ghanem is "genuinely concerned" that Muatassim or his confederates could seek revenge against Ghanem or his family if Muatassim does not receive the funds and/or learns that his father was informed of the request. The courtly el-Meyet was unusually blunt in assessing al-Qadhafi's children as "undisciplined thugs", noting that "no one can cross or refuse such people (the al-Qadhafi family) without suffering consequences, particularly when the matter is to do with money".

¶5. (S/NF) In a long conversation with el-Meyet on July 5, Ghanem said that given the potential danger to him and his family

stemming from Muatassim's request, he sees little choice but to resign. He had already drafted a letter of resignation and was waiting for al-Qadhafi to get through visits by Spanish Foreign Minister Moratinos (who was in town July 10) and the Union for

the Mediterranean summit in Paris (on July 13) before submitting it. Noting that Ghanem was "the only real reformer left" in the GOL, el-Meyet expressed concern that Ghanem's resignation would seriously impact the GOL at a critical time. Ghanem is a comparatively well-respected technocrat who enjoys a reputation as one of the only senior GOL officials who can speak candidly, and at times openly contradict, Muammar al-Qadhafi. At a time when Libya is trying to push ahead limited economic reforms and oil prices are at a historically unprecedented high, losing Ghanem would be a serious blow.

NO MEANINGFUL REFORM POSSIBLE IN AL-QADHAFI'S LIFETIME

¶6. (S/NF) In their conversation on July 5, Ghanem expressed frustration to el-Meyet about the difficulty of implementing meaningful reforms in Libya as another reason for resigning. (Note: Ghanem pushed for reform during his stint as Prime Minister in 2004-2006; resistance from conservative regime elements to those changes ultimately prompted al-Qadhafi to replace Ghanem with al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who is widely viewed as being a more traditional figure with whom the old guard is more comfortable. End note.)

¶7. (S/NF) After several years worth of discussion during their family's weekly get-togethers, el-Meyet and Ghanem have concluded that there will be no real economic or political reform in Libya until al-Qadhafi passes from the political scene. Al-Qadhafi is focused on giving the appearance of reform - and is particularly mindful of U.S. perceptions of Libya's efforts in that regard - and therefore wants a PM with a reformist image. According to el-Meyet, al-Qadhafi asked Ghanem in mid-May whether he would serve again as Prime Minister if al-Mahmoudi leaves office later this year. El-Meyet said Ghanem did not say no - "no one - not even Shukri Ghanem - flatly tells the Leader no" - but did not express enthusiasm and was trying to find a pretext for declining that would not anger al-Qadhafi. (Note: Ghanem was among those reportedly being considered for the PM position in the run-up to the March session of the General People's Congress, at which it was expected that al-Mahmoudi would be sacked. El-Meyet said al-Qadhafi had in fact originally intended to replace al-Mahmoudi in March, but thought such a move would be too disruptive if taken in concert with the proposed radical privatization and government restructuring (details reftel) he called for in his GPC address. End note.)

¶8. (S/NF) Despite the rhetoric, el-Meyet said he and Ghanem believe that al-Qadhafi is not genuinely ready "in his heart and in his bones" to implement change, for two reasons. First, real change would entail undoing economic fiefdoms of regime loyalists whose profitability derives from political connections and who would be unable to successfully compete in an economy characterized by transparency and rule of law. Second, genuine reform would be a tacit admission that the Jamahiriya system, of which al-Qadhafi himself was the author, had failed. Al-Qadhafi perceives himself as "a superman of history" and is not able to admit fault or weakness. Cosmetic attempts at economic reform are acceptable and help advance al-Qadhafi's goal of reingratiating Libya with the West, but the shared assessment of Ghanem and el-Meyet is that meaningful economic and political reform will not occur while al-Qadhafi is alive.

¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Speculation about which senior GOL official's star is waxing or waning is a favorite subject of the chattering classes in Tripoli and we've heard reports before that Ghanem

was unhappy with repeated intervention by old guard elements in his reform efforts and could resign. Whether Ghanem makes good on his stated intention to bow out remains to be seen, but the fact that el-Meyet is a sober-minded observer and enjoys a close relationship with Ghanem suggests that there may be something to the claim that Muatassim approached Ghanem for a substantial sum of cash. The reported attempts by al-Qadhafi's sons to use the NOC as a personal bank, together with the pessimism of el-Meyet and Ghanem about the prospects for meaningful reform, suggest that despite occasional rhetorical flourishes, the underlying dynamic of the regime remains unchanged in some key respects.
End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI566

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI566 aka Wikileaks id #161880 ?
Subject	LIBYA SIGNS CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL WITH FRANCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Jul 2008 06:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI566.html
References	07TRIPOLI641 , 07TRIPOLI664
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
O 140634Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3684
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000566

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/14/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SIGNS CIVILIAN NUCLEAR DEAL WITH FRANCE

REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 641 , B) 07 TRIPOLI 664

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) French Poloff Pierre-Antoine Molina briefed Poloff on July 9 on a recently-signed civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between Libya and France. According to Molina, Libya U/S for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi visited Paris on July 7-8 to formally sign the agreement, which was first discussed during President Sarkozy's July 2007 visit to Libya and initialed by Obeidi on the margins of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's December 2007 visit to France (reftels). As a signatory to the EuroAtom treaty, France had been obligated to notify all EuroAtom members of its plans to pursue a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement with Libya and to wait for a stipulated period of time in which other members could register objections before proceeding. By July 2008, the waiting period had ended without objection and France could proceed. The text, identical to the December 2007 initialed agreement, establishes a vague framework for future cooperation in the field of civilian uses of nuclear energy but does not/not commit France to specific projects or investments in Libya.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI567

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI567 aka Wikileaks id #161886 ?
Subject	THE EU-LIBYA FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: VENI, VISAS, VETO
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Jul 2008 07:39 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI567.html
References	08TRIPOLI457
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI134 , 09TRIPOLI579
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

P 140739Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3685
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000567

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/14/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EU *[Europa Island]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PBTS *[National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THE EU-LIBYA FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT: VENI, VISAS, VETO

REF: TRIPOLI 457

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. The Government of Libya (GOL) remains keenly interested in pursuing a European Union-Libya Framework Agreement and views a more formalized partnership with the European Union (EU) as a "reward" for Libya's decision in July 2007 to release six foreign health workers accused of intentionally infecting over 400 Libyan children with HIV/AIDS. Certain EU members, unsure that a more formal cooperation mechanism would be beneficial and sensing Libya's eagerness, have used the threat of a veto to push their bilateral agendas, particularly with respect to commercial and human rights issues. One year after Libya and the EU agreed in principle to pursue an agreement, a sizeable perception gap exists between the two sides on the merits of a more formalized partnership. Despite occasional differences with the EU, most recently over the

French-backed Union for the Mediterranean proposal, the GOL will continue to seek an EU framework agreement, in large part because of Muammar al-Qadhafi's desire to be taken seriously by European leaders. End summary.

BULGARIAN MEDICS CASE HAUNTS EUROPE

¶2. (C) Libya's much-heralded decision in July 2007 to allow six foreign health workers imprisoned since 1999 on charges of intentionally infecting children in Benghazi with the HIV/AIDS virus frames current discussions on an EU-Libya Framework Agreement. Widely seen by Europeans in Libya as a successful alignment of European and Libyan interests, the denoument of the Bulgarian medics case - particularly their immediate pardon upon their arrival in Bulgaria - remains a lasting embarrassment for key elements of the Libyan regime. The GOL, preoccupied with avoiding the public perception that it caved to foreign pressure to resolve the case, has trumpeted a putative EU framework agreement as a significant concession and a positive coup for Libyan diplomacy. In an hours-long televised news conference just days after the medics left, Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham and Under Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi boasted that a draft agreement, initialed by EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner during her July 2007 visit to Tripoli, would pave the way for easier access to Schengen visas for Libyan citizens and increased EU infrastructure investments in Libya. Ferrero-Waldner's announcement in February 2008 that the EU Commission had submitted a recommendation to the Council of Ministers to grant a mandate to open negotiations with Libya stoked GOL hopes for rapid progress.

¶3. (C) French, Spanish, and German diplomats describe Libya's primary objective in pursuing an EU framework agreement as reducing the mandatory waiting period for Schengen visas for Libyan nationals from the current 10 days to 48 hours. Libya fails to understand that visa policy is not an EU competence, Spanish diplomats said, adding that the GOL hopes to publicly highlight reduced waiting time for Schengen visas as a "reward" for having resolved the medics case. According to French Poloff Pierre-Antoine Molina, the current Schengen regime for Libya gives each Schengen member 10 days to object to any Libyan applicant on security grounds. Libya hopes to lobby for a reclassification under the Schengen rules to shorten the waiting period to 48 hours. Libyans are particularly vexed that neighbors Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt are not subject to the 10 day waiting period. The July 2007 draft agreement notes that reclassifying Libyans for Schengen purposes would be contingent upon Libya abolishing all visa requirements for EU citizens, something the GOL has so far shown no inclination that it is prepared to do.

¶4. (C) The July 2007 EU-Libya draft also lays out cooperation in the fields of human rights, health, and development. U/S Obeidi informed French Ambassador Francois Gouyette in June 2008 that Libya agreed in principle to negotiate a human rights chapter within the framework agreement; however, Obeidi categorically refused to include discussions of individual human rights cases in the EU negotiations. The Libyans also envision EU commitments to fund health infrastructure investments in Benghazi, to provide "life-long" treatment for the Benghazi children (including treatment in Europe), and to provide continued support to Libya's efforts to develop a national HIV/AIDS strategy. (Note: European states already play a significant role in supporting Libya's HIV/AIDS efforts through the Benghazi International Fund, developed in connection with the Bulgarian medics case, which the Belgian Red Cross plays a lead role in shepherding. End note.) In addition, the GOL has claimed that draft language initialed by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner "commits" the EU to facilitating access to European markets for Libyan food exports, to providing technical assistance to archeological restoration projects in Libya, and

assistance to archeological restoration projects in Libya, and to funding a "surveillance mechanism" along Libya's land and sea borders to combat illegal migration.

VENI, VIDI, VETO

¶5. (C) Certain EU members, sensing Libya's eagerness to move ahead, have threatened to block a framework agreement as a means by which to secure bilateral concessions, chiefly on commercial and human rights issues. Italian Economic and Commercial Counselor Domenico Bellantone said that Italy is prepared to veto any framework agreement unless Libya ends a series of discriminatory commercial practices that target Italian firms operating in Libya. Italy particularly wants the GOL to lift a pernicious requirement that any contract with an Italian firm be approved by the office of the Prime Minister (a requirement other states' firms are not subjected to), and to permit Italian nationals evacuated from Libya in the 1970's to visit Libya. French and Greek diplomats in Tripoli have hinted that they may also dangle a veto threat to resolve commercial disputes. The Netherlands have approached certain EU members about a possible veto over Libya's outstanding private debt to Dutch firms. Danish Consul-General George Wallen recently told EU Ambassadors in Tripoli that Denmark would veto a framework agreement with Libya unless the GOL lifts bans on Danish imports and Danish participation in infrastructure projects in Libya (prompted by a Danish magazine's re-publishing in February 2008 of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad). Denmark also wants the GOL to release Jamal al-Hajj, a Danish-Libyan dual-national arrested on February 16, 2007 in connection with plans to hold a peaceful political demonstration. Maltese diplomats have said Malta is considering a veto over dissatisfaction with Libya's maritime patrols in its designated Search and Rescue (SAR) area and continuing concerns over the lack of cooperation by the GOL in efforts to stem the flow of irregular migrants from Libya to Europe.

¶6. (C) European diplomats believe that apart from help in combating illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia through Libya to Europe, Europe has little to gain from a closer partnership with Tripoli. In absence of a more formal agreement, some European countries have pursued bilateral cooperation that they privately assess as being more nimble and effective than broader cooperation under an EU framework agreement might be. Italian diplomats characterized a recent donation of six vessels to Libya's coast guard and an offer to train Libyan border security officials as Italy's bilateral response to what they view as a lack of meaningful EU engagement on illegal migrant flows through Libya. Greek DCM Ioannis Stamatekos lauded Italy's move and said Greece may follow suit. Maltese Poloff Daniel Malina said that Malta, lacking resources to make a large equipment donation, hoped to keep the critical migration issue on the EU's radar during Council deliberations over the Commission's mandate to pursue the framework agreement.

DON'T RAIN ON MY CHARADE

¶7. (C) Twelve months have passed since Ferrero-Waldner initialed a draft memorandum on an EU-Libya framework agreement; however, a year of inaction does not appear to have dampened GOL perceptions that relations with Europe are on an up-swing. While senior European diplomats in Tripoli are quick to point out that formal negotiations with Libya on any kind of European-Libyan cooperation agreement have yet to even begin, many GOL officials speak of key Libyan negotiating positions, such as the 48-hour Schengen visa point, as if they're already in place. Tripoli Airport Director Youssef al-Jeribi told Poloff (incorrectly) in March that Libyans no longer need to wait 10 days to obtain Schengen visas. Similarly, many Libyans persist in thinking (again, incorrectly) that over $400 million in EU "compensation" payments to the Libyan victims of the 1999

Benghazi HIV/AIDS outbreak have facilitated the latest European rapprochement. A series of high-level European visits, most recently that of Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Moratinos, have helped attenuate the GOL's disappointment over what it perceives as slow progress on the framework agreement and on implementing commitments made during al-Qadhafi's visits to Spain and France in December 2007.

¶8. (C) Comment: Libya's interest in a closer partnership with Europe seems sincere; however, the GOL's foreign policy, particularly at the senior levels, remains somewhat fickle. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's visit to Madrid and Paris last December sparked a surge of pro-European rhetoric in Tripoli - in one instance, Qadhafi threatened to pull Libyan investment from sub-Saharan Africa to redirect to his new European friends. More recently, though, al-Qadhafi orchestrated a meeting of Arab Maghreb Union leaders in Tripoli to publicly disparage Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterannean proposal (reftel). Characterizing the proposed union as "insulting", he claimed it would undermine Arab and African member states' commitments to the Arab League and African Union, and told former British Prime Minister Tony Blair he was concerned that the proposal represented an effort by southern European states to create a North African bulwark against illegal migration from sub-Saharan Africa and to "further legitimize" Israel. Despite such disagreements, Qadhafi's interest in being taken seriously, particularly by his "friends Nicholas (Sarkozy) and Silvio (Berlusconi)", will continue to drive the GOL's keen interest in finalizing a framework agreement with the EU. End comment.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI574

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI574 aka Wikileaks id #161985 ?
Subject	U.K. VISIT TO RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Jul 2008 15:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI574.html
References	08TRIPOLI466
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Removed on Wed, 23 Mar 2011 17:52 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 24 Mar 2011 13:54 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Wed, 4 May 2011 10:48 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6513
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0574/01 1961550
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141550Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3694
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 0081
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0547
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0866
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0453
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4203
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000574

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/14/2018
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CWC *[Chemical Weapons Convention]* , OPCW, CBW, IT *[Italy]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: U.K. VISIT TO RABTA CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION FACILITY

REF: TRIPOLI 466

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The U.K. Deputy Head of Mission told us the recent visit by U.K. chemical weapons experts to the Rabta chemical weapons production facility (CWPF) had "greatly reassured" the U.K. that Libya was committed to converting the facility to pharmaceuticals production, meeting the deadline for destroying stocks of chemical weapons agent and dealing with the OPCW in a more transparent way. End summary.

¶2. (C) A U.K. team comprising Chris Rampling, Clive Rowland, Shailesh Patel and Jim McGilly visited Libya July 6-9. FCO official Chris Rampling gave us a readout of his meeting on July 7 with officials from the MFA's International Organizations (MFA/IO) department and GOL's lead interlocutor on CWC issues, Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy; U.K. Embassy Deputy Head of Mission Mark Matthews subsequently gave us a readout on July 10 of the team's visit to the Rabta facility and their conclusions. The U.K. team stressed that a major objective for their visit was to re-establish contact with Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy and other key GOL interlocutors on CWC issues, with whom they have not had direct contact for some time.

MEETING WITH DR. HESNAWY & MFA/IO: LIBYA AGREES MORE TRANSPARENCY NEEDED

¶3. (C) Rampling led the U.K. team's meeting on July 7 with the MFA's International Organizations (MFA/IO) department and Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, Libya's lead interlocutor on CWC issues. Rampling stressed the need for greater transparency from the GOL as to the reasons that conversion of the Rabta CWPF from chemical weapons to pharmaceuticals production had been delayed. Rampling said he "suggested, but not explicitly" that Libya consider submitting a new national paper at the next OPCW meeting. Hesnawy blamed Italian company PharmaChem, with which it has contracted for conversion-related work, for delays in conversion work. He agreed that greater transparency could help alleviate concerns about Libya's activities, and suggested Libya would submit a new national paper.

¶4. (C) Rampling also urged the GOL to be more transparent about the contract with Italian firm SIPSA Engineering for destruction of chemical agent at Rabta. Rampling said Hesnawy bristled when asked whether the destruction contract with SIPSA Engineering contract had actually been signed. Complaining that the Italian Embassy in Tripoli had called regularly - "they are pushing us too hard on this" - to ask whether the contract had been signed, Hesnawy stressed that Libya would "sign when we're ready to sign, and not before". As reported reftel, Hesnawy told us in June that contract negotiations with SIPSA had been completed and terms were mutually understood; however, the contract itself had not yet been formally approved by all relevant GOL entities. (Note: Rampling told us that despite the fact that Italian officials in Rome and at the OPCW deny that Italy's government has played a direct role in the SIPSA contract, Italian Embassy officials in Tripoli freely admitted that they were actively involved in trying to get the contract finalized and signed. End note.) Hesnawy expressed confidence that Libya would "easily meet" the deadline for destruction of its chemical agent.

RABTA VISIT: U.K. TEAM "GREATLY REASSURED"

¶5. (C) U.K. DHM Mark Matthews told us the U.K. team was "greatly reassured" by its visit to the Rabta CWPF on July 8 that the GOL had been transparent about its conversion and destruction activities. GOL officials - Hesnawy accompanied the team on its visit - were "very cooperative". The U.K. team had full access to the Rabta CWPF and was able to take photographs during their five-plus hour visit. The team reported that "significant" construction and conversion work had been performed at the former CWPF. The U.K. team had "no concerns" about Libya's proposal to retain the sandbag-covered enclosure berm that the original conversion plan envisioned removing. GOL interlocutors reiterated earlier arguments that retention of the berm would help preclude damage to the production facility's equipment that could occur during removal and, more importantly, help product the facility from sand storms prevalent in the area.

¶6. (C) The U.K. team was not/not allowed to visit the chemical weapons destruction facility. Hesnawy said only site preparation work was underway there, and that there was nothing of substance to see. Hesnawy told the U.K. team that some equipment for the destruction facility would be obtained

equipment for the destruction facility would be obtained locally, with some to be brought in from abroad, including destruction monitoring equipment that may/may be purchased from a U.K. company. Hesnawy may/may travel to the U.K. in October to meet with representatives of the U.K. company; the U.K.'s Ministry of Defense may/may provide training on use of the destruction monitoring equipment. Rampling told us on July 7

TRIPOLI 00000574 002 OF 002

that he intended to pull Hesnawy aside to raise the issue of establishing a system to identify and track proliferation sensitive production equipment; however, Matthews told us in his readout that Rampling had ultimately not/not raised the issue.

¶7. (C) Separately, MFA/IO official Adel Ben Issa told us on July 14 that the request for the U.S. team of CWC experts to visit Libya July 20-24 had been forwarded to MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi, Libya's lead interlocutor for Tri-lateral Steering Coordinating Committee (TSCC) issues. (Note: Obeidi has been in Paris in connection with the Union for the Mediterranean event recently held there, and just returned to Tripoli. End note.) Ben Issa said all the indications were positive that the U.S. team's visit would be approved, and that he expected to receive official permission for the visit from Obeidi within a day or so.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI577

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI577 aka Wikileaks id #162137 ?
Subject	QADHAFI FOUNDATION CONTINUES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE OF FORMER LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP MEMBERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 15 Jul 2008 15:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI577.html
References	08TRIPOLI182
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI919 , 08TRIPOLI920 , 08TRIPOLI993 , 09TRIPOLI48
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO7466
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0577 1971549
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 151549Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3698
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0552
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0718
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0549
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0868
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0664
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1153
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4207
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000577

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/15/2018
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI FOUNDATION CONTINUES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE OF FORMER LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP MEMBERS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 182 , B) TRIPOLI 320

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: An ongoing dialogue between the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) and the

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) has resulted in the release and reintegration of some 130 former LIFG fighters into Libyan society thus far (reftels). The dialogue, initially led directly by Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam, aims to convince LIFG members in Libyan detention facilities to renounce violence and resume their lives as normal Libyan citizens. Approximately 90 LIFG members remain in Libyan prisons; discussions with them are ongoing and it is expected that they may be released soon. End Summary.

¶2. (U) Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Human Rights Committee of the QDF and a senior adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, provided an update on July 13 to CDA and Poloff regarding the QDF-LIFG dialogue.

FORTY ADDITIONAL FIGHTERS RELEASED IN JUNE

¶3. (C) According to Saleh, talks between the QDF and LIFG have thus far resulted in the release of 131 former LIFG fighters - 91 in April (ref B) and an additional 40 in June. Saleh carefully emphasized that the talks were part of "a dialogue", vice negotiations, that had been underway for over a year and a half under the personal patronage of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. Saleh described the dialogue as unconditional, noting that the only thing required of LIFG members was " ... a willingness to change ideas on the use of violence". He stressed that the dialogue emphasizes the reintegration of former fighters, particularly with respect to helping them secure work after their release. He also confirmed press reports that the QDF had paid 10,000 Libyan dinar (about 8,300 USD) to each released fighter to help them re-establish themselves after their release, and had additionally paid monthly stipends to former fighters until they secured jobs. He said the "vast majority" of those released in April and June had already secured work; only a small number remained unemployed.

QDF USES OUTSIDE MEDIATORS TO FACILITATE DISCUSSIONS

¶4. (C) Saleh said that Ali al-Salabi and Numan Ben Othman (the latter is a former LIFG member), usually accompanied by a QDF official, have represented the QDF in the dialogue. (Note: al-Salabi resides in Dubai and Ben Othman resides in London; both travel to Libya for their mediation work. End note.) Abdullah al-Sadiq, Abu Munther al-Saadi, and Abu Hazim al-Sharif have represented the LIFG leadership. The semi-official QDF mediators meet with the LIFG leadership at the Abu Salim prison, located on the outskirts of Tripoli, every two to three weeks. (Note: The Abu Salim prison is formally managed by military police; however, it is the facility at which most political prisoners are housed and the Internal Security Organization (ISO) plays a large role in administering it. End note.) The most recent meeting took place in mid-June; it is expected that the next will take place in early August.

THE LIFG IS NO LONGER JUDGED TO BE A VIABLE ORGANIZATION INSIDE LIBYA

¶5. (C) Saleh characterized the LIFG as "not present on the ground in Libya", noting that the vast majority the known remaining members in Libya - about 90 individuals - are currently in Libyan government detention. (Note: A number of individuals affiliated with the LIFG are outside Libya. End note.) The LIFG as a terrorist organization is "completely gone", Saleh said. The QDF remains in contact with the 131 fighters released to date through local administrative authorities ("lajnaat al-shabiya"), and the QDF and Libyan authorities monitor former LIFG members to ensure they have "become citizens again and have peaceful ideas".

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI584

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI584 aka Wikileaks id #162835 ?
Subject	LIBYAN FOREIGN BANK - PRIMED FOR EXPANSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 21 Jul 2008 10:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI584.html
References	08TRIPOLI126 , 08TRIPOLI214 , 08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI230
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2061
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0584/01 2031018
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211018Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3704
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0666
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0554
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0720
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1155
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0325
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0455
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0550
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0869
RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0006
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4214
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000584

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON) AND ISN/CPI (MCGEEHAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KBIO, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN FOREIGN BANK - PRIMED FOR EXPANSION

REF: A) GODFREY-MCKEEHAN EMAIL 7/15/2008, B) TRIPOLI 214 , C) TRIPOLI 230 , D) TRIPOLI 126 , E) TRIPOLI 199, F) TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Libyan Foreign Bank (LFB), Libya's

longtime conduit for international trade, is pursuing a substantial program of expansion involving a ten-fold increase in its capitalization and creation of an onshore bank. Its chairman is aggressively seeking new investment opportunities in Africa and beyond, and is contemplating whether and how to get into the U.S. market. The LFB recently doubled its capitalization of Bahrain-based Alubaf Bank, of which it has a 95 percent share. Regarding much-anticipated GOL reform initiatives, the LFB's Chairman expects a reprise of past efforts that featured form over substance. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) CDA and Econoff met with Dr. Mohammed Abdullah Bayt Almal, Chairman of the Libyan Foreign Bank (formerly known as the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank) on July 16 to discuss recent changes at the LFB and its plans for the future. Established in 1972 as an offshore bank, the LFG has been Libya's leading institution for transactions essential to the conduct of international trade (issuing letters of credit, providing currency exchange services, etc.). The LFB has historically been the only Libyan bank that handled foreign currency accounts; Bayt Almal confirmed that it still does not possess any Libyan dinar-denominated accounts.

ALUBAF BANK

¶3. (C) CDA asked about press reports detailing recent initiatives made by Bahrain-based Alubaf Arab International Bank. Bayt Almal confirmed that a proposal to double Alubaf's capital to $100 million and to appoint Bayt Almal to the Board of Directors were approved by shareholders in a meeting on July ¶9. He offered that Alubaf Bank nearly collapsed after a significant number of Iraqi-owned accounts were closed in 2003, but said the bank had since rebounded. He confirmed that the LFB owns a 95% share of Alubaf's Bahrain branch and 100% of its branch in Tunisia (ref A). Libya's Central Bank owns 100% of LFB, and is therefore the ultimate owner of Alubaf.

DIVERSIFIED & SEEKING A PRESENCE IN THE U.S.

¶4. (SBU) The LFB's foreign interests are diverse and growing. It currently has "participation" (i.e., interests) in thirty-seven foreign entities located in twenty countries, from Mexico to China. Most of its interests are focused in sub-Saharan Africa, including every country in the Maghreb except Morocco. Bayt Almal estimated the LFB's current capital at $1 billion, with assets in excess of $21 billion worldwide. We had heard and reported previously that all Libyan government and financial institutions had divested themselves of holdings and accounts in the U.S. in response to potential seizure of assets under Section 1083 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (the so-called Lautenberg Amendment. According to Bayt Almal, the LFB continues to hold U.S. dollar accounts and - despite efforts by the Libyan Investment Authority and other Libyan government entities to limit their exposure in the U.S. (ref B) - is actively exploring the possibility of establishing a "strategic partnership" with a major U.S. bank and investing in a U.S.-based bank.

LAND HO: MOVING ONSHORE

¶5. (SBU) Bayt Almal said that the LFB planned to open an onshore bank in Libya soon, contingent on approval by its parent institution, the Central Bank (CB). A plan currently before CB Governor Farhat Ben Gdara calls for a ten-fold expansion of the LFB's capital, from $1 billion to $10 billion. Conceding that LFB had aimed high, Bayt Almal said he would be happy with $6-7 billion, and expected to get it. Part of the justification for expanded capitalization involves establishing an onshore entity, which would allow LFB to diversify the range of products it offers in the Libyan market. With the continuing reform of the Libyan banking system, to include the purchase of stakes in Libyan banks by foreign entities (refs C, D), the LFB wants to ensure that it will remain competitive. It intends to

inaugurate risk management and asset management services, which would both be entirely new service lines for the bank. (Note: Risk management and asset management are areas CB Governor Ben Gdara told us are most in need of help. End note.) In anticipation of this step, the LFB has expanded its training

efforts, sending employees abroad for hands-on training at partner institutions in Europe (Britain, France, Belgium, and Germany) and the Middle East (Jordan and the UAE). Bayt Almal cited a dearth of trained employees as one of the biggest stumbling blocks to banking reform in Libya.

AL-QADHAFI'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT REFORMS - "FORM OVER SUBSTANCE"

¶6. (C) Responding to a question about expected privatization and government restructuring stemming from Muammar al-Qadhafi's dramatic speech to the General People's Congress on March 2 (refs E, F), Bayt Almal wearily noted that Libya had "been through this before". He referred to his own experience in 2000, when the Libyan Cabinet underwent wholesale changes, leaving only Bayt Almal (then the Finance Minister) and the Foreign Minister in a "Prime Minister-plus two" formulation. During that round of reform, other ministries were re-labeled as "Haya" (translated as "institution" or "entity"). Despite the semantics, the old structures were essentially left in place. Bayt Almal expected a similar outcome at the end of the current reform exercise. He predicted that foreign affairs, defense, finance and the security services would be left intact in their current guises as "sovereign ministries" that would report directly to the Prime Minister-equivalent, a formulation al-Qadhafi himself hinted at in his March 2 address.

¶7. (C) Biographical Note: Bayt Almal was born in Egypt in 1948 and spent his childhood in Benghazi, despite the fact that his family originally hails from Misurata. He spent 1970-1978 in U.S., where he obtained an MA in accounting (in Muncie, Indiana) and PhD (at the University of Kentucky in Lexington) in finance. He then returned to Libya, where taught accounting at Garyounis University in Benghazi before serving as Secretary of Finance (1992-2000) and Auditor General (2003-2005). Various sources report that he served a three-year prison sentence in 2000-2003 in connection with an embezzlement case in Benghazi (Emboffs were not able to corroborate this story during their office call). Bayt Almal was married in 1970 while in the U.S., and he has seven daughters (two of them AmCits by birth), all of whom currently reside in/around Misurata. End biographical note.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI588

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI588 aka Wikileaks id #162927 ?
Subject	LIBYA ENFORCES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 21 Jul 2008 16:35 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI588.html
References	08TRIPOLI515 , 08TRIPOLI530
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI614 , 09TRIPOLI22
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2230
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0588/01 2031635
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 211635Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3709
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0556
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1158
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0722
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0668
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0871
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0552
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE 0028
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4219
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000588

SIPDIS

ABU DHABI PLEASE PASS TO NEA A/S WELCH

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ODIP *[U.S. Diplomatic Representation]* , OFDP *[Foreign Diplomats and Foreign Missions]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ENFORCES TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST U.S. OFFICIALS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 530 , B) TRIPOLI 412, C) STATE 55839, D) TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL), E) 07 TRIPOLI 165, F) TRIPOLI 515

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Four years after re-establishing diplomatic relations, the Government of Libya (GOL) remains deeply concerned about efforts to cover internal political issues and actively seeks to prevent Emboffs from traveling in-country and

engaging with Libyans. The GOL has actively enforced new strictures to prevent certain foreign diplomats from traveling outside Tripoli without prior permission and a travel permit. The measures have been justified on security grounds; however, they appear to be largely motivated by a desire to circumscribe reporting on internal political issues and to specifically target U.S. diplomats. While perceptions of foreign interference are known to be a particularly neuralgic issue for the GOL, recent actions to limit our activities nonetheless go beyond the pale, the more so since since they appear to specifically target U.S. diplomats. Since March, there have been five instances of proposed in-country travel by Emboffs - involving five different officers and four different putative destinations - that the GOL has effectively blocked. Given that the regime's other recent measures on sensitive bilateral issues appear to have been authored at the highest levels, engagement by senior officials in Washington with their GOL interlocutors will likely be necessary to mitigate the current constraints on Post's ability to conduct in-country travel and engagement with Libyans. End comment.

ATTEMPTS TO CONDUCT IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL, ENGAGEMENT STRIKE A NERVE

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, an attempt to visit the historical Berber heartland in March prompted an angry response from the MFA and a prohibition against travel to the city of Zuwara by Emboffs. MFA interlocutors angrily denounced Post's attempt to engage with the Berber community as "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs. Following the Berber incident, CDA and P/E Chief spoke with MFA counterparts to clarify the mechanism by which proposed in-country travel could be coordinated through the MFA to avoid complications.

¶3. (C) Following the protocol established in those discussions, post proposed in early March that Poloff visit the southern city of Sabha (located some 650 km southeast of Tripoli, in the Fezzan Province) to meet with Libyan officials to discuss local government and migration issues. The MFA claimed to support the visit and offered to facilitate meetings with local Libyan officials. Post formally advised the MFA of Emboff's travel plans on March 30; however, on April 19, the MFA asked that the visit be delayed to allow additional time to arrange meetings with the Basic People's Congress in Sabha. The MFA also requested changes in the language of the diplomatic note advising the GOL of the proposed visit. Post sent a new diplomatic note, incorporating the MFA's suggested changes, on April 22 regarding Poloff's proposed visit to Sabha on May 6, and was in regular contact with the MFA concerning trip logistics from May 1-6.

EMBOFF DETAINED TO PREVENT TRAVEL TO SABHA

¶4. (C) On May 6, Libyan security officials pulled Poloff out of line on the tarmac at Tripoli International Airport while he attempted to board a commercial flight from to Sabha. A plainclothes security official took Emboff's travel documents; other plainclothes security officials and uniformed police prevented Poloff from boarding the flight. A uniformed police officer told Poloff he was not allowed to wait on the tarmac and escorted him inside the terminal, where he was directed to report to the senior security official on site at the airport to retrieve his travel documents. Poloff was subsequently detained for approximately an hour in the senior security official's office, where he was surrounded by four to six uniformed and plainclothes security officials and two armed guards in uniform. Security officials attempted to question Poloff about his work at the Embassy and accused Poloff of not having a valid residence permit to remain in Libya. Poloff was told during the course of questioning that his luggage had not been loaded on the aircraft because security officials had decided well before the flight that he would not be allowed to travel. (Note: The MFA was aware that Poloff intended to travel on May 6 and gave no indication that there was any problem with the proposed trip

no indication that there was any problem with the proposed trip. End note.) Nearly two hours after he was to have boarded the flight, security officials informed Poloff that he must "leave the airport immediately" without further explanation.

¶5. (C) Following the incident at the airport on May 6, the MFA

sent Post a diplomatic note asking that the Sabha trip be "delayed". A senior Libyan official told CDA on May 8 that while the MFA would attempt to coordinate with security officials to reschedule the visit, elements of the security apparatus, particularly the External Security Organization (ESO), were deeply uncomfortable with attempts by reporting officers to travel in-country and engage with Libyans outside of narrowly circumscribed official channels. To date, the MFA has not arranged the requested Sabha visit; Post has been informed that all Emboffs are currently banned from traveling to Libya's third largest city.

MFA ATTEMPTS TO REQUIRE THAT ALL DIPLOMATS OBTAIN "PERMISSION" FOR IN-COUNTRY TRAVEL

¶6. (SBU) As reported ref B, the MFA sent to Western European and North American missions on May 19 a diplomatic note requiring that all diplomatic missions obtain "permission" (the Arabic wording is exact) for diplomats and/or members of their families to travel more than 70 km outside of Tripoli, regardless of the purpose of travel. Per guidance in ref C, Post has adopted a policy of notifying the GOL of travel by Emboffs and their families outside the 70 km radius. Add language on 'ya'ani greater Tripoli area"

SECURITY SERVICES OBSTRUCT CHARGE'S TRAVEL TO BENGHAZI & POINTS EAST

¶7. (C) On May 23 - after receipt on May 19 of the MFA note requiring permission to travel and before receipt of ref C guidance on May 23 - security officials attempted to prevent CDA and two Emboffs from making a trip to Benghazi and eastern Libya for tourism. Four security officials, who identified themselves as External Security Organization (ESO) officials, met CDA inside the terminal at Tripoli International Airport and demanded to see his travel permit. Security officers were overheard discussing in Arabic the arrival of "the Americans" in the terminal. The officials noted that they were informed on May 22 that three Emboffs would attempt to travel to Benghazi. The ESO officials told CDA that the Emboffs would not be allowed to travel to Benghazi because they had not obtained permission to do so. CDA and Emboffs nonetheless attempted to check in for the flight; however, a security official physically went behind the airline counter to instruct the agent not to allow them to check in for their flight. After multiple phone calls to senior MFA and security officials, the security officials at the airport agreed to allow the officers to travel; however, they refused to allow Emboffs to ride on the same airport shuttle bus with other passengers and kept them under close observation.

¶8. (C) A Buraq Air agent told CDA and Emboffs during the encounter on May 23 that all Libyan-owned airlines with domestic service - Buraq Air, Libyan Arab Airlines, and Afriqiyah - received instructions from GOL officials in May that they were not to allow U.S. diplomats to board domestic flights from Tripoli without special permission from security organizations. The Buraq agent clarified that the instructions applied only to U.S diplomats, vice the entire diplomatic community.

¶9. (C) In Benghazi, security officials subjected CDA and Emboffs to a steady stream of harrassment. A security officer met CDA and Emboffs on the tarmac in Benghazi and immediately began questioning them about their trip. During a road trip

from the Benghazi airport to Susa (some 200 km northeast), four security officials closely followed CDA and Emboffs. When they stopped at a scenic overlook, a security official in one of the chase cars got out and took numerous photographs of CDA, Emboffs and their locally-hired driver from a distance of five to ten feet. CDA confronted the official, who refused to identify himself and refused to stop taking photos. The same individual aggressively snapped hundreds of photographs of CDA, Emboffs, and the locally-engaged driver during the subsequent two days of their trip to eastern Libya. The driver, who is from Benghazi and is regularly used by Emboffs when they visit the east, said security officials routinely question him "for hours" after each visit by Emboffs and had instructed him to report any trip coordination with Emboffs at least 24 hours before their planned arrival in Benghazi. (Note: P/E Chief traveled to Benghazi and eastern Libya in early May and used the same driver, who is also used by PD officers when they travel in the east. End note.) Following Poloff's May 22 phone call to arrange a pick-up from the Benghazi airport, the driver had notified local security officials that the CDA and Emboffs planned to travel to Benghazi.

EMBOFFS DENIED "PERMISSION" TO TRAVEL IN SUPPORT OF U.S. PROGRAMS

¶10. (C) In late June, Post formally advised the MFA via diplomatic note that two Emboffs would accompany an Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) team to Benghazi, where they planned to conduct a three-day course on July 12-15 for 50 Libyan officials responsible for airport security and passenger screening. Post provided detailed information on Emboffs' proposed travel and clearly stated that they were to provide logistical support to the U.S. delegation. On July 9, the MFA informed Post via diplomatic note that Emboffs would not be permitted to travel to Benghazi in support of the EXBS training program (text of note sent via email to NEA/MAG). The note provided no explanation for denying permission to Emboffs to travel in support of the program. Post has cancelled the Benghazi portion of the airport security training course; a parallel EXBS airport security training program at the Tripoli International Airport is currently underway. In a meeting on July 15, MFA Americas Department Director Matari expressed frustration and conceded that such decisions were driven by security organizations, but said he would see what he could do to help. He advised that Emboffs seek in the interim to obtain the travel permit mandated in the May 19 diplomatic note to facilitate their in-country travel.

¶11. (C) On July 9, Post formally advised the MFA via diplomatic note that the Public Affairs Officer, CDA and their son would travel on July 20 to the Graeco-Roman ruins at Cyrene (east of Benghazi) for tourism. The PAO also intended to meet with representatives of the Global Heritage Fund, who received a USG grant for archaeological work being done at the Cyrene site. Despite daily inquiries between July 14 and 20, the GOL failed to issue travel permits for PAO and CDA. Inquiries to airline officials suggested that Emboffs would not be allowed to board the flight to Benghazi without travel permits; the trip was therefore cancelled.

TRAVEL RESTRICTIONS APPEAR TO TARGET U.S. DIPLOMATS

¶12. (C) In addition to instructions prohibiting Libyan air carriers from boarding U.S. diplomats for domestic flights from Tripoli, the May 19 diplomatic note requiring diplomats and their families to obtain permission for travel more than 70 km outside Tripoli appears to be targeted at western diplomats, particularly those from the U.S. The requirement for travel permits has been on the books for some time; however, it has not been consistently enforced. Diplomats at the embassies of Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Chad and Sudan told Emboffs

Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Jordan, Chad and Sudan told Emboffs their missions did not receive the MFA's note requiring travel permits and are not required to notify the GOL in advance of in-country travel. Egyptian and Tunisian diplomats laughed off the suggestion that they would comply with the requirement, noting that if the GOL tried to enforce it against them, their governments would immediately reciprocate with similar strictures on Libyan diplomats accredited to Cairo and Tunis. European diplomats report that while certain EU embassies provide the GOL with advance notice of their travel (the U.K., for instance), there are no known instances in which the GOL has restricted a European diplomat or their family from traveling outside Tripoli. Several eastern European missions that received the May 19 note told us they have no intention of complying with the requirement; personnel from those missions have subsequently traveled without incident (and without permits) to Benghazi, Sabha and Ghadames.

¶13. (C) Comment: Despite comments by senior GOL officials attesting to the desire for broader and deeper ties, significant elements of the regime, particularly within the security apparatus, remain deeply skeptical of U.S.-Libya bilateral re-engagement in general, and of Emboffs' travel and outreach in particular. The GOL maintains an expansive definition of "unacceptable interference" in its domestic affairs; security organizations regard any effort to engage with Libyans and to report on domestic issues as dangerously subversive, reflecting the regime's overweaning focus on pre-empting any potential challenge to its authority. While perceptions of foreign interference are known to be a particularly neuralgic issue for the GOL (witness the March 2006 attack on the Italian consulate in Benghazi and the December 2007 arrest of a Lukoil executive on charges of industrial espionage), GOL officials appear to harbor particular concerns about U.S. diplomats. Blunt demarches by senior GOL officials (refs D, E) have underscored

the GOL's concern. Recent actions by the GOL to limit our activities nonetheless go well beyond the pale, particularly since they appear to have specifically targeted U.S. diplomats. We now have five instances of proposed in-country travel by Emboffs (involving five different officers and four different putative destinations) since March that the GOL has effectively blocked. Given that the regime's other recent counter-productive measures on the bilateral front appear to have been authored at the highest levels (refs A, D and F), engagement by senior officials in Washington with their GOL interlocutors will likely be necessary to mitigate the current constraints on Post's ability to conduct in-country travel and engagement with Libyans. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI592

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI592 aka Wikileaks id #163087 ?
Subject	THUG LIFE: HANNIBAL AL-QADHAFI'S ARREST PROMPTS FISSURE IN SWISS-LIBYAN RELATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 22 Jul 2008 16:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI592.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI642 , 08TRIPOLI819 , 08TRIPOLI851 , 08TRIPOLI987 , 08TRIPOLI994 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI59 , 09TRIPOLI714
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO3461
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0592/01 2041634
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221634Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3716
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1164
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0562
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0726
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0672
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4226
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000592

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/22/2018
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , KCRM [Criminal Activity] , CVIS
[Visas] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EAIR [Civil Aviation] , LY [Libya] , SZ [Switzerland]
SUBJECT: THUG LIFE: HANNIBAL AL-QADHAFI'S ARREST PROMPTS FISSURE IN
SWISS-LIBYAN RELATIONS

TRIPOLI 00000592  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli,
Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: The arrest in Geneva of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son
of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and his wife has prompted a serious
diplomatic fissure between Switzerland and Libya, which has
accused Swiss police of using unnecessary force, of having
violated Hannibal's diplomatic immunity, of having violated
diplomatic protocol by not granting Libyan diplomats immediate
consular access to him, and of deliberately seeking to embarrass
Libya because of Switzerland's "well-known" dislike of Arabs
```

Libya because of Switzerland's "well known" dislike of Arabs. Efforts by the Swiss government to accord Hannibal preferential treatment earned no quarter from the GOL, which has reduced the number of flights between the two countries, ceased issuing visas to Swiss citizens seeking to travel to Libya, and harassed Swiss companies in Libya. Since Hannibal's arrest a week ago, two Swiss companies have been closed on the pretext that their registration papers were not in order and one Swiss businessmen has been detained for irregularities with his residency permit. Diplomatic efforts to smooth over the incident are underway: the Swiss Foreign Minister spoke with her Libyan counterpart today, and a high-level Swiss delegation is scheduled to arrive in Tripoli tomorrow for talks aimed at restoring equilibrium to bilateral relations. The GOL's reflexive efforts to attack Swiss commercial interests and cease issuing visas to Swiss citizens underscore the extent to which the regime treats business as an extension of politics and the sensitivity of anything to do with the al-Qadhafi family. The incident also reflects the gap - perceived by some to be growing - between average Libyans, who take a dim view of the al-Qadhafi clan's embarrassing and repeated falls from grace, and a hidebound regime that sees the state as an extension of the al-Qadhafi family empire. End summary.

ABUSING THE HELP

¶2. (C) Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt gave CDA and A/RSO an extensive readout on July 22 on the recent arrest in Geneva of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and the subsequent rift in Swiss-Libyan bilateral relations. Hannibal and his wife, who is nearly nine months pregnant, together with a sizeable retinue of bodyguards and assistants, were in Geneva for the delivery of their child. Two of their household staff, a Moroccan man and a Tunisian women, contacted a Swiss NGO to complain that Hannibal and his wife had physically abused them. The NGO contacted Swiss police and warrants were issued by a Swiss magistrate for the two. Swiss police informed Libyan diplomats at the Libyan missions in Geneva and Bern that they intended to take Hannibal and his wife into custody for questioning about allegations that they had physically abused their assistants and detained them illegally by confiscating their passports. (Note: Von Muralt explained that a large number of Arabs, many of them wealthy citizens of Gulf states, visit and live in Switzerland and have a reputation of abusing their domestic help. The scope of the problem is such that some Swiss NGO's essentially specialize in "rescuing" domestic help who are abused, physically and otherwise, by their well-heeled employers. End note.)

HANNIBAL REFUSES TO GO QUIETLY

¶3. (C) Swiss police officers arrived at Hannibal's room at the Hotel President Wilson on July 15 to serve the warrants, but were told by Libyan diplomats at the hotel that Hannibal and his wife did not intend to surrender themselves into custody. After an hour and a half of fruitless negotiations, Swiss police used a hotel key to enter the room. Von Muralt said two bodyguards posted just inside the door of the suite's entryway physically attacked the Swiss officers, who subdued the bodyguards and relieved them of their concealed sidearms. The bodyguards did not have permits for the weapons. The Swiss officers, some of whom had drawn their sidearms when attacked by the two bodyguards at the entrance, then forced open the doors to the suite's bedrooms; Hannibal's wife and three year-old daughter were hiding in one and he was hiding in another with six other bodyguards and other members of his entourage.

PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT ...

¶4. (C) Swiss officers took Hannibal's wife to a hospital, where she remained under police custody. Hannibal was taken in an armored sedan (vice a police van) to the Ministry of Justice building, where he was held in a private room July 15-17.

Emphasizing the special treatment accorded to Hannibal, Von Muralt said Hannibal, a chain smoker, was allowed to smoke despite a prohibition against doing so in all Swiss public buildings. In addition, von Muralt said that although Swiss law permitted authorities to detain Hannibal incommunicado for 2-8 days, he was permitted to make a telephone call shortly after

his arrest. Swiss authorities assumed he would call his father, Muammar al-Qadhafi; however, Hannibal insisted on speaking instead with his sister, Aisha al-Qadhafi. Von Muralt said contacts close to the al-Qadhafi family told him that Hannibal has lived in fear of father since a series of incidents in which he assaulted Italian police officers in Rome (2001), attacked police in Paris after being stopped for speeding on the wrong side of the Champs Elysees while inebriated (2004) and received a four-year suspended prison sentence from a French court after beating his pregnant girlfriend, who refused to let him into their hotel room (2005). Hannibal was banned from traveling in the European Schengen zone between 2005 and 2008; he successfully obtained a visa from the Swiss Embassy in Tripoli in February 2008.

... EARNS NO QUARTER FROM AN ANGRY AISHA

¶5. (C) Aisha al-Qadhafi arrived in Geneva on July 17 and promptly issued a statement to the press in which she accused Swiss police of having used excessive force, and the Swiss government of discriminating against Arabs and perpetrating a "deliberate plot against the al-Qadhafi family". Aisha closed her remarks by noting that Libya's response to Hannibal's arrest would be in line with the proverb of "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth", prompting speculation in the media that the GOL would retaliate against Switzerland. Noting that it would have been better had she not come, von Muralt sharply criticized Aisha's statement as "highly inaccurate" and said her attempts at mediation hurt, rather than helped, efforts to quietly resolve the incident. Eventually, Hannibal and his wife were released on bail - 200,000 Euros for Hannibal; 300,000 Euros for his wife, who is accused of perpetrating most of the alleged physical abuse - and flew from Geneva to Tripoli late on July 17 on a private aircraft, together with Aisha, six of the bodyguard cohort and various other assistants. The two bodyguards who assaulted Swiss officers and carried the unregistered handguns remain in detention in Geneva.

GOL COUNTER ATTACKS ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT ...

¶6. (C) Noting that he had been officially convoked by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on five different occasions since July 15, von Muralt stressed that GOL officials were more focused on mitigating damage to the al-Qadhafi family reputation and saving face than on the fact that Hannibal's behavior had been egregious. Von Muralt's primary MFA interlocutors have been the MFA U/S-equivalent for European Affairs, Abdulati Obeidi, and the MFA Secretary for Adminstrative Affairs, Muhammad Kaim. MFA officials had presented to von Muralt a series of demarches and diplomatic notes accusing the Swiss government of having used excessive force (particularly with respect to detaining Hannibal's wife), of having violated Hannibal's diplomatic immunity, of having violated diplomatic protocol by not granting Libyan diplomats immediate consular access to him, and of deliberately seeking to embarrass Libya because of its "well-known" dislike of Arabs.

¶7. (C) Von Muralt noted that Swiss officers had only drawn their weapons because they were physically assaulted by armed bodyguards, that Hannibal was not/not entitled to diplomatic immunity (he entered Switzerland on a diplomatic passport but was not accredited to the Swiss Government as a diplomat), that Libyan diplomats were not entitled to immediate consular access

Libyan diplomats were not entitled to immediate consular access because he was not an accredited diplomat, and that Switzerland had a proud history of racial tolerance and diversity (one in five residents is a foreigner). (Note: Libyan MFA officials have insisted that Article 36 of the Vienna Conventions provides for immediate consular access; von Muralt said Switzerland's interpretation, based on international practice, was to provide access within four to six days. End note.)

... AND ATTACKS SWISS INTERESTS

¶8. (C) The GOL also moved swiftly to exact reprisals against Swiss interests in Libya. The Libyan People's Bureau (embassy-equivalent) in Bern ceased issuing visas to all Swiss travelers on July 17. GOL officials reduced Swiss Air's connections to Tripoli from three flights per week to one and Libya's Air Afriqiyah reduced its flights to Geneva from three flights per week to one. Swiss companies in Libya have been summoned for inspections of their registration documents and, in the case of Swiss nationals, checks of their residency permits. Two Swiss companies, ABB and Stukey Co., have been closed since July 15 for alleged irregularities in their registration papers and the Swiss national country representative for ABB has been in detention since July 19 on charges that his residency papers

were not in order. Von Muralt estimated that another 20 Swiss companies were at risk of being shuttered unless the diplomatic impasse is resolved quickly. The GOL has provided a small detachment of National Police to guard the Swiss Embassy and Residence, and has suggested to von Muralt that angry Libyans, upset by Swiss treatment of Hannibal, could stage popular demonstrations against the Swiss mission.

HIGH-LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS UNDERWAY, BUT OUTCOME UNCLEAR

¶9. (C) Emphasizing that the Swiss government is keen to put the relationship back on an even keel, von Muralt nonetheless stressed that Switzerland "really doesn't need Libya for anything". There are 41 registered Swiss nationals in Libya, of whom 25 are dual Libyan-Swiss nationals. He suggested that while the Swiss Foreign Ministry was working to resolve the issue, there were limits to how much they were willing to concede. Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey spoke by telephone with Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham on July 22. Von Muralt said Shalgham insisted that Switzerland had violated the Vienna Conventions by not granting immediate consular access, but backed away from accusations by Aisha al-Qadhafi and other MFA officials that Swiss police had used undue force and that Swiss officials deliberately sought to embarrass Libya.

¶10. (C) A senior Swiss delegation is scheduled to travel to Tripoli on July 23 for talks to "smooth things over"; however, von Muralt noted that Hannibal and his wife are out on bail and are currently required to return to Geneva to stand trial. Should they fail to appear, the Swiss judge could issue an Interpol arrest warrant. If that were to happen, von Muralt speculated that the GOL would take "drastic measures" and the Swiss Embassy could be shuttered. Von Muralt suggested to MFA official Abdulati Obeidi on July 20 that the GOL retain good legal counsel and pursue an out-of-court settlement with the Tunisian and Moroccan who pressed the charges, which could obviate the need for Hannibal and his wife to appear before a court in Geneva. The Swiss are making contingency plans to quickly close their mission should that become necessary. The embassy has continued to operate normally since Hannibal's arrest, to include issuing visas, but may cease visa issuance if Libya does not quickly resume issuing visas to Swiss citizens. Von Muralt noted that the Swiss Embassy issues some 9,000 visas each year to Libyans.

¶11. (C) Comment: The GOL's reflexive efforts to attack Swiss commercial interests and cease issuing visas to Swiss citizens underscore the extent to which the regime treats business as an extension of politics and the sensitivity of anything to do with the al-Qadhafi family. Von Muralt dismissed the possibility that his mission would be threatened by angry Libyans. Noting that Switzerland is a large source of second-hand vehicles (a sizeable market in Libya) and a popular venue for medical care and banking for well-heeled Libyans, he said several non-official Libyans had privately expressed the wish that the Swiss had kept Hannibal, who is unpopular here, in custody. He also noted that the single remaining Swiss Air and Air Afriqiyah flights were booked with Libyan elites, who would not view favorably a complete cessation of direct air connections to Geneva. Hannibal's repeated falls from grace highlight the broad gulf between average Libyans, who view the al-Qadhafi family as unsophisticated upstarts from a historically inconsequential part of the country (Sirte) who routinely embarrass Libya, and senior regime officials, who view the state as an extension of the al-Qadhafi family empire. The Swedish ambassador, who is based in Tunis but accredited to Libya, told CDA on July 21 that the "deep-seated, visceral" hatred many Libyans feel for the al-Qadhafi family has grown in recent years to the point that he does not expect that one of al-Qadhafi's children will be able to succeed Muammar al-Qadhafi. He was posted in Tripoli in 1986-1990, and said the popular perception of the ruling family has deteriorated considerably since then, in part because al-Qadhafi's sons have comported themselves so poorly as they have come of age. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI594

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI594 aka Wikileaks id #163146 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE - JULY 21, 2003
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Jul 2008 07:31 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI594.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3916
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0594 2050731
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 230731Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3720
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0566
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1168
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4230
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000594

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DS/ISP/NEA, DS/DSS/ITA, NEA/EX, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2018
TAGS: ASEC *[Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE - JULY 21, 2003

REF: 08 CIA WASHDC 460412 - UNSUBSTANTIATED THREAT FROM MARTYR'S DETACHMENT OF AQIM AGAINST THE U.S. AND ITALIAN EMBASSIES IN TRIPOLI

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) CDA convened an EAC meeting on July 21 to discuss recent threat reporting (reftel) and the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. The following personnel attended: CDA, CONS, DAO, MGT, PAO, GRPO, RSO. The EAC considered recent threat reporting and the shooting attack in Istanbul, and their possible impact on Libya. GRPO contacts reported no additional specific threat information concerning U.S. or any other western interests in Libya beyond the non-specific information in reftel. The EAC concluded that Post's current security posture was appropriate and that it would reconvene as new information became available.

¶2. (S/NF) Local police and intelligence sources are aware of Post's ongoing concerns regarding threats to U.S. and western interests in Libya and in the region.

¶3. (U) Point of contact for this report is the Regional Security Office Tripoli; Mobile: +218 91 220 3094.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI595

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI595 aka Wikileaks id #163160 ?
Subject	A COMMERCIAL CAUTIONARY TALE: BECHTEL'S BID FOR SIRTE PORT PROJECT FALLS FLAT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Jul 2008 08:32 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI595.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3934
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0595/01 2050832
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 230832Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3721
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0675
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0567
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0729
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1169
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0327
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0457
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0556
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0875
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0026
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4231
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000595

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/23/2018
TAGS: ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , EWWT *[Waterborne Transportation]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: A COMMERCIAL CAUTIONARY TALE: BECHTEL'S BID FOR SIRTE PORT PROJECT FALLS FLAT

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b)

¶1. (C) Summary: An unsuccessful year-long bid by U.S. firm Bechtel to build a commercial port in the Libyan city of Sirte has shed light on how decisions about large foreign investment projects in Libya are made. Bechtel's bid went through several evolutions, including signing a memorandum of understanding with the Prime Minister and a resolution by Libya's

the Prime Minister and a resolution by Libya's Cabinet-equivalent to give the company the contract. In the end, the contract evaporated after apparent late-innings intervention by senior regime figures. Despite a year's worth of effort, $1 million worth of expenses, numerous high-level visits, and formal decisions by the GOL to bless the contract, the company's efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, underscoring the fact that Libya's much-trumpeted bidding process is less than transparent, and that the GOL's formal structures do not have the final word on major foreign investment projects. The fact that an operator with Bechtel's savvy and deep pockets was ultimately unable to secure its contract serves as a cautionary tale for the many U.S. and western companies seeking to enter Libya's booming market. End summary.

PROMISING BEGINNINGS ...

¶2. (C) U.S. engineering and consulting giant Bechtel has just declared as dead a year-long attempt to secure a $1 billion cost-plus contract to build a commercial port in the Libyan city of Sirte. Bechtel began its pursuit of the Sirte port contract in July 2007, when senior Bechtel representative Charles Redman (strictly protect), former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, arrived in Tripoli for discussions at the invitation of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), a quasi-governmental entity headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. During the initial visit, QDF representatives encouraged Bechtel to bid on several small infrastructure projects so the company could "prove itself". Redman made it clear that Bechtel wanted, but did not need, business in Libya and had a record that spoke for itself. Eventually, QDF representatives invited Bechtel to execute two projects: a new commercial port facility at Sirte and management of an industrial city adjacent to the Ras Lanuf oil facility. The QDF proposed that Bechtel partner with the Libyan Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) to execute the Sirte Port project.

¶3. (C) This initial burst of positive energy dissipated over the next six months. Bechtel slowly made progress on a contract for the Sirte port project, but its relationship with General People's Committee (GPC) for Transportation, its primary interlocutor on the deal (apart from the QDF), became increasingly difficult. This primarily manifested itself in a lack of responsiveness on facilitation of visas for Bechtel representatives, prompting Bechtel to seek support from other quarters of the Government of Libya (GOL) to facilitate travel by its negotiators and technical staff. In November 2007, then Deputy Foreign Minister Muhammed Siala remarked publicly during a visit to Washington that Bechtel would not secure the Sirte port contract if Secretary Rice failed to visit Libya by year's end.

LEAD TO HIGH-PROFILE COMMITMENTS

¶4. (C) After months of go-slow negotiations, Bechtel experienced an apparent breakthrough in February, when Redman received an urgent call from Minister of Transportation Elmabruk, who asked that the company's team be in Sirte on February 25 to "sign the contract". Although the company was still in the midst of conducting a laborious due diligence review of the contract (key provisions of which had not been finalized), they were convinced to rush a delegation to Sirte in time for a signing event. At that event, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Bechtel signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) committing the two sides to finalizing the contract as soon as possible. In addition, the General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent) issued Decision #158 on March 3, which was effectively an announcement of contract terms that granted permission to the GPC for Transportation to sign a contract with Bechtel. Following these public steps by the GOL, Bechtel reported that the GPC for Transportation appeared to be working in earnest to finalize an English-language version of the contract.

RADIO SILENCE BROKEN BY BAD NEWS FROM SAIF AL-ISLAM'S INTERMEDIARY

TRIPOLI 00000595 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) With expectations running high that a final deal was imminent, Bechtel pressed on with negotiations and a fully-vetted contract was presented to the Transportation Minister in early May. From that point on, all communication with the QDF, GPC for Transportation and Libyan Ports Authority (another key player in the deal) went dead. Sensing that something was amiss, Bechtel representatives continued to inquire about that status of the contract, but received no response. On July 14, Abdulhakim el-Ghami, described as "an intermediary for a person very close to Saif al-Islam", called Redman to inform him that the port project had been canceled. (Note: Redman told us el-Ghami, who is based in Munich, appears to be a key conduit for Saif al-Islam's dealings with foreign companies. End note.) Bechtel received no explanation as to why the contract was cancelled, but el-Ghami encouraged the company to "seriously consider" undertaking a different, unspecified infrastructure development project.

¶6. (C) Comment: Bechtel's experience throws into stark relief the fact that economic and commercial decisions ostensibly finalized by even the most senior levels of the GOL can be overturned by influential elements operating outside the formal government structure. Libyan officials have made much of recent measures designed to ensure transparency and predictability in bids for commercial contracts; however, the reality is that contracts of any size, particularly those involving foreign companies, are subject to intense maneuvering by regime insiders jockeying to ensure that they company they happen to champion wins the prize. Bechtel's story also reinforces post's understanding of Saif al-Islam's key as a principal gatekeeper for large foreign investment projects in Libya, a process he manages through the QDF and the National Engineering Services and Supply Company (NESSCO - further details will be reported septel). The silver lining in this tale of woe is that Bechtel's power division has been awarded a project management job for construction of a new power plant outside Sirte; however, the sorry denouement of the company's efforts to secure the Sirte port contract have dampened its for seeking any new major projects in Libya in the near future and should serve as a cautionary tale for other U.S. companies considering major investment projects here.

.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI597

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI597 aka Wikileaks id #163258 ?
Subject	EUROPEAN OIL COMPANIES EXTEND CONTRACTS IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Jul 2008 18:06 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI597.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI745 , 09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TRIPOLI 00000597 R UN 23-JUL-08 EUROPEAN OIL COMPANIES EXTEND CONTRACTS IN LIBYA [7824779]From:
CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Wednesday, July 23, 2008 7:55 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000597 R UN 23-JUL-08 EUROPEAN OIL COMPANIES EXTEND CONTRACTS
IN LIBYA [7824779]

UNCLAS

VZCZCXRO4416
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0597 2051806
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231806Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3724
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0678
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0028
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1172
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0732
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0329
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0558
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0011
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4234
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000597

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , NO
[Norway] , SP [Spain; Balearic Islands; Canary Islands; Mallorca] , FR [France; Corsica] , AU [Austria] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN OIL COMPANIES EXTEND CONTRACTS IN LIBYA

¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) has
signed extensions for a pair of exploration and production
```

signed extensions for a pair of exploration and production sharing agreements (EPSAs) with Spain's Repsol, France's Total, Austria's OMV, and Norway's Saga Petroleum, continuing its policy of redefining old contracts under the new EPSA IV framework. The joint investment commitment in the new deal should help boost Libyan production significantly in the years to come. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) In a widely-anticipated move, a consortium of European oil companies has extended its contracts in Libya. A new EPSA agreement signed on July 17 with a four-company consortium operated by Spain's Repsol covers two blocks, NC115 and NC186, in the Marzuq Basin, and extends the duration of the contracts to 2032. This represents an additional 15 years for NC-115, and from five to nine years (depending on the specific fields) in block NC-186. The deal ensures the exploitation of the vast resources discovered in both blocks, whose remaining proven oil reserves at the end of 2007 totaled 765 million barrels.

¶3. (SBU) Within the new framework, the production share for the European consortium will be reduced from 25% to 13% for NC-115 and from 40% to 12% for NC-186. Under the former agreement, the production share was 75% for the NOC, 10% for Repsol, 7.5% for OMV, and 7.5% for Total in Block NC-115; and 60% for the NOC, 12.8% for Repsol, 9.6% for OMV, 9.6% for Total, and 8% for Saga. The new agreement represents 87% for NOC, 5.2% for Repsol, 3.9% for OMV, and 3.9% for Total for block NC-115. In block NC-186 the new percentages run 88% for the NOC, 3.84% for Repsol, 2.88% for OMV, 2.88% for Total and 2.4% for Saga. The new contract also includes a $1 billion signature bonus payable by the consortium over three years, and a gross investment requirement in excess of $4 billion, of which 50% will be covered by the NOC, in an effort to reach a steady-state production level of 380,000 barrels of oil per day.

¶4. (SBU) Comment: Repsol, OMV, Total and Saga Petroleum have followed other major actors in Libya in acceding to pressure by the NOC to convert to the new EPSA-IV framework, which features significantly reduced production shares for international oil companies (IOC's). The revised deals have allowed IOC's to guarantee access to significant deposits of high-quality oil while also securing new field development opportunities jointly funded by the NOC. The expected increase in production under this deal should make a significant contribution to the NOC4s aspiration of doubling Libya's oil output to more than 3 million barrels per day in the coming years. End comment.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI6

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI6 aka Wikileaks id #136491 ?
Subject	LIBYA IMPOSES NEW CURRENCY REQUIREMENT FOR TOURISTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 7 Jan 2008 15:53 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/01/08TRIPOLI6.html
References	08TRIPOLI987
Referenced by	08CAIRO786
History	First published on Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6166
RR RUEHAT RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0006 0071553
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 071553Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2972
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0392
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0968
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0709
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0366
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0007
RUEHAT/AMCONSUL AMSTERDAM 0008
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0012
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0403
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0052
RUEHFT/AMCONSUL FRANKFURT 0228
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3413
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000006

SIPDIS

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS *[Visas]* , CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA IMPOSES NEW CURRENCY REQUIREMENT FOR TOURISTS

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 987

¶1. (SBU) Post received January 3 a copy of a note sent from the GOL's Civil Aviation Committee to airlines announcing that as of 7 January, all tourist visa holders -- except bearers of Egyptian and Tunisian passports -- will be required to present USD 1000 or the equivalent in another convertible currency as a requirement for entry to Libya. On January 6, the Consular

Section was able to confirm with the MFA's Head of Consular Affairs, Ahmed Ameish, that the law would take effect January 7.

Ameish stated that travelers checks, bank statements and credit cards would not/not be accepted; the requirement is for "currency". (Note: The Egyptian and Tunisian Embassies have confirmed that their citizens are not/not subject to the new requirement. End note.)

¶2. (SBU) Similar to the passport translation requirement (reftel), this law has apparently been on the books for a number of years, but was not enforced in the recent past. Ameish provided no reason for the change.

¶3. (SBU) Foreign airlines (British, KLM, Swissair, Lufthansa) indicate that they will not/not be checking currency holdings at the time of check-in at European airports. As in the case of the passport translation, it is not clear to us, other diplomatic missions or the airlines how the currency requirement will be implemented. We will likely only obtain a clearer picture over time as the parameters of who is turned back shape up. The U.K. and Italian Embassies are advising on their respective Foreign Office websites that citizens from their countries traveling on tourist visas comply with the new rule.

¶4. (SBU) The Embassy received notification of this requirement via a copy of the Civil Aviation notice that was sent to airlines, which Swissair forwarded to us. We received no notification from the GOL. We learned from the U.K. Embassy on January 6 that the Libyan People's Bureau in Rome notified EU embassies there about ten days ago that the new requirement would be implemented. The EU Embassies in Tripoli learned about the currency requirement shortly after the New Year's holiday from their counterparts in Rome and have since met in Tripoli to discuss options for engaging the GOL.

¶5. (SBU) Comment: There is considerable speculation as to the reasons for implementation of the rule. The U.K. and Italian missions are convinced that the new strictures will be broadly applied; the German and Dutch missions have insisted they will not apply to European and North American travelers. Citing unconfirmed reports, the latter contend that the strictures are designed to prevent more sub-Saharan African guest workers from entering Libya. While it is not clear which sub-Saharan Africans are able to enter Libya visa-free and which obtain tourist visas on arrival, the Civil Aviation note specifies that even citizens of countries exempted from entry visa requirements are subject to the new rule (except, again, Egyptians and Tunisians). As with the passport translation issue, the MFA was unable to articulate any reason for the currency requirement (beyond that it was already on the books), nor did it provide any advance notice to missions in Libya. Both changes will be enforced by Immigration, rather than the MFA's Consular Affairs Department. End comment.

MILAM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI614

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI614 aka Wikileaks id #164142 ?
Subject	EXBS AIRPORT TRAINING PROCEEDS DESPITE SECURITY SERVICE OBSTRUCTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 30 Jul 2008 12:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/07/08TRIPOLI614.html
References	08TRIPOLI588
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9382
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0614/01 2121250
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 301250Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3740
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0570
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1173
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0733
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0679
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0559
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0877
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4251
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000614

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/30/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EXBS AIRPORT TRAINING PROCEEDS DESPITE SECURITY SERVICE OBSTRUCTION

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 144, (B) TRIPOLI 588

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. On July 20-22, a three-member Customs and Border Protection team traveled to Libya to provide airport security training to approximately 30 Libyan customs, security, and counter-narcotics officials at Tripoli International Airport. The program was enthusiastically received by the participants; however, senior elements within the security services erected significant obstacles to the training program, including delaying visa issuance for the U.S. team for several

including delaying visa issuance for the U.S. team for several weeks, confiscating all training materials and physically preventing the distribution of written course materials to program participants, denying "permission" for Embassy officials to travel with the visiting U.S. team to Benghazi for a second course module, and attempting to strong-arm the trainers into providing a written "assessment" of Libya's current airport security posture. End summary.

U.S. TRAINS 30 AIRPORT OFFICIALS UNDER EXBS AUSPICES

¶2. (C) On July 20-22, a three-member delegation from the Department of Homeland Security's Customs and Border Protection (DHS/CDP) directorate traveled to Libya to provide classroom and practical training to approximately 30 Libyan customs, security, and counter-narcotics officials under Export Control and Border Security (EXBS) auspices. The course, requested by the Libyan authorities on the margins of an EXBS port security program in Tripoli in February, focused on airport security at Libya's largest airport, Tripoli International Airport (ref A). The course included modules on passenger screening, luggage screening, behavioral analysis, and targeting / threat assessment. The course consisted of one and half days of classroom instruction in a conference room at the airport and one and a half days of practical "live" exercises on the airport floor. The acting director of the airport, Izzeddin al-Naas, attended the training's opening session while a senior official within the uniformed police service at the airport participated in the entire program.

SECURITY SERVICES ERECT NUMEROUS OBSTACLES

¶3. (C) Despite high-level political support for the EXBS airport course from the Libyan side, security services erected numerous obstacles to the smooth implementation of the training course. Once scheduling and visa difficulties were sorted out (a process which took several months) and dates for the visit were agreed, Post received a diplomatic note stating that Embassy officers would not/not be permitted to travel to Benghazi to provide logistical support to the U.S. delegation during the three-day portion of the course at Benghazi International Airport (ref B). (Note: Post informed the Libyan authorities via diplomatic that two officers would accompany the DHS/CBP team to Benghazi. End note.) The Libyan authorities did not/not offer a reason for denying travel permission. Post informed the Ministry of Public Security (General People's Committee for Public Security, or GPCPS) that, if the GOL refused to authorize Embassy officers to accompany the team to Benghazi, Post would be forced to cancel the Benghazi part of the program; while GPCPS offered to "intervene" with the security services, they were unable to reverse the decision and Post was forced to cancel the three-day Benghazi course.

¶4. (C) On July 20, the DHS/CBP trainers and Poloff arrived at Tripoli International Airport to begin the training program. The director of airport security met the officers outside the classroom and informed them that the trainers would not/not be permitted to distribute written training materials to any course participants until security officials had had sufficient time to "review" the course materials. Security officials confiscated 50 training manuals and several boxes of gifts the trainers had brought to distribute to the participants, including DHS hats, keychains, and small pocket tools such as screwdrivers and pocket knives. Poloff immediately requested meetings with the civilian director of the airport and the director of uniformed police at the airport (who was the senior Libyan participant in the course) to request their assistance releasing the course materials; both officials promised their assistance and conceded deep disappointment with the security services' decision to confiscate the course materials. Despite repeated assurances that they would release the course materials, security officials did not/not allow the trainers to distribute any written materials throughout the three-day course. At the course's

conclusion, the director of airport security physically locked all written course materials in his office to prevent their distribution to the Libyan participants.

TRIPOLI 00000614 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) On July 21, the director of airport police apologetically informed Poloff that he did not/not have the authority to grant Poloff permission to accompany the U.S. team on a one-hour walking tour of the Tripoli airport. An External Security (ESO) official demanded that Poloff accompany him to a security office at the airport and copied down details of his Libyan diplomatic ID. After 30 minutes, the official agreed Poloff could participate in the tour; however, a total of five security officials accompanied Poloff at distances of less than five feet throughout the orientation tour. In addition, on July 22, the director of airport security approached the U.S. delegation to demand that they produce a detailed, Arabic-language report praising security procedures at Tripoli International Airport prior to the team's departure from Libya. The director stressed that the report must be received the same day and must provide a detailed "official" U.S. assessment of screening and interdiction procedures at the airport.

¶6. (C) Comment. While mid-level officials within the Libyan law enforcement community appear genuinely interested in cooperation and training programs, the GOL's designated authority for law enforcement training -- the GPCPS training department -- does not/not have the authority to issue visas to U.S. trainers, to facilitate in-country travel for visiting experts, or to organize access to Libyan government facilities for U.S. delegations. The training department has expressed interest in an EXBS land border security program targeting narcotics trafficking and human smuggling along Libya's porous southern border with Niger; however, Post's experience is that security services will retain control over the pace of U.S. law enforcement cooperation in Libya. The EXBS airport program, while warmly received by the 30 Libyan participants, should serve as a cautionary tale for hopes of ramped-up law enforcement cooperation under both EXBS and ATA auspices in the near future. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI621

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI621 aka Wikileaks id #164475 ?
Subject	RESPONSE TO LIBYAN BANKING DEMARCHE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 1 Aug 2008 09:24 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI621.html
References	08STATE81148
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1049
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0621 2140924
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 010924Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3747
INFO RUEHMK/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0008
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0574
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4260
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000621

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, ISN, T, EAP, NEA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PREL [External Political Relations] ,
PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , IR [Iran] , GM [Germany] , XA
[Africa] , XF [Middle East] , XI [North Africa] , TS [Tunisia] , BA [Bahrain] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO LIBYAN BANKING DEMARCHE

REF: STATE 81148

(SBU)  Charge delivered points in reftel to Secretary of the
Americas Affairs Dr. Ahmed Fituri on July 31.  In response, Dr.
Fituri stated that he understood the USG's concerns very well
and pledged that he would pass the message directly to Foreign
Minister Shalgham at the earliest opportunity.  Post will report
any additional further response septel.

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI632

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI632 aka Wikileaks id #164689 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR JULY 2008
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 4 Aug 2008 09:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI632.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

R 040958Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3757
INFO DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000632

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR JULY 2008

AVIATION

¶1. Flight Safety Foundation Workshop in Libya: The Flight Safety Foundation's CAAG (Controlled Flight Into Terrain and Approach and Landing Accident Reduction Action Group) brought its internationally regarded Approach and Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Tool Kit workshop to Tripoli, Libya last week. Libyan aviation professionals said that this was the first time a non-governmental international aviation safety event has been held in Libya. The workshop was hosted by Afriqiyah Airways of Libya and organized by Capt. Samir Abussada, a Libyan commercial pilot. More than 50 aviation professionals from Chad, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia attended the workshop. They represented civil aviation authorities, air traffic management organizations and several airlines in the region. [Flight Safety Foundation, 7/21/08]

CONSTRUCTION

¶2. Seokwang Gets Contract: South Korean builder Seokwang Construction Co Ltd has announced that it has won a 493 billion won ($475.5 million) order to build houses in Libya. Seokwang said in a filing to the Korea Exchange that it had secured the deal from SMI-Hyundai Corporation Ltd., which has a well-established presence in Libya. [Reuters, 7/3/08]

¶3. Impregilo finalizes Libya contract to build university centers: Impregilo SpA said it has finalized contracts to build three university centers in Libya after the Libyan government approved construction plans. Impregilo said that the 'initial' authorization covered three buildings for a total of approximately 400 million euros. Impregilo said work will start on the three centers in the next few months and is expected to be completed by 2011. The contracts were signed by Impregilo Lidco, which is 60 percent owned by Impregilo and 40 percent by Libyan Development Company and the ODAC (Organization for Development of the Administrative Centers). [Thomson Financial, 7/7/08]

¶4. Spain's Sacyr Signs Libya Deal: Spanish construction firm Sacyr Vallehermoso has announced that it has signed three building deals in Libya worth 600 million euros through its subsidiary Svlidco. The contracts involve the construction of public service networks to provide gas, drinking water, telephone services and road construction in the cities of Bengazhi and El Beyda. Svlidco, which is 60 percent owned by Sacyr and 40 percent owned by the Libyan government, hopes to sign the final contracts within six to eight months, according to a company statement. [Reuters, 7/14/08]

¶5. Hill International Signs Contract: U.S. firm Hill International announced today that it has received a contract from the Libyan Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers (ODAC) to provide pre-construction and design management services on behalf of the Libyan Ministry for Higher Education in connection with 27 new university campuses across Libya. The one-year contract has an estimated value to Hill of approximately $11.5 million. The overall $5 billion university construction program is expected to be completed by December 2011. The campuses will range in size and diversity, accommodating 2,500 to 13,500 students in various regions throughout the country. [Businesswire, 7/15/08]

¶6. Movenpick to Open Resort in Libya: Movenpick Hotels & Resorts has signed a management contract with Libya's Bank of Commerce & Development for an urban resort hotel with over 500 units to open in Tripoli in 2010. Movenpick Hotel Diar Assalam will be situated in the most upmarket residential district of Tripoli as part of a multipurpose development whose planned features include a commercial center and a yacht club. To be located directly on the waterfront, the upscale resort will offer 320 rooms and suites, nine villas as well as 213 serviced apartments. Among these are several restaurants, a conference hall accommodating 400 delegates as well as a spa complex. [Libyainvestment.com, 7/18/08]

¶7. Libya to Expand Cement Production: Libya's government is planning to expand cement production to 15 million tons by 2011 from 8 million, a government official has told Reuters. The Tripoli government awarded licenses to four foreign companies -- out of 24 applicants -- earlier this month to set up cement-related operations to exploit natural resources including iron ore, lime and clay, according to Khalifa Ahmed al Badr, head of the state-owned National Mining Corporation. Badr did not name the four foreign firms which won the licenses to operate in Libya but said these companies have to form partnerships with Libyan firms whether state-owned or private ones. "The National Mining Corporation fixed the minimum share

of the Libyan side in the partnership operation at 50 percent," said Badr, adding the bid winners have also to pay 25,000 dinars ($21,150) as upfront payments. [Reuters, 7/22/08]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶8. Energy projects with Egypt: Libya is planning an oil refinery and a natural gas pipeline in Egypt, helping boost investment in its Arab neighbor to $10 billion in the next two years, its prime minister has said. "We have now about $2 billion (of investments) and we expect that within a period of two years maximum this will reach $10 billion," al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi told a news conference. "It was agreed that an oil refinery will be built west of Alexandria with Libyan funding and it will be used for Libyan crude," he added. The refinery would have a capacity of 250,000 barrels per day, Mahmoudi said, without giving further details. Plans also included a natural gas pipeline between the Egyptian coastal city of Alexandria and the Libyan city of Tobruk, Mahmoudi said. He did not say if the pipeline would carry Egyptian natural gas or Libyan natural gas or say when it would begin operating. Other investments could include agriculture, real estate, and further energy projects, Mahmoudi said. [Reuters, 7/3/08]

¶9. Portugal and Libya ink accords: OPEC-member Libya and Portugal have signed two accords to boost cooperation in the oil and gas industry and allow the north African country to carry out investments inside and outside Portugal, Libya's official news agency Jana said. The two countries signed a framework agreement and a memorandum of understanding on Saturday in Tripoli during a visit by Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates. The framework agreement seeks to encourage cooperation in oil and natural gas, especially in the areas of exploration, drilling, distribution, refinery and oil supply. The agreement also aims to boost bilateral trade and invited Portuguese companies to carry out projects in Libya in sectors such as housing, renewable energy, water purification, sanitation and tourism. The memorandum of understanding stipulates that the Libyan Investment Corporation (LIC) explore the possibilities of investment on its own, or in partnership with the Portuguese Ministry of Economy, in tourist, real estate and petrochemical projects both inside and outside Portugal, Jana said. [Reuters, 7/20/08]

OIL & GAS

¶10. Gazprom in Libya talks: Gazprom, Russia's state-controlled energy company, has offered to buy all oil and gas available for export from Libya, threatening to grab greater control of Europe's energy supplies. Chief Executive Officer Alexei Miller made the proposal to Libyan leader Moammar Qadhafi during a visit to Tripoli on July 9, the Moscow-based company said in a statement. Libya exported about 1.53 million barrels of oil a day in 2006, almost enough to supply Italy. Gazprom considers the country its priority partner in North Africa and said it has registered a unit called Gazprom Libya in Tripoli. Less than a month ago the company opened its first African office in neighboring Algeria. [Bloomberg, 7/10/08]

¶11. Libya to Cut Oil Production Because of Pipeline Work: Libya will cut output by 5.7 percent because of pipeline maintenance, trimming supplies at a time of near-record prices. The repairs will shut down 100,000 barrels a day of production this week, Shokri Ghanem, the country's top oil official, said in telephone interview. Libya has already idled Total SA's 75,000 barrel-a-day al-Jurf field after a drilling accident in May. [Bloomberg, 7/15/08]

¶12. Star Consortium concludes $2 billion Libya deal: The Star Consortium, comprised of UAE-based Al Ghurair Investments' subsidiary TransAsia Gas International and ETA Ascon Star Group's Star Petro Energy, has concluded a $2 billion deal with

the National Oil Company of Libya to set up a joint venture company to own and upgrade its Ras Lanuf refinery. The proposed Joint Venture Company will be incorporated and registered in one of the free zones in Dubai, with offices in Ras Lanuf, Tripoli and Dubai. [Libyainvestment.com, 7/15/08]

¶13. Houston-based NATCO Awarded Contract: NATCO has announced that it has been awarded a $24.9 million contract to provide membrane separation technology and equipment to capture CO2 for re-injection in Bouri, Libya's largest offshore oil field. Eni Oil Limited Libyan Branch operates the Bouri production platforms in the Mediterranean Sea, one of which will house the pre-treatment equipment and membrane systems intended to treat more than 160MM SCFD gas. [Reuters, 7/16/08]

¶14. Yara Deal with NOC: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) and Yara International ASA of Norway, have completed a joint venture for the production and marketing of mineral fertilizer. This partnership agreement was signed on July 17 by Dr Shokri M. Ghanem for and on behalf of the NOC, Mr Mustafa Zarti on behalf of the Libyan Investment Authority, and Dr. Thorleif Enger, President and CEO of Yara International ASA. The planned Joint Venture will be owned 50% by YARA and 50% by the Libyan party (National Oil Corporation and Libyan Investment Authority) which includes the ammonia and urea plants located at Marsa el Brega in Libya, presently owned by the NOC. It is planned that the newly formed joint venture will commence the operation of the plants during the month of September 2008. This partnership agreement covers upgrading the existing production capacity at Marsa el Brega in Libya, and to study the feasibility of adding new fertilizer plants. [NOC website, 7/18/08]

¶15. Enppi, Petrojet Win $1.4 Billion Gas-Pipeline Contract in Libya: Petroleum Projects & Technical Consultations Co. (Petrojet) and Engineering for the Petroleum and Process Industries (Enppi) have reportedly won a $1.4 billion contract to expand Libya's natural-gas distribution network. The two Egyptian state-run companies will extend Libya's gas pipeline network by 1,000 kilometers (620 miles), the Egyptian Oil Ministry said today in a statement on its Web site. The contract is part of a Libyan project to link 500,000 homes to the gas network in five years, it said. Egypt and Libya also plan to link their electricity grids to facilitate power trading during periods of peak consumption, according to the statement. [Bloomberg, 7/18/08]

¶16. Libya wins better terms for oil field contracts: Four of Europe's biggest energy groups have rewritten two large oilfield contracts with Libya, agreeing to significantly reduced terms for the right to keep working there. Total of France, StatoilHydro of Norway, Spain's Repsol and Austria's OMV agreed to pay a $1 billion signing bonus for the contracts, which extend their stakes in the projects for another 10-15 years to 2032. The onshore fields, which lie 700km south of Tripoli, produce 300,000 barrels a day, with output expected to rise to 380,000 b/d in 2012. The two contracts cover block NC115, in which Total and OMV have 30 per cent stakes and Repsol the remaining 40 per cent. In the other block, Total and OMV each hold a 24 per cent stake, Repsol has 32 per cent stake and StatoilHydro holds the remaining 20 percent. [Reuters, 7/18/08]

¶17. Distance Learning Agreement signed between NOC and IHRDC: On Thursday 27th July 2008, the Libyan NOC signed a distance learning agreement with Houston-based International Human Resources Development Corporation (IHRDC) which is organized and authorized by British Petroleum (BP). Under this Agreement, IHRDC will install a distance learning system, which will allow 300 users access at the same time through NOC's main domain. 150 licenses are to be given to national companies, as well as NOC's affiliates, in order to expand the user's base of the distance learning process. IHRDC will provide training and workshops on the application of such system. [NOC website,

7/29/08]

¶18. Verenex Makes Find: Verenex Energy, Inc., the Canadian explorer that operates in North Africa and France, has made its seventh oil find in Libya's western region of Ghadames. The exploration well, called 4/47-1A, tested at flow-rates between 1,399 and 1,535 barrels a day, according to Libya's state-run NOC in a statement on its website. Under a 30-year production-sharing agreement signed in 2005 by Verenex, Indonesia's PT Medco Energi International and Libya, the two foreign companies will take 13.7 percent of any output and the North African state 86.3 percent. Verenex is the operator of the concession. Medco said in February that all six wells drilled in area 47 had found oil, and that the concession held potential reserves of 1 billion barrels with a potential daily output of 75,000 barrels a day. [Bloomberg, 7/28/08]

¶19. Libyan Oil Shipments Resume with Switzerland: According to Head of the Swiss Oil Association Rolf Hartl, Tripoli has resumed oil supplies to Switzerland with its own ships, reversing a July 24 decision to halt shipments. A Libyan tanker arrived in Genoa with 80,000 tones of crude oil which will be transferred to the Swiss refinery of Collombey through an oil pipeline. Two Swiss citizens detained in Libya immediately after the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi have been released, though they are not allowed to leave the country. The two work for a Swiss company in Libya, and were officially arrested for violation of immigration regulations. After 10 days in prison, they are now in the Swiss embassy in Tripoli, waiting for authorization to leave. [AGI, 7/30/08]

¶20. Boots & Coots signs hydraulic workover and prevention contract in Libya: Boots & Coots International Well Control of Houston, Texas has announced it has signed a multi-service contract with Libya's Harouge Oil Operations Company. The new contract, valued at close to US$15 million for a two year period, with optional one year extensions, provides for one hydraulic workover unit and a Safeguard prevention well control specialist for Harouge's Amal field. The hydraulic workover and prevention services provided under the contract give Harouge in-house first responder capabilities and will help the oil company achieve its field maintenance and production objectives. Boots & Coots currently performs services under hydraulic workover/snubbing and/or Safeguard contracts in the North African neighboring countries, Algeria and Egypt, as well as in West Africa, the Middle-East, Venezuela, India, Oman and domestically in the US. [Boots & Coots website, 7/31/08]

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI635

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI635 aka Wikileaks id #165374 ?
Subject	A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT: A CASE STUDY IN LIBYAN INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 8 Aug 2008 14:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI635.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI705
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6478
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0635/01 2211407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 081407Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3763
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0686
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0742
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0581
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1183
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0334
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0463
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0567
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0883
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4277
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000635

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/5/2018
TAGS: BTIO *[Trade and Investment Opportunities]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , SENV *[Environmental Affairs]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT: A CASE STUDY IN LIBYAN INFRASTRUCTURE MANAGEMENT

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, Charge d'Affaires , U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (d), (e)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan authorities are scrambling to address the side effects of a veritable river of untreated wastewater running through downtown Tripoli in an area near Muammar al-Qadhafi's compound. The project, and the urgency with which the government is seeking to address it, sheds light on the broader wastewater problem afflicting Libya and the government's ad hoc efforts to address the issue. The focus on mitigating the stench near al-Qadhafi's compound, as opposed to protecting the broader public's health, is also telling. The belated

the broader public's health, is also telling. The belated effort to tackle water and wastewater issues could create lucrative business opportunities for U.S. engineering and construction companies. End summary.

¶2. (C) Econoff met with a senior representative of the Biwater company in late July to discuss progress on their Libyan wastewater projects. Biwater Construction Limited is a Surrey, U.K.-based firm currently engaged in a turn-key program for the Libyan Public Works Authority to redevelop four wastewater treatment plants centered around the eastern Libyan city of al-Bayda. Econoff's interlocutor is a senior-level officer in the company.

SOMETHING IS ROTTEN IN TRIPOLI ...

¶3. (C) During a broader discussion of Libya's infrastructure needs, the Biwater representative said the Tripoli Public Works Authority recently approached Biwater with an urgent proposal that the company fix a problem stemming from a 1.8 meter diameter, 25 km-long pipe that runs through Tripoli. In particular, Libyan authorities are seized with repairs to a roughly 1 km stretch located close to Tripoli's city center, a section that runs parallel to Muammar al-Qadhafi's "Baab al-Azziziya" compound.

¶4. (C) The crux of the problem is that this pipe is leaking sewage and associated gases, and the smell has become decidedly pungent inside the al-Qadhafi compound. This has prompted panic among local authorities, who have been told that al-Qadhafi intends to spend a substantial portion of the holy month of Ramadan (which starts on/about September 1) at the Baab al-Azziziya compound. The Public Works Authority has been ordered to get rid of the smell by any means possible, and it is now scrambling to find a foreign contractor willing to take on the job. Senior GOL officials have apparently been tasked with fixing the problem, lending great urgency to the so far fruitless search for a foreign contractor. The companies approached by the GOL, including Biwater, have been told that they can "have whatever (future) contracts they want" if they can fix the odorous problem.

A RIVER (OF SEWAGE) RUNS THROUGH IT

¶5. (C) The large-diameter pipe, constructed of concrete and asbestos, was laid 4 meters underground in a natural wadi (ravine) more than 30 years ago. Although it was designed and intended to be used to convey rainwater runoff from Tripoli's occasional storms, the local municipality and private Libyans have over time run thousands of sewage lines into it. The combination of fecal matter and heat generates sulphuric acid, which has degraded the integrity of the pipe. Libyan authorities estimate that there are six areas of leakage along the pipe's length, but given the age of the pipes and the profusion of sewage connections, Biwater assesses that there are many more leaks. Over time, the pipe's capacity has been increasingly taxed; it is now completely full, with an estimated average flow-rate of about 1 foot per second. Given standard engineering assumptions for pressure and fluid density, it is estimated that the pipe is now dumping approximately 1 million liters of untreated sewage a day into the Mediterranean Sea.

¶6. (C) Since the pipe was never intended to handle sewage, it empties directly into the sea along a stretch of coast just a few hundred yards west of the city's most heavily-peopled public beach. The stench from the flow and the damage to water and sand are obvious. Given the pipe's age and the pressure it is under, any attempt to fix it carries considerable risk of a major rupture, with attendant health threats for nearby residents and environmental impact. The Biwater representative described this as a looming "humanitarian crisis" for the city" and complained that Libyan authorities have so far only evinced concern with fixing the section of pipe adjacent to al-Qadhafi's

compound, rather than addressing the broader issue of establishing a viable sewage and wastewater treatment plan for

the city.

CLEAR EVIDENCE OF A LARGER PROBLEM

¶7. (C) Biwater estimates that there are eight major wastewater pipes currently running through Tripoli and into the sea. Most of these are linked to one of Tripoli's three main water treatment plants, but two of these are largely non-functional, and the third is running at half-capacity. Biwater estimates that roughly 10 million liters of untreated sewage is dumped into the sea just off Libya's coast every day. Representatives of U.S. engineering company AECOM, after conducting an initial Libyan wastewater treatment assessment in 2007, told Econoff that they had identified a total of 46 untreated sewage effluent sources nationwide with the help of Libyan authorities. Libya does not currently have the capacity to recycle wastewater for agricultural or other uses, so all water (mostly sourced from the ancient desert aquifers tapped by the Great Manmade River Project) that goes down the drain is routed directly into the Mediterranean Sea. Combined with subsidized rates for water usage and a lack of conservation measures, Libyans on average use twice as much water per annum as the average EU citizen, according to Biwater's statistics. The net result is that Libya, an extremely arid country, is spending considerable sums to pump water from the desert to the more densely populated littoral, where it is used once and then dumped into the sea.

¶8. (C) Comment: More than thirty years of neglect and poor infrastructure management have generated major needs for the redevelopment of Libya's infrastructure. U.S. companies are already starting to see some business opportunities to address these problems, and sizeable further projects are under discussion. The complexity and scope of these problems call for high-technology, high-end engineering solutions. U.S. firms, which Libyan officials have shown a particular interest in engaging in this sector, should be well-placed to tackle these engineering challenges and to secure potentially secure lucrative contracts to do so. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI642

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI642 aka Wikileaks id #165772 ?
Subject	HANNIBAL GOES TO SEA: INSIGHTS INTO ANOTHER AL-QADHAFI FAMILY BUSINESS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 12 Aug 2008 15:32 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI642.html
References	06TRIPOLI198 , 08TRIPOLI592
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

TRIPOLI 00000642 R CO 12-AUG-08 HANNIBAL GOES TO SEA: INSIGHTS INTO ANOTHER AL-QADHAFI FAMILY BUSINESS [7909670]From: CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, August 12, 2008 5:30 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000642 R CO 12-AUG-08 HANNIBAL GOES TO SEA: INSIGHTS INTO ANOTHER AL-QADHAFI FAMILY BUSINESS [7909670]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO8786
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0642/01 2251532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121532Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3772
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0689
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0584
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0745
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1186
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0337
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0003
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0466
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0570
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0887
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4286

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000642

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EWWT *[Waterborne Transportation]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , CY *[Cyprus]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HANNIBAL GOES TO SEA: INSIGHTS INTO ANOTHER AL-QADHAFI FAMILY BUSINESS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 592 , B) TRIPOLI 596, C) BERN 368, D) HOTRWASHIN 06243883 , E) 2006 TRIPOLI 198

TRIPOLI 196

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's maritime business, in which Hannibal al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi) plays a large role, appears to be another key sector of Libya's economy that effectively falls under the al-Qadhafi family's sway. Projected increases in Libya's oil and gas production in the next 5-8 years are expected to generate concomitant growth in the maritime component of hydrocarbon transportation and production. Libya's private and state-run companies, which have a majority of that business, are expected to grow and retain their control of that lucrative sector. The use of government funding to capitalize Hannibal's "private" maritime transportation company, together with the fact that the national maritime transportation in which he plays a large role quickly halted Libyan oil shipments to Switzerland in response to Hannibal's recent detention in Geneva, highlight the close integration of private and public interests in many of Libya's key economic entities. Despite the ostensibly egalitarian nature of al-Qadhafi's "Jamahiriya", the reality is that the al-Qadhafi family and its close political allies own outright or have a considerable stake in most things worth owning, buying or selling in Libya. End summary.

¶2. (C) Econoff recently met with Talal Arebi, Chairman and General Manager of the Mariner for Maritime Transportation, Ltd. company to discuss Libya's oil and gas shipping industry, and to glean information about the ownership structure of Mariner and the General National Maritime Transportation Company (GNMTC). Mariner is reported to be owned and controlled by Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. The GNMTC is nominally state-owned, although Hannibal reportedly has a sizeable stake in and effectively controls it. The GNMTC was publicly linked to Hannibal during the Libya-Switzerland contretemps over his recent arrest and detention in Bern (refs A, B); the state-run company announced shortly thereafter that it was halting all oil shipments to Switzerland (Ref C).

MARINER ON THE GROW ...

¶3. (C) Mariner was established in 2000 in Cyprus, and merged shortly thereafter with unnamed Libyan company in a joint venture structure. It initially served as a broker between Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) and European firms for offshore oilfield transportation and shipping. The company subsequently expanded its services to include direct chartering of vessels. By 2003, it had purchased its first oil product storage vessel, adding a second the following year. With these two ships in hand, Mariner began to service offshore oil rigs operated by TOTAL (France) and Eni (Italy) in Libyan waters. The company now has three major areas of operation: offshore oil/gas platform support, shipping management and clean (i.e., refined) oil product transportation from Libya to foreign ports.

... AND SO FAR A NEAR-MONOPOLY PLAYER

¶4. (C) According to Arebi, Mariner now provides up to 75% of the NOC's requirements for transporting clean products to market, primarily in Europe. It is seeking to further expand its offshore support business by adding another 10-15 supply vessels to match the boom in offshore drilling that is expected to occur in the next several years. Arebi flatly stated that Mariner has no Libyan competition; however, it does compete with Italian and French companies for the offshore support business, and primarily Greek and Greek-Cypriot firms in the oil transportation sector. Addressing the role of Maltese companies, Arebi said Malta's primary competitive advantage was its shipyard and some re-supply capabilities, but noted that Maltese firms were limited because they typically did not own their own vessels.

¶5. (C) Asked about the company's financing, Arebi stressed that Mariner is "an entirely private company" that draws on foreign banks to underwrite major loans. Regarding political support by the Libyan government and/or regime figures (i.e., Hannibal al-Qadhafi), Arebi was coy, allowing only that the company has "enjoyed high-level support". He conceded that such support had been critical in getting the company launched, particularly with respect to gaining access to decisionmakers at the NOC and its subsidiaries, particularly Brega. He maintained that Mariner did not/not receive any government funding; however, a contact at the National Engineering and Supply Services Company (NESSCO)

TRIPOLI 00000642 002 OF 002

told us recently that Mariner had received financial support from the NOC as recently as late 2006. Separately, a prominent member of Libya's small community of elite businessmen told P/E Chief that the initial request for funds to capitalize Mariner had coincided with a decision by Muammar al-Qadhafi to steer Hannibal, who has had a checkered past, towards business pursuits in the hope that it would temper his behavior. (Note: The use of government funds to capitalize entities owned/controlled by al-Qadhafi's children has become common practice. Credible reports suggest that Muhammad, Saif al-Islam and Saadi al-Qadhafi have all benefited from considerable government financing and political backing in their business endeavors. End note.)

ANOTHER ANGLE: THE GNMTC AND LIBYAN NAVY

¶6. (C) In addition to Mariner, Hannibal al-Qadhafi is also reported to have a controlling interest in Libya's GNMTC. Hannibal's precise role in the company is unclear. He is decribed as a "consultant" in some sources; others describe him as playing a key management role in the company, particularly with respect to procurement decisions. According to its website, the GNMTC has a fleet of five crude oil, three "clean product" and two liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tankers in its fleet. GNMTC's operating capital was recently expanded to 600 million Libyan dinars (about $480 million), in addition to a new government-backed loan for $350 million to purchase an additional nine tankers. Opposition websites document alleged instances in which Hannibal has used his influence over the GNMTC to establish himself up as a broker for the purchase of vessels, thereby reaping millions of dollars worth of personal profit. Separate reporting (ref D) also address his Mariner equities and a controlling interest in Libyan naval contracts.

¶7. (C) Comment: Hannibal's stake in Mariner and prominent role in the GNMTC afford another example of the kleptocratic nature of al-Qadhafi's regime. While the Jamahiriya political ideology espoused by Muammar al-Qadhafi owes an intellectual debt to socialism and includes hefty doses of pseude-egalitarian rhetoric, the reality is that the al-Qadhafi family and its political loyalists own outright or have a considerable stake in most things worth owning, buying or selling in Libya (ref E). The extent and nature of the family's economic activities are deliberately obscured to help deflect public scrutiny and allegations of corruption; however, Hannibal's stake in Libya's maritime sector - like those of his siblings in other industries - is an open secret in Libya's small, closed society. The quick decision by the GNMTC to halt oil shipments to Switzerland in response to Hannibal's detention in Geneva throws into stark relief the seamless private-public nature of many of Libya's key economic entities, a reality that will complicate nascent efforts to encourage economic reform and greater transparency. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI650

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI650 aka Wikileaks id #166459 ?
Subject	LIBYA SEEKS TO PURCHASE 130,000 KALASHNIKOVS FOR UNKNOWN END-USERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 18 Aug 2008 16:15 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI650.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI868
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7344
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0650 2311615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZDK ZDS
P 181615Z AUG 08 CCY
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3781
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0128
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0136
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0748
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1189
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 0032
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0017
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4295
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000650

SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY - CHGD TXT PARA 2

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , LY *[Libya]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , UP *[Ukraine]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SEEKS TO PURCHASE 130,000 KALASHNIKOVS FOR UNKNOWN END-USERS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) UK Embassy PolOff told P/E Chief on August 10 that HMG's Embassy in Tripoli had recently received a request from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to vet a request for a license to export to Libya a sizeable quantity of automatic rifles. UK company York Guns, acting as the intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian arms manufacturer and procurement officials at Libya's Temporary People's Committee for Defense

(MinDefense-equivalent), has requested an export license to deliver 130,000 Kalashnikov automatic rifles (NFI on model) to Libya in the fourth quarter of 2008. According to UK PolOff, it is not clear what the rifles would be used for; attempts to solicit further information from York Guns representatives and Government of Libya (GOL) officials have "raised more questions than they answered".

¶2. (C) He said the UK had received no answer as to whether the weapons would be used to equip Libyan military units, and in any event was skeptical that such would be the case given the quantity involved. (Note: Information available to the DATT suggest that Libya's armed forces comprise approximately 90,000 personnel, of which some 60,000 are in the ground forces. The London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies puts the total number of military personnel at 76,000. End note.) UK PolOff noted that the UK is concerned that the intention may be to re-export the weapons, particularly to armed rebel factions backed by Khartoum and/or Ndjamena in the Chad/Sudan conflict. He thought the license request would not be approved.

¶3. (SBU) In a similar case reported in open source media in April, Italian police arrested a number of Italian arms traffickers in February 2007 who were finalizing arrangements for the delivery of 500,000 Chinese-manufacture T-56 automatic rifles to Libya. The 500,000 represented the initial tranche of a deal that was to have included one million automatic rifles and 10 million rounds of ammunition. Media reports and Italian contacts indicated that Italian authorities concluded from their investigation that the weapons were to have been re-exported from Libya to Chad and Sudan.

¶4. (C) Comment: The fact that York Guns and GOL officials have been vague about the intended end-use of the 130,000 Kalashnikov rifles raises potentially troubling questions about the extent to which Libya is still involved in supplying military materiel to parties involved in the Chad/Sudan conflict. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI666

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI666 aka Wikileaks id #167280 ?
Subject	LIBYAN REACTION TO CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT POSITIVE, HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. INFLUENCE ON AL-QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 25 Aug 2008 16:40 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI666.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI679
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9521
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0666/01 2381640
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (TAO)
P 251640Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3808
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0895
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0578
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4322
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000666

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/25/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN REACTION TO CLAIMS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT POSITIVE, HIGH EXPECTATIONS FOR U.S. INFLUENCE ON AL-QADHAFI

TRIPOLI 00000666 001.5 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Reaction among ordinary Libyans and well-informed contacts to news that the U.S. and Libya finalized a comprehensive claims settlement agreement has been enthusiastic. Coverage in state-owned media has been positive but limited, in part to minimize questions about the parameters of the compensation package and potential criticism from old guard elements. Some informed contacts have characterized the agreement as a "grand opening" in U.S.-Libyan bilateral

relations, as compared to the "soft opening" between the re-establishment of diplomatic ties in 2004 and the signing of the claims agreement in 2008. There are high expectations in some quarters that the U.S. will seek to capitalize on the new tenor of the relationship to press Muammar al-Qadhafi to open further political space - particularly with respect to respect for human rights, freedom of the press and an expanded role for civil society - in what remains a tightly-controlled society. End summary.

OFFICIAL MEDIA REACTION POSITIVE, BUT NOT EXTENSIVE

¶2. (C) The reaction of state-owned media and the public to news of the comprehensive claims settlement agreement signed on August 14 during the visit to Tripoli by NEA A/S David Welch has been positive. State-owned Libyan television and newspapers carried coverage and articles August 14-16 highlighting comments by MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri to the effect that the agreement had " ... opened new horizons for Libyan-American relations, based on mutual respect, and serious and productive cooperation, which will result in progress and prosperity for both countries and their peoples". Fituri also stressed that the agreement represented the turning over of a new leaf in bilateral U.S.-Libya relations and was expect to facilitate improved people-to-people relations between the two countries. Longer term reaction in state-owned press has been limited; there have not been editorials or analytical pieces extolling the benefits of the agreement or predicting commercial windfalls as there were in the wake of French President Nicholas Sarkozy's visit in July 2007, or Muammar al-Qadhafi's visits to Madrid and Paris in December 2007. MFA Americas DeskOff Muhammad Ayab told us the GOL had chosen not to highlight the U.S.-Libya agreement in the press to mitigate potential questions about the parameters of the deal (the GOL has not released publicly the amount of the humanitarian fund that is to compensate U.S. and Libyan victims) and to avoid potential backlash from old guard elements who might criticize the regime for having "capitulated" to the U.S.

REACTION AMONG LIBYANS POSITIVE ...

¶3. (C) The observed reaction among Libyans has been very positive. Shopkeepers, dry cleaners, neighbors and taxi drivers have all expressed effusive congratulations to Emboffs in the week since the agreement was signed. Locally-engaged staff have been equally enthusiastic, offering felicitations and expressing hope that an important corner in bilateral relations has indeed been turned. Reaction among well-connected and informed contacts - typically a more hard-bitten, reserved group - has also been positive. The expectation is that resolution of the key outstanding political irritant will facilitate more robust U.S. commercial involvement in Libya and help remove the specter of a potential relapse into the "bad old days" of sanctions, a fear fueled by the decision of the U.S. Congress to pass the Lautenberg Amendment in January 2008.

¶4. (C) Husni Bey, scion of a well-connected, wealthy Benghazi-based family prominent in key business sectors, likened the agreement to a "grand opening" of U.S.-Libyan bilateral relations after the 2004-2008 "soft opening" during the period between re-establishment of diplomatic ties and finalization of the claims agreement. Ibrahim el-Meyet, a former senior MFA official turned business lawyer (and occasional adviser to al-Qadhafi's regime) described the agreement as "a remarkable achievement", noting that he had not believed it possible for the U.S. and Libya to resolve such a complicated issue so quickly. Hotel developer/businessman Muhammad al-Obeidi - a cousin of MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi, who played a key role in the negotiations - noted for us that while he was "delighted" at the news of the important agreement and "expected great things", he had lost 100 L.D. in a bet with colleague (al-Obeidi wagered that the deal would not be finalized and signed before the U.S. presidential elections in

November).

... BUT EXPECTATIONS HIGH THAT U.S. WILL PRESSURE AL-QADHAFI ON POLITICAL SPACE, HUMAN RIGHTS

¶5. (C) While reaction to news of the agreement has been

positive, there are high expectations in some quarters that the U.S. will pressure al-Qadhafi and the GOL more publicly and directly to open further political space in what remains a closed, tightly-controlled society. Acting on Libyan state media reports that the Secretary planned to visit soon in the wake of the agreement, a journalist and human rights activist called P/E Chief to express hope that she would press for greater press and civil society freedoms during her expected visit. The contact, who is under indictment for authoring an editorial criticizing ill-coordinated government development programs, expressed frustration that public rhetoric about reform has not been consistent with the results to date. Echoing the soft opening/grand opening formulation, a contact who works for the Ministry of Justice-equivalent and the Ministry of Interior-equivalent told us he hopes the U.S. will now pressure the GOL more directly to pursue needed legal reforms. (Note: Libya's legal code, an amalgam of Italian, British and Islamic Shari'a law, has not been substantially revised since the 1950's. We understand that a draft of a new legal code is currently being reviewed by various government ministries. End note.)

¶6. (C) A contact in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi, told us that Benghazi residents had expressed hope on hearing of the agreement that the U.S. would seek to capitalize on the new tenor of the relationship to press the GOL for improved respect for human rights. Of particular concern, for residents of the eastern province of Cyrenaica is the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, who hails from a prominent tribe there. Easterners, a number of whom regard el-Jahmi as a symbol of courageous resistance against what they perceive as an illegitimate regime, have been "disappointed" that the U.S. did not push harder and more publicly for el-Jahmi's release. They also felt that the U.S. "disappointed" their expectations in 2004-2008 (i.e., before the agreement was signed) by not pressing al-Qadhafi harder to open further political space. "Frankly", our contact said, "we are now hoping that the U.S. does what we all expected it to do during the past four years - to make it clear to the al-Qadhafi clan that their 35 year period of honey is over". Easterners have also been frustrated that Cyrenaica has not benefited economically under al-Qadhafi's regime to the extent that Tripoli, Sirte and other areas viewed more favorably by the regime have.

¶7. (C) Comment: Libyan reaction to news of the U.S.-Libya claims settlement agreement is a mixture of relief and high expectation. Libyans are genuinely pleased that a key political irritant in the bilateral relationship has been resolved, seemingly reducing the likelihood that U.S.-Libya relations could lapse back into something akin to the sanctions period. There is also the belief that expanded political and economic engagement with the U.S. and the West, which is expected to accelerate with the lifting of the Lautenberg Amendment and potential asset seizure, will help solidify internal Libyan reforms undertaken in recent years. Many Libyans hope that expanded engagement with the U.S. will include U.S. advocacy for political reform and greater respect for human rights. A key challenge for al-Qadhafi will be to temper expectations that fully normalized relations with the U.S. will prompt an immediate shift in the nature of the regime and its reluctance to move quickly on political reform. End comment.
STEVENS

Media

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI676

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI676 aka Wikileaks id #167599 ?
Subject	ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AVERTED: HOW LIBYA (MIS)HANDLED RECENT OIL TANK BLAZE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 27 Aug 2008 17:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI676.html
References	08TRIPOLI368
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9941
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0676 2401759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 271759Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3823
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0754
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0698
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0601
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0898
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0582
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0339
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0468
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4337
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000676

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/26/2018
TAGS: ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , CA *[Canada]*
SUBJECT: ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AVERTED: HOW LIBYA (MIS)HANDLED RECENT OIL TANK BLAZE

REF: TRIPOLI 368

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, State.

REASON: 1.4 (d)
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On August 19, a storage tank for crude oil caught fire during routine maintenance operations in Ras Lanuf, the site of Libya's largest oil refinery and a petroleum port. The fire was isolated to one tank after burning for two days. There were no casualties and oil experts from the port of Ras

There were no casualties and oil exports from the port of Ras Lanuf were not immediately affected. The long-term impact on production and the tank farm is not yet clear. The incident highlighted, however, shortcomings in the capacity of Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) and the Government of Libya to respond to such incidents. End Summary.

¶2. (C) According to Ian MacIntosh (strictly protect), General Manager of Petro-Canada in Libya, the fire began the morning of August 19 inside one of the thirteen tanks at the Ras Lanuf facility, and pressure caused by the fire helped prompt a leak of oil through a faulty valve at ground-level. Oil spread into a ditch, surrounded by a dirt berm encircling the tank. That oil then caught fire as well, further heating the tank from outside. The tank in which the fire began has a capacity of 460,000 bbl. The structural integrity of the tank remained intact; however, there were concerns about whether that would hold. MacIntosh noted that public remarks by NOC Chairman Shukhri Ghanem that most of the oil in the tank was from fields developed by Petro-Canada were misleading. Only 2-4% of the oil in the tank was Petro-Canada's; the rest was NOC oil. Ghanem has also said that production would have to be reduced from 70,000 to 100,000 barrels per day (bpd); however, McIntosh told PolEcon Chief that Petro-Canada has not yet concluded that such would be the case.

¶3. (SBU) While some 1,000 Libyan police, firefighters and NOC employees were on-site by the end of the day on August 20, the incident has underscored real limitations in the capacity of the NOC and the GOL to respond to such issues. According to press reports, Libya was already producing below its full capacity of 1.85 million barrels per day (bpd) before the fire, in part due to a drilling accident last May in an offshore field which cut output by 45,000 bpd (see reftel). In addition, maintenance on a pipeline for associated gas in the Sirte region has reduced output by 100,000 barrels a day since July.

ENVIRONMENTAL DISASTER AVERTED

¶4. (C) Coincidentally, a new Health, Safety & Environment (HSE) officer for Petro-Canada arrived in Libya the day just before the blaze. He was quickly dispatched to the scene. MacIntosh stressed that the biggest value the HSE officer added was not what he did (oil firefighting capabilities here are limited), but rather, what he prevented officials of the NOC and GOL from doing. At one point, they were seriously considering emptying the burning tank (about 200,000 bbls of oil were still in the tank at that point) into the adjoining desert, which would have been "an environmental nightmare." The HSE officer dissuaded them from carrying out this plan.

AN INEFFECTIVE RESPONSE

¶5. (C) Comment: The reaction of the NOC and Libyan authorities has been judged by the tightly-knit community of international oil community (IOC) representatives here to have been ill-coordinated and ineffective, underscoring real limitations in the capacity of the NOC and the GOL to respond to such incidents. Efforts by the NOC to increase production from 1.8 million bpd to 3.0 million bpd will further stress the oil and gas infrastructure, much of which suffered for lack of maintenance during the period in which international sanctions against Libya were in place. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI679

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI679 aka Wikileaks id #167762 ?
Subject	SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI CALLS FOR FURTHER REFORM, THREATENS TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 28 Aug 2008 15:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI679.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI666
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI921 , 08TRIPOLI936 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI678
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0809
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0679/01 2411512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 281512Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3826
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0899
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0583
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4340
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000679

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , KPRV *[Privatization]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI CALLS FOR FURTHER REFORM, THREATENS TO WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 666 , B) 07 TRIPOLI 759, C) TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000679 001.2 OF 005

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a lengthy, much-anticipated speech at an annual youth forum gathering, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of

Muammar al-Qadhafi, implicitly criticized past decisions of his father's regime, called for dramatic changes to Libya's system of governance, claimed that much of his program of social, political and economic reform had been achieved, and said he intended to withdraw from politics to focus instead on civil society and development work. Conceding that Libya had suffered from "stagnation" during the sanctions period, he focused on the government's ambitious development program. The decentralized Jamahiriya system instituted by his father was confusing and had not delivered results, and Libya needed a constitution to underpin a more transparent government structure and more predictable decisionmaking processes. Drawing a line between proposed government restructuring and greater participation by Libyans in their own governance, he called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater respect for human rights, and more press freedoms. Describing Muammar al-Qadhafi as a historically unique figure whose powers and prerogatives could not be inherited, he criticized Arab regimes in which sons succeed their fathers and flatly rejected the idea that he would automatically assume a position of leadership by dint of being his father's son. In the most controversial portion of his remarks, Saif al-Islam claimed that the major foreign policy issues and reform agenda items had been resolved, and that he intended to withdraw from politics. Expected to be a speech in which he previewed his father's upcoming Revolution Day address and clarified reform efforts and perhaps his own role within the government, Saif al-Islam's speech has instead confused Libyans and raised more questions than it answered. There have already been a series of highly-publicized meetings and press articles calling for him to "return" to politics, suggesting that his announced intention to "disappear for awhile" may have been a ploy to engender statements of popular support, possibly to help buttress him against critcism from conservative regime elements unhappy with his reform agenda. Regardless of his intent, the speech has raised doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda and called into question whether Saif al-Islam is ready for a formal leadership role. End summary.

LIBYA'S FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES HAVE BEEN RESOLVED ...

¶2. (C) At at the third annual Libya Youth Forum near the southern city of Sabha on August 20, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi framed his remarks by saying that Libyan had resolved its major foreign policy issues and no longer faced external threats. (Note: The head of the Federal Express franchise in Libya, who bid on a contract to deliver equipment and supplies to the venue, said the remote site had been selected largely to facilitate better crowd control and security. Demonstrations, which were violently suppressed, broke out at last year's Youth Forum gathering in Benghazi, prompting state media to cut the television feed. End note.) Speaking at a desert venue by the Oubari Lakes, Saif al-Islam referred to the U.S.-Libya comprehensive claims settlement agreement signed by NEA A/S Welch in Tripoli on August 14 (ref A) and noted that embargoes and sanctions were now a thing of the past. The U.S. and other states were now contemplating selling arms to Libya, which had been "just a dream" a few short months ago. Saif's reference to the U.S.-Libya claims agreement drew loud, sustained applause from the crowd of young Libyans. In an implicit criticism of Libya's past foreign policy adventures, Saif al-Islam said that many of Libya's issues with the West had been "unnecessary battles in the first place".

... LEAVING IT TO FOCUS ON REMEDYING INTERNAL "STAGNATION"

¶3. (SBU) Saying Libya had been "in stagnation for decades" because of international sanctions, Saif al-Islam conceded that Libya was "also at fault" for its period of isolation. He cautioned that while there were many reasons for Libya's past foreign policy decisions, "now is not the time to talk about that". He instead focused on Libya's ambitious program of infrastructure development, much of which is designed to demonstrate tangible benefits of the Fatah Revolution in the

demonstrate tangible benefits of the Fatah Revolution in the run-up to the upcoming 40th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power. Conceding that infrastructure, housing and development had been neglected for too long, he also tacitly conceded that the current sudden spending spree had occasioned its own problems, saying that the rush to disburse 130 billion Libyan dinar (about USD 108 billion) worth of infrastructure contracts in the past year had led to "confusion and hysteria". In a nod to two key popular

concerns, he specifically mentioned large investments in education and health care, claiming that foreign universities and foreign hospitals were being established in Libya.

JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM HASN'T DELIVERED; NEW GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE & CONSTITUTION NEEDED

¶4. (SBU) Turning to governance, Saif al-Islam resurrected his call for a constitution, something he explicitly advocated in his 2006 Youth Forum speech in Sirte, which drew harsh criticism at the time from the Revolutionary Committees and other conservative regime elements. Reacting to that, Saif al-Islam had softened his language in his 2007 speech in Benghazi (ref B), using the term "social contract". In Sabha this year, he adopted slightly more forward leaning language, saying Libya "needs something, which is perhaps called a constitution - let's say a popular pact similar to the social pact or a pact of the mass of the people". Such a contract should stem from the popular authority of the people, he said, but stressed that a formal document of some kind was needed to enshrine and protect the will of the people against unconstitutional attempts to usurp power as in the recent coup in Mauritania.

¶5. (SBU) Criticizing the inchoate nature of the decentralized Jamahiriya system, he said Libyans are frustrated with the the existing system's failure to deliver basic services such as trash collection, pest control, water and electricity, and now want a clearly articulated system of rules that govern personal conduct, economic affairs and governance. Describing the bedrock of good governance as effective local government, he stressed that despite the rhetoric about popular local committees, the Jamahiriya system of his father had not delivered on that front. Describing the decision to dismantle formal decisionmaking structures and to effectively decouple the local and central governments as "a mistake", he called for a "new administrative structure" that would better integrate local municipalities and districts with the central government.

¶6. (SBU) Referring to Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 address to the General People's Congress, in which he called for government restructuring and radical privatization (ref C), Saif al-Islam conceded that he had been personally involved in the work of the committees tasked with implementing his father's vision. He emphasized that plans for restructuring the government are underway, and will involve reshaped local institutions and greater privatization. Arguing for aggressive privatization, he said "the state will not own anything" and "everything should be done by the private sector". (Note: As reported ref C, five committees were established to formulate plans for implementing Muammar al-Qadhafi's March 2 vision. Contacts have told us Saif al-Islam established shadow committees staffed by personnel from the Economic Development Board (EDB) and National Planning Council (NPC); the final recommendations for implementing al-Qadhafi's vision reflected heavy input from the shadow committees. End note.) Referring obliquely to reports of fierce infighting over recommendations about restructuring and privatization, Saif al-Islam noted that "many things that were not nice" had happened in the course of recent intra-government debates, but stressed that those issues had been resolved.

CIVIL SOCIETY, JUDICIAL REFORM, HUMAN RIGHTS & PRESS FREEDOMS NECESSARY

¶7. (SBU) Drawing a line between proposed government restructuring and greater direct participation by Libyans in their own governance, Saif al-Islam explicitly called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater respect for human rights, and more press freedoms. Stressing that the best guarantee of "democracy, liberty and human rights" was "a strong, independent, enduring civil society" akin to that in the U.S., he argued that Libya urgently needs a more robust civil society if it is to develop further. Noting his personal involvement in sending an estimated 12,000 Libyan students abroad to Europe, Australia and the U.S. to study, he predicted that great strides would be made when those students returned to work in Libya, and called on Libyan youth to establish civic associations to help ensure government accountability.

¶8. (SBU) Citing corrupt judicial systems in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere in the Middle East, Saif al-Islam called for a fair judicial system and rule of law, without which "all the things (reforms) that we do will be undermined ... and disappear". In a swipe at Muammar al-Qadhafi's famously

mercurial style of leadership, Saif al-Islam linked human rights progress to a stable, clearly articulated political and judicial system, noting that "we want to have an administrative, legal and constitutional system once and for all, rather than change ... every year". In a line that drew sustained applause and wide press coverage, he noted that a new draft legal code was currently being reviewed by the government and said " ... the count-down towards building a state of institutions, constitutions, rule of law, and modern management has started with a set of new laws which is being presented to the people everywhere, incuding the new administrative structure of the country".

¶9. (SBU) The new legal code, he argued, was critical if Libya was to enshrine essential civil society concepts such as expanded respect for human rights and press freedoms. Conceding that "anybody could have violated your rights" in Libya before, he claimed those days were over. Softening his criticism of past abuses, he said Libya had not been in a position to simultaneously address development and human rights needs. With progress on the development front, respect for human rights was now necessary, in part to help sustain development efforts: "Libyans cannot build the Libya of tomorrow when they are scared and frightened of internal, external security apparatuses, the police and so on". (Note: The Qadhafi Development Foundation, headed by Saif al-Islam, announced an initiative the week before his speech to compensate families of prisoners killed during the government's suppression of a riot at the notorious Abu Salim Prison in 1995. End note.) He called for greater press freedom as a means to help ensure government accountabilitym noting that a more independent press would reveal "where the secret deals are taking place, where the problems lie, and where the conspiracies are being planned".

NO ONE CAN INHERIT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI'S POWERS & PREROGATIVES

¶10. (SBU) Criticizing the "forest of dictatorships" in the Middle East, he said modern Arab regimes were characterized by hereditary, dictatorial executives, "fanciful, ineffective parliaments" and human rights violations. Disparaging Arab governance, he complimented the state of Israel, in which a president could be forced from office on sexual harassment charges, and a prime minister on corruption charges. Reprising nomenclature he used in his 2007 Youth Forum address in Benghazi (ref B), Saif al-Islam nonetheless described Muammar

(ref B), Saif al-Islam nonetheless described Muammar al-Qadhafi's role as a "redline" that was beyond criticism and not subject to other government restructuring efforts. Likening his father's position in modern Libya to that of George Washington, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and the Ayatollah Khomeini, he stressed that Muammar al-Qadhafi's role was historically unique and that neither he nor anyone else was entitled to inherit that mantle. He flatly rejected the proposition that he would automatically assume the position and prerogatives of his father by dint of blood relation. "This is not a private farm to be inherited", he said. For Libya to experience hereditary succession would put the country "at square one again" in terms of political development.

SAIF SAYS HE'LL WITHDRAW FROM POLITICS ...

¶11. (SBU) In the most publicized and controversial part of his address, Saif al-Islam said he would recuse himself from politics and instead focus on civil society and development work. Claiming that "the time of major battles has ended" - he referred to the U.S. claims agreement and foreign policy contretemps such as the Lockerbie bombing and the Bulgarian medics case - Saif al-Islam said "I have no more major battles and my position has become embarrassing". Justifying his prominent role in sensitive affairs of state, he admitted freely that he had intervened extensively in foreign affairs, government restructuring and development " ... because there were " ... no presently-functioning institutions and no administrative system (in Libya) which were capable of doing these jobs". Claiming that much of his program of resolving key foreign policy challenges, initiating government restructuring and development, and human rights reforms had been accomplished and that the rest was "on track", he said his central role was no longer needed or appropriate. Referring to George Orwell's novel "The Animal Farm" as a cautionary tale against the danger of would-be revolutionary leaders recapitulating the errors of the systems they had overthrown, he cautioned that it would be problematic if he were to continue his involvement in political issues. Noting that some regime elements "hated" his reform efforts, he stressed that Libya's future lies with clearly

organized institutions and a robust civil society, rather than charismatic personalities. Addressing his future, Saif al-Islam claimed he would withdraw from affairs of state, perhaps "disappear for awhile" and focus on civil society and development efforts. Discounting the possibility that he would be lured back into politics, he stressed that he did not intend to return and said he would rightly be considered "a liar" if he did.

.. BUT THE MASSES SAY HE MUST "CONTINUE HIS REVOLUTIONARY JOURNEY"

¶12. (SBU) Reaction to Saif al-Islam's stated intention to withdraw from politics has been swift and well-coordinated. In a series of meetings held on August 24 at the People's Hall in Tripoli, members of the Revolutionary Committees, various youth organizations, professional associations, and local government committees issued strongly worded calls for Saif al-Islam to "return" to politics. The crowd at the People's Hall frequently broke into chants of "Keep up the journey, oh son of the brave man!" The dean of the lawyers' association, Bashir al-Tawir, said Saif al-Islam was "a revolutionary man who should continue his revolutionary journey". Striking a populist note, Muhammad Aribi, the People's Leadership Coordinator in Tripoli, claimed that "only America and Zionism" would benefit from Saif al-Islam's withdrawal from politics. Similar calls were issued at gatherings of youth organizations around the country that began the day after his speech, and a larger youth event - designed to lure Saif al-Islam back - is scheduled to take place

in Benghazi shortly before Muammar al-Qadhafi's Revolution Day speech on September 1. The leadership of the national youth organization and Saif al-Islam's Libya al-Ghad (Libya of Tomorrow) organization reportedly threatened to resign en masse unless he continued in his political role. Unusually, the proceedings at the People's Hall were not covered by state radio or television, but were heavily covered by the Libya Fada'iya satellite channel and Ouea newspaper, both owned by Saif al-Islams 1/09 media group.

COMMENT

¶13. (C) Saif al-Islam's Youth Day speeches are closely followed as a barometer of reform efforts and a harbinger of policy initiatives.
Embassy contacts, who expected Saif al-Islam's remarks to clarify expectations about Muammar al-Qadhafi's Revolution Day speech early next week, were instead left confused about the state of the reform agenda and government restructuring, as well as Saif's own political future. Several noted that Saif al-Islam did himself a disservice by clearly departing from his prepared remarks in an attempt at a more improvised delivery. The halting, rambling speech exacerbated the perception that the typically charismatic Saif al-Islam was nervous. Key advisers Omran Bukhres and Dr. Yusuf Sawani were reportedly "beside themselves" that he had departed from the carefully crafted text they helped prepare. Several contacts also noted that there were junctures at which Saif al-Islam appeared to be restraining himself from going further in his remarks, particularly with respect to intra-governmental squabbling about restructuring and rumors that he was hated by conservative regime elements.

¶14. (C) Few take seriously Saif al-Islam's claim that he intends to withdraw from politics entirely, but there is confusion about what he intended to achieve by threatening to do so. The swift calls for him to "return" suggest a scripted plot to garner political credibility for him as a genuinely populist figure, possibly as a prelude to announcement of a more formal role for him during the upcoming Revolution Day speech. There have been reports on websites that the government restructuring could include a Social Leadership Council, to be headed by a senior figure. Some observers have speculated that his remarks on hereditary Arab regimes and Muammar al-Qadhafi's historically unique role were intended as a subtle warning to his own siblings, some of whom have recently become more naked in their ambitions. A contact with regular access to the family believes that Saif al-Islam intended to signal to his father dissatisfaction that he, Saif, has undertaken the most sensitive, labor-intensive work in the government without benefit of formal position, by contrast with his brother, Muatassim, who was named National Security Adviser last year.

¶15. (C) Saif al-Islam's claim that work on human rights, personal liberties and development was in "its last round" is broadly seen to be premature. The consensus among Libyans is

that while Saif al-Islam has helped contribute to the beginnings of reform in some areas, much remains to be done. A line of thinking we've heard from some of our savvier contacts is that references to accomplishments and intra-government bickering were a tacit admission that he had not yet achieved all he hoped to, in part because of resistance from truculent conservative regime elements. The corollary to that interpretation is that he is still needed to keep those efforts in train. His remarks about closing the books on past mistakes have been interpreted by a number of contacts as a subtle signal to the Revolutionary Committees and other old guard regime elements that he is willing to put aside old grievances. The commonly-held view is that while Libya has made some strides in the right direction

since Saif al-Islam's coming out party in 2003, when he previewed a reformist agenda in his first major public address, the gains that have been made to date are modest and not likely to endure absent the active advocacy and protection of a politically well-connected patron. Whether he was sincere in stating his intent to withdraw from politics or meant it as a coy means by which to engender popular support, the effect of Saif al-Islam's speech has been to raise doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda (if he in fact exits the scene) and to call into question whether he is really ready for a formal leadership role (if this is all part of an elaborate act of kabuki theater). All eyes are now on Muammar al-Qadhafi and his Revolution Day address on or about September ¶1. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI680

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI680 aka Wikileaks id #167961 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 29 Aug 2008 18:11 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/08/08TRIPOLI680.html
History	First published on Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30 UTC (original) Removed on Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:47 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Mon, 20 Dec 2010 07:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO1989
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0680/01 2421811
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 291811Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3831
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0602
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0755
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0699
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4345
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000680

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR S, AF/SPG, NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/28/2018
TAGS: OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , AU *[Austria]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]* , AG *[Algeria]* , TS *[Tunisia]* , MO *[Morocco]*
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY RICE'S VISIT TO LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (C) Embassy Tripoli and the Government of Libya are looking forward to your historic visit to Tripoli September 5. Coming on the heels of NEA A/S Welch's successful finalization of a comprehensive claims settlement agreement in Tripoli August 14, the GOL views your visit as a signature event in its decade-long effort to achieve reintegration into the international community, and as a tangible benefit of its strategic decision in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs and renounce terrorism. Key issues for your visit include:

-- Internal political issues

-- Bilateral relations

-- Human rights

-- Counter-terrorism cooperation

-- Sub-Saharan Africa

-- Regional issues, including Iraq and Iran

-- Energy sector and commercial opportunities

INTERNAL POLITICAL ISSUES

¶2. (C) Your visit comes days after the 39th anniversary of the September 1, 1969 military coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power. It is expected that al-Qadhafi will outline in his Revolution Day speech how the GOL will implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he advocated in a key address in March. Al-Qadhafi's plan could represent his most radical experiment in governance since the late 1970's. Ordinary Libyans are concerned about the rising costs of food, fuel and other staples; privatization would strike a direct blow at the tacit pact - oil revenue-financed, cradle-to-grave subsidies in exchange for political quiescence - that has underpinned the regime for decades. Drawing a line between reform and greater participation by Libyans in governance, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Muammar al-Qadhafi's son and heir apparent, called for a more robust civil society, judicial reform, greater press freedoms and respect for human rights in a major speech August 20. A new legal code, which would be the first major change to Libya's judicial system since the 1950's, is currently under review. Saif al-Islam implicitly criticized past decisions of his father's regime, claimed he had achieved much of his own reform agenda and said he would withdraw from politics to focus on civil society and development work. Expected to clarify government reform efforts and his own political future, Saif al-Islam's speech has instead confused Libyans, raising doubts about the long-term viability of the reform agenda and calling into question whether he is ready for a formal leadership role. The issue of who might succeed Muammar al-Qadhafi looms large. The conventional wisdom is that it is Saif al-Islam's job to lose; however, some observers interpreted the appointment of another son, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, to the newly-created position of National Security Adviser in early 2007 as a sign that Muammar al-Qadhafi was hedging his bet.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

¶3. (C) Your visit - the first by a U.S. Secretary of State since John Foster Dulles' trip in 1953 and the most recent Cabinet-level visit since then-Vice President Nixon was here in 1957 - is viewed as the key component of a "grand opening" in U.S.-Libyan bilateral relations, as compared to the "soft opening" between re-establishment of diplomatic ties and finalization of the claims agreement (i.e., 2004-2008). The GOL also wants to see a fully-accredited U.S. ambassador posted to Tripoli and full visa services at the Embassy. The fact that most Libyans must currently travel to Tunis to apply for non-immigrant visas (the Embassy's security posture/infrastructure have not permitted broader visa operations to date) is perceived as a slight. Anxious to avoid the public perception that U.S.-Libya ties are chiefly about counter-terrorism cooperation, prospective military-to-military ties and hydrocarbon resources, the GOL is keen to emphasize cooperation in education (it wants to send more students to study in the U.S.), science and technology and culture. The GOL wants to be able to purchase lethal military equipment and would like to sign a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement. Despite high-level rhetoric, limited GOL capacity will significantly constrain efforts to quickly expand bilateral cooperation and

engagement in all these areas.

¶4. (C) Libyan reaction to news of the recently finalized

TRIPOLI 00000680 002 OF 004

U.S.-Libya claims settlement agreement has been a mixture of relief and high expectation. Coverage in state-owned media has been positive, but muted; we're told the GOL did not publicly trumpet the agreement to avoid questions about the deal's parameters (it has not publicized the agreed amount of compensation to be distributed by the humanitarian fund) and to avoid criticism that it capitulated to U.S. demands. A recent editorial in the "Ouea" newspaper, owned by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, expressed cautious optimism that bilateral relations had turned a corner and welcomed U.S. assistance in education and technology transfers, but squarely blamed the U.S. for past contretemps and cautioned against U.S. "interference" in Libyan internal affairs. Libya has balanced re-engagement with us by actively pursuing closer ties with Russia. Then-president Putin visited in March and resolved a thorny Soviet-era debt issue that paved the way for lucrative commercial contracts; he is expected to send his deputy to attend the September 1 Revolution Day festivities. In recent remarks, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi described Russia as "a key strategic partner" and said the GOL would support Russia in its position on Georgia. Libya is conflicted about re-engagement with the U.S. Conservative regime elements are still wary that our ultimate goal is regime change, while ordinary Libyans are genuinely pleased that a key political irritant in the bilateral relationship has been resolved. Many hope that expanded political and economic engagement with the U.S. will help solidify recent Libyan economic reforms.

HUMAN RIGHTS & POLITICAL FREEDOMS

¶5. (S) There are high expectations in some quarters that the U.S. will pressure al-Qadhafi and the GOL more publicly and directly to urge greater respect for human rights and open further political space in what remains a closed, tightly-controlled society. A number of Libyans are disappointed that this did not occur immediately after relations were re-established in 2004. The GOL has expressed tepid interest in a high-level human rights dialogue; however, they have cautioned that they view discussion of individual cases as improper interference in their internal affairs. The case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, viewed by many as a symbol of courageous resistance against an illegitimate regime, is a key bilateral irritant. Embassy officers visited him several times in February-April 2008 and a Human Rights Watch/Physicians for Human Rights team visited him in March 2008. Embassy officers have been denied access to him since April and the GOL falsely claimed he had been released from their custody (he remains in hospital under guard). Claiming to speak for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi disparaged the Embassy's involvement in el-Jahmi's case and warned of the "potentially catastrophic effects" on bilateral relations of Post's democracy and human rights outreach efforts. We've also been told that Muammar al-Qadhafi has personally followed el-Jahmi's case and is upset that the U.S. keeps raising it.

¶6. (C) Embassy officers were also criticized for improper behavior after meeting in early 2007 with self-described regime critics led by Dr. Idriss Boufayed on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration. The GOL arrested fourteen individuals to pre-empt the demonstration - two were released in May 2008, 11 were convicted in June 2008 and given sentences of 6 to 25 years imprisonment and one has not been seen since his arrest. Among the charges on which the 11 were convicted was having unauthorized communications with an official of a foreign government (i.e., the U.S. Embassy). Boufayed is terminally ill

government (i.e., the U.S. Embassy). Boulayed is terminally ill with cancer; the Qadhafi Development Foundation and European governments have argued for his parole on humanitarian grounds. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi has publicly acknowledged past abuses and called for national reconciliation; however, human rights remains a neuralgic issue for the GOL. Absent a clear message that engagement on human rights will be a necessary adjunct of an expanded U.S.-Libya relationship, meaningful progress in this area is unlikely.

COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION & EXTREMISM

¶7. (S) Libya has been a strong partner in the war against terrorism and cooperation in liaison channels is excellent. Muammar al-Qadhafi's criticism of Saudi Arabia for perceived support of Wahabi extremism, a source of continuing Libya-Saudi tension, reflects broader Libyan concern about the threat of extremism. Worried that fighters returning from Afghanistan and Iraq could destabilize the regime, the GOL has aggressively pursued operations to disrupt foreign fighter flows, including more stringent monitoring of air/land ports of entry, and blunt the ideological appeal of radical Islam. The Qadhafi

Development Foundation brokered talks with imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) that led to the release earlier this year of about 130 former LIFG members. The GOL considers the program an important means to signal willingness to reconcile with former enemies, a significant feature of Libya's tribal culture. Libya cooperates with neighboring states in the Sahara and Sahel region to stem foreign fighter flows and travel of trans-national terrorists. Muammar al-Qadhafi recently brokered a widely-publicized agreement with Tuareg tribal leaders from Libya, Chad, Niger, Mali and Algeria in which they would abandon separatist aspirations and smuggling (of weapons and trans-national extremists) in exchange for development assistance and financial support. Libya also cooperates closely with Syria, particularly on foreign fighter flows. Syria has transferred over 100 Libyan foreign fighters to the GOL's custody over the past two years, including a tranche of 27 in late 2007. Our assessment is that the flow of foreign fighters from Libya to Iraq and the reverse flow of veterans to Libya has diminished due to the GOL's cooperation with other states and new procedures. Counter-terrorism cooperation is a key pillar of the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship and a shared strategic interest.

SUB SAHARAN AFRICA

¶8. (C) Having largely abandoned pan-Arab leadership aspirations, the GOL places a heavy premium on maintaining its perceived role as a leading state in Africa. Libya spearheaded establishing the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); the 10th anniversary of CEN-SAD's founding in September 1999 will occur shortly after your visit. Libya is deeply frustrated with its inability to deliver a sustainable peace between Chad and Sudan. Despite abortive UN/AU-led Darfur talks in Libya in October 2007 and the stillborn October 2007 Libya-brokered Chad cease-fire, the GOL remains actively involved in Chad-Sudan mediation efforts (it played a key role in re-establishing Chad-Sudan diplomatic relations in July 2008). But Libya recognizes it cannot broker peace unilaterally. The GOL views skeptically calls for an international observer force on the Chad-Sudan border under the March 2008 Dakar Accord and refers instead to the February 2006 Tripoli Accords (which also called for joint military observation of the Chad-Sudan border) and the October 2007 Sirte process as the platforms for a viable peace process. Hard experience - despite personal appeals by Muammar al-Qadhafi, the GOL failed to entice Darfur rebel leaders to attend the October 2007 Sirte conference - has prompted Libya to realize it is better positioned to pressure the regimes in

Ndjamena and Khartoum than rebel movements. Libya believes the key to "fixing" Chad is to pressure Deby to address the deep, popular opposition to his government. The GOL has facilitated humanitarian relief through a key overland corridor running from Kufra, in southeast Libya, to Darfur. After years of failed unilateral intervention, Libya appears to appreciate UN/AU leadership of the Darfur political process and U.S. partnership in efforts to promote peace in and between Chad and Sudan. A visit by Special Envoy Williamson could help reinvigorate Libya's support for stalled international mediation efforts. On AFRICOM, the GOL has argued that any foreign military presence, regardless of mission, on the African continent would constitute unacceptable latter-day colonialism and would present an attractive target for al-Qaeda. AFRICOM's Deputy Commander visited Tripoli for low-key talks in January 2008 and General Ward plans to visit in October/November.

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (S) Iraqi spokesman Ali Dabbagh recently met with Muammar al-Qadhafi, who expressed interest in pursuing closer relations with Iraq. It was agreed that a Libyan delegation would visit Iraq soon. Libyan-Iranian relations are complicated and increasingly contentious. Iranian First Vice President Davoudi, the highest ranking Iranian official to visit Tripoli in 25 years, signed a number of cooperation agreements during his January 2008 stop here as part of an apparent effort to garner support in the UNSC for heading off a third resolution on Iran's nuclear activity. Libya wanted Iran's help in smoothing over ties with Lebanon, which have been strained since the disappearance of Imam Musa Sadr during a 1978 visit to Tripoli. Iran's decision to demur appears to have factored into Libya's decision not to oppose a third UNSCR on Iran. Al-Qadhafi recently disparaged publicly Iran's nuclear aspirations, which prompted an angry rebuke in the Iranian press. Nonetheless, there are concerns about possible ties between state-owned Libyan banks and Iranian entities of particular concern. Ties with Syria are less contentious; Libya's new sovereign wealth fund announced last week that it had invested $200 million in a Syrian cement production venture. Claiming that it wants to

TRIPOLI 00000680 004 OF 004

emulate Dubai in its development approach, Libya has recently pursued closer ties with Arab Gulf states. A $500 million joint investment fund was announced during the August 2008 visit of Oman's Sultan Qaboos, his first since 1972. A number of similar investment projects have been established with the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain during a flurry of visits over the past year. Relations with Saudi Arabia remain strained.

ENERGY SECTOR & COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITIES

¶10. (C) Libya's economy is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas. Libya has the largest proven oil reserves (43.6 billion barrels) and the third largest proven natural gas reserves (1.5 billion cubic meters) on the African continent. Libya currently produces about 1.7 million barrels/day of oil; only Angola and Nigeria produce more in Africa. Oil and gas infrastructure suffered during the sanctions period. The lifting of sanctions has opened the way for new exploration and improved production. New technology and refined management techniques introduced by international oil companies (IOC's) are a key part of Libya's plan to increase oil production to 3.0 million barrels/day by 2013. Most of Libya's oil and natural gas are exported to Europe - Italy, Germany, Spain and France are key customers. Major U.S. energy companies active in Libya include Amerada Hess, ConocoPhillips, Marathon, Chevron, ExxonMobil and Occidental. Joint ventures involving U.S. companies currently account for about 510,000 barrels/day of Libya's 1.7 million barrels/day production. A large number of small to mid-sized

U.S. oil and gas services companies are also working in Libya.

¶11. (C) After years of isolation under sanctions and limited spending by the GOL, Libya is currently in the midst of an economic boom, partly driven by a desire to complete large-scale infrastructure projects as tangible symbols of the regime's achievements in advance of the 40th anniversary of al-Qadhafi's revolution on September 1, 2009. High oil prices have helped fuel the outlays. Western companies, eager to establish a position in what is expected to be a lucrative market, are arriving in sizeable numbers. A temporary pause prompted by adoption of the Lautenberg Amendment in January 2008 and concern about asset seizure is coming to an end on news of the comprehensive claims agreement. U.S. companies recently secured lucrative contracts for infrastructure development and construction contracts - AECOM and the Tennessee Overseas Construction Company have the largest non-energy cohorts of expatriate Americans here - and are competing in a variety of other sectors, including communications and aviation. Despite great promise, Libya remains a challenging business and investment environment. Contradictory regulations, inefficient government bureaucracy, limited human capacity and rampant corruption (in 2007, Transparency International ranked Libya 133rd out of 180 countries in terms of being most corrupt) are significant challenges that could hamper greater investment.

AL-QADHAFI & HIS FOREIGN MINISTER

¶12. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi is notoriously mercurial. He often avoids making eye contact during the initial portion of meetings, and there may be long, uncomfortable periods of silence. Alternatively, he can be an engaging and charming interlocutor, as he was during NEA A/S Welch's meeting on August ¶14. A self-styled intellectual and philosopher, he has been eagerly anticipating for several years the opportunity to share with you his views on global affairs. We've been told that issues he might raise include Sarkozy's Union for the Mediterranean proposal (which al-Qadhafi opposes), the Georgia conflict, illegal migration (Libya is a key transit country), Iran, Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict (including his "Isratine" one-state solution), and Africa. Intellectually curious and a voracious consumer of news - trusted advisers are tasked with summarizing in Arabic important books and articles printed in other languages, including your recent article in Foreign Affairs - al-Qadhafi will be well-informed and more inclined to focus on strategic views than pragmatic measures. Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham, whom you met in Washington, is also expected to meet with you during your visit
STEVENS

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family’s Exploits - NYTimes.com
- 'Noble' War In Libya - Part 1
- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- WikiLeaks cables: Muammar Gaddafi – mercurial, phobic 'King of Culture' | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI685

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI685 aka Wikileaks id #168137 ?
Subject	LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 2 Sep 2008 15:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI685.html
References	08TRIPOLI455
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI76
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4022
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0685/01 2461501
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021501Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3841
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4355
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000685

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI, L (J. SCHWARTZ, S. POMPER)
AND NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/11/2018
TAGS: KBTR, PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] ,
PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PINR [Intelligence] , PINS [National Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL
TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU

REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, B) WILLIAMS-STEVENS EMAIL 08/
23/2008,  C) TRIPOLI 455 , D) GODFREY-NARDI/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008, E) 07 TR
IPOLI
723

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo
detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts and clarify
the status of any pending legal action against them.  One
```

detainee's trial has reportedly been completed and he understands he has been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. The trial of the second detainee has begun and several hearings have been held; the next is scheduled for September 3. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Per refs A and B, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainees Muhammad Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) on September 1. The meeting took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli. A host government security official facilitated the meeting; however, no host government officials participated in the meetings with the two returned detainees. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on June 10, 2008 (ref C).

ISN 194

¶3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi (ISN 194), who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: Al-Rimi had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between his return to Libya in December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to Abu Salim. End note.) Al-Rimi said he continues to be held alone in his cell, but he is able to exercise at least once a week for about an hour at a time. He indicated he is able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi stated that he had received one family visit - his sisters came to see him in July - since our last meeting with him on June 10. (Note: Our understanding is that members of his family have visited him on four occasions since his return to Libya - January 2007, May 2007 (ref D), March 2008 and July 2008. End note.) Al-Rimi said he would like to receive more family visits, if possible.

¶4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref E), al-Rimi said both were fine. He noted that he needed dental care for another tooth, which had developed problems after his return to Libya. A dentist recently visited him at Abu Salim prison and told al-Rimi the tooth (a back tooth on the upper row in which al-Rimi has recently experienced pain) should be extracted. Al-Rimi said he instead requested that it be "cleaned and repaired", but the dentist said the tooth was not salvageable. According to al-Rimi, the dentist is to visit him again soon to discuss how to proceed.

¶5. (S/NF) In our previous meeting on June 10, al-Rimi said he understood his case was being deliberated at that time by a panel of judges, who were to render a verdict and issue a sentence on/about June 16. Al-Rimi said he was not present when his verdict and sentence were issued, but heard from other prisoners who were present in the courtroom on June 16 in connection with their own cases that he was found guilty of some charges (NFI) and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. (Note: Per ref C, al-Rimi's understanding was that he faced four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country, and; 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. It is not clear which of those he was convicted of. End note.) Al-Rimi has received no information from Libyan officials about his trial, verdict or sentence. He met with his court-appointed legal counsel on one occasion about two months before his reported conviction and sentencing on June 16, and has not heard from him since.

ISN 557

¶6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August

¶6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: He was detained at an ESO detention facility for about three months after his return and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. End note.) He remains in solitary detention, his biggest complaint. He is able to speak through the walls with prisoners in adjacent cells, but is not able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners and is not able to exercise. Hamouda wants to be able

to leave his cell. (Note: During our previous meeting on June 10, the security official who facilitated the meeting explained that detention protocols for extremists and terrorists mandate that they be held in solitary detention to preclude the possibility that they could recruit other members of the prison population. End note.) Hamouda complained about the lack of sunlight and fresh air. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He does not have access to books, radio or television. He requested that he be provided with pens, paper and books. Hamouda said he not received a family visit since our last meeting with him on June 10, but conceded that he was unsure whether they had tried to do so. (Note: Our understanding is that Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and children visited in late December, and his wife and brother-in-law saw him in January. End note.)

¶7. (S/NF) Hamouda has access to medications and was visited by a prison doctor in March/April, who responded to his complaints of depression and anxiety by prescribing him anti-depressant medication that left him "groggy and tired". He also received a prescription at that time from the Libyan doctor for an indeterminate condition for which he said he had been treated at Guantanamo Bay. He complained that the medication prescribed by the Libyan doctor for the condition was ineffective and asked for Laproxin, which was prescribed for him at Guantanamo Bay and had been effective; however, he has been told that Laproxin is not available in Libya. (Note: Per ref C, Hamouda said on June 10 that he may be seen by a prison doctor if he is ill, but that he had not needed to so since his return. He had no answer when he was asked to explain the contradictory accounts. End note.)

¶8. (S/NF) Hamouda said his trial had begun and that there had been three hearings to date, which he attended, at a court facility in the Abu Salim prison. His next hearing is scheduled for September 3; it is unclear whether the court will render a verdict at that hearing. He has court-appointed legal counsel, but has not met his lawyer outside of courtroom hearings. His understanding is that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. He complained that the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect, and maintained that he was innocent.

¶9. (S/NF) Facilitation of access to the detainees under the revised rubric detailed in ref D was quick and straightforward. Post submitted a diplomatic note on August 24 formally requesting access to the detainees and, despite the beginning of Ramadan and Libya's national day celebrations in the intervening period, access was granted on September 1 (i.e., within a week of the request).

¶10. (S/NF) Despite several requests for information about the legal basis on which the two returned detainees are being held and the status/schedule of any legal proceedings against them, Post has received no response from the GOL to date. The only information we have is from the two detainees. We pressed the

GOL to provide information about the detainees' legal status and the state of play in the legal proceedings against them, stressing that we needed to receive such information directly from the GOL. To date, however, we have not received the requested information from the GOL.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI686

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI686 aka Wikileaks id #168141 ?
Subject	LIBYA FURTHER PRIVATIZES FUEL DISTRIBUTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 2 Sep 2008 15:08 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI686.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TRIPOLI 00000686 R UN 02-SEP-08 LIBYA FURTHER PRIVATIZES FUEL DISTRIBUTION [7982233]From: CBPC,
EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Tuesday, September 02, 2008 5:33 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000686 R UN 02-SEP-08 LIBYA FURTHER PRIVATIZES FUEL DISTRIBUTION [7982233]

UNCLAS

VZCZCXRO3309
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0686 2461508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 021508Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3843
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1209
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0759
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0606
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0703
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4357
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000686

SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , KPRV *[Privatization]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA FURTHER PRIVATIZES FUEL DISTRIBUTION

¶1. (SBU) The Chairman of the Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), Shukri Ghanem, launched the country's third privately-owned fuel distribution company, al-Rahila, in a low profile ceremony at a newly refurbished filling station last week. The al-Rahila Company is one of three companies established to participate in the privatization of fuel distribution in Libya; the other two are al-Sharara and the Libyan Company for Distribution of Petroleum Products. Ghanem told local press the aim was to accelerate privatization and to improve the quality of service by introducing competition.

¶2. (SBU) The chairman of al-Rahila, Mohamed bin Hussain, told the press his company and two other firms emerged as a result of the restructuring of Braiga Oil Marketing Company. Capitalized with 50 million Libyan dinars, al-Rahila currently owns 106 gas stations and is planning to build eight modern stations in various parts of the country. According to Ghanem, NOC will continue to have a role in fuel distribution in Libya through the state-owned Braiga Company.

¶3. (SBU) Comment: The launching of Libya's third privately-owned fuel distribution company marks another step in Libya's efforts to further privatize key sectors of its economy. The GOL hopes that this process will contribute to more reliable fuel supplies and help mitigate any shortages (earlier this year Tripoli residents faced gas shortages due to delayed shipments of refined gasoline). End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI688

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI688 aka Wikileaks id #168338 ?
Subject	QADHAFI, BERLUSCONI SIGN HISTORIC AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 3 Sep 2008 18:53 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI688.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI870 , 09TRIPOLI212
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Removed on Mon, 21 Feb 2011 17:31 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Wed, 23 Feb 2011 05:31 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4561
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0688/01 2471853
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031853Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3845
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0760
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0705
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0607
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1210
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4359
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000688

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , IT [Italy] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI, BERLUSCONI SIGN HISTORIC AGREEMENT

TRIPOLI 00000688  001.2 OF 002


¶1.  (SBU) The Italian Ambassador in Tripoli briefed local heads
of mission on a "historic treaty of friendship and cooperation"
(or "colonial compensation agreement", as the Libyan government
has characterized it) signed on August 30 in Benghazi by Libyan
leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and Italian prime minister Silvio
Berlusconi.  The signing ceremony took place on the front
terrace of the former residence of the Italian colonial military
governor of Libya, and was witnessed by several hundred
descendants of Libyans who had been exiled by the Italians
during that period, as well as by the son of famed Libyan
resistance fighter Omar al-Mukhtar.  In remarks at the event
```

that were widely publicized in Libya, Berlusconi expressed regret for the pain that Italy's colonization had caused to Libyans.

¶2. (SBU) According to the ambassador, the treaty is intended to "turn a new page" in Italian-Libyan relations, which have been plagued by difficulties due to Italy's colonial history in Libya. He said his government had insisted that Qadhafi, rather the the prime minister, sign the document to underscore its historic nature and to help ensure that it would be respected by Libya. It contains 23 articles covering a wide variety of topics including trade and investment, illegal immigration, scholarships, the return of stolen antiquities, the re-naming of a Libyan holiday, and, most prominently, an Italian commitment to fund USD 5 billion of infrastructure projects in Libya.

¶3. (SBU) Highlights of the treaty, which the ambassador said must be ratified by the Italian parliament, are:

-- Infrastructure investment: Italy will provide USD 5 billion in funding for infrastructure projects in Libya over a 20-year period (i.e., USD 250 million/year). Libya will propose projects; a joint Libyan-Italian committee will decide which will be funded; and Italian companies will implement them.

-- "Special initiatives": Italy will build 200 housing units for descendants of Libyans who were deported to Italy during the Italian occupation; provide hospitalization in Italy to victims of land mines (according to the local United Nations head representative, there are approx. 2 million land mines in Libya dating from the Italian colonial era, WWII, and Libya's conflicts with Egypt and Chad); provide a number of scholarships for Libyans to study in Italy; and return antiquities that had been taken from Libya to Italy (the "Venus of Cyrene," a Roman-era statue that had been removed from Libya in 1916, was unveiled at the signing ceremony).

-- Non-discrimination: Libya will revoke a regulation requiring Italian companies investing in Libya to double-register with the Ministry of Economy and the Prime Minister's office. This regulation had added a discriminatory, political layer of regulatory approval for Italian investments, the ambassador said.

-- Illegal migration: The treaty calls for implementation of earlier bilateral agreements aimed at stemming the flow of illegal migration from Libya to Italy. The ambassador noted that the number of such migrants, who are mainly sub-Saharan Africans, had sharply risen, from 8,000 last year to 18,000 this year.

-- Border control: In response to a longstanding Libyan request to the European Union to fund a border control surveillance system for its southern land border, Italy in this treaty agreed to fund up to 50 percent of the cost of such a system, provided that Italian firms are awarded a corresponding percentage of the project.

-- Visas: Italians who were expelled from Libya in 1970 (shortly after Qadhafi came to power) will be allowed to return to Libya to visit. They originally numbered over 20,000 and had been barred from returning to Libya.

-- Fishing: Libya agreed to negotiate an MOU with Italy over

fishing rights in disputed waters.

-- Human rights: The agreement includes a provision on respect

TRIPOLI 00000688 002.2 OF 002

for human rights.

-- Dialogue: The two sides agreed to meet yearly at the prime minister and foreign minister levels.

-- New holiday: Libya agreed to cancel the annual October 7 "Italian Evacuation Day", marking the expulsion of Italians from Italy, and replace it with a "Libyan-Italian Friendship Day," to be celebrated annually on August 30, the date of the signing of the treaty.

¶4. (SBU) Comment: The GOL was eager to conclude the historic treaty with Italy this year as part of its recent, accelerated opening to Europe that began with the resolution in 2007 of its dispute with the EU over the jailed Bulgarian nurses. The GOL views the signing of a claims settlement agreement with the United States on August 14 and the Secretary's upcoming visit as similarly major milestones in its re-engagement with the West. STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI719

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI719 aka Wikileaks id #169408 ?
Subject	LIBYA: TRI-LATERAL DIPLOMACY IS THE WAY FORWARD ON CHAD-SUDAN CONFLICT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 11 Sep 2008 14:22 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI719.html
References	08NDJAMENA334
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI820 , 08TRIPOLI871 , 09TRIPOLI40
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

TelegramC O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 00000719
VZCZCXRO0702
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0719/01 2551422
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 111422Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3891
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0139
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4405

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000719

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/11/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PBTS *[National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty]* , UN *[United Nations]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: TRI-LATERAL DIPLOMACY IS THE WAY FORWARD ON CHAD-SUDAN CONFLICT

REF: A. A. STATE 88188
B. B. NDJAMENA 334

TRIPOLI 00000719 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. Dr. Ali Treiki, Secretary for African Affairs in the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), is optimistic that Chad and Sudan can be brought to the table to make peace through Libya's tri-lateral efforts. Treiki said the "Group of Three" (Treiki and the Chadian and Sudanese foreign ministers) is "the only effective group," contrasting it against the Contact Group (CG), which he characterized as "not being neighbors, like we

(CG), which he characterized as "not being neighbors, like we are, to the conflict." While Libya plans to attend the CG meeting in Asmara on September 12, Treiki thought that agreements reached in Sirte and Tripoli over the past two years have a better chance of success than the Dakar agreement signed in March 2008. Treiki dismissed the African Union peacekeepers as poorly trained and undisciplined. He preferred that a joint Chadian-Sudanese force be deployed to Darfur after Presidents Deby and Bashir make peace. Libya strongly opposes the recent charges brought against President Bashir in the International Criminal Court (ICC), and Treiki predicted most African and Arab countries will withdraw from the Treaty of Rome if the indictment goes forward. Treiki invited Special Envoy Williamson to visit Tripoli in early-to-mid October. We think a visit next month could be useful. End Summary.

LIBYA'S TRI-LATERAL DIPLOMACY SUPERCEDES DAKAR PROCESS

¶2. (C) CDA met with MFA's Dr. Ali Treiki just one day after Libya celebrated the auspicious 9th anniversary of the September 9, 1999 Sirte Proclamation, which launched the African Union and is seen here as the road to a "United States of Africa." Libya feels that the conflict between Sudan and Chad is an African problem that demands an African solution. Treiki was optimistic that the peace process is moving forward and Libya will attend a meeting of the Contact Group (CG) in Asmara on September 12. Treiki said the CG plays an important role, but he thought it was relatively ineffective because it is comprised of states that are too far removed from the conflict to understand the complex issues involved. Instead, in Treiki's view, the "Group of Three" -- consisting of Dr. Treiki and the foreign ministers from Chad and Sudan -- is the body that will bring results. He highlighted the distance from Dakar and Asmara to the Sudan/Chad border, saying that Libya alone shared a frontier with the conflict.

¶3. (C) Treiki also opposed a proposed Arab League meeting in Doha on the issue, again saying that African problems should be dealt with in Africa. He was optimistic that Libya can broker and implement a viable solution with both parties soon. President Deby, he says, is "keen to cooperate" and Chad will work with Libya "regardless of [Deby's] relationship with the government in Sudan." Treiki confirmed that he has ongoing contact with rebel leaders -- most of whom have returned to Darfur and Chad -- but thinks that demobilization requires that both governments reconcile their differences first.

¶4. (C) Libya, he said, views peace in Darfur as essential for the security of Chad. Unfortunately, the international peacekeepers in Darfur are "poorly trained" and "are the worst troops from each nation." Libya believes that a stable settlement will require a bilateral peacekeeping force consisting of both Chadian and Sudanese troops who will have more incentive to keep peace.

BASHIR AND THE ICC

¶5. (C) Part of Treiki's confidence in Libya's chances for a breakthrough stems from his assessment that Bashir is ready for peace. The CDA asked if the recent charges brought against Bashir by the ICC had anything to do with his readiness, to which Treiki responded, "No, no, no. It is not true that this helps. It is very bad. We should have avoided it; it will hurt the peace process." In general, Libya feels strongly that genocide cases should be tried within the Sudanese judicial system. Speaking on behalf of all Arabs and Africans, he said that they all stood in opposition to the ICC. According to Treiki, Arabs won't recognize a conviction in front of the court and he expects most African and Arab states to withdraw from the Treaty of Rome if the Bashir indictment goes forward. He twice asked if we knew "who was behind the charges."

COOPERATION WITH THE US

¶6. (C) Treiki signaled that his window of opportunity to broker peace will be short-lived because he will take up a new responsibility next spring. After two stints as Foreign Minister and three as Libya's PermRep in New York, Treiki is looking forward to a new UN tour, this time as the African representative to the UNGA. Though he will not start his duties until June of 2009, he plans to travel to the US for

TRIPOLI 00000719 002.2 OF 002

consultations as early as March. He expressed gratitude for his ongoing dialogue with A/S Frazer, and gave an impressive recitation of his friends in the US government dating back 40 years. He asked the CDA to extend an invitation to Special Envoy Williamson to visit Tripoli in early- or mid-October.

¶7. (C) Comment: Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi sees himself as a major player in African issues and Dr. Treiki is his point man on the conflict between Chad and Sudan and the situation in Darfur. We strongly support a visit to Tripoli by Special Envoy Williamson to Tripoli in October, if the timing can be worked out. End Comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI741

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI741 aka Wikileaks id #170610 ?
Subject	MINISTER OF ECONOMY POSITIVE ON BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT, CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC REFORM PLANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 19 Sep 2008 12:26 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI741.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

TRIPOLI 00000741 P CO 19-SEP-08 MINISTER OF ECONOMY POSITIVE ON BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT, CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC REFORM PLANS [8046536]From: CBPC, EACTAPP [EACTAPP@state.sgov.gov]
Sent: Friday, September 19, 2008 2:24 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000741 P CO 19-SEP-08 MINISTER OF ECONOMY POSITIVE ON BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT, CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC REFORM PLANS [8046536]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO6787
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0741/01 2631226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191226Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3913
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0907
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0591
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4430

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000741

DEPT OF COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; DEPT OF ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]*
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF ECONOMY POSITIVE ON BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT, CONCERNED ABOUT DOMESTIC REFORM PLANS

TRIPOLI 00000741 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, Charge d'affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli.
REASON: 1.4 (d)

REASON: 1.4 (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During a September 16 meeting, Dr. Ali al-Issawy, the Secretary of the General People's Committee for the Economy, Trade and Industry (equivalent of minister of economy and trade) told the CDA that he looked forward to the visit of Assistant Secretary of Commerce Israel Hernandez in October, and to finalizing the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement. Commenting on GOL plans to distribute oil revenues directly to the public and to privatize Libya's public sector, al-Issawy expressed concern about the impact on prices and the Libyan work ethic. Al-Issawy said he was interested in pairing U.S. and Libyan universities, and requested U.S. experts visit Libya to advise on the mortgage market. End summary.

WELCOMING A/S HERNANDEZ

¶2. (SBU) Minister al-Issawy said he looked forward to the planned visit of Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Director General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service, Israel Hernandez in October. CDA, introducing the Embassy's new FCS officer, said the visit was intended to highlight the growing commercial relationship between the two countries, and to open the Embassy's U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service office.

TIFA: WAITING FOR THE END OF RAMADAN

¶3. (SBU) Al-Issawy said he looked forward to finalizing the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). He suggested that his staff work directly with Embassy staff (in coordination with USTR) to finalize the agreement. He preferred to wait until after Ramadan to meet and go over any remaining points in the text. (Note: Embassy had previously sent the latest USTR-cleared draft to the ministry's lead negotiator, Mr. Dia Hammouda and his team).

PLANS IN PROGRESS ON OIL WEALTH DISTRIBUTION

¶4. (C) Referring to Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent national day speech, the CDA asked about plans to distribute Libya's oil revenue directly to the public. The Minister expressed concern about inflation, noting they could not simply hand out cash. It would be preferable to distribute a combination of cash, securities and shares. He said the final decision on a framework for the distribution was not yet finished. Once the plan was finished, he believed it would be presented to the General People's Congress for final approval.

"LIBYA HAS A CULTURE OF RENT, NOT WORK"

¶5. (C) Minister al-Issawy commented that some Libyans were already dreaming about using the money they will eventually receive to live in Tunisia or Malta (two favorite nearby holiday destinations). He added some students are already wondering about the utility of studying because they think they won't need to find jobs once the wealth distribution program starts. He attributed these attitudes to what he called Libya's "culture of rent" as opposed to a "culture of work."

¶6. (C) On the other hand, the Minister noted a wealth distribution plan could smooth the way for greater liberalization of the economy, especially in terms of lifting price controls and doing away with subsidies. His thinking was that if people have more disposable income, they will be able to afford unsubsidized goods. When asked when the program would start, he said teams were working "day and night" to finalize the wealth distribution program and the related privatization plans.

MOVING AHEAD ON PRIVATIZATION AND LOOKING FOR U.S. PARTNERS IN HIGHER EDUCATION

¶7. (SBU) Minister al-Issawy said plans for privatizing key sectors of the economy, including health, education, utilities,

and transportation were almost finished. The CDA said he had heard concerns from Libyans that they would be negatively affected by privatizing health and education, in particular. The Minister agreed these were the sectors that worried people the most.

¶8. (SBU) On higher education, in particular, the Minister said they were interested in joint ventures with U.S. universities, such as MIT. The CDA told him the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had raised a similar idea. He noted there were many models in the region for such collaboration, including in Dubai, Qatar, and Morocco. The CDA said the Embassy would provide him with more information on these partnerships.

.AND ALSO LOOKING TO LEARN FROM THE U.S. MORTGAGE CRISIS

TRIPOLI 00000741 002.2 OF 002

¶9. (SBU) The Minister also asked if the Embassy could provide an expert to speak about the mortgage situation in the U.S. since Libya plans to privatize the housing sector and make loans more broadly available to potential home-owners. He mentioned Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. The CDA said he would look into potential U.S. experts to engage with the GOL.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI745

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI745 aka Wikileaks id #170886 ?
Subject	GERMAN OIL FIRM RWE MAKES TWO MORE DISCOVERIES IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Sep 2008 12:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI745.html
References	08TRIPOLI474 , 08TRIPOLI597
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8238
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0745 2661258
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221258Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3918
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0039
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0619
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0715
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4435
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000745

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GERMAN OIL FIRM RWE MAKES TWO MORE DISCOVERIES IN LIBYA

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474 ; B) 08 TRIPOLI 597

¶1. (SBU) The German oil firm RWE made two more oil discoveries in the Sirte Basin in Libya in September 2008. RWE's new successful discoveries do not reveal any new fields, but ensure the potential of its blocks in the Sirte Basin, where the quality of its sweet crude is high, and operating costs are low ($1-5 a barrel). Further appraisal work will be required in order to confirm the scale of the anticipated reserves and the possibilities of exploiting them economically.

¶2. (SBU) RWE is assessing these new reservoirs and is planning five further exploratory wells. RWE also intends to drill a series of appraisal wells in order to further define the most

series of appraisal wells in order to further define the most promising areas in its concession.

¶3. (SBU) The agreement signed in June 2003 between RWE and the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) fell under Exploration and Production Share Agreement-III (EPSA-III), and covers six blocks with a total area of 30,270 square kilometers. This EPSA agreement runs for a period of 30 years, with the NOC retaining a 68 percent interest in the block, and RWE holding the remaining 32 percent. RWE is the Operator with a 100 percent participation interest in these concessions. (Note: The EPSA-III framework featured significantly higher production shares for international oil companies (IOC's) whereas the latest EPSA-IV framework entails higher Libyan government shares (see reftels a, b). End note.)

¶4. (SBU) Comment: Overall, the exploration program of RWE in the Libyan Sirte Basin, with seven discoveries to date, is successful but not surprising since the Sirte Basin contains approximately 80 percent of Libya's total proven oil reserves. End of comment.

STEVENS

STEVENSC

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI748

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI748 aka Wikileaks id #171132 ?
Subject	GEORGIA - ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA PARTICIPATION IN UN DISCUSSIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 23 Sep 2008 12:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI748.html
References	08STATE100791
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9400
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0748 2671247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 231247Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0141
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3922
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4439
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000748

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSCR, PREL *[External Political Relations]* , GG *[Georgia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GEORGIA - ABKHAZIA AND SOUTH OSSETIA PARTICIPATION IN UN DISCUSSIONS

REF: STATE 100791

Drawing on points contained in reftel, Charge d'affaires sought Libyan support to prevent Abkhazian and South Ossetian participation in UNSC meetings in a September 23 discussion with MFA Secretary for Americas Affairs Ahmed Fituri. Fituri made no substantive response, but promised to inform appropriate officials of the USG position. He noted that the head of the MFA's International Organization Affairs Department, Hindi Abdulatif Hindi, is currently in New York for the UNGA, and that FM Abderrahman Shalgham had not/not traveled to New York to head Libya's delegation to the UNGA as had been previously anticipated.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI755

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI755 aka Wikileaks id #171477 ?
Subject	UN 1267: USG HOLDS ON LIBYAN TERRORIST SANCTION REQUESTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 25 Sep 2008 13:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/09/08TRIPOLI755.html
References	08STATE97379
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1523
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0755 2691321
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 251321Z SEP 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3929
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0142
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0040
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4446
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000755

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]*
SUBJECT: UN 1267: USG HOLDS ON LIBYAN TERRORIST SANCTION REQUESTS

REF: STATE 97379

¶1. We are still trying to arrange a face-to-face discussion on Libya's outstanding UNSCR 1267 nominations (reftel) with the MFA's International Organizations Affairs office. The combination of Ramadan hours and the absence in New York of the leadership of that office has so far frustrated our efforts. On September 17, we sent a diplomatic note transmitting the essential points concerning our desire to work with the Libyans to resolve the issues surrounding the libyan nominations for the 1267 list.

¶2. We will continue to seek a meeting with the relevant Libyan officials, but do not think it will occur until after the Id al-Fitr ends here on October 3.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI764

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI764 aka Wikileaks id #172337 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SE WILLIAMSON TO LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 2 Oct 2008 15:15 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI764.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
TelegramRestricted by caption. UNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000764
O P 021515Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3938
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0133
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0139
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0085
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0014
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1231
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0771
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0623
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0145
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0909
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0593
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4455
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000764

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG FOR GMKEEL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , CD [Chad] , SU [Sudan] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SE WILLIAMSON TO LIBYA

¶1.    (SBU) Your trip to Libya comes one month after Secretary
Rice's historic visit marked a new chapter in Libya's
re-engagement with the West and nearly two months after a
U.S.-Libyan agreement to settle outstanding claims for
compensation for attacks including the Lockerbie bombing of
1988.  In recent years, Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has
rebranded himself as a leader of Africa and a mediator in
African affairs.  He is personally invested in peace in Chad and
Sudan.  Libya's diplomatic effort is led by Dr. Ali Treiki, a
career diplomat and former foreign minister with over 40 years
of experience.

QADHAFI'S LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS

¶2.    (SBU) Libya celebrated 39 years of the "Al-Fateh" revolution
```

last month. Since taking power in a bloodless coup in 1969, Qadhafi has pursued policies ranging from support for terrorism, rebellion, and insurgency to forging diplomatic bonds throughout the Arab and African spheres. The Sirte Declaration of September 1999 is touted here as the genesis of the African Union and a platform for the future "United States of Africa." Domestic propaganda celebrates Qadhafi as the father and guide of closer integration on the continent. Despite his leadership aspirations, the Leader is open to an international solution for Darfur. During her visit, the Secretary told Qadhafi that the U.S. wants to cooperate with Libya to secure peace in Africa and particularly in Sudan.

¶3. (SBU) Resolving the conflict in Darfur is also strategically important for Libya. Regime security depends, in part, on regional security. Senior GOL officials have made it clear that they are concerned that al-Qaida and associated groups could gain a foothold in ungoverned areas like Darfur. They worry about a potential "belt of terrorism" running from Somalia in the east to Mauritania in the west. A secure Sudan would bisect that belt, but if Chad and Sudan are unable to control their territories, Libya fears its own desert south will be vulnerable to terrorist infiltration.

LIBYA'S POINT-MAN ON DARFUR, SUDAN, CHAD

¶4. (SBU) Dr. Ali Treiki personally leads the GOL's diplomatic engagement on African issues. Treiki is a career diplomat who has served multiple times as PermRep in New York and as foreign minister. He now handles the Africa portfolio within the Foreign Ministry, but sits in the Prime Minister's office -- possibly a sign of his unique status within the GOL, as he is said to report directly to the Leader, and not to the Foreign Minister. Treiki will leave Libya in the spring or summer of next year to take on the presidency of the UN General Assembly for 2009.

¶5. (SBU) Treiki is supportive of the UN-AU peace process in principle, but worries about the effectiveness of AU troops in the region. He sees reconciliation between Chad and Sudan as a prerequisite to peace in Darfur and has hosted meetings between both sides to reach an end to hostilities. Treiki is willing to pay lip service to the Dakar Process and the efforts of the Contact Group in order to maintain cordial African relations. He has expressed doubt about the effectiveness of Arab League or Qatari intervention. He sees tri-lateral engagement between Libya, Chad, and Sudan as the most promising approach, given these governments' direct stake in the outcome. He views last month's agreement to exchange ambassadors between N'Djamena and Khartoum as a first step toward Chadian-Sudanese cooperation that will include a bilateral peacekeeping force to monitor the border. Treiki recently told us that Libya strongly opposes the ICC indictment of President Bashir, believing this will only harden Bashir's stance on Darfur.

¶6. (SBU) Libya's previous attempts to broker peace under Treiki's guidance have not yet borne fruit. The Darfur peace conference held in Sirte in 2007 disbanded after key rebel groups failed to attend. An intra-Chadian reconciliation conference held at the same time and attended by President Deby, Bashir, and Chadian rebels resulted in an agreed ceasefire. That ceasefire proved to be shortlived, however, and rebels resumed their attacks against the government in February 2008. Chadian intra-rebel talks held in Tripoli last spring and observed by the EU and UN also fizzled.

¶7. (SBU) Treiki enjoyed a good relationship with your predecessor and appreciates working with the United States. He

thinks Libya is best positioned to bring peace to Darfur because of its proximity to the conflict, but he is open to effective foreign cooperation. However, he believes the situation in Sudan is an African problem that demands an African solution and will prefer to work within the framework of a resurrected Sirte agreement.

MANAGING PERCEPTIONS IMPORTANT FOR COOPERATION

¶8. (SBU) Qadhafi's desire to be viewed as a leader defines the parameters under which Libya can coordinate efforts in Sudan. He has railed against Western colonization in Africa and raised his concerns on AFRICOM with the Secretary. Treiki will need to balance the Leader's interest in success in Sudan with the need to show independence and leadership.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI799

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI799 aka Wikileaks id #172730 ?
Subject	KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION AT UNGA -- LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 6 Oct 2008 16:02 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI799.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9519
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0799 2801602
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061602Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3973
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0147
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4491
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000799

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , UN [United Nations] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , LY [Libya] , KV
[Kosovo]
SUBJECT: KOSOVO ICJ RESOLUTION AT UNGA -- LIBYA

REF: STATE 105796

Drawing on background and talking points contained in reftel, we
informed via dipnote on October 6 the General People's Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA
equivalent) of the USG intention to vote against the Serbian
resolution at UNGA concerning the legality of Kosovo's
declaration of independence.  We urged Libya to join us and
other concerned countries in voting against the measure.  We
have been unable to meet with appropriate Libyan officials at
the General People's Committee because of their Ramadan and the
Eid al-Fitr holiday work schedules.  Given Libya's previous
position on Kosovo, we expect that its delegation to the UNGA is
likely to vote with any emerging Arab/Islamic consensus.

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI800

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI800 aka Wikileaks id #172731 ?
Subject	U.S. AFRICA COMMAND STATUS UPDATE - LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 6 Oct 2008 16:03 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI800.html
References	08STATE104550
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9520
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0800 2801603
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 061603Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3974
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4492
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000800

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: U.S. AFRICA COMMAND STATUS UPDATE - LIBYA

REF: STATE 104550

¶1. We informed the Libyan General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA equivalent) on October 6 via diplomatic note of the formal establishment of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) as a unified combatant command effective October 1.

¶2. There has been no reporting or comment in the Libyan media on the establishment of AFRICOM. We will stay alert for significant publiuc or private comment in the future.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI803

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI803 aka Wikileaks id #172945 ?
Subject	U.S. FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE OPENS FOR BUSINESS IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 8 Oct 2008 03:57 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI803.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0773
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0803/01 2820357
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 080357Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3976
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0717
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0773
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0625
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1233
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0350
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0470
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0595
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8778 PRIORITY
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4496
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000803

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , LY *[Libya]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]*
SUBJECT: U.S. FOREIGN COMMERCIAL SERVICE OPENS FOR BUSINESS IN LIBYA

¶1. (SBU) Summary: During his October 5 visit to Tripoli, Department of Commerce Assistant Secretary and Director General of the U.S. and Foreign Commercial Service Israel Hernandez officially opened the new Foreign Commercial Service office at the Embassy and discussed commercial opportunities with U.S. and Libyan business leaders and cooperation with senior Libyan government officials. Coming one month after Secretary Rice's historic trip to Libya, Libyan government representatives enthusiastically welcomed him, as did the small but growing Libyan private sector and representatives of U.S. firms in the

Libyan private sector and representatives of U.S. firms in the energy, telecommunications, and construction sectors. The main messages to him were that there are significant commercial opportunities for American firms in Libya, but challenges still remain in terms of visas, and legal and bureaucratic obstacles. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) In a breakfast roundtable, the leaders of the major U.S. firms in Libya briefed A/S Hernandez on their activities here and described some of the challenges they face, such as procuring visas (both U.S. and Libyan) for employees and Libyan government trainees, and navigating the Libyan legal system. Most of the U.S. companies are involved in oil exploration, production and services, while others have contracts in the burgeoning construction sector (such as AECOM, based in Los Angeles). Some U.S. firms, such as Motorola, are seeking to enter the Libyan telecommunications sector. All the participants voiced complaints about visas, either for their U.S. staff (and their families) to reside in Libya or for their national staff and government partners to travel to the U.S. for training. Some said they believe the Libyan government is delaying the issuance of U.S. employees' visas because Libyans must still travel abroad (i.e., to Tunis) in order to apply for a U.S. visa. The Charge d'affaires pointed out there is a Business Visa program at post to facilitate visas for U.S. companies' Libyan employees and also informed the group the Embassy expects to expand visa issuance in Tripoli in 2009.

¶3. (SBU) Another concern of the U.S. businesses relates to the Libyan legal system. One general manager noted "nothing is written, so all is interpretation." He remarked that he believes Libya is even more litigious than the U.S. and since there are no international law firms and no internationally-trained lawyers, the companies have to rely on local legal counsel. As Libya has been isolated for 20 years, even legal firms based in the Middle East (such as in Dubai) have limited utility in Libya since they lack experience here. On the positive side, U.S. businesses have not had major problems importing materials for their operations, especially since most activities are tied to Libyan government entities, such as the National Oil Company (NOC).

¶4. (SBU) A/S Hernandez also met with the Libyan Businessmen Council, the main organization of Libya's nascent private sector. The Council welcomed the opening of an Embassy Commercial Office because they would like to do business with small- and medium-sized U.S. companies. Most of the American delegations they have seen were from large companies that dealt mainly with the Libyan government. Most of the Council's members, however, are smaller Libyan enterprises. One of the Libyan representatives for a major U.S. equipment provider noted the Libyan market is highly competitive and many European companies (French, German, Italians) never left Libya during the embargo years. It is therefore even more difficult for U.S. companies to enter or re-enter this market, he said. He did not foresee a "u-turn" on the part of the Libyans to nationalize the economy, as in the past, but he did see a need for a more aggressive U.S. approach to help U.S. businesses and to promote the education of Libyans in American universities, especially in medicine and technology.

¶5. (SBU) The next stop was the Libyan government's National Planning Council in which Under Secretary Mohamed Zidoun and his staff briefed A/S Hernandez on Libya's efforts to diversify its economy and to privatize government enterprises. The Assistant Secretary outlined the purpose of his trip to Libya, i.e. to open the new U.S. FCS office here, noting that Libya was one of the fastest growing markets for U.S. trade. He said the US already had a significant trade deficit with Libya (USD 2.9 billion) so the new FCS office would seek to increase U.S. exports to the Libyan market. Under Secretary Zidoun explained

the role of the National Planning Council as a Libyan "think tank" that prepares studies related to economic, commercial and trade policy. The proposed government restructuring aimed to provide better services to the population and to further development in education, technology, and healthcare. U/S Zidoun's staff would like to see Libya adopt U.S. models for an educational curriculum. Libya is also trying to diversify its "mono-source" economy so as to raise the standard of living. Libya sees itself as a potential transport hub (like Dubai) and in particular, seeks to be the "gateway" to the rest of Africa. Libya also wants to learn from the Gulf countries' experiences: "It is not enough to construct sky-scrapers but one must also train people to run the companies that occupy them."

¶6. (SBU) On privatization, the Planning Council emphasized "expanding the base of ownership." The Council has conducted studies on how to provide services to Libyans everywhere in the country via the municipalities (akin to counties in the U.S.). The goal is to provide wealth directly to citizens who may spend the money as they like. The Council's staff noted Libya has a relatively small population concentrated along the Mediterranean coast. Therefore, they think reforms are possible so that government will provide only the "basics." One Council member commented, "we cannot go back; we have suffered a lot and we are facing hard moments" in terms of "rebuilding our country" and engaging with the world. He said to A/S Hernandez, "we need your help in education and training" in order to rebuild Libya.

¶7. (SBU) Lastly, A/S Hernandez met with the Under Secretary of the General People's Committee (GPC) for Economy, Trade and Investment. Under Secretary Taher Sarkez and his staff explained the GPC's role in negotiating international trade agreements (such as the ongoing Trade and Investment Framework talks with USTR) and in promoting Libyan exports. A/S Hernandez extended an invitation to Under Secretary Sarkez to visit Commerce Department offices in the U.S. to learn about programs to assist small- and medium-sized businesses. Under Secretary Sarkez welcomed this opportunity. A/S Hernandez said the new FCS office would also work with Libyan businesses who were interested in participating in American trade shows and other networking opportunities in the U.S. U/S Sarkez noted the need to host more U.S. business groups in Libya and said Libya would probably need to issue more visas to Americans. Finally, U/S Sarkez' staff described an initiative of the GPC to promote Libyan exports other than oil and gas, such as agricultural and fisheries products, via the newly-created Libyan Export Promotion Center.

¶8. (SBU) Comment: A/S Hernandez' trip to Libya is the first high-level delegation here since Secretary Rice visited Libya just a month ago. He was enthusiastically welcomed by Libyan government representatives, the small but growing Libyan private sector, and representatives of U.S. firms. The main messages to him were that Libya is open to American companies and future educational/technological exchanges but that challenges still remain in forging the new relationship in terms of visas, legal and bureaucratic obstacles and re-establishing new ties with Libyans after a 25-year absence from the market. End comment.

STEVENS
STEVENSC

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI819

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI819 aka Wikileaks id #173683 ?
Subject	SELF-DESCRIBED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED RELEASED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 14 Oct 2008 17:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI819.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI541 , 08TRIPOLI592
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI882 , 08TRIPOLI919 , 08TRIPOLI920 , 08TRIPOLI925 , 08TRIPOLI943 , 08TRIPOLI969 , 09TRIPOLI860
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5492
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0819/01 2881719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 141719Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3993
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0627
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1237
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0775
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0719
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4514
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000819

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/14/2018
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , FR [France; Corsica] , LY [Libya] , SZ [Switzerland] , DA [Denmark]
SUBJECT: SELF-DESCRIBED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED RELEASED

REF: A. (A) TRIPOLI 332, B) TRIPOLI  472 , C) TRIPOLI 592 , D) TRIPOLI 541 , E)
TRIPOLI 158, F) TRIPOLI 159, G) TRIPOLI 160), H) TRIPOLI
     B. 161, I) TRIPOLI 165

TRIPOLI 00000819  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli,
Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C)  Summary: Regime critic Idriss Boufayed, who was
sentenced to 25 years in prison in June and who is suffering
from cancer, has been released from custody on humanitarian
grounds and has returned home.  He may seek to secure travel
```

documents (seized at the time of his arrest) and permission to travel abroad for medical treatment. The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) played a role in urging his release; the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), which is affiliated with the QDF, is monitoring Boufayed's case and has offered to help him secure travel documents and permission to travel. 10 other individuals convicted and sentenced in connection with Boufayed's case remain in custody. EU missions are waiting for permission from Brussels to collectively demarche the Government of Libya (GOL) to request consular access to one of them, a dual Danish-Libyan national. The HRSL has petitioned the QDF to urge the GOL to release the 10 other individuals; QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi is currently reviewing the petition. While Boufayed's release is a positive gesture, some Libyan interlocutors have noted that he was essentially let go to avoid criticism of the regime if he were to succumb to cancer while still in the GOL's custody. End summary.

BOUFAYED RETURNS HOME

¶2. (C) Libyan opposition website Libya al-Mustaqbal reported October 8 that Libyan authorities allowed detained regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed to leave the Sabratha Hospital, where he had been held and undergone treatment for lung cancer since his transfer from prison earlier this year (ref A). Mohammed Tarnesh, Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), told us October 12 that he had spoken with members of Boufayed's family, who confirmed that Boufayed had returned to the family's home in Gharyan on October 8. Tarnesh said intervention by the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), chaired by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, had helped facilitate Boufayed's release on humanitarian grounds. Boufayed was convicted on June 10 of planning to foment a rebellion against the "people's authority system" and meeting with an official from a foreign government, and was sentenced to 25 years in prison (details ref B).

MAY SEEK TO TRAVEL ABROAD FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT

¶3. (C) Tarnesh said Boufayed, whose medical condition was described by family members as "poor", was considering whether to try to travel abroad for medical treatment. Tarnesh believed Boufayed was inclined to do so. A complication was that Boufayed's passport and identity documents were confiscated at the time of his arrest in February 2007. Tarnesh said he offered the assistance of the HRSL in helping Boufayed obtain his passport and identity documents and permission to exit the country. Noting that Boufayed was very weak, Tarnesh lamented that he had not been granted a humanitarian parole sooner after his conviction in June to allow him to benefit from specialized medical treatment that could not be obtained in Libya. In remarks to the press on October 14, the QDF's Human Rights Committee Director, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, gave media interviews in which he said the QDF would facilitate Boufayed's travel to Switzerland for cancer treatment; however, ongoing Swiss-Libyan contretemps related to the July arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi (ref C), son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, could hamper those efforts.

EU CONTEMPLATES FURTHER ACTION; HRSL URGES ACTION TO RELEASE OTHER PRISONERS

¶4. (C) French and British diplomats told us EU heads of mission had agreed to a joint demarche to the GOL requesting consular access to Jamal al-Hajj, a Danish-Libyan dual citizen who was among the individuals arrested along with Boufayed. EU officials in Brussels are currently reviewing the proposed joint demarche, which would call for consular access to Boufayed, information on the status of the appeal of his conviction and possibly urge his release. It is not expected that missions in Tripoli will receive a decision on the joint demarche by weeks' end.
As reported refs B and D, EU member missions previously

As reported refs B and D, EU member missions previously demarched the GOL to urge Idriss Boufayed's release and consular access to Jamal al-Hajj; however, they have not/not raised the cases of the other members of the group convicted in connection with the case. Separately, the HRSL's Tarnesh told us October 14 that his organization had submitted a petition to the QDF asking that the organization intervene to urge the GOL to release the other individuals convicted in connection with the case. Tarnesh argued in the petition that gross improprieties in authorities' investigation of the case and the excessive

sentences justified a review of their case, if not an outright pardon. Tarnesh told CDA Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi is currently considering the petition.

BACKGROUND

¶5. (C) Boufayed is a long-time critic of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, and directed a small opposition group called the National Union for Reform during 16 years of exile in Switzerland. He returned to Libya in September 2006 and was briefly detained in November and December 2006. 14 self-described dissidents and regime critics were arrested on/about February 16, 2007 on the eve of staging a peaceful public demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square to protest Libyan authorities' violent suppression of a demonstration in Benghazi a year earlier. The arrests came shortly after Idriss Boufayed and al-Mahdi Humaid met with an Emboff to discuss the planned demonstration (see refs E-G and H-I (NOTAL) for details on the arrest and the GOL's reaction to Emboff's meeting with dissidents). Eleven members of the group, including Boufayed, were convicted on June 10 of planning to foment a rebellion against the "people's authority system" and of meeting with an official from a foreign government; sentences ranged from 6 to 25 years (see ref B for details on sentences). Juma'a Boufayed, brother of Idriss Boufayed, and Adel Humaid were released in late May and early June 2008, respectively. Abdulrahman al-Qutawi has not been seen in prison or at trial proceedings since he was arrested with Juma'a Boufayed in February 2007. Opposition websites have alleged that he died in police custody while being interrogated shortly after he was taken into custody.

¶6. (C) Comment: While Boufayed's release is a positive gesture, some Libyan interlocutors have noted that he was essentially let go to avoid criticism of the regime if he were to succumb to cancer while still in the GOL's custody. The HRSL's Tarnesh stressed that six months elapsed between the QDF's announcement that it had facilitated Boufayed's transfer from prison in Tripoli to the Sabratha Hospital (60 km west of Tripoli) for treatment and his ultimate release to return home. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI820

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI820 aka Wikileaks id #173684 ?
Subject	SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 14 Oct 2008 17:31 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI820.html
References	08TRIPOLI719
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5501
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0820/01 2881731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 141731Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3995
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0135
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0141
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0016
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1239
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0629
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0777
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0721
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4516
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000820

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]*
SUBJECT: SE WILLIAMSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYA'S ALI TREIKI

REF: TRIPOLI 719

TRIPOLI 00000820 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Special Envoy Richard Williamson emphasized the urgent need to stem the violence in Darfur in order to bring relief to the millions of displaced persons and refugees during his meeting in Tripoli with Libyan Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki on October 6. SE Williamson said he appreciated Libya's interest in securing peace in the region and welcomed Libya's initiatives to broker an agreement between the

governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena. Treiki reiterated Libya's tri-lateral peace plan that includes a joint Chadian-Sudanese peacekeeping force. The first meeting of Treiki and the Foreign Ministers of Chad and Sudan is scheduled for October 23 in Tripoli. End Summary.

TREIKI REITERATES "TRI-LATERAL" PROPOSAL

¶2. (C) SE Richard Williamson met with U/S-equivalent for African Affairs Ali Treiki October 6. Treiki thanked SE Williamson for visiting Tripoli and highlighted the importance of the regular consultations he enjoys with U.S. counterparts, especially A/S Jendayi Frazer. Treiki told SE Williamson that his visit came at an important time, as many initiatives have been proposed to end the crisis in Sudan and that the time had come to choose which vehicle would be most effective in ending violence and providing relief in Darfur.

¶3. (C) Treiki presented SE Williamson with a detailed explanation of Libya's "tri-lateral" peace initiative. The first step is to ease tensions and renew diplomatic relations between Chad and Sudan. After state-to-state hostility has been reduced, Libya envisions a joint peacekeeping deployment consisting of 1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan at 10 locations on the border. He stressed that proximity to the conflict gave Libya a unique position to bring the parties to the negotiating table. He dismissed the recent Contact Group meeting in Asmara as "unsuccessful," and said "nothing was done there - we don't need meeting after meeting." He was equally doubtful that a Qatari proposal to work through the Arab League would net results, noting that African rebels would be distrustful of Arab mediators and noted that even Egypt is not happy with the Qatar initiative. He repeated his recommendation that the "AU/UN framework" was the appropriate venue for other countries to intervene.

¶4. (C) During the meeting, Treiki answered a call on his cell phone from Sudanese Advisor to the President, Mustafa Osman Ismail to coordinate a tri-lateral meeting in Tripoli for mid-October. Ismail said he would be traveling but called back a bit later to say October 23 would be fine. Treiki dispatched aides to coordinate the date with the Chadian FM Moussa Faki. (Note: As in previous meetings, Treiki had to ask - in Arabic - for his aides to remind him of Faki's name. End note.)

WILLIAMSON WELCOMES LIBYA'S INITIATIVES, PRESSES FOR IMMEDIATE RELIEF

¶5. (C) SE Williamson noted four rings of interest in Darfur: First, the parties on the ground in Sudan; second, the neighbors with a large stake in peace in Sudan, including Libya; third, more distant countries with a deep interest in the region like the U.S. and EU partners; and fourth, countries who want to help, but are too far removed from the crisis to be effective. He agreed that resolving tensions between the governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena would be a positive step in stabilizing the region. Williamson and Treiki shared their concerns on the inevitable lack of implementation of the September 19 agreement between Minni Minnawi and Ali Osman Taha. Treiki said GOS treatment of Minnawi, and lack of implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement would prevent other rebel groups from negotiating with Khartoum.

¶6. (C) The Special Envoy stressed the importance of immediate relief for the millions suffering in Sudan. After providing Treiki with USG efforts to bolster the UN/AU peacekeeping force and our aid to the region, SE Williamson conveyed our concern that new violence could erupt at the end of the rainy season or with an ICC warrant for President Bashir. Treiki thought that there were "no serious immediate threats except Khalil Ibrahim," and that he is in contact with the GOC to prevent an attack by Ibrahim. Treiki belittled the role of rebel leaders in Europe,

especially Abdul Wahid al-Nur, who he derided as, "sitting peacefully in Paris making propaganda."

TRIPOLI 00000820 002.2 OF 002

LIBYAN REACTION

¶7. (C) After initially agreeing to a low-key visit, Treiki rolled out the red carpet and had both photos and video of the hour-long meeting. State media reported the visit on the front page and Treiki gave a five-minute interview on TV evening news. However, neither report gave specifics of the meeting, referring merely to friendly consultations, holding out the prospect of further policy consultations with the USG.

¶8. (C) Comment. While the Special Envoy made clear that our priorities were humanitarian relief and an immediate cessation of violence, Treiki's focus continues to be a state-based solution with a longer timeline. SE Williamson gave specific detail of refugee camps of particular concern and recent attacks, but Treiki preferred to talk about high-level diplomatic solutions. The GOL's initiative may be complementary to our goals, but Treiki seems more concerned about securing diplomatic and security gains for Libya than immediately and directly addressing the humanitarian crisis. End Comment.

¶9. (U) This cable has been cleared by SE Williamson.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI824

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI824 aka Wikileaks id #174127 ?
Subject	LIBYA WORKING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUBJECTS OF 1267 LISTING HOLDS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:02 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI824.html
References	08STATE97379
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7906
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0824 2910902
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 170902Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3999
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0041
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0148
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4520
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000824

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO TREASURY FOR SZUBIN AND LEV

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KTFN *[Terrorism Finance Traffic]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA WORKING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUBJECTS OF 1267 LISTING HOLDS

REF: STATE 97379

¶1. (C) CDA met October 15 with Jalal Jaidi of the MFA's International Organizations office to discuss Libya's response to reftel demarche. Jaidi said the GOL was working to develop additional supporting evidentiary and bio-identifier information on the eight USG holds and expected to provide that information in seven to ten days. On the proposed visit of OFAC Director Adam Szubin to discuss 1267 listing modalities and counterterrorism finance, Jaidi said it was unlikely that key GOL interlocutors for those issues would be available during the last week of October. The GOL would strongly prefer that the visit be delayed until early November.

GODFREY

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI825

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI825 aka Wikileaks id #174134 ?
Subject	LIBYA ON DESIGNATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:21 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI825.html
References	08STATE104496
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7928
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTRO #0825 2910921
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 170921Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4000
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1241
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0631
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0779
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0723
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4521
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000825

SIPDIS

FOR ISN, T, TREASURY, NEA/IR, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , EUN *[European Union]* , EWWT *[Waterborne Transportation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ON DESIGNATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES

REF: STATE 104496

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S) CDA met October 13 with Jalal Jaidi of the MFA's International Organizations Department to follow up on reftel demarche and urge that the GOL freeze assets of entities listed reftel, require comprehensive mandatory inspections of IRISL-related cargo and ensure that all Libyan national companies cease business operations with IRISL. Jaidi argued that it was up to individual shipping companies and freight forwarders to determine whether to do business with IRISL, and said he was unsure whether a customs mechanism existed that would facilitate mandatory inspections of IRISL-related cargo. He said the GOL would review demarche points and notify us if they decide to take any measures related to IRISL. Post will follow up with the MFA and customs officials and report any further substantive response septel.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI826

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI826 aka Wikileaks id #174135 ?
Subject	LIBYA ON DESIGNATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:21 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI826.html
References	08STATE104496
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7930
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTRO #0826 2910921
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 170921Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4001
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1242
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0632
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0780
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0724
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4522
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000826

SIPDIS

FOR ISN, T, TREASURY, NEA/IR, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/15/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , EUN *[European Union]* , EWWT *[Waterborne Transportation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA ON DESIGNATION OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN SHIPPING LINES

REF: STATE 104496

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) CDA met October 13 with Jalal Jaidi of the MFA's International Organizations Department to follow up on reftel demarche and urge that the GOL freeze assets of entities listed reftel, require comprehensive mandatory inspections of IRISL-related cargo and ensure that all Libyan national companies cease business operations with IRISL. Jaidi argued that it was up to individual shipping companies and freight forwarders to determine whether to do business with IRISL, and said he was unsure whether a customs mechanism existed that would facilitate mandatory inspections of IRISL-related cargo. He said the GOL would review demarche points and notify us if they decide to take any measures related to IRISL. Post will follow up with the MFA and customs officials and report any further substantive response septel.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI827

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI827 aka Wikileaks id #174144 ?
Subject	CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR OUTLINES LIBYA'S REACTION TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 09:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI827.html
References	08TRIPOLI227
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI842 , 08TRIPOLI856
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO7959
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0827/01 2910952
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 170952Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4002
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0781
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0633
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0725
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1243
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0911
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0597
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4523
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000827

SIPDIS

CAIRO FOR TREASURY ATTACHE CLARENCE SEVERENS; STATE FOR
NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/17/2018
TAGS: EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ECON [Economic Conditions] ,
EINV [Foreign Investments] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR OUTLINES LIBYA'S REACTION TO THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 227 , B) TRIPOLI 699, C) TRIPOLI 130

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: In a meeting with a visiting U.S. trade
specialist, Libya's Central Bank Governor shared his thoughts on
the current financial crisis and outlined steps the government
is taking to maintain financial stability.  Libya is less
```

focused on the short term impact of declining stock and investment holdings and more concerned by potential near to mid-term declines in oil prices, which could adversely impact the government's ability to finance its ambitious development programs. He had cancelled his trip to the recent IMF/World Bank meetings to help orchestrate Libya's efforts to shift its position in global markets, to include a decision earlier this week to purchase some two billion dollars worth of depreciated stock in European and U.S. markets. End summary.

¶2. (C) On October 13, Public Affairs-sponsored speaker Bruce Stokes, a trade and economic specialist with the National Journal, met with Libyan Central Bank (CB) Governor Farhat Omar Ben Gdara. Stokes was accompanied by the CDA, PAO, Econoff and PA Assistant. (Note: Ben Gdara is one of our more impressive and candid interlocutors on banking and financial matters. Young, intellectually curious and dynamic - there is always a stack of books on current affairs, which he reportedly devours, on his desk - there is criticism that he is unqualified. He is reportedly a protigi of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, who strongly advocated his selection as CB Governor. End note.) Ben Gdara discussed how the current global financial crisis has affected Libya's development plans and steps the government is taking to maintain financial stability.

¶3. (C) Downplaying concern about the short-term impact of the crisis on Libya's sizeable investments in international markets, Ben Gdara stressed that a continued flattening of oil prices could significantly and adversely impact Libya's ambitious development programs. Current development budgets, most of which date to 2006 and 2007, were calculated on the assumption that oil prices over the next five years would be at/around USD 65; however, as oil prices spiked earlier this year, larger development-related commitments were made. If oil prices continued to decline, Libya could be forced to reconsider projected development project outlays and/or seek additional foreign investment capital. A combination of flat oil prices and continued volatility in global markets would be particularly difficult for Libya. Ben Gdara also suggested that implementation of the ambitious government re-structuring and privatization program proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi in March 2008 (details refs A-B) could be delayed by lower oil prices.

¶4. (C) Ben Gdara said maintaining Libya's current level of foreign currency reserves was a priority for the GOL; declining oil prices could make that difficult. He said Libya currently has roughly USD 50 billion worth of foreign currency holdings in offshore accounts, which he likened to an emergency fund, and an additional USD 45 billion in foreign currency holdings managed by its sovereign wealth fund, the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA). (Note: Italian and French diplomats have told us that GOL policy calls for maintaining sizeable hard currency holdings as a hedge against the possibility that Libya could fall out of international favor and again be subject to international sanctions. End note.)

¶5. (C) Due to the financial crisis, Libya has reconfigured its own foreign investments to take advantage of low prices. Ben Gdara said GOL fund managers had decided earlier this week to purchase USD 700 million worth of depreciated stock in the U.S. market and almost USD 1.3 billion worth of stock in European markets. (Note: The U.K. Embassy's DHM told us that the LIA had recently contracted with several well-respected fund managers in London's financial sector (NFI) to manage day-to-day investment decisions for Libya's sovereign wealth fund. End note.) He partly attributed the decision to cancel his attendance at the recent IMF/World Bank annual meetings in Washington to having had to stay home to help make decisions about re-positioning Libya's investments in light of the ongoing crisis. He stressed that he had looked forward to meeting with Under Secretary Jeffrey and others, and hoped those meetings could be re-scheduled.

¶6. (C) Comment: Libya's decision to re-invest in U.S. financial markets is an interesting development in light of the fact that it divested itself of billions of dollars worth of U.S. holdings

TRIPOLI 00000827 002 OF 002

earlier this year in response to adoption of the Lautenberg Amendment (ref C), which allows claimants in terrorism-related cases in U.S. courts to seek attachment of Libyan assets. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI828

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI828 aka Wikileaks id #174207 ?
Subject	LIBYA WORKING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUBJECTS OF 1267 LISTING HOLDS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 14:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI828.html
References	08STATE97379
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8250
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0828 2911419
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171419Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4004
INFO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0042
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0149
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4525
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000828

SIPDIS

PLEASE PASS TO TREASURY FOR SZUBIN AND LEV

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2018
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KTFN *[Terrorism Finance Traffic]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA WORKING TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL INFORMATION FOR SUBJECTS OF 1267 LISTING HOLDS

REF: STATE 97379

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) CDA met October 15 with Jalal Jaidi of the MFA's International Organizations office to discuss Libya's response to reftel demarche. Jaidi said the GOL was working to develop additional supporting evidentiary and bio-identifier information on the eight USG holds and expected to provide that information in seven to ten days. On the proposed visit of OFAC Director Adam Szubin to discuss 1267 listing modalities and counterterrorism finance, Jaidi said it was unlikely that key GOL interlocutors for those issues would be available during the last week of October. The GOL would strongly prefer that the visit be delayed until early November.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI829

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI829 aka Wikileaks id #174214 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI: TO RUSSIA, WITH LOVE?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Oct 2008 14:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI829.html
References	08TRIPOLI297 , 08TRIPOLI321 , 08TRIPOLI340 , 08TRIPOLI4
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI870
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8755
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0829/01 2911446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 171446Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4005
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0074
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0011
RUEHSK/AMEMBASSY MINSK 0001
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0007
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0599
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1245
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0635
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0783
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0727
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0150
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0003
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4526
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000829

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/17/2018
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and
Sales] , LY [Libya] , BO [Belarus] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , UP [Ukraine] , VZ [Venezuela]
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: TO RUSSIA, WITH LOVE?

REF: A) TRIPOLI 340 , B) TRIPOLI 297 , C) TRIPOLI 321 , D) IIR 6 915 000 609

TRIPOLI 00000829  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Russian diplomats in Tripoli said Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi planned to travel to Moscow October 31-November 2 to reciprocate the visit of then-President Vladimir Putin to Tripoli earlier this year. Al-Qadhafi will be preceded by his son, Muatassim al-Qadhafi (Libya's National Security Adviser), who plans to arrive as early as October 25 to meet with officials at the Federal Security Bureau and the Ministry for Emergency Situations. The visit would come on the heels of a recent port call in Tripoli by Russian naval vessels. Al-Qadhafi reportedly considers his relationship with Putin to be good, and Libya seems eager to at least give the appearance of cultivating closer ties with Moscow, possibly to counter-balance recent agreements with Italy and the U.S. on colonial compensation and terrorism-related legal claims, respectively. A successful visit to Russia could prompt closer military-to-military cooperation and equipment sales, something Russian diplomats here say they've been advocating for some time. End Summary.

LIBYA HEADS INTO THE COLD

¶2. (C) Poloff met with Russian Emboff Evgeny Kozlov October 16 to discuss the recent visit to Tripoli of Russian warships. Kozlov volunteered that he was involved in finalizing arrangements for an upcoming October 31-November 2 visit to Russia by Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. It is expected that military-military cooperation and sales of Russian military equipment to Libya will feature prominently in al-Qadhafi's visit. (Note: Per refs B-C, Russian DCM Anatoly Martinov told us in April in advance of Putin's visit that Russia hoped a joint Russian-Libyan military cooperation council established in the late 1990's would yield increased sales to Libya of Russian military equipment. End note.) Kozlov said al-Qadhafi had hoped that Putin would attend his Revolution Day speech on August 31 in Benghazi and help inaugurate the Russian Railroad Company's work on a multi-billion dollar contract to construct a 554-kilometer rail spur between Benghazi and Sirte, which was negotiated during Putin's visit in April (ref A). Al-Qadhafi had also arranged a joint meeting with Italian PM Berlusconi and Bolivian President Morales - both attended the Revolution Day celebration - and was disappointed that Putin had not joined them. Describing the atmosphere between al-Qadhafi and Putin during the latter's visit to Tripoli on April 16 as "very friendly", Kozlov said Libya seemed eager to deepen its "productive coordination efforts" with Russia.

¶3. (C) According to Kozlov, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Adviser, will travel to Russia ahead of his father to meet with senior officials at Russia's Federal Security Bureau and Ministry of Emergency Situations. (Note: Muatassim and another al-Qadhafi son, Khamis al-Qadhafi, have undertaken military studies in Moscow. Khamis al-Qadhafi spent 14 months in a combined Russian staff college course especially designed for him and obtained a PhD in military sciences in 2007. End note.) Kozlov did not yet know whether External Security Organization chief Musa Kusa would accompany Muatassim. He noted that nearly 200 Libyan protocol and MFA officials, together with another 100 military and security personnel, were en route to Moscow to advance the visit. Russian officials believed al-Qadhafi planned to stop in Minsk and Kiev on his way back to Tripoli from Moscow.

THE BEAR VISITS THE SHORES OF TRIPOLI

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi's visit would follow the October 11-13 port call of Russian warships to the shores of Tripoli (ref D). The nuclear-powered missile cruiser Peter the Great, together with the frigate Intrepid and anti-submarine destroyer Admiral Chabanenko and support vessels, were in and around Tripoli harbor. (Note: Tripoli's relatively shallow port prevented the Peter the Great from docking in the harbor. End note.) According to Kozlov, at least seven senior Libyan naval officers, including the commander of the Tripoli naval base,

officers, including the commander of the Tripoli naval base, toured the vessels. Defense attaches accredited to Tripoli did not have an opportunity to tour the vessels, but children from the Russian Embassy-sponsored school did. In an apparent nod to tensions between Moscow and Kiev, Ukrainian children at the school stayed in class while their Russian, Belarussian and Central Asian classmates enjoyed their field trip. Kozlov said

TRIPOLI 00000829 002.2 OF 002

the flotilla would stop in Turkey and Syria before heading to Venezuela for joint Russian-Venezuelan naval maneuvers scheduled for late November. Media reports indcate that the Intrepid will proceed separately to waters off Somalia.

¶5. (C) Comment: Kozlov touted the ship visit and al-Qadhafi's upcoming trip as signs that Russian-Libyan ties continue to grow. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi made several statements to the press supporting Russia's actions at the height of the Georgia crisis in August, and Libyan PM al-Mahmoudi reportedly told the Kremlin that Libya would support Russia in the UNSC; however, it is difficult to assess the extent of Libya's commitment to deeper ties with Moscow. Having just concluded agreements with Italy and the U.S. to resolve issues of longstanding concern - colonial compensation and terrorism-related legal claims, respectively - al-Qadhafi may be seeking to balance engagement with Western powers by reminding us and others that he still has other options for military-to-military cooperation and other engagement. On a lighter note, Kozlov told us Libyan protocol had not yet raised whether and where it might pitch al-Qadhafi's tent - his preferred mode of lodging while on the road - in Moscow during the chilly fall season. End Comment.GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI833

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI833 aka Wikileaks id #174412 ?
Subject	COLONEL AL-QADHAFI'S SUMMER READING LIST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 20 Oct 2008 13:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI833.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9531
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0833 2941344
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201344Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4009
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0913
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0601
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4530
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000833

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , KBIO, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: COLONEL AL-QADHAFI'S SUMMER READING LIST

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) During a recent meeting at the office of MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent), Dr. Ahmed Fituri, P/E Chief commented on a stack of English-language books on current affairs on Fituri's desk. Fituri offered that he had been personally tasked by the Leader, Muammar al-Qadhafi, to read and summarize in four- to seven-page Arabic-language reports "significant" English-language books dealing with American politics and policy, current affairs and history. The books on his desk were those on which he was currently working. Fituri said the Leader occasionally assigned Fituri to translate particular books. Fituri, an academic by training with a Phd from the University of Michigan, said he had begun the work several years ago, before assuming his position at the MFA. Characterizing al-Qadhafi as an avid consumer of television and print media, he said other "trusted officials" were similarly tasked with preparing summaries of books written in other

non-Arabic languages. He noted that al-Qadhafi's demand for these translations had somewhat diminished in the past year.

¶2. (C) Fituri estimated that he has summarized six to eight books per year, as well as miscellaneous articles from key journals and magazines. He was currently summarizing Fareed Zakaria's latest book, "The Post-American World" and was about to begin work on Thomas Friedman's "The World is Flat 3.0". He had recently translated in full the Secretary's article in the Foreign Affairs journal. Other books Fituri had summarized in the past year included Zakaria's "The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad" (which al-Qadhafi liked), Barack Obama's "The Audacity of Hope" and George Soros' "The Age of Fallibility: Consequences of the War on Terror".

¶3. (C) Fituri offered that al-Qadhafi and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa had asked him about six months ago to undertake a similar program for Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Adviser, with an emphasis on security/intelligence issues and European and American politics and history. Fituri had so far only sent Muatassim summaries of articles and books he had already prepared for his father. Kusa, he said, had complained to him in August that Muatassim was "not an avid reader" and had to be prodded to read even summaries. Stressing that Muatassim had "his own strengths", Fituri offered that many in senior GOL circles did not consider Muatassim to be as intellectually curious as either his father or his older brother, Saif al-Islam, who is enrolled in a Phd program at the London School of Economics.

¶4. (C) Comment: The beginning of the relative downtick in the Leader's reading roughly coincides with the period early last summer in which al-Qadhafi reportedly suffered a series of minor strokes. Fituri's characterization of Muatassim's less than enthusiastic embrace of the reading program is no surprise, given what we've heard from other contacts, who describe him as a traditional strongman who has focused on consolidating his power-base and pursuing his business interests and social life. End comment.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI842

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI842 aka Wikileaks id #174930 ?
Subject	CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR TAKES LONGER VIEW OF REFORM PROCESS THAN AL-QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 23 Oct 2008 13:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI842.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI827
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI856 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 09TRIPOLI40
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2395
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0842/01 2971341
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231341Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4021
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0789
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0734
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0641
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1251
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0914
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0602
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0356
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4542
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000842

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; CAIRO FOR CLARENCE
SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/23/2018
TAGS: EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ,
EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR TAKES LONGER VIEW OF REFORM PROCESS
THAN AL-QADHAFI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 827 , B) TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a meeting with a visiting U.S. trade
specialist, Libya's Central Bank (CB) Governor shared his views
on implementing Muammar al-Qadhafi's vision of government
restructuring and distributing the country's oil wealth directly
to the population.  In contrast to al-Qadhafi's insistence that
the wealth distribution program begin by year's end and be fully
implemented shortly thereafter, the CB Governor expects the
```

implemented shortly thereafter, the CB Governor expects the process to take several years. End summary.

¶2. (C) Public Affairs-sponsored visitor Bruce Stokes, a trade specialist with the National Journal, met with Libya's Central Bank Governor, Farhat Bengadara on October 13. Stokes was accompanied by CDA, PAO, Econoff and PA Assistant. (Note: Bengadara is one of our more impressive and candid interlocutors on banking and financial matters. Young, intellectually curious and dynamic - there is always a stack of books on current affairs, which he reportedly devours, on his desk - there is criticism that he is unqualified. He is reportedly a protege of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, who strongly advocated his selection as CB Governor. End note.) Among other topics such as the global financial crisis (ref A), Bengadara spoke at length about Libya's financial situation and its plans to restructure existing government structures and distribute oil revenues directly to Libyans as part of a program of radical privatization (ref B).

¶3. (C) Conceding that Libya's ambitious infrastructure and development programs would likely be adversely affected if oil prices continue to fall (the GOL's 5-year plan is based on a price of USD 65/barrel) and that attracting foreign investment could be harder in light of the global financial crisis, Bengadara said Libya's development plans would have to be reconsidered and adjusted. Asked whether slumping oil prices would slow implementation of reforms proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi, he said it was more likely that infrastructure development would be postponed.

¶4. (C) Addressing al-Qadhafi's proposed reforms, Bengadara said he favored a strong "shock therapy" approach that would jump start the transition from a largely statist economy to one with a more robust private sector. Taking issue with GPC Secretaries (minister-equivalent) who advocate a more gradual approach, Bengadara said he preferred direct cash payments to Libyans (in line with al-Qadhafi's proposal) to a continued program of price supports for key commodities and services; however, he conceded that details for implementing direct distribution of oil revenues had not been finalized. In contrast to al-Qadhafi's insistence in major public addresses earlier this year that direct wealth distribution be inaugurated by year's end and be fully implemented soon thereafter, Bengadara said he expected the program would take two to three years at a minimum, and likely five to ten, to fully realize. He offered that once a plan had been finalized, it would likely have to be approved by the General People's Congress before it could be implemented.

¶5. (C) Reiterating themes he touched on in our meeting with him in March, he said a program of direct wealth distribution could undermine parallel efforts by the GOL to encourage entrepeneurial enterprise and a more robust private sector. Noting that Libyans did not have a strong work ethic, he expressed concern that after years of living in a system of oil-funded cradle-to-grave subsidies, prompting people to be more self-reliant was a challenge. Direct wealth distribution could disincentivize them to work at all, but the proposed reforms could help temper that effect. For example, health and education would no longer be free in the future and there would be competition, which he viewed as the necessary driving force of the economy.

¶6. (C) The fact that 95 percent of the economy currently comprises government entities - something "not correct if you want to accelerate growth" - put a premium on accelerating privatization. Bengadara said he saw merit in the U.S. economic system and admired companies like General Electric, with its vast numbers of shareholders; however, during times of crisis large numbers of ordinary people were hurt in capitalist systems. Libya was striving for "people's capitalism," which he described as something between socialism and capitalism. A first step would be to develop public-private partnerships,

particularly in non-oil sectors.

TRIPOLI 00000842 002 OF 002

¶7. (C) Comment: The fact that details for a plan to implement direct wealth distribution, together with Bengadara's candid assessment that the process is likely to take multiples of years, vice months, suggests that al-Qadhafi's vision of distributing checks to Libyan families by early next year is unrealistic. In our meeting with him in March, Bengadara advocated a basket of subsidies, stock and cash as opposed to lump sum payments, but expressed frustration that Libya's limited bureaucratic capacity made such a scheme difficult. His remarks in our most recent meeting suggest that he has modified his thinking and may be leaning towards a heavier cash component of the proposed wealth distribution program. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI851

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI851 aka Wikileaks id #175369 ?
Subject	LIBYAN-SWISS CONTRETEMPS DRAGS ON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 27 Oct 2008 13:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI851.html
References	08TRIPOLI592
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI882 , 08TRIPOLI926 , 08TRIPOLI987 , 08TRIPOLI994 , 09TRIPOLI59
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5603
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0851/01 3011350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271350Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4050
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0016
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0736
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1255
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0643
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0791
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0604
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0916
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4571
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000851

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN-SWISS CONTRETEMPS DRAGS ON

REF: A) TRIPOLI 687, B) TRIPOLI 674, C) TRIPOLI 596, D) TRIPOLI 592

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Earlier predictions that the Swiss-Libyan contretemps prompted by the mid-July arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi in Geneva would soon end have not been fulfilled, according to the Swiss Ambassador to Tripoli. Although key Libyan demands have been met -- charges against Hannibal have

been dropped, a joint commission is looking into the incident and Switzerland is prepared to make a formal public apology -- Libyan officials now want Swiss police officers and officials involved in the incident to be punished, a line the Swiss government has so far refused to cross. Media reports that Libya had withdrawn USD 7 billion from Swiss banks and cut oil shipments to Switzerland appear to have been a warning; Libyan MFA officials told the Swiss Ambassador that such actions could be taken unless the joint commission's findings are to the GOL's liking. For its part, Switzerland has linked issuance of a humanitarian visa to the relative of a prominent regime official to obtaining an exit permit for a Swiss company representative who has been stranded since the conflict began in July. Swiss Air's station manager in Tripoli also notified civil aviation authorities that Swiss Air would close its one remaining weekly flight unless the GOL issued her a one-year, multiple entry visa and restored the other two weekly flights operated by Swiss Air until mid-July. End summary.

¶2. (C) Reversing his earlier prediction (ref A) that the crisis prompted by the arrest in Geneva of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, was all but resolved, Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt told P/E Chief on October 21 that he was no longer optimistic that the contretemps would be resolved anytime soon. A Libyan-Swiss memorandum of understanding signed August 31 in Tripoli stipulated that Switzerland: 1) drop the charges against Hannibal; 2) establish a joint commission of inquiry to investigate the incident; and 3) issue a formal public apology for the incident. As reported ref A, the Moroccan claimant in the case accepted compensation in exchange for agreeing not to pursue charges against Hannibal and his wife. Swiss authorities have cooperated with the joint investigation; the next meeting (the Swiss hope it proves to be the final one) is scheduled to take place in Geneva in early November. Switzerland is also prepared to issue a formal apology (von Muralt said it has already been drafted); however, it does not plan to do so until Swiss authorities are convinced that Libya is prepared to accept the conclusions of the commission of inquiry, let the matter die and restore relations to the status quo ante.

¶3. (C) Von Muralt said it had become increasingly clear in the past six weeks that Libyan officials were effectively pursuing a fourth condition: punishment of the Swiss police officers and officials involved in detaining Hannibal and his wife. Libyan officials have been unhappy with the testimony of eyewitnesses and others interviewed by the joint commission, which had not substantiated allegations by the GOL that Swiss police and officials acted inappropriately in detaining Hannibal and his wife and subsequently facilitating consular access to them. Libya has insisted that the Swiss officers be punished and has blocked efforts to bring the joint commission's work to a close and issue a report of its findings. Libyan members of the joint commission have instead insisted on calling more witnesses to try to bolster its claims of wrongdoing. Interviewing the additional witnesses delayed the commission's report, which was to have been issued in early October.

¶4. (C) To the great consternation of the Swiss, the GOL publicly accused Swiss officials of delaying the investigation. Hotly rejecting the idea that Swiss authorities had been anything but cooperative and emphasizing Bern's keen desire to resolve the issue amicably, von Muralt noted that Swiss authorities recently agreed to make three police officers involved in the arrest available for questioning (reversing an earlier decision) "as a gesture of good faith". He said there was "no chance" that the officers would be punished, stressing that their handling of the arrest had been "professional and correct". Swiss authorities were keen to demonstrate that they had done all they could to facilitate the joint commission's work to enable issuance of a mutually-agreed report. Swiss officials are concerned that Swiss and Libyan joint commission members could fail to agree on language for their final report, potentially constituting another stumbling block in the effort to mend frayed bilateral

another stumbling block in the effort to mend frayed bilateral ties.

¶5. (C) Citing senior Libyan officials, including Central Bank

TRIPOLI 00000851 002 OF 002

Governor Farhat Bengadara, media reports on October 8 said Libya had withdrawn some 7 billion USD in deposits from Swiss banks and stopped deliveries of Libyan oil to Switzerland to "protest poor treatment of Libyan diplomats and businessmen". Von Muralt said Swiss authorities had received no confirmation that either had occurred. He shared with us a Libyan note verbale dated October 10 that: 1) reiterated claims that Swiss authorities violated diplomatic protocol in arresting Hannibal; 2) conceded that Libya had not withdrawn funds from Swiss banks or terminated oil shipments to Switzerland, but suggested it could; and, 3) called on Swiss authorities, specifically authorities of the Geneva canton, to cooperate so the joint commission could conclude its work as soon as possible. Separately, von Muralt obtained copies of notices from the office of Libyan Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi to Libyan government agencies forbidding them from executing existing contracts or finalizing new ones with Swiss companies.

¶6. (C) In addition, von Muralt was convoked by MFA Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi on October 11 and told that Switzerland should regard media reports that Libya had withdrawn its Swiss deposits and cut oil shipments as a sign of next steps the GOL would take unless the results of the joint commission's work were to the GOL's satisfaction. Von Muralt interpreted Obeidi's message as "a baldfaced attempt" to blackmail Switzerland into punishing police officers involved in the incident. Citing unnamed contacts close to the al-Qadhafi family, he claimed that the GOL's motivation for doing so was to further discredit the Swiss and deflect attention from Hannibal's egregious behavior. Stressing the al-Qadhafi clan's public relations problem, von Muralt noted that a number of Libyans had approached him to express "quiet support" for Switzerland and "embarrassment" about Hannibal's behavior.

¶7. (C) Von Muralt shared that Switzerland responded to Obeidi's October 11 demarche by linking issuance of a visa to the daughter of a prominent regime official, who needs specialized cancer care in Switzerland, to obtaining an exit permit for a representative of a Swiss company who is currently living at the Swiss Embassy. The Swiss individual was detained and his travel documents confiscated immediately after Hannibal's arrest in mid-July. Von Muralt contacted Bashir Saleh, Muammar al-Qadhafi's chief-of-staff-equivalent, a week ago to make it clear that no visa would be forthcoming unless the Swiss businessman was able to leave Libya; he has received no response. In addition, Swiss Air's station manager in Tripoli sent a formal notice to Libya's Civil Aviation authorities in early October advising that Swiss Air would close its one remaining flight per week to/from Switzerland at the end of October unless the GOL issued her a one-year, multiple entry visa and restored the other two weekly flights operated by Swiss Air until mid-July.

¶8. (C) Comment: Von Muralt characterized the ongoing contretemps as "an education" for Swiss leaders in Bern, who have been surprised that their willingness to compromise has so far failed to secure agreement by the GOL to resolve the incident and move on. Drawing a parallel to the case of the Bulgarian medics, he ascribed the GOL's tactics to a desire to deny any culpability, blame foreign powers for domestic shortcomings (in this case, the behavior of one of the Leader's sons), and aggressively counter-attack in the media to secure maximum concessions. According to von Muralt, Muammar al-Qadhafi and senior regime figures are determined that Swiss officials be punished to mitigate damage caused by Hannibal's misbehavior in Europe to

the family's already sullied reputation in Libya. End comment.
STEVENS

Media

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI856

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI856 aka Wikileaks id #175940 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S CENTRAL BANK CONTINUES FINANCIAL SECTOR MODERNIZATION EFFORTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 30 Oct 2008 11:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/10/08TRIPOLI856.html
References	08TRIPOLI827 , 08TRIPOLI842
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9000
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0856 3041158
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301158Z OCT 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4056
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0793
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0738
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0646
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1258
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0606
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0918
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4577
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000856

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; CAIRO FOR CLARENCE SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , LY [Libya] , EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S CENTRAL BANK CONTINUES FINANCIAL SECTOR
MODERNIZATION EFFORTS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 827 , B) TRIPOLI 842

¶1.  (SBU) Summary: Libya's Central Bank Governor briefed a
visiting U.S. trade expert and Emboffs on efforts by the
Government of Libya (GOL) to modernize the financial sector, in
part to attract greater foreign direct investment in non
hydrocarbon sectors.  Libya is working with international
organizations to improve financial sector transparency, plans to
```

organizations to improve financial sector transparency, plans to bring international credit rating agencies to Libya to assess Libyan financial instruments and its fledgling stock market, and is working to improve basic banking supervision and operations. Libya plans to sell Certificates of Deposit (CD's) to banks and eventually directly to the public, and is in the process of training banking officials in loan risk assessment as part of an effort to broaden lending to small and medium sized enterprises (SME's). End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On October 13, Public Affairs-sponsored speaker Bruce Stokes, a trade and economic specialist with the National Journal, met with Libyan Central Bank (CB) Governor Farhat Omar Bengadara. Stokes was accompanied by the CDA, PAO, Econoff and PA Assistant. Bengadara discussed, inter alia, a financial sector reform program that comprises encouraging financial market operations - including modernizing Libya's stock market and selling CD's to banks and the general public - and modernizing Libya's banking practices and the CB itself. (Note: See reftels for details on Libya's response to the global financial crisis and Bengadara's views on Muammar al-Qadhafi's proposals for government restructuring and privatization. End note.)

¶3. (U) Stressing the negative impact of sanctions-era isolation on Libya's banking sector and the need for technical banking assistance, Bengadara said the CB is also working actively with the World Bank, IMF and McKinsey (with whom it has a consulting contract) to improve Libya's banking and financial sector. The overarching goal is to help create a better functioning, more transparent financial sector to make Libya a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Noting that there was plenty of interest in oil and gas exploration and production, which benefitted from well-organized investment under the auspices of the National Oil Corporation's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement scheme, Bengadara stressed that the CB's efforts were targeted at securing FDI in non-hydrocarbon sectors such as agriculture and tourism. There was also room for more FDI in downstream hydrocarbon industries such as petrochemical production and refining (Libya imports most of its gasoline from Italian refineries). Echoing a line we've heard from other senior GOL officials, he said Libya - with its strategic location, long shoreline and multiple port facilities - wanted to become a regional center for travel, banking and investment akin to Dubai.

¶4. (U) As part of the program to sell CD's, the CB is working to facilitate visits by rating agencies Moody's and Standard and Poor in an effort to secure credible ratings of GOL financial instruments and as assessment of the fledgling stock market. The CB is also interested in improving greater overall transparency in the Libyan economy; Bengadara and his team have been involved in ongoing discussions with international groups working on this issue. Specific areas of discussion included infrastructure development, tax reform and streamlining visa issuances for foreign businesspeople.

¶5. (SBU) Bengadara said the CB is also focused in efforts to improve basic banking supervision and operations. The CB has two external advisors who oversee a credit risk initiative to train banking officials in analyzing loan applications from small- and medium-sized enterprises, although the retail banking sector is still very limited. In broader terms, Libya views itself as being more akin to Saudi Arabia than the UAE, in the sense that the UAE has fewer oil and gas resources and therefore depends to a greater degree on FDI. Like Saudi Arabia, Libya's considerable hydrocarbon resources afford it more cushion and make it less dependent on FDI; however, Bengadara is trying to encourage GOL officials to take a longer-term view of FDI as a means by which to help diversify Libya's oil-dependent economy.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI868

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI868 aka Wikileaks id #177000 ?
Subject	U.K. DENIES LICENSE FOR EXPORT OF KALASHNIKOVS TO LIBYA; GOL POTENTIALLY SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SELLERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 6 Nov 2008 08:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI868.html
References	08TRIPOLI650
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4329
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0868 3110808
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 060808Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4084
INFO RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0013
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0137
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0144
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0795
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1269
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 0034
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0019
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0919
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0002
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4605
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000868

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/CATR AND EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/4/2018
TAGS: ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]* , UP *[Ukraine]* , SU *[Sudan]* , RO *[Romania]*
SUBJECT: U.K. DENIES LICENSE FOR EXPORT OF KALASHNIKOVS TO LIBYA; GOL POTENTIALLY SEEKING ALTERNATIVE SELLERS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 650 , B) STATE 95271

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) U.K. Embassy PolOff told P/E Chief on October 30 that HMG had decided not/not to approve a license for U.K. company York Guns to export to Libya 130,000 Kashnikov automatic rifles. Per ref A, York Guns was to have acted as intermediary between an unidentified Ukrainian party and procurement officials at Libya's Temporary People's Committee for Defense (MOD-equivalent). Based on the intervention reported ref B and on concerns expressed by the U.K.'s Embassy in Tripoli that the Government of Libya (GOL) might have intended to re-export the weapons to either the governments or armed rebel factions in Chad and Sudan, the U.K.'s Foreign and Commonwealth Office recommended about one month ago against approving the export license. After conducting a review of the case, Whitehall concurred on October 30 with the decision to not/not approve the export license.

¶2. (C) Separately, Muhammad el-Obeidi, a Libyan businessman with ties to some quarters of Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime, told P/E Chief on October 23 that he had signed a contract with a Romanian company (NFI) for the export from Romania to Libya of 100,000 AK-47S automatic rifles. (Note: El-Obeidi's older brother was Libya's Minister of Defense from 1954-1969; his nephew is a former Prime Minister and the current MFA Secretary (U/S-equivalent) for European Affairs. End note.) El-Obeidi signed the contract in late September in Paris during a business trip there. El-Obeidi said he had been tapped to help facilitate procurement for the Jafl al-Khamis ("Khamis Brigade"), a special forces unit headed by Khamis al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. He said Captain Ahmed Ben Shraga'a, head of procurement for the unit, has instructions to work through el-Obeidi on a number of "special procurement issues". El-Obeidi was open about the contract, but avoided the question as to whether the rifles were to be used in Libya or re-exported to another destination.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI870

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI870 aka Wikileaks id #177149 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI'S RUSSIA TRIP SIGNALS DESIRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 6 Nov 2008 17:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI870.html
References	07TRIPOLI1033 , 08TRIPOLI340 , 08TRIPOLI688 , 08TRIPOLI829
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI992 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4843
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0870/01 3111717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 061717Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4085
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0076
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV 0014
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1270
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0648
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0796
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0740
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0073
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4607
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000870

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/6/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , BO *[Belarus]* , UP *[Ukraine]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S RUSSIA TRIP SIGNALS DESIRE FOR FOREIGN POLICY BALANCE

REF: A) TRIPOLI 340 , B) TRIPOLI 688 , C) TRIPOLI 829 , D) TRIPOLI 1033 , E) TRIPOLI 699

TRIPOLI 00000870 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Apparently seeking to balance perceptions of recent overtures to the U.S. and Italy, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi conducted a five-day visit to Russia, Belarus and Kiev. Expectations that major agreements for large military equipment sales, gas exports and an "OPEC for natural gas" appear to have been inflated - al-Qadhafi left Moscow with a framework agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation and potential defense purchases in the future. Russian Embassy officials in Tripoli implied, but did not state, that media reports that Libya had agreed to provide a naval base in Benghazi to the Russian navy were inaccurate. They also expressed frustration at Libya's failure to implement previously concluded agreements, noting that the GOL had nonetheless pushed hard to sign a bevy of ill-prepared agreements during al-Qadhafi's visit. Most local observers said that al-Qadhafi's visit was designed to signal to the U.S. and other western powers that despite its relatively recent reintegration into the international community, Libya is an independent actor that will seek to balance its engagement between East and West. The relatively prominent role played by Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Adviser, suggests that he is becoming a more seriously-regarded player in the regime. End Summary.

AMID HEIGHTENED EXPECTATIONS, MEDIA ANTICIPATES MAJOR AGREEMENTS ...

¶2. (U) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi made his first trip to Moscow since 1985 during a five-day, three-country tour of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine. Russian Poloff Evgeny Kozlov gave Poloff a readout of the Russia stop on November 5. Al-Qadhafi's delegation included his son, National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, Foreign Minister Abudlrahman Shalgam, External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa, and National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukri Ghanem, all of whom held meetings and pursued negotiations on the margins. Citing senior Russian and Libyan sources, media reports in the run-up to the visit predicted major defense, energy (natural gas) and nuclear agreements.

¶3. (C) Muatassim al-Qadhafi and Kusa arrived in the Kremlin in advance of al-Qadhafi for meetings with the Foreign Ministry and security officials, fueling expectations that Libya would sign long-awaited arms deals rumored to be worth upwards of USD two billion. Russian Embassy officials told us in advance of the visit that a joint Russia-Libya military cooperation committee was working to finalize defense procurement contracts. The failure to conclude contracts for sale of military equipment to Libya during the visit to Libya earlier this year by former President Putin had been a disappointment for the Kremlin (ref A). Russian newspaper Russkiy Kommersant - the media organ in which Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son and putative heir of Muammar al-Qadhafi previewed his announcement in mid-August of his intention to withdraw from politics - also reported at the outset of the visit that Tripoli would offer Russia the right to establish a naval base in the eastern Libyan city of Benghazi. Multiple media reports claimed the two sides had also concluded a civilian nuclear agreement encompassing construction of nuclear power plants and nuclear medical cooperation.

¶4. (C) Rhetoric for the visit was grandiose, with much made of Russian-Libyan agreement on "strengthening the foundations of a multi-polar world and political settlement of conflict situations". Referring to al-Qadhafi's crowning in August by African tribal leaders as "King of Kings" in Africa, Kozlov joked that al-Qadhafi now aspired to be "the Great Balancer" between East and West. A range of diplomatic and private sector contacts in Tripoli attributed the timing of the visit to al-Qadhafi's desire to remind the world that he has options and is not beholden to the west in the wake of a recent colonial

is not beholden to the west in the wake of a recent colonial compensation agreement with Italy (ref B) and a comprehensive claims agreement for terrorism claims with the U.S. Reiterating familiar themes, al-Qadhafi lamented that the world had become unipolar and unstable because of "violations of the balance of power".

... RUSSIAN EMBASSY CONFIRMS ONLY ONE

TRIPOLI 00000870 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Kozlov said the two sides ultimately signed only a general framework agreement for civilian nuclear cooperation that had been the subject of negotiations for several years. (Note: Per ref A, an MOU was signed during Putin's visit in April committing both sides to concluding a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy by the end of 2008. End note.) Kozlov refused to confirm that Libya had offered Russia use of a naval base in Benghazi, but seemed to downplay the possibility by stressing Russia's efforts to restore a large naval base in Tartus, Syria. He confirmed that the Russian navy planned at least two more port calls in Libya by warships during 2009, following on last month's visit by a flotilla en route to Venezuela (ref C). Kozlov said Muatassim al-Qadhafi discussed military cooperation and engaged in negotiations for big-ticket defense equipment sales, but gave no specifics and indicated nothing had been finalized.

¶6. (C) Moscow still hopes to reach agreement for an "OPEC for natural gas" with Libya, Qatar, and Iran; however, we were told the only energy agreement discussed in Moscow was a three-way deal between Gazprom, Eni, and Libya's National Oil Corporation to build additional pipelines and a refining facility in Libya. The GOL also offered to direct investment from its sovereign wealth fund to Russian firms hard hit by the global financial crisis, focusing particularly on those that had suffered losses on investments in U.S. markets and financial instruments.

LIBYA SHOOTS FOR THE MOON, RUSSIA DEMURES

¶7. (C) Echoing complaints we heard from Spanish counterparts in the wake of al-Qadhafi's visit to Madrid in December 2007 (ref D), Kozlov said Libyan officials "dusted off agreements that were still under negotiation" on the eve of the Moscow visit, expecting that they could be readied for signature. Pointing to delays in implementing commercial and military agreements that constituted part of the agreement earlier this year to forgive USD 4.5 billion of Soviet-era debt, Kozlov bemoaned the fact that " ...the Libyans always want to sign everything, but only implement what they want - an agreement is only valid if both sides read it the same way". According to media reports, stops in Minsk and Kiev saw technical agreements on prevention of double taxation and expressions of mutual cooperation in the energy sector. Notably missing from public announcements were announcements of weapons sales, although media reports indicated al-Qadhafi discussed purchasing strategic and tactical airlift assets in Ukraine.

¶8. (C) Comment: Al-Qadhafi's itinerary and the trip's timing - he touched down in Moscow on the same day the final deposits were made in a humanitarian relief fund to compensate U.S. victims of Libyan acts of terrorism - suggested a desire to signal that Libya is not beholden to the west and still has foreign policy options, themes he touched on directly in his Revolution Day speech on August 31 (ref E). While the GOL wants to preserve room for maneuver with respect to energy and arms purchases, several reliable Libyan interlocutors noted that Libya's relationship with Russia has never been genuinely warm. "Libyans believe Russians are too dour and are not trustworthy",

one contact with regime ties told us. The fact that Muatassim al-Qadhafi featured in the visits is an interesting development, suggesting that he is becoming a more seriously-regarded player in the regime. Our Russian interlocutor bemoaned Moscow's lack of understanding of intra-Libyan regime dynamics, noting that Muatassim was initially scheduled to meet only mid-level bureaucrats until the Russian Embassy in Tripoli intervened to explain that he was a potential successor to his father. His reports from Moscow were that Muatassim took a clear lead in his meetings, albeit with Musa Kusa at his side as an advisor, and comported himself reasonably well. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI871

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI871 aka Wikileaks id #177286 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S TRI-LATERAL DIPLOMACY AND A PERSPECTIVE ON SLA/UNITY'S EFFORTS IN DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 7 Nov 2008 11:22 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI871.html
References	08TRIPOLI719
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI935 , 09TRIPOLI109
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5559
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0871/01 3121122
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 071122Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4087
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0023
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE PRIORITY 0014
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0087
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4609
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000871

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, S/E WILLIAMSON, AF/SPG, AF/C AND NEA/MAG
NSC FOR PITTMAN/HUDSON
PARIS FOR KANEDA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/7/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , CD *[Chad]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S TRI-LATERAL DIPLOMACY AND A PERSPECTIVE ON SLA/UNITY'S EFFORTS IN DARFUR

REF: A) TRIPOLI 719 , B) TRIPOLI 281

TRIPOLI 00000871 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Both the GOL and Darfur rebel groups resident in Tripoli are busy crafting agreements with their respective interlocutors regarding efforts in Darfur. In late October, Libya chaired a "Tripartite Committee" meeting, brokering an agreement between Chad and Sudan that called for an exchange of ambassadors in early November and a commitment to refrain from

ambassadors in early November and a commitment to refrain from providing support to opposition groups in both countries. Libyan officials told us the parties also agreed to stand up a 2,000-member bilateral security force on the Chad-Sudan border; that agreement was not included in the joint statement issued after the meeting. At the same time, representatives of SLA/Unity in Libya en route to southern Darfur discussed their efforts to bring other rebel groups under the SLA/Unity umbrella (they claimed JEM/Collective and members of Khalil Ibrahim's leadership were in the process of joining with SLA/Unity) to enable a strike against Khartoum. Abdallah Yehia's leadership of SLA/Unity is undisputed, according to them. They outlined their strategic approach, criticizing the less effective tactical mindset of other rebel groups, and were dismissive of both the Sudan People's Initiative and Qatari efforts. End Summary.

GOL CLAIMS DIPLOMATIC VICTORY, BUT IMPLEMENTATION NOT ASSURED

¶2. (C) Ali Treiki, MFA Secretary for African Affairs (U/S-equivalent), hosted Sudan's Presidential Advisor, Mustafa Osman Ismael, and Chad's Foreign Minister, Moussa Faki, for talks in Tripoli on October 22-23. The parties released a joint statement agreeing to refrain from providing support to opposition groups in both countries and to an exchange ambassadors between Chad and Sudan before November 7. They also committed to a series of follow-on meetings in Tripoli November 19-20. Treiki's chief of staff, Mahmoud Azzabi, characterized both sides as "desperate," but said that negotiations had nevertheless been "very difficult." A Libyan-led joint security force comprising 1,000 troops each from Chad and Sudan was not announced in the joint communiqui; however, in an October 27 meeting, Treiki told the CDA that both sides had agreed to contribute to the force, which will be deployed at 10 points along the border. Treiki stressed that the joint Chad-Sudan force is designed to augment efforts of UN/AU forces already in place.

¶3. (C) The GOL also plans to host on November 15 a military and security meeting between the three parties, which will run through the next meeting of the Tripartite Committee on November 19-20. French and British diplomats have told us that Muammar al-Qadhafi plans to host a Deby-Bashir summit in Tripoli by the end of November (Note: Treiki also said there would be a summit, but was vague on the timeframe. End note.) Chadian diplomats here told contacts they were doubtful the follow-on meetings would occur given the Contact Group meeting scheduled to take place in N'Djamena November 12-13. Reiterating remarks reported ref A, Treiki was careful not to rule out non-Libyan initiatives, but broke out laughing when asked about Qatar's efforts in Darfur. "Help from any country is appreciated . . . especially if the country is rich," he said, but shared that Qatar's lack of experience in the region and feel for the complex nuances of the situation likely limited its potential contribution to peace efforts.

SLA/UNITY CLAIMS LEADERSHIP ISSUES RESOLVED & SAYS OTHER REBEL GROUPS SEEK TO ALLY WITH IT

¶4. (C) London-based SLA/Unity Spokesman Mahjoub Hussein and Netherlands-based Saayid Sharif joined Osman Muhammad Busra in a meeting with P/E Chief and Poloff on October 29. Echoing remarks made in our previous meeting with them (ref B), they stressed that internal divisions among SLA/Unity leadership had been resolved, and that Abdallah Yehia is the undisputed leader of SLA/Unity. Yehia's authority stemmed from his election to leadership by other SLA/Unity members in 2006. Other notables - specifically Suliman Jamous and Sharif Harir - were not empowered to negotiate without Yehia's approval. Hussein and Busra claimed that other Darfur rebel groups were in the process of coming under the SLA/Unity umbrella, ostensibly because they "see the strength" of SLA/Unity. Busra said JEM/Collective and even members of SLA/Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW) were "coming down the

mountain to be with us", and claimed some rebel leaders and forces had recently co-located themselves with SLA/Unity forces in southern Darfur. Hussein, Sharif and Busra agreed that Abdul Wahid was a historic figure for Darfur and Sudan, but downplayed his relevance in the future, characterizing him as "a rebel

version 1.0". The longer Wahid remains outside Sudan and away from the fighting, the less credible he is. Husein claimed that SLA/Unity has enjoyed a recent surge in support from IDP's in the camps, saying they realized that "we (SLA/Unity) are the future".

¶5. (C) Hussein, Sharif and Busra agreed that stability in Chad was in the strategic interest of SLA/Unity and the region, in part to help serve as a bulwark against a "janjaweed state that would stretch from Khartoum to Mali". Hussein claimed SLA/Unity does not receive direct military or material support from Chad or Libya; however, Khalil Ibrahim and his group receive military equipment and funds from Libya, which is routed through Deby's regime in Ndjamena. Hussein and Busra (Sharif was the most reserved of the three) stressed that SLA/Unity's leadership had adopted a more "strategic approach" towards establishing ties with other rebel groups than other rebel leaders, who had followed a more tactically-minded and less effective approach. SLA/Unity's aim was to overthrow Bashir's government in Khartoum, not just to gain tactical advantage vis a vis other groups. Hussein and Sharif were to travel from Tripoli to Kufra, and then on to southern Darfur for meetings "in the field".

SUDAN PEOPLE'S INITIATIVE "A PLOY"; QATARI INITIATIVE NOT SERIOUS

¶6. (C) Hussein, Sharif and Busra dismissed the Sudan People's Initiative, stressing that "nearly all" Darfurians and Sudanese viewed it as a deliberately-timed ploy to undermine President Bashir's indictment by the ICC. "It is not a genuine initiative, but a game to try to stop the ICC", said Busra. He was equally dismissive of Khartoum's desire to achieve peace. "Bashir's government speaks about peace while preparing for war; the problem in Darfur is not in Darfur, it is in Khartoum", he said. All three were skeptical that Qatar's recent efforts to play a positive role in Darfur would yield results. Doha did not have relationships with key rebel leaders and lacked a feel for the complicated situation on the ground. Busra claimed Qatari representatives, for example, seemed not to understand the way dynamics in Chad bear on problems in Darfur. The three agreed that Doha's initiative appeared to mostly represent an effort by the Arab League to deflect attention from Bashir's indictment.

¶7. (C) Comment: Treiki seems serious about developing concrete milestones for progress in Libya's trilateral mediation efforts. After having been publicly embarrassed by the failure of key rebel leaders to show up in Sirte for peace talks under Libyan auspices, he and the GOL appear to have focused greater attention on the governments in Khartoum and Ndjamena, and relatively less on direct engagement with rebels. Treiki has also been more measured in conversations with us in predicting progress, suggesting that the GOL remains a bit chastened after the public failure of the Sirte process. That said, the GOL has not abandoned its propensity for dating around; Treiki himself suggested that the GOL would seek to re-engage with rebel groups after upcoming meetings attendant to Sudan-Chad rapprochement. The SLA/Unity representatives we speak with appear to have extensive contacts with other rebel groups, but it is difficult to gauge how much of the talk about SLA/Unity gaining strength and attracting allies represents reality, and how much is just rhetoric. End comment.
STEVENS

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI874

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI874 aka Wikileaks id #177720 ?
Subject	LIBYAN LEADER AL-QADHAFI'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 10 Nov 2008 16:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI874.html
References	08STATE118192
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO7687
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0874 3151616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 101616Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4093
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4615
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000874

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/ES-CR, S/ES-O, AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: OPDC *[Diplomatic Correspondence]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN LEADER AL-QADHAFI'S CONGRATULATORY MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT

REF: STATE 118192

¶1. (U) Post received on November 9 via telefax a letter from Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi conveying his congratulations to the President-elect. We have not yet received the note in hard copy.

¶2. (SBU) Post's informal translation of the Arabic language letter follows:

Begin text of letter:

Dear Mr. President Obama,

I have the pleasure to send a congratulation note for the first time to an American president, and on behalf of all Africa, and of Cen-Sad, the base of the African pyramid, and on behalf of the Arab Maghreb Union, and in the name of all Arab leaders as I am their dean.

Since relations are resumed between our two countries, we have the right to congratulate you from the bottom of our hearts because you are the son of Africa.

God gives reign to whom He wishes and takes it away from whom He wishes; he holds dear whom he wants and humiliates whom he wants as well. He retains all the good in His hands, and He is the all powerful; and He pledged to confer His favors on those deemed weak and to bequeath them the Earth.

Blacks were deemed weak and were oppressed, and were taken to the American continent as slaves and indentured servants.

The main point is that Blacks shall not have an inferiority complex and imitate the Yankees.

They have to prove that they are partners to the whites and sharing the same continent; that the Whites themselves are not indigenous, but that they have come from overseas; that the black man is not less competent than the white man; and that the black color shall prevail in the world as predicted by the Green Book.

I salute the American people who have chosen you in these historical elections for such a high position, so that you may lead the change that you have promised them and for which they have rallied around you.

We hope that you lead the United States of America on the path of good and respect peoples' sovereignty and observe the policy of neutrality.

Sincerely,

Muammar al-Qadhafi

End text.

¶3. (U) Post will forward the original via diplomatic pouch if/when we receive it.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI88

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI88 aka Wikileaks id #139794 ?
Subject	TFCD01: LIBYAN LEADER TO CONTINUE PERSONAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CHAD CRISIS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 3 Feb 2008 11:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08TRIPOLI88.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

VZCZCXRO8178
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0088/01 0341111
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 031111Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3042
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0605
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0405
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0987
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 3518

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000088

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , CD *[Chad]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TFCD01: LIBYAN LEADER TO CONTINUE PERSONAL EFFORTS TO RESOLVE CHAD CRISIS

TRIPOLI 00000088 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi, backed by an informal mandate from AU leaders, plans to continue a round of personal diplomacy with both the Chadian government and rebel groups, possibly including an emergency meeting in the coming days. Libya is in contact with France to evacuate Libyan diplomatic personnel and dependents from Ndjamena. The GOL recognizes that the latest violence could complicate peacekeeping deployments to both Chad and Sudan; however, Libya

has no objections to the peacekeeping deployment and favors a quick resolution to the latest hostilities. Though Libya strongly supports Chadian President Idriss Deby, Qadhafi has an apparently sincere, if egotistical, interest in seriously working towards a renewed ceasefire. End summary.

SECURITY SITUATION "VERY SERIOUS"

¶2. (C) Echoing February 2 press comments by MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki, Salam al-Riyani, Treiki's chief of staff, told Poloff on February 3 that the GOL believes the situation in Chad is "very serious." The GOL estimates approximately 300 vehicles carrying 2,000-3,000 armed rebels are in Ndjamena on February 3. Libya believes Chadian President Deby is holed up in a heavily-fortified presidential palace. Al-Riyani speculated that rebels are receiving vehicles across Chad's borders with Sudan, CAR, and Niger, but he categorically denied that any elements in Libya were supporting the rebels. On Sudan's role in the latest violence, al-Riyani conceded the rebels' support "had to come from somewhere."

LIBYAN LEADER TO CONTINUE "PERSONAL" DIPLOMACY

¶3. (SBU) According to al-Riyani, the African Union, meeting in Addis Ababa, had asked Libya and the Republic of Congo to take the lead on AU efforts to resolve the current crisis. Pressed about Libya's mandate, al-Riyani said that the AU did not actually vote or officially nominate Libya to act on its behalf; rather, Libya's leadership role on the Chadian crisis emerged after a series of "informal consultations" of AU leaders on the margins of the Addis Ababa summit.

¶4. (C) Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi spoke with both President Deby and United Front for Democratic Change (UFDC) leader and former Chadian diplomat Mohammad Nouri on February 2 to urge implemention of a Libya-backed ceasefire signed in October 2007. According to al-Riyani, despite some press reports to the contrary, not all rebel factions had agreed to an immediate ceasefire. Qadhafi, back in Tripoli on February 3, plans to continue his "personal" diplomacy with the Chadian government and rebel groups through a series of telephone calls. Al-Riyani also raised the prospect that Qadhafi could call an emergency meeting on the crisis, either in Libya or elsewhere, in the coming days.

LIBYA TO EVACUATE DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL FROM NDJAMENA

¶5. (C) Al-Riyani told Poloff that Libya is currently working with France to evacuate 74 diplomatic staff and dependents attached to the Libyan Embassy in Ndjamena to Libreville, hopefully on February 3. Al-Riyani noted that both the Libyan and French Embassies in Ndjamena are located close to the Presidential Palace, the scene of the heaviest fighting.

VIOLENCE COULD COMPLICATE PEACEKEEPING DEPLOYMENTS

¶6. (C) Al-Riyani conceded that the latest violence could complicate peacekeeping deployments to both Chad and Darfur and complicate on-going international efforts to bring about a political solution to the Darfur crisis. However, he doubted that Sudan orchestrated the Chadian crisis to obstruct deployment of a European peacekeeping force. Noting Libya's long-standing position that foreign troops in Africa invariably "complicate" things, al-Riyani said that, since the Government of Chad decided to accept the peacekeeping force, Libya had dropped all objections.

COMMENT

¶7. (C) Consistent with Qadhafi's self-image as an African peacekeeper, Libya devoted considerable energy to an October 2007 cease-fire between the Chadian government and rebel

TRIPOLI 00000088 002.2 OF 002

factions; consequently, renewed fighting has embarrassed Libya and called into question Qadhafi's ability to mediate. Though firmly in Deby's camp, Qadhafi has a clear if egotistical interest in quelling the latest violence. (Note: GOL interlocutors periodically remind us that Deby is president thanks largely to Libya's multi-faceted "intervention" in the Chadian civil war. End note.) Libya also clearly recognizes that internal violence in Chad will complicate relations between Ndjamena and Khartoum, which, in Libya's assessment, will have negative reprecussions for UN/AU-led mediation efforts on the Darfur crisis. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI882

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI882 aka Wikileaks id #178115 ?
Subject	UPDATE ON RELEASED REGIME CRITIC DR. IDRISS BOUFAYED AND PLANNED MEDICAL TRAVEL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Nov 2008 12:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI882.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI819 , 08TRIPOLI851
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI923 , 09TRIPOLI900
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9905
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0882/01 3181206
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 131206Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4101
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1276
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0920
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0607
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0654
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0803
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0746
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0472
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0018
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4623
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000882

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON) AND DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON RELEASED REGIME CRITIC DR. IDRISS BOUFAYED AND PLANNED MEDICAL TRAVEL

REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY EMAIL 10/27/2008, B) TRIPOLI 472 , C) TRIPOLI 819 , D) TRIPOLI 851

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) has reportedly obtained a passport and is finalizing travel permission for self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed,

who was recently released on humanitarian grounds from a 25 year prison term in light of his advanced lung cancer. The QDF will coordinate and pay for Boufayed's travel, and will facilitate (and possibly also underwrite) medical treatment abroad. The QDF is anxious that Boufayed travel quickly - perhaps in part out of concern that delays in granting his humanitarian release contributed to the seriousness of his medical condition - and is waiting for a decision from him on where he wishes to go for medical treatment and when. Boufayed is reportedly feeling better and is receiving visitors and paying social calls to neighbors. Reports that the QDF helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate his travel abroad for medical treatment represent a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. End summary.

¶2. (C) Pef ref A, P/E Chief met with Muhammad Tarnesh (strictly protect), Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), on November 10 to follow up on the case of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment earlier this year in connection with planning a peaceful demonstration (ref B). Boufayed was released on humanitarian grounds on October 8 from the Sabratha Hospital, where he was undergoing treatment for advanced lung cancer (ref C), and returned to his family home in Gharyan.

¶3. (C) Tarnesh visited Gharyan on November 6 and met with Idriss Boufayed's brother, Juma'a Boufayed. (Note: Juma'a Boufayed himself was arrested in February 2007, shortly after his brother and eleven other individuals were arrested on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square. As reported ref B, Juma'a Boufayed was released on/about May 27, shortly before a state security court convicted his brother and 10 others of planning to overthrow the government and conducting unauthorized meetings with representatives of a foreign government. End note.) Tarnesh said the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), which had helped facilitate Idriss Boufayed's release on humanitarian grounds, had secured a passport for Boufayed (who is not yet in possession of it) and was in the process of obtaining permission from Libyan security organizations for him to travel abroad for medical treatment. Tarnesh did not anticipate problems with respect to exit permissions; Boufayed's name was removed from airport and land border crossing watchlists when he was granted humanitarian release. The QDF will coordinate entry visas for the (presumably European) country in which Boufayed decides to seek treatment, and will also facilitate travel arrangements and medical appointments. Tarnish said the QDF was still discussing whether to pay for Boufayed's medical treatment (it has already agreed to defray his travel expenses), and said he thought it would.

¶4. (C) Noting that the QDF's Human Rights Committee Director, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, was personally involved in the case, Tarnish said the QDF was anxious that Boufayed travel quickly and was only waiting for a decision from him as to where he wanted to travel for medical treatment and when. (Comment: Boufayed's medical condition is reportedly grave and we've heard reports that the GOL would prefer that he not die in Libya to minimize potential public discontent. The QDF may be anxious to expedite his travel to mitigate charges that the GOL's failure to grant humanitarian release earlier contributed to his decline. End comment.) Addressing rumors that Boufayed might be discouraged from traveling to Switzerland (where he resided for a number of years) in light of ongoing Libyan-Swiss contretemps (ref D) , Tarnesh said the QDF would do all it could if that was where Boufayed decided he wanted to go.

¶5. (C) Citing Juma'a Boufayed, Tarnesh said Idriss Boufayed's medical condition and mental health had improved since his

medical condition and mental health had improved since his release. Visits to him were initially limited after his return home because his health was fragile and his family did not want large numbers of visitors in their home; however, Boufayed is currently able to receive visitors at will and has begun paying

social visits to neighbors' homes as well. Tarnesh said a number of regime critics, journalists and members of Libya's nascent civil society have quietly made the trip to Gharyan in recent weeks to see him. Tarnesh is scheduled to visit Boufayed next week and will give us a readout. Tarnesh's HRSL has not received a response to the petition it submitted in October to the QDF asking that it urge the GOL to release the other 10 individuals convicted in the Boufayed case, who remain in prison. Separately, U.K. Poloff David Clay told us on November 9 that not all EU capitals had weighed in yet on whether to agree to a joint demarche to the GOL requesting access to Jamal al-Hajj, a Danish-Libyan dual citizen who was among the individuals arrested with Boufayed.

¶6. (C) Comment: The news that the QDF has helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate and perhaps underwrite his travel abroad for medical treatment is a welcome development; however, we've been here before with respect to the QDF claiming positive intervention that later proved to be untrue, particularly in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi. Tarnesh's planned visit to Idriss Boufayed next week should afford another point of reference from which to gauge the likelihood that medical travel will in fact be facilitated. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI889

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI889 aka Wikileaks id #178536 ?
Subject	TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 16 Nov 2008 16:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI889.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI921 , 09TRIPOLI19 , 09TRIPOLI40
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2246
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0889/01 3211617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 161616Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4135
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1289
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0656
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0805
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0748
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0609
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0922
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0145
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0138
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY 0001
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4657
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000889

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/ES-O, AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , ASEC *[Security]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]* , SU *[Sudan]* , CD *[Chad]* , SA *[Saudi Arabia]*
SUBJECT: TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Mainstream and opposition media began reporting November 4 on clashes between Government of Libya (GOL) security forces and locals in and around the oasis town of Kufra, located

forces and locals in and around the oasis town of Kufra, located in southeastern Libya near the borders with Egypt, Sudan and Chad. Business contacts with representative offices there confirmed that violent clashes had occurred, that large numbers of GOL security forces were in and around the area, that significant damage was inflicted and that there were casualties. Opposition websites and media have attributed this year's outbreak of violence (there were parallel clashes in 2006 and 2007) to efforts by the government to deny Toubou tribesmen identity and ration cards and access to schools and medical clinics. Alternatively, reliable contacts have reported that clashes over disputed land on/about November 2 near Kufra between members of the Arab Zawiya tribe and the Toubou tribe (which includes Chadian and Libyan citizens) resulted in the death of several members of the Zawiya tribe, which subsequently retaliated, prompting GOL security forces to intervene. National (Libyan-Chadian), ethnic (Arab-African) and tribal (Zawiya-Toubou) tensions were already high due to the recent influx of large numbers of Chadian refugees and reports that the GOL intended to deport large numbers of Chadians from the town. Despite the fact that the GOL dispatched some 600 troops, this year's violence proved harder to quell. A physical cordon around Kufra remains in place; it is unclear whether the airport has been reopened. Some mobile telephone and landline service has been restored and some schools in the area have reopened. The land border crossing near Kufra had re-opened, but traffic was moving very slowly. There are credible reports that GOL security forces have begun large-scale deportations of illegal immigrants - mostly Chadians - in response to the violence and that they would destroy the migrants' shantytown in Kufra, which was the scene of some of the most violent clashes. Some Chadian Toubous who have been resident in Kufra for decades fear they will be deported together with more recent arrivals. The clashes highlight the contradiction between Muammar al-Qadhafi's stated desire to posit himself as a leader of a united Africa and his regime's history of discrimination against non-Arabs in Libya. End summary.

BACKGROUND

¶2. (C) There are large numbers of Toubou tribesmen, many of whom are darker skinned than most Libyans, in and around Kufra. Many have lived in the area for decades and supported al-Qadhafi's regime during its periodic contretemps with Chad and Sudan. Some of the longer-term residents have obtained Libyan residency or citizenship; however, many have not and are considered Chadian by the GOL and other Libyan residents of Kufra. The number of Toubou and other Chadians in and around Kufra has increased markedly in recent years, prompted in part by violence in neighboring Darfur and Eastern Chad. There was a significant influx in connection with the February 2008 rebel offensive against N'djamena and a large shantytown developed near the center of Kufra. The eyesore of ramshackle buildings, together with increased crime and violence that many Libyan residents attributed to the recently arrived illegal migrants, disrupted the town's ethnic equilibrium and contributed to national (Libyan-Chadian), ethnic (Arab-African) and tribal (Zawiya-Toubou) tensions. There have also been allegations of Toubous engaging in cross-border smuggling of weapons, food, fuel into Darfur & Eastern Chad; Toubou leaders claim their tribesmen were accused of supporting Chadian rebels and/or President Deby's regime in N'djamena, and of actively subverting the GOL. The main actors comprised Libyans of Arab descent, Libyans of the Toubou tribe, Chadians of the Toubou tribe and other Chadian illegal migrants.

¶3. (C) In addition, GOL officials stopped issuing Toubou tribesmen identity and ration cards in August 2008; Toubous also had difficulty enrolling their children in schools and were denied access to medical care at GOL facilities. The Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL), headed by Norway-based Issa Abd al-Majid Mansour, has claimed that some Toubous were

"stripped of their citizenship"; however, it appears this may be a reference to Toubous who had not obtained Libyan citizenship

and who were either denied identity cards or had them confiscated. The developments coincided with reports in October-November that the GOL was preparing to deport large numbers of Toubous and Chadians as part of a broader, Libya-wide campaign to deport illegal migrants. (Note: Large numbers of sub-Saharan African illegal migrants were detained and deported in August and September as part of an ongoing campaign to limit the number of illegal migrants in Libya. End note.) Together with longstanding disputes over land ownership, the situation was combustible.

VIOLENCE ERUPTS

¶4. (C) Accounts differ as to what sparked the clashes. The TFSL and Paris-based Arab Commission for Human Rights claim the clashes began on November 3 when Toubous, angry over lack of access to medical care, ration cards and schools, set fire to local GOL offices in protest. Alternatively, several reliable contacts have reported variations of a story involving Toubou tribesmen who recently obtained forged documents attesting that they owned land in the area, prompting disputes with Zawiya tribesmen, who claimed the land was theirs. Post's information suggests clashes on/about November 2 near Kufra between members of the Zawiya and the Toubou tribes resulted in the death of several members of the Zawiya tribe. The Zawiya retaliated, attacking Toubou homes and the shantytown, prompting GOL security forces to intervene. (Note: The Zawiya are reportedly well-armed with hunting rifles and automatic rifles; they were equipped with the latter by the GOL during the Libya-Chad war over the disputed Ouzou Strip in the 1980's. The Toubou are reportedly less well-armed, carrying hunting rifles and machetes. End note.)

¶5. (C) The outbreak of violence appears to have united long-term Toubou residents of Kufra, Chadian Toubous and other Chadian illegal migrants against the Zawiya and GOL. Reliable contacts say the Toubous wanted to pressure Zawiya tribesmen to return to their homelands near Jalu, some 700 kilometers to the north. The Federal Express station manager in Kufra (strictly protect source) confirmed open source reports that some Toubous hoisted Chadian flags over buildings - including government offices - in Kufra shortly after the violence began, exacerbating tensions. His office was looted and heavily damaged. A representative of the Bey and Sons Company (strictly protect source), a large holding company with import/export, shipping, distribution and logistics interests, told us 35 of the company's trucks had been burned and their office looted at a large transportation and logistics facility they maintain in Kufra. The company transports sugar, oil, rice and other food staples into Chad and Sudan; the UN Resident Representative express concern that there could be related shortages of staples, particularly in Eastern Chad. French Embassy contacts, Federal Express and Bey and Sons all confirmed open source reports that GOL security offices and vehicles had been attacked and burned. The Bey and Sons and Federal Express representatives confirmed opposition website reports that many shops and homes had been burned, and that there were violent clashes over a period of about a week (circa November 2-November 10), with a number of casualties. French Embassy contacts in Kufra said there had been deaths every night during the week of November 2-9.

THE GOL REACTS

¶6. (C) After the initial clashes, GOL security forces put a cordon around Kufra on/about November 4, closing roads and the airport. Post sent a warden message on November 5 alerting U.S.

citizens to the possibility of demonstrations and warning them to avoid the area. Contacts reported that the forces were regular army and national police (the latter are distinguished by the their blue-gray fatigues). Mobile and landline telephone communications were also cut. French Embassy contacts in Kufra said the GOL initially deployed some 600 troops, who failed to quell the violence. The Federal Express station manager, citing information from a relative in the GOL's security services, put the number at 400-500. Opposition websites reported circa November 9 that the GOL dispatched additional reinforcements to Kufra via helicopter and truck, together with helicopter

gunships. (Note: Contacts have confirmed the presence of helicopters in and around Kufra in connection with the violence; Post is unable to confirm whether any were gunships. End contact.) The scope of the violence appears to have surprised GOL security forces. Noting that similar violent clashes had erupted in 2006 and 2007, the representative of Bey and Sons noted that while "such episodes are usually over in a couple of hours, this has lasted days".

OPPOSITION, AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT ATTEMPT TO FAN FLAMES

¶7. (C) Media and opposition reports, claiming contact with individuals on the ground in Kufra, claimed that there were shortages of food and water, and that wounded civilians did not have access to medical care. Media and opposition reports also claimed that GOL security forces were deliberately targeting unarmed civilians, who accounted for all of of the fatalities; however, the Federal Express station manager reported seeing the bodies of two soldiers in uniform, partially covered by tarpaulins, near a checkpoint on the city's outskirts as he drove his family out of the city on November 5. Large numbers of women and children (schools were closed on November 4), mostly Arabs, were evacuated from the town during the period November 4-7; many reportedly decamped to Benghazi to wait out the fighting. Citing reports from their Kufra office, the Bey and Sons representative told us that there were 11 fatalities and 35 wounded as of (three Libyans and eight Chadians) as of November 9.

¶8. (C) Reports appeared on November 10-11 on opposition websites and in the al-Sharq al-Awsat newspaper that violence in Kufra had spread to Benghazi, where clashes between youths and GOL security services were reported to have occurred. Post canvassed multiple contacts in and around Benghazi on November 12-15, including a resident of one of the neighborhoods in which the clashes reportedly occurred. None had seen or heard anything confirming that clashes or demonstrations had occurred. Neither Post's Econoff, who was in Benghazi November 6-9, nor the U.K. Embassy's Poloff, who was there November 10-12, saw or heard anything suggesting the reports of clashes in Benghazi were accurate. (Note: A number of local observers have commented on the fact that al-Sharq al-Awsat is majority Saudi-owned and the ongoing Saudi-Libyan contretemps, implying that the apparently unsubstantiated reports that violence in Libya had spread was motivated by the Saudis' desire to embarrass al-Qadhafi. End note.) An opposition website report picked up by UPI claimed on November 14 that the GOL had taken steps to quash internal reporting about the violence in Kufra. While state media has been quiet about the situation, the show referenced in the UPI report dealt with other political issues. Locally-based stringers for international news agencies, who have excellent contacts within the GOL, told us officials have refused to discuss the situation in Kufra with them.

¶9. (C) Opposition websites have sought to make political hay, criticizing the GOL for its allegedly excessive response to the violence, its failure to provide food, water and medical

violence, its failure to provide food, water and medical supplies and the silence of GOL officials about the clashes. In a statement on November 11, the TFSL threatened to sabotage the al-Sarir oil field, located some 400 kilometers from Kufra. (Note: The al-Sarir field is Libya's second largest after the Waha field and produces some 230,000 barrels/day of sweet, light crude. International oil company contacts assessed the risk to the field from Kufra-related violence as being relatively low. End note.)

CURRENT SITUATION

¶10. (C) Citing a conversation with his Kufra station manager, the representative of Bey and Sons described the situation on November 14 as "largely under control, but still simmering". The airport in Kufra had been closed since November 4 and Federal Express was told the cordon around the city would remain in place until about November 20. Statoil, which operates an oil rig about 120 kilometers west of Kufra, had been scheduled

to fly a rig team into Kufra November 11-12 and had been unable to do so. As of November 14, they had not been able to reschedule the trip. The World Food Program's director (strictly protect source) was told on November 11 that the situation in Kufra had calmed considerably and that GOL security forces had standing orders to protect his organization's offices. (Note: A key humanitarian relief corridor used by WFP and the UN extends from Kufra into Darfur and Eastern Chad. End note.) The land border crossing near Kufra had re-opened, but traffic was moving very slowly. The UN's security officer in Tripoli (strictly protect source) was told on/about November 11 that GOL security forces would deport all illegal immigrants in Kufra - mostly Chadians - within a week and would destroy the shantytown near the town center. There are reports that deportations have already begun; there are reportedly concerns among longtime Chadian Toubous resident in Kufra that they will be deported together with more recent arrivals. Some schools in and around Kufra re-opened on November 11. Multiple contacts have reported that a large security and police presence will remain in Kufra for some time to preclude a resurgence of the violence. Some well-informed contacts have reported that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi had dispatched a small team from his Qadhafi Development Foundation to help mediate between GOL security forces and Toubou and Zawiya tribesmen.

¶11. (C) Comment: The clashes highlight the contradiction between al-Qadhafi's stated desire to posit himself as a leader of a united Africa and his regime's history of discrimination against non-Arabs, many of whom are darker-skinned, in Libya. It also throws into sharp relief the difference between the littoral, where the reach of the GOL's security apparatus is long, and the areas along Libya's long land borders, which are more porous. The presence of weak and failing states to the south complicates the security challenge the GOL faces in attempting to improve its capacity to secure its frontiers against illegal migrants and smugglers. An additional issue is that al-Qadhafi's regime has longstanding contacts with Toubou tribesmen in the Tibesti Mountains area spanning the Libya-Chad border. Many of the weapons used in the recent round of fighting in Kufra were reportedly supplied by the GOL to Arab and Chadian tribesmen, whom the GOL has historically used as proxies in its various activities along the border. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI895

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI895 aka Wikileaks id #178635 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INTERIM TIP ASSESSMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 17 Nov 2008 12:33 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI895.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2704
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0895 3221233
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 171233Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4144
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0809
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0752
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4666
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1293
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0660
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000895

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, AND G/TIP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KTIP *[Trafficking in Persons]* , KCRM *[Criminal Activity]* , KWMN *[Women Issues]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: INTERIM TIP ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 109257

¶1. (U) Libya has no legal or regulatory framework to separate victims of trafficking from the general migrant population and undocumented presence in Libya is generally considered a crime. In practice, however, the GOL has drawn on other elements of its existing criminal code to prosecute traffickers known to have withheld travel documents and pay from victims. Businesses have also also compelled to pay for the repatriation of the trafficked workers. Overall enforcement is hampered by the lack of criminal statutes specifically criminalizing trafficking and stipulating related penalties. During the year, there were reports that the government was circulating a draft of a new criminal code, which reportedly includes provisions specifically related to TIP, to GOL ministry-equivalents for review; however, no drafts have been publicly released and copies have not been provided to diplomatic missions.

¶2. (U) During the year, Libya continued the practice of supporting training and awareness-building programs for law enforcement officials and prosecutors. Duplicating their effort to provide in-kind support for training of law enforcement officials, the government has offered support for follow-on training of prosecutors and legal professionals. International organizations report that individual officials are receptive and eager for new information and training, but that Libya lacks an institutional or cultural awareness of trafficking. International organizations continue to have access to vulnerable migrant populations -- GOL officials allow them informal access to victims of trafficking held in detention on a case-by-case basis -- and are able to provide some protective services to victims of trafficking, although representatives of those organizations note that victim identification is not systematic. Continued training is necessary to ensure that both effective and systematic identification procedures are developed and that protective services can be offered. The government does not provide psychological or legal assistance to victims of trafficking, but does allow outside groups to provide targeted assistance for migrants - including victims of trafficking - held in detention. Individual Libyan officials have expressed interest in receiving more TIP-related training. The GOL offers in-kind contributions to such training programs, although most observers agree that it will take some time for the benefits of such training to generate broader institutional awareness of TIP issues.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI896

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI896 aka Wikileaks id #178829 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI AND THE REFORM "VISION THING"
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 18 Nov 2008 12:26 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI896.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI842
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3586
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0896/01 3231226
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 181226Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4145
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0926
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0029
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0613
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4667
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000896

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON) AND INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KPRV *[Privatization]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI AND THE REFORM "VISION THING"

REF: A) TRIPOLI 227 , B) TRIPOLI 842 , C) TRIPOLI 699

TRIPOLI 00000896 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting broadcast on state-owned television, senior Government of Libya (GOL) officials disagreed with Muammar al-Qadhafi about plans to implement dramatic

government restructuring and privatization he proposed last March. Al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, accusing them of wanting to maintain the status quo to continue profiting from corruption, and insisted that plans to restructure the government and directly distribute shares of oil revenues to the Libyan people be implemented. International media have touted the show as a rare glimpse into the opaque Jamahiriya system; however, local observers believe the meeting was a staged piece of political theater designed to give public cover to an expected scaling back of the proposed reforms. Senior GOL officials have told us privately that serious risks (inflation, currency devaluation, etc.) posed by Leader's vision, together with a lack of consensus about how to implement it, mean the project will be delayed until at least the second quarter of 2009. The personal, albeit unpublicized, involvement of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in implementing the initiative has thrown into stark relief disagreements between the regime's old guard and would-be reformers. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison and temper calls for more sweeping change. End summary.

GOL LEADERS DISPUTE REFORM PLAN

¶2. (SBU) In a development picked up by Reuters, AFP and the Financial Times, Libya's state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA) televised a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and senior government officials on November 11 in which several GPC secretaries (minister-equivalents) openly disagreed with the Leader about plans to implement dramatic government restructuring and privatization he first proposed in an address to the General People's Congress in March (ref A). In the meeting, Central Bank Governor Farhat Bengadara warned that implementing plans to directly disburse monthly shares of Libya's oil revenues to the Libyan people would fuel undisciplined consumption (an idea al-Qadhafi specifically refuted in March), spark inflation, precipitate devaluation of the dinar, create a balance of payments deficit and cause a decline in real incomes. Minister of Economy and Trade Ali Essawi cautioned that the combination of direct cash payments and dismantling much of the government structure would not prompt greater production or investment, and would adversely impact long-term economic growth and social development. Instead of direct cash payments, Secretary of the General People's Committee (Prime Minister-equivalent) al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi advocated an ill-defined scheme to give Libyans shares in banks and companies through portfolios that would be managed by financial institutions. Pointing to the recent decline in oil prices, several senior GOL officials noted that plan would be more tenable with higher oil prices, but was too risky given the dramatic fluctuations recently seen.

AL-QADHAFI (PUBLICLY) INSISTS ON GOING FORWARD

¶3. (SBU) Striking a populist note, al-Qadhafi blasted the officials, insisting that they wanted to maintain the status quo to keep their positions and continue profiting from corruption. (Note: Al-Qadhafi criticized PM al-Mahmoudi by name in his Revolution Day speech and accused him of being corrupt; his exchange with him in the televised meeting has reinforced widespread expectation that al-Mahmoudi will be sacked in connection with an expected Cabinet shuffle during the March 2009 General People's Congress. End note.) Reprising themes he touched on in March, he said that since multiple efforts to address corruption and mismanagement in the popular committees (ministry-equivalents) had failed, Libyans should instead receive a direct share of oil revenues from which to underwrite health care, education, utilities and investments. Responding to concerns about implementation of the reforms, he stressed that " ... the decision to distribute oil revenues, their sole source of wealth, directly to the people is not negotiable". He

source of wealth, directly to the people is not negotiable." He conceded that it was "bad luck" that the wealth distribution proposal coincided with declining oil prices, but stressed that the result of the regime's 40-year effort to manage Libya's resources on behalf of its people had been "very bad". He reiterated the argument made in March that once oil revenues were directly distributed, it would no longer be necessary to maintain subsidies or government services (to include health care and education), since people could afford to buy whatever

they needed directly.

MEDIA BREATHLESS ABOUT OSTENSIBLE VIEW INTO JAMAHIRIYA POLICY DEBATE ...

¶4. (SBU) International media reaction - JANA broadcast the show, but state-owned media has otherwise not dwelled on it - has largely focused on the unusual spectacle of the ostensible policy debate that took place. Libya watcher and Dartmouth University professor Dirk Vandewalle opined that the meeting reflected the fact that top-down decision-making in Libya was being increasingly questioned and that the power of technocrats had increased. Reuters characterized it as "a rare glimpse into decision-making in the North African country".

... BUT LOCAL OBSERVERS REMAIN UNCONVINCED

¶5. (C) Observers closer to the scene have been less sanguine, and several senior GOL officials - including those involved in the meeting - had previewed for us in earlier meeetings that lack of agreement about how to implement government restructuring and privatization meant that implementation would be delayed and the scope likely reduced. As reported ref B, CB Governor Bengadara told a visiting U.S. trade specialist in October that while he favored a more aggressive "shock therapy" approach to economic reform than many other senior GOL leaders, he expected the wealth distribution program to take several years to implement and was frankly skeptical about the extent of government restructuring. Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, who heads the Economic Development Board (EDB) and National Planning Council and also leads the five committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision, told visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams on November 5 that nothing had been firmly decided with respect to government restructuring or privatization of education and healthcare (further details on the Williams-Jibril meeting septel). Conceding that the implementing committees had made little progress in agreeing on a plan, he suggested that change would be unlikely until after the first quarter of 2009. (Note: The General People's Congress typically meets in March; we've been told that they would have to formally bless any restructuring or privatization plans before they could be implemented. End note.) Similarly, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employment and Training (minister-equivalent) Matuq Matuq told us on November 13 that GOL leaders had encountered difficulty in trying to develop plans to implement al-Qadhafi's vision, and flatly told us that privatization and government restructuring would be delayed considerably.

SAIF AL-ISLAM'S BEHIND-THE-SCENES ROLE A MIXED BLESSING

¶6. (C) Part of the issue appears to be that the restructuring and privatization initiatives have become lightning rods for the struggle between the old guard and would-be reformers. Over the summer, contacts told us the five implementing committees had been unable to achieve consensus on whether and how to implement the reforms. A supra-committee under Dr. Jibril was formed to coordinate the implementing committees' work; however, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi - who had formed shadow committees composed of staff from his Qadhafi Development Foundation - has played a

powerful and at times leading role in shaping implementation plans. A contact at the EDB told us that Saif al-Islam's involvement was a blessing and a curse. His personal status allowed him to advocate more forcefully than most GOL officials; however, the fact that he is at odds with influential members of the regime's old guard raised the stakes in the debate about restructuring and privatization.

¶7. (SBU) Implementation of the Leader's vision has already been delayed. When he outlined his vision in March, al-Qadhafi called for the five committees to submit plans for implementing the project by September 1, with the idea that he would detail the plan in his annual Revolution Day speech on/about September 1 and that the changes would be initiated before year's end. He disappointed those hopes, instead shifting the goalposts in his Revolution Day speech by saying the committees would submit implementation plans by year's end, and that changes would begin early in the new year (ref C).

¶8. (C) Comment: While the televised meeting was noteworthy for the fact that it offered the unusual spectacle of ostensible dissent in the sterile Libyan political environment, the fact that a number of the participants raised their hands to publicly dispute the reforms, together with al-Qadhafi's strident insistence on implementing the original plan, smacks of staged

political theater. Local observers have expected for some time that al-Qadhafi would in the end - as he's done before - significantly scale back the scope of the reform agenda he announced in March. By explicitly linking the reforms to the populist issue of anti-corruption, al-Qadhafi has seized the moral high ground on an issue of genuine public concern, which would allow him to blame venal GOL officials for failing to execute his vision if the original plan is modified. Doing so would allow him to limit real reform, and would mitigate to a certain extent criticism of the Jamahiriya system that is his brainchild. More cynical contacts have speculated that al-Qadhafi's intent all along was to raise the specter of privatization - particularly of education and healthcare - and government restructuring to make the increasingly creaky Jamahiriya system seem favorable by comparison in the eyes of a largely conservative, risk-averse Libyan public. According to that line of thinking, al-Qadhafi - concerned that Libya's economic opening was creating pressure for political reform - floated the privatization and government restructuring policy balloon largely as a means by which to muddy the waters and create an atmosphere of "constructive chaos" in which to effect limited (vice sweeping) change. It's a tactic he has used before: Libyan contacts are fond of telling the fable of a race in which participants have to carry a sack of rats a certain distance before they chew through the bag. Al-Qadhafi wins because he figures out that by constantly shaking the bag, the rats are too disoriented to make their way out. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI901

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI901 aka Wikileaks id #179308 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND TRADE WELCOMES COOPERATION WITH U.S.
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 20 Nov 2008 16:04 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI901.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5881
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0901/01 3251604
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 201604Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4152
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0616
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0929
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0032
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0474
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1294
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0661
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4674
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000901

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S MINISTRY OF ECONOMY AND TRADE WELCOMES COOPERATION
WITH U.S.

¶1.    (U)  Summary: In a meeting with visiting NEA/MAG Director
Stephanie Williams, Under Secretary for Economy, Trade and
Investment Taher Sarkaz emphasized the importance of U.S.-Libya
cooperation and outlined steps his ministry taking to facilitate
trade and investment.  Libya is keenly interested in technical
economic assistance, particularly in the area of small- and
medium-sized business development, which the GOL views as a key
potential area for future growth.  Sarkaz commented favorably on
the U.S.-Libya Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA)
currently being negotiated, and expected it to be finalized
soon.  Williams highlighted the importance of capitalizing on
```

Scott Williams highlighted the importance of capitalizing on the new period of bilateral cooperation ushered in by implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims agreement and underscored U.S. interest in pursuing further cooperation on economic and trade issues. End summary.

¶2. (U) Visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams, accompanied by A/DCM and Econoff, met with Under Secretary for Economy, Trade and Investment Taher Sarkaz on November 6. Sarkaz stressed the importance to the GOL of U.S.-Libya cooperation in the areas of economy and trade. Citing various studies the General People's Committee (ministry-equivalent) for Economy and Trade had undertaken with assistance from the World Bank and private consulting firms, he said the GOL is keenly focused on facilitating greater trade and developing Libya as a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment (FDI). Those efforts were informed by a desire to diversity to the extent possible Libya's economy, which was largely dependent on oil and gas.

¶3. (SBU) Sarkaz said the ministry had focused in the last several years on easing rules governing the establishment of new companies, a subject in which he was personally interested. Of particular concern were efforts to expedite the entry of new foreign investors into the market, including introduction of new laws that would allow foreigners to own 100 per cent of their investment projects in Libya. (Note: Investors are currently required by law to have a Libyan partner; the percentage of the joint venture that must be Libyan-owned varies by sector. End note.). He noted that the minsitry had facilitated the issuance of a law that allows Libyan nationals to invest their own capital in Libya and offers them incentives on par with those offered to foreign investors. (Note: In a hangover from Libya's more revolutionary period, there were until recently tight strictures on the types of economic activities, particularly those related to investment, that Libyan citizens could undertake. End note.) Noting that the ministry was heavily involved in privatization efforts, Sarkaz said the General People's Committees were under instructions to help shift the focus in Libya's economy from the public to the private sector. (Note: In a separate meeting, the Secretary of the GPC for Manpower, Employment and Training recently told us that the GOL was working to reduce the number of public sector employees from one million to 130,000 in the net 3-5 years. End note.)

¶4. (U) Pointing to the Misurata Free Trade Zone (located east of Tripoli), Sarkaz also discussed efforts to create a law governing free trade zones to help promote Libya as a transit hub between Europe and Africa. Efforts are underway to establish a parallel free trade zone west of Tripoli in the Zwara-Abu-Kammash area, a project headed by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. That project is particularly important since a large percentage of Libya's trade flows across its western border with Tunisia. In addition, Libya was working to develop its port and transport infrastructure to enable it to better capitalize on its long coastline and proximity to south-central Europe.

¶5. (SBU) Addressing Libya's needs for technical assistance, Sarkaz said there is a great need for Libyan economic experts to visit the U.S. and learn from their American counterparts, particularly with respect to helping grow the small and medium-enterprise sector. Sarkaz also expressed interest in any help the U.S. could provide in helping make the GOL more efficient and eliminate the waste of public funds. He acknowledged that Libya needed to modernize its customs authority, ports authority, tax system and banking system to underpin other reforms the GOL is pursuing. He asked for U.S. assistance in introducing a computerized database to collect and analyze economic data, with the goal of providing up-to-date

statistics to decision-makers and planning advisors.

¶6. (SBU) Sarkaz noted that negotiations for a U.S.-Libya Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) were underway, and that it was expected to be finalized soon. Williams welcomed the news and underscored U.S. interest in further economic cooperation.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI912

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI912 aka Wikileaks id #179959 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR OCTOBER 2008
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 25 Nov 2008 11:04 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI912.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI474
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Sat, 5 Feb 2011 21:47 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

R 251104Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4168
INFO DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000912

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON; CAIRO
FOR CLARENCE (ALEX) SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR OCTOBER 2008

OIL AND GAS

¶1. (U) A New Oil Discovery by Sirte Oil Company: On October 7, Sirte Oil, a state-owned company, announced a new oil discovery in the well A1-NC216A in the Ghadames Basin. The well is located approximately 310 km southwest of Tripoli. The initial production testing established an oil rate of 1,725 barrels per day, and a gas rate of 0.25 million standard cubic feet per day. This well represents the company's first discovery in the block. [noc.com.ly, 10/7/2008]

¶2. (U) Russian-British Firm TNK-BP Seeks to Develop Major Libyan Oil Field: After a conflict between the oil company's Russian and British shareholders was settled, TNK-BP received the right to compete with BP in international projects. TNK-BP is

negotiating to develop Libya's Sarir field, one of the largest oilfields in Libya located about 500 kilometers east of Tripoli in the Sirte Basin. TNK-BP is ready to sell $1bn-$2bn to obtain the status of operator of Libya's Sarir project. The Russian-British oil producer is now in talks with Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) regarding the development of the Sarir field. In September, a delegation of TNK-BP top executives visited the country to hold cooperation talks. However, investment in the Libyan oil project, which may total between $1bn and $7bn, has yet to be approved by TNK-BP's new CEO. [oilandgaseuroasia.com, 10/21/2008]

¶3. (U) WesternGeco Wins Libyan Seismic Deal: WesternGeco, part of oil field services giant Schlumberger, has won a contract from Russia's Gazprom to gather 3D seismic data on its Ghadames Basin acreage in Libya. WesternGeco says the survey will start in November, with data to be processed in its new processing center in Tripoli. Gazprom was awarded offshore Area 19 in the Libyan third oil and gas exploration licensing round last year. [MEED, 10/22/2008]

¶4. (U) Fourth Forum and Exhibition of Oil and Gas Technologies: The forum and exhibition took place in Tripoli from October 20 to 23. The event was sponsored by the NOC and organized by the Libyan Oil Institute. 120 international companies operating in the oil and gas industry from 20 countries as well as Libyan oil companies participated in the event. The exhibition aims to contribute to the communication between the parties of the oil and gas industry, and their counterparts in the international oil and gas industry, and to get an access to the latest techniques and methods in exploration, production, maintenance, marketing, and consuming. [noc.com.ly, 10/22/2008]

¶5. (U) Foster Wheeler confirms Libyan Refinery Deal: The U.S. company Foster Wheeler has been awarded a project management and consultancy contract for the development of a $4 billion, 200,000 barrel a day refinery in Zwara, western Libya. Foster Wheeler says the Zwara refinery is expected to be completed by 2014; producing gasoline, jet fuel and diesel. The client is Zwara Oil Refining Company (Zorco), a project company in which Libya's state-run Tamoil Africa Holdings has the equity. Foster Wheeler says its contract includes the refinery configuration, the selection of the licensors and the front-end engineering and design (FEED) phase, including preparation of a cost estimate. The firm will also prepare the tender documents for the engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) phase, assist Zorco in selecting the EPC contractor and act as project management consultant during construction. The refinery, located near the Tunisian border, will boost the country's refinery capacity to nearly 600,000 barrels a day. [MEED, 10/30/2008]

CONSTRUCTION

¶6. (U) Al Maabar Plans $11.5 billion Investments: Abu Dhabi-based Al Maabar International Investments has lined up overseas investments worth $11.5 billion over 10 years. The investments will be in real estate projects in Morocco, Libya, Tunisia, Qatar, Belarus and Jordan. The projects in Libya and Morocco are to be immediately funded. The rest of the projects are long-term; they are now either under initial master plan or are going into detail design. [gulfnews.com, 10/5/2008]

¶7. (U) Hill Signs $42 million Libya University Project: U.S. company Hill International has signed a $42 million contract to provide construction supervision services at a university expansion project in Tripoli. The 21-month contract from the Libyan Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers is part of a $2 billion expansion of Al Fateh University, Libya's largest institute of higher education. Under a 2007 agreement, Hill already provides project management services for the expansion, which will add 17.9 million square feet of space to 39 buildings. [nibiz.com, 10/12/2008]

¶8. (U) Libyan Iron Steel Company Signed a Contract to Establish a New Factory for Iron Bars Industry: Libyan Iron Steel Company (LISCO) signed a contract to establish a new factory for iron bars with a production capacity of 800,000 tons a year and at a cost of $240 million. After completion of the project, the total production will reach 1.8 million tons against 500 tons a year in 2007. LISCO has signed contracts with specialized Italian companies to get this project executed. The project is expected to be finished in about 30 months. [MEsteel.com, 10/19/2008]

¶9. (U) ESDF, Asamer Launch First Concrete Plant: Libyan Cement Manufacturing Joint Venture Company (JLCC), a joint venture between the Economic Social Development Fund (ESDF) and the Austrian Asamer Group Company, launched the first concrete plant in Tajura. The Tajura concrete plant is the company's second big project launched in Libya. The first one was the cement plant in Benghazi with a minimal capacity of three million tones of cement. [Tripoli Post, 10/19/2008]

¶10. (U) Turkey's Floating Fair Carries Machinery and Construction Industry to North Africa: Floating Fair Bluexpo's journey included four important trade centers of North Africa; Alexandria in Egypt, Tripoli in Libya, Tunis in Tunisia, and Algiers in Algeria. About 3,500 sector professionals visited the fair located in two ferries; the exhibition involved 150 businesspeople from Turkey who came to Libya under the umbrella of the Turkish Contractors Association. Bluexpo North Africa Construction project aims to provide business opportunities to Turkish companies supplying service and materials in infrastructure and building industries, which have an investment priority in the North African countries. [adg.com, 10/20/2008]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶11. (U) More Cooperation in Electricity: Egypt and Libya agreed on boosting joint cooperation in electricity production. The agreement was reached at a meeting between Egypt's Holding Company for Electrifying Egypt and a visiting delegation of the Libyan electricity authority. The two sides reached an agreement on Libya's contribution in implementing a power generation plant in southern Giza area at a total capacity expected to reach 1,300 megawatts. The plant will start operation in 2012. It was also agreed that Libya will contribute to other electricity projects in Egypt. [ANSAmed, 10/1/2008]

¶12. (U) U.S. Opens Trade Office in Libya: on October 5, the American Commercial Service Office was opened in Tripoli to take part in promotion of the economic cooperation among the different Libyan and American institutions. Libyan officials and businessmen from both countries attended the office's opening. The American Assistant Secretary of Commerce underlined the importance of this office to strengthen economic and commercial ties between both countries, clarifying that the office is a good move to boost cooperation and bilateral commercial exchange. The Under Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy, Trade and Investment said that this office will be a means to provide the institutions and companies with sufficient information about commercial and economic laws and legislations applied in both countries; provide the commercial information required by the American companies that have the desire to execute projects in Great Jamahiriya; and to provide the American investors with information about the Libyan markets and their needs. [ljbc.com, 10/7/2008]

¶13. (U) Libya Maritime Exhibition and Conference: The Libya Maritime Exhibition and Conference (LIMEX 2008) was held at the naval base in Tripoli from October 13 to 15. It showcased the latest maritime technology by bringing together key industry, government and defense personnel from Libya and Overseas. [ljbc, 10/16/2008]

¶14. (U) Finance Ministers and Central Banks Governors to Discuss Global Financial Crisis on African Economy: The African Development Bank called on African Union finance ministers and governors of Central Banks to meet November 12, to discuss repercussions of the global financial crisis on African economy. The conference aims at taking a unified stance amongst African Union member states in confronting the global financial crisis, the bank said in a statement issued in Tunis. The statement also said the African Development Bank and the African Union Commission affirm that Africa's voice would be heard during discussions on the reform of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund following the financial collapse of the capitalist system. [ljbc, 10/26/2008]

IT

¶15. (U) Libyans Take to the Mobile Web: BuzzCity, which provides global wireless communities and consumer services, has published the Global Mobile Advertising Index, which shows the growing use of the mobile Internet and the ensuing advertiser interest. BuzzCity reports continued growth in Indonesia, which remains in top position despite network irregularities, as well as significant growth in Kenya, USA and Bangladesh. BuzzCity also reports record growth for demand of its service in Libya, which it says will surprise both the global mobile community and digital advertising industries. Only six months ago Libya was in 93rd position. BuzzCity says the growth is likely to be directly linked with changes in mobile operator business models, offering affordable and understandable mobile data packages. [mobilemarketingmagazine.co.uk, 10/14/2008]

INVESTMENT

¶16. (U) Libyan Investment Projects Increase: Resources in the Board of Encouraging Investment mentioned that the size of investment increased from $200 million in 2003 to $2.157 billion in the first half of year 2008. The increase is varied in the size of investment from one year to another and the year 2007 recorded the highest development average. It created ten thousand opportunities of jobs to the national elements. The projects were increased by a value of $1.5 billion in comparison to $720 million in 2007. The number of investment projects that entered the operations in the first half of this year provided 2,267 opportunities of employment for Libyans. [libyaninvestment.com, 10/22/2008]

¶17. (U) Libya Eyes European, U.S. Equities: The Libyan Investment Authority is looking to invest $65 billion in European and U.S. equities to diversify its portfolio after recent market declines. "We want to diversify, number one in Europe, number two in the United States, and then in emerging market economies," said Farhat Bin Guidara, Governor of the Central Bank of Libya and a member of the board of the state's investment authority. "We are going more towards pharmaceuticals, telecoms, utilities and food manufacturing," he told reporters on the sidelines of a conference in Cairo. [Reuters, 10/24/2008]

BANKING

¶18. (U) Libya Buys 4.23% Stake in UniCredit: The Central Bank of Libya, the Libyan Investment Authority and the Libyan Foreign Bank acquired a combined 4.23% stake in Italian bank UniCredit SpA (UCG.MI). According to UniCredit's spokesman, the acquisition by Libyan interests is "friendly." The stake initially held by Libyan interests in the Italian bank was 0.87%, the UniCredit spokesman said, with the rest being purchased over the last few days. UniCredit shares have had hardly any relief from selling and have lost 30% since the bank

hardly any relief from selling and have lost 50% since the bank announced its funding plans on October 5. Italian Premier Silvio Berlusconi said he is concerned sovereign wealth funds from oil-producing countries could launch a hostile takeover for Italian companies, given their low valuations after the recent sharp fall in the stock markets. [libyaninvestment.com, 10/19/2008]

¶19. (U) Egypt's Naeem Wins Approval to Open in Libya: Naeem Holding, Egypt's second-largest publicly traded investment bank, said on Sunday it had won approval to open a representative office in Libya. The bank did not say when it would open the office in a statement on the stock exchange website. A company spokesman said he could not immediately give further details. Naeem, which operates in Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates, said in May it planned to reduce the proportion of its revenue from Egypt to between 35 percent and 40 percent from 70 percent within two years. [Reuters, 10/27/2008]

AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY

¶20. (U) Zhongxing Auto to Export 5,000 Pick-ups to Libya: Hebei Zhongxing Automobile Co., Ltd., an expert of pick-up trucks and SUVs in North China, clinched an agreement with Libya on October 20, 2008 on exporting 5,000 pick-ups. The Hebei-based carmaker exported 4,000 cars to the North African country in 2003 and those products used by government organs and social organizations won excellent public praise in the country for the company, laying a strong foundation for the big order this time. The order of 5,000 pick-ups accounts for 40%-50% of the market demand for 10,000-12,000 such cars in Libya this year. The company expects to sell 35,000 to 40,000 cars this year, with a yearly increase of 15% to 20%. [tmcnet.com, 10/23/2008]

LABOR

¶21. (U) Libya to Recruit Large Number of Bangladeshi Laborers: Libya signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Bangladesh to recruit a large number of workers as Tripoli launched a $130 billion infrastructure development program that will require over one million foreign workers. The MoU was signed by the Bangladesh Foreign Adviser, Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury and the Libyan Labor Minister Maa'touq Mohammed Maa'touq. Under the five-year development program, Libya will construct 300,000 housing units, 27 university complexes, over 10,000 kilometer roads and maintain 24,000 kilometer roads. Presently, some 25,000 Bangladeshi are employed in Libya. The Libyan minister did not give the exact number of Bangladeshi workers they will recruit but said they issued 6,000 visas for Bangladeshi workers last month. [thedailystar.com, 10/31/2008]

STEVENSC

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI913

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI913 aka Wikileaks id #180222 ?
Subject	TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR ADAM SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MFA OFFICIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 11:49 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI913.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0173
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0913/01 3311149
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 261149Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4172
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1307
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0667
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0814
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0757
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0931
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0618
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4694
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000913

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR SZUBIN, LEV AND POLLACK; CAIRO FOR SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KTFN *[Terrorism Finance Traffic]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR ADAM SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MFA OFFICIALS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: In a meeting with MFA officials on November 12 on UNSCR 1267-related issues, visiting Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin: 1) stressed the need for better U.S.-GOL coordination with respect to refining the GOL's UNSCR 1267 listing submissions; 2) encouraged the GOL to submit for listing three LIFG leaders and to withdraw its circa 2004 request to list 74 individuals and instead re-submit those names in smaller, better-coordinated tranches, and; 3) urged the GOL to lift Libya's holds on U.S. submissions. Libya had been a leader in submitting large numbers of names to the UNSCR 1267 committee for listing; however, poor formatting and

insufficient biographical and evidentiary information had hampered those efforts. Better communication and coordination in advance of Libya's submissions, to include sharing information on targeted individuals, could help alleviate such problems. Host government officials expressed strong interest in greater cooperation on listing submissions and agreed that Libya's MFA and security organizations would work with Post to develop mechanisms to facilitate such coordination. Szubin urged Libya to be vigilant in dealing with Iranian banks and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and its subsidiaries, noting Iran's well-established record of duplicity to mask proliferation activities. End summary.

Meeting participants:

Libya:
MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) Ahmed Fituri
MFA Secretary for International Organizations Affairs (A/S-equivalent) Hindy Abdulatif Hindy
Tajuri el-Sheradi Tajuri, Director of United Nations Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Assad al-Djerbi, MFA Americas Desk Officer

U.S.:
OFAC Director Adam Szubin
Charge d'Affaires Chris Stevens
OFAC Senior Advisor Ori Lev
Treasury Analyst Gregory Pollock
A/DCM John Godfrey (notetaker)

¶2. (S) Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin and a small delegation visited Tripoli and met on November 12 with Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. Szubin explained OFAC's mission and highlighted the effectiveness of financial sanctions tools in countering terrorism finance and curbing funding for weapons of mass destruction proliferators and states of particular concern such as Iran. The U.S. shares key strategic goals with the Government of Libya (GOL), particularly with respect to defeating al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic fighting Group (LIFG). On UNSCR 1267-related issues, Szubin and his team: 1) stressed the need for better U.S.-GOL coordination with respect to refining the GOL's UNSCR 1267 listing submissions; 2) encouraged the GOL to submit for listing three LIFG leaders and to withdraw its circa 2004 request to list 74 individuals and instead re-submit those names in smaller, better-coordinated tranches, and; 3) urged the GOL to lift Libya's holds on U.S. submissions.

UNSCR 1267 LISTING SUBMISSIONS

¶3. (C) Responding to Fituri's speculation that the incoming U.S. presidential administration would be more focused on economic issues than counter-terrorism (CT), Szubin stressed that CT and CT finance would remain high priorities. Libya's current membership on the UNSC and the recent implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims settlement agreement afforded an excellent window of opportunity in which to expand bilateral cooperation on CT finance. The U.S. and Libya have a shared strategic interest in impeding AQ and LIFG from obtaining funding. The UN sanctions process can be very effective, but successful listing requests require substantial evidentiary information and proper formatting, which can take work to achieve. Praising the GOL's decision to avail itself of the UNSCR 1267 mechanism and its previous submission of large numbers of names for listing, he noted that most of the GOL's submissions had unfortunately not been accepted for designation to date.

¶4. (C) The problem was not a substantive difference over goals, but a lack of advance coordination as well as specific information on Libya's submissions, Szubin said. Pointing to Libya's submission of 12 names for listing in 2005, Szubin noted

that the 1267 Committee was only able to add three of these individuals to the Consolidated List. Previous efforts to improve coordination through Libya's MFA and UN Mission had not been productive. Stressing that even if the information the GOL shared was not publicly releasable, Szubin noted that additional information from the GOL could help the U.S. build a case for listing that met the U.S. legal standard. Doing so could allow the U.S. to lift its holds on previous Libyan submissions and support new ones. Drawing on intelligence and law enforcement sources, the U.S. had worked to develop cases to support some of Libya's submissions and had information it could share to help bolster the GOL's listing requests. The focus was on building a fact-based dossier to implicate targeted individuals, Szubin said. Limiting the number of names submitted at one time would also be helpful.

¶5. (S) In addition to lack of biographical and evidentiary information, Libya's submissions had not been properly formatted, a key hindrance in the UN's bureaucratic system. In addition to bio-identifying data, a good submission would feature several paragraphs on the basis for the designation, with detail on what was done by the target, when it was done and how those actions contributed materially to support for designated terrorist entities. Szubin discussed with Fituri and Hindy the UNSCR 1267 cover sheet (blank) and a sample statement of case based on unclassified sources concerning a LIFG-affiliated individual. Szubin also shared the names of two additional LIFG members whose designation the USG could support. He assured his interlocutors that OFAC stood ready to assist the GOL in its efforts to craft submissions that secured designation of individuals who were of concern to the GOL. The key issue from the U.S. perspective was to facilitate good communication between the GOL's security agencies and MFA to obtain sufficient information about terrorist financiers to support listing them under UNSCR 1267. The CDA and Szubin urged the GOL to consider coordinating with the U.S. before submitting its listing requests, as other countries do. Doing so would allow us to share additional information we might have about specific individuals and help properly format Libya's listing requests.

SMALLER IS BETTER & LIFTING LIBYAN HOLDS ON U.S. SUBMISSIONS

¶6. (S) Noting that insufficient evidentiary and biographical data and poor formatting had compelled the U.S. to place holds on many of the 74 names the GOL submitted for listing in August 2004, Szubin stressed that the U.S. would ideally like to see all of Libya's submissions accepted for listing. He suggested that the GOL withdraw the list of 74 names, work in cooperation with the U.S. and others to develop more robust statements of case and re-submit the individuals' names in smaller tranches. The U.S. would be happy to review the format and substance of those submissions, and to work on possible joint submissions of LIFG financial supporters based in Europe and, particularly, Switzerland. In addition, there was confusion about 19 LIFG leaders whose names Libya submitted in May 2005. The U.S. would encourage the GOL to re-submit the names of two members from that tranche and one additional individual - Abu Yahya al-Libi, Abdallah Sa'id, and Atiyah Abd al-Rahman - whose designation the USG could support and about whom the USG had information that could bolster those submissions. Reiterating that the two sides shared common goals but had suffered from a lack of good communication, Szubin urged the GOL to lift holds Libya had placed on recent U.S. submissions, including branches of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) and members of the Abu Ghadiyah network.

¶7. (S) Denying that the holds had been politically motivated, MFA UN Affairs Director Tajuri argued that Libya needed time to

perform its own investigations of the three indivduals. "Just as the U.S. requested more information about the 74 names we submitted, Libya needs more information about the listings the U.S. requested", he said. Pushing back, Szubin underscored that the RIHS had been previously designated so that there was no question about the propriety of designating additional branch offices, and that the activities of the Abu Ghadiyah foreign fighter facilitation network were well-known. He urged his GOL counterparts to seek additional information from the Libyan security services should they need it, as the USG does when other countries nominate names to the Committee. He added that, to his knowledge, Libya had been the only state to place a hold

TRIPOLI 00000913 003 OF 004

on the submissions.

GOL WELCOMES GREATER COORDINATION

¶8. (S) Stressing the importance of having implemented the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, Fituri emphasized the GOL's desire for greater dialogue and cooperation on the "very sensitive" issues of 1267 listings and CT finance. He agreed that greater exchange of information and coordination in advance of Libya's submission of individuals' names for listing would be beneficial, indicated the GOL would be receptive to such an approach and said the Libya's MFA and security organizations would work with Post to develop modalities for such exchanges of information. Fituri was keen to hear Szubin's assessment of Libya's cooperation in comparison with other Arab states. Szubin said Libya's performance on implementing UNSCR 1267 sanctions appeared to have been good and pointed to Libya's interest in FATF/MENA as a positive sign. Libya had been a leader in terms of the volume of its submissions for UNSCR 1267 listing; however, formatting problems and insufficient information had hampered those efforts. With better communication and coordination, Libya was poised to be a leader in this area.

¶9. (C) Fituri and Hindy both asked for Szubin's assessment of Libya's efforts to modernize its banking and financial sector. Emphasizing that recent bank privatizations and regulatory reforms were positive signs, Szubin stressed the need to develop robust banking supervision and controls in tandem with modernization to mitigate the potential for Libya's financial system to be exploited by terrorist financiers or rogue regimes. States with more developed financial systems were in some ways at greater risk for such exploitation. Transparency was key, Szubin said: the questions asked of those establishing accounts and executing funds transfers, the identification they were required to provide and basic banking controls were the essential building blocks to any effective effort to combat money laundering and terrorist finance.

¶10. (C) Fituri asked what training opportunities for banking, CT finance and money laundering were available, stressing that Libya was particularly interested in receiving training from the U.S. CDA outlined training possibilities under the Financial Service Volunteer Corps (which conducted its first training in Libya earlier this month), the Commercial Law Development Program (which concluded an initial assessment visit this week) and training under the auspices of the Treasury Department. Szubin highlighted an upcoming opportunity for Libya to participate in a regional workshop on CT finance, to be held under Treasury-State auspices early next year. Fituri stated unequivocally that Libya would participate, and asked to be informed of any other potential CT finance and banking training so that his office could help coordinate GOL support for same.

IRISL & IRAN AIR

¶11. (S) Noting that [illegible] UNSCR [illegible]

¶11. (S) Noting that four separate UNSCR's called for tough sanctions against Iran's banks and companies involved in proliferation activities, Szubin stressed the need for vigilance in dealing with Iranian banks, which had a long history of fraud and using front companies to mask proliferation activities. In a similar vein, the U.S. had, consistent with UNSCRs 1737, 1747 and 1803, designated the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) and Iran Air Cargo under E.O. 13382. Noting the fact that he had seen a number of IRISL cargo containers aboard vessels in Tripoli's harbor, Szubin cautioned the GOL to be careful with respect to any dealings with IRISL and/or its subsidiaries. Echoing remarks reported ref B, UN Affairs Director Tajuri questioned whether IRISL's designation was really a multilateral issue (vice a bilateral U.S.-Iran one) and called for more information. Szubin pushed back, stressing that U.S. sanctions on IRISL had been adopted in parallel with a UNSCR that singled out IRISL as a proliferation risk. The important point with respect to interactions with Iranian banks or commercial entities was that Iran's record of duplicity to mask proliferation activities - to include submitting false bills of lading in the case of IRISL - was well-established. The GOL should take care to avoid interactions with Iranian entities, which could expose Libya to exploitation by Iranian proliferating entities and/or call into question Libya's commitment to implementing UNSCRs targeting Iran.

TRIPOLI 00000913 004 OF 004

¶12. (U) OFAC Director Szubin's party cleared this message.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI916

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI916 aka Wikileaks id #180302 ?
Subject	TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE OFFICIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 14:53 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI916.html
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0374
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0916/01 3311453
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 261453Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4179
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1312
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0672
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0762
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0935
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0622
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4701
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000916

SIPDIS

TREASURY FOR SZUBIN, LEV AND POLLACK; CAIRO FOR SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KTFN *[Terrorism Finance Traffic]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TREASURY OFAC DIRECTOR SZUBIN'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN MINISTRY OF FINANCE OFFICIALS

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting with Libyan finance, banking and security officials on November 12, visiting Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin stressed two key messages: 1) the U.S. stands ready to help the GOL engage more effectively with the U.N 1267 Committee to ensure that GOL submissions are accepted by the Committee, and; 2) the U.S. urges Libya to exercise appropriate oversight over foreign Libyan banks with respect to their dealings with Iran, consistent with UNSC resolutions on Iran and the risk of dealing with Iranian institutions.. Libyan officials stressed their willingness to share further bio-identifying and evidentiary information to support their UNSCR 1267 listing requests. Libya

views money laundering, corruption and counter-terrorism finance as interrelated issues and has adopted stringent measures under a 2005 law against money laundering. GOL officials complained that Italian and U.S. authorities had not responded to their requests for information in two widely publicized corruption cases; Szubin encouraged them to submit the request through Treasury's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) and offered to assist with that exchange if needed. On Libyan banks dealing with Iran, GOL officials took a legalistic approach, arguing that large numbers of European banks and companies continued to do business with Iran, and that any foreign banks in which the GOL has a stake are subject to the oversight of the regulatory authorities of the countries in which they are located, who bear responsibility for issuing and implementing regulations to ensure compliance with Iran-related strictures. Szubin pushed back, noting that most major European banks have curtailed dealings with Iran and underscoring the risks for Libya if its state-owned banks sought to reap short-term commercial gains by dealing with Iranian banks. The international consensus is that the risks associated with dealing with Iranian banks are great, owing to Iran's pervasive lack of transparency. In the U.S. view, should Libya choose to ignore that consensus for the sake of potential short-term business gains, it risks considerable damage to its financial sector and its international reputation. End summary.

Meeting participants:

Libya:
Ashur Treybil, Ministry of Finance Undersecretary
Nasser Ashur, Economic Security Directorate, External Security Organization
Muhammad Najib al-Jamal, Director of Economic Affairs, National Security Council
Dr. Hend Siala, National Security Council
Tajuri el-Sheradi Tajuri, Director of United Nations Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Muhammad Abu Sneina, Director of Banking Supervision & Exchange Control, Central Bank

U.S.:
OFAC Director Adam Szubin
Charge d'Affaires Chris Stevens
OFAC Senior Advisor Ori Lev
Treasury Analyst Gregory Pollock
A/DCM John Godfrey (notetaker)

¶2. (C) Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Adam Szubin and a small delegation visited Tripoli and met with Libyan interlocutors on November 12. Szubin stressed the effectiveness of financial sanctions tools in countering terrorism finance and curbing funding for weapons of mass destruction proliferators and states of particular concern, such as Iran. The U.S. shares key strategic goals with the Government of Libya (GOL), particularly with respect to combating al-Qaeda and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Szubin and his team had two main goals in visiting Libya: 1) discussing how the U.S. and GOL can better share information with respect to proposed listings with the UN 1267 Committee, and how the U.S. can assist the GOL in refining its submissions to the UN 1267 Committee, and; 2) conveying the USG's concern about Libyan-affiliated foreign banks located in Europe dealing with Iran, notwithstanding the emerging international consensus regarding the risk of such dealings in light of Iran's deceptive conduct in the financial sector.

UNSCR 1267 LISTING SUBMISSIONS

¶3. (C) On UN 1267 Committee modalities, Szubin highlighted the threat of terrorist financiers, including those from Europe, and stressed the utility of sanctions in denying such individuals access to the international banking system and the ability to

travel freely. The UN sanctions process can be very effective, but successful listing requests require clear evidentiary information and proper formatting. Praising the GOL's decision to avail itself of the UNSCR 1267 mechanism, he noted that most of the GOL's submissions had not been accepted for designation to date. Despite the fact that the U.S. strongly supports the GOL's efforts to combat terrorism through the UNSCR 1267 mechanism, it has been compelled to put holds on many of the GOL's submissions because of shortcomings in the format of the GOL's submissions and insufficient evidentiary information. Previous engagement on this issue with the MFA and Libya's UN delegation had yielded limited results.

¶4. (S) Szubin said the U.S. believes Libya's implementation of UNSCR 1267 designations had been strong and wants to support Libya's UNSCR 1267 listing submissions; however, USG standards for biographical and evidentiary data had not been met to date. By way of example, Libya's initial submission of 74 names in August 2004 had been badly formatted and only three of the 12 names Libya submitted in May 2005 were ultimately added to the Consolidated List. Stipulating that the primary burden for generating information and properly formatting GOL listing requests might rest with Libya's security organizations and MFA, respectively, and not with its economic and finance ministries, Szubin noted that he would be discussing this issue in a mtg with the MFA later that day. (Note: Copies of draft Statements of Case for LIFG leaders were passed in the subsequent meeting with MFA officials. End note.) He assured his interlocutors that OFAC stood ready to assist the GOL in its efforts to craft submissions that secured designation of individuals who were of concern to the GOL. The key issue from the U.S. perspective was to facilitate good communication between the GOL's security agencies and MFA and the USG and UN to obtain sufficient information about terrorist financiers to support listing them under UNSCR 1267. Ideally, we would like to see all Libyan listing requests succeed. It appeared that, in part because of U.S. holds on Libyan submissions, Libya had placed holds on several U.S. submissions for listing. Here, too, the problem was not/not a difference in the two sides' objectives, but a lack of communication.

¶5. (C) Stressing that the proper channels for coordination on UNSCR 1267 issues were the MFA and Libya's UN delegation, U/S Treybil affirmed the GOL's interest in cooperating with the U.S. to refine its submissions. He assured Szubin that relevant authorities (the security organizations and MFA) would pass any needed information to the U.S. Noting that the GOL had been ahead of the curve in arguing for more robust counter-terrorism (CT) efforts in the 1990's, he said Libya had adopted a number of national measures to facilitate CT efforts, particularly with respect to increased monitoring of bank transactions and financial activity.

¶6. (C) Libyan NSC Economic Affairs Director al-Jamal highlighted anti-money laundering laws (Law Number 2 of 2005) as an example of Libya's efforts on CT finance, and shared that the Ministry of Finance Auditing Department played a key role in monitoring financial transactions and money-laundering. (Note: Our previous understanding was that the Central Bank led those efforts and that MinFin's role was marginal. End note.) The Central Bank's Abu Sneina explained the GOL's mechanism for distributing information within Libya's financial system about individuals and entities designated under UNSCR 1267: the MFA's International Organization Department (MFA/IO) conveys the information to the CB's Banking Supervision and Exchange Control Department, which then circulates the information to Libya's state-owned and semi-private banks. Banks theoretically inform the CB if any AQ or Taliban designees are determined to have conducted transactions through Libyan banks; the CB then passes

that information to MFA/IO and Libya's UN Mission. The CB's Banking Supervision and Exchange Control Department also plays a lead role in implementing anti-money laundering guidelines issued by a special national anti-money laundering committee operating under the auspices of the General People's Congress (Parliament-equivalent). The CB's Financial Crimes Unit was the principal point of contact for banks to report suspicious transactions. NSC Adviser Siala stressed the GOL's interest in obtaining U.S. training in areas such as CT finance and banking controls.

¶7. (C) External Security Organization (ESO) official Nasser Ashur stressed the need for transparency and reciprocity in sharing information. Libya's laws and regulations complied with international standards and the GOL therefore insisted on full

cooperation and transparency. Stressing the links between money laundering, corruption and CT finance, he complained about the lack of responsiveness of Italian and U.S. authorities in two recent and widely publicized corruption cases. The first involved an alleged plot by Libyan defense procurement officials to obtain via Italian brokers large numbers of assault rifles from China, ostensibly for re-export to Iraq. Complaining that requests to Italian and Swiss authorities for further information had gone unanswered, Ashur claimed the GOL's investigation had demonstrated that the defense procurement officials had acted properly and that the arms contracts were above board. The second case involved allegations that Norwegian StatOil officials paid bribes in the millions of dollars to Libyan officials to secure hydrocarbon exploration and production sharing contracts. Stressing that the GOL needed more information to pursue its investigation of Libyan officials implicated in the case, Ashur complained that Libya's requests in intelligence channels for further information about the case from the Department of Justice had gone unanswered. Noting that law enforcement channels can sometimes move slowly, Szubin encouraged the GOL to submit appropriate requests for information to the Department of Treasury's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), FinCEN, as well.

IRAN SANCTIONS ISSUES & CONCERNS ABOUT LIBYAN BANKS' ACTIVITIES

¶8. (C) On efforts to increase pressure on Iran to prompt compliance with WMD-related UNSCR's, Szubin raised concern about Libyan-owned or affiliated banks in third countries agreeing to conduct transactions with Iranian banks and other entities. Iran's established practice of moving funds for WMD development and terrorist programs under false names and front companies had prompted the world's responsible banks to refrain from dealing with Iranian banks. International sanctions efforts under the auspices of four UNSCR's had made it difficult for Iran to find international banks to hold its accounts and issue letters of credit for its transactions. In addition, the Financial Action Task Force recently issued a third warning urging vigilance with respect to dealing with Iranian banks. Szubin urged the GOL to do all it could to ensure that foreign banks owned by, or affiliated with, the Libyan Foreign Bank were exercising due caution in dealing with Iranian banks. The danger for Libya was that a small bank exposed to bad practices or corrupt dealings by Iranian banks could lead to repercussions against Libyan-owned financial entities and the perception that the GOL had not taken seriously its commitments under relevant UNSCRs to enforce sanctions against Iran.

GOL ADOPTS UNHELPFUL APPROACH

¶9. (C) ESO official Ashur and NSC official al-Jamal argued that large numbers of European companies and banks continued to deal

with Iran. Adopting a legalistic approach, al-Jamal argued that small European banks in which Libya had ownership stakes were subject to the oversight of European central banks, which bore responsibility for issuing and implementing regulations to ensure compliance with Iran-related strictures. Libyan-owned banks operated under joint directorships; their boards took decisions based on the banks' commercial interests.

Pushing back, Szubin stressed that most major European banks had determined that the risks of dealing with Iranian banks were too great to bear because of Iran's pervasive lack of transparency. The U.S. does not want to see Libyan-owned banks moving to fill the vacuum of Iran's banking needs for commercial reasons. The potential long-term risks for Libya's financial sector and international reputation were considerable, outweighing (in the U.S. view) any potential short-term business gains.

¶10. (U) OFAC Director Szubin's party cleared this message.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI917

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI917 aka Wikileaks id #180303 ?
Subject	HEAD OF LIBYA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD: U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS NOT JUST ABOUT OIL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 14:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI917.html
References	08TRIPOLI227
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI937 , 09TRIPOLI386 , 09TRIPOLI40
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0377
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0917/01 3311453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261453Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4182
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0938
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0625
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0765
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0819
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0675
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0362
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1315
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0476
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0019
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4704
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000917

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , KMPI *[Middle East Partnership Initiative]* , EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HEAD OF LIBYA'S ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD: U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS NOT JUST ABOUT OIL

REF: TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The head of Libya's national economic planning apparatus and the effort to implement Muammar al-Qadhafi's vision for government restructuring and privatization told the visiting NEA/MAG Director that a new, commonly agreed frame of

reference for U.S.-Libya relations that took into account more than oil was needed. Libya's strategic location, aversion to extremist iterations of Islam and hydrocarbon resources will make it increasingly important in the coming decade. The U.S. would do well to focus more on cultivating people-to-people relationships by engaging more on health care, education, technology and training, and should not expect "all or nothing" from Libya by way of its political and economic choices. Libya needed to diversify its economy beyond oil and develop its human resources, and wants to place more students in U.S. universities for undergraduate and graduate study. Libya would also like to attract greater foreign direct investment in its technology and health care sectors; he expects U.S. universities will be able to establish satellite campuses in Libya soon. On plans to implement government restructuring and privatization, he conceded that "everyone is confused", does not expect greater clarity by year's end, and does not expect real change to be implemented before the second quarter of 2009. On reports that education would be privatized, he expected that basic education would continue to be free of charge and that the General People's Committee for Higher Education (ministry-equivalent) would remain in place, but said the GPC for Basic Education could be dismantled and replaced by a government-run accreditation and inspection system for primary and secondary schools. Plans are underway with Georgetown, Princeton, Harvard and Yale for a series of DVC's for Muammar al-Qadhafi End summary.

LIBYA: "PRECIOUS" IN TERMS OF OIL RESERVES AND STRATEGIC LOCATION

¶2. (C) Visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams met with Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, Chair of Libya's Economic Development Board and head of the National Planning Commission, on November 5.
Williams was accompanied by the CDA, A/DCM and Econoff. In his typical professorial fashion, Jibril framed his remarks in broad historical and geostrategic terms: the Arab Gulf region will witness greater instability in the coming decade because of demographic pressures, increased extremism, greater competition for hydrocarbon resources from Russia, China and India, and a new generation of (implicitly) less competent leaders. Jibril's "hunch" is that Libya will become "more precious" in coming years by dint of its relatively virgin hydrocarbon resources, aversion to extremist iterations of Islam and strategic proximity to Europe. He referenced the Libya-EU partnership negotiations currently underway and also Libya's efforts to forge a new foreign policy with Russia (including al-Gadhafi's recent trip to Moscow).

U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP SHOULD BE REASSESSED: IT'S NOT JUST ABOUT OIL

¶3. (C) Arguing that the U.S.-Libya relationship needs "a common frame of reference", Jibril offered that the U.S. approaches relationships as economic and transactional, whereas Arab culture puts a premium on tribal ties in which gifts are given and expected, but not asked for or stipulated. He offered the example of Kissinger perceiving Anwar Sadat as being a "clown" because he did not ask the U.S. for anything when he expelled Soviet advisors from Egypt. Jibril stressed that as an Arab, Sadat did not feel he needed to ask for anything because the U.S. should have perceived that he had offered something and reciprocated of its own accord. Jibril argued that a new perspective, particularly from the Department, was needed that took into account more than oil. Informed by Libya's rich culture and long history, a new generation of Libyans is emerging and there is real potential for civil society development.

¶4. (C) Arguing that there had been "too much talk and not enough deeds" in the U.S-Libya relationship since ties were re-established in 2004, Jibril urged the U.S. to focus to a greater extent on cultivating people-to-people relationships by engaging more on health care, education, technology and training. Our globalized world is characterized by diversity
(which he defined as mutual respect for the choices of others) and multiplicity of choices (economic decisions are not as politically-charged as they used to be because economic actors have more choices). A frame of reference that encompasses culture and economics is needed. Cautioning the U.S. against expecting "all or nothing" from Libya by way of political and economic choices, he stressed that developing countries are increasingly taking an ala carte (vice prix fixe) approach to political-economic choices.

THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS & THE TIMELINE FOR LIBYAN GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING

¶5. (C) Responding to a question about how the global financial crisis was affecting Libya's plans for government restructuring and privatization, Jibril said the government was developing contingency plans for three possible scenarios: 1) a one to three year dip in oil prices and a global recession; 2) a global recession leading to a depression; and, 3) a global recession and a relatively quick recovery. He believed global stability could be achieved within one to three years, but predicted a recurrence of the crisis after the initial recovery due to the gap between industrial age economic theories and policies and the postmodern technological revolution, particularly in the financial

policies and the postmodern technological revolution, particularly in the financial sector. The world had transitioned in the late 20th century from a "work creates wealth" to a "wealth creates wealth" model; we therefore need to better regulate and control the critical financial system. He noted that the world's 66,000 multi-national companies can produce much more than the world's population can consume. He dismissed current efforts to resolve the global financial crisis as being merely "painkillers", and argued that deeper reforms are needed in the international system.

¶6. (C) Responding to the assertion that potential investors in Libya are confused about myriad, ill-defined plans for restructuring and privatization first articulated by Muammar al-Qadhafi in March (reftel), Jibril conceded that " ... everybody is confused!" Noting that the five committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's reform vision had considered many options, he stressed that the critical thing was to get the final decision on a course of action right. (Note: Addressing rumors that Jibril had lost his position as head of the EDB, EDB official Khaled Bezaylia told us shortly before the meeting that Jibril had relinquished management of day-to-day operations over the summer to chair a supra-committee that coordinates the efforts of the five committees tasked with implementing al-Qadhafi's vision. End note.). Confirming reports from other contacts, Jibril flatly stated that nothing had been decided with respect to restructuring and privatization. He said he expected the "period of ambiguity" to last until at least year's end, and did not expect major changes to take place during the first quarter of 2009. He offered that some GOL officials have argued for delaying restructuring/privatization in light of the global financial crisis, while others believe it is actually an ideal time to take steps to restructure the government.

ECONOMIC DIVERSIFICATION, EDUCATION REFORM & HUMAN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT ARE KEY

¶7. (C) Dr. Jibril said he expected oil prices to pick up, but not to reach the USD100/barrel mark. He took this as a sign that Libya needed to diversify its economy beyond oil and to develop its human resources. Libya is keenly interested in placing more students in U.S. universities for undergraduate and graduate study. The EDB plans to send 60-70 graduate students to the U.S. to pursue MA's and PhD's, with the idea that they would constitute a nucleus of competence in key ministries and serve as catalysts for change until the rest of the government can be reformed. As an example, MA and PhD students in political science would be fast-tracked into key positions in the MFA. The EDB would like to send many of them to Georgetown University; it has independent funding for the program and intends to pursue it regardless of broader restructuring efforts. Williams noted the Secretary's keen interest in Education, stressing that a partnership between the GOL and AMIDEAST would help facilitate placement of larger numbers of Libyan students in American universities and improve English language instruction available in Libya. Noting ongoing discussions with AMIDEAST, Jibril added that the EDB is collaborating with the British Embassy to send 70 judges to the U.K. for training in British court procedures. A/DCM informed him that the U.S. is working with the General People's Committee (ministry-equivalent) for Justice to facilitate training and engagement under the MEPI-funded Commercial Development Law Program (CLDP). Jibril noted that such efforts would help counteract the stereotype that the U.S. is only interested in oil.

¶8. (C) Jibril said Libya is looking for U.S. companies with which to partner in all technology development, hospital management and human resources development, and was considering different incentive mechanisms. In terms of restructuring the healthcare system, Dr. Jibril said Libya is evaluating systems in the United Arab Emirates, Sweden, and the UK as possible models. Williams noted that Cornell Medical Center's presence in Doha could offer a good exemplar and point of reference for those efforts. Offsets for foreign direct investment in the health care sector had also attracted significant investment and development in the UAE. Partnerships between U.S. universities and the UAE and Qatar also afforded models for potential parallel arrangements in Libya. On reports that the GOL plans to privatize its universities as part of the broader restructuring program, Jibril said many options were under consideration, including programs for scholarships and loans for higher education. He expected that basic education would continue to be free of charge and thought the General People's Committee for Higher Education (ministry-equivalent) would remain in place, but said the GPC for Basic Education could be dismantled and replaced by a government-run accreditation and inspection system for primary and secondary schools.

¶9. (C) Jibril also outlined a program of Digital Video Conferences (DVC's) the EDB was coordinating with Georgetown, Princeton, Harvard and Yale universities, which would kick off in early 2009 and feature Muammar al-Qadhafi (in a reprise of his 2006 DVC with Columbia University).

STEVENS

Media

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI918

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI918 aka Wikileaks id #180326 ?
Subject	LIBYA: WE ARE AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR FOR SOMALIA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 15:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI918.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI935
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0484
OO RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0918/01 3311544
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 261544Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4185
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0020
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI PRIORITY 0006
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1318
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0678
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0822
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0768
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0941
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0628
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4707
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000918

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/E, AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SO *[Somalia]* , DJ *[Djibouti]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: WE ARE AN EFFECTIVE MEDIATOR FOR SOMALIA

REF: A) STATE 123635, B) NET-CENTRIC DIPLOMACY EMAIL DATED 11/19/2008

TRIPOLI 00000918 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan officials were evasive on whether the GOL had agreed to offer financial support to Somalia's

Transitional Federal Government (TFG) - they suggested that Libya would not be in a position to deny "humanitarian assistance" to its "Somali brothers" - during the recent visit to Tripoli of TFG President Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. They argued that Libya's strong cultural, religious, and historical ties to Somalia enable it to play a uniquely effective role in mediating Somali affairs, and that Yusuf's approach al-Qadhafi for assistance, to include possibly shifting the venue for negotiations from Djibouti to Tripoli, was consistent with the latter's role as a proven negotiator and wise man on the African continent. End summary.

¶2. (C) A/DCM delivered reftel demarche on November 25 to Asseid Nuha, Deputy Director of the MFA's Arab Affairs Office, and Idriss Abu Dib, Senior Adviser in the MFA's Arab Affairs Office. (Note: Abu Dib was Libya's Ambassador to Mogadishu from 2003-2007. End note.) Defending Libya's role in negotiations between Somalia's Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS) and the TFG, Nuha claimed Libya was the only country that had maintained its embassy there throughout the violence. Libya's special interest in Somalia stemmed from the two countries' shared history of Italian colonial occupation and the fact that Somalia is Arab, Islamic, African and a member of CEN-SAD. Libya has "deep knowledge" of internal Somali affairs by dint of historical ties and its robust official presence there. (Note: We've heard reports that the Libyan mission in Mogadishu numbers several hundred individuals, with various organizational affiliations. End note.)

EVASIVE ON FINANCIAL SUPPORT

¶3. (C) Nuha was evasive in responding to A/DCM's conveyance of reftel points urging the GOL to not/not extend financial support to President Yusuf. He claimed no direct knowledge of such a request from Yusuf to al-Qadhafi, but stressed that the meeting between the two was at the head-of-state level and suggested that if financial assistance had been provided, it would not have been inappropriate given Libya's longstanding relationship with Somalia and its efforts to promote political solutions to ongoing violence there. At conversation's end, Nuha circled back to the issue of finances, adding that Libya would not be in a position to deny "humanitarian assistance" and funds for same to the "Somali brothers."

IT IS NATURAL TO HELP OUR ARAB BROTHERS

¶4. (C) According to Nuha, Libya sees TFG President Yusuf as the legally-elected president and legitimate representative of Somalia. It was therefore entirely appropriate that he was received in Tripoli and met with Muammar al-Qadhafi. Arab affairs are tribal and familial and it is "natural" that Libya would want to help its "Arab brothers" in Somalia. Many African leaders have turned to al-Qadhafi for wisdom and counsel - in Chad and Darfur, for example - and the Leader takes his leadership role in Africa seriously. President Yusuf had requested the Leader's help in moving Somali negotiations forward, to include specifically asking that ARS-TFG negotiations be moved from Djibouti to Tripoli. Yusuf extended an invitation through al-Qadhafi for a senior Libyan delegation to visit Mogadishu to assess the situation on the ground and the feasibility of moving talks from Djibouti to Tripoli. (Note: our interlocutors did not indicate whether Libya intended to take Yusuf up on his offer. End note.)

LIBYA WANTS "STABILITY AND PEACE" IN SOMALIA

¶5. (C) The critical point, Nuha emphasized, was that Libya endeavors to achieve "stability and peace" in Somalia. Libya is willing to engage in dialogue with anyone who can help reach that goal; the path by which such success was achieved was inconsequential. Citing his experience in Mogadishu, Abu Dib stressed that all parties had to participate in negotiations -

regardless of venue (i.e., Djibouti or Tripoli) - if they were to have a chance of achieving a durable solution. He viewed Yusuf as being relatively weak in Somali politics by dint of the

TRIPOLI 00000918 002.2 OF 002

fact that he is from Puntland's Darod clan and therefore lacks a base in Mogadishu, where the Hawaye enjoy strong support. Abu Dib and Nuha argued that Libya could be a credible mediator between Hawaye and Darod.

¶6. (C) Comment: This meeting was our first with these interlocutors. Former ambassador to Mogadishu Abu Dib, in particular, was keen to show his extensive knowledge of the problems facing Somalia. Talking at length in near professorial tones, he recounted in impressive detail the history of tribal alliances through the years, and attributed Somalia's persistent political morass to tribal conflict, corruption, and power relationships. He argued that a key problem was the inability of Somalis to think beyond their own interests and those of their clans, a necessary precondition for broader political compromise that addressed national concerns. Their argument that Libya's longstanding involvement in and knowledge of sub-Saharan African affairs justify its mediation in Somalia parallels the GOL's position regarding its efforts in Chad and Darfur, where its track record has been mixed. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI919

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI919 aka Wikileaks id #180346 ?
Subject	NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 16:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI919.html
References	08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI577 , 08TRIPOLI819
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0582
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0919 3311633
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261633Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4187
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1320
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0680
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0824
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0770
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0943
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0630
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4709
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000919

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON), DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM) AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

REF: A) TRIPOLI 819 , B) TRIPOLI 472 , C) TRIPOLI 280 , D) TRIPOLI 577

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) In a meeting with Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Yusuf Sawani, visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams urged the GOL to release detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi without conditions and facilitate his travel abroad for medical care if he chose to pursue that. Williams, accompanied by A/DCM, PAO and Econoff, met with Sawani

Williams, accompanied by A/DCM, PAO and Econoff, met with Sawani on November 6. Williams acknowledged the release of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who is critically ill with cancer, from detention on October 8 (ref A) as a positive development and urged that the QDF help facilitate his travel abroad for needed medical care. Noting the interest of EU member states, she urged the QDF to do all it could to encourage the Government of Libya (GOL) to release the ten other members of Boufayed's group, who were arrested on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Martyrs' Square in February 2007 and sentenced to lengthy prison terms earlier this year (ref B).

¶2. (C) Reprising arguments we've heard before, Sawani argued that el-Jahmi was mentally unstable and his own worst enemy. The QDF had made repeated efforts to secure his release, but he and his family had refused to take the steps necessary to facilitate that. (Note: As reported ref C and previous, el-Jahmi has rejected any conditions for his release, and has refused to permit his son, Muhammad, to sign an agreement that he would refrain from political statements and discussing his detention if he were released. End note.) El-Jahmi's U.S.-based brother, Muhammad el-Jahmi, had exploited Fathi el-Jahmi's case to pursue a political vendetta against al-Qadhafi and the GOL, Sawani said. Sawani denied reports that the regime was quietly seeking to influence the el-Jahmi tribe to disown Fathi el-Jahmi as a precursor to liquidating him. He stressed that the most senior levels of the GOL, including security officials, are aware of and invested in el-Jahmi's case, which made it difficult for the QDF to play a positive role. On Boufayed, Sawani said the QDF was working to secure his passport and permission for him to travel. He was noncommital on the possibility that the ten members of the Boufayed group remaining in detention would be released soon.

¶3. (C) Separately, Sawani said talks between the QDF and imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) were continuing and that release of a further tranche of LIFG members was expected by year's end, possibly in connection with the upcoming Eid al-Adha holiday. (Note: As reported ref D, tranches of 131 and 40 LIFG members were released in April and June, respectively, in connection with talks under the auspices of the QDF. End note.) Acknowledging reports that there had been "handicaps" to efforts to reintegrate former LIFG members into Libyan society after their release, he stressed the QDF's emphasis on "transitional justice", i.e., financial compensation, restitution of legal and property rights and help with job placement for those released. The extent to which former LIFG members are able to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into Libyan society would bear on Libya's domestic political reform efforts, he said. Accordingly, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and Chairman of the QDF, continued to play a role in the ongoing discussions with imprisoned LIFG members. He expressed hope that the new U.S. administration would continue to pursue bilateral U.S.-Libya ties in the same spirit of cooperation that had recently obtained, warning that if it did not, the GOL would not continue to support QDF initiatives such as the LIFG talks. (Comment: Sawani implied, but did not say, that the QDF's ability to intermediate on human rights issues would be further circumscribed if the GOL perceived pressure from the U.S.. End comment.)

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI920

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI920 aka Wikileaks id #180353 ?
Subject	NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Nov 2008 16:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI920.html
References	08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI577 , 08TRIPOLI819
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI923
History	First published on Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0583
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0920 3311650
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261650Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4188
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1321
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0681
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0825
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0771
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0944
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0631
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4710
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000920

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON), DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM) AND S/CT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/26/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEA/MAG DIRECTOR DISCUSSES HUMAN RIGHTS AND LIFG NEGOTIATIONS WITH QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION

REF: A) TRIPOLI 819 , B) TRIPOLI 472 , C) TRIPOLI 280 , D) TRIPOLI 577

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) In a meeting with Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Yusuf Sawani, visiting NEA/MAG Director Stephanie Williams urged the GOL to release detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi without conditions and facilitate

his travel abroad for medical care if he chose to pursue that. Williams, accompanied by A/DCM, PAO and Econoff, met with Sawani on November 6. She acknowledged the release of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who is critically ill with cancer, from detention on October 8 (ref A) as a positive development and urged that the QDF help facilitate his travel abroad for needed medical care. Noting the interest of EU member states, she urged the QDF to do all it could to encourage the Government of Libya (GOL) to release the ten other members of Boufayed's group, who were arrested on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Martyrs' Square in February 2007 and sentenced to lengthy prison terms earlier this year (ref B).

¶2. (C) Reprising arguments we've heard before, Sawani argued that el-Jahmi was mentally unstable and his own worst enemy. The QDF had made repeated efforts to secure his release, but he and his family had refused to take the steps necessary to facilitate that. (Note: As reported ref C and previous, el-Jahmi has rejected any conditions for his release, and has refused to permit his son, Muhammad, to sign an agreement that he would refrain from political statements and discussing his detention if he were released. End note.) El-Jahmi's U.S.-based brother, Muhammad el-Jahmi, had exploited Fathi el-Jahmi's case to pursue a political vendetta against al-Qadhafi and the GOL, Sawani said. Sawani denied reports that the regime was quietly seeking to influence the el-Jahmi tribe to disown Fathi el-Jahmi as a precursor to liquidating him. He stressed that the most senior levels of the GOL, including security officials, are aware of and invested in el-Jahmi's case, which made it difficult for the QDF to play a positive role. On Boufayed, Sawani said the QDF was working to secure his passport and permission for him to travel. He was noncommital on the possibility that the ten members of the Boufayed group remaining in detention would be released soon.

¶3. (C) Separately, Sawani said talks between the QDF and imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) were continuing and that release of a further tranche of LIFG members was expected by year's end, possibly in connection with the upcoming Eid al-Adha holiday. (Note: As reported ref D, tranches of 131 and 40 LIFG members were released in April and June, respectively, in connection with talks under the auspices of the QDF. End note.) Acknowledging reports that there had been "handicaps" to efforts to reintegrate former LIFG members into Libyan society after their release, he stressed the QDF's emphasis on "transitional justice", i.e., financial compensation, restitution of legal and property rights and help with job placement for those released. The extent to which former LIFG members are able to be rehabilitated and reintegrated into Libyan society would bear on Libya's domestic political reform efforts, he said. Accordingly, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and Chairman of the QDF, continued to play a role in the ongoing discussions with imprisoned LIFG members. Sawani expressed hope that U.S.-Libya relations would continue in the spirit of cooperation that had recently obtained, saying the GOL would otherwise cease its support for QDF initiatives like the LIFG talks. (Comment: Sawani implied, but did not say, that the QDF's ability to mediate on human rights issues would be further circumscribed if the GOL sensed it was subject to external pressure. End comment.)

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI921

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI921 aka Wikileaks id #180631 ?
Subject	LIBYA SEEKS TO DOWNPLAY TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 30 Nov 2008 14:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/11/08TRIPOLI921.html
References	08TRIPOLI530 , 08TRIPOLI679 , 08TRIPOLI889
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI19
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2427
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0921/01 3351452
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 301452Z NOV 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4189
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1322
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0682
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0826
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0772
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0632
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0945
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0149
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY 0005
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4711
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000921

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , ASEC *[Security]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]* , SA *[Saudi Arabia]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SEEKS TO DOWNPLAY TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA

REF: A) TRIPOLI 889 , B) TRIPOLI 679 , C) TRIPOLI 530

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In an apparent response to persistent reports

by opposition and international media about tribal violence in Kufra, an oasis town located in southeastern Libya, the Government of Libya (GOL) recently staged a meeting in which tribal leaders pledged loyalty to Muammar al-Qadhafi and orchestrated a tightly-controlled visit to the town by selected journalists. The GOL's reaction - a heavy response by security forces, a press blackout during the events, and carefully managed revisionist press reports that blame foreign media for distorting facts - is similar to the tack it took in response to the Benghazi riots in 2006. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) According to the state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA), GOL officials staged in Kufra on November 20 a meeting of Toubou tribal leaders, who pledged their personal allegiance to Muammar al-Qadhafi and his Jamahiriya political philosophy, and rejected as externally-generated propaganda reports that there had been violent clashes between Toubou tribesmen (which include Chadian and Libyan citizens) and Zawiya tribesmen (who are ethnically Arab) in early November (ref A). In a meeting broadcast on television by JANA, Toubou leaders rejected the Norway-based Toubou Front for the Salvation of Libya (TFSL) and its leader Issa Abd al-Majid Mansour, calling the latter "corrupt and irresponsible" and saying the TFSL did not/not speak for Toubous. They dismissed reports in international media based on information from the TFSL as "media excitement aiming to mislead public opinion". In a statement at the meeting's conclusion, Toubou leaders hailed al-Qadhafi as " ... the maker of the historic glories, the wise man of Africa, the founder of its unity and the strong advocate of its security, stability and freedom". The statement also called on Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of and potential heir to Muammar al-Qadhafi, to continue his project for Libyan youth and to remain involved in the country's affairs. (Note: In a speech to the Third Annual Libyan Youth Forum on August 20, Saif al-Islam said he had achieved his major goals and intended to withdraw from politics. End note.)

¶3. (C) Reports of the Toubou tribal leaders' gathering were carried widely in state-owned Libyan press, which also publicized a visit to Kufra by journalists on November 20, organized by GOL officials to coincide with the Toubous' meeting. Participation in the trip was tightly-controlled - locally-based correspondents for al-Jazeera and the BBC were not allowed to go. Correspondents for the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) and Maghreb News Agency (strictly protect source) learned about the trip beforehand and asked to go, but were declined permission to do so by Libya's Foreign Media Authority, which told them the trip was by invitation only. Reuters stringer Salah Serrai (strictly protect), who participated in the trip, said 20-25 journalists - mostly from Libyan state-owned news - took part in the one-day visit. Journalists were given "an unofficial tour" of Kufra, but did not have an opportunity to speak with anyone independent of their GOL minders. Serrai, who had visited Kufra previously to report on World Food Program efforts to stage food shipments into Darfur, said shops and schools were open (we'd heard previously that some had begun to re-open in mid-November) and that signs of damage were not obvious in the areas they visited. (Note: Contacts at businesses with offices in Kufra said a major clean-up operation had been begun immediately after the worst violence ended on/about November 14. End note.)

¶4. (C) In the aftermath of the press corps' visit, state-owned media characterized the clashes as "a minor incident between young members from two tribes in the town" and said reports of violence had been inflated by international news organizations. Toubou tribal leader Juma Maly was quoted as saying that the clashes were "quickly resolved by elderly tribal leaders and civic figures". As reported ref A, contacts suggested the violence began on/about November 2 and lasted in earnest for at least a week. There were reports on/about November 14 that while the situation was largely under control, there were still sporadic clashes between Toubous, Zawiya tribesmen and GOL

sporadic clashes between Toubous, Zawiya tribesmen and GOL security forces. Contacts reported that more than 30 people were killed and several hundred injured.

¶5. (C) Comment: As in parallel cases such as the 2006 riots in

TRIPOLI 00000921 002 OF 002

Benghazi, the GOL suppressed real-time coverage of recent events in Kufra and has since rolled out a carefully managed series of revisionist reports in state-owned media that minimized the extent of the conflict, blamed foreign media and opposition for exaggerated reports and highlighted pledges of loyalty to al-Qadhafi. The clear premium is on maintaining the appearance of political order, underscoring the ostensibly universal popularity of al-Qadhafi's rule and minimizing any hint of ethnic or tribal tension. The latter is a neuralgic issue for a regime that, despite its professions of tolerance, publicly (and inaccurately) maintains that Libya is an ethnically and religiously homogeneous state of Arabs. As reported ref C, al-Qadhafi privately told Berber leaders in May that " ... you can call yourselves whatever you want inside your homes -- Berbers, Children of Satan, whatever -- but you are only Libyans when you leave your homes". End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI923

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI923 aka Wikileaks id #180713 ?
Subject	GOL SEEKS TO TURN THE PAGE ON LINGERING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 1 Dec 2008 10:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI923.html
References	08TRIPOLI882 , 08TRIPOLI920
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2821
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0923/01 3361044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011044Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4194
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1324
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0684
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0828
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0774
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0947
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0634
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4716
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000923

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL SEEKS TO TURN THE PAGE ON LINGERING HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 882 , B) TRIPOLI 920

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A group of older political prisoners, many of whom are in ill health, may be released soon in connection with talks that have taken place under the auspices of the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF). Separately, the GOL and QDF may soon significantly raise the amount of compensation offered to families of individuals killed in the 1996 Abu Salim prison riot to help secure an agreement with them to bring their legal claims to an end. Both developments are part of an effort by the GOL to pave the way for the celebration on September 1, 2009 of the 40th

for the celebration on September 1, 2009 of the 40th anniversary of the military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. Bringing some sense of closure to the Abu Salim issue would be an important step as Libya moves forward with a broader agenda of (vaguely defined) political and economic reform in the run-up to the September 1 festivities. End summary.

A GROUP OF POLITICAL PRISONERS MAY BE RELEASED SOON

¶2. (C) Muhammad Tarnesh (strictly protect), Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), told us on November 26 that the Government of Libya may release "within days" a tranche of 40-60 political prisoners. Talks about the potential release have been ongoing for nearly two months and have taken place under the auspices of the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), reportedly with the personal involvement of Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, head of the QDF's Human Rights Committee. Noting that many, if not most, of the prisoners were older and in poor health, he said they had been carefully vetted by GOL security services, who were confident that they would not take up unwelcome political activities. While a few had made "full political conversions" and renounced their opposition to al-Qadhafi's regime, most were being released simply so they could seek medical treatment, with the understanding that they were "too old and too broken" to pose a threat. Drawing a parallel with the case of regime critic Idriss Boufayed (ref A and previous), who was released well after it was known that he was suffering from terminal lung cancer, Tarnesh expressed the hope that the QDF and HRSL could in time get the GOL to release political prisoners "before they're on their deathbeds".

POTENTIAL MOVEMENT ON ABU SALIM MASSACRE NEGOTIATIONS

¶3. (C) Separately, Tarnesh said there had recently been movement on negotiations between the GOL, QDF and families of the victims of those killed in the Abu Salim prison riots. (Note: Prisoners staged a demonstration in 1996 at Abu Salim prison, near Tripoli, a facility run by military place under oversight by the Internal Security Organization at which a large number of political prisoners are held. According to opposition website reports, the GOL responded with massive force, herding inmates into a central courtyard and opening fire with automatic weapons. Some reports put the number killed at 1,200. End note.) Libyan state-owned media and on the QDF's website reported that the GOL offered 120,000 Libyan dinars (approximately USD 97,000) in compensation to each victim's family in August. Tarnesh, who has been involved in the negotiations as an adviser to the QDF, estimated the total number of families to be 1,100-1,200, and said that a number of families - many of whom have sought to bring legal action against the GOL - had rejected the amount as too small, pointing to other cases in which victims' families had obtained much larger settlements -- notably the families of the Benghazi children infected with the AIDS virus, who received one million Libyan dinars per child. (Note: The principle of compensation for lost family members is deeply ingrained in Libya's predominantly tribal society and, as seen in recent cases involving the Bulgarian nurses, the Italy-Libya colonial compensation agreement and compensation for U.S. victims of Libyan-sponsored terrorism, plays a prominent role in Libya's approach to foreign policy as well. End note.)

¶4. (C) Tarnesh argued that two things need to happen to unstick the negotiations, which have been heavily featured in externally-based opposition website reports: 1) the GOL should increase the amount of compensation offered to families, and; 2) families must abandon claims for "unreasonable" sums. Tarnesh said there is increasing awareness by GOL and QDF officials that the amount of compensation will have to be raised. Based on his consultations with the families, Tarnesh has recommended to GOL and QDF officials that 500,000 LD (approximately USD 405,000) would be an appropriate amount. He believes a counter-offer on

that order will be made to the families in the coming weeks. Many of the holdout families are from Benghazi. Noting eastern

TRIPOLI 00000923 002 OF 002

Libyans' reputation as being willfully obstinate, he complained that some of the families were "simple-minded and greedy". Some have sought the HRSL's assistance in contacting the International Criminal Court (ICC) to determine whether they might be able to pursue a case with the ICC. Tarnesh has tried to discourage them from doing so, arguing that there is a robust negotiations process in place and a sufficient architecture between the QDF and the GOL to facilitate a compromise and compensation. His counsel to both sides, he said, has been that 12 years have passed since the Abu Salim massacre and that "we all need to benefit from that passage of time, compromise and move on".

GOL/QDF SEEK TO CLEAR THE DECKS OF LINGERING ISSUES

¶5. (C) Framing efforts to secure the release of political prisoners and compensation for families of those killed in the Abu Salim massacre, Tarnesh said the GOL (and by, proxy, the QDF) was trying to turn the page on past contretemps in part to help pave the way for a raft of domestic political initiatives it plans to undertake next year in the run-up to the 40th anniversary of the military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. In that regard, the initiatives were of a piece with recent projects to finalize an Italy-Libya colonial compensation deal and a U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, whose time has been increasingly divided as his role in economic reform and key foreign policy issues has expanded, has nonetheless continued to play an active role in negotiations over the release of political prisoners and Abu Salim. Tarnesh expressed concern that the GOL/QDF efforts were not born of a genuine desire for reconciliation, but rather of a pragmatic need to close nettlesome accounts. Drawing a comparison with South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he stressed that "Saif al-Islam is no Mandela". While Saif al-Islam, in Tarnesh's view, saw involvement in the political prisoner and Abu Salim issues as a way to demonstrate to skeptical old guard elements his ability to resolve difficult issues, the issues were sufficiently sensitive that he ran a considerable risk of incurring backlash from conservative regime elements.

¶6. (C) Comment: The Abu Salim massacre has been and remains a particularly emotive issue for Libyans. The GOL's silence for more than a decade on the matter has been cited by Libya's externally-based opposition as a sign of the regime's callous indifference. Bringing some sense of justice and closure to the issue could constitute an important step as Libya moves forward with a broader agenda of (vaguely defined) political and economic reform in the run-up to the September 1, 2009 anniversary. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI924

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI924 aka Wikileaks id #180745 ?
Subject	A RARE PEEK INSIDE LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 1 Dec 2008 12:54 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI924.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2947
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0924/01 3361254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011254Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4196
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0636
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0949
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0034
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0479
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0365
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4718
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000924

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: A RARE PEEK INSIDE LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION

REF: TRIPOLI 915

TRIPOLI 00000924 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting, a 15-year veteran of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) gave an insider's account of widespread dissatisfaction with NOC Chairman Shukri Ghanem's management style. Autocratic, jealous of his prerogatives and inclined to rely on a small, subservient team, Ghanem has driven many experienced managers into the private sector and allowed

key positions on the NOC's critical management committee to go unfilled, diminishing the NOC's administrative capacity. International oil companies (IOC's) have benefited to an extent by hiring some experienced former NOC employees; however, there are concerns that if the NOC's human capacity is denuded much further, it will cease to be a viable working partner. Ghanem's reluctance to meet regularly with IOC general managers and his lack of technical expertise have left him isolated and ill-informed at a critical juncture in which Libya is seeking to significantly expand oil production. End summary.

¶2. (C) P/E Assistant met with Karima el-Mshawet (strictly protect), a 15-year veteran of Libya's state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) on November 18. El-Mshawet started in the Financial Department, then moved to the Human Resources Department as a training program coordinator and currently works in the Internal Auditing Department. With around 700 employees, the NOC is responsible for all oil sector operations in Libya. It is developing a plan to realize optimum returns, exploit Libya's oil reserves (the largest in Africa), and operate and invest in those reserves. The NOC has publicly stated that it aspires to increase oil production from a current level of 1.7 million barrels/day to some 3.0 million barrels/day by 2012.

NOC WAS BETTER-MANAGED UNDER GHANEM'S PREDECESSOR

¶3. (C) According to Mshawet, the NOC was better managed and more active under its previous chairman, Abdullah Salem al-Badri (2004-2006), than under its current leader, Shukri Ghanem. Ghanem served as Prime Minister-equivalent in 2004-2006 before moving over to the NOC. El-Mshawet complained that since he took the helm, most NOC employees no longer have a clear idea of the organization's vision, mission or strategy. There is also greater fear that they could lose their jobs or be assigned to portfolios outside their areas of expertise. Ghanem is a mercurial personality and a number of people have been summarily sacked. In addition, the NOC's organizational chart has gone through several dramatic evolutions in recent years. The example of the gas department is illustrative of this point. There was previously a natural gas department; however the responsibilities of the department's personnel were never clear. The situation became even more muddled after the gas department was merged with the investment department; lack of clarity about who is responsible for what with respect to managing Libya's gas resources is seen as a key hindrance to the NOC's stated objective of increasing its natural gas production.

AUTOCRATIC STYLE DRIVES OUT EXPERIENCED LEADERS

¶4. (C) Changes in the ranks of the NOC's senior, experienced personnel due to personality conflicts with Ghanem have also taken a toll. Several former members of the NOC's key management committee who had repeatedly resisted entreaties from private sector employers have departed in recent years rather than continue working for Ghanem. Ahmed Aoun, former head of planning, studies and projects for the management committee, moved to Shell as a deputy managing director. Ibrahim Elsoul, former head of financial and administrative affairs for the management committee, took a job in banking in Tunis. NOC Vice Chairman Faraj Said is due to retire this year and, according to el-Mshawet, he probably will not stay any longer than he has to. ConocoPhillips GM Page Maxson (strictly protect) recently told us that IOC's were in a tough position. On the one hand, competent Libyan managers were at a premium; on the other, there was concern that Ghanem could drive out so many qualified staff that IOC's would no longer have a competent national authority (the NOC) with which to work, a critical problem in a country in which all work on oil and gas is run by the NOC.

¶5. (C) Ghanem's penchant for a small, tightly-controlled management structure, together with his autocratic style, have also limited opportunities for experienced NOC employees to

weigh in on key decisions. Under the current organizational chart, virtually all departments report directly to the chairman. In addition, the management committee has been dramatically reduced in size and now comprises only three officers in addition to the Chairman (Ghanem) and Vice Chairman

(Said): Azzam Ali Elmesallati, head of investment and joint ventures; Abdulkasim M. Zwary, head of marketing and manufacturing; and Omar Abdulkarim, head of exploration and production. Replacements for Aoun, former head of planning, and Elsoul, former head of finance - two key portfolios - have not been named. According to Mshawet, the prevailing view within the NOC is that Ghanem believes the management committee does not need more than three members beyond the chairman and vice-chairman rumor. Within the ranks of the NOC's professionals, Azzam Elmeslati is not seen as an influential person, said el-Mshawet, particularly since Ghanem takes key decisions on investments and joint ventures himself.

NOC'S HEAVY-HANDED APPROACH UNDERMINES HUMAN CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

¶6. (C) Human capacity remains a key limiting factor for the NOC, and an area in which Ghanem's leadership has been wanting. The NOC has a stated policy of developing indigenous capacity in the oil and gas sector, a policy supported by most IOC's as part of their corporate best practices, and virtually all contracts under the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric stipulate that companies will hire specific numbers of Libyans for particular types of technical jobs. Nonetheless, Libyan graduates, especially petroleum engineers, face problems finding jobs in foreign companies due to their limited English language skills and lack of IT and technical knowledge. By way of a partial remedy, the NOC has begun three different training programs for recent Libyan graduates in petroleum engineering, geology and geophysics, and accounting. The petroleum engineering training program takes 18 months, is offered continuously and has 100 engineers per class. The programs for accountants and for geologists and geophysicists have not been held as frequently, in part because those professionals are able to find work in other fields. The NOC has completed two cycles of training for geology and geophysics (with about 100 students per cadre) and two cycles for accounting (with about 50 students per cadre).

¶7. (C) The NOC pressures the IOC's to hire graduates of the three programs sight unseen; however, hard experience with ostensibly competent personnel who turned out to be unqualified has prompted the IOC's to insist on interviewing candidates for placement. As reported reftel, a new NOC pressure technique involves linking residence permits for expatriate IOC workers to decisions by IOC's to hire graduates of the three programs. The idea is that IOC's will be so desperate to obtain residence permits (a time-consuming and labor-intensive process at best), that they will concede to hiring the graduates sight unseen just to expedite the process; however, it appears that the effect so far has been to stiffen, rather than weaken, the resolve of the IOC's to resist the pressure.

¶8. (C) El-Mshawet said the NOC is aware that many of the graduates are not very capable, despite efforts by the NOC's training department to select the best they have to farm out to the IOC's. As training programs coordinator, Ms. Mshawet was in charge of selecting the personnel for the NOC's training programs. In order to be eligible for the program, candidates are required to meet certain requirements; however, during the last selection cycle, Ghanem insisted that a candidate who did not meet the standards (he was quite elderly and lacked the appropriate educational background) be enrolled in the program. When el-Mshawet refused to enroll him, Ghanem moved her to a different department. She expressed concern that despite the

different departments. She expressed concern that despite the IOC's understanding that Libya needs to develop its indigenous oil and gas management capacity and their desire to help with that project, Ghanem's management style and approach had alienated the IOC's and hurt potential cooperation on human capacity development in Libya's most critical economic sector. Libya's long period of isolation from the international community during the sanctions period and the deterioration of its educational system had made the problem particularly acute.

GHANEM VIEWED AS ISOLATED, ILL-INFORMED & NOT TECHNICALLY PROFICIENT

¶9. (C) Despite his eagerness to speak with the international media, particularly about OPEC production and macro-economic factors affecting oil and gas (other senior OPEC officials reportedly refer to him as "the Libyan media whore"), el-Mshawet said most NOC professionals share the view that Ghanem lacks the technical and management skills to properly manage the organization. IOC general managers (GM's) are almost universal in agreeing with that assessment. British Gas GM Peter Thompson

(strictly protect) told P/E Chief that Ghanem's mistaken belief that he knows everything, together with his autocratic style of management, had left him isolated and ill-informed. Former ConocoPhillips GM Page Maxson (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that Ghanem was much less willing to meet with and hear out IOC GM's than his predecessor had been. Maxson typically saw al-Badri, Ghanem's predecessor, at least once a week and enjoyed a candid, collegial relationship with him. By contrast, he typically only saw Ghanem when ConocoPhillips' CEO is visiting and the tone was almost always combative (Note: Maxson was recently transferred to another post outside Libya. End note.) Other GM's have told us that Ghanem is in some respects a throwback to the circa-1970's Libyan oil managers, who viewed IOC's through a nationalist lens and considered them to be predatory entities which had to be carefully managed. As reported reftel, the ham-fisted tactics by which unqualified Libyans are foisted on the IOC's, together with an overweaning focus on identifying new cost centers in the production chain from which to extract rents from the IOC's, have made the overall operating environment in Libya more difficult for IOC's since Ghanem took over.

¶10. (C) Comment: The conversation with el-Mshawet afforded a rare, working-level perspective on the internal management of Libya's key parastatal entity. Oil and gas revenues generated under the NOC's auspices account for 95 percent of Libya's economy and everything of significance - the government's budget, salaries, subsidies for food staples and gasoline - depends on the hydrocarbon sector. The fact that the NOC is in the hands of an autocratic individual who is ill-regarded by his subordinates and international oil and gas professionals does not augur well for Libya's efforts to increase production from 1.7 million barrels/day to 3.0 million barrels/day in the next four years. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Crowdleaks: Libyaâ€™s oil industry suffers; incompetence of NOC revealed
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI925

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI925 aka Wikileaks id #181022 ?
Subject	RELEASED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED TO TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 2 Dec 2008 17:00 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI925.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI819
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI943 , 08TRIPOLI960
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4119
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0925/01 3371700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 021700Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4199
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1326
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0686
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0830
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0776
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0952
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0639
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0020
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0482
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4721
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000925

SIPDIS

NSC FOR YERGER, DEPT FOR DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM) AND
NEA/MAG (JOHNSON, NARDI)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: RELEASED REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED TO TRAVEL TO
SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT

REF: A) TRIPOLI 472 , B) TRIPOLI 819 , C) NEA/MAG OI 12/01/2008

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss

Boufayed has decided to travel to Switzerland for specialized medical treatment for his lung cancer, a trip he had not undertaken sooner after his release in October because he was weak from chemotherapy. Boufayed has obtained his passport and a Swiss visa and agreed to accept financial assistance from the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), which has agreed to underwrite his travel, lodging and treatment (although he has not yet received the funds). He is scheduled to depart Libya on/about December 6. Boufayed's brother, who intended to accompany him, has been denied permission to travel; Boufayed believes his family are being kept in Libya as insurance against his speaking out about his trial or detention. The QDF has also indicated that most of the remaining ten members of Boufayed's group, who were arrested in February 2007 on the eve of a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Martyr's Square, may be released from prison in the coming week. End summary.

BOUFAYED TO TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR TREATMENT

¶2. (C) Muhammad Tarnesh, Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya, gave P/E Chief an update on the case of self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed on December 2. (Note: Boufayed was sentenced to 25 years of imprisonment earlier this year in connection with a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Martyr's Square (ref A); as reported ref B, he was released on humanitarian grounds - he suffers from advanced lung cancer - on October 8. End note.) Tarnesh visited Boufayed on November 28 at the latter's family home in Gharyan, some 120 kilometers from Tripoli. Tarnesh said Boufayed: 1) had decided to travel to Switzerland for specialized medical treatment for his lung cancer; 2) had obtained his passport (which was confiscated at the time of his arrest in February 2007) from the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), which had helped facilitate his release from detention, and; 3) planned to depart on December 6 for Geneva. Tarnesh said the QDF had decided to underwrite Boufayed's travel, lodging and treatment, and that Boufayed had agreed to accept the assistance. (Note: In an earlier meeting, Tarnesh told us Boufayed had not yet decided whether to accept the QDF's financial assistance, as doing so could be construed as tacit acceptance of the regime's legitimacy. End note.) Addressing recent reports on opposition websites that the GOL had delayed permitting Boufayed to travel for treatment, Tarnesh called Juma'a Boufayed (Idriss' brother) and handed the phone to P/E Chief. (Note: Juma'a Boufayed was arrested with other members of the group and detained for 14 months before released; he was not convicted or sentenced. End note.) Juma'a dismissed the reports, explaining that Idriss Boufayed had elected not to travel sooner after his release because had been undergoing chemotherapy and was too weak to travel or undergo further invasive cancer therapy.

¶3. (C) Confirming reports in ref C, Swiss Consul Francois Schmidt told us Boufayed obtained a Swiss visa on December 2. Boufayed also has a Swiss residency permit (scheduled to expire on December 19), which he intends to renew during his upcoming visit. Schmidt said Boufayed was coughing and appeared drawn at his visa interview, a condition Boufayed attributed to the chemotherapy regimen. Boufayed told Schmidt the QDF had "promised" to pay for his travel, lodging and medical treatment, although he had not received funds to date and did not expect to before he departed on December 6. Schmidt said Boufayed suggested in his interview that the QDF hoped to induce Boufayed to refrain from speaking publicly about his trial or detention by offering to underwrite his medical travel. Schmidt noted that as a legal resident, Boufayed was entitled to seek medical care in Switzerland and did not have to demonstrate financial means in the way that a normal visa applicant would. Boufayed told Schmidt he had not decided which medical facility he would obtain treatment at, but said he planned to stay with friends in the Geneva area.

FAMILY TO REMAIN IN LIBYA AS INSURANCE

FAMILY TO REMAIN IN LIBYA AS INSURANCE

¶4. (C) Separately, Tarnesh told us in a telephone call that the GOL had decided not to permit Juma'a Boufayed to accompany his

ailing brother, which was the original plan. It is not clear who will accompany Idriss Boufayed. Tarnesh suggested that another member of the family would; however, Schmidt told us he was not aware that any other Boufayed family members had Swiss visas. He added that Idriss Boufayed had responded to the question as to who would travel with him by noting that his family members would remain in Libya "as insurance" (against his talking). Boufayed suggested that he did not intend to speak out during his travel

MOST OF BOUFAYED GROUP REMAINING IN PRISON MAY BE RELEASED SOON

¶5. (C) Citing a conversation on December 1 with QDF Human Rights Director Saleh Abdusalam Saleh, Tarnesh said it was expected that all but one or two of the 10 members of the Boufayed group remaining in prison were expected to be released in the coming week. (Note: As reported ref A, Idriss Boufayed and 10 other members of a group of self-described regime critics were convicted on June 10 of planning to foment rebellion against "the people's authority system". Boufayed received a sentence of 25 years; sentences for the other 10 ranged from six to 15 years. End note.) Tarnesh said it had not yet been determined whether they would be pardoned of their crimes or simply released on humanitarian grounds. He speculated that members of the group kept in detention would likely be those who refused to sign statements agreeing to refrain from speaking publicly about their trials or detention, a common condition of release for political prisoners.

¶6. (C) Comment: The news that the QDF has helped Boufayed obtain a passport and stands ready to facilitate and perhaps underwrite his medical treatment abroad is a welcome development, as are reports that the members of the group remaining in prison may soon be released. Post does not recommend a proactive media note, but suggests that any press guidance in connection with Boufayed's travel to Switzerland: 1) welcome the news as a positive development; 2) suggest that it would be appropriate if members of the Boufayed group who remain in prison were released (if such has not already occurred), and; 3) encourage the GOL to consider parallel measures for detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi, who remains in detention at the Tripoli Medical Center. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI926

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI926 aka Wikileaks id #181024 ?
Subject	SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY VISIT TRIPOLI IN "LAST GASP" EFFORT TO MEND FRAYED BILATERAL TIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 2 Dec 2008 17:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI926.html
References	08TRIPOLI851
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI987 , 08TRIPOLI994 , 09TRIPOLI59
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Removed on Sun, 13 Mar 2011 21:31 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Mon, 2 May 2011 23:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4123
OO RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0926 3371706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021706Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4201
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4723
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0022
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1328
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0688
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0832
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0778
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000926

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/2/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS FOREIGN MINISTER MAY VISIT TRIPOLI IN "LAST GASP" EFFORT TO MEND FRAYED BILATERAL TIES

REF: TRIPOLI 851

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Swiss Consul Francois Schmidt told P/E Chief on December 2 that Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey intends to travel to Tripoli on December 5 for talks with as-yet undetermined Government of Libya interlocutors in what he

described as "a last gasp" effort to resolve the lingering Libyan-Swiss contretemps occasioned by the arrest in Geneva of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in July. (Note: Schmidt asked that we keep news of the possible visit close-hold as it had not yet been finalized. End note.) The Swiss Embassy submitted a diplomatic note to the Libyan MFA on December 1 requesting meetings for Calmy-Rey with Muammar al-Qadhafi and a number of lesser officials, including Foreign Minister-equivalent Abdulrahman Shalgham and National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi. Schmidt said Swiss Ambassador to Tripoli Daniel von Muralt had advised against the trip, cautioning Calmy-Rey that she could be "badly humiliated" if she decided to come. Admitting that there was "no agreed strategy, message or approach" behind the proposed visit, Schmidt said the Swiss Federal Government had nonetheless directed her to make the trip in the hope that it could rejuvenate Libyan-Swiss talks that he characterized as "hopelessly stalled".

¶2. (C) Schmidt said the situation had worsened since Libyan and Swiss members of a joint commission of inquiry exchanged copies of their respective drafts of a final report on November 14. The idea was that they would agree on language for a report that would be jointly issued to the public, which would detail the events attendant to Hannibal's arrest and mutually-agreed remedies. Ambassador von Muralt stressed in an earlier meeting with us (reftel) that the joint commission's report would likely be the next stumbling block in the effort to mend frayed ties. Schmidt confirmed that such had come to pass, saying the two reports were "miles apart" in terms of their interpretations of events and conclusions. Schmidt highlighted the fact that Libyan members had come away with completely different understandings of the testimony of key witnesses, and suggested that they had shaded their intepretations to bolster the key Libyan demand that the arresting police officers be punished.

¶3. (C) Lamenting that the GOL had repeatedly shifted the goalposts in terms of its demands for redress, Schmidt said GOL officials' latest demands were that the officers be "banished" from Geneva to other cantonments and that the Swiss prosecutor be investigated for legal malpractice. They had also recently stipulated that a public apology to be issued by the Swiss government as part of a grand bargain admit that Swiss officials had conspired to "deliberately entrap" Hannibal al-Qadhafi. He attributed most of the creeping demands to the personal involvement of Aisha al-Qadhafi and Hannibal al-Qadhafi in the work of the Libyan committee tasked with resolving the issue. In a positive step, all but two of Switzerland's citizens remaining in Libya had obtained exit visas; the two remaining are under indictment for alleged crimes in cases brought right after Hannibal's arrest. Swiss Air's station manager, who had been prohibited for over a month from leaving, obtained a six month, multiple-entry visa and a one-year residency permit after Swiss officials linked her case to that of the gravely ill daughter of a senior regime official, whom the family wanted to take to Switzerland for specialized treatment. In addition, Swiss Air, which had threatened to cease operating its one remaining Zurich-Tripoli route (landing permits for two of its three weekly flights were cancelled by the GOL after Hannibal's arrest), has decided to continue flying until year's end and will assess then whether to shutter its operations.

¶4. (C) Comment: Other EU missions have quietly questioned the Swiss approach to the ongoing kerfuffle, particularly Bern's decision to not/not solicit support from Brussels for a joint EU response to the GOL's pressure tactics. The fact that the reports of the Libyan and Swiss members of the joint commission of inquiry are so divergent with respect to what happened and who is at fault does not augur well. While high-level shuttle diplomacy with the GOL has worked in some cases in the past (witness French efforts with respect to the Bulgarian nurses), the consensus among the diplomatic corps here is that Tripoli believes it has the upper hand and will not concede much to the Swiss. The dispute highlights the extent to which the GOL

Swiss. The dispute highlights the extent to which the GOL remains a family enterprise, willing to go to extreme lengths over what amounts to a matter of face involving the abhorrent behavior of Hannibal al-Qadhafi. End comment.

STEVENS

Media

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI935

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI935 aka Wikileaks id #181589 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S TOP AFRICA DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES CHAD-SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND MAURITANIA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 5 Dec 2008 12:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI935.html
References	07NDJAMENA557 , 08TRIPOLI871 , 08TRIPOLI918
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9416
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0935/01 3401212
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 051212Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4211
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0142
RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0032
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0151
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0022
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1333
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0690
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0834
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4733
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000935

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/SPG, AF/E; AFRICOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , MR *[Mauritania]* , SO *[Somalia]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S TOP AFRICA DIPLOMAT DISCUSSES CHAD-SUDAN, SOMALIA, AND MAURITANIA

REF: A) TRIPOLI 871 , B) NDJAMENA 557 , C) TRIPOLI 918

TRIPOLI 00000935 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Libya is pleased with recent progress on Chad/Sudan reconciliation and expects a Libyan-led peacekeeping force to be deployed along the border by year's end, according

to the GOL's top diplomat for African affairs, Dr. Ali Treiki. Treiki said the GOL would soon re-start efforts to engage rebel leaders and lure them back to negotiations. On Somalia, Treiki said the GOL remained involved in efforts to resolve the crisis in governance and would host the leader of the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia (ARS), Sheikh Sharif, in December. Treiki said the GOL supports a restoration of democratic rule in Mauritania and plans to continue its dialogue with both sides. He said Libya welcomes cooperation with the U.S. Africa Command, having been reassured that the Command does not intend to establish a headquarters or bases on the continent. End summary.

CHAD/SUDAN: NEW FOCUS ON REBEL GROUPS

¶2. (C) In a November 30 meeting with the CDA, Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) expressed pleasure with progress on Chad/Sudan reconciliation, saying the mid-November Contact Group (CG) meetings in N'Djamena were "very good and productive" and that there was now "no difference [of opinion]" between members of that group on the way forward in the region. Concerns from regional partners as to Libya's command of the 2,000-member peacekeeping force had been assuaged and he expected the final details to be ironed out at the December 12 meeting of the Contact Group in Khartoum. He said he expects the Senegalese to approach the EU and USG to help fund the program.

¶3. (C) Treiki shifted the goalposts on grandiose plans for a Libyan-led trilateral initiative, claiming victory while suggesting that many of the Tripoli-based meetings comprising the "Trilateral Initiative" (ref A) would instead be held under the auspices of the CG. The proposed Bashir-Deby summit, originally slated for Tripoli, will instead take place on the Chad-Sudan border on an unspecified date in December, he said. Treiki remained rosy in his assessment of Libya's leadership role and continued to view the Qatari initiative with skepticism. He was interested in SE Williamson's recent trip to Doha, but did not feel the Qataris had gained much traction in the past month.

¶4. (C) With Sudan-Chad reconciliation "on the right track," Treiki said he plans to devote more time to engagement with the rebel movements. He said he expected to meet with Senior Assistant to the Sudanese President and SLM Leader Minni Minawi on December 2, and looked forward to renewing ties with JEM/KI. He noted that "the real problem now is that there is a lot of division within the movements," and that it was impractical to negotiate with so many different factions. Libya is working to "reorganize and re-combine the groups" in preparation for an expected visit to Tripoli by Khalil Ibrahim in late December, but realizes it will be difficult due to Ibrahim's insistence that he be treated as the sole legitimate leader of the JEM. Treiki said he expects Ibrahim to remain in Tripoli for an extended period of time for discussions with the GOL on rebel dynamics and the way ahead. Treiki also expected Joint UN/AU mediator Djbrill Bassole to arrive in Tripoli on December 26 to meet rebel leaders. He suggested that Bassole could make Tripoli his temporary headquarters for an unstated length of time. (Comment: A sentiment that seemed based more on hope than any solid indication that Bassole planned to do so. End comment.) Treiki had nothing to say about the arrival of Daoussa Deby as ambassador to Libya (ref B); however, Chadian PolCouns Padjalengar Nguinengar told us on December 1 that Deby was expected to replace Chad's current ambassador to Tripoli by month's end, and would possibly travel with Ibrahim.

SOMALIA: ENGAGING SOMALI LEADERS

¶5. (C) Echoing earlier comments on Somalia by officials from the MFA's Arab Affairs Department (ref C), Treiki trumpeted Libya's leadership role in regional diplomacy and its seat at the nexus

of AU-UN-Arab League intervention in Somalia. Citing the delicate state of Somali affairs and the seeming inability of east African neighbors of Somalia to effectively resolve the

crisis, he said, "this is an urgent matter - we should not involve neighboring countries at all". He said Libya would host both a UN delegation and Sheikh Sharif of the Alliance for the Re-liberation of Somalia in mid to late-December (i.e., after the upcoming Eid al-Adha holiday and before New Year's).

MAURITANIA: "A SPECIAL KIND OF COUP"

¶6. (C) Reminding us that the AU and Arab Maghreb Union had come out against the coup and that Libya supported a quick return to democracy, Treiki nonetheless cautioned that Mauritania represented "a special kind of coup". Noting that the parliament remains in place and that the majority of its members support the coup leaders, he stressed that "they are not one voice". Libya is in contact with both sides; he claimed the GOL had leaned on coup leaders to give ousted President Abdallahi freedom of movement. He expressed frustration that the situation in Mauritania meant that Mauritania was being excluded from important regional activities, such as a recent meeting of senior intelligence and security officials In Mali.

U.S. AFRICA COMMAND IS OK

¶7. (C) While discussing security cooperation and capacity building in the Sahel/Sahara region, the CDA mentioned that this was one of U.S. Africa Command's areas of expertise. Treiki replied that Libya is "over [our concerns] with AFRICOM - we're not worried about coordination and if you can help in training, this is good, but if you have any large military presence in our region, this will lead to an escalation from groups like al-Qaeda".
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI936

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI936 aka Wikileaks id #181605 ?
Subject	MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI QUIETLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS TO ADOPT A LIBYAN CONSTITUTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 5 Dec 2008 13:15 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI936.html
References	08TRIPOLI679
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9470
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0936/01 3401315
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 051315Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4213
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0956
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0643
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4735
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000936

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON) AND INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER, SWEET)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/5/2018
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI QUIETLY INVOLVED IN PROCESS TO ADOPT A LIBYAN CONSTITUTION

REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 759, B) TRIPOLI 679

TRIPOLI 00000936 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A new draft was circulated in mid-November to members of a 20-person committee tasked with formulating a Libyan constitution, with the idea that it could be adopted before the September 1, 2009 anniversary of the military coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power. A well-connected

contact has told us that Muammar al-Qadhafi quietly supports the project and personally selected about half of the members of the committee working on it. He reportedly has kept his role quiet to allow his son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to play a leading role in what could be a popular reform initiative and to afford himself maximum latitude to cajole reluctant old guard members into accepting it. The secretive nature of the project has prompted concern among constitution committee members that it could be abandoned altogether if Muammar al-Qadhafi changes his mind. They are also worried that the process by which the project has developed reflects a broader failure by Muammar al-Qadhafi and even Saif al-Islam to realize the connnection between robust processes (a key weakness of the Jamahiriya system) and durable political results. End summary.

NEW DRAFT CONSTITUTION DRAFT CIRCULATED TO COMMITTEE MEMBERS

¶2. (C) Muhammad Tarnesh, Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), told P/E Chief on November 26 that a revised iteration of a draft constitution for Libya had been circulated in mid-November for review. (Note: Post obtained a copy of an earlier draft, posted on Libyan opposition websites, in March. End note.) The draft had been circulated to 20 members of a special committee tasked with formulating a constitution, and to key General People's Committee secretaries (minister-equivalents). Conceding that work on the draft had "gone slowly", Tarnesh said it was expected that the revised text would be circulated in early 2009 to the Basic People's Committees for review. After that, suggested changes would be reviewed and the draft constitution could be submitted to the General People's Congress (which typically convenes in March) for consideration and potential ratification. The hope and expectation was that the constitution would be accepted and ratified before September 1, 2009, the 40th anniversary of the military coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power.

¶3. (C) Tarnesh said a committee of 20 individuals had been formed in 2007, with a mandate to formulate a draft constitution that would eventually be submitted to the General People's Congress (GPC) for consideration. The committee consists of Libyan intellectuals, political scientists and experts in constitutional and international law, as well as a half-dozen foreign academics, including professors from the Sorbonne and Cairo University. The National Democratic Institute (NDI) has consulted with and provided input to the committee; however, it was not clear to Tarnesh whether NDI representatives were considered part of it. The committee has met in Tripoli a number of times and its members are in regular contact via e-mail. Tarnesh knows several of the Libyan members well and has personally participated in several rump sessions of the committee as an ad hoc adviser.

MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI QUIETLY SUPPORTS DEVELOPMENT OF A CONSTITUTION ...

¶4. (C) Tarnesh said Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and Chairman of the Qadhafi Development Foundation, had first approached his father in late 2004/early 2005 to argue that a constitution be adopted to codify the relationship between Libyans and their government and clarify the government's structure. Muammar al-Qadhafi's Jamahiriya ("state of the masses") system of governance, premised on the Third Universal Theory articulated in his Green Book, calls for direct, popular rule through a pyramid system of committees. Hostile to formal decisionmaking structures, al-Qadhafi has long maintained that a constitution would represent an unneeded, redundant barrier between the "masses" of the Jamahiriya and the popular committees that represent it. (Note: As reported previously, GOL officials have underscored to us that "we don't have a government here [in Libya]- we have something else [the Jamahiriya system]. End note.)

¶5. (C) According to Tarnesh, Muammar al-Qadhafi was initially

¶5. (C) According to Tarnesh, Muammar al-Qadhafi was initially opposed to adopting a constitution, in part because it constituted an implicit criticism of the Jamahiriya system of which he was the original author; however, over time he responded to the argument that some political adjustments were necessary to underpin badly needed economic reform. Tarnesh said al-Qadhafi played a personal role in selecting members of

the constitutional committee, reviewing with Saif al-Islam a list of prospective candidates and personally selecting about ten of them. Al-Qadhafi also endorsed a key early decision to not/not include Revolutionary Committee (RevComm) members and former ministers, and to instead enlist "independent personalities" such as academics and private lawyers. The goal was to foster a better product and to mitigate potential criticism that the constitution was just another political ploy to give the existing Jamahiriya system a face-lift. Using nominally independent actors was critical if the project was to enjoy any credibility.

... BUT KEEPS ROLE QUIET TO LET SAIF AL-ISLAM TAKE THE LEAD AND MAINTAIN ROOM FOR MANEUVER

¶6. (C) Responding to the comment that al-Qadhafi's view of and role in the constitution drafting process had been unclear, Tarnesh said that was deliberate. Citing conversations with committee members and Saif al-Islam, he said Muammar al-Qadhafi had, in typical fashion, obscured his role in forming the committee and his support for the project to: 1) allow Saif al-Islam to play a leading role in what could be a popular reform initiative, and; 2) afford himself maximum room for maneuver to cajole reluctant old guard members into accepting a constitution. Insisting that al-Qadhafi supported the constitution project, Tarnesh noted that "nothing as politically significant as that could continue for as long as it has without the Leader's support, even if Saif al-Islam wants it". To preserve the appearance of political propriety, the document authorizing the constitutional committee and appointing its members was signed by Muftah Kaiba, Secretary of the General People's Congress (Speaker of the Parliament-equivalent and formally the head of state). Kaiba played a nominal role in selecting the members of the committee; however, almost all were chosen by Muammar and Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi.

DEBATE ABOUT EXTENT OF AL-QADHAFI'S SUPPORT FOR CONSTITUTION & SAIF'S ROLE

¶7. (C) The alleged support of Muammar al-Qadhafi for the project to adopt a constitution squarely contradicts earlier reports from other contacts. Ibrahim Leghwell, a lawyer and intellectual who has authored a number of books on Jamahiriya political theory, told P/E Chief as recently as a month ago that a constitution was "unnecessary and inappropriate", and that al-Qadhafi would not allow one to be promulgated in his lifetime. (Note: Leghwell, who was once described by al-Qadhafi as the "sheikh of all Libyan lawyers", is considered a keeper of the revolutionary flame. He enjoys periodic access to al-Qadhafi and is close to senior Revolutionary Committee members and the dwindling number of Free Officers who staged the 1969 coup. End note.) Debate about a constitution has become a bellwether for broader political and economic reform efforts, and a lightning rod for conflict between would-be reformers and old guard elements resistant to change. Saif al-Islam explicitly called for a constitution and abandoning the people's congress system of his father in his August 2006 Youth Forum address, prompting harsh criticism from the Revolutionary Committees and other conservatives. He moderated his language at the 2007 Youth Forum, calling instead for a "social contact". In his 2008 address, he advocated " ... something which is perhaps called a constitution - let's say a popular pact similar

to the social pact or a pact of the mass of the people". (Note: An adviser to Saif al-Islam, Dr. Yusuf Sawani, told us the conflation of reform-speak - "constitution" and "social pact" - and Jamahiriya-speak - "pact of the mass of the people" - had been deliberate. End note.)

¶8. (C) Comment: Whether Muammar al-Qadhafi will ultimately support the adoption of a constitution, we are inclined to agree with Muhammad Tarnesh that a project as sensitive as this could not have continued for as long as it has without at least his tacit support. Should the project stall, it would not be the first time that al-Qadhafi had quietly floated a policy balloon as a means by which to determine the extent of support among senior regime figures, particularly the increasingly elderly - but still politically important - old guard. Some contacts have noted that developing a constitution more openly would have enabled old guard elements to quickly kill it. Regardless, the secretive nature of the project has prompted concern among constitution committee members that it could be abandoned altogether if Muammar al-Qadhafi changes his mind, despite the extensive personal involvement of Saif al-Islam. There is grumbling among the committee members and the small circle of Libyans aware of their work that secretly developing a

TRIPOLI 00000936 003.2 OF 003

constitution reflects the failure of al-Qadhafi to realize the importance of robust processes (a key weakness of the Jamahiriya system) as a precursor of durable political results. There is concern that in their haste to remedy a raft of problems after nearly 40 years of neglect, Muammar al-Qadhafi and perhaps even Saif al-Islam - on whom reformers have pinned much hope - are taking the most politically expedient route, rather than investing in a more transparent and slower (but more credible) process. Some of our more sophisticated contacts have drawn a line between that perception and the broader problem of an overly paternalistic structure, which, despite decades of populist rhetoric, does not really believe that Libyans are up to the task of governing themselves. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI937

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI937 aka Wikileaks id #182144 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S NASCENT BUSINESS INCUBATOR PROGRAMS A POTENTIAL AREA FOR BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 Dec 2008 10:10 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI937.html
References	08TRIPOLI917
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI222 , 09TRIPOLI223 , 09TRIPOLI764
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2584
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0937/01 3451010
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101010Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4216
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0646
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0959
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0037
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1335
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0692
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0836
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0779
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0484
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4738
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000937

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB (EGAN); ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR
NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY LIAISON (SEVERENS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2018
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , KIPR *[Intellectual Property Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , BBSR *[Business Services Reporting]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S NASCENT BUSINESS INCUBATOR PROGRAMS A POTENTIAL
AREA FOR BILATERAL ENGAGEMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 917

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM, Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent roundtable discussion, experts at Libya's Economic Development Board (EDB) described their nascent Business Incubator Program to a visiting U.S. Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) specialist. The Libyan program seeks to support existing businesses and to create new small

to support existing businesses and to create new small businesses in Libya, especially in non-hydrocarbon sectors, and includes a component for re-direction of former WMD scientists. The group discussed their efforts to reach out to other business incubators overseas, particularly in the U.S., and welcomed the CLDP's help in facilitating such contact. A representative of the EDB noted that the Government of Libya (GOL) could fund visits to the U.S. by Libyan experts and asked for detailed proposals (CLDP is preparing the proposals and can help facilitate the visits). End Summary.

TECHNOLOGY INCUBATORS BEGET BROADER BUSINESS INCUBATOR PROGRAM

¶2. (C) In a meeting on November 18, Dr. Omar Annakou, head of Libya's Incubator for Technology and Innnovation (ELITE), explained the program to visiting U.S. Department of Commerce CLDP specialist Marc Tetjel and Econoff. Annakou explained that the program began a year ago and focused on developing Libya's research capacity; it will expand with the opening of business incubators in the major cities of Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha. Part of ELITE's original mandate was to help re-direct the efforts of scientists formerly involved in Libya's WMD development program. In addition to laboratory facilities, there are several precision-tooling facilities that have largely been moribund since the GOL decided in 2003 to abandon its WMD programs. (Note: ELITE was the original program; the related business incubators are related to ELITE, but are broader in scope. End note.)

¶3. (SBU) The incubators will provide information and communication technology (ICT) services, office space, shared workshops, financial management training, assistance in developing links to financiers, business information, training in business management and help entering particular markets. Program managers are in negotiations with a Jordanian consultant, who will assist in establishing the incubators. It is expected that the contract will be finalized in a month or two. The EDB will also open "innovation centers" in universities, starting with al-Fateh University in Tripoli, and is working to create "maritime clusters" of companies along Libya's coast to develop fishing, boat-building and maritime environmental programs. The maritime project is being developed in cooperation with a French program to link Libyan and French small businesses.

GOING FROM PUBLIC TO PRIVATE ENTERPRISES

¶4. (SBU) Another expert at the roundtable stressed the importance of understanding how the incubators project fit into the broader history of Libya's economic refom effort. He noted that Libya had experienced three decades of a state run economy, but was now undergoing a "drastic" shift towards privatization. (Note: As detailed in reftel and previous, senior GOL officials are currently debating whether and how to implement a dramatic program of government re-structuring and privatization articulated by Muammar al-Qadhafi in his March 2008 address to the General People's Congress. End note.) In his view, Libya had relied on oil and gas to an extent that was unhealthy and should focus on diversifying economic activity in tourism, transit, ICT technology, solar energy, and petrochemicals. He flagged silicon production as a potential area for investment, noting that there is quartz in Libyan sand, and said no U.S. companies were presently working in that sector. The GOL's ultimate goal is that non-oil and gas activity will eventually account for 50 per cent of Libya's GDP. (Note: This will be a stretch. The GOL's official figures claim hydrocarbons currently account for about 70 percent of Libya's economy; however, external sources put the figure at 90 percent or more. End note.)

LIBYA NEEDS HELP DEVELOPING SMALL BUSINESSES AND IN IPR ENFORCEMENT

¶5. (SBU) The director of planning for the program, Dr. Ramadan, praised the U.S. as "pioneers" in the idea of business

TRIPOLI 00000937 002 OF 002

incubators. The GOL is currently trying to transform the collective mindset of Libyans and is looking at models from other countries, including the U.S. Junior Achievement program targeting young people. Rather than importing foreign programs wholesale, the GOL is looking at how Jordan has tailored programs to its specific culture and needs. Noting the U.S.-Libya Science and Technology Agreement signed in January 2008, Ramadan suggested that some U.S. support for Libya's small business incubator could fall under this agreement. The long-term goal is to help Libya's sizeable informal sector integrate into the formal sector. (Note: The gray and black markets in Libya are robust and account for a large portion of economic activity outside the oil and gas sector. End note.) The CLDP's Tejtel pointed out that the World Bank (via the IFC) also offers excellent training for small- and medium-sized businesses. Responding to Tetjel's question as to whether safeguarding intellectual property rights (IPR) was an issue, our interlocutors described it as "a huge need" and welcomed exchanges with U.S. counterparts. CLDP could arrange for U.S. consultants to visit Libya to discuss various IPR protection instruments, including patents, trademarks, and protection of trade secrets. (Note: Libya lacks appropriate laws for IPR protection and there is virtually no current enforcement of IPR strictures. End note.)

GOL WILLING TO SELF-FUND VISIT BY LIBYAN EXPERTS TO U.S. BUSINESS INCUBATOR CENTERS

¶6. (SBU) Tetjel suggested that a group from the EDB Business Incubator Program could visit the U.S. to meet with counterparts at incubators in Washington DC, Baltimore and North Carolina. EDB representative Khaled Bezaylia said the GOL could fund such trip(s) and requested a detailed proposal. (Note: The CLDP is preparing proposals and can help facilitate the visits; Tetjel will follow-up with GOL counterparts during his planned visit December 13-16. End note.) The Libyan experts noted that better linkages between academia and private companies in Libya needed to be forged. Because Libya did not have a strong history of private sector development and the number of true private enterprises remained small, the roles of academia and the private sector in research and development were still vaguely defined and not well understood.

¶7. (C) Comment: This was Post's initial meeting with the stewards of the EDB's Business Incubator Program. The tone was positive and suggested that there is good potential for future cooperation and engagement in terms of programs the U.S. could offer through the CLDP and programs the GOL says it could self-fund. Developing Libya's non-hydrocarbon sector is important in the context of Libya's overall economic health and offers comparatively greater opportunity for U.S.-Libya economic cooperation than the more mature - and more tightly controlled - oil and gas sector. Support for the EDB's Business Incubator Program, with its focus on re-directing the efforts of scientists formerly involved in Libya's WMD program, also dovetails with a key Mission goal. As with other areas of putative economic reform, the EDB's Business Incubator Program is long on rhetoric and management-speak and (so far) short on tangible results. The EDB is headed by Dr. Mahmoud Jibril, a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and a key reform proponent), and therefore enjoys some sway within the GOL; however, the extent to which the Business Incubator Program has been coordinated with and enjoys the support of other key GOL actors such as the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employment and Training (Ministry of Labor-equivalent) is unclear and could be a limiting factor.

End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI942

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI942 aka Wikileaks id #182643 ?
Subject	OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. FIRMS AS LIBYA INVESTS BILLIONS IN NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 12 Dec 2008 13:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI942.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI242 , 09TRIPOLI63
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4814
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0942/01 3471338
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121338Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4223
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0486
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0369
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4745
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000942

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EEB (EGAN); COMMERCE (MASON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/24/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. FIRMS AS LIBYA INVESTS BILLIONS IN NATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

TRIPOLI 00000942 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with CDA, the powerful head of Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB), Abuzeid Dorda, discussed Libya's development needs and the current state-of-play in U.S.-Libyan relations. Dorda portrayed the current period in U.S.-Libyan relations as "sensitive" and cautioned either side against taking action that could "lead to doubts." Regarding the putative January 2009 start date for Muammar al-Qadhafi's oil wealth distribution program, Dorda said the target date would likely slip as the plan was being debated

the target date would likely slip as the plan was being debated.

Dorda, who oversees a USD 100 billion infrastructure development budget, said there is a good future for U.S. firms who are willing to take the risk, noting the example of AECOM, which is managing Libya's housing and infrastructure projects. As for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's recent trip to the U.S. and his stated plans to introduce a constitution to Libya by September 2009, the anniversary of the coup that brought his father to power, Dorda said Saif had "many good ideas" but they needed to be discussed further, given Libya's history and the importance of its tribal structure. The way forward, in Dorda's view is to improve education, spur industrialization, and build new cities. End summary.

LIBYA: "HANDLE WITH CARE"

¶2. (C) Abuzeid Dorda, a former prime minister and UN permrep who is currently the chair of Libya's multi-billionaire dollar-endowed Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB), discussed Libya's development needs and the state-of-play in U.S.-Libyan relations in a recent meeting at his headquarters in Tajura, a few miles east of Tripoli, with CDA and Econoff. Dorda portrayed the current period in U.S.-Libyan relations as "sensitive" and cautioned either side from making any moves that could "lead to doubts." The U.S. should remember that Libya is different from other countries, is proud of its independence, and bristles when others try to dictate. Giving an example, Dorda told us as a young official, he met with the French diplomats arranging for the visit of then-Prime Minister Jacques Chirac. The diplomats made many demands, to which Dorda told them, "we are not one of your African countries you can boss around." In the end, the Libyans rejected a French proposal for a cultural agreement solely for reasons of pride.

AL-QADHAFI: A PHILOSOPHER, YET PRAGMATIC, TOO

¶3. (C) Regarding the purported January 2009 start date for Muammar al-Qadhafi's oil wealth distribution program, Dorda said it was still under discussion and would not start by January. Indirectly criticizing the initiative, which would entail distributing approximately USD 4,000 monthly to each Libyan family and transferring responsibility for basic governmental functions such as health and education to "the people," Dorda said Libya needed to increase its wealth, not waste it. People would just spend the money on consumer goods, rather investing it in their communities as al-Qadhafi had envisioned. Dorda said al-Qadhafi's proposal should not be taken literally. "Al-Qadhafi is a philosopher but he is also responsible." Technocrats in the leadership (such as Dorda himself, he implied) would eventually agree on a way to implement al-Qadhafi's vision in a way that served the national interest.

DEVELOPING LIBYA'S INFRASTRUCTURE: BUSINESS IS BOOMING

¶4. (SBU) When asked about opportunities for U.S. businesses in Libya, Dorda said there is a good future for U.S. firms who are willing to take the risk. He cited the American project management company, AECOM, as an excellent example. AECOM won a major contract to oversee the HIB's nation-wide infrastructure development program. Dorda said he is effectively privatizing his own agency by outsourcing the work to AECOM. In the process, he is also transferring several hundred Libyan HIB employees to AECOM, where he hopes they will receive training and learn American business best practices. Dorda said U.S. firms have missed an important time to sign other large contracts with HIB. HIB's development budget is USD 100 billion; USD 47 billion worth of contracts were signed in the last year. Dorda said he sees a need for large U.S. construction companies to undertake urban re-development projects. plans.

URBAN RENEWAL VERSUS TRIBAL INTERESTS

¶5. (C) Turning to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's recent trip to the U.S. and his stated plans to introduce a constitution to Libya by September 2009, Dorda said Saif had many good ideas but "they need to be discussed further." In Libya, tribes are still very strong and so, even if a country has political parties,

TRIPOLI 00000942 002.2 OF 002

they are still controlled by the tribes. The way forward, in Dorda's view, is to improve education, spur industrialization, and build new cities and not old villages. This will lead to the development of civil society and reduce the influence of the tribes. He said as chair of HIB, he often had to negotiate with tribes, especially in eastern Libya where they are particularly strong, over the location of new housing developments or other infrastructure improvements. Tribal interests were not always in synch with national interests, he said.

¶6. (C) Comment: Dorda has been entrusted with the overhauling of Libya's decaying infrastructure and he has chosen to contract out much of the management to an American firm, AECOM. In effect, he is privatizing what has been a government function while transforming the Housing and Infrastructure Board into an oversight body. His approach is innovative for Libya, which is emerging from decades of a centrally-planned economy, and may serve as a model for al-Qadhafi's ambitious plans to downsize the government. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI943

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI943 aka Wikileaks id #182725 ?
Subject	DEVELOPMENTS IN EL-JAHMI AND BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 12 Dec 2008 16:30 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI943.html
References	08TRIPOLI266 , 08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI819 , 08TRIPOLI925
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI960 , 09TRIPOLI227
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5037
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0943/01 3471630
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 121630Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4225
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1337
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0694
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0838
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0781
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0961
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0648
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4747
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000943

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON) AND DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM), NSC FOR YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEVELOPMENTS IN EL-JAHMI AND BOUFAYED HUMAN RIGHTS CASES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 280 , B) TRIPOLI 266 , C) TRIPOLI 925 , D) TRIPOLI 472 , E) TRIPOLI 819 , F) TRIPOLI 468 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Chris Stevens, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: An official of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) invited CDA to meet for an update on the Fathi el-Jahmi and Boufayed group human rights cases. He said el-Jahmi remained hospitalized with a heart condition, and the QDF was in contact with his family to arrange for his treatment at a private clinic (in Libya) or overseas. He gave us an opening, saying the QDF was now willing to coordinate with

el-Jahmi's family and the Embassy to arrange to transport el-Jahmi abroad for medical treatment. The QDF had successfully lobbied for the release of most of the members of a group led by self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed; two members of the group remained in prison in connection with criminal charges that pre-dated their arrest in February 2007 in connection with a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli. While the developments are positive, the views of the QDF on the el-Jahmi case do not necessarily represent those of the ultimate decision makers on this issue (i.e., old guard regime figures and Muammar al-Qadhafi himself). Nevertheless, we hope the offer represents a genuine opening and propose that post follow up on this end to meet with el-Jahmi's family members and with el-Jahmi to assess his medical condition and wishes with respect to medical travel. End summary.

QDF OFFERS TO COORDINATE EL-JAHMI'S POSSIBLE TRAVEL ABROAD FOR TREATMENT

¶2. (C) On instructions from QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, updated CDA December 11 on the status of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi. According to Saleh, el-Jahmi remained in the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) for treatment of a heart condition and other medical problems. (Note: Ref A details el-Jahmi's medical condition during Post's last visit to him in April. End note.) Saleh said he had been in direct contact with el-Jahmi, his wife Fawzia and his eldest son, Muhammad, over the past several weeks. He had met with Muhammed three times in the run-up to the recent Eid al-Adha holiday (celebrated locally December 7-10) and had offered to arrange for the family to visit el-Jahmi during the holiday. Saleh claimed that the family had declined to do so, ostensibly because of the difficulty of traveling from Benghazi, where they reside. As a result, FAJ had spent the holiday alone. (Note: Post's understanding is that while most of el-Jahmi's extended family reside in and around Benghazi, his wife and several of his children spend most of their time in Tripoli. End note.) Saleh claimed that el-Jahmi's eldest son, Muhammad, had not been in contact with his father's doctor at the TMC to inquire about his condition. (Note: See ref C for details on threats to the family, particularly to Muhammad, who was was under "tremendous pressure" from GOL and QDF officials. End note.)

¶3. (C) Saleh said the QDF had offered to move el-Jahmi from the TMC to a private clinic (in Libya), but the family had chosen not to accept the offer. Saleh claimed the QDF wants to shift responsibility for el-Jahmi's care to his family; however, the family has not agreed. (Note: See ref B for details on the QDF and GOL's stipulation that Muhammad and Fawzia el-Jahmi sign a statement pledging that el-Jahmi would refrain from speaking with "anyone in any channel" about political issues or his experience in detention as a condition for his release from the TMC to the family's home, which el-Jahmi refused to allow. The QDF's Executive Director, Yusuf Sawani subsequently told the CDA that the requirement had been dropped; however, the family has told us it has not. End note.) Responding to CDA's question as to whether the QDF had asked el-Jahmi about his wishes, Saleh said it was difficult to have a rational conversation with him as he appeared confused and mentally unstable - shouting one minute, calm the next. Saleh gave us an opening, saying the QDF was now willing to coordinate with el-Jahmi's family and the Embassy to arrange to transport el-Jahmi abroad for medical treatment, and mentioned Jordan as a possibility (Egypt is another possible venue the QDF mentioned previously).

MOST OF BOUFAYED GROUP RELEASED

¶4. (C) On the case of the group led by self-described regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, Saleh said Idriss Boufayed was expected to travel imminently (on/about December 12) for medical treatment. (Note: He suffers from stomach cancer and, per ref E, has residency in Switzerland and is expected to travel there for

treatment. End note.) Saleh said the QDF had successfully lobbied for the release of all but one member of the rest of the group, who were convicted and sentenced on June 10 of planning to to foment rebellion against "the people's authority system".

TRIPOLI 00000943 002 OF 002

He offered no detail on their legal status, but said they were now "with their families". (Note: As reported ref D, Idriss Boufayed and 10 others received sentences of six to 25 years in June in connection with a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Martyr's Square in February 2007. As reported ref E, Idriss Boufayed was released on humanitarian grounds on October 8, leaving 10 members of the group in prison. End note.)

¶5. (C) Separately, the Executive Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL), told P/E Chief on December 11 that all but two (vice the one cited by Saleh) of the 10 members had been released and had returned to their homes; Jamal al-Haji and Faraj Humeid remained in prison. (Note: The individuals released are believed to be as follows: Al-Mahdi Humaid, Al-Sadiz Salih Humaid, Ali Humaid, Ahmad Yusef al-Ubaidi, 'Alaa al-Dirsi, Farid al-Zuwi, Bashir al-Haris and Al-Sadiq Qashut. Jamal al-Haji is a dual Danish-Libyan citizen and is the subject of a potential collective EU demarche requesting consular access to him. End note.) Tarnesh had personally escorted several home and was in the process of visiting the others. Tarnesh said they had not yet been pardoned, a process that required a legal hearing. It was expected that a hearing would be held in the coming week and that they would be pardoned then. Tarnesh said the two individuals who remained in prison were being held for "separate legal issues" unrelated to their arrest in February 2007 with the Boufayed group. (Note: As reported ref C, Tarnesh previewed the release of some of the Boufayed group members on December 2 and speculated then that the members of the group whe were not released would likely be those who refused to sign statements agreeing to refrain from speaking publicly about their trials or detention. End note.)

¶6. (C) Comment: The fact that most of the Boufayed group has been released and that Idriss Boufayed is expected to travel abroad soon for medical treatment represents a very positive development. Post will work through channels here to confirm whether Boufayed actually travels, and to track whether the members of the group who have been released are in fact pardoned. The Boufayed group's case has been less heavily publicized and sensitive than that of el-Jahmi, making it comparatively easy for the regime to make what it views as concessions. On el-Jahmi, Saleh's offer to help coordinate contact with the family and el-Jahmi's potential travel abroad is a potentially significant opening; however, neither his views nor those of his boss, QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, necessarily represent those of the ultimate decision makers on this issue, who include old guard individuals such as Abdullah al-Sanussi and, critically, Muammar al-Qadhafi himself (see ref F (NOTAL) for details on their views). In that regard, Post notes that QDF representatives have previously claimed on several occasions that el-Jahmi had been released into his family's care, had left the TMC and could be permitted to travel abroad for medical care if he agreed to remain silent. Those claims turned out to be untrue. It is not clear whether the QDF deliberately misled us or acted in good faith and was subsequently overruled by other regime elements (we suspect a bit of both). Nevertheless, we hope the most recent offer from Saleh turns out to be a genuine opening and propose the following next steps for post: 1) request a meeting through the QDF with el-Jahmi's family members to discuss his medical condition, their ability to visit him and their understanding of his wishes with respect to travel for treatment; 2) request that the QDF coordinate a visit to el-Jahmi by an Emboff and a representative of another embassy (the Dutch or Germans would be

ideal) to ascertain his medical condition and his wishes; and 3) request a follow-on meeting through the QDF with el-Jahmi's family members (if needed). An issue that may complicate efforts to secure his release and medical travel is that el-Jahmi told us in our most recent meeting with him (in April), that he would not agree to any conditions (i.e., refraining from speaking about political issues or his detention) for his release and that his preference was to remain in Libya with his family. End comment.
STEVENS

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI945

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI945 aka Wikileaks id #182821 ?
Subject	LIBYA: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON ANNAPOLIS PROCESS UNSCR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 14 Dec 2008 16:44 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI945.html
References	08STATE130963
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5742
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0945 3491644
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 141644Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4228
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0154
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1339
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0840
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0696
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0783
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4750
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000945

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KWBG *[West Bank and Gaza]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: DEMARCHE DELIVERED ON ANNAPOLIS PROCESS UNSCR

REF: STATE 130963

¶1. (SBU) CDA delivered reftel demarche to Dr. Ahmed Fituri, MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) on December 14, encouraging a 'yes' vote and stressing that any amendments to the current draft resolution language would likely prevent it from being passed. Fituri undertook to pass reftel points to Foreign Minister Shalgham (who was unavailable to meet) as a direct message from Secretary Rice, and called later to say that he had done so. He made a point of noting Muammar al-Qadhafi's advocacy of a one state ("Isratine") solution, but said the GOL had not yet decided its position on the Annapolis process UNSCR.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI960

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI960 aka Wikileaks id #183072 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION FACILITATES VISIT TO DETAINED HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 15 Dec 2008 19:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI960.html
References	08TRIPOLI266 , 08TRIPOLI280 , 08TRIPOLI925 , 08TRIPOLI943
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI969 , 09TRIPOLI196 , 09TRIPOLI47 , 09TRIPOLI590
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6772
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0960/01 3501950
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 151950Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4243
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1340
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0697
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0841
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0784
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0963
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0650
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4765
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000960

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON, NARDI) AND DRL/NESCA (KWIRAM,
JOHNSTONE), NSC FOR YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION FACILITATES VISIT TO DETAINED
HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVIST FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: A) TRIPOLI 943 ; B) TRIPOLI 280 , C) TRIPOLI 925 , D) TRIPOLI 266

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept
of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF)
facilitated a visit to detained human rights activist Fathi
el-Jahmi, our first since April. El-Jahmi's medical condition
was visibly better than during our last visit and his doctor
said his heart condition had improved and stabilized. Several

other medical issues need to be resolved before el-Jahmi can be declared fit for discharge and travel; it is estimated that he might be ready in about three weeks. The QDF has offered el-Jahmi three options: 1) travel abroad for treatment; 2) remain at his family home in Tripoli and pursue outpatient care; and, 3) transfer from the TMC to a private clinic in Libya. The QDF says it would facilitate obtaining passports and exit permissions for el-Jahmi and accompanying family members, and would underwrite el-Jahmi's travel and medical expenses. Reversing his position in April, when he rejected any conditions for his release, el-Jahmi said he had changed his mind and was ready to travel abroad for medical treatment, even if doing so meant acceding to the condition that he refrain from discussing political issues or his detention, and even if it meant he might not return to Libya. El-Jahmi, the QDF representative and the CDA agreed on the following course of action: 1) work will be done to resolve el-Fathi's remaining medical issues; 2) el-Jahmi's family will meet with him later this week to discuss which of the three options (travel abroad for treatment, return to home in Tripoli or transfer to private clinic in Libya) they wish to pursue; and, 3) Muhammad el-Jahmi, Saleh and the CDA will subsequently meet to discuss the family's wishes and how to proceed. End summary.

¶2. (C) Following on the meeting reported ref A, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, called the CDA and invited him to visit detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi on December 13 at the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC). On instructions from QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, Saleh met CDA at the TMC and escorted him throughout the meeting. Also present were Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, el-Jahmi's treating physician, and an individual identified as his nurse, Abdullah Bashir. (Note: Bashir is a security official. End note.)

MEDICAL CONDITION IMPROVED

¶3. (C) El-Jahmi's medical condition was visibly better than during our last visit in April (ref B), when he was short of breath and disoriented. Mehdy said el-Jahmi's cardiac condition, his most serious medical problem was "suitable and acceptable". His blood ejection fraction was about 45 - normal was about 53, but el-Jahmi's had been as low as 20 in April. El-Jahmi had experienced fluctuation in his blood sugar levels (he suffers from diabetes), and had recently switched from tablet medication, which adversely interracted with other medications he was taking, to injections. El-Jahmi still suffers from edema in his legs and pain in his arms and legs related to poor circulation. Noting that the most difficult issue - el-Jahmi's heart condition - had improved, Mehdy said three things needed to happen before el-Jahmi could be discharged: 1) his blood sugar levels should be stabilized; 2) the vascular issues in his legs needed to be fully analyzed; and, 3) he needed consultations wtih neuromedical specialists regarding the pain in his extremities.

¶4. (C) Mehdy said el-Jahmi is scheduled to have a series of tests run on his lower legs on December 17 to address the vascular issues. He is scheduled to begin limited physiotherapy, including walks outside his room, this week to counter the effects of having been bedridden for a lengthy period. El-Jahmi said he has been outside his room only twice since he was admitted in July/August 2007 to the TMC from the prison at which he had been detained. When pressed on how soon el-Jahmi might be fit to be discharged and travel, Mehdy said he would "hopefully" be ready in about three weeks. In a brief one-on-one exchange, Mehdy said it appeared the QDF and GOL were now seriously considering releasing el-Jahmi and permitting him to travel for treatment; however, he had been "encouraged" not to clear el-Jahmi for discharge for several weeks. He speculated that the QDF and GOL wanted time to coordinate arrangements with el-Jahmi's family, arrange his travel and make the necessary political arrangements. (Note: Mehdy told us in

the necessary political arrangements. (Note: Mehdy told us in March that he had been pressured by the QDF and GOL to not discharge el-Jahmi, even if he had been well enough to leave the TMC. End note.)

EL-JAHMI READY TO LEAVE LIBYA, EVEN WITH CONDITIONS & POSSIBILITY HE MIGHT NOT RETURN

¶5. (C) El-Jahmi said his wife, Fawzia, and several daughters last visited him about two months ago. His oldest son, Muhammad, visited him briefly on December 4. During a brief one-on-one exchange, el-Jahmi told CDA his position had changed and he was ready to travel abroad for medical treatment, even if doing so meant acceding to the condition that he refrain from discussing political issues or his detention, and even if it meant he might not return to Libya. (Note: QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi called Saleh to check on the progress of the meeting; Saleh and Abdullah Bashir stepped into the hallway to take the call, leaving CDA alone with el-Jahmi. End note.) Asked what had prompted him to change his mind - in April, he clearly rejected any conditions for his release and traveling abroad for treatment if it meant he might not come back - el-Jahmi said he was "finished fighting" and was "tired and spent". Noting the toll that the QDF and GOL "pressure campaign" had taken on his family, he said they had all "had enough". Despite the recent improvement in his cardiac condition, his health was fragile and he needed treatment abroad and wanted to leave the TMC.

QDF & GOL OFFER OPTIONS FOR TRAVEL, TREATMENT - EL-JAHMI & FAMILY MUST CHOOSE

¶6. (C) Saleh said there were three options for el-Jahmi: 1) travel abroad for treatment; 2) remain at his family home in Tripoli and pursue outpatient care; and, 3) transfer from the TMC to a private clinic in Libya. After el-Jahmi's condition improved to the point that he was able to be safely discharged, he and his family had to choose which option they wanted to pursue. El-Jahmi stressed his wish to travel abroad for treatment, but noted that he lacked the funds to do so. Saleh said the QDF would facilitate obtaining passports and exit permissions for accompanying family members, and would underwrite el-Jahmi's travel and medical expenses. (Note: As reported ref C, the QDF made a similar commitment to recently released regime critic Idriss Boufayed. End note.)

¶7. (C) Saleh said either Muhammad el-Jahmi or his younger brother, Ahmed, would likely accompany el-Jahmi, as well as his wife, Fawzia. It was "possible" that the brother initially left behind, as well as el-Jahmi's daughters and their families, would be permitted to travel to join their father later. Saleh stressed that there were no conditions for el-Jahmi's release, tacit or otherwise. (Note: As reported ref D, the QDF and GOL had earlier stipulated that Muhamamad and Fawzia el-Jahmi sign a statement pledging that el-Jahmi would refrain from speaking about political issues or his detention as a condition for his release from the TMC, which el-Jahmi refused to condone. End note.) If el-Jahmi chose to travel abroad for treatment, he would be able to return to Libya "at any time, as any Libyan citizen can".

NEXT STEPS

¶8. (C) El-Jahmi, Saleh and the CDA agreed on the following course of action. First, work will be done to resolve the three remaining medical issues, (hopefully) paving the way for his discharge from the TMC. Second, el-Jahmi's family, currently in Benghazi, will travel to Tripoli this week and meet with him

sometime thereafter to discuss which of the three options (travel abroad for treatment, return to home in Tripoli or transfer to private clinic in Libya) they wish to pursue. Third, Muhammad el-Jahmi, Saleh and the CDA will subsequently meet to discuss the family's wishes and how to proceed. Noting that Muhammad el-Jahmi had not been "responsible or active" in advocating Fathi el-Jahmi's interests, Saleh attributed delays in Fathi el-Jahmi's release to family squabbles and stressed that the QDF wanted agreement from as many el-Jahmi family members as possible on the desired course of action. Claiming the joint meeting with el-Jahmi had helped avoid misunderstandings, Saleh cautioned the U.S. against relying on "wrong information" from el-Jahmi's U.S.-based brother, who has intermittent contact with el-Jahmi family members in Libya.

¶9. (C) Comment: While Muhammad el-Jahmi is clearly being made to be the scapegoat in the QDF's version of events, it seems clear that the long months of pressure on the family and particularly on Muhammad, who is the main interlocutor with the QDF and GOL,

TRIPOLI 00000960 003 OF 003

have taken a considerable toll. Fathi el-Jahmi was bitter and defiant when we last saw him in April. In this visit he was still angry, but seemed more concerned about his family's safety and resigned to the fact that he would have to accept terms if he wanted to leave the TMC. He told the CDA that "my problem is that I'm a man who believes in civil rights, in human rights and in the basic right to freedom of expression in a country whose regime does not value those things, and in fact despises and fears them". We will follow up with the QDF on the proposed meeting with Muhammad el-Jahmi to discuss the family's wishes and next steps. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI966

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI966 aka Wikileaks id #183785 ?
Subject	LIBYA: WE WILL NOT SELL URANIUM YELLOWCAKE TO IRAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Dec 2008 16:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI966.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI32
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9835
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTRO #0966 3531641
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 181641Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4251
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0064
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4773
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000966

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ISN/RA FOR HEIDLBERG; NSC FOR YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , IR *[Iran]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: WE WILL NOT SELL URANIUM YELLOWCAKE TO IRAN

REF: STATE 125972

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Charge d'Affaires.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) The CDA met with Tajuri el-Sheradi Tajuri, Director of UN Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), on December 18 to convey reftel demarche (the non-paper had been conveyed under cover of a diplomatic note on December 4). On Libya's commitment to sell its uranium yellowcake, Tajuri indicated that his understanding was that Libya intended to do so; however, he directed us to Dr. Ali Gashut, head of Libya's recently formed national nuclear authority, for further information on contacts with prospective buyers and any negotiations. Tajuri offered to help facilitate a meeting with Gashut; Post will follow up and

help facilitate a meeting with Cabdul, Jose will follow up and report.

¶2. (C) On concerns about possible future attempts by Iran to procure new uranium stocks, including perhaps from Libya, Tajuri emphatically said there was "absolutely no possibility" that Libya would sell its stockpile of natural uranium yellowcake ore to Iran. Even if Iran asked to do so - and Tajuri made it clear that he was not aware of anything suggesting that it had - Libya "has the utmost respect for its obligations under UNSCR's 1737 and 1803". Stressing Libya's decision in 2003-2004 to abandon its WMD programs and its desire to preserve its hard-earned credibility with the IAEA and international community, Tajuri closely questioned us about whether we had specific information suggesting Iran may have approached Libya about purchasing yellowcake and reiterated that Libya would not entertain such a request.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI967

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI967 aka Wikileaks id #183795 ?
Subject	LEBANON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Dec 2008 16:57 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI967.html
References	08STATE129978
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9863
PP RUEHAG RUEHDF RUEHIK RUEHLZ RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0967 3531657
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 181657Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4252
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0163
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4774
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000967

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/ELA (IRWIN, LAWSON)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LE *[Lebanon]* , SY *[Syria]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , EUN *[European Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LEBANON SPECIAL TRIBUNAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: STATE 129978

¶1. (SBU) The CDA delivered reftel demarche to Tajuri el-Sheradi Tajuri, Director of UN Affairs at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), on December 18. Tajuri said Libya was inclined to view the request to briefly extend the UN International Independent Investigation Commission (UNICC) mandate favorably, but noted that its position had not yet been finalized. He was non-commital On the issue of funding for the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, but asked for more information on the level of funding provided by other Arab states.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI968

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI968 aka Wikileaks id #183796 ?
Subject	LIBYA COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 2008
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Dec 2008 16:59 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI968.html
References	08STATE120019
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9866
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0968 3531659
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 181659Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4253
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1348
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0705
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0844
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0787
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4775
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000968

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , ASEC *[Security]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KCRM *[Criminal Activity]* , KHLS *[Homeland Security]* , AEMR *[Emergency Planning and Evacuation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM 2008

REF: STATE 120019

¶1. (U) The United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in June 2006 after Libya renounced terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in 2003. Libya has continued to cooperate closely with the United States and the international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.

¶2. (U) In November 2007, Egyptian cleric and al-Qa'ida (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a merger between AQ and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). In an audiotape, al-Zawahiri urged AQ fighters to topple the government of Libya, describing Muammar al-Qadhafi as an "enemy of Islam" and criticizing the 2003 decision to renounce WMD and terrorism. According to press accounts, LIFG maintained a limited presence in eastern Libya and has facilitated the transfer of foreign fighters to join insurgents fighting U.S.-led forces in Iraq.

fighters to join insurgents fighting U.S. led forces in Iraq.

¶3. (U) On August 14, Libya and the United States signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement to create a process and a mechanism to provide compensation to claimants in both countries for terrorism-related cases. Included in the settlement agreement are claims stemming from the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin. On October 31, the Secretary of State certified to Congress that all settlement funds had been received, paving the way for the confirmation of a U.S. Ambassador to Tripoli and the restoration of full diplomatic ties.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI969

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI969 aka Wikileaks id #183811 ?
Subject	REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED IN SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Dec 2008 17:52 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI969.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI819 , 08TRIPOLI960
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI47
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9942
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0969 3531752
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 181752Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4254
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1349
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0706
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0845
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0788
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0966
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0653
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0023
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0488
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4776
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000969

SIPDIS

NSC FOR YERGER, DEPT FOR DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM) AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: REGIME CRITIC IDRISS BOUFAYED IN SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT

REF: A) TRIPOLI 960 , B) TRIPOLI 472 , C) TRIPOLI 819

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, CDA, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Geneva-based opposition website Libya al-Youm reported on December 12 that recently released regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed had arrived in Geneva for medical treatment. Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Qadhafi Development

Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee, told the CDA on December 13 on the margins of a meeting with detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (details ref A), that he had personally escorted Boufayed onto a Vienna-bound Austrian Air flight on December 11 (Boufayed then traveled on to Switzerland). Noting that there had been "complications" in securing permission for Boufayed to travel, Saleh said he had personally accompanied him to the airport at the direction of QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi to "avoid problems" with Libyan security organization officials and ensure that he was able to leave. Muhammad Tarnesh, Director of the Human Rights Society of Libya, told CDA on December 17 that Boufayed's brother, Juma'a Boufayed, confirmed earlier this week that his brother had arrived in Geneva and begun treatment for his advanced lung cancer. (Note: Juma'a Boufayed was arrested along with his brother in February 2007 in connection with a planned peaceful demonstration in Tripoli's Green Square. As reported ref B, Juma'a was released on May 27; per ref C, Idriss Boufayed was released on October 8 on humanitarian grounds. End note.)

¶2. (C) According to Swiss Embassy officials, Boufayed's arrival in Switzerland allowed him to maintain his Swiss residency and eligibility for state-funded medical care. Noting that the QDF would have preferred to keep news of Boufayed's travel quiet, Saleh made a point of stressing that the QDF had paid for his travel and intended to pay for his medical care. He had asked Boufayed to send contact details for the medical facilities at which he was receiving treatment so the QDF could arrange to pay his bills there directly.

¶3. (C) Comment: Boufayed's case, which is less well-publicized and less sensitive for senior regime figures than that of Fathi el-Jahmi, could provide a useful template for resolving el-Jahmi's case. It is clear that high-level engagement on human rights issues during QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam's recent visit to the U.S. helped re-focus the regime's attention on these issues. Saif al-Islam called Saleh during the CDA's meeting with el-Jahmi to check on the visit and confirm that Boufayed had traveled. According to Saleh, Saif al-Islam underscored to him the importance of noting for the USG the positive role the QDF had played in facilitating Boufayed's travel. Given the GOL's desire to avoid calling attention to Boufayed's travel, Post recommends against any proactive statements regarding the case. End comment.

GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI970

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI970 aka Wikileaks id #184031 ?
Subject	HIV INFECTION RATES IN LIBYA MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 19 Dec 2008 15:40 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI970.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0959
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0970/01 3541540
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191540Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4255
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0654
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0967
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0039
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0164
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1350
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0707
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0846
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0789
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4777
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000970

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , AMED *[Medical Services]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HIV INFECTION RATES IN LIBYA MAY BE SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN PREVIOUSLY ESTIMATED

¶1. (SBU) Summary: In a recent televised interview, Libya's leading HIV/AIDS prevention official said the number of Libyans infected with HIV could be as high as 70,000 individuals, representing some 1.13 percent of the total population. Previous estimates had put the number at .6 percent (about 37,000 people) to one percent (about 61,000 people). Intravenous drug use and risky sexual behavior constitute the most prevalent disease vectors. Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics in Libya, the estimate of 70,000 cases of HIV-positive cases is useful, although the presence of a large migrant population from sub-Saharan Africa and lack of

clarity about the extent of intravenous drug use and risky sexual behavior suggest that the real figure of HIV-positive cases could be still higher. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On the occasion of World AIDS Day on December 1, Dr. Muhammad Sammud, Director of Libya's HIV/AIDS prevention program at the National Center for Infectious Diseases was interviewed on state-owned television about the country's efforts to track and prevent the spread of the disease in Libya. The interview also appeared on satellite channel al-Jazeera. Dr. Sammud said the government had recently tested some 70,000 people for HIV in an effort to obtain a valid statistical sample that would help determine HIV infection rates in Libya. He said there were 10,600 known cases of Libyans infected with HIV in the country; however, he pointed out that epidemiologists typically multiply the number of known cases by a factor of six in developing countries since testing protocols and concerns among infected individuals about stigmatization often lead to a dramatic under-representation of the actual number of cases. Using this approach, he said the number of Libyans who are HIV-positive could be as high as 70,000. (Note: It was not clear whether the 70,000 individuals tested included members of the Libya's large migrant community, many of whom are from sub-Saharan Africa. Some estimates put that population at about two million people. End note.)

¶3. (SBU) In a recent meeting sponsored by the EU's HIV/AIDS Action Plan for Benghazi, an HIV-positive rate of 0.6 percent among Libyans was given. Using the 2007 CIA World Factbook's total population figure of 6,173,579, that represents about 37,000 people. But some studies, including ones undertaken by the Government of Libya (GOL), UNAIDS and the U.K., suggest that the prevalence of HIV among Libyans engaged in risky behavior approaches one percent (about 61,000 people out of the total population). The figure of 70,000 individuals cited by Dr. Sammud would represent about 1.13 percent, significantly larger than previous estimates.

¶4. (SBU) The first cases of HIV infection in Libya were detected in 1985 among hemophiliacs, who contracted HIV from Factor VIII imported from Europe. National AIDS Programme (NAP) figures showed that since 1998 there has been an alarming increase in the number of HIV-positive cases, a period that coincided with the infection of some 429 children at the Benghazi Children's Hospital. (Note: The GOL claimed those infections had been deliberately perpetrated by a group including five Bulgarian nurses and a Palestinian doctor, who allegedly injected the children with the virus. End note.) UNAIDS and NAP estimate that 90 percent of adult infections in Libya result from intravenous drug use. Although the NAP has promulgated a multi-pronged awareness campaign since 2002, HIV/AIDS remains a heavily stigmatized illness because of its associations with drug abuse and extra-marital sexual relations. The head administrator of a leading medical center in Tripoli told us earlier this year that Libyan health officials were also increasingly concerned about the large number of Libyan men, married and unmarried, who frequent prostitutes but do not use protection, representing another potentially significant vector for the disease.

¶5. (SBU) Comment: The recent television interview of the country's leading authority on HIV/AIDS represented a rare bit of public candor from Libya's health officials. More typical is a reluctance to say anything to the public, as in the case of a recent outbreak of "bluemouth disease" among sheep. The outbreak occurred on the eve of the Eid al-Adha holiday, which families typically celebrate by eating mutton. This year, rumors about the extent of the bluemouth outbreak and the impact of the disease on humans prompted many Libyans to celebrate Eid

al-Adha with chicken. Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable statistics in Libya, the estimate of 70,000 cases of HIV-positive cases is useful, although the large migrant population and lack of clarity about the extent of intravenous drug use and risky sexual behavior suggest that the real figure of HIV-positive cases could be still higher. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI976

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI976 aka Wikileaks id #184229 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR NOVEMBER 2008
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Dec 2008 08:43 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI976.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5505
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0976/01 3570843
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 220843Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4262
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0709
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1352
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0848
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0791
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0371
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4784
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0011
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0085
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0969
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0656
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000976

C O R R E C T E D COPY - ADDING ADDRESSEES

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, HAYES, PATTERSON)
STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD) AND USAID (MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND
CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB (BHALLA)
CAIRO FOR FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EINV [Foreign
Investments] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR NOVEMBER 2008

TRIPOLI 00000976  001.2 OF 005
```

CONSULTING

¶1. (SBU) Economics officer and senior commercial officer met on November 30 with a representative of Bearing Point, who was in Tripoli discussing future contracts for the company with the Libyan government. Bearing Point did a Basel Core Principles assessment for Libya a few years ago, and now is interested in helping the Central Bank implement some of the recommendations previously made, including work on the regulatory regime for banking supervision, and anti-money laundering. Bearing Point is also discussing with the Privatization Board a study tour of U.S. regulators for the power industry. Bearing Point is also in discussions with the Economic Development Board about Bearing Point's assistance in coordinating between the various economic actors carrying out programs and assisting in the development of SME's through the business incubator program.

OIL & GAS

¶2. (U) Energy City Libya Masterplan: Bahrain's Gulf Finance House launched the $5 billion Energy City Libya project, which will develop the country as a regional hub for the energy sector. The project will cover 6 square kilometers on the shore of Sabratha, a city 70km west of Tripoli and is intended to serve as a crossroads between the European, African and Arab markets. The project involves the construction of a centerpiece surrounded by specialized business clusters including an environmental and renewable energy advisory centre, an area dedicated to oil and gas producers, an area for shipping and trading companies, an area for energy service industries, and an area for downstream and infrastructure industries. The Economic and Social Fund of Libya is an investor in the project and will have a consultative role in the project. [MEED, 11/9/2008]

¶3. (U) Canadian Firm Verenex Submits Final Appraisal Report for Libya's Area 47: The report recommends that the field be declared commercial as a first step in advancing a gross 50,000 barrels of oil per day development project in the southern part of Area 47. Under the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA), a declaration of commerciality by the Area Management Committee would clear the way to establish a Joint Operating Company with the National Oil Corporation as a 50% partner to finalize the development plan and to execute the project. [Petroleum Africa, 11/13/2008]

¶4. (U) Geology of Southern Libya Symposium & Exhibition: The event was officially sponsored by the National Oil Corporation and marked the 50th anniversary of the Earth Science Society of Libya. The symposium and exhibition was held during 17 - 20 November. Geosciences, seismic, geophysical, and exploration and production services companies, as well as consulting and training organizations from UK, USA, Denmark, Spain, Canada and Libya participated. [libyaonline.com, 11/15/2008]

¶5. (U) Geowave Endeavour sets production record for any seismic vessel: Norwegian Wavefield is undertaking BP's offshore seismic data collection with the Geowave Endeavour vessel. The vessel acquired 2,991 sail miles during the month of October while working offshore Libya for BP; this is believed to be a new production record for any seismic vessel. The contract incorporates the industry's largest ever onboard processing project. This is BP's largest 3D seismic survey ever acquired in terms of area. [Hart Energy Publishing, 11/21/ 2008]

¶6. (U) Libya-focused Verenex Energy opens data rooms to potential buyers: The Canadian company, focused on Libya, announced in September it was considering selling options but had not specifically said it was for sale. The data rooms will remain open until at least mid-December, and the company aims to make a decision in the first quarter of 2009.Verenex Energy Inc.

The Libyan National Oil Corporation has approved a list of large companies qualified to view the confidential technical data on the assets in the Ghadames Basin. Verenex acquired rights to Area 47 in 2005 and has drilled 16 exploration and appraisal wells, and released an estimate that the area contains 2.15 billion barrels of oil equivalent. [oilweek.com, 11/27/2208]

TRIPOLI 00000976 002.2 OF 005

¶7. (U) Pertamina in talks to acquire Verenex's Libya oil field: Indonesian oil company PT Pertamina is in talks with Verenex Energy Inc. to buy the Canada-based firm's stakes in an oil field in the Ghadames Basin, Libya. Pertamina already has exploration rights in two blocks in Libya. It is still unclear if Pertamina intends to enter the block alone or with partners. [The Jakarta Post, 11/29/2008]

¶8. (U) OiLibya Begins Pouring Oil in Ethiopia: After 60 years of presence in the country, as of November 14, Shell Ethiopia has totally moved out of the Ethiopian market, after Libya Oil Holding Ltd (OiLibya) finalized the purchase and sale agreement. Shell signed a purchase sale and agreement with OiLibya, which gives the latter 100% ownership of Shell's downstream oil products marketing business share in Ethiopia. Its 142 employees have been retained. The last months of Shell Ethiopia's life were characterized by a serious confrontation it had with the company's labor union over service benefit claims the employees demanded. OiLibya has already pledged a 15% salary increment for the employees as of January 2009. [allafrica.com, 11/25/2208]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (U) Liberia gets 30 Tons of Rice from Libya: The government of Libya has provided about 30 tons of rice to Liberia. The Charge d'Affaires of the Libyan People's Bureau in Liberia, Aymen T.A. Shah, said the donation was Libya's way of identifying with Liberia in the wake of global food crisis; in response, Deputy Foreign Minister for Administration, Johnson N. Gwaikolo, who received the rice on behalf of the Liberian government, commended the government and people of Libya for the donation. During the year, Libya has also donated generators, tractors, and several medical supplies to Liberia. [libyaonline.com, 11/3/2008]

¶10. (U) Libya, Belarus Sign Cooperation Agreements: During an official visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Belarus, Libya and Belarus signed four agreements related to the economic, judicial and cultural sectors. The signing ceremony took place on November 3rd. The agreements include a convention on avoiding double taxation, a protocol on cooperation between judicial branches, a memorandum of understanding between the two countries' standardization agencies and an agreement on media cooperation. Muammar al-Qadhafi arrived in Minsk after visiting Moscow. [Tripoli Post, 11/4/2008]

¶11. (U) Memorandum of Understanding Signed between Libya and the Ukraine: Ukraine and Libya signed Convention for Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with respect to Taxation on Income. Also, a Memorandum of Understanding in the area of Metrology and Certification was signed. The memorandums were signed in the presence of Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko and Muammar al-Qadhafi, on a state visit to Kyiv. [ljbc, 11/4/2008]

¶12. (U) Libya offers employment opportunities to Sri Lankans: A 12- member Libyan labor delegation, led by Libyan Manpowerr Minister, Matough Mohamed Matough, made a four-day visit to Sri Lanka. Libya and Sri Lanka entered into a Memorandum of Understanding regarding health, hospitality, and education. The Libyan Minister indicated their urgent requirements of doctors, nurses, and paramedics in the Libyan hospitals. Libya also

indicated its desire to set up a hotel management school in Sri Lanka, and to have engineering, physics, biology, and chemistry lecturers from Sri Lanka in its universities. Sri Lanka President has also approved the setting up of a Sri Lanka High Commission in Libya. Libya has come forward to recruit immediately 1,000 doctors and 1,000 nurses from Sri Lanka. [Asian Tribune, 11/6/2008]

¶13. (U) New Islamic University to Open in Kampala: The Libyan-based World Islamic Call Society is to open a university in Uganda by the end of this year. The society's secretary-general, Dr. Muhammad Shariff, said the university, which started in Tripoli, Libya in 1975 had opened up branches in Chad, Syria and England. The university would initially operate from the training centre at the Old Kampala Mosque,

before relocating to a permanent place. [New Vision Kampala, 11/11/2008]

¶14. (U) EU-Libya talks start: Negotiations on an EU-Libya Framework Agreement, covering political, social, economic, commercial and cultural relations with Libya, opened in Brussels with EU External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and representatives of the current French EU presidency representing Europe. On the Libyan side of the table will be Secretary for European Affairs Abdulati Elobeidi and Mohamed Tahar Siala, Deputy Secretary at the General People Committee for International Cooperation. To date Libya remains the only Mediterranean country with no official relations with the European bloc. Earlier this year Libya had declined an invitation to join the Union for the Mediterranean proposed by the EU's French Presidency. [eubusiness.com, 11/12/2008]

CONSTRUCTION

¶15. (U) Sovereign Hospitality Holdings to develop urban resort in Tripoli with InterContinental Hotels Group: Kuwaiti Sovereign Hospitality Holdings announced it will develop an extensive resort in Tripoli, Libya, to be managed by Holiday Inn, an InterContinental Hotels Group owned brand. The development will feature the 4 star Holiday Inn Tripoli Hotel, as well as real estate opportunities, and is due to open in 2011. Sovereign Hospitality Holdings will invest around $130 million in this project. [libyaninvestment.com, 11/11/2008]

¶16. (U) Thai Firm Wangdee Engineering ready for $40 million project in Libya: Thai Wangdee Engineering and Construction Company has entered the North African market by securing a contract to build housing units worth $40 million in the south of Libya. The contract is part of a Libyan government public housing programme in which 25,000 housing units will be built nationwide. Rawas for Constructions and Maintenance Company is the main contractor for the Libyan government's rural area development project, and Wangdee is a subcontractor for 1,612 one-storey row houses in the southern city of Brack, about 700 kilometers south of Tripoli. [Bangkok Post, 11/22/2008]

¶17. (U) South Korea's Kolon wins $86 million deal in Libya: The Kolon Engineering & Construction Company, a South Korean builder, signed a preliminary $86 million deal to build a sewage treatment plant in Tripoli. The plant is expected to be completed 30 months after its launch. [Business in Asia Today, 11/24/2008]

¶18. (U) Libya sets up joint venture with Egypt's Sewedy: Two Libya's state-owned firms have set up a $25 million joint venture with Egypt's El Sewedy Cables, to produce high voltage cables for Libya's domestic market. The joint venture has been named El Mushtaraka Cables Manufacturing. El Sewedy owns 55

percent, Manufacturing Investment Development Company Holding owns 40 percent and Electricity Industries Company, owns 5 percent of the JV. El Sewedy is one of the biggest cable manufacturers in the Middle East. [Reuters, 27/11/2008]

¶19. (U) China Railway Construction Corporation starts $1.7 billion project in Libya: The railway project consists of a 453 kilometer railway line which will link Tripoli with Sirte. The railway line is part of a major Libyan plan to build a railway network linking it to other African states, including neighboring Maghreb countries. Libya is one of China's largest trading partners in Africa, with two-way trade estimated by Libyan officials at more than $2.0 billion during last year. [Reuters, 11/28/2008]

¶20. (U) Libya Enlists British Architects for Conflict Museum: The London-based Metropolitan Workshop, a collective of British architects, has won a closed competition to design the conflict museum. The proposed design takes the form of a sequence of origami-like, zigzag forms that somehow manage to conjure an image of some ultra-modern Bedouin tent hunkered down in the desert dunes of North Africa. [dexigner.com, 11/30/2008]

IT/TELECOM

TRIPOLI 00000976 004.2 OF 005

¶21. (U) Atrexx Targets the North African Oil and Gas Market: German company Atrexx, a provider of telecommunication and broadcast services, has confirmed the conclusion of major contracts for the provision of satellite communications to European suppliers in the Libyan oil and gas industry. The communications will be provided to remote exploration sites and to drilling teams based in the region. Atrexx has been working in the Libyan oil and gas market since the embargo was lifted. [Atrexx, 11/3/2008]

¶22. (U) North Africa to See Enterprise Voice & Data: Tunisia Telecom Integrator and Alcatel-Lucent have joined forces to supply enterprise voice and data solutions in the North African nations of Libya and Tunisia. The agreement will showcase the two firms' common skills and technological abilities and broaden their presence in North Africa. Alcatel-Lucent and TTE will offer complete and secure communication solutions while evolving the network infrastructure in Tunis and Libya. [TmcNET, 11/4/2008]

¶23. (U) Summit in Bahrain to Address Information Technology Priorities: The event aims to discuss Information Technology (IT) Strategies to develop the productivity of the Oil & Gas sector, discuss challenges facing this industry in the Arab region and establish a strategic platform for the IT executives in the Oil, Gas and Industrial sector. The OT Summit took place November 18 and 19, and hosted the heads of IT sectors in the region's top oil producing countries.[otsummit.com, 11/17/2008]

¶24. (U) ThurayaIP Rolled Out in Libyan Government and Corporate Sectors: Thuraya, a UAE Satellite Telecommunications Company, signed a major commercial deal with the General Post and Telecommunications Company (GPTC), according to which a large number of ThurayaIP terminals will be rolled out in most areas within Libya before the end of this year. Thuraya has recently begun installing ThurayaIP terminals for key user segments including government agencies, oil and gas companies, business corporate, media and international organizations operating in the country. [thuraya.com, 11/18/2008]

¶25. (U) MicroWorld Forms Retail Partnership with CIS Libya: MicroWord, the advanced AntiVirus and Content Security Solution developer, announced its retail partnership with CIS Libya, a provider of IT vendors with an established client base of

provider of IT vendors with an established client base of corporate companies like Libyan Telecom Company, General Electricity Company of Libya, and Shell Libyan Branch. The partnership aims to distribute MicroWorld's security products in Libya. The partnership will enable both companies to work together in helping users secure and manage their information assets. [emailwire.com, 11/24/2008]

¶26. (U) Power plant builder Technopromexport and Libya to set up energy JV: Russia's state-controlled power plant builder Technopromexport and the Libyan African Investment Portfolio have agreed on a joint venture to build power plants in Africa. The joint venture, Laptechno-Power, will build and operate power facilities in seven African countries: Libya, Uganda, Ghana, Algeria, Egypt, Yemen and Namibia. The construction of electric power facilities will be financed by the Libyan African Investment Portfolio, which will manage $6.73 billion in funds to implement the projects in the seven countries. The first projects will be the construction of a 1,250-km [777-mile] electric transmission line with a capacity of 400 kiloWatts in Libya and a 300 MegaWatts hydro power plant on the Blue Nile River in Uganda. [RIA Novosti, 11/20/2008]

BANKING

¶27. (U) Egypt's Beltone Financial opens office in Libya: Egypt-based investment bank Beltone Financial has expanded into Libya by partnering with the Libyan Economic and Social Development Fund to open an office in Tripoli. "Beltone Financial is providing a comprehensive suite of services in Tripoli including securities brokerage, asset management, investment, corporate restructuring and advisory services," the bank said in a statement. Beltone was established in 2002, and

is present in Cairo, Riyadh, Jeddah, Dubai, Qatar, London and New York. The investment bank manages about 30 billion pounds of assets. [Reuters, 8/11/2008]

¶28. (U) First Gulf Bank teams up with Libya to launch first joint lender: Abu Dhabi-based lender First Gulf Bank (FGB) and Libya's Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) have launched First Gulf Libyan Bank (FGLB) operations in Tripoli, Libya. The inauguration was held under the patronage of the Libyan Prime Ministry. Equally owned by ESDF and FGB and fully managed by FGB, FGLB will initially offer a range of corporate products to businesses in Libya. FGLB will expand its range of services to address the emerging needs of the country. [Gulf News, 13/11/2008]

PRESS

¶29. (U) AFP launches bureau in Libya: Agence France-Presse formally opened a bureau in Tripoli on November 22, the first global news agency in Libya. The new bureau, directly linked to AFP's Middle East regional headquarters in Nicosia, Cyprus, will be staffed by two journalists covering Libyan news in Arabic and French, plus a photographer. The news agency was previously represented in Tripoli by a local freelance. [libyaonline.com, 23/11/2008]

TRANSPORTATION

¶30. (U) The Oil Carrier "Aisha" included to the Fleet of Public Marine Transport Company: The modern oil carrier "Aisha" built by Samsung Company, was enlisted to the commercial operation of the Libyan national company for public marine transport. Its capacity reaches 100,000 barrels. Resources from the Libyan marine transport company mentioned that the enlisting of this carrier to the company fleet follows the company's plan to become the biggest fleet of oil carriers in the Arab and

Mediterranean Sea. The plan is under the supervision of Hannibal
al-Qadhafi. [libyaninvestment.com, 23/11/2008]
GODFREYJT

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI979

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI979 aka Wikileaks id #184944 ?
Subject	ARRIVAL OF AMBASSADOR GENE A. CRETZ AT POST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 29 Dec 2008 07:09 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI979.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5730
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0979 3640709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 290709Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4269
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1357
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0714
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0853
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0796
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0144
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0153
RUEHFSC/USOFFICE FSC CHARLESTON SC IMMEDIATE 0116
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4791
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000979

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/EX AND PER/CDA/SL/PAS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: APER *[Personnel]* , AFIN *[Financial Management]* , OTRA *[Travel]* , AMGT *[Management Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: ARRIVAL OF AMBASSADOR GENE A. CRETZ AT POST

¶1. (U) Ambassador Gene A. Cretz arrived at Tripoli on December 27 at 1500 local time and assumed charge.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI982

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI982 aka Wikileaks id #185000 ?
Subject	LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 29 Dec 2008 13:14 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI982.html
References	08TRIPOLI480
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

From: CBPC, EACTAPP
Sent: Monday, December 29, 2008 3:05 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000982 O UN 29-DEC-08 LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT
[8377562]

UNCLAS

VZCZCXRO5965
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0982 3641314
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 291314Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4271
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4794

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000982

SENSITIVE

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KBCT *[Arab League Boycott]* , ABLD *[Buildings and Grounds]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , AL *[Albania]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , AMGT *[Management Operations]* , ASUP, AFIN *[Financial Management]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT

REF: A) STATE 132944, B) TRIPOLI 480

¶1. (U) The Government of Libya (GOL) does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Local firms are required by national law to comply with the Arab League (AL) boycott, and would therefore not be able to sign the required U.S. certification without exposing themselves to civil and/or criminal penalties. Post accordingly requests a waiver of the AL boycott certification.

¶2. (SBU) In 2007, the Ministry of Trade and Economy informed Post that the GOL does not enforce the boycott; however, the government continues to use the boycott as a means by which to selectively sanction foreign corporations and boycott language continues to appear in contracts. As detailed in ref B, UK-based retailer Marks and Spencer was threatened with closure and decried in the government-sanctioned press as being a "Zionist entity," despite having been removed from the AL's boycott list in mid-2007. At year's end, Marks and Spencer continued to operate one location in Tripoli, albeit under the recurring threat of being shuttered. Bills of lading and customs declarations for imports cannot indicate trade with Israel, and shippers are legally required to certify that no goods are of Israeli origin. Libya continues to enforce a travel ban for passports containing Israeli visas or entry/exit stamps.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI984

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI984 aka Wikileaks id #185022 ?
Subject	LIBYA PROTEST'S ISRAEL'S STRIKES ON GAZA, CALLS FOR "MEANINGFUL" UNSC ACTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 29 Dec 2008 14:31 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI984.html
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI988 , 09TRIPOLI30 , 09TRIPOLI5
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6033
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0984 3641431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291431Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4273
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0155
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4796
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000984

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/29/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , UN *[United Nations]* , IS *[Israel]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA PROTEST'S ISRAEL'S STRIKES ON GAZA, CALLS FOR "MEANINGFUL" UNSC ACTION

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) MFA Secretary for European Affairs and senior regime figure Abdulati Obeidi convoked P-5 chiefs of mission on December 28 to denounce Israel's airstrikes against the Gaza Strip.

The meeting was filmed and televised by the state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency (JANA). Describing strikes by the region's most powerful military force against Palestinians in Gaza as "unjust and disproportionate", Obeidi claimed the attacks were a "political and electoral gambit" whose timing was at least partly dictated in part by Israel's upcoming elections and domestic political concerns. Israel said its strikes were intended to deter further rocket attacks from the Gaza Strip; however, the disparity between the "anxiety" prompted by Hamas' rocket attacks and the mass casualties caused by the IDF strikes suggested that Israel's real goal was to fundamentally alter facts on the ground in Gaza. The ongoing strikes in Gaza were of a piece with Israel's historic policy of "exterminating" senior Hamas leaders as a means by which to destabilize the

situation in the West Bank and Gaza. Dutifully noting that the parties and international actors should fully consider a one-state endgame in line with the "Isratine" concept articulated by Muammar al-Qadhafi, Obeidi contrasted the "unfairness" of international intervention in Iraq, Sudan and elsewhere and the international community's reluctance to sanction Israel.

¶2. (C) Libya and Arab League states with whom it has been in touch believe the "correct address for action"is the UNSC. Libya wants a "balanced and binding" resolution that would: 1) call for an immediate end to rocket attacks; 2) an immediate cessation of Israeli military operations in and around Gaza, and: 3) an immedate lifting of the blockade against Gaza to permit the flow of humanitarian assistance. (Note: Arab ambassadors were also summoned on December 28 by MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs Muhammad Siala to hear Libya's views on a putative UNSCR. End note.) In something of a departure from typical Libyan positions on Arab-Israeli questions, Obeidi acknowledged that the IDF strikes had been a response to the rocket attacks from Gaza. He candidly conceded that there were intra-Palestinian disagreements that only the Palestinians themselves could resolve, and said other Arab actors had not previously been as positive or pro-active as they could or should have been.

3) Responding to the French Ambassador's question as to whether Libya might support a UNSC Presidential Statement in lieu of a UNSCR, Obeidi stressed Libya's strong preference for "meaningful action" in the form of a binding resolution, but was careful not to rule out the possibility of a Presidential Statement. Underscoring the Arabs' position and dismissing previous UNSCRs, the Annapolis process and the Arab Initiative as "timid and ineffectual", he stressed that Libya "does not want just empty words and wishful thinking".

¶4. (C) Comment: The consensus view among the P-5 COM's was that Libya's position was more balanced than had been expected, and that while Libya was keen to achieve a binding resolution, it was ready to talk and perhaps consider a UNSC Presidential Statement or other alternatives to a UNSCR. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI987

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI987 aka Wikileaks id #185239 ?
Subject	THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE OPERATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 30 Dec 2008 15:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI987.html
References	08TRIPOLI592 , 08TRIPOLI851 , 08TRIPOLI926
Referenced by	08TRIPOLI6
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7153
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0987/01 3651534
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 301534Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4275
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1359
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0716
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0854
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0797
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4798
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0024
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000987

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE OPERATIONS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 592 , B) TRIPOLI 851 , C) TRIPOLI 926

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The diplomatic row between Switzerland and Libya prompted by the mid-July arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi has worsened again. The GOL recently notified Swiss companies active in Libya that they must cease their operations and liquidate their locally-held assets by January 31. Employees of Swiss companies have been threatened with incarceration unless they leave Libya immediately. The last remaining Swiss Air flight between Zurich and Tripoli was cancelled by the GOL for

"technical reasons", and Swiss diplomats believe their entire mission may be declared personae non grata soon. The GOL's latest actions appear to have been motivated by Switzerland's refusal to agree to Libya's request that the police officers who arrested Hannibal be punished (Switzerland's position is that the arrest was lawful and properly executed). In addition, the decision by Swiss members of a bilateral commision of inquiry to make public parts of a draft report under review gave Libya an opening to justify more aggressive measures against Swiss interests in Libya. The latest developments are further evidence that business is politics in Libya, and that the al-Qadhafi regime is prepared to risk a complete rupture of at least some bilateral relationships to save face. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The diplomatic fallout stemming from the July 15 arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi in Geneva (ref A) continues to worsen. The Government of Libya (GOL) has ordered Swiss companies to cease operations in Libya and liquidate their assets by January 31 and the Swiss Embassy here has ceased all non-essential services. Third-country nationals employed by Swiss firms in Libya have been threatened with incarceration unless they depart the country immediately. The GOL cancelled the last remaining Zurich-Tripoli Swiss Air flight shortly before Christmas, and Libya's state-owned Afriqiya Airlines has ceased its flights to Switzerland. (Note: Swiss Air operated three weekly flights from Zurich to Tripoli until Hannibal's arrest, after which two of the three were cancelled by the GOL, ostensibly for "technical reasons". End note.) Swiss DCM Francois Schmidt told Poloff on December 29 that he "wake[s] up every day not knowing if they will allow us to leave the country or not". The situation has become so tenuous that one of two Swiss nationals who had taken refuge at the Swiss Embassy decided last week to leave the compound and go it alone. Schmidt did not know what would happen to the final "hostage" remaining at the Swiss Embassy in the event Swiss diplomats were declared personae non grata by the GOL, a possibility he viewed as increasingly likely.

¶3. (C) Swiss diplomats continue to be frustrated by the ever-changing demands from the Libyan side. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on August 31 agreeing to: 1) drop the charges against Hannibal; 2) establish a joint commission of inquiry to investigate the incident; and 3) issue a formal public apology (ref B). Schmidt complained that the Libyans decided to use the joint commission, with Libyan and Swiss co-presidents, as a vehicle to exact further demands after the Swiss dropped the charges and apologized for the incident. The Swiss had hoped that a visit by Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on December 5 would help the co-presidents agree on final language for the commission's report (ref C); however, the visit was canceled a few hours before Calmy-Rey was due to arrive.

¶4. (C) Through mid-December, the Libyans insisted that the report describe the behavior of the arresting officers in Geneva as inappropriate. The GOL has insisted that any resolution of the crisis must involve punishment of the police officers and law enforcement officials involved. While Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt acknowledged the police acted on the more aggressive side of the spectrum of possible actions - a line consistent with recent Swiss Foreign Ministry statements reported in the media - he said there was no question that they acted within the scope of Swiss law. Despite an agreement to keep the commission's work confidential, the Swiss co-president reportedly allowed language from a working draft that highlighted the impasse over legal culpability to be passed to the Libyan press, giving the GOL an opening to condemn the commission's work. The day after the press reports, employees of Swiss corporations received letters directing them to cease their operations and liquidate their assets in Libya by January ¶31. Spanish CDA Rafael Reig told Poloff that one Spanish national employed by an unnamed Swiss company was told to leave the country "immediately," despite the fact that Libyan authorities were processing his travel documents for an extended

authorities were processing his travel documents for an extended work permit and he would be forced to travel without his passport.

TRIPOLI 00000987 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) Comment: Swiss diplomats are clearly exasperated by Libya's efforts to pressure Switzerland into punishing its police officers for what they believe to have been a lawful, properly executed arrest. Swiss diplomats here have lost confidence that the new year will bring a resolution to the bilateral impasse. Swiss DCM Schmidt has complained that Bern has contributed to the problem by acceding too easily to Libya's demands. Libya's latest measures to ratchet up the pressure on the Swiss suggest that al-Qadhafi's regime is willing to risk a complete rupture in the bilateral relationship to save face (from the GOL's perspective) over what amounts to a matter of egregious behavior by Hannibal. While some diplomats in Tripoli partly blame the Swiss for the public manner in which they chose to detain Hannibal, virtually all agree that the incident serves as a cautionary tale for countries and companies seeking to do business in the Jamahiriya. The Canadian Ambassador captured the consensus view, reminding us that business is politics here, and that U.S. commercial interests would suffer if U.S.-Libya ties were to experience turbulence. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI988

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	08TRIPOLI988 aka Wikileaks id #185242 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S VIEWS ON ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON GAZA SITUATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 30 Dec 2008 15:36 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI988.html
References	08TRIPOLI984
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI30 , 09TRIPOLI5
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7161
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0988 3651536
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 301536Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4277
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0156
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4800
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000988

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/IPA (KNOPF)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , KWBG *[West Bank and Gaza]* , MOPS *[Military Operations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UN *[United Nations]* , IS *[Israel]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S VIEWS ON ARAB LEAGUE MINISTERIAL MEETING ON GAZA SITUATION

REF: A) STATE 134964, B) TRIPOLI 984

¶1. (SBU) A/DCM conveyed reftel points to MFA Americas Desk Director Ahmed Aoun on December 30. Aoun took our points on board, but stressed that while HAMAS' decision to break the ceasefire had precipitated Israel's military strikes in Gaza, the decision to execute rocket attacks had come against the backdrop of the ongoing "siege" of Gaza. Any durable cease-fire would therefore need to include the immediate lifting of Israel's blockade against Gaza to facilitate humanitarian assistance. In both the AL Ministerial and discussions at the UN, Libya intended to continue calling for a course of action consisting of: 1) an immediate end to HAMAS' rocket attacks; 2) an immediate cessation of Israeli military operations in and around Gaza, and: 3) an immedate lifting of the blockade against Gaza to permit the in-flow of humanitarian assistance. Aoun expected that a call for lifting the blockade of Gaza would be a component of any statement issued in conjunction with the AL Ministerial, and was careful to note that Libya had and would argued for balanced statements at the AL Ministerial. He had no information on who from the GOL would represent Libya at the Ministerial meeting. He reiterated points reported ref B, saying Libya and Arab League states with whom the GOL has consulted continue to believe that the correct address for action is the UNSC, and that the appropriate mechanism for UN intervention is a UNSCR.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI989

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI989 aka Wikileaks id #185243 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SOMALIA DPKO
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 30 Dec 2008 15:37 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI989.html
References	08STATE134229
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7163
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0989 3651537
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 301537Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4278
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4801
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000989

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/E, AND IO/PSC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , SO *[Somalia]* , ET *[Ethiopia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SOMALIA DPKO

REF: STATE 134229

¶1. (SBU) Post delivered reftel points and draft resolution to the General People's Committee for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation's (MFA-equivalent) International Organizations Department on December 30. We will report septel any substantive response from the GOL.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI991

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	08TRIPOLI991 aka Wikileaks id #185392 ?
Subject	READOUT OF U.S.-UK-LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, NOVEMBER 24-26
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 31 Dec 2008 12:21 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI991.html
References	06TRIPOLI498 , 08TRIPOLI498
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7857
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0991/01 3661221
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 311221Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4280
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0974
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0016
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0718
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1361
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0856
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0799
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0661
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4803
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000991

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND VCI/BIO (NORDMAN), LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS
FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , TBIO *[Biological and Medical Science]* , LY *[Libya]* , UK *[United Kingdom]*
SUBJECT: READOUT OF U.S.-UK-LIBYA TSCC BIO SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING,
NOVEMBER 24-26

REF: 06 TRIPOLI 498

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, Acting DCM, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: The Libyan Permanent National Committee on
Bioethics and Biosafety (LPNCBB) hosted the Trilateral Steering
and Coordination Committee (TSCC) Biological Subcommittee in
Tripoli November 24-26 for their first meeting since November
2007. After several years of productive meetings, UK and U.S.
experts found the Libyan side less willing to speak openly about
the way forward and more forceful in calls that the GOL needed

the way forward and more forceful in calls that the GOL needed to see concrete "rewards" for having voluntarily abandoned its WMD programs. Most contentious was the tri-lateral presentation to be delivered at the December 1 Meeting of the States Parties of the BWC; the LPNCBB avoided agreeing on the language, claiming that it failed to see how the joint presentation could enhance Libya's standing in front of the BWC. The LPNCBB provided a list of names for training at the NIAID and CDC during 2009 and a laundry list of proposed training courses it wants. U.S. and UK delegations also attended a workshop on clinical bioethics. The LPNCBB's insistence on seeing results mirrors what we are seeing in many areas of the relationship, as the GOL seeks to balance their opening to the West with their independence and regional leadership ambitions. End Summary.

¶2. (U) The TSCC Biological Subcommittee held their first meeting since 2007 in Tripoli November 24-26. The meetings opened with a review of the minutes from the November 2007 subcommittee meeting. LPNCBB officials notified the UK-U.S. teams that the proposed trilateral Memorandum of Understanding that would better define the three sides' roles had not yet been approved by all relevant actors on the Libyan side. The three parties agreed to keep the MOU as an ongoing action. In the November 2007 meeting, LPNCBB officials had asked both the UK and U.S. to investigate the possibility of providing funds to defray travel and lodging expenses for LPNCBB delegations to travel to the U.S. and UK. Neither the U.S. or UK are able to provide such funding; the Libyan side was informed that funding would remain the responsibility of each individual nation.

LIBYA'S REWARD-SEEKING COMPLICATES DISCUSSION OF PAPERS

¶3. (C) The UK delegation presented their paper outlining the subcommittee's Criteria of Success, which was accepted with a few minor modifications centered on appropriate metrics to monitor and understand success. Negotiations became contentious, however, when the three parties entered into discussion on the paper titled "Enhancing Capabilities for Biosafety, Biosecurity and Bioethics: Trilateral Cooperation on a Trio of Issues", which was to have been presented jointly at the December 1 meeting of the BWC in Geneva. The Libyan delegation used the discussion as an opportunity to criticize the U.S. and UK for not having provided enough "things" [rewards] to the LPNCBB. Unlike recent meetings between the U.S. team and LPNCBB members in which Libyan officials asserted a certain level of autonomy, the LPNCBB officials commented that they had to show results to the General People's Committee. While the LPNCBB conceded that much bilateral work had occurred in the last few years between both U.S., UK and Libyan institutions, they argued that such activity was not under the purview of the LPNCBB and therefore did not "count" as Bio-Subcommittee activities. Despite repeated urging from the UK-U.S. team, it was clear that most LPNCBB members failed to recognize that a joint presentation to the BWC showing the benefits to Libya of eliminating its BW-related activities would be a positive step. Changes were discussed, but the Libyans insisted that the revisions needed to be cleared at a higher level.

¶4. (U) While significant time was set aside discuss training opportunities for Libyans in the U.S. and UK, little time was actually spent addressing the issue. Both the U.S. and UK chairs provided points of contact for upcoming visits, but no final arrangements were made. The Libyans provided a list of names to come to the U.S. for discussion at NIAID and CDC in late-February 2009. Libya also provided a list of desired courses for review, which was largely a recapitulations of the wish list it provided in 2004.

U.S. AND UK DELEGATIONS VISIT BIOETHICS WORKSHOP

¶5. (C//REL UK) The Libyan National Center for Infectious Disease Control sponsored a workshop on Bioethics on November 25 for

approximately 20 Libyan physicians and scientists. The highlight of the workshop was a talk by Dr. Ali Bourawi, the workshop's chair, on the Islamic Concept of Truth-Telling for

TRIPOLI 00000991 002 OF 002

Medical Practitioners. During one of the sessions, Dr. Bourawi commented that Libya had imprisoned drug users in 1993-1994. The casual remark was accepted by the Libyans in the room as a given, and was mentioned in the context of hypothetically removing HIV-positive people from the general population in order to lower the figure of infected individuals.

¶6. (C) Comment: After years of relatively open communication between the three sides, there was considerable disagreement with interlocutors from the LPNCBB during the U.S. team's three-day visit. A measure of the new tension was that Libyan contacts of the visiting delegations were reluctant to meet at the airport. They claimed it "would not be good and would raise questions" if they were seen meeting Westerners at the airport or hotel (as opposed to at meeting venues). It was clear that as the focus shifted from disarmament to capacity building, Libyan officials were under pressure from their superiors to secure further tangible "rewards" for giving up WMD programs, a demand we have heard repeatedly from other GOL interlocutors. End comment.

¶7. (U) Meeting participants were:

Libya:
- Dr. Mohamed Sharif, Chairman of the LPNCBB
- Dr. Abdurrahman Mohamed Etwel, Faculty of Science, al-Fatah University
- Dr. Abdulaziz Mohamed el-Buni, Faculty of Science, al-Fatah University
- Dr. Mohamed Saad Ambrak, President of Libyan International Medical Univerity
- Dr. Abdulkader Abdurawoof el-Maleh, Faculty of Agriculture, Omar al-Mukhtar University
- Dr. Abdalgader Saleh Ali, Faculty of Science, al-Fatah University
- Dr. Achris A.A. Abdulgasem, General Director for Food and Drug Control
- Dr. Abdulhafid Abdusallam Abudher, Director of the National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control
- Dr. Mohamed Faraj Abu Ghalia, Temporary General Committee for Defense
- Dr. Mahmoud Sedig al-Falah, Director of the General Authority for Environment
- Abdulaker Mohamed Alioah, General People's Committee for Justice, General Administration for Law

UK:
- Dr. Peter Biggins, UK TSCC Bio-Subcommittee co-chair, DSTL
- Dr. Lorna Miller, DSTL
- David Clay, British Embassy

U.S.:
- Dr. Brian Nordmann, U.S. Co-Chair, Department of State
- Katherine Crittenberger, Department of State
- Tanya Anthony, Department of State
- Chris Andino, Embassy Tripoli
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI992

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI992 aka Wikileaks id #185422 ?
Subject	LIBYA INTERESTED IN U.S. WEAPONS, MORE AMBIVALENT ON OTHER MILITARY COOPERATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 31 Dec 2008 14:22 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI992.html
References	08TRIPOLI481 , 08TRIPOLI870
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI31
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7958
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0992 3661422
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 311422Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4282
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1363
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0720
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0858
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0801
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0976
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0663
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4805
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000992

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER, U.S.
AFRICAN COMMAND FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA INTERESTED IN U.S. WEAPONS, MORE AMBIVALENT ON OTHER MILITARY COOPERATION

REF: A) TRIPOLI 870 , B) TRIPOLI 481

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) MFA Secretary for the Americas Ahmed Fituri told A/DCM on December 23 that Muammar al-Qadhafi's much-publicized discussions about possible weapons purchases during his recent

visit to Russia, Belarus and Ukraine (ref A) were "largely for show". Citing a conversation with National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, on December 22, Fituri said Muatassim and senior Libyan MOD and security officials (NFI) supported purchasing more military equipment from the U.S. and (to a lesser extent) European suppliers like the U.K. and France. (Note: Muatassim traveled to Moscow in advance of his father's visit and reportedly held discussions with Russian officials about security cooperation and defense procurement possibilities. End note.) Libyan MOD and security officials intended to shift away from purchasing military equipment from Russia and former Soviet republics because U.S. military hardware was seen as being technically superior and because they believed the recently implemented U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement had paved the way for purchasing lethal weapons from the U.S. in the near future. Muatassim told Fituri the public discussion of large-scale weapons purchases before and during al-Qadhafi's October visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev were intended to "prompt competition for Libya's military business". (Note: Al-Qadhafi gave similar remarks to media during his stop in Kiev. End note.)

¶2. (C) Fituri said that while Muatassim and senior Libyan MOD and security officials agreed that they would prefer to purchase U.S. equipment, the picture was less clear regarding training and cooperation. According to Fituri, Muatassim and his brother, senior regime figure Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, support broader military cooperation with the U.S.; however, Muammar al-Qadhafi expressed reservations to Muatassim in mid-November about U.S.-Libya military-to-military cooperation that could lead to having large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers present in Libya. He was keen that U.S. military personnel not be seen in uniform in Libya, a prospect with which he was particularly concerned given that the "evacuation" of U.S. and U.K. military bases (the Wheelus and el-Adem airbases, respectively) in 1970 was viewed as a key accomplishment of the revolution. Muatassim's understanding was that he had a mandate to explore further military-to-military cooperation via the proposed U.S.-Libya Military-Military Memorandum of Understanding; however, his father intended to closely monitor each step of expanded U.S.-Libya military-to-military engagement.

¶3. (S/NF) Comment: Fituri's account is consistent with what we have heard previously about the fact that military engagement with the U.S. is a particularly sensitive subject for Muammar al-Qadhafi and other senior Libyan officials. As reported ref B, a senior MFA interlocutor told us on the margins of meetings with representatives of DOD and Lockheed-Martin to discuss the disposition of eight C-130H's purchased by Libya in the 1970's and stranded in Marietta, Georgia that al-Qadhafi had personally met with Libya's C-130 team before the meeting to discuss Libya's approach. Al-Qadhafi was adamant that any agreement to resolve the matter of the C-130H's or for future weapons purchases be contingent on securing USG guarantees that export licenses would be granted for those items, and was concerned that Libya not be "embarrassed by the U.S.". Fituri's readout of Muatassim's remarks suggests that expansion of U.S.-Libya military-to-military ties will be carefully calibrated from the Libyan side. Given al-Qadhafi's well-known predilection for changing his mind, it is likely to be fitful. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI993

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI993 aka Wikileaks id #185424 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION RESUMES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE OF LIFG FIGHTERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 31 Dec 2008 14:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI993.html
References	08TRIPOLI182 , 08TRIPOLI577
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI48 , 09TRIPOLI483 , 09TRIPOLI590
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7962
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0993 3661425
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 311425Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4283
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0977
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0664
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1364
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0721
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0859
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0802
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4806
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000993

SIPDIS

LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION RESUMES DIALOGUE ON RELEASE OF LIFG FIGHTERS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 577 , B) TRIPOLI 182 , C) TRIPOLI 320

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Human Rights Committee Director of the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), told P/E Chief on December 27 that the latest round of talks between the QDF and imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) had begun on/about December 21. The talks

are part of what QDF officials describe as "an ongoing dialogue" that had been underway for about 18 months under the personal patronage of QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. As reported reftel, QDF officials say the dialogue has so far resulted in the release of 131 former LIFG fighters, the most recent tranche in June, who have returned to their homes and participate in a QDF-subsidized program of reintegration and social rehabilitation. QDF officials say about 100 former LIFG fighters remain in the GOL's custody. (Note: The dialogue concerns LIFG members arrested in the mid to late-1990's, before the September 2007 merger between al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM) and the LIFG. End note.)

¶2. (C) Saleh said it had been expected that the current round of talks would take place in August, and that there would be another tranche of LIFG fighters released sometime in September/October. The talks were delayed, however, when questions arose about the sincerity of some LIFG fighters' renunciation of political violence. Consequently, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi had personally participated in the opening round of talks earlier this month to underscore the importance of released LIFG members abstaining from violence and extremism. As reported refs B and C, the program is designed to demonstrate the ability of former extremists to rehabilitate themselves; however, the GOL and QDF are keenly mindful of the potential for recidivism and place a heavy premium on vetting candidates for release to ensure that they do not intend to resume extremist activities.

¶3. (C) According to Saleh, the current round of talks is expected to lead to the release in February 2009 of "most" of the approximately 100 former LIFG fighters remaining in the GOL's custody. He said there were "a few" hardened LIFG former fighters who would not likely be released, and confirmed that Abdullah al-Sadiq, Abu Munther al-Saadi and Abu Hazim al-Sharif are representing the LIFG leadership in the current round of talks.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #08TRIPOLI994

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	08TRIPOLI994 aka Wikileaks id #185425 ?
Subject	THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE OPERATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 31 Dec 2008 14:26 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2008/12/08TRIPOLI994.html
References	08TRIPOLI592 , 08TRIPOLI851 , 08TRIPOLI926
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI59 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI65 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7963
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0994/01 3661426
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 311426Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4284
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0026
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1365
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0722
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0860
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0803
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4807
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000994

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/30/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THINGS FALL APART: LIBYA TELLS SWISS COMPANIES TO CEASE OPERATIONS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 592 , B) TRIPOLI 851 , C) TRIPOLI 926

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The diplomatic row between Switzerland and Libya prompted by the mid-July arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi has worsened again. The GOL recently notified Swiss companies active in Libya that they must cease their operations and liquidate their locally-held assets by January 31. Employees of Swiss companies have been threatened with incarceration unless they leave Libya immediately. The last remaining Swiss Air flight between Zurich and Tripoli was cancelled by the GOL for

"technical reasons", and Swiss diplomats believe their entire mission may be declared personae non grata soon. The GOL's latest actions appear to have been motivated by Switzerland's refusal to agree to Libya's request that the police officers who arrested Hannibal be punished (Switzerland's position is that the arrest was lawful and properly executed). In addition, the decision by Swiss members of a bilateral commision of inquiry to make public parts of a draft report under review gave Libya an opening to justify more aggressive measures against Swiss interests in Libya. The latest developments are further evidence that business is politics in Libya, and that the al-Qadhafi regime is prepared to risk a complete rupture of at least some bilateral relationships to save face. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The diplomatic fallout stemming from the July 15 arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi in Geneva (ref A) continues to worsen. The Government of Libya (GOL) has ordered Swiss companies to cease operations in Libya and liquidate their assets by January 31 and the Swiss Embassy here has ceased all non-essential services. Third-country nationals employed by Swiss firms in Libya have been threatened with incarceration unless they depart the country immediately. The GOL cancelled the last remaining Zurich-Tripoli Swiss Air flight shortly before Christmas, and Libya's state-owned Afriqiya Airlines has ceased its flights to Switzerland. (Note: Swiss Air operated three weekly flights from Zurich to Tripoli until Hannibal's arrest, after which two of the three were cancelled by the GOL, ostensibly for "technical reasons". End note.) Swiss DCM Francois Schmidt told Poloff on December 29 that he "wake[s] up every day not knowing if they will allow us to leave the country or not". The situation has become so tenuous that one of two Swiss nationals who had taken refuge at the Swiss Embassy decided last week to leave the compound and go it alone. Schmidt did not know what would happen to the final "hostage" remaining at the Swiss Embassy in the event Swiss diplomats were declared personae non grata by the GOL, a possibility he viewed as increasingly likely.

¶3. (C) Swiss diplomats continue to be frustrated by the ever-changing demands from the Libyan side. The two countries signed a memorandum of understanding on August 31 agreeing to: 1) drop the charges against Hannibal; 2) establish a joint commission of inquiry to investigate the incident; and 3) issue a formal public apology (ref B). Schmidt complained that the Libyans decided to use the joint commission, with Libyan and Swiss co-presidents, as a vehicle to exact further demands after the Swiss dropped the charges and apologized for the incident. The Swiss had hoped that a visit by Swiss Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey on December 5 would help the co-presidents agree on final language for the commission's report (ref C); however, the visit was canceled a few hours before Calmy-Rey was due to arrive.

¶4. (C) Through mid-December, the Libyans insisted that the report describe the behavior of the arresting officers in Geneva as inappropriate. The GOL has insisted that any resolution of the crisis must involve punishment of the police officers and law enforcement officials involved. While Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt acknowledged the police acted on the more aggressive side of the spectrum of possible actions - a line consistent with recent Swiss Foreign Ministry statements reported in the media - he said there was no question that they acted within the scope of Swiss law. Despite an agreement to keep the commission's work confidential, the Swiss co-president reportedly allowed language from a working draft that highlighted the impasse over legal culpability to be passed to the Libyan press, giving the GOL an opening to condemn the commission's work. The day after the press reports, employees of Swiss corporations received letters directing them to cease their operations and liquidate their assets in Libya by January ¶31. Spanish CDA Rafael Reig told Poloff that one Spanish national employed by an unnamed Swiss company was told to leave the country "immediately," despite the fact that Libyan authorities were processing his travel documents for an extended

authorities were processing his travel documents for an extended work permit and he would be forced to travel without his passport.

TRIPOLI 00000994 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) Comment: Swiss diplomats are clearly exasperated by Libya's efforts to pressure Switzerland into punishing its police officers for what they believe to have been a lawful, properly executed arrest. Swiss diplomats here have lost confidence that the new year will bring a resolution to the bilateral impasse. Swiss DCM Schmidt has complained that Bern has contributed to the problem by acceding too easily to Libya's demands. Libya's latest measures to ratchet up the pressure on the Swiss suggest that al-Qadhafi's regime is willing to risk a complete rupture in the bilateral relationship to save face (from the GOL's perspective) over what amounts to a matter of egregious behavior by Hannibal. While some diplomats in Tripoli partly blame the Swiss for the public manner in which they chose to detain Hannibal, virtually all agree that the incident serves as a cautionary tale for countries and companies seeking to do business in the Jamahiriya. The Canadian Ambassador captured the consensus view, reminding us that business is politics here, and that U.S. commercial interests would suffer if U.S.-Libya ties were to experience turbulence. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09ACCRA712

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09ACCRA712 aka Wikileaks id #218401 ?
Subject	GADDAFI CANCELS VISIT TO GHANA
Origin	Embassy Accra (Ghana)
Cable time	Tue, 28 Jul 2009 09:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09ACCRA712.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAR #0712 2090942
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 280942Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8057
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS ACCRA 000712

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AU [Austria] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , XA [Africa] , XY [West Africa] , XF [Middle East] , LY
[Libya] , GH [Ghana]
SUBJECT: GADDAFI CANCELS VISIT TO GHANA

¶1.    SUMMARY: (U) An international conference of West African
traditional rulers scheduled to be held in Ghana was abruptly
canceled three days before Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi was
scheduled to be crowned "king of kings" at the event. Reasons
for the cancellation are not clear, but press speculation
centers on a misunderstanding between the GOG and the
National House of Chiefs that was to host the event about the
purpose of the meeting.  Gaddafi, who had planned to pay for
the conference, is thought to have wanted to use the
traditional leaders to push for a single African government
with him as president, a move opposed by elected officials.
END SUMMARY

¶2.    (U) The first West Africa Traditional Rulers conference
was scheduled to bring together more than 600 chiefs, kings,
sultans, and mayors of cities in West Africa. Ghana was
selected to host the conference entitled "The role of
traditional rulers in the integration of African states" in
honor of the centenary of the birth of Ghana's first
president and pan-Africanist Kwame Nkrumah.

¶3.    (U) The conference was to have been paid for then opened
by Gaddafi, who one newspaper called "the main character of
the event". Delegates to the conference were expected to
```

proclaim Gaddafi "king of kings" despite the fact that the same title was bestowed on him last year by 200 traditional rulers and African kings at a conference in Libya.

¶4. (U) Staff at the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture confirmed reports printed in a state-owned newspaper that Gaddafi wanted to use the traditional leaders to push for a single African government in which the traditional rulers hold a formal place and Gaddafi is president, a move to which Africa's elected political leaders object. In what appears to be a face-saving measure, the same newspaper reported Libyan government sources as saying Gaddafi could not make the trip because he was attending to some exigencies and that his visit has been rescheduled for September. The president of the National House of Chiefs said the conference had been called off because of a "technical hitch" and was in no way related to Gaddafi's inability to make the trip.

¶5. (U) The timing of the traditional rulers' event also raised questions in the media. The African Union (AU) Summit in Libya ended July 3, seven days before President Obama arrived in Ghana and gave a forceful speech in support of Ghana's democratic principles. One commentator noted that Gaddafi's visit to Ghana less than two weeks after the President's visit would have been an apparent challenge to the USG efforts to shore up Ghana's and Africa's progress in developing home-grown democracy, freedoms, and the rule of law.
TEITELBAUM

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09CAIRO2297

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09CAIRO2297 aka Wikileaks id #239928 ?
Subject	EGYPT'S "INVISIBLE" REFUGEES
Origin	Embassy Cairo (Egypt)
Cable time	Tue, 15 Dec 2009 12:09 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09CAIRO2297.html
Referenced by	09CAIRO1140 , 09CAIRO330
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Thu, 17 Feb 2011 01:31: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXYZ0006
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHEG #2297/01 3491209
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151209Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4446
INFO RUCNRCC/REFUGEE COORDINATOR COLLECTIVE
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L CAIRO 002297

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ELA, AF/E, PRM FOR GILMORE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: PREF [Refugees] , PREL [External Political Relations] , SO [Somalia] , ET [Ethiopia] , EG [Egypt]
SUBJECT: EGYPT'S "INVISIBLE" REFUGEES

Classified By: Minister Counselor for Economic and Political Affairs
Donald A. Blome for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1.   (C) Key Points:

-- Both Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities in Egypt
(numbering around 6000 and 5000, respectively) feel neglected
compared to larger or more visible groups such as Sudanese or
Iraqis.

-- The Somalis receive few benefits from UNHCR and suffer
from lack of educational opportunities.  Ethiopians believe
UNHCR staff fail to understand political realities in
Ethiopia, and consequently refuse to recognize their refugee
status.  Both groups cite additional barriers to integration
including limited UNHCR funding, a Government of Egypt (GoE)
prohibition on refugee employment, and language constraints.

-- Due to lack of opportunities many Somali and Ethiopian
refugees attempt to migrate onward to Israel and Europe,
```

often at risk to their lives.

¶2. (C) Comment: Despite significant differences in refugee status recognition, Somali and Ethiopian refugees suffer from similar problems of discrimination, lack of employment opportunities, medical care and education. Somalis are granted prima facie refugee status by UNHCR Cairo. However, the Ethiopian rate of refugee acceptance is only 20 percent, which is by far the lowest acceptance rate among applicants in Egypt. The next lowest are Eritreans with a 70% refugee acceptance rate.

Somalis "Neglected"

¶3. (C) We met in separate late November meetings with leaders from the Somali and Ethiopian refugee communities in Egypt to discuss their challenges. Both communities expressed their concerns that unlike the Sudanese, who are numerous, or the Iraqis and Eritreans that have garnered international attention, Somalis and Ethiopians are the "invisible" refugees in Egypt. Mulki Al Sharmani, A Somali-born American University in Cairo professor told us that despite being recognized as refugees, the Somali community of around 6,000 is "neglected" by UNHCR and NGOs that service refugees. She said organized refugee schools provide education in Arabic and English primarily for Sudanese children, but do not target the Somali community.

Ethiopians Not Granted Refugee Status

¶4. (C) Ethiopian community leader Getawehew Tadesse (protect) believes the majority of the approximately 5,000 Ethiopians in Cairo were not recognized as refugees because "the UNHCR staff does not understand the political situation in Ethiopia." He noted that all of the Ethiopian community leaders in Egypt fled their homeland over the past 3-15 years due to political persecution by the Meles Government. Bete Dagnachew (protect), another Ethiopian community leader, said many Ethiopian refugees are members of political parties such as the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD), the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), and the Tigrayan People' Liberation Front (TPLF) and cannot return home without fear of persecution and imprisonment. However, most still lack refugee protection. Others, according to Tadesse have been granted refugee status by UNHCR, but have been denied resettlement in the U.S. because of a USG policy that deems members of certain Ethiopian opposition groups to be "terrorists." (Note: We have forwarded information on one case to the Department for review. End Note).

Egypt Safe; Discrimination and Language Limit Opportunities

¶5. (C) Al Sharmani said most Somalis come to Egypt because they believe it is safe, has better education opportunities, and the Government of Egypt (GoE) does not forcibly repatriate Somalis. However, she said many soon realize that there in fact are few education opportunities in Egypt for refugees and "black Africans" are discriminated against and unable to integrate into Egyptian society. Abdallah, a leader in the Somali refugee community and founder of the Somali Development Organization for Refugees, said language is also a major impediment to Somali integration since few are conversant in Arabic. He said Somali children cannot attend public school because they do not speak Arabic and older Somalis cannot find work in the informal sector due to language issues.

¶6. (C) According to Tadesse, Ethiopians also choose Egypt because the situation in the neighboring countries of Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Sudan is "too dangerous and unstable." However, Ethiopians suffer discrimination at the hands of Egyptians because they are "Africans" and Ethiopian children are unable to attend Egyptian schools because they do not speak Arabic.

Minimal UNHCR Benefits and No Employment Opportunities

¶7. (C) According to Al Sharmani, since the Government of Egypt prohibits refugees from working in the formal sector, UNHCR provides "minimal" financial assistance of 350-500 Egyptian pounds (USD 63-90) per month to Somali families with a minimum of 3 children. However, this does not begin to cover expenses such as rent and food. (Note: Rent in poor refugee areas of Cairo averages LE 600-1000 (USD 110-180) per month. End Note). Smaller families and unaccompanied refugees do not receive assistance. Abdallah said most Somalis in Cairo are forced to rely on remittances from the Somali community in the West to pay for rent and food.

¶8. (C) Abdallah told us that Somali women who work informally as domestic servants leave older children at home to watch younger children. This prevents the older children from attending school. Abdallah and Al Sharmani are working to organize centers to provide day care and school classes for Somali children in three areas of Cairo where Somalis reside, but they lack the funding to rent space for the centers.

¶9. (C) Tadesse told us that the Ethiopians know the economy in Egypt is better than other place in East Africa, but due to official and unofficial restrictions only 1 in 5 Ethiopian refugees are employed. Ethiopian men are rarely able to find jobs and those that can make between 500-600 Egyptian pounds (USD 90-110) per month as manual laborers. Ethiopian women often work as maids where they make around 1000 Egyptian pounds (USD 180) per month, but can be subject to sexual abuse and harassment in Egyptian homes. Many Ethiopians, including two of the community leaders, rely on remittances from family members in Ethiopia to support them in Cairo.

Israel and Europe Represent Hope for A Better Life

¶10. (C) Due to the lack of economic opportunities in Egypt, both Abdallah and Al Sharmani stated that Somalis view Egypt as a transit point to the West. Al Sharmani said that many Somalis have decided to go illegally to Israel or Europe via Libya in search of economic opportunities. She said there are at least 900 Somalis in Libyan prisons and many others in Sinai prisons for attempting to illegally cross international borders. Abdallah said the movement of Somalis to Europe and Israel has left many "unaccompanied children" in the Somali community in Egypt. (Note: UNHCR estimates that there may be as many as 2,000-3,000 Africans attempting to cross the Egypt-Israel border each month. However, we are unable to confirm this number. End Note).

¶11. (C) Emmanuel, a young Ethiopian refugee told us that many Ethiopians in Egypt are frustrated and see Israel as "the only hope for a better life." He said he is aware that many people are shot, killed, or imprisoned trying to cross the border, but he believes that this is his only chance to improve his situation and is willing to risk his life. Despite our attempts to dissuade him, Emmanuel is trying to save some of his 580 Egyptian pound (USD 105) salary per month to pay the USD 500 fee to smugglers to help him cross into Israel.

Scobey

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09CARACAS1147

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09CARACAS1147 aka Wikileaks id #223434 ?
Subject	CHAVEZ GIVES OBAMA AFRICAN PRIDE ADVICE
Origin	Embassy Caracas (Venezuela)
Cable time	Wed, 2 Sep 2009 20:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09CARACAS1147.html
References	08CARACAS409 , 09CARACAS1059
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7322
PP RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGA RUEHGD RUEHHA RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHMT RUEHNG
RUEHNL RUEHQU RUEHRD RUEHRG RUEHRS RUEHTM RUEHVC
DE RUEHCV #1147 2452019
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 022019Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3648
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1031
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001147

SIPDIS

HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/11/2018
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , VE *[Venezuela]*
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ GIVES OBAMA AFRICAN PRIDE ADVICE

REF: A. CARACAS 1059
B. 2008 CARACAS 409

Classified By: Political Counselor Robin D. Meyer
for Reason 1.4(b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary: Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, on a September 1 state visit to Libya to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's revolution, urged President Obama to "rise to the height of his African blood," adding that although he may have good ideas, his hands are tied by the "North American empire." One of Chavez, goals during his two-week tour of Africa, the Middle East, and Europe is to get Head of State commitments to attend the Summit on Africa and South America that Chavez is hosting on the Venezuelan island of Margarita on September 26-27, dates that would facilitate participation by Heads of State attending the

United Nations General Assembly. He succeeded in getting Qadhafi's commitment to attend. With his courtship of African leaders Chavez is clearly looking to tilt this summit toward his anti-American rhetoric. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) During a September 1 State visit to Libya to celebrate Qadhafi's 40th anniversary in power, Chavez praised Qadhafi's revolution as "properly socialist" and put him in the pantheon of leaders like Nasser, Machel, Nyerere and Castro. Chavez added that the African Union, like the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), formed part of "a new geo-political map" of a multipolar world. During the visit, Chavez acknowledged Obama had "lots of good ideas" despite being "bound to a North American empire." Chavez hoped that Obama would "rise to the height of his African blood" and "defeat the empire." In Tripoli, Chavez expressed his worry that if Obama "tried to defeat the empire, God forbid, they could kill him."

¶3. (SBU) Chavez's two-week tour includes Algeria, Syria, Iran, Belarus and Russia as well as Libya. One of his goals is to secure the commitment of Heads of State to attend the September 26-27 AU-UNASUR Summit in Venezuela. He had recently sent Eduardo Buria as a special envoy to Africa in part to spur interest and support for this Summit. On his current trip, Chavez has so far secured the commitment of Qadhafi to attend the Summit and is likely to obtain that of Algerian President Bouteflicka, especially considering that Caracas hosts one of the few Polisario embassies in the world.

¶4. (C) Comment: The September 26-27 timing of the African-South American Summit will likely maximize the participation of South American and African leaders in Venezuela as they proceed to the United Nations General Assembly. The planning for this Summit has been described by post's contacts as disorganized (ref A). With the courtship of African leaders, Chavez is likely trying to tilt this Summit toward adopting some of his anti-American rhetoric. End Comment.
DUDDY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09CARACAS1230

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09CARACAS1230 aka Wikileaks id #226011 ?
Subject	STILL NO AGREEMENT ON DRAFT DECLARATION FOR UNASUR-AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Caracas (Venezuela)
Cable time	Fri, 18 Sep 2009 20:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09CARACAS1230.html
References	09CARACAS1059
Referenced by	09CARACAS1284
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 16 Aug 2011 10:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9564
PP RUEHAG RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
RUEHTRO
DE RUEHCV #1230 2612036
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 182036Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY CARACAS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3719
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHWH/WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS PRIORITY
RUMIAAA/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L CARACAS 001230

SIPDIS

FOR WHA/AND/MBOND, AF/RSA/LMAZEL, AND NEA/RA/MADLER
HQSOUTHCOM ALSO FOR POLAD
DEPARTMENT PASS TO AID/OTI (RPORTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2029
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , VE [Venezuela]
SUBJECT: STILL NO AGREEMENT ON DRAFT DECLARATION FOR
UNASUR-AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT

REF: CARACAS 1059

Classified By: Political Counselor Robin D. Meyer,
for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

¶1.    (C) Summary: South African Ambassador Bhekizizwe Gila
told Ambassador Duddy on September 18 that South African
President Zuma would attend the September 26-27 UNASUR
-African Union Summit taking place on Venezuela's Margarita
Island.  Gila said the heads of state of Brazil, Libya,
Algeria, and possibly Ecuador would also attend.  He noted
that the Venezuelan government (GBRV) has resisted making any
```

that the Venezuelan government (GBRV) has resisted making any changes in their proposal for a Summit Declaration, which includes several articles praising the "Bolivarian Socialist Revolution." Brazil and South Africa are negotiating separately to develop an alternative declaration. End Summary.

President Zuma Coming to Venezuela

¶2. (C) In spite of earlier reports of minimal South African participation at the UNASUR - African Union Summit (reftel), Gila confirmed that President Zuma would attend the event. He noted that South Africa is hoping to increase its business relationship with Venezuela, especially with regards to the mining industry. He said that South Africa currently has only a very light presence in Venezuela, especially compared to Colombia, where South African investment is significant. The South African government is actively encouraging the GBRV to rejoin the Kimberley Process regulating the diamond trade. "The Venezuelans," Gila said, "are flooding the illegal market with diamonds, and affecting international prices." In addition to attending the Summit, President Zuma hopes to hold bilateral meetings with senior GBRV officials.

Venezuelans Unwilling to Negotiate the Summit Declaration

¶3. (C) Preparatory meetings for Summit have apparently failed to result in a negotiated Summit Declaration. Gila said the Venezuelans do not seem to have the "necessary patience" required for multilateral negotiations, and the GBRV's Ministry of Foreign Affairs has refused to discuss any changes to the text. The GBRV proposal has over 80 articles, Gila said, beginning with several that praise the Bolivarian Socialist Revolution. Gila called the GBRV's projects like BancoSur and TeleSur symbolically acceptable, but "impractical." He also questioned the Venezuelans' insistence on locating all south-south institutions in Caracas. South Africa to date has refused to accept the declaration as drafted and is negotiating with Brazil on a separate two-page compromise document. Gila indicated that Venezuelan intransigence could result in no Summit declaration at all.

DUDDY

MEDIA

- Wikileaks de Venezuela: La cumbre que perdiÃ³ ChÃ¡vez, Articulo OnLine
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09EFTOTRIPOLI704

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09EFTOTRIPOLI704 aka Wikileaks id #222906 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PROTOCOL CHIEF CONFIRMS QADHAFI WILL NOT STAY IN ENGLEWOOD RESIDENCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 30 Aug 2009 15:56 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09EFTOTRIPOLI704.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4481
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0704 2421556
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
P R 301556Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5211
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0231
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0591
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1150
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0822
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5755
```

Hide header

UNCLAS E F T O TRIPOLI 000704

SENSITIVE NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PROTOCOL CHIEF CONFIRMS QADHAFI WILL NOT STAY IN ENGLEWOOD RESIDENCE

ENTIRE TEXT SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED/NOFORN; PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY.

¶1. (SBU/NF) In an August 29 meeting, Libyan Protocol Chief Nuri al-Mismari confirmed that plans for Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi to stay in Englewood, NJ are off. Instead, the GOL is focusing on finding accommodations for Qadhafi in Manhattan. According to Mismari, the most likely outcome is that Qadhafi will stay at the Libyan Permrep's residence in Manhattan. Mismari showed A/DCM an August 25 e-mail from him to the Libyan Permrep, telling him to abort plans to use the NJ residence, noting that, "see, you didn't need to pressure me about this; we were already working on an alternative arrangement." Mismari said that, if asked, the GOL will tell journalists that it is

not using the NJ residence because the necessary renovations will not be completed in time for Qadhafi's visit. Mismari stressed that any further USG public comment on the issue would be "damaging," and that the Libyan Government doesn't want things to "spin out of control, and then he [Qadhafi] will get involved, and not want to do the trip at all." Mismari was keenly interested in the potential protests in Englewood on August 30, noting that he really hopes they have been canceled. He asked that A/DCM contact him as soon as possible if any news about the protests is heard.

¶2. (SBU/NF) Mismari showed A/DCM a fax he sent August 28 to the Libyan missions in NY and DC, telling them to focus henceforth only on the "official purpose" of Qadhafi's visit, and to cancel planning for "extraneous" activities, such as a Qadhafi walk through of Harlem, and some press roundtables. "I want to wait for things to cool down in the U.S. before proceeding with any such extra events," he said.

¶3. (SBU/NF)Mismari asked A/DCM about flight clearances for the Qadhafi delegation. He said his current plan is for the delegation to travel on the Ifriqiyah Airways VIP plane to Portugal, then charter a separate plane for the delegation to use to travel to NY. He inquired if "this will work for your people."

¶4. (SBU/NF) Comment: Mismari, even in the frenzy of the lead-up to the September 1 celebration, seemed remarkably focused on Qadhafi's NY trip. He kept both the Italian Ambassador and an Italian Prime Ministerial advance team and the two lead organizers of the September 1 events waiting for an hour, even though A/DCM offered that he should meet the others first, as they all had arrived at the same time. Mismari appeared very committed to the success of the NY trip, stressing, "This is not about Qadhafi or Obama, but rather about our two countries and peoples writ large. This trip has to move forward, so the relationship can progress, and we do not leave future generations of Libyans and Americans to deal with this hot potato of abnormal bilateral relations."

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09LONDON1946

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09LONDON1946 aka Wikileaks id #222002 ?
Subject	SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT HOLDS EMERGENCY SESSION AS DEBATE OVER MEGRAHI DECISION REACHES FEVER PITCH
Origin	Embassy London (United Kingdom)
Cable time	Mon, 24 Aug 2009 14:05 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09LONDON1946.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
INFO  LOG-00   AF-00    AID-00   AMAD-00  INL-00   DODE-00  PERC-00
      PDI-00   DS-00    DHSE-00  FBIE-00  VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00
      INR-00   IO-00    L-00     MOFM-00  MOF-00   VCIE-00  NEA-00
      DCP-00   NSAE-00  NIMA-00  PM-00    SCT-00   DOHS-00  FMPC-00
      SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   SS-00    NCTC-00  SCRS-00  PMB-00
      DSCC-00  PRM-00   SAS-00   FA-00    PESU-00    /000W

O 241405Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3245
INFO EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE
DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L LONDON 001946


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/WE AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PREF [Refugees] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , UK [United Kingdom] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT HOLDS EMERGENCY SESSION AS
DEBATE OVER MEGRAHI DECISION REACHES FEVER PITCH

REF: A. LONDON 1925 AND PREVIOUS
     B. STATE 80743


Classified By: Ambassador Louis B. Susman, reasons 1.4 (b/d).

¶1.  (C/NF) Summary.  The Scottish Government severely
underestimated the both USG and UK public reaction to its
decision to grant compassionate release to convicted Pan Am
103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi on August 20.  Scottish
First Minister Alex Salmond has privately indicated that he
```

was "shocked" by FBI Director Mueller's public letter. The media continue to report U.S. anger over the decision, and concern Scotland will be targeted economically, through reduced U.S. tourism and whiskey boycotts. The media speculate that the UK Government had a hand in the deal to maintain good diplomatic relations with Libya and secure oil and gas deals, which the UK Government has denied as "completely wrong" and "offensive." Today (August 24), the Scottish Parliament meets to hear Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill's explanation of his decision. The media speculates that Scottish opposition parties, all of which are on record condemning the decision, may move against the Scottish National Party's (SNP) minority government in a vote of no confidence, though the two-thirds majority required to secure such a move would be very difficult to obtain. Prime Minister Gordon Brown has not yet made a statement on Megrahi's release, with other Cabinet members maintaining that it was a decision for the devolved Scottish Government. Given growing discontent and speculation about a UK Government hand in the deal, Brown may have to make a statement soon. Meanwhile, local Scottish opposition politicians are using the issue to call into question the SNP government's credibility and competence. End summary.

Reaction to USG Statements

¶2. (C/NF) The UK media have widely reported on FBI Director Mueller's letter to MacAskill and Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Mullen's comments on the Scottish Government's decision to grant compassionate release to convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi. Washington-based Scottish Government Representative Robin Naysmith told CG Edinburgh Sunday, August 24 that Scottish First Minister Salmond was "shocked" by Mueller's comments, which were "over the top" given that President Obama had already commented on the decision. Naysmith underscored that Scotland received "nothing" for releasing Megrahi (as has been widely suggested in the UK and U.S. media), while the UK Government has gotten everything - a chance to stick it to Salmond's Scottish National Party (SNP) and good relations with Libya. (NOTE: We expect Naysmith to be engaging heavily in Washington on these issues. END NOTE.)

¶3. (C/NF) The media have also reported growing concerns that American anger over the decision will translate into a boycott of Scottish whiskey and reduced American tourism in Scotland, an approximately USD 416 million business annually. In a previous meeting with CG Edinburgh on Friday, August 21, Salmond reiterated that he and his government "had played straight" with both the USG and UK Government, but implied that the UK Government had not. During the meeting, which occurred before the Mueller and Mullen statements, he said he wanted to move beyond the Megrahi issue and deepen Scotland's relationship with the USG. He said the Libyan Government had offered the Scottish Government "a parade of treats," all of which were turned down. (NOTE: Roughly fifty percent of Scottish exports go to the U.S., and over 450 U.S. businesses employ over 100,000 Scots in Scotland. END NOTE.)

¶4. (SBU) Scottish Government statements, including those from Salmond, have acknowledged the "strongly-held views of the American families," but underscored that those views are not shared by all of the victims' families (referring primarily to the British families). Salmond defended the decision, saying it was "right in terms of (the Scottish) legal system" and "what (they) are duty-bound to do." Salmond is also reported in the media to have said that the USG had made clear that, while it opposed Megrahi's release, it regarded freeing him on compassionate grounds "far preferable" to a transfer under the Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA). (NOTE: While indicating the USG's preference for compassionate release over a PTA transfer, as described in reftel B

release over a PIA transfer, as described in letter B, Salmond's statement does not mention the USG's strong opposition to any release, particularly one that would allow Megrahi to travel outside of Scotland. END NOTE.)

Scottish Parliament Holds Emergency Session

¶5. (SBU) The Scottish Parliament holds an emergency session Monday at 1430 local time (August 24), calling on Scottish Justice Minister Kenny MacAskill to explain his decision. All three opposition parties in Scotland (Labour, Conservatives, and the Liberal Democrats) have condemned the minority Scottish National Party (SNP) government's decision to release Megrahi. The media openly speculate that a vote of no confidence will occur if MacAskill does not resign, but it would be difficult for opposition parties to garner the two-thirds majority required (87 of the 129 seats), if the SNP is able to maintain control of its 47 Members of Scottish Parliament (MSPs).

¶6. (SBU) Scottish opposition political figures, like Scottish Labour leader Iain Gray and former Scottish First Minister Jack McConnell, have condemned the decision to release Megrahi, calling it a "grave error of judgment." Scottish Liberal Democrat leader Tavis Scott said, "The SNP's credibility at home and abroad is in tatters. Scotland's must not be allowed to follow with it."

Compassionate Release for Oil and Gas?

¶7. (SBU) The UK media widely speculates that the UK Government had a hand in the decision to release Megrahi in order to maintain good diplomatic relations with the Libyans and to secure oil and gas deals, citing the now infamous 2004 "deal in the desert" between former PM Blair and Libyan leader Qaddafi, recent meetings and correspondence between PM Brown and "Muammar," a recent meeting between Business Secretary Lord Mandelson and Qaddafi's son Saif al-Islam, and other high-level trade delegations. Qaddafi's personal thanks to Brown, the Queen, and the British Government after embracing Megrahi in a televised statement have fanned the flames and increased calls for Brown to explain the UK's involvement in the decision-making process. Mandelson insisted to the media that it is "completely wrong" and "offensive" to suggest that Megrahi's release was linked to trade deals. A Foreign Office contact reiterated to Poloff August 24 that such speculation is "completely absurd." He acknowledged that the Libyans had raised Megrahi at every turn in their burgeoning diplomatic relationship, but said that Megrahi's release was "never directly or implicitly" linked to any deal.

UK Government Reaction

¶8. (C/NF) Prime Minister Gordon Brown, who is currently on holiday in Scotland, has refrained from comment. Acting PM Chancellor Alistair Darling has said, "you either devolve the responsibility for criminal justice or you don't," a position that Foreign Secretary Miliband supported in interviews on Friday, August 21. Miliband affirmed that "the sight of a a mass-murderer getting a hero's welcome in Tripoli is deeply upsetting, deeply distressing." Conservative leader David Cameron has sent Brown a public message condemning the decision and calling on Brown to "make clear his own views" on the decision.

UK-Libya

¶9. (C/NF) Foreign Office North Africa team leader Rob Dixon

told Poloff August 24 that the UK has been telling the Libyan Government, through Saif al-Islam and the Foreign Ministry, that the Libyan Government's handling of its September 1 national day festivities will determine the future of the UK-Libya bilateral relationship. Dixon explained that the UK has explicitly told the Libyans that Megrahi should not be featured in any high-profile way. He said that the UK has also told the Libyans that Qaddafi's personal thanks to PM Brown and the Queen were "unhelpful" and the UK Government's "unhappiness" had been communicated "in clear terms." Dixon said the Foreign Office will take stock after the September 1 festivities.

UK-Scotland

¶10. (C/NF) Dixon termed "absurd" MacAskill's comment (in his original August 20 statement about Megrahi's release) that the UK Government's refusal to make representations was "highly regrettable." Referring to MacAskill's welcoming of a public inquiry into the case, Dixon said such an undertaking would be "nearly impossible" given the way devolution works. Dixon implied that the comments were designed to blame the UK Government for putting the Scots in a position to have to make a decision. Dixon told Poloff on August 24 that the Foreign Office had had no contact with the Scottish Government since the decision was announced.

Comment

¶11. (C/NF) It is clear that the Scottish Government underestimated the blow-back it would receive in response to Megrahi's release and is now trying to paint itself as the victim. It seems likely, especially given the increasing speculation that the UK Government had a hand in the decision, that Prime Minister Brown will have to address the issue publicly. Meanwhile, local Scottish opposition politicians are trying to undercut the SNP minority government's credibility as much as possible.

¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

Visit London's Classified Website:
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Unit ed_Kingdom

SUSMAN

Media

- WikiLeaks: Britain secretly advised Libya how to secure release of Lockerbie bomber - Telegraph
- WikiLeaks cables: Lockerbie bomber freed after Gaddafi's 'thuggish' threats | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09MANAGUA1139

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09MANAGUA1139 aka Wikileaks id #239542 ?
Subject	VOTER REGISTRY VERIFICATION CHARACTERIZED BY LOW PARTICIPATION, IRREGULARITIES
Origin	Embassy Managua (Nicaragua)
Cable time	Fri, 11 Dec 2009 19:39 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09MANAGUA1139.html
References	08MANAGUA1367 , 08MANAGUA417 , 09MANAGUA859 , 09MANAGUA935
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 20 Aug 2011 22:19: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4118
RR RUEHLMC
DE RUEHMU #1139/01 3451940
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 111939Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0263
INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0005
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0004
RUEHLMC/MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE CORPORATION WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 001139

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR WHA/CEN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/12/11
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , NU *[Nicaragua]*
SUBJECT: Voter Registry Verification Characterized by Low Participation, Irregularities

REF: A) MANAGUA 935 ; B) MANAGUA 859 ; C) 2008 MANAGUA 1351
D) 2008 MANAGUA 982; E) 2008 MANAGUA 417 ; F) 2008 MANAGUA 1367

CLASSIFIED BY: RJCallahan, AMB; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The November 27-30 verification of the voter registration lists for the upcoming Atlantic Coast regional council elections was characterized by low participation and numerous irregularities, both worrisome developments for the climate in which March's regional elections will take place. The opposition parties face an up-hill climb to ensure the regional elections are transparent and fair. End Summary.

CSE minimizes low turn-out, FSLN deputy and opposition criticize

¶2. (U) According to local press, approximately 30% of the electorate in Nicaragua's two autonomous regions participated in the process to verify their domicile and the location where they will vote on Election Day with the Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). Robert Rivas Reyes, CSE President, characterized the turn-out in both the North Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAN) and the South Atlantic Autonomous Region (RAAS) as "extremely low," citing a lack of resources for the low participation. However, Rivas minimized the low turn-out, expressing confidence that voter participation would reach the 35%-40% regional average during the March 7, 2010 election. Interestingly, Rivas's opinion was not shared by all government officials. Brooklyn Rivera, YATAMA party leader and National Assembly Deputy aligned with the governing Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN), voiced criticism of Rivas and the CSE claiming that "thousands of people would not be able exercise their right to vote" as a result of voter registration irregularities. Rivera estimates that 30% of the total population in the RAAN has been impeded from obtaining cedulas (voter registration cards). Opposition parties, including the Liberal Constitutional Party (PLC) and the electoral alliance the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance-Vamos con Eduardo-Independent Liberal Party (ALN-VCE-PLI), blamed the low turn-out in the region on poor government publicity and insufficient resources. In some urban zones, low participation was attributed to the fact it conflicted with the end of the school year and high school graduation ceremonies.

Numerous irregularities cited by opposition and press

¶3. (U) Local press reported no violence during voter verification, but cited numerous procedural irregularities in both regions. In the RAAN, most verification centers opened on-time, except in the capital city of Bilwi where a lack of registration materials delayed opening. As in previous voter verifications in Bilwi, the FSLN-controlled Citizen Power Councils (CPCs) supervised all verification tables (Ref F). The cities of Bonanza, Siuna, and Rosita, known collectively as the "Mining Triangle," experienced the most verification irregularities. Guillermo Medrano, an ALN-VCE-PLI Alliance representative in the RAAN, cited cedula distribution problems, misuse of public funds for partisan purposes, and lack of precinct supervisors as major irregularities in this area. In Rosita, a traditional Liberal municipality awarded to an FSLN mayor after the November 2008 elections, voters were required to request their cedula from the Electoral Council located in the FSLN party office. Medrano confirmed that FSLN supporters were assured speedy distribution of their cedula (one week), where as some non-FSLN voters were informed of possible delays due to a lack of printing resources or mechanical issues. Medrano also accused FSLN government officials in Rosita of trying to falsely boost voter registration rolls by using public resources to transport and register FSLN loyalists from nearby Waslala, a municipality where citizens are ineligible to vote in the election since they have no representation on the regional council.

¶4. (U) Arnoldo Aleman, former president, convicted felon and honorary leader of the PLC, denounced the verification process in the RAAS as flawed, claiming that the FSLN-controlled CSE excluded PLC party officials from observing verification in the municipal of Paiwas. Aleman also decried a lack of logistical, technical, and promotional support in the region for the verification process and

charged that the electoral lists presented prior to the verification process were not identical to those actually used for the verification. Wilfredo Navarro Moreira , National Assembly Secretary and Vice-President of the PLC, announced plans to audit voting irregularities in order to build a case for possible election annulations in 2010.

5). (U) La Prensa, Nicaragua's largest newspaper, reported that the CSE and Nicaraguan Air Force used helicopters to transport FSLN motorcycles to its campaign officials in the municipality of Bluefields, located in the RAAS. Both the CSE and Nicaraguan Air Force denied the La Prensa report.

Next on the election calendar

¶6. (U) The regional council elections are scheduled for March 7, 2010. The CSE must establish procedures for participation of observers by January 21, which also marks the first official day of campaigning. Final voter registration lists are due February 5 and campaigns will officially close on March 3 in anticipation of Election Day.

Comments

¶7. (C) Turn-out for the verification process was expected to be low; however, the irregularities are disconcerting. The verification processes for the regional council elections in the RAAN and RAAS bear similarities to the tainted verification processes held in past regional elections as well as the fraudulent municipal elections in November 2008 (Refs D, E, F). Opposition parties fear with good reason that the Atlantic Coast regional elections will be manipulated by the FSLN as were the municipal elections in 2008 (Ref C). Opposition leaders are already calling for neutral, international observation of the election, a difficult feat considering the Ortega Administration's rejection of international observers for the 2008 municipal elections and current declarations against such interventions. For example, Nicaragua recently voted against the inclusion of a paragraph presented in a U.S.-backed resolution before the United Nations recognizing the need to fortify election observation through harmonizing the methods of the different non-governmental and inter-governmental organizations. Nicaragua, Russia, Libya, Iran, Ecuador, Cuba, Bolivia, and Venezuela were among the 19 countries who voted against the paragraph in the resolution (127 countries voted in favor while 28 abstained). Much is at stake for both the FSLN and opposition parties. The FSLN wants victories in the region (by fair means or fraud) to demonstrate its national "popular support" and to continue its "socialist project" (Refs A, B). The opposition will have to work hard to ensure elections in the RAAN and RAAS are open and fair. Moreover, opposition leaders will have to suppress personal ambitions and overcome ideological differences in order to unite and counter Ortega's power grab (Ref A).
CALLAHAN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09MONROVIA952

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09MONROVIA952 aka Wikileaks id #241295 ?
Subject	LIBYA INVESTS $30 MILLION IN LIBERIAN RICE DEVELOPMENT
Origin	Embassy Monrovia (Liberia)
Cable time	Tue, 22 Dec 2009 18:04 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09MONROVIA952.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3238
RR RUEHMA RUEHPA
DE RUEHMV #0952 3561804
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 221804Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY MONROVIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1537
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

UNCLAS MONROVIA 000952

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O.12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , ASEC *[Security]* , LI *[Liberia]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA INVESTS $30 MILLION IN LIBERIAN RICE DEVELOPMENT

¶1. (U) SUMMARY. The GOL and the Foundation for African Development Aid's (ADA) $30 million concession for large-scale commercial rice production, funded through Libyan African Investment Portfolio, is the first large scale domestic rice program in a country that imports over 55% of all its rice -- a staple in the Liberian diet. Ambassador recently visited the site in Lofa County, near the Guinean border, to witness the first harvest, which will be used for seedlings. ADA will introduce its locally cultivated rice in July 2010, contributing to the availability and affordability of rice. Improved rice production is key to Liberia's food security, and the ADA agreement is seen as the first step in building a sustainable local crop. However, without a sufficient transportation network, ADA and other farmers will continue to struggle to distribute and export their crop. Given ADA's proximity to the Guinean border, issues of cross-border activities have arisen. END SUMMARY.
¶2. (U) ADA is financed through a $30 million loan from the Libyan African Investment Portfolio (LAIP) at six percent interest for ten years with a three year grace period. The 15,000 hectare, 20-year concession was signed in 2008, and expects to supply the local

market in mid 2010 according to ADA Project Manager, Elvis Morris. Its first harvest will be used primarily for seedlings. The concession agreement includes the construction of a rice processing plant, housing facilities, medical centers and schools for workers- which the Ambassador did not see during her trip. ADA's initiative should be a positive influence on the nation's rural economy, bringing much needed employment and development by expanding ADA's current workforce of 1,000 to over 6,000 in three to four years.

¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador, along with the SRSG, visited the Lofa County concession area on December 18 trip. In her discussion with the project manager, she noted rampant rumors that ADA is employing mostly Guineans at the expense of the local Liberian population. Morris, one of only two expatriate staff at ADA, noted with the porous borders within sight of the concession area and close ethnic ties of the people on both sides, it was impossible to differentiate the two and acknowledged that some of the workers may in fact be from Guinea.

¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador also raised the concern that ADA's goal to provide Liberia with enough domestic rice crop to meet demand could squeeze out smaller farms. Morris said that many farmers will simply turn to cash crops as the price for rice falls, and ADA plans to regionally export some of its crop, so a market will remain in Liberia. Overall, the large-scale mainly mechanized process was impressive, although few of the promised social structures were yet realized.

¶5. (U) ADA's investment will complement other donor initiatives such as the World Bank's emergency food response. The Bank signed a $10 million grant agreement with the GOL in May 2008 to assist it in tackling the sharp increases in the price of food. When the global food crisis hit Liberia in 2008, the GOL adopted a three point comprehensive strategy to alleviate the impact: mitigating domestic price rise and maintaining consistent supply; maintaining access to food among vulnerable populations; and promoting domestic food production. The government at that time eliminated the two dollar consumer tax on 50kg bags of imported rice; removed tariffs on agricultural equipment; allocated $750,000 to a "rice stabilization" fund to purchase seed rice for local farmers; and increased the FY2009/2010 agriculture budget by about 30%.

¶6. (SBU) COMMENT: The scarcity of rice was blamed for the country's political unrest in 1979, which led to 25 years of instability. The political risk associated with the scarcity and high price of rice is great, and GOL hopes ventures such as ADA will secure the supply. Although ADA plans eventual harvests of 270,000 metric tons, which will satisfy domestic demand, poor infrastructure will prevent distribution. Without significant road improvements, it is unlikely that the ADA rice will reach markets in Maryland, River Gee, or Grand Kru and Liberia will continue with an insecure food supply. Regional exportation from Liberia will be difficult as well, and a more likely scenario would include exporting crop through Guinea using the existing railways on the other side of the border. Mechanized farming is the only way to create food security in Liberia, enticing people back into the farms from the city slums and lowering food costs for all. To do so, however, requires capital investment not only in the farms but in the surrounding infrastructure. That ADA appears to be a success has as much to do with its location - Lofa County with its arable land and industrious people. We hope this can be replicated elsewhere.

THOMAS-GREENFIELD

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09SECTION02OF03QRIPOLI583

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09SECTION02OF03QR aka Wikileaks id #217296 ?
Subject	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 20 Jul 2009 10:25 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09SECTION02OF03QRIPOLI583.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1456
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0583/02 2011025
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 201025Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5051
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0530
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0203
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5590
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03QRIPOLI 000583

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA ACTING A/S FELTMAN; ALSO PM/RSAT (MMILLER),T/QN,NEA/MAG,DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/20/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MARR [Military and Defense
Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PHUM [Human Rights] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , ABLD
[Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , LY [Libya] , UN [United Nations]
SUBJECT: BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA
RELATIONSHIP

**********
* Missing Section 001 *
**********


TRIPOLI 07200583  002 OF 003


few days to several weeks due to Security Advisory Opinion
requirements.  The GOL continues to adhere to restrictive visa
issuance policies vis-a-vis Americans, including an apparent
virtual ban on tourist visas for Americans, lengthy delays and
exorbitant fees for American business people, and a long record
of visa refusals for USG-sponsored visitors for academic,
```

cultural, science, economic, and other programs. The GOL has agreed, in principle, to the idea of forming a bilateral visa working group to resolve these issues, including visa reciprocity. During a July 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Musa Kusa maintained that visas for Americans would continue to receive the most scrutiny of any foreign visitors to the Jamahiriya, for security reasons. Your underscoring for the Libyans that the current imbalance in visa issuance is not sustainable will show your interlocutors that the issue has been raised to high levels in Washington.

¶6. (S/NF) An ostensibly related issue involves the treatment of Libyan travelers at U.S. ports of entry, particularly Libyan officials, who are routinely separated from other passengers at ports of entry and questioned extensively about their travel. GOL officials, who view the issue as a personal affront, will raise it with you. Musa Kusa and UNPermREP Shalgham are only two of the several high level Libyan officials who have been "mistreated" at our ports of entry, and their experiences have engendered deep resentment here. Your recent letter to DHS described the issue well; we believe that we will not be able to make significant process on visa reciprocity until we make some headway here. A DHS delegation is scheduled to visit Tripoli in late July to address treatment of Libyan officials at U.S. ports of entry/NSEERS issues with GOL counterparts, among other issues. However, the GOL has not yet granted visas to the delegation.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

¶7. (S/NF) USTR has been working with the GOL to finalize a TIFA text for over a year. The GOL last invited Emboffs to review the draft text on November 24, 2008. Despite post's attempts to discuss TIFA with Libyan trade officials at every possible opportunity, the text has languished on the Libyan side. We would like to press the GOL to sign a TIFA as soon as possible. We concur with USTR view that the signing should take place even in light of renewed problems regarding Caterpillar and potential problems involving the Chevrolet dealership. We may have a better hand to play on these issues when we can argue them out in this formal framework.

MEGRAHI

¶8. (S/NF) The Megrahi case is likely to be an agenda item for your interlocutors. Qadhafi raised the issue during his July 9 meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown, and recent press reports suggest that Megrahi's physical condition is deteriorating (although the UK Embassy was not able to corroborate such reports during a July 19 meeting with the CDA). If the issue is raised, we recommend that you remind Libyan officials that the decision to allow a Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) for Megrahi is a matter for the Scottish Government to decide. UK Embassy officials believe that a PTA decision could be forthcoming in mid-August. We defer to the Department's view on a possible request for Megrahi's compassionate release.

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (S/NF) While Libya's regional focus at present seems to have concentrated primarily on its pan-African agenda, Qadhafi has skillfully leveraged the AU Chairmanship to ingratiate himself with European and South American leaders - most recently Silvio Berlusconi. His visits to Moscow, Madrid, Paris, Lisbon, and Rome have afforded him opportunities to sign military-to-military agreements and to engage on civil-nuclear issues, as well as to negotiate commercial energy and investment deals. He has even exploited EU, especially Italian, concerns about illegal immigration to press forward his security and political agendas. As Qadhafi's engagement as an African leader has expanded, he has notably decreased his efforts in the Arab World. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a

world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians - "Isratine" - including during his May meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward. The Libyans will appreciate anything you can relate regarding the work of Special Envoy Mitchell and how we see Administration policy playing out in the peace process.

****
* Missing Section 003 *
****

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09STATE101238

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09STATE101238 aka Wikileaks id #227470 ?
Subject	(C/NF) EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-01941)
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Tue, 29 Sep 2009 15:30 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09STATE101238.html
References	09BRIDGETOWN407
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXYZ0004
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #1238 2721549
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 291530Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1469
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 101238

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2034
TAGS: PINR *[Intelligence]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , AC *[Antigua and Barbuda]* , BB *[Barbados]* , DO *[Dominica]* , GJ *[Grenada]* , SC *[Saint Kitts and Nevis]* , ST *[Saint Lucia]* , VC *[Saint Vincent and the Grenadines]* , VE *[Venezuela]*
SUBJECT: (C/NF) EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERSHIP (C-AL9-01941)

REF: BRIDGETOWN 000407

Classified By: MICHAEL P. OWENS, ACTING DIR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

¶1. (C/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS APPRECIATE PAST REPORTING ON LEADERSHIP STYLES AND GOVERNANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN. IN RECENT MONTHS, EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS HAVE BEEN MORE OUTSPOKEN--AND SOME UNUSUALLY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES WHEN PRAISING VENEZUELA--AND IT APPEARS THAT VENEZUELA'S FINANCIAL ATTENTION IS BEGINNING TO REAP MORE POLITICAL GAINS AND POTENTIAL IDEOLOGICAL ALLIES.

¶2. (C/NF) AS TIME AND RESOURCES ALLOW, WE WOULD WELCOME FURTHER INSIGHTS INTO THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS THAT RELATE TO ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA, BARBADOS, DOMINICA, GRENADA, SAINT KITTS AND NEVIS, SAINT LUCIA, AND SAINT VINCENT AND THE GRENADINES:

(A) (C/NF) ARE LEADERS MODELING THEIR GOVERNING STYLE AFTER PRESIDENT CHAVEZ OR OTHER LEFT-LEANING, POPULIST FIGURES IN LATIN AMERICA? REF A, FOR INSTANCE, NOTES PRIME MINISTER SKERRIT SEEMS TO BE EMULATING CHAVEZ.

(B) (C/NF) HAVE LEADERS CRACKED DOWN ON THE PRESS TO FURTHER THEIR OWN OBJECTIVES?

(C) (C/NF) ARE ANY PLANNING TO ALTER THE CONSTITUTION TO PROLONG THEIR TENURE OR PASS THE REINS TO SUCCESSORS?

(D) (C/NF) HOW CLOSE ARE EASTERN CARIBBEAN LEADERS TO POPULIST, LEFT-WING FIGURES ELSEWHERE IN THE REGION (CHAVEZ, THE CASTROS, MORALES, CORREA, ET AL)? HAVE THEIR RELATIONS CHANGED IN THE LAST YEAR, AND IN WHAT DIRECTION?

(E) (C/NF) ARE CARIBBEAN ALBA MEMBERS LOBBYING OTHER CARIBBEAN COMMUNITY AND COMMON MARKET (CARICOM) COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE TIES TO IRAN OR VENEZUELA, SUCH AS THROUGH ALBA? IF SO, HOW ARE THEY DOING THIS AND WHAT REACTION ARE THEY RECEIVING?

(F) (C/NF) HOW ARE CARIBBEAN ALBA MEMBERS' INTERNATIONAL ACTIONS REGARDING VENEZUELA, LIBYA, AND IRAN PLAYING AT HOME?

¶3. (U) PLEASE CITE C-AL9-01941 IN THE SUBJECT LINE OF REPORTING IN RESPONSE TO THE ABOVE QUESTIONS.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09STATE125737

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09STATE125737 aka Wikileaks id #238751 ?
Subject	(S/NF) SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI AND HIS INNER CIRCLE
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Dec 2009 23:03 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09STATE125737.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0858
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #5737 3422303
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 082303Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 1365
```

Hide header

S E C R E T STATE 125737

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2034
TAGS: PINR *[Intelligence]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: (S/NF) SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI AND HIS INNER CIRCLE

Classified By: ELISSA G. PITTERLE, DIRECTOR, INR/OPS. REASON: 1.4(C).

¶1. (S/NF) WASHINGTON ANALYSTS ARE INTERESTED IN GENERAL COORDINATOR AND HEAD OF THE QADHAFI FOUNDATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (QFD) SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI'S INNER CIRCLE, INCLUDING WHOM SAIF TRUSTS, WHOSE ADVICE HE LISTENS TO THE MOST, AND ANY RIFTS THAT MAY EXIST AMONG HIS ADVISERS. AS TIME AND RESOURCES PERMIT, WE WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE POST'S ATTENTION TO THE TOPICS AND QUESTIONS BELOW BY THE END OF JANUARY:

A. (S/NF) WHO BELONGS TO SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI'S INNER CIRCLE (OFFICIALS HE TRUSTS THE MOST AND WHO PERFORM THE MOST IMPORTANT TASKS FOR HIM) AND WHAT ARE THEIR OFFICIAL TITLES? WHAT FUNCTION(S) DO THEY SERVE FOR SAIF AND WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP? WHAT IS THEIR BASIC BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION AND, IF POST HAS MET THEM, WHAT ARE THEY LIKE AS INTERLOCUTORS?

B. (S/NF) DO ANY MAJOR RIFTS ON POLICY, POLITICS, OR IDEOLOGY EXIST AMONG MEMBERS OF SAIF'S INNER CIRCLE? IF YES, BETWEEN WHOM, AND ON WHAT ISSUE(S) DO THEY DISAGREE? WHOSE INFLUENCE IN THESE RIFTS HAS CARRIED MORE WEIGHT?

C. (S/NF) OF THE INNER CIRCLE, WHICH THREE OFFICIALS DOES

SAIF TRUST THE MOST (E.G., TO CARRY OUT POLITICALLY SENSITIVE TASKS, ON PERSONAL MATTERS)?

D. (S/NF) AMONG MEMBERS OF THE INNER CIRCLE, WHICH OFFICIALS HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE SAIF, BEYOND JUST IMPLEMENTING HIS PLANS?

E. (S/NF) WHO ARE SAIF'S MOST INFLUENTIAL ADVISERS IN THE FOLLOWING ISSUE AREAS (THERE MAY BE SOME OVERLAP ACROSS ISSUE AREAS): DOMESTIC POLITICS, QFD WORK, BUSINESS DEALINGS, ECONOMICS, AND FOREIGN RELATIONS?

F. (S/NF) TO WHAT EXTENT ARE MEMBERS OF SAIF'S INNER CIRCLE INVOLVED IN HIS DECISIONS?

G. (S/NF) DOES SAIF HAVE ANY ALLIES IN HIS FAMILY? IF SO, WHO? ARE THEY ABLE TO INFLUENCE SAIF? WHAT IS HIS RELATIONSHIP LIKE WITH KHAMIS AL-QADHAFI?

¶3. (U) TRIPOLI MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09STATE129518

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09STATE129518 aka Wikileaks id #240715 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE: REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF BANGLADESH, LIBYA, AND SERBIA FOR CONTRIBUTION OF HELICOPTERS TO THE UN/AU MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Fri, 18 Dec 2009 18:57 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09STATE129518.html
Referenced by	09BELGRADE1596
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0710
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #9518/01 3521858
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 181857Z DEC 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE IMMEDIATE 1032
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA IMMEDIATE 2366
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1545
INFO DARFUR COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 129518

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: BG *[Bangladesh]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , LY *[Libya]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , YI *[Yugoslavia]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE: REQUEST TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF
BANGLADESH, LIBYA, AND SERBIA FOR CONTRIBUTION OF
HELICOPTERS TO THE UN/AU MISSION IN DARFUR (UNAMID)

SUMMARY

¶1. Summary. This is an action request. Please see paragraph ¶7. Department requests the assistance of Embassies Belgrade, Dhaka, and Tripoli in obtaining a commitment from their host governments to provide helicopters to the AU/UN Mission in Darfur (UNAMID). The mission is looking for up to 18 medium transport utility helicopters, with a goal of 6 helicopters per sector and operating crews for deployment to UNAMID at the earliest possible time. The helicopters would be utilized for mission critical activities in Darfur, and permit UNAMID to improve operational capability in fulfilling its mandate. End Summary.

OBJECTIVES

¶2. Department instructs Embassies Belgrade, Dhaka, and Tripoli to pursue the following objectives:

--Impress upon the host governments there is a critical need for 18 medium utility helicopters and crews for deployment to UNAMID, without which the mission cannot meet its operational goals and objectives. The requirement is for military elements to ideally consist of six operational, rotary wing aircraft with the capability to deploy anywhere within Darfur, with each aircraft providing up to 40 flying hours per month. The unit must be self-sufficient in all categories, except fuel, for the first 90 days of deployment. The aviation unit must deploy with support and maintenance elements. UN Force Generation Services can provide additional details on unit requirements;

--Persuade the host governments to identify and donate to UNAMID UN-certifiable medium transport helicopters on a UN-reimbursable basis, or determine if there is any interest by the respective governments in providing these assets;

--Encourage officials of the host government's Foreign Ministry and Ministry of Defense, as appropriate, to initiate discussions as soon as possible with officials within the United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and Department of Field Support to commence negotiations leading to the deployment of the helicopters and operating crews.

REPORTING DEADLINE

¶3. Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to Erin Whitney, IO/PSC by January 5, 2010.

BACKGROUND

¶4. Since inception, UNAMID has unsuccessfully sought to acquire utility helicopters for the mission. The concept of operations calls for 18 medium transport helicopters to perform essential mission functions. Despite the best efforts of DPKO and the international community, UNAMID has been unable to obtain the necessary helicopters. The operating conditions in Darfur are some of the harshest for UN peacekeepers, with poor roads, poor airfields, and a brutal climate. Air transportation, particularly during the rainy season when all movement is severely curtailed, is the only viable mode of transportation.

¶5. The concept of operations calls for each UNAMID sector to have one military helicopter operating 24 hours per day, 7 days per week, although the Government of Sudan has not yet granted clearance for night flights. A major use for the helicopters would be for medical and casualty evacuations. Given the operating conditions in Darfur for UNAMID troops, the large internally displaced population in camps, and their fragile health, welfare, and security conditions, it is essential to have reliable medical transport capabilities whenever needed. The helicopters will also be used to enhance the safety and security of UNAMID troops, including for troop transport and re-supply, to conduct patrols and search and rescue operations, and to investigate and monitor reports and incidents of conflict within UNAMID,s area of operations.

STATE 00129518 002 OF 002

¶6. The ability for UNAMID to fulfill its mandate is dictated by the level of contributions of member states. UNAMID must be capable of rapid mobility over vast distances and

difficult terrain. Given the lack of adequate roads, this mobility cannot be achieved without the helicopters. UNAMID,s area of operations covers almost 200,000 square miles) an area larger than California. The 18 medium transport utility helicopters are a key enabler to mission success, increasing the mobility and operational impact of the mission.

¶7. Action request. Embassies Belgrade, Dhaka, and Tripoli are requested to approach their respective host governments at the highest appropriate level to obtain a commitment to donate up to 18 medium transport helicopters to UNAMID for service in Darfur. If any host government responds positively to this request, Department requests Embassies to obtain assurances from the host government that the helicopters to be offered to UNAMID are, or will be, UN-certifiable prior to or immediately after delivery to UNAMID. Please inform the Department if a firm commitment is not immediately forthcoming but interest in exploring the option is exhibited by the host government. Department requests the involvement of each Embassy's Defense Attache's Office in this effort. Department appreciates the assistance from Embassies Dhaka, Tripoli, and Belgrade.

--Please note that follow on assessments may be conducted should the host government identify equipment for use in UNAMID that does not meet UN standards. These assessments will determine if upgrades are possible, or if the US can engage with the UN to accept minimal differences in their stated requirements. Troop Contributing Countries may engage in a dry lease arrangement with the UN in which the UN provides for equipment maintenance.

End action request.

POINT OF CONTACT

¶9. Please contact Erin Whitney at (202) 736-7740 or Thomas Brown at (202) 736-7789 or via e-mail for any necessary further background information or argumentation to meet our objectives.

¶10. Tripoli minimize considered.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09STATE88783

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09STATE88783 aka Wikileaks id #222277 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO LIBYAN AMBASSADOR: ENCOURAGING A MEASURED RESPONSE TO MEGRAHI,S RELEASE
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Tue, 25 Aug 2009 22:34 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09STATE88783.html
References	09STATE86640 , 09TRIPOLI683
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0913
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #8783/01 2372252
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 252234Z AUG 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 9296
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 088783

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED TO LIBYAN AMBASSADOR:
ENCOURAGING A  MEASURED RESPONSE TO MEGRAHI,S RELEASE

REF: A. STATE 86640
     B. TRIPOLI 683

Classified By: Classified by: NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY
-------

¶1.    (S) NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman delivered
reftel demarche regarding the release of Abdel Basset
Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi to Libyan Ambassador Ali Aujali
on August 20, concurrent with the Scottish Executive's
announcement of the decision to issue Megrahi,s release
on compassionate grounds and his return to Libya.  A/S
Feltman warned Aujali that a "hero's welcome" for
Megrahi could hinder the bilateral relationship.
Aujali said Megrahi's return should not be viewed
as a "political victory" for Libya.  He added that
the Libyan government does not intend to link Megrahi's
return to celebrations on September 1, the fortieth
anniversary of Libyan Leader Muammar Qadhafi,s rule.
```

A/S Feltman said that a "hero's welcome" for Megrahi would negatively impact Qadhafi,s first visit to the United States to participate in the United Nations General Assembly.

Megrahi's Return to Libya

¶2. (S) NEA Assistant Secretary Feltman delivered reftel points to Libyan Ambassador Aujali on August 20 just as Abdel Basset Ali Mohamed al-Megrahi's plane was touching down in Tripoli. A/S Feltman stressed to Aujali that the return of Megrahi is a very sensitive matter, given the number of American victims and families whose lives were destroyed by Megrahi,s actions. He urged the Libyan government to take this into account when considering how to treat Megrahi upon arrival and throughout the duration of his life in Libya. A/S Feltman warned Aujali that a "hero's welcome" for Megrahi could hinder the bilateral relationship. He noted that the Charge at U.S. Embassy in Tripoli delivered the same message to Foreign Minister Musa Kusa on August 20.

¶3. (S) A/S Feltman said that any action by the Libyan government to publicly pardon Megrahi for his crimes will increase the negative reaction of the American people. He asked that the Libyan government enforce the terms of Megrahi's life sentence by ensuring he remain in prison or under house arrest and underscored that the less attention Megrahi receives in Libya, the better for the bilateral relationship. A/S Feltman urged Aujali to press the Libyan government to carefully consider the government's public response to Megrahi's eventual death and the scope of publicity it might receive. Aujali said that he would pass A/S Feltman's message to his government. He stressed that Megrahi's return should not be viewed as a "political victory" for Libya. Aujali dismissed suggestions that the Libyan government intended to link Megrahi's return to celebrations on September 1, the fortieth anniversary of Libyan Leader Qadhafi's rule, questioning the source of such a link.

Qadhafi at UNGA

¶4. (S) A/S Feltman underscored that a "hero's welcome" for Megrahi would negatively impact Qadhafi debut visit to the United States in September to participate in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA. He urged that the Libyan government think carefully about the type of statements Qadhafi will make in New York. A/S Feltman said that Americans are closely watching Megrahi's reception in Libya and stressed that they will also follow Qadhafi's actions at the UNGA. He added that the potential of the bilateral relationship has not yet been realized and that the USG hopes Qadhafi,s visit to New York will promote progress and not hinder it.

¶5. (S) Aujali said that Qadhafi's first visit to the U.S. is an historic and important moment for Libya. He noted that Qadhafi's brief exchange with President Obama at the G8 in Italy was positive and stressed the importance to Libya of building

STATE 00088783 002 OF 002

on it through a meeting between Qadhafi and President Obama at the UNGA. Aujali stressed that such a

meeting would be "very important" for the U.S.-Libya relationship, while acknowledging that there will be opposition from Congress and the families of the Pan Am victims.

Human Rights Dialogue

¶6. (S) A/S Feltman expressed his gratitude to the Libyan government, and particularly FM Kusa, for hosting the August 18 discussion between U.S. and Libyan officials on human rights. A/S Feltman said he is pleased that the dialogue was constructive and welcomed Libya,s willingness to engage in the dialogue as a demonstration of Libya,s commitment to the bilateral relationship. Aujali looked forward to a subsequent meeting in six months to continue the dialogue.

¶7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09STATE97566

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09STATE97566 aka Wikileaks id #226061 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE REQUEST: UNGA WALKOUT REDLINES
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Sun, 20 Sep 2009 20:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09STATE97566.html
Referenced by	09ATHENS1489 , 09BERLIN1171 , 09BOGOTA3037 , 09BUENOSAIRES1051 , 09CANBERRA869 , 09COPENHAGEN410 , 09DUBLIN389 , 09LISBON507 , 09MADRID938 , 09OSLO578 , 09OTTAWA743 , 09PRAGUE562 , 09TALLINN289 , 09VIENNA1217 , 09WARSAW971
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0069
OO RUEHSL
DE RUEHC #7566/01 2632037
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 202018Z SEP 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO IMMEDIATE 8680
RUEHRK/AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK IMMEDIATE 9733
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 6635
RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 5275
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON IMMEDIATE 0319
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0541
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 1920
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES IMMEDIATE 7613
RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA IMMEDIATE 0002
RUEHSJ/AMEMBASSY SAN JOSE IMMEDIATE 1269
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO IMMEDIATE 3116
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA IMMEDIATE 9457
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE 4974
RUEHSF/AMEMBASSY SOFIA IMMEDIATE 3903
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA IMMEDIATE 5550
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE IMMEDIATE 0970
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN IMMEDIATE 0941
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN IMMEDIATE 0210
RUEHHE/AMEMBASSY HELSINKI IMMEDIATE 2285
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN IMMEDIATE 3624
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS IMMEDIATE 1227
RUEHUP/AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST IMMEDIATE 7678
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN IMMEDIATE 1046
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 2340
RUEHVL/AMEMBASSY VILNIUS IMMEDIATE 2617
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG IMMEDIATE 6011
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE 6372
RUEHWR/AMEMBASSY WARSAW IMMEDIATE 4849
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON IMMEDIATE 7880
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST IMMEDIATE 2123
RUEHSL/AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA IMMEDIATE 0424
RUEHLJ/AMEMBASSY LJUBLJANA IMMEDIATE 6762
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID IMMEDIATE 2634
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM IMMEDIATE 8043
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 6756
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 7805
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 097566

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/19/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE REQUEST: UNGA WALKOUT REDLINES

Classified By: IO PDAS Gerald C. Anderson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (U) This is an action request (see para 4) for delivery at the most senior appropriate level of host government at OOB Monday, September 21.

¶2. (C) For posts in EU member states, please note that there will be an EU Political Directors meeting in NYC on Monday, September 21 and we hope to have instructions to EU missions relayed in advance of that meeting.

Background

¶3. (C) The United States has decided that we will break with past practice and start out every UNGA speech with an appropriate-level person behind the U.S. placard during all/all speeches at the UN General Assembly high-level event September 23-October 2. The seniority of the person in the chair will be calibrated appropriately to the speaker. Given the September 18 speech by Iranian President Ahmadinejad in which he again denied the fact of the Holocaust and called for the destruction of the state of Israel, a UN member state, and given the ongoing concerns about the unpredictable nature of Libyan President Qadahafi?s recent public remarks, Washington has decided to establish some clear redlines for walking out during these speeches in the case of extremely offensive remarks. Paragraph 7 contains those redlines.

¶4. (C) Department requests that posts reach out to appropriately senior-level of host governments OOB on Monday, September 21 to convey the talking points in para 6 and our redlines in para 7 and request that host governments agree to join us in a walkout and to so instruct their missions in New York and their delegations for UNGA.

¶5. (C) We understand that the French, UK and Canadian PermReps in New York have recommended to capitals that their governments join us in a walkout and anticipate sending a lower level (first secretary or below) to these speeches. The EU does not yet have a common position. We understand that the PermRep of EU President Sweden opposes a walkout under any circumstances and is attempting to organize a meeting of EU Political Directors on Monday, September 21 in New York to attempt to achieve an EU consensus position. He acknowledged there is not consensus yet.

Talking Points

STATE 00097566 002 OF 003

¶6. (U) Beginning Talking Points:

-- The United States has decided that we will break with

past practice and start out every UNGA speech with an appropriate-level person behind the U.S. placard during all/all speeches at the UN General Assembly high-level event starting on September 23 and running through October

¶2. The seniority of the person in the chair will be calibrated appropriately to the speaker. This in keeping with our increased engagement in multilateral institutions.

-- However, given the September 18 speech by Iranian President Ahmadinejad in which he again denied the fact of the Holocaust and called for the destruction of the state of Israel, a UN member state, and given the ongoing concerns about the unpredictable nature of Libyan President Qadahafi?s recent public remarks, Washington has decided to establish some clear redlines for walking out during these speeches in the case of extremely offensive remarks, the types of remarks that transcend legitimate political discourse and grossly exceed the minimum proprieties of the UNGA.

-- We request that your government join us in such a walk-out of either the Iranian or the Libyan speeches if these redlines are crossed.

For EU member states only:

-- We understand that your Political Directors will meet in New York on Monday morning September 21 local time to discuss this issue. We hope that the EU will agree to these redlines. If your country cannot agree, we hope that you will not block consensus for other members of the EU joining in walking out.

U.S. Redlines

¶7. (U) Our redlines for walking out of a speech, which should be conveyed to the host government, are:
-- Denying the historical reality of the Holocaust
-- Comparing U.S. or Israeli actions to those of Nazi Germany
-- Using other clearly anti-Semitic rhetoric, including suggestions (similar to those in Ahmadinejad?s 2008 UNGA remarks) that Jews or Zionists control the media and the financial system or have formed a nefarious conspiracy
-- Threatening the destruction of Israel or any other UN member state
-- Denying Israel?s or another UN member state?s right to exist
-- Suggesting that the United States deserved 9/11
-- Embracing or justifying the Lockerbie bombing
-- If asked: The U.S. will, of course, reserve the right to respond to any other obnoxious or offensive statements.

STATE 00097566 003 OF 003

Reporting Deadline

¶8. (U) Department requests responses from posts to this cable be sent to Washington and USUN New York and be slugged for Christopher Deutsch in IO/UNP and to Jennifer Simon at USUN no later than OOB Tuesday, September 22.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09THEHAGUE578

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09THEHAGUE578 aka Wikileaks id #226554 ?
Subject	CWC: LIBYA DESTRUCTION DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUEST-- ARE THE LIBYANS BACKTRACKING?
Origin	Embassy The Hague (Netherlands)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Sep 2009 15:38 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09THEHAGUE578.html
References	09THEHAGUE526
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2523
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTC #0578/01 2661538
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231538Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3295
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 000578

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP&GT
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/23/2019
TAGS: LY [Libya] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , CWC [Chemical
Weapons Convention]
SUBJECT: CWC: LIBYA DESTRUCTION DEADLINE EXTENSION
REQUEST-- ARE THE LIBYANS BACKTRACKING?

REF: A. SECSTATE 59827
     B. THE HAGUE 526
     C. E-MAIL FERGUSON-SMITH/BAKER SEPTEMBER 9 2009
        (RESPONSE TO LIBYA PAPERS)
     D. EC-58/NAT.5 (LIBYAN EXTENSION REQUEST)

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-55-09
```

¶1. (U) This is an action request -- see para 4.

SUMMARY AND ACTION REQUEST

¶2. (S) Libya formally submitted its national paper to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons on August 24 requesting an extension to its Chemical Weapons destruction deadline (ref D), before giving the U.S. Delegation a draft on August 27 as promised during the July Executive Council (EC). The reasons presented in the Libyan paper for the extension request (complaints by citizens groups and environmental concerns) appear to be lifted from U.S. explanations for delays in our own destruction program. However, senior officials at OPCW and members of other delegations are skeptical of the Libyan explanations for the extension. The Director-General himself told Delrep privately that the Libyans' extension request is a "work of pure fiction."

¶3. (S) The Libyan government has been less than transparent in recent reports to the EC and has been less than truthful in its delegation's series of consultations with the U.S. and UK. While it would be awkward for the U.S. to publicly challenge Libya's extension request, due to its similarity to our own, Del believes that the U.S. should be directly confronting Libya privately with questions about its commitment to total CW destruction and its real timeline. Other delegations may wish to raise questions in the Executive Council, as they have in the past.

¶4. (S) Action requested: Del requests the inter-agency's and Embassy Tripoli's views on the legitimacy of Libya's justification for its extension request and whether the Government of Libya is walking back from its commitments to the Chemical Weapons Convention and the complete destruction of its CW stockpile. Del would appreciate talking points for use with the Libyan delegation, and for use with other national delegations, on the U.S. evaluation of Libya's extension request in the run-up to Executive Council 58 (October 13-16) when a decision will need to be made on that request.

BACKGROUND

¶5. (SBU) On August 27, Delrep received a copy of two Libyan papers in Arabic: (1) Notice of Amendments to the General and Detailed Plans for Converting the Former Chemical Weapons Producing Facilities "al-Rabta I" and al-Rabta II" and (2) National Paper of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Regarding the Request to Extend the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for Destroying the Chemical Weapons Arsenal. The papers were provided by Libya Delegate, Mohadeb Gheton and were provided only in Arabic. Gheton asserted that these were in draft form, requested USG comments, and stated Libya's

intention to submit these formally to the OPCW after receiving USG comments. He stated a desire to submit both documents within thirty days of the upcoming Executive Council session. Gheton also asked that should the U.S. translation of the documents be completed in advance of their own, that the U.S. Delegation pass the copies to the UK Delegation for consideration as well.

¶6. (SBU) Both documents were translated into English at the State Department and returned to the Delegation on September 4. Delrep provided copies to the Libyan and UK delegations on September 5. On September 9, the USG response to the Libyan papers was provided via email (ref C).

¶7. (SBU) Meanwhile, other European delegations were reporting to Delreps that the Libyan government had demarched their embassies in Tripoli, requesting support the extension request but without providing the document.

¶8. (C) Delrep met with UK Delegate Karen Wolstenholme on September 15 to review U.S. and UK comments in advance of a scheduled trilateral discussion on September 16. Also on September 15, the Technical Secretariat released "The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Request for Extension of the Intermediate and Final Deadlines for the Destruction of its Category 1 Chemical Weapons" (EC-58/NAT.5) (Del note: The TS document shows the date of submission as August 24, three days before the Libyan delegation gave us the "draft" in Arabic.")

¶9. (SBU) On September 16, Delrep met with UK Delegate Wolstenholme and Libya Delegate Ahmed Hassan Walid to discuss the status of both papers.

---------- ------
LIBYA'S DESTRUCTION DEADLINE EXTENSION REQUEST
---------- ------

¶10. (SBU) Walid informed Delrep and Wolstenholme that the deadline extension request paper was submitted in final form for consideration by Executive Council Session 58 (EC-58). Delrep expressed disappointment in the coordination of the document and stated that it had clearly been described as a draft which would be submitted following substantive discussion of the comments received from Washington and London. Wolstenholme inquired how the Libya delegation intends to handle the comments received from both delegations. Walid stated that he would prefer to receive the comments in the form of a non-paper which he will then pass to the National Authority in Tripoli. He stated that the comments could be further discussed with the technical team from Libya that will travel to The Hague to attend EC-58.

¶11. (SBU) Delrep verbally communicated the USG response (ref C) and provided a copy of the "Excerpts from the June 2009 Non Paper" while indicating that she would share the request for a non-paper with Washington. Walid had copies of previous USG non-papers with him and stated that the technical group had considered these in the drafting of their papers and would continue to do so in preparation for EC-58.

¶12. (SBU) Wolstenholme stated that she would request a non-paper from London as well, and

request a non-paper from London as well, and
Qrequest a non-paper from London as well, and
provided the UK response to the extension request
verbally. Both Delrep and Wolstenholme emphasized
the desire for detailed communication of the
destruction progress to include interim benchmarks

THE HAGUE 00000578 003 OF 003

for tracking progress, and highlighting that
additional transparency into destruction operations
and activity would likely foster greater support
from States Parties for their extension request.
Wolstenholme stated that the UK generally supports
Libya's position on the extension request.

¶13.(SBU) Delrep, Wolstenholme and Walid tentatively
scheduled a meeting with the Libya delegation, to
include the technical group responsible or drafting
these requests, on October 11 in advance of EC-58.

REQUEST TO RETAIN SANDBAG WALL

¶14. (SBU) Walid stated that the Libyan paper
regarding the retention of the sandbag wall was
also submitted to the Technical Secretariat in
final form along with the "Notification of Changes
to the General and Detailed Plans for Conversion of
the CWPFs. Rabta Pharmaceutical Factory - 1, Rabta
Pharmaceutical Factory - 2, (Phase II)" and
provided a copy of the latter. (Delnote: Document
was passed electronically to ISN-CB on September
16, but has still not been officially released by
the TS.)

¶15. (SBU) Per Ref C guidance, Delrep communicated
that the U.S. is agreeable to supporting the
proposed amendments if the Government of Libya
provides a firm commitment to meet the
transparency level stipulated in our June non-paper
on "General Considerations for the Rabta
Conversion." Wolstenholme stated that the UK
generally supports the Libya position on this paper
as well, and added that inclusion of a description
on the original function of the sandbag wall would
be preferred.

¶16. (U) BEIK SENDS.
LEVIN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09THEHAGUE755

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09THEHAGUE755 aka Wikileaks id #240346 ?
Subject	CWC: TRILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN LIBYA, UK AND U.S. DELEGATIONS ON THE STATUS OF LIBYAN CONVERSION AND DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES
Origin	Embassy The Hague (Netherlands)
Cable time	Thu, 17 Dec 2009 12:10 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09THEHAGUE755.html
References	09STATE115619 , 09TRIPOLI933
Referenced by	09THEHAGUE757 , 10THEHAGUE29
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9027
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTC #0755/01 3511210
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 171210Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3586
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1967
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAC PRIORITY
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 THE HAGUE 000755

SIPDIS

STATE FOR ISN/CB, VCI/CCA, L/NPV, IO/MPR,
SECDEF FOR OSD/GSA/CN,CP&GT
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC
COMMERCE FOR BIS (BROWN, DENYER AND CRISTOFARO)
NSC FOR LUTES
WINPAC FOR WALTER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2019
TAGS: LY *[Libya]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CWC *[Chemical Weapons Convention]*
SUBJECT: CWC: TRILATERAL MEETING BETWEEN LIBYA, UK AND
U.S. DELEGATIONS ON THE STATUS OF LIBYAN CONVERSION AND
DESTRUCTION ACTIVITIES

REF: A. STATE 115619
B. TRIPOLI 933
C. STATE 122230

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

Classified By: Janet E. Beik for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

This is CWC-74-09.

INTRODUCTION

¶1.(SBU) On December 2, 2009, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Libyan delegations met to discuss issues related to conversion of the Chemical Weapons Production Facility (CWPF) at Rabta, progress on destruction activity in Ruwagha, and construction of the Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility (CWDF)in Rabta. The trilateral meeting took place on the margins of the 14th Session of the Conference of States Parties (CSP). Libyan delegates included Ahmed Walid (Permanent Representative to the OPCW) and Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy (Member of the Libyan National Authority). (Del note: Gen. Mohamed Rajab El-Ghadi had been confirmed to attend the trilateral meeting and was credentialed as the Head of the Libyan delegation to the CSP; however, he was not present during the week of November 30-December 4). The UK delegation was represented by John Foggo(National Authority, London) and Dr. James McGilly (DSTL Chemical and Biological Sciences, Porton Down). U.S. Delreps David Weekman, Damon Prather, Don Clagett and Jennifer Smith attended.

¶2. (SBU) The CSP approved the request by the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya for extension of the intermediate and final deadlines of its Category 1 chemical weapons (EC-58/NAT.5, dated 24 August 2009 and Add. 1, dated October 14 2009). As discussed at the 58th Session of the Executive Council and during the CSP, support for this request was predicated on Libya meeting requested transparency measures.

¶3. (C) During a private discussion with Director-General Rogelio Pfirter on November 30, he indicated to Andrew Weber (Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, and Chemical, and Biological Weapons, Department of Defense) and Dr. Robert Mikulak (ISN/CB Director and Head of the U.S. Delegation to the CSP) that the Technical Secretariat would be exerting increased pressure on the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya on their destruction progress. This sentiment was supported in informal discussions with members of the Technical Secretariat following the trilateral meeting.

RABTA CONVERSION: COMPLETION BY DECEMBER 31, 2009

¶4. (SBU) Hesnawy discussed the progress made on the conversion of the CWPF in Rabta and projected that this will be complete by December 31, 2009. Hesnawy emphasized that he was working with the Technical Secretariat to coordinate a visit to verify completion, and that he was keen on this being completed rapidly to enable him to commence commissioning of the facility in preparation for future pharmaceutical production activity.

¶5. (SBU) Hesnawy described the commissioning to include water testing of piping and units operational evaluations of the digital controllers, Qoperational evaluations of the digital controllers, vacuum system (capable of 10 mbar), silicone fluid

based heating unit, cooling units and cooling tower. According to Hesnawy, raw materials and solvents for trial production in the amount of "several tons" are on-site and chemicals and solvents that he could recall included xylene, ethyl acetate, hexane and potassium butyrate.

¶6. (SBU) Hesnawy stated that four active pharmaceutical ingredients are planned for production, all involved with anti-retroviral agents used in treatment of HIV/AIDS. Actual production should begin in the first half of 2010 with product shipment in the June-July 2010 time frame.
Dr Hesnawy recalled three of the four pharmaceuticals: zidovudine (AZT), an azidothymidine; nevirapine, a dipyridinodiazipine; and stavudine, a deoxythymidine (the fourth is likely Lamivudine, a thiocytidine, noted in process flow diagrams from SIPSA). (Del note: These are synthetically complex products to produce and it is not clear whether the converted site will produce the final pharmaceuticals or the intermediates. Dr Hesnawy was vague on this point-he might not be involved in the pharmaceutical plant owners' plans.)

DESTRUCTION ACTIVITY PLANNED AT RUWAGHA

¶7. (SBU) Hesnawy stated that Libya decided not to move the chemical weapon precursors: phosphorus trichloride, thionyl chloride, pinacolyl alchohol and isopropanol from the storage facility in Ruwagha to the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. Instead they will destroy these chemicals at Ruwagha. This change in plans will require revision of their detailed plans for destruction and their facility agreement. This action has not yet been completed, but Hesnawy indicated that they are working on the revisions with the TS.

¶8. (SBU) Hesnawy asserted that the destruction of the precursors would commence in March 2010 and would take approximately 3-4 months to complete, likely finishing activity in July 2010.

¶9. (SBU) Hesnawy described the process as follows: a concrete basin will be constructed to which will be added water (trucked in) and sodium hydroxide. The phosphorus trichloride and the thionyl chloride will simply be metered into the basin where they will be hydrolyzed to sodium salts. In the case of phosphorus trichloride hydrogen peroxide will be added to convert the phosphite to phosphate. The basin containing the salts will simply be covered up with sand when the operations are complete. An open gas fired burner will be used to destroy the pinacolyl alcohol and the isopropanol which will be metered into the flame. No environmental control will be used as "only carbon dioxide and water will result from the combustion of the alcohols").

STATUS OF CONSTRUCTION OF CWDF IN RABTA

¶10. (SBU) Hesnawy described the contracting for the activity to include local contractors for site Qpreparation, utilities, grounding, foundation and structural building construction activity; and an international contract with the Italian firm SIPSA for process units and controls. (Del note: A

request for clarification on which contracts are concluded has been passed to the National Authority in Tripoli via the Libyan delegation)

¶11. (SBU) Hesnawy described the site preparation activity underway by Libyan contractors. The site is rectangular and is surrounded by a fence, ditch and access road. At present the power house is installed at the southwest corner with electric power in the process of being pulled to the site. Water piping has reached the site as far the access road on the west side of the site. An evaporation pond is being dug near the east fence line. In December, grounding and foundation pillars (3 m deep with grounding resistance about 8 ohms) will be installed. The building itself will be prefabricated steel set up on a concrete slab.

¶12. (SBU) According to Hesnawy, the site will be ready to install process equipment in June 2010. The system has been described in the detailed verification plan and includes a rotary kiln (normal operating temperature 900 degrees C) followed by a post combustion chamber (PCC)(normal operating temperature 1200 degrees C) and environmental control equipment. The high temperature of the PCC is expected to preclude dibenzodioxin and dibenzofuran by-product production. Completion of process equipment installation is expected in September 2010. Commissioning and final engineering review by the TS is expected in October 2010 with 1% of the Mustard destroyed by November 1. Category 1 mustard and category 2, 2-chloroethanol, will be destroyed in the PCC by opposed co-injection of diesel oil and mustard or 2-chloroethanol. The mustard will be pumped from the mobile storage wagon (filled in early 2009 at Ruwagha) through flex-hose which will be quick-fit connected to the PCC. 2-chloroethanol will be used to flush the wagon and other contaminated equipment. The mustard/2-chloroethanol and any remaining 2-chloroethanol will be burned in the PCC.

¶13. (SBU) Hesnawy asserted that destruction activities will be completed in 2010 and that the 100% destruction deadline extension of May 15, 2011, was chosen to allow for slippage in the event that unforeseen circumstances arise. In that regard, Hesnawy said that the only unit that might have problematic delivery is the kiln which has a 6 month construction time line, but, as that is necessary only for contaminated solids (dunnage, PE containers, etc.) its absence will not affect the mustard destruction, which is to be accomplished in the PCC. Dr Hesnawy has been working with a Dr. Boccardi of SIPSA on contracts and equipment delivery timing. Hesnawy claims that no changes in the Rabta CWDF detailed verification plan or facility agreement are required. (Del note: This is not likely as the precursor hydrolysis must be removed at the very least.)

¶14. (SBU) When asked about past environmental concerns, Hesnawy claimed that there were no longer any environmental concerns.

Q

ONGOING TRANSPARENCY MEASURES

¶15. (SBU) Weekman and Foggo then addressed the issue of transparency measures. Weekman noted the intervention made by the Swedish delegation on behalf of the European Union at the 58th Session of

the Executive Council in October, which called on Libya to provide more detail on a regular basis so that Member States could be more confident about the Libyan conversion and destruction programs. Weekman suggested that Libya should detail its incremental progress on both conversion and destruction during the informal consultations on destruction activity at the 59th Session of the Executive Council in February and augment its presentation with photos, as discussed previously. Hesnawy stated that it was impossible to answer everyone's questions and concerns and stated that he would make himself available to interested delegations. Smith stated that the expectations of the U.S. ought to be fairly clear, taking into consideration the previously supplied Non-Papers which outlined suggested items to include as transparency measures. She stated that it is likely that other States Parties share these expectations for transparency and emphasized that U.S. support of the deadline extension request was conditioned upon these being met. McGilly and Foggo concurred and reiterated that the expectations of the UK delegation were consistent with those of the U.S. delegation and those included in the European Union statement.

¶16. (SBU) Weekman and Foggo requested a copy of the Libyan National Statement to the CSP and recommended that Libya ensure that it is placed on the OPCW website. Walid stated that he would provide a copy, but that the statement was only in Arabic. Discussion followed on whether the National Statement was circulated as a matter of course, and Weekman described that this had to be requested by the delegation usually during delivery of the statement.

¶17. (SBU) Weekman said that in line with trilateral transparency agreements it would be useful for the UK and the U.S. to review copies of the contracts for the Ruwagha destruction activity and the Rabta CWDF which could also be shared with the Technical Secretariat. He stated further that review of the equipment contracts would help provide a solid piece of evidence that the Libyan CWDF would be built as scheduled, enabling the TS to respond to questions from Member States about Libya's progress with confidence. Hesnawy pushed back, stating that Libya has been transparent and that he is always available to answer questions. (Del note: The request for contracts from Libya was communicated to Dominique Anelli, Head, Chemical Demilitarization Branch, who responded that the requesting of contracts was not common practice and

that they would be requesting DFIs.)

¶18. (C) Del Comment: We believe Hesnawy clearly understood the message that is in Libya's interest to be more voluntarily forthcoming. However, the only commitment Hesnawy made was to provide a copy of the Libyan Statement at the Conference (which the Del has not yet received). It remains to be seen whether the Libyans will follow through with transparency measures and the new destruction Qtransparency measures and the new destruction deadlines. End Comment.

IMPRESSIONS OF THE TECHNICAL SECRETARIAT

¶19. (C) On December 3, Delreps Weekman and Prather followed up with Horst Reeps, Director of the Verification Division, to compare notes after the Technical Secretariat met with the Libyan

THE HAGUE 00000755 005 OF 005

delegation earlier that day. Reeps stated the TS was very pessimistic about Libya completing their chemical weapon destruction but felt the precursor destruction timeline was realistic because it was a simple process.

¶20. (C) Reeps stated that the TS will conduct an inspection at the storage facility in Ruwagha during the week of December 7, and plans on observing any progress that Hesnawy claimed at the nearby chemical weapon precursor destruction facility. The Technical Secretariat also plans on visiting the completed conversion facility after January 13, 2010; the chemical weapon precursor destruction facility for an engineering review in mid March 2010; and the CWDF site in September 2010, assuming Libya adheres to their stated schedule.

¶21. (U) BEIK SENDS.
LEVIN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1 aka Wikileaks id #185628 ?
Subject	INFLATION ON THE RISE IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 4 Jan 2009 14:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI1.html
References	09TRIPOLI227
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI192 , 09TRIPOLI600
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9310
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0001/01 0041454
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 041454Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4287
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0665
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0978
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0489
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4810
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000001

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE (NEA/MAG), ENERGY (ERICKSON), COMMERCE (MASON), CAIRO
(TREASURY LIAISON SEVERENS)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] ,
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: INFLATION ON THE RISE IN LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000001  001.2 OF 002


¶1.  (SBU)  Summary:  Prices have increased in Libya in the past
year, dramatically so for consumer goods (especially food),
housing and construction materials.  Libya's National
Information Board estimates that prices in the third quarter of
2008 increased by 9.8 percent compared to the same period in
2007.  Post's informal market basket survey showed significantly
```

2007. Post's informal market basket survey showed significantly greater increases in the price of foodstuffs than the GOL's official figures, particularly for previously subsidized goods such as sugar, rice, and flour, which have increased by 85 percent in the past two years. Overall inflation for 2007 was 6.3 percent, and 12 percent for 2008. Libya's Central Bank believes high international commodity prices are the main reason for inflation; however, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) traces the rise in consumer prices to the rapid rise in the domestic money supply spurred by the influx of petrodollars into the economy. In addition, Libya has embarked on a multi-billion dollar capital improvement program after years of neglecting its aging infrastructure, which has driven up prices for construction inputs. Accustomed to price subsidies and stringent price controls, inflation has come as a rude shock for Libyans. Concern that a radical program of privatization and government restructuring proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi earlier this year could be at least partly implemented have prompted fears that the quality of life for ordinary Libyans may erode further still as the GOL wrestles to implement economic reforms. End summary.

PRICES ARE RISING ...

¶2. (SBU) Whether talking with diplomats, expatriates working in the private sector, or Libyans, there is an overwhelming sense that prices across the board have increased in Libya in the past year, and that the situation has gotten worse in recent months. Most people agree that consumer goods (food), housing, and construction materials (i.e. cement) have witnessed particularly large increases. According to Libya's National Information Board, third quarter prices in 2008 rose by 9.8 percent compared to the third quarter of 2007, with the largest increases coming in foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco (which increased by an average of 16.4 percent). Housing costs increased by 6.1 percent and clothing and shoes by 4.9 percent in the same period. Official Government of Libya (GOL) figures put inflation for 2007 at 6.3 percent and 12 percent in 2008.

~ESPECIALLY FOR FOOD

¶3. (SBU) An informal market basket survey carried out by post showed results similar to official government figures for increases in the price of clothes and shoes (5 percent); however, our survey showed that prices for unsubsidized goods increased by about 25 percent in the past year alone. Particular increases were seen in prices for foodstuffs - the price of previously subsidized goods such as sugar, rice, and flour increased by 85 percent in the two years since subsidies were lifted. (Note: Flour sold to bakeries is still subsidized and bread prices remain low; however, flour sold in stores to the public is not subsidized. End note.) Construction materials have also increased markedly: prices for cement, aggregate, and bricks have increased by 65 percent in the past year. Cement has gone from 5 Libyan dinars for a 50 kilogram bag to 17 dinars in one year; the price of steel bars has increased by a factor of ten. The price of prized black market pharmaceuticals (produced in Tunisia and Egypt, and therefore considered to be of higher quality) increased by 12.5 percent. The cost of basic medical services has not increased markedly, but prices at private clinics in Libya have increased. (Note: Most Libyans who can afford to elect to either use private clinics or travel to other countries to seek medical treatment. End note.)

DIFFERING VIEWS ON THE CAUSES

¶4. (SBU) Libya's Central Bank has argued that high international commodity prices are primarily to blame for recent price inflation in Libya; however, the IMF has attributed rising prices to the rapid increase of Libya's domestic money supply, which spiked with rising oil prices. A massive housing and

infrastructure development plan begun in 2006 and involving tens of billions of dollars in government contracts, has also

injected more money into the domestic market. Many large-scale development projects that had to be shelved in the 1980's due to international sanctions against Libya, such as a new bypass highway in Tripoli, have been resurrected. The IMF has formally recommended to the GOL that it attempt to better sequence its public expediture programs - to include delaying work on some infrastructure projects - if inflation does not decline to avoid compounding the problem.

¶5. (SBU) Comment: The GOL's decades-long policies of stringent price controls and subsidizing staples have meant that Libya has experienced little inflation for many years. Consequently, the inflation seen since 2007 has come as a rude shock for Libyans, especially the sizeable middle class and strata of poor, who generally (and unsurprisingly) agree that the GOL is not doing enough to curb price increases. The GOL's termination of subsidies and price controls as part of a broader program of economic reform and privatization has certainly contributed to inflationary pressures and prompted some grumbling. A radical program of privatization and government restructuring proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi in his March address to the General People's Congress (reftel) has further stoked ordinary Libyans' fears that the regime is abandoning them to market forces after years of cradle-to-grave subsidies. Al-Qadhafi proposed that 5,000 Libyan dinar per month be distributed to each family; however, a number of senior GOL officials have told us in recent weeks that implementing that scheme would almost certainly occasion greater price inflation without contributing to GDP growth. While it appears unlikely that al-Qadhafi's plan will be implemented in full, the combination of high inflation and diminishing subsidies and price controls is worrying for a Libyan public accustomed to greater government cushioning from market forces. End comment.
GODFREY

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI100

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI100 aka Wikileaks id #190317 ?
Subject	UN SEEKS USG ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYAN DE-MINING PROGRAM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI100.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2520
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0100 0351016
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 041016Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4424
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0994
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0681
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0043
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0491
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1394
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0155
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0163
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4948
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000100

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND PM/WRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/4/2019
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KHDP *[Humanitarian Demining Program]* , LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]* , EG *[Egypt]*
SUBJECT: UN SEEKS USG ASSISTANCE FOR LIBYAN DE-MINING PROGRAM

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: UN experts, based on consultations with GOL officials and preliminary review of Libyan minefield maps, estimate that there are 16 million landmines in the Ouzou Strip along the Chadian border and along the Libyan-Egyptian border to the east. In addition, unexploded ordinance from World War II is a major problem in and around the eastern city of Tobruk and along the Egyptian border. There have been a number of recent fatalities involving landmines; the UN views the situation as critical and has developed a relationship with several Libyan partners to begin de-mining in earnest. They will focus first on the Ouzou Strip, move next to the Egyptian border and then address unexploded WWII ordnance. France, Germany, Italy, and

the UK will contribute funds and expertise for the final phase, with the UN providing an estimated $4 million for an initial assessment. UN officials expect to receive funding from the GOL for the bulk of the work and would welcome technical expertise and/or funding from the USG. End Summary.

MINES IN LIBYA: SITUATION CRITICAL

¶2. (SBU) UN Resident Coordinator Brian Gleeson recently briefed the Ambassador on the status of de-mining efforts under UN auspices. Citing consultations with GOL officials and minefield maps obtained from the government, the UN estimates there are upwards of 16 million miles on Libya's southern and eastern borders. On the southern Ouzou Strip, mine density in certain areas exceeds one device per square meter. The dangerous situation is compounded by the demographic of the two regions: the porous desert borders are home to nomadic Bedouin herders who pass from country to country. Gleeson has received reports of Bedouins cooking off unexploded ordinance in their campfires and killing themselves. Critically, Libyans are smuggling mines to the Chad side of the border to recycle the explosives.

¶3. (SBU) In separate conversations with P/E Chief, Gleeson said a World Food Program (WFP) driver had been killed in late October while driving from the southeastern WFP logistics hub in Kufra into eastern Chad. Walking a few meters from the main north-south track for a rest stop, the driver tripped a WWII-era mine. Another incident occurred in connection with a UN-sponsored de-mining conference in the eastern city of Tobruk in November. A Libyan military officer was showing unexploded WWII ordinance to journalists; the device detonated, killing three people.

DE-MINING POLITICALLY SENSITIVE

¶4. (C) When Gleeson first broached the subject of a de-mining initiative under UN auspices, he was told to avoid the issue because it was of personal interest to Muammar al-Qadhafi and therefore extremely sensitive. According to well-placed contacts of the UN, al-Qadhafi wanted to keep the mines in place as a deterrent against potential aggression by Egypt or Chad. The UN has nonetheless quietly pursued a de-mining initiative through Libyan partners, including the Libyan Anti-Mining League, the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) and the National Security Council (NSC). The QDF and NSC partnerships are key, since they are headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Muatassim al-Qadhafi, respectively (both are sons of Muammar al-Qadhafi). With buy-in from members of the al-Qadhafi family, Gleeson now believes he has agreement for a major de-mining initiative in Libya.

¶5. (SBU) Gleeson proposes a three-phase initiative. Work will begin first in the southern Ouzou Strip, where Libya laid millions of mines during its war with Chad over the contested Ouzou Strip in the 1980's. The second phase would focus on an area along the Egyptian-Libyan border, where millions of mines were laid during the 1977 Egypt-Libya border war. In the third and final phase, unexploded circa-WWII ordnance, mostly in and around the eastern city of Tobruk and along the northern section of the Egyptian-Libyan border, would be removed. The UN will pay $3-4 million for an assessment by technical experts to better determine the scope of the work. It expects the GOL to fund the bulk of the actual de-mining work. Gleeson noted that USG technical expertise and/or funding for de-mining would be welcomed.

¶6. (C) Comment: Cooperation on technical issues seen to be non-political and of benefit to the Libyan people are comparatively palatable to the GOL. U.S. technical assistance and/or funding could afford another area for U.S.-Libya cooperation; however, Post would recommend waiting to see whether the UN is able to move beyond assessments to actual

implementation before taking any further steps. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1021

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1021 aka Wikileaks id #240795 ?
Subject	HRW RELEASES REPORT FROM TRIPOLI AT LIVELY MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 20 Dec 2009 14:50 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1021.html
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI99
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO1304
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1021/01 3541450
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 201450Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5609
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0062
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1527
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0854
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0971
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0915
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1203
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0871
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6159
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 001021

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NEASA, LONDON/PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/20/2019
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: HRW RELEASES REPORT FROM TRIPOLI AT LIVELY MEETING

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary:  Human Right Watch's December 12 launch of its
latest report on Libya -- the first such launch in-country --
provided an unprecedented public forum for discussion of Libya's
past abuses.  The event degenerated into a shouting match
between regime critics and supporters, some of which appears to
have been scripted.  HRW officials credited Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi as key to the event, stating that his personal
involvement prompted them to move them the event from Cairo and
```

enabled the families of several victims of the Qadhafi regime's abuses to travel from Benghazi to the event. HRW told us privately that Justice Secretary Mustafa Abduljalil is a proponent of rule of law, and urged the USG to provide technical support for Libya's new draft criminal code, for which HRW already has provided 30 pages of comments. We believe this proposal is worthy of further consideration, particularly under the auspices of our bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Representatives from Human Rights Watch (HRW) credited members of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) for the latter's "brave and risky" facilitation of an event in Tripoli launching the rights group's first comprehensive report on Libya since 2006. The December 12 press conference brought members of the Libyan and international press together with relatives of past victims of Libyan human rights abuses -- and members of Libya's powerful security forces. While HRW staff recognized the historical and political significance of launching the report from Tripoli, they were careful not to overstate its importance or make assumptions on what it would mean for resolving outstanding human rights issues. Tom Malinowski, director of HRW's Washington office, told Poloff that the QDF's release of a similar report on December 10 was likely designed to reduce the sting of HRW's report by giving a national voice to human rights recommendations. Despite Saif al-Islam's positive intervention, authorities detained at least five families of the 1996 Abu Salim prison riot on their way from Benghazi to the event and denied visas for Washington Post and New York Times journalists to attend the HRW's press conference.

¶3. (S//NF) A phone call from Muammar al-Qadhafi's staff putting HRW on notice for a possible audience with the Libyan leader thirty minutes before the scheduled start of the press conference nearly caused a last-minute cancellation, but the event began with only minor technical complications. The crowd was twice as large as HRW expected, with approximately 80 journalists, diplomats, and government critics in the room. At least four security agents took notes, photos, and film of the proceedings; the primary cameraman had served as poloff's assigned surveillant for nearly six months. HRW briefly outlined its report, citing improvements on freedom of expression and the increased willingness of some public officials to accept and act on criticism. They acknowledged that many of Libya's major cases stem from events many years old, but that their concerns related to those cases would remain until victims and their relatives were given full accounts of and received justice for past violations. Thanking the QDF for its facilitation of both their study tour in April and the in-country launch of the report -- a fact that put Libya ahead of many other Arab states -- they also took so-called reformers to task for not doing enough to codify and institutionalize progress on human rights that has so far been won with support from Saif al-Islam and members of his inner circle.

¶4. (C) The short briefing and recommendations were followed by a lively question-and-answer segment that quickly degenerated into a litany of grievances against the Internal Security Organization (ISO) for years of repression. A family member of a victim of the Abu Salim riot, holding a photo of his dead brother, described his brother's case in detail claiming the family had taken food and clothing to the prison for 13 years, until they received a death certificate this spring that lacked a cause of death. A woman from Benghazi asked whether HRW would apply pressure on the GOL to prosecute the director of an orphanage accused of sexually abusing girls under his care. Journalists and security agents swarmed those who spoke, some of whom were flanked by known employees of the QDF.

¶5. (C) After several longer testimonies, a journalist from state news agency JANA spoke, claiming to have accepted government compensation for his brother's death at Abu Salim. He railed against HRW and those continuing to petition the government for

justice on past abuses as "anti-Libyan" and denounced HRW for

holding Libya to different standards than the rest of the world. He asked how HRW's report could even be written when abuses like "the war in Iraq, Abu Ghraib, and Guantanamo" went unpunished. He defended Libya's actions as necessary to keep the country safe, and noted that no attacks like 9/11 could occur on Libyan soil due to these protections. HRW reiterated its non-governmental and politically neutral status, and pointed out that it had been the first organization to report on alleged abuses at Abu Ghraib. While HRW's explanation appeared to calm some in the audience, his statements ended what appeared to be a carefully scripted piece of theater. The next speakers, only some of whom seemed to be at the event at the invitation of the QDF, made more vocal complaints on the deaths or disappearances of relatives and made specific claims against the ISO.

¶6. (C) The event quickly evolved into an angry shouting match between government supporters and a sizable group of Libyan citizens urging the creation of compensation and truth commissions. The pro-government crowd, taunted by members of the audience as ISO agents, verbally attacked the HRW and their detractors, causing several individuals from both sides to storm out. After this public catharsis had endured for over 90 minutes and with no further questions about the content of the report, HRW ended the press conference and spoke individually with several government critics. (Notably, the actual events differed from a Times of London report, which exaggerated the details of the role of GOL security officials in "shutting down" the press conference.) Watching from the parking lot, emboffs observed several of the most vocal government critics entering a large van with staff from the QDF unhindered by security agents. Others, including a lawyer claiming to have represented Idriss Bufayed, departed individually without apparent incident.

¶7. (C/NF) In a December 13 meeting, HRW staff told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had personally intervened to allow the group to launch the report from Tripoli and that his influence had led to unprecedented access and openness from both high-ranking Libyan officials and ordinary citizens. HRW moved the planned launch from Cairo to Tripoli in mid-November at Saif al-Islam's encouragement, and the QDF facilitated meetings and visas for HRW. Contrasting their experience with their first visit in 2005, they remarked that everyone from lawyers to ISO director al-Tuhamy Khalid spoke more freely about Libya's human rights culture and no longer "cited chapter and verse of the Green Book." Malinowski assessed that a stalemate between "law-and-order" officials like Justice Secretary Mustafa Abduljalil and security officials like Khalid would make further progress on human rights difficult. Recounting a two-hour "philosophical debate" with Khalid, Malinowski said the ISO Chief recognized he was operating his organization outside the law by holding some 330 prisoners who had been acquitted or served their sentences, but justified his inaction on the grounds of national security and Libya's fight against terror. Khalid ended his meeting with HRW by telling them, "There are some criminals who don't deserve human rights. Other than that you and I agree on everything."

¶8. (C/NF) HRW recommended that the U.S. support those elements of Libyan society that sought to institutionalize human rights protections. They see Abduljalil as a proud nationalist who believes in the principles of justice and the primacy of law and chalks up Libya's fitful march toward human rights legitimacy as "birthing pains" of a nation that is just reentering international society. Abduljalil told HRW that he would continue to fight against the culture of corruption that allowed security services to operate above the law. HRW sees the draft criminal code -- written under the QDF umbrella -- as a key, yet still insufficient part of institutionalizing human rights

protections within the Libyan legal structure. They provided post and the QDF with 30 pages of recommendations on the draft law -- which has been circulating for at least three years -- that would bring Libya's penal code in line with international human rights norms, and suggested that U.S. technical experts play a role in finalizing the draft code, through the provision of technical assistance. While they recognize that change will come slowly in Libya's security organizations, HRW said that U.S. security officials might be able to deliver messages to the ESO and ISO on the long-term (in) effectiveness of aggressive detention and questioning policies. To help insulate Libya's fledgling progress from the whims of its personality-driven political system, HRW advised that enshrining human rights

TRIPOLI 00001021 003 OF 003

protections into the law and its application will be fundamental to real societal change.

¶9. (C) Comment: Press reports on the tensions between security officers and regime critics at the HRW launch event were overstated. Most of the proceedings, including some of the back-and-forth between victims' families and security officials, seemed to follow a script that exalted the work of Saif al-Islam but remained carefully within the "red lines" that would cause significant offense. Although known security agents photographed and videotaped the event, and some families were detained for a short time and ordered not to travel from Benghazi to Tripoli, there are no reports that security officials took punitive action against regime critics.

¶10. (C) Comment continued: This event -- the first-ever of its kind in Libya -- helped solidify Saif al-Islam's reputation as a "reformer" and also undoubtedly pushed the envelope with some Old Guard elements. The draft criminal code strikes us as an interesting opportunity for real reform in Libya. It is encouraging that the Libyan Government is engaged in a dialogue with HRW on the specifics of the draft legislation, and we believe that HRW's suggestion that the USG consider providing technical assistance merits further review. The draft criminal code, including our providing the background to U.S. jurisprudence handling of free speech, assembly, and criticism of public officials, could be good topics of discussion for the working groups that will be convened under the auspices of our Human Rights Dialogue. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- U.S. diplomats have long seen Libya's Jalil as a reformer | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1022

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1022 aka Wikileaks id #240797 ?
Subject	LIBYA HEU UPDATE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 20 Dec 2009 15:06 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1022.html
References	09TRIPOLI966
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1309
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1022 3541506
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201506Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5612
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0109
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0098
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6162
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001022

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLYCUMMINS, SARAH DICKERSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , KGIC *[Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , KRAD *[Radioactive Contamination of the Environment]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE

REF: TRIPOLI 966

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) After raising a sensitive proposal on another topic (septel) during their hastily-called late Friday evening meeting, and only in response to the Ambassador's insistence that the HEU issue be raised, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told the Ambassador on December 18 that there would be "no problem" regarding the planned December 21 transfer to Russia of Libya's remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel. The Ambassador underscored the urgency of this issue to the

Ambassador underscored the urgency of this issue to the bilateral relationship, noting that the Secretary, NEA A/S and National Security Advisor had been engaged in seeking a resolution. He wanted to ensure that Kusa was aware of the imminent December 18 deadline for the U.S. to either commit or withdraw its 800,000 USD financial obligation for contracting for the Russian plane. The Ambassador told Kusa that once the spent fuel transfer is successfully completed, the U.S. would be in a better position to discuss moving ahead on the full range of the bilateral relationship, including the several issues raised by Kusa in his December 3 conversation with the Secretary. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador handed over the letter discussed by the NEA A/S and Kusa on December 12 to ensure that the U.S. had done everything to effect completion of the mission.

¶2. (S/NF) Separately, the DOE team visited the Tajoura Nuclear Center on December 19 and 20, and reported that all necessary preparations were underway for the shipment to take place on December 21. The team's Libyan counterparts said they had received all necessary approvals from the Libyan government. The spent fuel casks will be loaded into shipping containers today and transported from Tajoura to Mitiga Air Base later this evening. The Russian-chartered plane arrived in Tripoli today at 1500 and is scheduled to depart Libya at 0500 local time on December 21. DOE reports that all necessary overflight clearances have been received. We will send another update following the plane's departure.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1024

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1024 aka Wikileaks id #240983 ?
Subject	HINTS OF MINOR PROGRESS IN THE SWISS-LIBYA STANDOFF
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 21 Dec 2009 15:04 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1024.html
References	09TRIPOLI942
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI73
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1994
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #1024/01 3551504
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 211504Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5614
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN PRIORITY 0065
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6164
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001024

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , SZ [Switzerland] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: HINTS OF MINOR PROGRESS IN THE SWISS-LIBYA STANDOFF

REF: TRIPOLI 942

TRIPOLI 00001024  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: The Swiss Charge in Tripoli, Stefano
Lazarrotto, expressed cautious optimism that the bilateral
crisis with Libya had seen measured improvements.  On December
15, the GOL issued a visa to a Swiss diplomat assigned to work
in Tripoli, and in exchange, Switzerland issued a visa to a
Libyan diplomat assigned to work in Bern, as part of a "deal"
struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA.  Lazarrotto told us
```

struck between the Charge and Libyan MFA. Lazarrotto told us that Switzerland was now pursuing a dual-track approach in an attempt to resolve the crisis, a bilateral MFA dialogue based in Bern and a new Tripoli-based dialogue with the Qadhafi Development Foundation. The Libyan Government insists that a third party (Austria, Germany, France, or Spain) mediate discussions in both tracks. Although Lazarrotto no longer expressed an immediate fear that he would be declared persona non grata, he maintained his December 1 request that the Embassy support the detained Swiss in the event that Swiss officials are asked to leave the country. End summary.

POSITIVE SIGN BUT REQUEST FOR SUPPORT STANDS

¶2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarrotto said that the GOL had granted a visa to a Swiss diplomat who will be assigned to Libya to serve as "Head of Chancery" (the equivalent of a Management Officer). The diplomat arrived on December 19. Simultaneously, the Swiss Government issued a visa to a Libyan diplomat assigned to work at the Libyan Embassy in Bern. Lazarrotto said the "deal" was struck after three weeks of negotiation on the issue.

¶3. (S/NF) Due to this positive development, Lazarrotto said the Swiss were less concerned than they were a few weeks ago about the possibility that the Charge would be asked to leave the country for allowing the detained Swiss citizens, now sentenced in a Libyan court, to continue to reside at the Swiss Embassy (reftel). However, Lazarrotto noted that the request still stands for possible U.S. assistance in providing food to the detained Swiss in the event that the Swiss diplomats are declared persona non grata. Lazarrotto also said the Swiss Embassy had stockpiled food and water for the detainees, which somewhat lessened the need for humanitarian assistance in the event of further political difficulties. He said that he had made the request for humanitarian assistance to several embassies but that none had responded yet. Separately, the UK Embassy told us on December 16 that they had received the Swiss request but had not responded, and indicated that the UK Government was unlikely to respond positively.

SWISS PURSUE DUAL TRACK STRATEGY

¶4. (C) Lazarrotto confirmed that an appeals trial was still scheduled to take place on December 22 in the immigration court. The Libyan lawyer working on the case is trying to clarify whether the two men have to be present for the trial to take place. Separately, the hearings before the "economic court," which handles tax issues and other matters, have been pushed back to January 2, 2010 for Max Goeldi and to January 3, 2010 for Rashid Hamdani. The Swiss do not plan to attend. The lawyer is still trying to obtain in writing the list of specific charges.

¶5. (S/NF) The Swiss are now proceeding along two tracks to negotiate a solution to the situation. The first track, being led by the Swiss Government in Bern, consists of bilateral MFA talks to reopen discussions on political reconciliation. Lazarrotto reported that a Libyan MFA representative (the name of whom he could not remember) traveled to Bern last week for informal discussions of how to move forward. Libya is now insisting that any formal discussions include a third country "mediator." Bern agreed to allow Austria, Germany, France, or Spain to serve as the third party, as those countries had previously agreed to facilitate negotiations on behalf of the Swiss.

¶6. (S/NF) The Swiss have initiated a second track recently, through Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF). Lazarrotto explained that the Libyan lawyer representing the detained businessmen had approached the QDF to intervene with the GOL on the issue, and that the QDF had also insisted that a third party be involved in the discussions (namely, one of the countries mentioned above). According to

Lazarrotto, Human Rights Watch met with the Swiss during the group's recent visit to Tripoli and noted that in previous discussions they had had with Saif al-Islam in London, Saif had articulated his interested in "solving" the Swiss issue soon.

SWITZERLAND CONTINUES TO APPLY VETO POWER

TRIPOLI 00001024 002.2 OF 002

¶7. (S/NF) Lazarrotto said that he had faced pressure recently from "a few EU embassies," regarding Switzerland's decision to veto the issuance of Schengen visas to Qadhafi family members. He specified that the Portuguese Ambassador (strictly protect) had been particularly vocal in accusing Switzerland of abusing its veto power. Lazarrotto defended his nation's stance, stating "Imagine that this situation were to happen to another Qadhafi family member? Switzerland could not afford that. It is better that we take precautions." Lazarrotto stressed that the veto policy was only being applied to Libyan officials and Qadhafi family members -- "average Libyan citizens are still able to apply for Swiss visas in Cairo," he said.

¶8. (S/NF) Comment: Lazarrotto's previous fears regarding his status seem to have been greatly allayed by the GOL's issuance of a visa for a Swiss diplomat assigned to work at the Swiss Embassy. The introduction of EU mediating parties and a new negotiating track under the auspices of the Qadhafi Development Foundation strike us as positive developments though the Swiss remain angered and frustrated by the Libyan refusal to state what they truly want to settle the dispute once and for all. . End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1025

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1025 aka Wikileaks id #241006 ?
Subject	FINAL HEU SHIPMENT DEPARTS LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 21 Dec 2009 16:26 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1025.html
References	09TRIPOLI938 , 09TRIPOLI941 , 09TRIPOLI966
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2083
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1025 3551626
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 211626Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5616
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0110
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0099
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0253
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6166
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001025

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(ANDREW BIENIAWSKI, KELLY CUMMINS, AND SARAH DICKERSON).

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/21/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PINS [National Security] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PARM
[Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , KGIC [Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KRAD [Radioactive Contamination of the Environment] ,
ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FINAL HEU SHIPMENT DEPARTS LIBYA

REF: A) TRIPOLI 938    B) TRIPOLI 966  ; C) TRIPOLI 941

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (S/NF)  On December 21 at 0515, a Russian-chartered plane
took off from Tripoli with the seven casks containing Libya's
final Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks
```

final highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) spent fuel stocks. Department of Energy (DOE) staff in Tripoli confirmed that the flight arrived in Russia at 11:15 local time. Today's flight marked the successful completion of Libya's commitments to dismantle its nuclear weapons programs.

¶2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE staff reported that the loading of the casks the overnight on December 20-21 went smoothly. They said that Libyan officials at Tajoura Nuclear Center provided no insights into the reasons behind the GOL's last-minute decision to cancel the planned November 25 shipment (ref a) or to put it back on track via a letter to Russian authorities on December 15 (ref b). DOE staff said the month-long impasse had taken a visible toll on Dr. Ali Gashut, the head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment. Gashut seemed "embarrassed" and "different," and commented that he had spent a lot of time "waiting in ministry halls," presumably as the GOL debated policy options. The director of the Tajura Nuclear Center, Engineer Ahmed al-Habrush, was personally present for the loading of the casks and signed all the required documents for handing over the HEU.

¶3. (S/NF) In reference to queries made by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi regarding the disposition of Libya's centrifuges that were handed over to the U.S. (Ref C), the DOE visitors noted that any centrifuges that were sent to the U.S. were destroyed and could not be could be returned to Libya in their original form. If the Libyans were referring to other materiel, such as high efficient machinery, some equipment was moved to the U.S. and some was left in Libya to be used for peaceful purposes such for medical uses.

¶4. (SNF) The Ambassador would like to thank the DOE team - Kelly Cummins, Igor Bolshinsky, and Stan Moses - for their efforts to resolve this issue. Their on-the-ground, expert analysis ensured that the Embassy was fully apprised of all of the technical details, and their clear explanation of the complex timelines and constraints helped ensure a timely resolution. We are very grateful for their work.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks Archive - Libya Delayed Nuclear Disposal - NYTimes.com
- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1030

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1030 aka Wikileaks id #241095 ?
Subject	LIBYA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 22 Dec 2009 08:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1030.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2497
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #1030 3560821
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 220821Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5621
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1530
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0170
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0184
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0028
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0857
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0974
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0918
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6171
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 001030

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/CT AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , ASEC *[Security]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KCRM *[Criminal Activity]* , KHLS *[Homeland Security]* , AEMR *[Emergency Planning and Evacuation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM

REF: STATE 109980

¶1. (U) The United States rescinded Libya's designation as a state sponsor of terrorism in June 2006. Libya renounced terrorism and weapons of mass destruction in 2003 and has continued to cooperate with the United Sates and the international community to combat terrorism and terrorist financing.

¶2. (U) On July 20, Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure confirmed to the Malian press that Libya, Algeria, and Mali planned to coordinate military and intelligence efforts to fight security threats linked to al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in the Sahel-Saharan region.

¶3. (U) In November 2007, Egyptian cleric and al-Qa'ida (AQ) leader Ayman al-Zawahiri announced a merger between AQIM and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). In an audiotape, al-Zawahiri urged AQ fighters to topple the Government of Libya, describing Muammar al-Qadhafi as an "enemy of Islam" and criticizing the 2003 decision to renounce WMD and terrorism. In late September, six leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison, issued a document renouncing violence and claiming to adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. The 417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of People," was the product of a two-year reconciliation project between the Government of Libya and the LIFG, facilitated by the Qadhafi Development Foundation. The authors state that "The lack of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of 'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious violations."

¶4. (U) In the text, the authors directly challenge al-Qa'ida, addressing the recantation to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which include the rejection of violence as a means to change political situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly, monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with the sword is an error and shortcoming." According to press and government sources, at least 144 former LIFG members and 60 members of other jihadist groups have been released from prison after completing this rehabilitation effort.

¶5. (U) On March 23, a foreign embassy in Tripoli recommended that travelers avoid the cities of Ghadames and Ghat on the Libya-Algeria border. The Ministry cited Libyan authorities speaking of "an increasing threat of terrorism" and "risk of abduction" due to "heightened political tensions in the Arabic or Islamic world."

¶6. (U) On August 14, 2008 Libya and the United States signed a comprehensive claims settlement agreement to provide compensation to claimants in both countries who allege the other country's responsibility in incidents causing injury or death. Included in the settlement agreement are claims stemming from the 1988 bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland, and the 1986 bombing of the La Belle nightclub in Berlin.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1035

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1035 aka Wikileaks id #241383 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PRIVATE SECTOR LOOKS TO SAIF AL-ISLAM FOR STABILITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Dec 2009 09:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1035.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3844
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1035/01 3570941
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 230941Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5625
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6175
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001035

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR ITA NATE MASON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PRIVATE SECTOR LOOKS TO SAIF AL-ISLAM FOR STABILITY

TRIPOLI 00001035 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Several leading Libyan businessmen view Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's new role as "General Coordinator" of Libya as a positive development. They believe his appointment will ensure stability and continuity, ending the infighting of recent years. They believe Saif al-Islam is a logical choice to lead Libya due to his western education and pro-reform agenda, and note that Saif has been groomed for this position for several years. He reportedly has a system in place to receive daily report on his siblings. Well-connected contacts believe Saif's new position will be formalized in mid-January. They are hopeful that, once formalized, his new role will end the recent

chaos in Tripoli's commercial scene, which one regime insider attributed to the political uncertainty following Saif''s nomination as General Coordinator in early October. If Saif does try to implement reform, he is likely to face resistance from Libya's entrenched elite who have benefited from a business environment based on tribal ties and proximity to the regime. End summary.

LIBYAN BUSINESSMEN THINK SAIF IS A GOOD CHOICE~

¶2. (C) Several prominent Libyan businessmen positively view Saif al-Islam's new position as they believe it will promote stability and ensure continuity after Muammar Qadhafi is no longer on the scene. In a recent meeting between emboff and members of a leading Benghazi-based family with significant business interests throughout Libya, the family said the formal naming of Saif as a "General Coordinator" of Social Committees could create stability after the past few years of uncertainty and infighting amongst the Leader's children. According to the family's patriarch, the actual title of "Coordinator" is "meaningless." He said one could see a genesis for the position as far back as the late 1990's when the regime was faced with many anti-Qadhafi plots emanating from various tribes in Libya. In response, the Leader created "Peoples Social Committees" to deal with the "trouble-makers" within the tribal structure. This family believes Saif's appointment to this new position will help the Libyan Government prevent the rise of some sort of Muslim Brotherhood extremist group, or tribal infighting in support of different other al-Qadhafi siblings.

¶3. (C) Another prominent Libyan businessman said that Muammar al-Qadhafi had appointed Saif al-Islam to this new position in order to ensure continuity for when he is gone from the scene. Saif was "the logical choice" because he is well-educated, well-respected, and is reform-minded. In his view, Saif is "good for the future of Libya" since he is interested in attracting foreign investment to Libya and creating a modern Libya inspired by Dubai's model.

~AND BETTER THAN THE ALTERNATIVES

¶4. (C) Of the Leader's seven sons and one daughter, Libyan businessmen prefer Saif al-Islam as he is more of a known quantity. One businessman commented `the devil you know is better than the one you don't know.' According to one businessman, Saif is better-prepared to replace his father as he has positioned himself for such a leadership role for several years and reportedly gets daily reports on the activities of all of his siblings. As for al-Qadhafi's other son and National Security Advisor, Muatassim, he characterized him as "blood-thirsty" and violent. The rest of Muammar al-Qadhafi's children are simply "incompetent" and only interested in lavish life-styles.

¶5. (C) Members of the Benghazi-based family believe Saif is well-known to the average Libyan due to his visibility in the media and his speeches to Libyans, especially youth. They echo the comments of a Tripoli businessman (cited above) that the elder Qadhafi had long been preparing Saif al-Islam for his new role as "General Coordinator," by sending him to the West for his studies. Other Qadhafi sons have not lived or studied in the West. The head of the business family believes Saif should now "get rid of his immature friends," who continue to exert a bad influence on him. A relative of his commented that many Libyans perceive the U.S. to favor al-Qadhafi's other son, Muatassim, citing his recent trips to the U.S. He noted Libyans did not really know Muatassim, i.e. what his personality is, or even what he looked like, perhaps because as a "security person," Muatassim was rarely seen by the Libyan public.

WILL SAIF TAKE THE JOB?

¶6. (C) Although Saif has not officially "accepted" his new

¶6. (C) Although Saif has not officially "accepted" his new position as "General Coordinator," this head of the prominent Benghazi family believes Saif has given his tacit acceptance.

TRIPOLI 00001035 002.2 OF 002

He noted that in the past, Saif has always publicly stated his views on issues, such as when he said he would step down from public life in August 2008. This time, however, he has not said anything about the new position, which our contacts interpret to mean Saif has agreed to the new role.

¶7. (C) Contacts in Tripoli, including the well-connected son of one of the Free Officers, those officers who have been with Qadhafi from the beginning, have told us that Saif is expected to formally accept his new position around the middle of January. The Free Officer's son told us that Saif al-Islam has spent the last two months consolidating "his team," identifying key advisors who will be able to promote his agenda. This contact believes that Saif's vision for Libya is strongly pro-reform and pro-Western.

HOPE THAT SAIF CAN CREATE ORDER OUT OF A CHAOTIC URBAN DEVELOPMENT SCENE

¶8. (C) Libya's small private sector is hopeful that Saif will be able to impose some order to the chaos and uncertainty that has wracked Tripoli's business environment in recent months. As a result of construction projects and arbitrary closings of businesses, one major department store was recently closed for several weeks, along with 31 other shops along the popular shopping street of Gagaresh. The owner of the store estimated this affected 2,000 employees of these shops, along with their families due to lost wages. He said the ostensible reason the Tripoli municipality gave was that the entire area was not a "commercial zone" and so no shops were permitted outside of a small section of downtown Tripoli according to a rule enacted in 1978. He noted that the 1978 law is totally out-of-date and many shops have sprung up in response to the growth of Tripoli suburbs. These shops have permits to operate and their owners pay taxes so it does not make sense that they would be shut down.

¶9. (C) Another businessman noted that several shopping malls are being built by Libyan government joint ventures but that no malls are yet finished. He wondered why there was a rush, then, to reduce competition from shops outside the malls? He pointed out that shops in another area of Tripoli, Souk Talat, had also suddenly been torn down but that there had been no thought to relocating these businesses. As a result, many small business owners, primarily in the car parts and hardware businesses, have seen their livelihoods disappear. Lastly, a lack of coordination among the various commercial development projects means that the developers for one shopping mall were unaware that another mall was being built only one kilometer away from their property. The son of one the Free Officers, himself a business owner, attributed the recent commercial turmoil and the apparent wanton destruction gripping Tripoli to the overall state of political uncertainty following Saif al-Islam's appointment as General Coordinator in October. He believes the situation will improve once Saif's position is formalized.

¶10. (C) Comment: While the majority of the prominent businessmen we surveyed were hopeful about Saif al-Islam's prospects to effect real change, others are less sanguine. Although he is western-educated and has a history of advocating for reform, Saif al-Islam also is a product of a highly corrupt system that has been in place for 40 years. If/when he does try to implement political and economic reforms, he undoubtedly will face significant challenges from entrenched elites who have benefited from a business environment based on tribal ties and proximity to the regime. It may be that his visible appearance

at the planeside scene where convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Megrahi was welcomed home reflects Saif's (and perhaps his father's) realization that these interests need to be taken care of, even at the cost of sometimes alienating Libya's Western interests. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1036

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1036 aka Wikileaks id #241386 ?
Subject	LOCAL DIPLOMATS BELIEVE LIBYA UNLIKELY TO PUSH HARD FOR SECOND TERM AS AU CHAIR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Dec 2009 09:46 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1036.html
References	09ADDISABABA2945 , 09LILONGWE690
Referenced by	10ADDISABABA25 , 10LILONGWE34
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3848
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1036 3570946
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 230946Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5627
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0005
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE 0008
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6177
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 001036

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/23/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , AL-1 [Arab League] , KPAL [Palestinian Affairs] ,
MI [Malawi] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LOCAL DIPLOMATS BELIEVE LIBYA UNLIKELY TO PUSH HARD FOR
SECOND TERM AS AU CHAIR

REF: A. ADDIS ABABA 2945
     B. LILONGWE 690

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) Rumors persist that Libya is seeking an unprecedented
second consecutive term as African Union Chair, driven largely
by its continued "dinar diplomacy," much of it delivered by
personal envoys of Muammar al-Qadhafi.  Recent gifts, both
```

personal envoys of Muammar al Qadhafi. Recent gifts, both public and discreet, to member states have been interpreted by some diplomatic missions as part of an orchestrated campaign to insert Libya into position above Malawi or its Southern Region neighbors. A series of head-of-state visits, a C-10 summit (reportedly focused on UN reform) and the recent announcement of a $250 thousand gift to the Ghanaian Foreign Ministry have added fuel to the rumors. However, we have also learned that Malawi -- next in line to chair the AU -- has not been moved by either Libya or the other African states Libya has sought to influence through its largesse.

¶2. (C) Diplomats from two North African embassies separately told Poloff that they expected Libya's "donations" to continue but that they did not expect Libya to make the coordinated push for the Chairmanship that it did last year. Egyptian Poloff commented that the Libyans already have "their plate full" with the March 2010 Arab League summit, for which the government is constructing opulent guest quarters and a new meeting hall in Tripoli. He noted that while Libya cleared the way for its AU candidacy last year through CEN-SAD coordination meetings, several (un-named) CEN-SAD partners oppose a second term for Qadhafi and that "it would be very difficult for Egypt to support." He assessed that Libya's donations were "business as usual" for Libyan diplomacy and likely represented a hedge should the chairmanship become open, rather than a strong push for a second term.

¶3. (C) The same contact assessed that Libya was continuing its policy of cash donations to African countries in order to retain good relations with countries that "hate" Qadhafi's leadership of the AU. The Egyptian Poloff said he took rumors that Libya intended to focus on Gaza and Fatah-Hamas reconciliation efforts during its Arab League presidency as a sign that al-Qadhafi preferred to change course instead of pushing forward an AU agenda of immediate political union that had made little progress despite two Libyan-controlled summits. (Hamas leader Khalid Mashal was in Tripoli for consultations on December 20.) The consensus among AU-member diplomats polled was that should Malawi unexpectedly waiver due to Libyan pressure, that other Southern Region states that were "fed up" with Qadhafi's chairmanship would fill the gap, per regional rotation rules.

¶4. (C) Comment: Pan-African messages feature heavily in the image al-Qadhafi has created for himself. State media outlets append "President of the African Union" to his customary title of "Leader of the Revolution" (and, less frequently "King of the Traditional Kings of Africa"). On a personal level, it is likely al-Qadhafi would like to retain that title; on a practical level, it is unclear that Libya intends to pursue that role vigorously given competing concerns. Rumors of Qadhafi's plans for the AU chairmanship likely will persist barring a strong statement from Malawi or another Southern Region member affirming their intent to assume the chairmanship. We recommend monitoring Libya's moves in both the AU and Arab League before approaching high-level officials on al-Qadhafi's intentions, as providing notice of our high-level interest may have unintended consequences for both our bilateral and multilateral interests.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI1043

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI1043 aka Wikileaks id #241919 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MINISTER OF ECONOMY WELCOMES U.S. TRADE MISSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 29 Dec 2009 14:25 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI1043.html
References	09TRIPOLI258 , 09TRIPOLI485
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7169
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #1043/01 3631425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 291425Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5633
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0471
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0668
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0975
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6184
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 001043

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; STATE FOR NEA MAG; ENERGY FOR G. ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR ITA: NATE MASON; COMMERCE FOR CLDP: MARAM TALAAT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: LY *[Libya]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MINISTER OF ECONOMY WELCOMES U.S. TRADE MISSION

REF: A) TRIPOLI 258 ; B) TRIPOLI 485

TRIPOLI 00001043 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador met with Mohammad Ali al-Hweij, Minister of Economy-equivalent, on December 29 to brief him on the U.S. Trade Mission planned for February, a mission that would further our shared goal of attracting more U.S. companies to Libya. Al-Hweij said he welcomed the

delegation and would work on securing visas for the group. Al-Hweij said that a recent edict requiring foreign companies to have Libyan general managers had been revised to require that only representative offices of foreign companies must have Libyan managers. However, companies with Libyan branch managers would receive preferential licensing terms. Al-Hweij also reported that negotiations for a partnership between U.S. heavy machinery firm Caterpillar and the Economic and Social Development Fund were almost completed. The Ambassador noted that a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) would provide a useful framework for resolving similar disputes, adding that Libya's revised draft of the TIFA was with USTR for review. Al-Hweij was pleased to hear a U.S. federal judge will visit Libya next week to conduct a workshop for judges on international commercial arbitration. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) The Ambassador met with Mohammad Ali al-Hweij, the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Industry, Economy and Trade (Economy ministry-equivalent) on December 29 to brief him on the upcoming U.S. Trade Mission (February 20-22, 2010) and to seek al-Hweij's support for the delegation. The Ambassador said this trade mission would build on the U.S. and Libya's shared goal of attracting more American companies, in diverse fields, to Libya. He also emphasized that the companies are major Fortune 500 firms and cannot be left wondering whether they will receive their visas until the last minute. Secretary al-Hweij said he welcomed the delegation and would work on securing visas for the group. He also said he would personally meet with the delegation and would provide a schedule of site visits and meetings for them. The Ambassador also highlighted the need to secure visa approvals for several Department of Commerce employees who will come to Libya in advance of the delegation in order to prepare the schedule and make other logistical arrangements. Al-Hweij said he would direct his staff to follow-up with the Embassy to ensure the visas were approved on time.

¶3. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that U.S. companies had expressed serious concerns with a recent edict that requires foreign companies to hire Libyan general managers. Al-Hweij said he had reached an agreement with Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi that the edict would be revised and only representative offices of foreign companies would be required to have Libyan managers. He said that managers of branch offices of foreign companies could be of any nationality but that if the manager were Libyan, the company's Libyan license would be valid for five years. If the manager were foreign, the license would be valid for only three years.

¶4. (SBU) As for U.S. heavy machinery firm Caterpillar's efforts to resolve its status in Libya (Ref A), al-Hweij said negotiations for the joint venture partnership with the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) were almost completed. He said that even before the agreement is signed, however, Caterpillar may continue to import machinery and spare parts into Libya via its European agent. The Ambassador noted that a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) would provide a useful system for resolving such issues in the future, and told al-Hweij that the Libyans' revised draft of the TIFA was with the U.S. Trade Representative's office for review.

¶5. (SBU) The Ambassador informed al-Hweij that a U.S. federal judge from the Court of International Trade in New York will visit Libya next week (Jan. 3-7) to conduct a workshop for Libyan judges on international commercial arbitration, held in cooperation with the General People's Committee for Justice (Ministry of Justice-equivalent) (see Ref B). Al-Hweij said he welcomed this initiative and he would send a representative to the workshop. He also looked forward to meeting the judge during her visit if possible. He noted that Libya was in the process of revising its commercial laws in order to streamline procedures for registering companies and to modernize the

commercial code. He said that Libya had 20 laws bearing on commercial matters, with some dating from 1953. The legal reform is part of the current five-year plan to refurbish Libya's infrastructure and he hoped Libya would finish the

TRIPOLI 00001043 002.2 OF 002

program by 2013 when a new five-year plan would begin. Al-Hweij said he would brief the trade mission on these and other developments on Libya's economic and commercial situation.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: Hweij, like senior MFA officials who have been briefed on the Trade Mission, appeared to welcome to the initiative. However, we continue to face severe problems in the issuance of Libyan visas for USG and USG-sponsored travelers. Continued high-level engagement likely will be required to ensure that visas for the delegation and support staff will be issued in a timely fashion. We will continue to press the issue. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI109

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI109 aka Wikileaks id #190972 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI-BASED DARFUR REBELS BELIEVE GOL'S ATTENTION TO DARFUR HAS DIMINISHED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 8 Feb 2009 15:51 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI109.html
References	08TRIPOLI871 , 09KHARTOUM92 , 09TRIPOLI70
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI249
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5806
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0109/01 0391551
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 081551Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4431
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0146
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0156
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0035
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4956
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000109

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]* , SU *[Sudan]* , AU-1 *[African Union]*
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI-BASED DARFUR REBELS BELIEVE GOL'S ATTENTION TO DARFUR HAS DIMINISHED

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 871 , B) TRIPOLI 70 , C) KHARTOUM 92

TRIPOLI 00000109 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Representatives of the Sudan Liberation Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction resident in Tripoli find their days largely unoccupied despite renewed fighting in Darfur as Libyan officials have shifted their attention to crises in Gaza and Somalia. The late-2008 lull in fighting weakened their military potential and yielded no progress on rebel unification as Abdul Wahid continued to ignore calls to reunify SLA. SLA/U was heartened by UN/AU Mediator Djbril Bassole's January 7 field visit, but good feelings were dashed by January 24 when they suffered combat losses at Um Saruna that included the death of an important military commander. SLA/U leaders view the

an important military commander. SLA/U leaders view the Secretary's call for a "No Fly Zone" in Sudan favorably, but worry that an ICC indictment against Bashir will open the floodgates for Islamist foreign fighters to join government forces in Sudan. They are increasingly pessimistic that the GOL will resurrect the Sirte process, in part because the GOL has shifted its attention elsewhere, and are preparing to leave Tripoli for greener pastures. End Summary.

GOL CONTACT WITH SLA/U WANING; UN/AU MEDIATION FILLS THE GAP

¶2. (C) Poloff met with SLA/U representatives Saayid Sharif and Osman Muhammad Busra on January 28 at their Tripoli headquarters (a run-down room at the state-owned Grand Hotel), where they had been "spending time without much to do" since meeting last November. Their contact with the GOL had steadily decreased since late summer, and all but ceased in December when GOL officials became seized with crises in Gaza and Somalia and their efforts to win Libya the chairmanship of the AU (ref B). With UN/AU Chief Mediator Djbril Bassole's planned trip to Tripoli in December 2008 apparently postponed indefinitely and no active movement by the GOL to facilitate talks between rebel movements, Sharif and Busra held out little hope that Libya would ramp up engagement with Darfur rebels in the near term. While personally disappointed that cooperation had slowed, Sharif reported that Bassole's visit with SLA/U leaders in Um Saruna was promising. He quoted Bassole as having characterized SLA/U as a real movement with real support from the people, allegedly contrasting it with Abdul Wahid's faction. SLA/U remains skeptical of the Qatari peace initiative and believes Darfur is an African problem that needs an African solution.

LULL IN FIGHTING ENDS WITH GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN ATTACKS

¶3. (C) The relative lull in fighting through mid-January led to reduced supplies (fewer opportunities to raid government caches) and little incentive for foreign-based leaders like Abdul Wahid to discuss unification, according to the Tripoli-based SLA/U reps. In addition, the relative calm allowed the GOL, which has limited bureaucratic capacity, to focus on more pressing "Arab crises" in Gaza and Somalia. (Note: the GOL places both Sudan and Somalia within its Arab affairs administrations. End Note.) While they blamed increased fighting in Darfur on Khartoum's plan to manufacture a crisis in advance of the ICC's expected indictment of Bashir. Sharif and Busra offered no convincing argument as to why Khalil Ibrahim would cooperate in the government's plan to divert attention from international politics. Repeating reports SLA/U leader Abdallah Yehia conveyed to Embassy Khartoum (ref C), our interlocutors said SLA/U positions in Um Saruna were bombed first by GOS Antinov aircraft and then attacked by "over 100" GOS trucks full of men. Thirteen SLA/U fighters were wounded and another six killed in action, including An'kou Hussain, a key SLA/U commander. Sharif confirmed Yehia was in the camp at the time of the attack, and claimed he spoke to SLA/U field commanders via satphone throughout the day on January 24.

¶4. (C) Despite claiming that the GOS attacked Um Saruna en route to JEM/KI positions further north, both Sharif (who is younger and claims field experience) and Busra were optimistic that renewed fighting would enhance their negotiating position with both other rebel groups and the international community. On materiel and supply, Sharif noted, "when there is war, it is good...you can steal what you need from the government." An uptick in violence also increases the number of SLA/AW commanders who would fight with SLA/U leaders in the field, shifting the balance toward leaders willing to fight and away from those "not talking to anyone in Paris" (i.e., Abdul Wahid). Despite being outnumbered and surrounded, Sharif saw the battle as rejuvenating for the SLA cause, saying, "10 cars for SLA can beat 1,000 government cars because our people believe in the movement."

REBEL THOUGHTS ON US POLICY AND THE POST-ICC WORLD

TRIPOLI 00000109 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Urging more USG and international involvement in the region, Sharif insisted that a "free zone" for inter-movement negotiations be set up, responded positively to the Secretary's call for a no-fly zone over Sudan, and looked for Western diplomats to focus on the "real movements". Apparently missing the irony of deriding so-called rebel leaders resident outside Sudan while sitting in a Tripoli hotel himself, Sharif noted that "if you count everyone who calls themselves a rebel in London, Geneva or Paris you could have 100 or 1,000 movements, but there are really only two-and-a-half: SLA, JEM, and Abdul Wahid's people who are fighting with us."

¶6. (C) Better understanding of the realities in Darfur is urgent, according to Sharif, because Bashir's indictment will compel Islamist fighters to stream into Sudan, intensifying the fighting and suffering. When asked why Islamists would choose "an African fight" over an Islamist one in Gaza or Somalia, he cited Sudan's open borders and lack of international attention as opportunities for foreign fighters that would deter them from the fight in Gaza. Despite the urgency, rebel leaders hold out little hope that Libya will renew its efforts to engage both governments and rebel movements in earnest and Sharif plans to depart Tripoli February 5 for a coordination meeting in Geneva and will possibly seek to travel to the United States after that. (Note: Sharif holds a passport from The Netherlands and asked about Visa Waiver procedures. End note.)

¶7. (C) Comment: Libya's focus has recently shifted from Darfur to other issues perceived to be more exigent, such as securing Muammar al-Qadhafi's selection as 2009 Chairman of the African Union (septel). Having suffered public humiliation at Sirte in 2007 and been frustrated in their efforts to effect stronger government-to-government cooperation to the south, it appears Libya's Africa hands may have decided to declare diplomatic victory and move on to the broader goal of transforming the AU into Muammar al-Qadhafi's vision of a United States of Africa. Rebel leaders here have whiled away the past two months waiting for other crises to subside, but appear to be waking up to the reality that Libya doesn't have the bureaucratic capacity to engage effectively on more than a handful of issues at a time. With the confluence of Libya's non-permanent UNSC seat, its newly acquired chairmanship of the AU and the 40th anniversary of the al-Fatah revolution in September 2009, the GOL is stretched thin. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI110

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI110 aka Wikileaks id #191030 ?
Subject	SENIOR MFA ADVISER OBEIDI ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, COMPENSATION FUND, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND NEC
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Feb 2009 09:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI110.html
References	09TRIPOLI49 , 09TRIPOLI99
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramC O N F I D E N T I A L   TRIPOLI   00000110
VZCZCXRO6094
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0110 0400942
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 090942Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4433
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4958
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000110

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/8/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , ABLD [Buildings and Grounds] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SENIOR MFA ADVISER OBEIDI ON BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP,
COMPENSATION FUND, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND NEC

REF: A) TRIPOLI 99 , B) TRIPOLI 49

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  In a February 5 courtesy call on MFA Secretary
for European Affairs Abdelati al-Obeidi, the Ambassador stressed
that the U.S. remained committed to expanding the U.S.-Libya
relationship and encouraged the GOL to make concrete progress on
the bilateral agenda in the early months of the new U.S.
Administration. (Note: Obeidi has previously served as Prime
Minister-equivalent and Foreign Minister-equivalent, and is an
influential regime figure.  End note.) Proceeding with the
proposed visit of U.S. Africa Command's General Ward and
finalizing an Education and Cultural Agreement and Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement would be positive steps that
would constitute a platform from which to further expand future
bilateral engagement.  The Ambassador sought the MFA's support
in securing GOL approval for the U.S. to purchase land on which
to build a New Embassy Compound (NEC).  He expressed strong
concern about a recent meeting between international oil
companies (IOCs) and Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi
al-Mahmoudi and National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukri Ghanem
```

al-Mahmoudi and National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukri Ghanem regarding contributions to the U.S.-Libya claims compensation fund (ref A) and reminded Obeidi that the U.S. would not countenance pressure on U.S. companies to contribute to the fund. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Obeidi welcomed the Ambassador to Libya, saying that the GOL was ready to work with the United States to re-build the relationship. Acknowledging that Libya and the U.S. would not always see eye to eye on developments in the world, he advised the Ambassador that when the GOL appeared to be blaming Washington, it was actually calling on the U.S. as a "superpower and founding member of the United Nations" to help solve important international problems. (Comment: Likely a reference to the GOL's criticism of the USG position regarding Israeli attacks in Gaza. End comment.) Obeidi said the GOL was ready to move forward on the pending agreements; the expected visit of National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi to Washington in April represented a potential opportunity to finalize and sign those.

¶3. (C) On the NEC site search, the Ambassador said that GOL permission for the USG to buy a site would be an important signal of GOL intent with respect to its future relationship with Washington. Obeidi said the GOL supports the establishment of a new U.S. Embassy facility in Tripoli and offered that there was internal discussion within the GOL regarding USG ownership of the site versus a long-term lease.

¶4. (C)Obeidi, who was a lead negotiator on the claims compensation issue, appeared to be unaware of the PM's meeting with the oil companies regarding contributions to the fund. He expressed understanding for the PM's continuing efforts, saying the GOL had expected companies to contribute to the fund and had been disappointed that none had done so to date. He agreed to follow up with NOC chairman Shukri Ghanem to underscore the Ambassador's warning that overtly pressuring U.S. companies with potential consequences represented an ominous turn and crossed a USG redline.

¶5. (C) In a probable reference to the Ambassador's January 14 interview with Reuters, Obeidi suggested that the Ambassador avoid discussing sensitive human rights issues in the press; such matters were best handled in private channels (see ref B for details on the GOL's earlier demarche on this subject). He said the GOL would welcome a dialogue on human rights and suggested that the U.S. send a delegation to Tripoli to initiate the talks. (Comment: A suggestion the GOL has floated before, but never taken steps to facilitate. End comment.) The Ambassador responded that he was mindful of the sensitivities of discussing political topics in the press, but had only expressed U.S. policy that was well-known and had been publicly stated before. The Ambassador welcomed Obeidi's offer to begin a human rights dialogue, and agreed to convey the invitation to Washington.

¶6. (U) Ambassador also handed Obeidi the President's letter to al-Qadhafi replying to the latter's expression of congratulations on the President's election. The contents of the letter featured prominently in the Libyan press the following day.

¶7. (C) Comment: While his primary focus is on managing Libya's relations with Europe and Russia, Obeidi enjoys a direct line to senior regime officials (including Muammar al-Qadhafi) and by some accounts is more influential on key issues than the foreign minister. He closely tracks the relationship with the U.S. and is a strong proponent of closer U.S.-Libyan ties. Post intends to move forward on the NEC this week with a request to the GOL to approve an initial set of five potential NEC sites. On the offer to host a human rights delegation, Post recommends testing the MFA's long-stated willingness to facilitate same, with the caveat that we should be consistent in emphasizing that the

GOL's interlocutors of first instance are and should remain the Ambassador and Emboffs. End comment.

CRETZ

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI117

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI117 aka Wikileaks id #191129 ?
Subject	GOL PRESSING FOR BROAD AGREEMENTS ON SECURITY AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Feb 2009 16:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI117.html
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

P 091608Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4440
INFO OSD WASHINGTON DC
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000117

FOR NEA/MAG, PM, ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GOL PRESSING FOR BROAD AGREEMENTS ON SECURITY AND NUCLEAR COOPERATION

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) During a February 8 meeting, MFA Secretary for the Americas Dr. Ahmed Fituri told the Ambassador that National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi is looking forward to his planned trip to Washington in April and expects to sign a broad security cooperation agreement with the United States during the visit. The recently-agreed memorandum of understanding on military cooperation (signed by Fituri in Washington in January) was "not enough", Fituri said. In addition, the GOL expects to sign an "umbrella agreement" on civilian nuclear cooperation. Fituri said that the GOL believes it needs such an agreement in order to do business directly with private U.S. nuclear suppliers. Muatassim is also looking forward to initiating the political-military dialogue during his visit; Fituri said the GOL would soon respond to the U.S. nonpaper on ideas for the agenda. Other pending agreements - the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement and the Education and Cultural Agreement - could also be signed during the visit, Fituri said.

¶2. (C) The Ambassador responded that Washington considers the Mutaissim visit an important opportunity to advance the

bilateral security relationship. Repeating points he made to senior MFA adviser Obeidi the previous week, the Ambassador suggested that the two sides make progress on issues already in play before embarking on new agreements. In particular, it was unusual for the United States to enter into broad security commitments with other governments. A joint statement, as discussed in connection with former Secretary Rice's visit to Tripoli in September, would be a more appropriate vehicle. If there were areas where the GOL wanted to cooperate with the U.S., such as border security or legal cooperation, then we could consider entering into cooperation agreements on those specific issues.

¶3. (C) As for Fituri's suggestion regarding an "umbrella agreement" for civilian nuclear cooperation, the Ambassador said the current focus should be on concluding the pending Highly-enriched Uranium-Low-enriched Uranium (HEU-LEU) agreement for the return of spent nuclear reactor fuel from Libya to Russia. The Ambassador said he would be pleased to discuss these issues directly with Muatassim; Fituri undertook to arrange a meeting soon. The Ambassador suggested that the non-security-related agreements on trade and education could be signed in Tripoli as soon as the GOL was ready.

¶4. (C) Fituri asked whether the head of the U.S. Africa Command, General Ward, would accept the GOL's invitation to visit Libya in February. The Ambassador said that General Ward's schedule was full in February, and that the Embassy was in touch with the General's staff and would convey alternative dates soon. Fituri said General Ward's visit would be particularly important now that Libya had been elected head of the African Union.

¶5. (C) Comment: The GOL has been pressing for a broad agreement on security, including a commitment to come to Libya's aid if it were attacked, since last fall. The Libya proposal for a civilian nuclear agreement has been in play since then as well. Post's attempts to steer the GOL away from these overly broad and ambitious initiatives have so far not persuaded the GOL to drop them. Fituri told the Ambassador in a one-on-one setting after the meeting concluded that these agreements were necessary to prove to "doubters" in the regime that the U.S. would live up to its commitment to treat Libya as a full partner once Libya had abandoned its WMD and foresworn terrorism. Given the impasse, Post recommends presenting the GOL - likely via Muatassim - with a formal proposal for a joint statement on security cooperation in lieu of an agreement, together with cleared points outlining why the U.S. cannot enter into a broad bilateral security agreement or an agreement on civilian nuclear cooperation at this time. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI13

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI13 aka Wikileaks id #186248 ?
Subject	LIBYA: DEMARCHE OPPOSING IRAN'S UNDP PRESIDENCY DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 8 Jan 2009 15:02 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI13.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2322
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0013 0081502
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 081502Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4305
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0157
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4828
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000013

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/EDA (CCHANG), NEA/IR (VTAYLOR), AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , IR [Iran] , UN [United Nations] , EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: DEMARCHE OPPOSING IRAN'S UNDP PRESIDENCY DELIVERED

REF: STATE 1500

¶1.  (U) Post delivered reftel points to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation's
(MFA-equivalent) Office of International Organizations on
January 8 urging Libya to leverage its position on the Security
Council to generate alternatives to Iran's candidacy.  Post will
report any substantive response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI131

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI131 aka Wikileaks id #191389 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 10 Feb 2009 19:28 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI131.html
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7661
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0131/01 0411928
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101928Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4454
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0682
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0996
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4979
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 09 TRIPOLI 000131

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OIA AND NEA/MAG; STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD);
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS; USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE
(MASON), ADVOCACY CENTER, AND CLDP (TEJTEL, ELKOUSTAF); CAIRO
FOR TREASURY LIAISON (SEVERENS)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , KTDB [National
Trade Data Bank] , LY [Libya] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , OPIC [Overseas Private Investment
Corporation] , PREL [External Political Relations] , USTR [Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations] ,
ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] ,
EINV [Foreign Investments]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT

TRIPOLI 00000131  001.2 OF 009


OPENNESS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT

¶1.  Libya has taken a number of steps to encourage foreign direct
investment and its current initiative dates back to the
mid-1990s. Since that time, Libya has enacted numerous laws and
regulations intended to improve the Libyan business climate and
increase its attractiveness to foreign investment. This effort
```

has been modestly successful; foreign companies are returning to do business, and Libya has been able to draw substantial interest from foreign investors, particularly since the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003. This has included billions of dollars in investment in Libya's energy sector. Libya has also announced vast new development projects, including a November 2007 pronouncement that it would spend 150 billion dinars ($123.4 billion) on public works, much of it in infrastructure and housing, over the next five years.

¶2. Through Law No. 5 (1997), "Encouragement of Investment Decision," the government attempted to diversify its hydrocarbons-dependent economy, encourage technical training of Libyan nationals and enhance regional development. Sectors targeted under this law include - but are not limited to - agriculture, industry, tourism, services and health. The provisions of Law No. 5 attempt to lower the tax and customs fee burden on qualifying companies. Imported machinery, tools, and other capital equipment are exempt from all customs duties and taxes; any equipment, spare parts, or primary materials needed for the project operation are exempt for a period of five years; the affected project is exempt from income tax on its activities for a period of five years from the date of the commencement of production or work; goods directed for export are exempt from excise tax and from the fees and taxes imposed on exports; stamp duty tax on commercial documents are exempt; and finally, profits from the project will enjoy the same exemption if reinvested. A 2006 GPC amendment to Law No. 5 lowered a 50 Libyan Dinar (LD) million floor on investments qualifying under the law to LD 5 million (LD 2 million if 50% or more of the project is owned by Libyans).

¶3. The Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB) was created as the implementing agency for Law No. 5. Its mission is to oversee and regulate foreign investment in Libya's aging and obsolete industrial base, which is characterized by an absence of national industrial planning, obsolete technology, poor management, shoddy maintenance, slow restructuring and over-employment. While LFIB's mandate theoretically includes investment-promotion, its activity is generally limited to processing foreign investment inquiries, except those related to tourism or the Misurata Free Zone (Note: applications for investment in those sectors should be directed to the Tourism Committee and the Free Zone Authority, respectively. End note). LFIB aims to be a "one-stop shop," assisting with issues related to customs and immigration, taxes, and labor for those companies entering under Law No. 5. The function of the LFIB is essentially to serve as the screening mechanism for foreign direct investment. LFIB approval is required for a broad array of operational issues for projects undertaken under Law No. 5, including the disposal of imported materials, transfers of investment capital outside of Libya at project completion, and employment of foreigners when qualified Libyans could be hired.

¶4. Libyan legal requirements on foreign companies present challenges with respect to their operations. Non-Libyans cannot, as a rule, own land (Note: A provision of Law No. 5 does allow for foreign rental and ownership of land for project work, although this has not been widely observed in practice. End note). "National Treatment" provisions do not exist for foreign investors. The local content requirement is such that foreign companies must hire a number of Libyans to at least match the number of expatriates on staff. In the oil sector, Libyans put forward for employment with foreign companies often lack formal qualifications or applicable practical experience, leaving companies to either spend resources on extensive training and mentoring or to pay employees who do not contribute to the company's productivity.

¶5. The promulgation of Law 443 on November 14, 2006 fundamentally changed the way that foreign businesses in the oil services, construction, industry, electricity, communications,

transportation, agribusiness and marine sectors can structure themselves and operate in Libya. Among other measures, new

foreign entrants seeking to establish themselves in these sectors of the Libyan market are required to establish joint venture companies with a Libyan entity. In a departure from earlier regulations, the foreign companies are allowed to retain up to 65% ownership of these entities. The law does not apply to representative offices (which do not have the right to conduct negotiations or enter contracts), and to entities formed under Law 5 of 1997 or Law 7 of 2004 (tourism projects).

¶6. Some political screening of foreign investment takes place and the political equities significantly influence decisions on government procurement. In 2007, senior Libyan officials made public statements directly linking successful foreign bids on development projects to the health of bilateral political relations. There is also strong evidence that large government and quasi-government tenders are awarded for political reasons, often in tacit exchange for gestures perceived to demonstrate Libya's return to the international community. Similarly, large tenders are withheld when political relations are not perceived to be positive. This has a trickle-down effect on private sector business transactions, which can be made more difficult by Libyan government interference. The Committee for Audit and Oversight reviews all contracts involving government funding, and exercises considerable influence over the political vetting of foreign companies seeking to enter the Libyan market.

¶7. Foreign firms are subject to special taxation arrangements, including the Stamp Tax, which places a special tax of 0.5-3 percent on the value of items procured by foreign firms in Libya and the Jihad Tax, which applies a 4 percent tax on corporate profits. Corporate tax rates are subject to interpretation, and are often a matter of negotiation between the company and Libyan tax authorities, particularly for larger companies/projects. Law No. 5 (1997) does provide some tax benefits for companies conducting work in Libya that falls under its terms, but requirements to receive these benefits are not clearly defined in the law. Furthermore, several standard forms of tax relief are not provided, resulting in high withholding and income taxes.

¶8. The government commenced a program of privatizations of 360 state-owned enterprises in 2004, a process that is ongoing. Although foreign entities are allowed to participate, they must do so under local rules, which include employment protections for Libyan workers and divesting shares to a wide number of individual owners (with a preference for Libyans).

CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES

¶9. From February 1999 to December 2001, Libya maintained a dual exchange rate, with the official rate pegged to a Special Drawing Right (SDR) at the rate of 1LD=.608 SDRs. State import agencies effected transactions using the official rate. Since 2001, the Libyan Dinar has been unofficially pegged to the U.S. Dollar (allowed to float within a specified band). With a 50% devaluation of the official rate in 2002, the two rates were effectively unified. A further 15% devaluation took place in June of 2003. In June of the same year, Libya agreed to the terms of IMF Article IV consultations, which called for, among other things, advanced import requirements and an end to the 15% exchange tax and subsidy.

¶10. Individuals with residence permits are permitted to hold foreign currency in Libyan accounts. Non-residents working in Libya may open domestic accounts in which to hold earnings. Central Bank approval is required for all other credits to non-resident accounts. Per-transaction withdrawals are limited

non resident accounts. Per transaction withdrawals are limited to 5,000 USD in cash and 10,000 USD in travelers' checks (Note: Traveler's checks are not widely accepted in Libya. End Note).

¶11. The right to open an account in a convertible currency in a Libyan commercial bank is provided for companies entering Libya under Law No. 5. The Libyan Banking Law (Law No. 1 of 2005) allows any Libyan person or entity to retain foreign exchange and conduct exchanges in that currency. Libyan commercial banks are allowed to open accounts in foreign exchange and conduct cash payments and transfers (including abroad) in foreign currency. Commercial banks operating in Libya may grant credit in foreign exchange and transact in foreign exchange among themselves. Entities engaging in foreign exchange must be licensed by the Central Bank. Foreign exchange facilities are

available at most large hotels and airports, and ATMs are becoming more widely available. The importation of currency must be declared at time of entry. It is illegal to import or export Libyan Dinars in any quantity.

¶12. Most firms seeking to receive payment for services/products in Libya operate using letters of credit (LOCs) facilitated through foreign banks (often based in Europe). Foreign energy companies remitting large sums often make arrangements for direct transfers to accounts offshore. There have been reports of difficulties arranging LOCs with Libyan entities, owing to a range of institutional inefficiencies that slow the closure of deals, causing them to collapse as prices rise and deadlines slip.

EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION

¶13. The Libyan government has a history of state expropriation of private property, including the assets of foreign companies. These actions were taken largely for ideological reasons, including the nationalization of whole industries with the stated purpose of greater wealth distribution among the population. These activities were most prevalent during the 1980s, and appear to have fallen out of practice as a tool of government policy, although calls in early 2009 for a possible nationalization of the oil sector in light of falling world oil prices has brought the issue back to the fore. In recent years, the Libyan government has taken steps to expand the rights of Libyans to operate private enterprises and buy and rent property.

¶14. Several high-profile expropriations made in the energy sector have been resolved through a process of negotiations between the government and the affected companies. With the advent of a series of economic reforms and efforts at greater transparency since 2004, the prospect for government appropriation appears to be in decline. There have been other instances of compensation by the state for expropriated property, but figures related to the terms provided are not available.

¶15. With the imposition of Law 443 of 2006, local ownership is essentially enforced for most foreign entities seeking to do business in Libya, as well as many established before the law came into effect. While this law boosts the percentage of foreign ownership when compared with previous regulations, it requires that at least 35% of non-Libyan businesses be controlled by Libyan individuals or companies. This law has made competent Libyan partners in all sectors a highly valuable commodity for foreign investors, providing ample fuel for rent-seeking behavior in many sectors of the economy.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

¶16. The Libyan court system consists of three levels: the courts of first instance; the courts of appeal (also known as the courts of cassation); and the Supreme Court, which is the final appellate level. The GPC appoints justices to the Supreme Court. Special "revolutionary courts" may operate outside the court system to try political offenses and crimes against the state. "People's courts," another example of extrajudicial authority, were abolished in January 2005. A decree providing for state security courts was propagated in late 2007, and security courts were established in spring 2008. Matters related to personal law in Libya's justice system are nominally based on Sharia law. Other issues, including the commercial code, are largely based on Italian law, much of which dates to the 1950's.

¶17. Libya is not a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The `New York Convention'). In the case of commercial disputes, most foreign entities currently opt to try cases before the International Chamber of Commerce, whose judgments Libya has a history of respecting.

¶18. The law governing agencies specifies cases in which a contract may be terminated by either party. Otherwise, local courts will rule on the legality of the termination and/or award compensation to the injured party. Contracts are only exclusive if thus specified in the agency contract. Some agent-company disputes have reportedly been settled through direct appeal on

the part of the foreign company to the General People's Committee of Economy, Trade and Investment. Given the relative newness of the private sector, little precedent exists in this area.

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES

¶19. Libya is not a member of the WTO. Libya's application was received by the WTO on June 10, 2004. The General Council established a Working Party on July 27, 2004 and Libya is in the process of preparing its complete file for membership. Many of Libya's key supporting documents are in Arabic; translating these into correct, technically accurate English has been a significant impediment, according to Libyan trade officials.

¶20. Under the terms of Investment Law No. 5 (1997), approved projects receive a 5 year corporate income tax holiday (eligible for possible 3 year extension), exemption from corporate taxes and stamp tax on legal documents, exemption from customs duties and taxes on imports on project materials (5 years), and exemption from excise taxes for exported goods derived from the project. These incentives are only available for projects approved by the LFIB for implementation under Law No. 5. They do not apply for projects disapproved by the LFIB or foreign and domestic investors implementing projects outside of Law No. 5 (joint stock companies, Libyan agents, etc). Foreign firms and individuals generally have a more difficult time than Libyan nationals accessing credit from Libyan banks.

¶21. Offsets are often a part of large foreign investment deals, particularly in the energy sector. "Corporate responsibility" and local staff training programs are common requirements for successful concession bids, and training programs in particular are generally essential to win bids on most Libyan government contracts. These programs can range from the training of a handful of local staff up to multi-year programs exceeding $50 million for large energy companies. Also, some foreign firms have moved beyond these measures to bankroll much larger development projects. For example, following the October 2007 10-year extension of its holdings in Libya, Italian energy firm ENI Spa announced that it had signed an MOU with the Qadhafi Development Foundation to provide $150 million for the building

Development Foundation to provide $130 million for the building of hospitals and schools, and for the preservation of historical sites. Offsets of this type are very likely to remain a part of the business landscape for the foreseeable future.

¶22. Regarding visa matters, current U.S. and Libya visa policies are based on a framework of 'general reciprocity'. U.S. citizens are usually issued single-entry visas, and frequently encounter significant delays and complications in obtaining visas. Visas must be obtained prior to travel to Libya; they require an invitation or sponsor and can take up to several months to process. Residence permits are often difficult for foreign workers to obtain, and usually require several trips in and out of Libya. U.S. visitors to Libya should expect to wait weeks to months for issuance. Libyan visa practice is subject to change without notice. For example, in November 2007, Libya reimplemented an existing regulation requiring a stamped Arabic translation in all passports. This requirement lacks clarity, is not applied in a uniform fashion and was implemented without prior warning. In December 2008, the Libyan Embassies in London and Paris began to require that applicants appear in person and submit a lengthy list of supporting documents. This requirement was also imposed without prior notice, and is to be imposed worldwide in 2009. Further information can be found in the Country-Specific Information for Libya at the State Department website:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/ cis_951.html.

RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT

¶23. Laws and regulations on investment and property ownership allow domestic and foreign entities to establish business enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. However, the regulatory and legal environment is complex, and there is a systemic bias which favors government sector companies and Libyan firms over foreign entities. Foreign companies have several options for operating in Libya, including the establishment of joint ventures/joint stock companies, representative offices or to enter Libya under the terms of Law No. 5. However, foreign investors are increasingly being

encouraged to form joint ventures with Libyan entities in accordance with Law 443 of 2006. In practical terms, this has restricted the terms of foreign entry into the market.

¶24. Since 2004, foreign nationals and companies are allowed to lease property from private Libyan citizens. Rights to land ownership are possible only for foreign companies entering Libya under the terms of Law No. 5. There is considerable ambiguity in both the public and private rental markets; many aspects of these arrangements are left to local officials. Market distortions exist for various supplies related to housing, including industrial and construction supplies, and there is a lack of transparency in the distribution of these materials. The return of foreign companies and investors to Libya in 2003 has fueled a rapid increase in the price of rental housing and office space, and set off a construction boom. This has generated additional pressures on prices and building materials.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

¶25. Libyan property rights are complicated by past government policy actions and a weak regulatory environment. The Libyan government eliminated all private property rights in March 1978, and eliminated most private businesses later in the same year. The renting of property was declared illegal, and ownership of property was limited to a single dwelling per family, with all other properties being redistributed. Reduced rate "mortgages" were paid directly to the Libyan government, but many Libyans were exempted from these payments based on family income. This

process, and the destruction of official property documents that followed several years later, has greatly complicated subsequent effort to gain clear title to property throughout Libya.

¶26. Trademark violations are widespread and violators are adept at producing credible fakes. U.S. brands are at the present time extremely vulnerable to such activity, for their presumed high quality and Libya's lack of direct experience with the "real thing." The entry of several U.S. firms (most often through agents) has served to curtail some of the worst abuses related to their product lines. The General Authority for Products Control has established branches in seven Libyan cities, but they are primarily focused on health and safety issues. The Embassy has noted several cases in which foreign firms successfully pursued claims against trademark infringements by local (Libyan) companies.

¶27. While Libya is in the process of applying for entry to the WTO, it is not currently a member, and thus is not a party to TRIPS (Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights). The IMF has called upon Libya to bring its IPR regime in line with international best practice, and the Ministry of Economy and Trade is reportedly making a renewed effort to deal with the problem, although clear evidence of progress is not apparent.

TRANSPARENCY OF REGULATORY SYSTEM

¶28. The Libyan regulatory system is not transparent; the function and responsibilities of Libya's myriad government institutions are opaque and often contradictory. Transparency International placed Libya 126th out of 180 countries ("1" indicates least corrupt) in its 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index. Libya's legal and policy frameworks are similarly difficult to navigate. The issuance of licenses and permits is often delayed for significant periods for unspecified reasons, and such applications often appear to be adjudicated in a subjective fashion. The lack of transparency and clearly delineated lines of decision-making within Libyan institutions have fostered an environment in which graft and rent-seeking behavior are common.

¶29. Accurate, current information on the Libyan market and key commercial regulations is difficult to obtain. There are no non-governmental organizations present in Libya to help facilitate regulatory transparency.

EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT

¶30. Libya's banking system is dominated by four banks which are owned in full or in the majority by the Libyan Central Bank (Jamahiriya Bank, Wahda Bank, Sahara Bank, Umma Bank and the

National Commercial Bank). These banks constitute almost ninety percent of Libya's banking sector assets. All of these banks have capital of at least 100 million Libyan Dinars, and two of them (Wahda Bank and Sahara Bank), are in the process of being privatized. France's BNP Paribas acquired 19% of Libya's Sahara Bank in July 2007, and took operational control of the bank. The deal also includes an option allowing BNP Paribas to purchase additional shares up to 51% of Sahara's capital over the next three to five years. In November 2007, five foreign banks were shortlisted for the privatization of Wahda Bank, including French, Italian, Jordanian, Bahraini and Moroccan institutions; Arab Bank (of Jordan) was selected. They bid on a 19% of the share of Wahda Bank, with the option to increase their ownership to 51% in three to five years. The Central Bank announced in October 2007 that it would merge Umma Bank and Jamahiriya bank into a single entity; that process was completed in 2008

although there are still branches open under the banner of each bank. The Central Bank also owns the Libyan Foreign Bank, which operates as an offshore bank, with responsibility for satisfying Libya's international banking needs (apart from foreign investment). In addition, there are four specialized banks owned by the General People's Committee for Finance: the Agricultural Bank, Real Estate Investment Bank, Development Bank and Reefi Bank. There are also four substantial private banks (Bank of Commerce and Development, Amen Bank, Al-Jimaa al-Arabi Bank and Wafa Bank) and forty-eight smaller regional banks.

¶31. The availability of financing on the local market is weak. Libyan banks offer limited financial products, loans are often made on the basis of personal connections (rather than business plans), and public bank managers lack clear incentives to expand their portfolios. Lack of financing acts as a brake on Libya's development, hampering both the completion of existing projects and the start of new ones. This has been particularly damaging in the housing sector, where particularly small-scale projects often languish for lack of steady funding streams.

¶32. The Libyan banking system is currently undergoing a substantial modernization program to upgrade available services/products, deal with large numbers of non-performing loans, establish a functioning national payments system, facilitate the use of non-cash payment instruments and institute new standards of accounting and training. While foreign banks are technically able to enter the Libyan market under the Banking Law of 2005, the Central Bank has sought to delay their entry until the reform process has taken hold.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

¶33. Libya has experienced political violence. In December 2008, demonstrators threw rocks at the Egyptian Embassy in protest of Egypt's policies in connection with events in the Gaza Strip. The Mauritanian Embassy was also targeted. Protests in Benghazi in response to the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish magazine on February 17, 2006 resulted in the deaths of at least ten people and severe damage to the Italian consulate and a number of businesses. U.S. interests in Libya have not been targets of political violence since the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in late 2003. Peaceful demonstrations, small and large, do occur periodically.

¶34. The government of Libya takes active measures to maintain public security, and to prevent terrorist attacks. Recent worldwide terrorist alerts have stated that extremist groups continue to plan terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East region, including Libya. Visitors to Libya should consult the Department of State's latest travel information on Libya and the region at http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis_ pa_tw_1168.html.

CORRUPTION

¶35. Despite high-profile campaigns designed to draw attention to the issue, corruption remains widespread in Libya. It frequently takes the form of openly solicited or thinly veiled requests for valueless intermediation (i.e., rent seeking) or outright payoffs. This could include approvals for basic bureaucratic processes, such as required permits and services provided only by the government. Given the state of bureaucratic inefficiency and low salaries for government employees in Libya, these types of transactions are generally viewed as a necessary part of

doing business by local operators. Moreover, there is a general public perception that such interventions are essential to ensure the best pricing, service, etc. This tendency serves to reinforce the importance of personal connections and insider

knowledge in the conduct of day-to-day business operations.

¶36. While there are quasi-governmental organizations in Libya, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do not exist in practice. There are no international, regional or NGO "watchdog" organizations present in Libya. Several websites critical of government corruption are operated by Libyan opposition groups located outside of the country. Libya is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), but there has been little evidence of its implementation.

¶37. The government has established the "Administration and Oversight Board" as the responsible Libyan agency for the oversight of government activities for the prevention of corrupt practices. There has also been a public push for transparency on the part of high-ranking government officials. A series of speeches by Muammar al-Qadhafi during late 2006 set down a four-month window for all officials occupying senior government positions to declare all of their earnings and assets or risk unspecified punitive action by the state. As of January 2007 this deadline was extended for several months, and there were reports of arrests of leading businessmen on allegations of corrupt practices. Out of 4,600 files of senior government officials that were reviewed, 150 were suspected of corruption, and out of those, 20 were referred to the courts for judicial action. However, there was no clarity as to whether these actions were directly related to Qadhafi's ultimatum. The Leader and his son, Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, did address corruption in broad terms in a number of other public remarks made in 2007 and 2008, and called for greater accountability.

BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

¶38. There are no bilateral investment agreements in force between the U.S. and Libya. USTR and Libya are negotiating a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) which is expected to be finalized and signed in 2009. Libya has also stated its interest in concluding a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation with the U.S.

¶39. Libya has concluded a number of bilateral economic cooperation agreements with EU member states, and with Turkey, Tunisia, France, Italy, Kenya, Singapore and others. The terms of these agreements vary, ranging from MOUs with no binding aspects to more substantial agreements that grant "most favored nation" trade benefits and joint investment funds. Libya has concluded a number of tax treaties, including a new agreement with the UK in late 2007.

¶40. Libya is a member of the 1989 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) linking Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Libya. The AMU's stated objectives include the encouragement of free movement of goods and people, revision and simplification of customs regulations, and movement towards a common currency. Nominally, AMU mandates duty-free trade among its members. Disputes between AMU members have stood in the way of much concerted action. Libya is also a founding member of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). CEN-SAD's Secretariat and the CEN-SAD Bank for Investment and Trade are both headquartered in Tripoli. CEN-SAD is dedicated to creating an economic union among its 23 member states, although it has not made great progress toward this goal. Citizens of CEN-SAD member countries are afforded the use of dedicated immigration stalls upon arrival at Libya's major airports.

¶41. Libya is a part of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA, also called PAFTA, Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement) and the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP), also known as the "Barcelona Process," a dialogue between the European Union and 12 Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Declaration of November 27, 1995 outlined goals of reducing political instability and increasing commercial integration. In 1999, 27 EMP partners

agreed to admit Libya contingent on Libya's accepting the Barcelona acquis. In February 2004 Libya announced its intention to join the Barcelona process in full, but no formal Libyan request has been made to date.

OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS

¶42. President Bush waived bans on Export-Import Bank activities in Libya on February 28, 2006, and EXIM has conducted two visits to Libya since that time. EXIM offers financing assistance to US export projects with Libyan government-owned entities in three areas: the aviation sector, project finance (requiring predictability and hard revenue streams) and projects backed by the full faith and credit of the Libyan government (i.e., a "sovereign guarantee") for loan repayment.

¶43. OPIC does not as yet offer financing or guarantees for U.S. business activity in Libya. A senior-level OPIC delegation visited Libya at the end of September, 2005 to discuss with Libyan authorities a proposed bilateral agreement, and the Deputy Foreign Minister met with OPIC officials in Washington, DC in November 2007 to discuss the issue further.

LABOR

¶44. While official figures put the unemployment rate at 13%, unofficial estimates place the real rate at 30 to 40%. Libya's labor force numbers about 1.3 million persons, roughly 31% of whom work in industry, 27% in services, 24% in government and 18% in agriculture. Despite laws prohibiting moonlighting by civil service employees, many government functionaries hold multiple jobs. The majority of Libyan women hold some form of employment outside the home. Libyan labor law stipulates minimum wage, working hours, night shift regulations, dismissal and training. Laws governing dismissal are reasonably strict, and favor the employee.

¶45. Foreign workers make up a significant percentage of the Libyan labor pool, particularly in the service industries and manual labor jobs. During the 1980's, the Libyan government increased pressure on foreign workers and contractors, which it saw as consuming valuable foreign exchange and contributing to a growing unemployment problem. In 1983, 560,000 foreigners worked in Libya; by 1986, the number dropped to less than 200,000. As oil revenues rebounded in the early 1990's and Libya increased its profile on the African continent, al-Qadhafi announced an "open borders" policy, prompting a massive influx of work-seekers from Chad, Ghana, Niger, and other Sub-Saharan African states. Unable to find work in Libya, many of these immigrants have continued northward and have contributed to the economic migrant problem in Southern Europe. Migrants from Egypt also make up a sizable portion of Libya's informal labor force. With mounting pressure from the EU, and rising unemployment at home, Libya has in the past resorted to deportation. In early 2007, officials announced a series of measures to reduce the presence of illegal workers in Libya. In late 2007, the Egyptian border was closed to migratory workers. The Secretary of the GPC for Manpower, Employment and Training has called on all Libyan and foreign employers to ensure the legality of their employees under Labor Law No. 58, including the warning that failure to do so will result in punishment ranging from fines, to withdrawal of work permits, to imprisonment.

¶46. Law No. 15, passed in 1981, capped government salaries at between 150 and 500 Libyan Dinars (LD) per month, depending on grade. There had been no cost of living adjustment from that date until 2006, when several changes were instituted to raise minimum salaries in the public and private sectors. GPC Decision No. 277 of 2006 established basic government salaries at the

No. 277 of 2006 established basic government salaries at the following levels: 130 dinars for persons without dependents, 180 dinars for families with two members, and 220 dinars for a family of three of more members. Additional GPC Decisions during 2007 raised minimum salaries for other categories of employees, including those with advanced degrees and technical skills and corporations not financed by the central government, and removed a pay cap in place for many types of work outside of the public sector. There were also targeted pay raises for, inter alia, Libyan employees of state energy companies, healthcare workers and teachers.

¶47. Independent trade unions and professional associations are illegal in Libya. While workers do not have the right to form unions, they are allowed to participate in an organization called the National Trade Unions' Federation, created in 1972. Collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, as labor law requires government approval for all related actions.

TRIPOLI 00000131 009.2 OF 009

¶48. Unemployment is a major policy concern for the Libyan government, particularly in light of an expected increase in the pace of privatization, which would inevitably release large numbers of state-salaried employees into the market. In addition, 78,000 students graduate from Libya's state-run universities and enter the labor market each year. Proposals have been discussed for the creation of mechanisms such as an early retirement fund, vast re-tooling/re-training programs, and the creation of some form of social safety net. There have been some government actions to provide shares in public and private companies to "those Libyans deprived of wealth," as well as the announcement by Seif al-Islam al-Qadhafi of the institution of government-funded savings accounts for Libyans born after August 2007. Also, in January 2007, the GPC coupled its announcement of the liquidation of 400,000 Libyan government positions over a three-year period with news that the incumbents could either draw their regular salary or take a $43,000 loan designed to finance start-up costs of a small business.

¶49. The government directly intervenes in the hiring practices of foreign companies operating in Libya. For example, a 2006 decree ordered that all foreign oil companies must hire a Libyan national Deputy County Manager and Finance Manager. The National Oil Corporation also regularly assigns unqualified Libyan workers to foreign energy companies. Foreign companies have generally responded to this imposition in one of two ways: paying these individuals without expecting them to work, or undertaking an extensive training program to bring them up to a basic industry standard. Companies also receive lists of unemployed workers from the General People's Committee for Manpower and are requested to voluntarily find positions for them.

FOREIGN TRADE ZONE/FREE PORTS

¶50. Misurata, 210 km east of Tripoli, is the location of Libya's sole operating Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Projects in the free zone enjoy standard "Five Freedoms" privileges, including tax and customs exemptions. At present, the zone occupies 430 hectares, including a portion of the Port of Misurata. As of the end of 2008, the infrastructure for the free zone was still under development. Dubai's Jafza International signed an agreement with the Misurata FTZ Authority in October 2007 which commits both sides to explore the possibility of forming a joint venture, or granting Jafza a 30-year concession of over the FTZ. Later in the same month, Libya's General People's Committee announced plans to allocate roughly $700 million to upgrade the free zone's facilities.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS

¶51. Reliable foreign direct investment statistics for Libya are currently unavailable. Foreign energy companies have invested billions of dollars in the Libyan oil and gas sectors since the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003 and U.S. sanctions the following year. Libya has announced vast new development projects, including a November 2007 pronouncement that it would spend 150 billion dinars ($123.4 billion) on public works over the next five years. The Libyan government has embarked on an ambitious plan to upgrade its infrastructure, and construction is underway to build new roads, airports, and housing.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI133

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI133 aka Wikileaks id #191481 ?
Subject	THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY: GOL REACHES OUT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AS BEST IT CAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 11 Feb 2009 10:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI133.html
References	09TRIPOLI14 , 09TRIPOLI49 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68 , 09TRIPOLI72 , 09TRIPOLI99
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI192
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8252
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0133/01 0421006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 111006Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4464
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDHP/DIA DHP-1 WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4989
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000133

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/3/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THROUGH A GLASS, DARKLY: GOL REACHES OUT TO THE NEW ADMINISTRATION AS BEST IT CAN

REF: A) TRIPOLI 0072 , B) TRIPOLI 0014 , C) TRIPOLI 0049 , D) TRIPOLI 0064 , E) TRIPOLI 0068 , F) TRIPOLI 0099 , G) TRIPOLI 0068

TRIPOLI 00000133 001.2 OF 005

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The GOL, anxious that the new U.S. administration could adopt markedly different policies towards Libya, has in the past several weeks taken a number of steps - a

direct video conference (DVC) by Muammar al-Qadhafi with Georgetown University students, a New York Times editorial and a letter to POTUS - that appear to be part of an orchestrated effort to engage the new U.S. administration and remind it of Libya's strategic importance. The outreach coincided with other recent, positive steps: the first U.S. Ambassador to Libya in 36 years presented credentials, the GOL invited the U.S. Africa Command's General Ward to visit and a senior Libyan delegation visited Washington and signed a memorandum of understanding on military-to-military cooperation. Nonetheless, manifestations of lingering ambivalence about re-engaging with the U.S. simultaneously emerged on the ground here. At a public conference, a senior regime figure excoriated Libya's political opposition, decried restored U.S.-Libyan relations as "a great sin" and called on Libyans to shun the new U.S. Ambassador, whom he described as "a rotten dog." A senior MFA Americas Department official demarched us to protest the Ambassador's anodyne remarks on human rights and the GOL has resurrected a periodic campaign to prevent Emboffs from contacting GOL entities directly. A well-informed contact was recently told by the head of a state-owned company (who is a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi) that dealing with the U.S. was still "extremely sensitive", that his company would rather pay private consultants than obtain assistance gratis from the USG and that the contact (a U.S. citizen) should minimize meetings with Emboffs to avoid creating the "wrong impression" among GOL officials. Finally, the National Oil Corporation (NOC) renewed its campaign to solicit contributions to the U.S.-Libya comprehensive claims settlement fund, telling international oil company representatives at a meeting on February 1 that they "must contribute" to the fund by February 28 or suffer "serious consequences".

¶2. (C) Summary (continued): In the run-up to the Presidential transition, senior GOL interlocutors conceded that the regime was "anxious" about the change in U.S. administrations and wanted to continue positive developments made possible by implementation of the claims compensation agreement last October. The dissonance between the GOL's recent public outreach and its actual record of engagement is partly explained by the fact that the Jamahiriya lacks clearly-defined lines of authority and decision-making. After nearly forty years of dismantling state apparatus as a manifestation of Muammar al-Qadhafi's political philosophy of "direct rule of the masses", the regime has embraced a program of re-engagement with the world and limited political-economic reform that contradict its revolutionary message and far outstrip its limited institutional capacity and ability to stay on message. Muammar al-Qadhafi's practice of maintaining deliberate ambiguity on issues to maintain room for tactical maneuver further exacerbates the problem. He and senior regime figures have effectively played for time in recent years, quietly pursuing improved relations with the U.S. and western powers and initiating overdue internal reforms while simultaneously seeking to reassure skeptical conservative regime elements that their positions and prerogatives will not be hurt by those initiatives. Maintaining that balance would be a tall order for a robust, fully-functioning state apparatus; for a regime that insists that it is "not a government, but something else", it may prove to be untenable. The consequences for the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship are that efforts to expand cooperation and engagement will remain fitful for the foreseeable future and the regime will continue to send seemingly contradictory messages about the nature of the relationship it wants with us. Given this situation, we will continue to explore areas in which the GOL is willing to engage and cooperate, and to assess how much the political traffic here can bear. End summary.

BACKGROUND: "WE DON'T HAVE A GOVERNMENT HERE, WE HAVE SOMETHING ELSE"

¶3. (C) Following the bloodless military coup on September 1, 1969 - officially known as the al-Fateh Revolution - that ended

1969 - officially known as the al-Fateh Revolution - that ended the rule of King Idriss al-Sanussi, Libya went through a period in which the old constitutional monarchy was dismantled in favor of less formal (and effective) governing entities. From 1969 to 1973, the state apparatus effectively consisted of the Revolutionary Command Council (the policy-making body led by Muammar al-Qadhafi), institutional remnants of the constitutional monarchy, the army and the Arab Socialist Union. During this period, Libya undertook administrative, political

and economic reforms and made major changes in its foreign policy. From 1973 to 1977, al-Qadhafi introduced the "popular revolution", whose most obvious manifestation were the "Popular Committees", and dismantled remaining institutions dating to Idriss' reign. There was criticism by other participants in the revolution of al-Qadhafi's increased monopolization of control and regional policy failures such as the 1977 border war with Egypt. From 1977 to 1992, the regime re-fashioned itself as a "Jamahiriya" (a fabricated term defined as "a state of the masses") and established the "Revolutionary Committees" (RevComms), which were tasked with directing and furthering the aims of the al-Fatah Revolution. The RevComms provided a new mechanism for the regime to exercise control; however, their brutal tactics and disregard for the rule of law heralded a significant coarsening of the regime. From 1992 to present, the regime was preoccupied with international sanctions (and efforts to get out from under them) and, more recently, by a limited program of political-economic reform.

¶4. (C) The system that emerged from this decades-long process was one in which the "masses" ostensibly exercise their direct authority through a pyramid scheme of Basic Popular Congresses, Popular Committees and the General People's Congress (formally the supreme legislative body). The General People's Congress in turn appoints a General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent), which is tasked with implementing the policies established by the Basic Popular Congresses. In practice, the formal system became increasingly irrelevant as the limits of its ability to govern became increasingly clear. Instead, the regime has quietly initiated policy from the top. Such efforts were initially coordinated through the RevComms and the General People's Committees (ministry-equivalents); however, a series of failed assassination and coup attempts in the mid-1990's prompted the regime to rely increasingly on a small circle of security officials and members of the al-Qadhafi family. The regime has nonetheless been careful to maintain rhetorical deference to the Basic People's Congresses and General People's Congress. The result is an inchoate system in which lines of authority are ill-defined, and real decision-making processes are ad hoc and opaque. In negotiations on a bilateral agreement last year, a senior MFA official insisted on replacing "Government of Libya" with "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya", explaining that " ... in Libya we do not have a government, we have something else". The distinction is more than semantic.

THE REGIME REACHES OUT AS BEST IT CAN...

¶5. (C) Since the President's inauguration, Muammar al-Qadhafi has taken a number of steps - a DVC with U.S. students, a New York Times editorial and a letter to POTUS, and February 10 comments relating to Libya's chairmanship of the AU and potential cooperation with the U.S. - that appear to be part of an orchestrated effort by the GOL to engage the new U.S. administration and remind it of Libya's strategic importance. On January 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi participated in a direct video conference (DVC) with students and Georgetown University. Billed as a talk on his proposal - dubbed "Isratine" - for a one-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem and

clearly designed to showcase Libya and remind the new administration of its strategic importance in the wake of implementing the comprehensive U.S.-Libya claims agreement last October, al-Qadhafi nonetheless could not resist the opportunity to address topics sure to occasion unfavorable attention from the U.S. Characterizing terrorism as "a dwarf and not a giant", he described Osama bin Laden as "a person who can be given a chance to reform" and suggested that the world engage him in a dialogue to determine what had prompted him to undertake terrorism. Similarly, he claimed that the Taliban had been mis-represented and suggested that the U.S. reconsider its views on that group, too. In widely reported remarks, he also suggested that falling oil prices had prompted demands by members of the Basic People's Congresses that Libya slow or cease oil production and/or nationalize its oil industry to spur higher prices (see ref A for details and analysis).

¶6. (C) On January 22, an editorial ostensibly authored by al-Qadhafi appeared in the New York Times. In it, he expostulated his "Isratine" solution, an idea he first articulated in the "White Book". Rejecting proposals for a two-state solution or partition as strategically, economically and demographically untenable, he instead argued for a single, democratic state, with Jerusalem as the unified capital (or with status as an international city) and right of return for members

of the Palestinian diaspora. While Libya has at the UN likened Israeli actions to those of Germany's Third Reich and al-Qadhafi has previously said that "as long as I am alive I will never recognize either an Israeli state or a Palestinian one", the editorial (Post has not yet learned who ghost-authored it) was relatively measured in tone. Al-Qadhafi's letter to the POTUS, doubtless also intended to ingratiate, nonetheless struck a bit of a wrong note. In it, he expressed hope that the U.S. had, with the POTUS' election, "...started to transform from a country that supports reactionism (sic) and autocracy to one that supports popular democracy...". The outreach coincided with other recent,positive steps: the first U.S. Ambassador to Libya since 1972 relatively quickly presented his credentials on January 11 (ref B) and has slowly but surely been afforded access to high-level interlocutors , the GOL has agreed to facilitate a visit by U.S. Africa Command's General Ward, and MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri led a delegation to Washington in early January that signed a memorandum of understanding on military-to-military cooperation and discussed security and other issues.

... BUT OLD HABITS PROVE TO BE AS STUBBORN AS MULES

¶7. (C) Despite the (mixed) effort to extend a hand to the new administration, manifestations of lingering ambivalence about re-engaging with the U.S. simultaneously emerged on the ground here. On January 22 - the day al-Qadhafi's editorial appeared - the former Deputy Secretary of the general People's Congress (Deputy Prime Minister-equivalent) and current Director of the Green Book Center, Ahmed Ibrahim, gave remarks at a public conference in which he excoriated Libya's political opposition, decried restored U.S.-Libyan relations as "a great sin" and called on Libyans to shun the new U.S. Ambassador, whom he described as "a rotten dog". (Note: The Green Book Center is a government institution dedicated to the study of al-Qadhafi's Green Book trilogy and political thought. Libyans say Ibrahim was assigned to the GBC because while he can still command a public platform there, he has no real authority. End note.) Ibrahim is a long-time regime fixture - he has held the posts of Minister of Information-equivalent, Minister of Culture-equivalent, Minister of Higher Education-equivalent and head of the Revolutionary Committees - and represents the most ideologically conservative regime elements. (Note: His widely unpopular decision to ban the teaching of English and other

unpopular decision to ban the teaching of English and other foreign languages in schools in the 1980's earned him the sobriquet "el Bahim", which translates as "the donkey" in the Libyan and Tunisian dialects. End note.)

¶8. (C) MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri told the Ambassador on January 29 that he was "puzzled" by the remarks and said Ibrahim "spoke only for himself, and not for the government". But he conceded that there are still powerful individuals in Libya who strongly oppose an improved relationship with the United States, who stand to lose a great deal if the existing system changes significantly, and who view the U.S. as a likely catalyst of such reform. Ibrahim himself is under attack for human rights abuses perpetrated by the Revolutionary Committees in the 1970's and 1980's, including having personally tortured regime opponents and prosecuted an at times bloody campaign against members of the Libyan diaspora. In his remarks on January 22, he flatly said that opposition to the manner in which the al-Qadhafi regime came to power and its legitimacy were "...out of the question and unacceptable in any case". (Note: His remarks regarding the U.S. and the Ambassador may have been intended to muster support from conservative regime elements and to deflect attention from his personal legal travails. End note.)

HUMAN RIGHTS UNMENTIONABLE, CONTACT WITH EMBASSY "VERY SENSITIVE" AND OIL COMPANIES MUST PAY

¶9. (C) Also on January 22, a senior MFA Americas Department official demarched us to protest the Ambassador's remarks on human rights in a recently published interview in which he addressed the state of U.S.-Libya relations and the issues on which he intends to focus (ref C). The Ambassador's mention of recently released regime critic Idriss Boufayed and his call for the release of political prisoners and those of Boufayed's group who remained in detention constituted "unacceptable interference in Libya's internal affairs". The ambassador should be careful in what he discusses publicly, else there would be "serious repercussions for the bilateral relationship". Libya was willing to discuss human rights, but such discussions should be restricted to suitable (i.e., private) fora.

¶10. (C) The GOL also recently resurrected its periodic campaign to prevent Emboffs from reaching out directly to GOL entities and, in some cases, quasi-governmental organizations. Meetings with the Ministry of Economy and Trade, the National Oil Corporation and the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation were cancelled at the last minute because they had not been coordinated with the MFA-equivalent via diplomatic note. In addition, a well-informed U.S. business person working with the General National Maritime and Transportation Company (GNMTC) on possible deals for port security equipment suggested that the company be in touch with the Embassy regarding related bilateral training and engagement. Our contact received a message from Hannibal al-Qadhafi, head of the GNMTC, through a senior aide (who read from notes he said had been handwritten by Hannibal) on February 1 that dealing with the U.S. was still viewed as "extremely sensitive", that the GNMTC would rather pay private consultants than obtain assistance gratis from the USG and that she should minimize her meetings with Emboffs to avoid creating the "wrong impression among GOL officials. Finally, the NOC renewed its campaign to solicit contributions to the U.S.-Libya comprehensive claims settlement fund, telling international oil company representatives at a meeting on February 1 that they "must contribute" to the fund by February 28 or would suffer "serious consequences" (ref F).

¶11. (C) Comment: The DVC, op-ed and POTUS letter reflect a degree of message coordination that seldom obtains in the

Jamahiriya, underscoring the importance an anxious regime attaches to cultivating a productive relationship with the new U.S. administration (and likely reflecting external guidance on how to do so). Nonetheless, slandering the U.S. ambassador, cautioning U.S. businesspeople against meeting with the Embassy, threatening to nationalize oil production and ratcheting up pressure on IOC's to contribute to the claims compensation fund reflect both the regime's limited decision-making capacity and the paradox of the policy it has pursued. After nearly forty years of dismantling state apparatus as a manifestation of Muammar al-Qadhafi's political philosophy of "direct rule of the masses", the regime has embraced a program of re-engagement with the world and limited political-economic reform that contradict is revolutionary philosophy and far outstrip its limited institutional capacity and ability to stay on message. Although al-Qadhafi has cultivated an image as a political seer without formal title and nominally above the fray of day-to-day decisionmaking, he has effectively kept his hand in (see ref G). His mercurial nature, together with his habit of maintaining deliberate ambiguity on sensitive issues to maintain room for tactical maneuver, have fueled confusion within the regime about the direction in which Libya is heading. Example: He has quietly supported initiatives to develop a draft constitution, but publicly dismissed calls by his son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, for such a document and has not clearly signaled to conservative regime elements that he would support it.

¶12. (C) Comment (continued): The apparent contradictions are not coincidental: al-Qadhafi and other senior regime figures have effectively played for time since 2003, quietly pursuing improved relations with the U.S. and western powers and initiating (to an extent) overdue internal reforms while simultaneously seeking to reassure skeptical conservative regime elements that their positions and prerogatives will not be hurt by those initiatives. They have manipulated, with varying degrees of success, opaque and ill-defined lines of authority and decisionmaking within the GOL to: 1) avoid the emergence of alternative centers of power; 2) maintain control, and; 3) avoid directly addressing the contradiction between the regime's revolutionary rhetoric and the reality of its recent policy shifts. But that tactical advantage has come at the expense of institutional capacity and the ability to clearly coordinate the regime's message in those few instances in which it wishes to unambiguously do so (as in its recent outreach to us). Al-Qadhafi has successfully exploited a policy of deliberate ambiguity for decades; however, the increasingly apparent contradiction between the regime's limited reform efforts and re-engagement with the broader world, on the one hand, and its revolutionary rhetoric and reluctance to clearly state its policies, on the other, have begun to out-strip its ability to maintain that delicate balance. As conservative regime elements feel increasingly threatened by the sands shifting beneath their feet, they have begun to dig in their heels, further complicating al-Qadhafi's efforts to square the circle between an old guard whose livelihood will be seriously impacted by proposed reforms and a new, more predictable system in which ordinary Libyans can more productively participate. Declining oil revenues and an attendant recalculation of the state budget

and reduction of infrastructure development progams, together with recent events in Gaza, have further taxed the system and contributed to the prevailing sense of confusion. The consequences for the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship are that efforts to expand cooperation and engagement will remain fitful for the foreseeable future and that the regime will continue to send seemingly contradictory messages about the nature of the relationship it wants with us. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI134

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI134 aka Wikileaks id #191489 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI'S AFRICAN UNION: OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 11 Feb 2009 10:39 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI134.html
References	08FREETOWN604 , 08TRIPOLI567 , 09MONROVIA13 , 09TRIPOLI37 , 09TRIPOLI567 , 09TRIPOLI70 , 09USUNNEWYORK105
Referenced by	09ASMARA50 , 09LUSAKA130 , 09STATE16169 , 09TRIPOLI208
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8289
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0134/01 0421039
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 111039Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4469
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0005
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 0015
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0020
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0010
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0089
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4994
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000134

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; AFRICOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PROP *[Propaganda and Psychological Operations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LI *[Liberia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S AFRICAN UNION: OBSTACLES TO SUCCESS, OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT

REF: A. A. TRIPOLI 70
B. B. 08 FREETOWN 604
C. C. MONROVIA 13
D. D. TRIPOLI 37
E. E. 08 TRIPOLI 567
F. F. 08 TRIPOLI 61
G. G. USUN 105

TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi's election as Chairman of the African Union represents the culmination of a decade's worth of work by the regime and a significant personal victory for the Leader. After moving on from his dream of pan-Arab leadership, al-Qadhafi funneled billions of dollars into cultivating relationships in sub-Saharan Africa that would facilitate his leadership of the African Union. This year is the 40th anniversary of his rise to power and the 10th since the proclamation in his hometown of Sirte that led to the African Union. The GOL lacks the human and institutional capacity to successfully manage a concerted effort to unify Africa, an effort that most other African leaders oppose in any event. More vexing for ordinary Libyans is that al-Qadhafi's ambitious Africa policy - a common army, a common currency, and a common passport - seems to represent another foreign policy adventure that is long on spectacle and short on feasibility, but which is likely to divert more financial resources away from improving their lot. The fact that al-Qadhafi's election coincides with slumping oil prices and an attendant re-calibration of the national budget (to include ratcheting back popular infrastructure development initiatives) makes the tension between domestic and foreign policy equities an even bigger problem for the regime. Despite African leaders' reservations about having an AU Chair who attained office at the point of a rifle rather than through a ballot box, al-Qadhafi may be a useful partner in promoting peace and stability in areas of the continent in which Libya has direct equities. Nonetheless, controlling his heavy-handed (and deep-pocketed) tactics will likely make productive engagement on other issues of concern difficult. End Summary.

"THE KING OF KINGS" ENTERS THE SCENE ...

¶2. (C) Cast as an attempt to frame him as the popular choice of ordinary Africans, al-Qadhafi's flashy entrance to the AU Summit with a retinue of tribal kings shortly before his election as the AU chairman on February 2 did little to dispel the perception that he sees the AU as a bully pulpit. Media reports of the closed-door session in which he was tapped suggest that despite assurances of support from Maghreb and Sahel neighbors (ref A), he was hardly the consensus pick by his fellow AU heads of state. Al-Qadhafi's acceptance speech, in which he said that Africa remained predominantly tribal and therefore ill-suited to multi-party democracy, did little to assuage concern that the AU had chosen a dictator as its chairman during a period in which it has endeavored to promote democratic governance.

A DECADE IN THE MAKING

¶3. (C) After more than a decade of work, Muammar al-Qadhafi's election as Chairman of the African Union for 2009 represents a significant political victory for the regime and a personal victory for him. Installing himself as Africa's leader has been a personal preoccupation of the leader, driven in part by his vision of a united African government (that he presumably would lead). In addition, September marks not only the 10th anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation, but also the 40th anniversary of the bloodless military coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. With a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council, a possible UN General Assembly Presidency for Ali Treiki (Libya's senior Africa hand), and the AU chairmanship, Libya has a number of high profile fora in which to trumpet al-Qadhafi's importance on the world stage and the (ostensible) success of the Jamahiriya system of which he is the author. That is particularly important in light of current questions in Libya about political-economic reform and potential succession scenarios.

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi's shift from pan-Arabism (he started life as

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi's shift from pan-Arabism (he started life as an ardent Nasserite) to pan-Africanism came into full flower during his years of sanctions-imposed isolation (1992-2003). Firmly believing himself to be a "man of history", al-Qadhafi initially hoped to unite the Arab world; however, angered by Arab leaders' relative indifference to Libya's plight under international sanctions and heartened by the extent to which sub-Saharan African countries were willing to continue relations

TRIPOLI 00000134 002.2 OF 003

(usually in exchange for patronage), his focus shifted from the east to the south. Al-Qadhafi has devoted substantial resources - monetary and diplomatic - to Africa since the late 1990s. The Sirte Proclamation of September 9, 1999, in which Organization of African Union heads of state committed to forming what became the African Union, was seen by the regime as the foundation of a new and larger sphere of influence that could eventually lead to al-Qadhafi's leadership of a unified African continent. A domestic propaganda campaign designed to represent Libya as an African state was also undertaken: billboards and larger-than-life murals depict al-Qadhafi emerging, Messiah-like, from a glowing green Libya into an embracing African continent. Al-Qadhafi's personal designers (he employs two full-time) have incorporated the continent's shape into all types of clothing (favorites include a large green Africa-shaped brooch on a white double-breasted blazer, a pseudo-camouflaged tunic comprised of Africa-shaped patterns and a jersey emblazoned with pictures of prominent African leaders like Kwame Nkrumah).

WHAT PRICE AFRICA?

¶5. (C) While Libya's campaign for the AU chairmanship has been years in the making, its "dinar diplomacy" accelerated in 2008 and expanded to include non-state actors like traditional African tribal leaders. In August 2008, some 200 sub-Saharan tribal kings crowned al-Qadhafi "king of kings" at the Revolution Day celebration and bestowed on him a crown and scepter. (Note: Diplomatic observers at the event noted the similarity of the kings' crowns, prompting speculation that the GOL provided visiting dignitaries with their accoutrement. End note.) Al-Qadhafi's trip through west Africa in the run-up to the AU Summit in Addis Ababa provided an opportunity to drum up support for his chairmanship, and to remind fence-sitters that " ... saying no to Qadhafi creates a new enemy" (ref B). A series of Libyan investments in Liberia valued at $45 million was announced on February 8, prompting speculation about what may have been behind President Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf's public (albeit seemingly unenthusiastic) announcement in Addis Ababa that she had "accepted" al-Qadhafi's chairmanship. Speculation in Tripoli's diplomatic circles has focused on how much Libya paid and to whom to ensure al-Qadhafi's election; the timing and tone of his recent visits to sub-Saharan Africa seem to have been more than coincidental (ref C).

WHAT MIGHT IT MEAN?

¶6. (C) If history and Libya's relationships with the West are any guide, al-Qadhafi's chairmanship is likely to be long on rhetoric and grand gestures, but short on deliverables and implementation. There will almost certainly be further public statements decrying imperialism and calling on western powers to leave the continent alone (he has already defended Somali pirates, saying they were acting in part to protect Somalia against foreign intervention). Despite pleas for non-interference, the GOL's potential to increase its sphere of influence is limited by its human and bureaucratic capacity. Already stretched thin by its UNSC seat, internal political and economic reforms, and efforts to mark the 40th anniversary of al-Qadhafi's rule, the GOL is ill-equipped to actively promote

and implement a unified African government. Just 24 hours after his installation as chairman, hopes for fast-track unification were dashed when negotiations on the African Authority's mandate fell apart with al-Qadhafi walking out at two a.m., reportedly in connection with Ugandan President Museveni's having taken issue with al-Qadhafi's use of traditional tribal leaders in an attempt to end-run the authority of sovereign states (ref D).

TENSION BETWEEN FOREIGN POLICY ADVENTURISM & DOMESTIC REALITIES

¶7. (C) Al-Qadhafi's stated goals for Africa - a common army, currency, and passport - are at odds with some of Libya's domestic interests and stand to complicate relations with EU member states, with which it is engaged in Libya-EU Framework negotiations (ref E). Libya's largesse in the continent depends on a relatively stable currency backed by oil exports. Moving to the Afro - al-Qadhafi's proposed name for a unified continental currency - would saddle the Libyan economy with debts and inflationary pressures of countries bereft of the mineral wealth and massive foreign trade surpluses Libya enjoys. Such an initiative would be particularly unpopular and impractical, particularly at a time when slumping oil prices

have prompted the GOL to re-calibrate its own national budget. A common passport and customs zone also pose political and diplomatic challenges. Despite al-Qadhafi's fascination with Africa, the majority of Libyans self-identify as Arabs. (Comment: Interestingly, despite al-Qadhafi's pan-Arab vision, the GOL has continued to insist that Libya is homogeneously Arab, most recently in a demarche last spring denying that a Berber minority existed in Libya and denying permission for Emboffs to visit a predominantly Berber town. End comment.) A single passport would be ruinous for Libya's efforts to ease visa restrictions for Libyans traveling to Europe. Europeans, sensitive to the fact that tens of thousands of illegal migrants who make landfall in Europe each year depart from Libyan shores, will bristle at the potential for still greater numbers of sub-Saharan Africans to travel more easily to jumping-off points along Libya's littoral.

WELCOME HOME CEREMONY FOR THE KING OF KINGS

¶8.) At a February 10 mass "welcome home" ceremony in a huge tent at his compound, attended by the traditional African tribal kings, the diplomatic corps (command performance), GOL officials, and other citizens, Qadhafi "humbly" accepted his new title and reviewed the myriad of problems facing the continent, including those in Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Somalia and some issues which to a great extent (in his view) are the legacy of colonialism such as "illegal" migration and the "bad" treatment of Africans in Europe. He hit the Italians hard on their colonial practices but said he looked forward to working with the new Obama administration to bring about significant change. Qadhafi said Libya would have several channels to work for solution of problems including his newly-assumed one, the UNSC and the UN General Assembly. Qadhafi noted the significant "African" populations of some countries in the Caribbean and South America asserting they should also find a way to join the new united Africa.

¶9. (C) Comment: While al-Qadhafi's tenure as AU chairman will doubtless feature flamboyant costumes and equally colorful statements decrying western involvement on the continent, the fact that he needs his chairmanship to be perceived as a success affords a potentially useful lever with which to prompt constructive Libyan engagement on issues of concern. Casting al-Qadhafi as not just the leader of the al-Fateh Revolution and author of the (ostensibly) successful Jamahiriya system, but also as an actor of international stature, is an important part

also as an actor of international stature, is an important part of the regime's propaganda effort in what is a politically momentous year for the regime. While Libyan officials will dutifully advocate pan-African unity (and some, including al-Qadhafi, may actually believe in it), the real goals are more prosaic and self-serving. Libya will likely continue to engage effectively on issues it perceives to be directly related to its core security interests, including Chad-Sudan, Darfur, mediation with Tuareg leaders in the Sahel and Somalia (which it views as a potential safehaven and portal for Islamic extremists intent on operating in the Sahel). On other issues, al-Qadhafi is likely to take positions that bolster his image as a champion of anti-imperialism and pan-African unity. There are likely to be contradictions between what he says (which is often inflammatory) and what he does (which is typically more driven by realpolitik). U.S. Africa Command, for example, may be able to quietly gain traction in Libya; however, al-Qadhafi will likely continue his public opposition to an expanded role for the command, to include a physical presence, on the continent. When approached with appropriate deference, Libya can be an effective actor - leveraging support and connections on the continent to secure our foreign policy interests as it has done (to an extent) in Chad, Sudan, and Somalia. When rankled, al-Qadhafi will resort to granstanding to stymie our objectives. Allowing Libya to retain symbolic leadership in regional affairs will make participation in multilateral discussions more palatable, as evidenced by Libya's eventual acquiescence to the Dakar Process. The Libyan system of complex patronage and portfolio distribution based on personality, vice rank, does not translate well to a body representing 53 separate national groups. Given the difficulty of uniting Africans under a Libyan model and the tension between al-Qadhafi's lofty foreign policy ambitions and his real domestic constraints, it is difficult to see that Libya will go far towards implementing a vision of a unified African government during al-Qadhafi's tenure as AU chairman. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI139

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI139 aka Wikileaks id #191832 ?
Subject	GHANEM "UNDER THE GUN" TO COLLECT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 12 Feb 2009 18:25 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI139.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI413
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramUNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000139
VZCZCXRO2854
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0139 0431825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121825Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4479
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5004
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000139

DEPT FOR NEA, L AND EB

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: GHANEM "UNDER THE GUN" TO COLLECT CONTRIBUTIONS FOR CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND

¶1. (C) Summary: During a February 10 introductory meeting with the Ambassador, the chairman of Libya's National Oil Company, Dr. Shukri Ghanem, said Libya was unlikely to nationalize its oil industry and that Muammar al-Qadhafi's public comments were an expression of the Leader's frustration that foreign companies had not yet contributed to the international fund established under the U.S.-Libya Claims Compensation Agreement signed in August. The Ambassador said U.S. companies had reported feeling pressured to contribute to the fund, which if true was contrary to the understanding between the two governments that any contributions from U.S. firms would be strictly voluntary. Ghanem took the point but said he was under pressure to recover $700 million the NOC had "lent" the fund in October, and hoped that the U.S. would encourage companies to find a creative way to help. End summary.

2. (C) Ghanem welcomed the Ambassador to Libya, saying he was pleased that normal relations had been restored. He recounted "better times" when there was a large American community resident in Tripoli and Americans lived and worked "side by

resident in Tripoli, and Americans lived and worked "side by side" with Libyans. Many Libyans, including himself, had studied in the United States (Ghanem has a Phd from the Fletcher School at Tufts University). Ghanem compared the current state of U.S.-Libyan relations to a married couple who had been divorced for 25 years and then remarried: "It's not easy. We are watching each other very carefully, analyzing everything the other one says." After a discussion of the situation in Gaza during which Ghanem and his staff argued the merits of al-Qadhafi's proposal for a one-state solution, the Ambassador asked about the Leader's recent public statements suggesting that Libya might nationalize its oil sector.

¶3. (C) Ghanem dismissed the possibility of nationalization as unlikely, saying "We are not taking any action and are continuing business as usual." The Leader's comments were a sign of his "frustration" that foreign companies had not yet contributed to the international fund established under the U.S.-Libya Claims Compensation Agreement signed in August. Reviewing the negotiating history, Ghanem said that once the U.S. government made it clear that the USG would not pay into the $1.8 billion fund, the GOL adopted the same position. The solution was for the GOL to solicit contributions from "friendly countries and companies." While some foreign governments had helped, so far no private companies had contributed. This had led the leadership to conclude that the companies were merely exploiting Libya's resources. As a result, the NOC was under increasing pressure from the leadership to recover the funds it had "loaned" to enable the agreement to be implemented last October. That was why the Prime Minister had summoned international oil companies earlier in the month and pressed them to respond to the NOC's letters soliciting contributions. Ghanem said that the current amount of the funding "gap" was $700 million; the NOC had suggested that U.S. companies (presumably he was referring to the oil producers, vice the service companies and companies that are only exploring) contribute $180 million, based on their level of production. The amounts were relatively small for companies that stood to make large profits from producing oil and gas in Libya, he said. He predicted that "some" foreign companies would eventually make a contribution. (Comment: We have heard from contacts in the IOCs that Gazprom would make a payment. End comment.)

¶4. (C) The Ambassador reminded Ghanem that putting pressure on U.S. companies "crossed a red-line" and was contrary to the understanding between the U.S. and Libya. The PM's February 28 "deadline" for companies to respond "sent a troubling signal" in that it suggests that their business could suffer if they fail to contribute to the fund. Ghanem acknowledged the point (without addressing whether there would be any negative consequences after the deadline had passed) but said he needed to find a solution and was open to other ideas, such as re-labeling the fund if that would make it more palatable for U.S. companies. He asked that the U.S. at least refrain from instructing U.S. companies not to contribute. The Ambassador replied he was in no position to do that, reiterated again the U.S. position of no pressure, and urged Ghanem and his colleagues in the GOL to consider the long-term relationship with the United States.

¶5. (C) Comment: Ghanem fully understands the U.S. red-line and will no doubt pass the message to the political leadership, if only to help relieve some of the pressure he is getting from above. At the same time, it is clear that the Libyans, sensing a dead-end in soliciting contributions pegged to the fund, are now actively seeking other creative ways to package the solicitation. The one-two punch of threatening nationalization while summoning the IOCs and giving them a deadline might lead to payments from some foreign companies. The American IOCs with whom we are in contact continue to tell us they intend to hold the line, and are looking for USG support.

CRETZ

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI14

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI14 aka Wikileaks id #186577 ?
Subject	AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 11 Jan 2009 15:27 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI14.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI133
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramUNCLASSIFIED   TRIPOLI   00000014
VZCZCXRO4145
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0014 0111527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 111527Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4306
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1373
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0052
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0078
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0730
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0862
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0805
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4829
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000014

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/FO (HUDSON)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , ODIP *[U.S. Diplomatic Representation]* , OPDC *[Diplomatic Correspondence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR PRESENTS CREDENTIALS

¶1. (U) The Ambassador presented his credentials on January 11 to the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, becoming the first U.S. ambassador to Tripoli since 1972. In a brief, simple ceremony at the offices of the General People's Congress, Secretary of the General People's Congress Muftah Kaybah received the Ambassador's credentials. He was accompanied by: Secretary of the General People's Congress for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation Suleiman Shahumi (SFRC Chair-equivalent); MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs Muhammad Taher Siala (A/S-equivalent), MFA Protocol Head of Privileges and Immunities al-Mahdi al-Ouwdi; and MFA Director of the Americas Department Muhammad Matari (DAS-equivalent).

¶2. (U) In brief remarks, the Ambassador underscored how far relations had evolved in the past five years, stressing that implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement

implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement and the recent exchange of ambassadors (Libyan Ambassador Ali Aujali presented his credentials at the White House on January 8) marked a turning of the page on the contretemps of the past. The U.S. was keen to deepen the range of bilateral engagement, to include building a new embassy compound, providing full visa services to Libyan applicants, expanding commercial ties, increasing the number of Libyan students studying in the U.S., re-establishing people-to-people ties that had lapsed since the 1970's, and exploring more robust military-to-military engagement. The U.S. would also engage the Libyan government on key issues of principle, such as human rights, as it does with all nations with whom it enjoys diplomatic relations.

¶3. (U) Secretary Kaybah offered remarks welcoming the Ambassador's arrival and attendant elevation of bilateral diplomatic representation, and stressing Libya's desire to work cooperatively with the U.S. The strategic and historic decision of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi to renounce terrorism and abandon WMD programs had facilitated the historic process of U.S.-Libya re-engagement, he said. He emphasized that Libya's record of participation in various international bodies focused on human rights was long and distinguished, and cautioned the U.S. and others to remain mindful of the fact that human rights should be interpreted in each country's "unique historical and cultural context".

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI148

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI148 aka Wikileaks id #192239 ?
Subject	A BRIGHT SPOT: CANADA'S VERENEX STRIKES OIL IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Feb 2009 10:26 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI148.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI517 , 09TRIPOLI778
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3461
PP RUEHGA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0148/01 0471026
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161026Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4488
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0890
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0376
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1397
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0755
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0002
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 5013
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000148

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY ATTACHE ALEX SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: A BRIGHT SPOT: CANADA'S VERENEX STRIKES OIL IN LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Four years on after the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) held the first bidding round for new Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA's), results in the search for new commercially-exploitable oil and gas reserves in Libya have been mixed. Only a few companies have made significant discoveries, including Canada's Venerex Energy. In comparison with other successful bidders in the first round (including American firm Hess and Australia's Woodside), Verenex has enjoyed the most success in its exploration campaign thus far; it expects to start producing 50,000 barrels of oil per day in 2010. Verenex's recent discoveries are a bright spot in an

in 2010. Verenex's recent discoveries are a bright spot in an otherwise uncertain exploration landscape. Slumping oil prices, renewed pressure on international oil companies (IOCs) to contribute to the claims compensation fund and al-Qadhafi's recent call for possible nationalization of the oil industry, many companies are debating whether they will be able to ride out this rough patch. In addition, IOCs face pressure to hire unqualified Libyans, which has hurt productivity and their bottom line (many are effectively paid to stay home). Despite the challenges, our conversations with IOC representatives suggest that there is still optimism about oil and gas opportunities in Libya, particularly for companies still involved in the exploration phase. That, together with the fact that Libya is one of the few remaining areas of the world in which greenfield discoveries could yield significant booked reserves for IOCs - still a key factor in stock valuation of IOC's - likely mean that Libya will remain an important venue for oil and gas producers. End summary.

VERENEX STRIKES OIL

¶2. (C) Four years after the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) held the first bidding round to explore for oil and gas, there have been mixed results in the search for new, commercially-exploitable oil and gas fields. Only a few companies have made discoveries, including Canada's relatively small Venerex Energy, which struck oil in its parcel in Area 47, located about 112 miles southwest of Tripoli in the Gadhames basin. Most of the other successful bidders from EPSA bidding rounds dating from 2004 are either still in the exploration phase or have not yet discovered commercially-exploitable reserves. Verenex and its partner, Medco, share a 13.7 per cent interest in the concession; the remainder is held by the NOC. The EPSA-IV signed sets out an initial five year exploration and appraisal period, and defines the terms for development during a 25-year exploitation period of any commercial discoveries made during the initial five years.

¶3. (C) Verenex has drilled 19 wells in Area 47 (four appraisal and 15 exploratory wells). In November 2008, Verenex submitted a multi-field development plan to the Area 47 Management Committee, which consists of two NOC representatives and two investors' representatives. The report recommended the project be declared commercial, with production estimated at approximately 50,000 barrels per day of oil and 50 million cubic feet per day of natural gas. Preliminary development costs, including facilities, gathering systems and pipelines are estimated at around USD 800-850 million dollars. If the Area Management Committee declares the field commercialy exploitable, a Joint Operating Company (JOC) will be established to develop it, a model already in use by the NOC with other international oil companies producing in Libya (Eni, Oxy, and Petro-Canada).

¶4. (C) In addition to its recent find, Verenex expected to drill an additional 12 wells in 2009, but adjustments to its budget occasioned to the oil price drop mean it will drill fewer wells than initially planned. The company has requested that the NOC extend its five year exploration and appraisal period, which will otherwise expire in March 2010, to potentially allow it to drill more test wells. Verenex's general manager for Libya, Don Shepherd, (strictly protect), said Verenex had a good relationship with the NOC's Exploration Department and was confident the extension would be approved. Verenex's recent success and its comparatively small size (its total estimated value in 2007 was USD 326 million dollars worldwide) have made it an attractive candidate for acquisition. In September 2008, it announced a potential corporate sale as one of its options under a strategic review. Advancing that process, Verenex opened its proprietary information to possible buyers, with the approval of the NOC to show confidential technical data on the assets in the Area 47 to a list of 22 qualified companies. A sale decision has not been announced and it is increasingly uncertain what may happen since oil prices have slumped since

Verenex's proprietary information was released (ref A). Shepherd said the list of 22 companies interested in buying

TRIPOLI 00000148 002 OF 002

Verenex was confidential, but he divulged that Petro-Canada (also operating in Libya) was not on the list.

OTHER RECENT EXPLORATION POSITIVE ...

¶5. (C) In January, the NOC announced that three different oil discoveries were made by the American firm Hess, Canada's Verenex, and Australia's Woodside. Hess is the first American exploration and production company to find oil during the exploration campaign since American companies reentered Libya in 2005; it is also the first discovery made offshore in the Sirte Basin. Hess still has more exploratory work to do and will likely drill more appraisal wells before determining the magnitude of its find. Woodside's discovery in the Ghadames area adds useful information to the preliminary evaluation of the reservoir for the company to target future exploratory drilling operations.

... BUT OPERATIONAL HEADACHES CONTINUE

¶6. (C) Despite optimism over his company's recent find, Shepherd told us the operating environment in Libya remains challenging. The issue of the moment is increased pressure from the NOC on Verenex to hire unqualified Libyans. Currently, Verenex employs 24 Libyans, 8 of whom were hired at the request of the NOC. Shepherd noted that while Verenex understands the NOC is under pressure to generate more local employment, the situation is particularly difficult for companies in the exploration phase, in which there is less need for staff. Companies in the development phase (i.e., after the finds have been determined to be commercially exploitable and a JOC has been established) have more need to encumber positions and train local staff; however, that is a gradual process. In addition, graduates of Libyan technical training programs are not well-qualified (all who start the program graduate, for example) - many of the professional graduates the NOC is pressuring IOC's to hire lack the engineering skills or basic knowledge needed to perform their jobs. (Note: At an event hosted by the CDA late last year for IOC general managers, the crowed unanimously agreed that operating conditions in Libya had gotten worse in the past two years, largely due to efforts by the NOC to identify further cost centers in the production chain from which to extract rents. End note.)

¶7. (C) According to Shepherd, all IOC's receive regular visits from representatives of the General People's Committee for Manpower, Employoment and Training (GPCMET - the MinLabor-equivalent), who are supposed to verify that the companies adhere to the quota for local hires. Some foreign companies hire local employees only to fulfill the number that the law requires, sometimes going as far as to pay them without requiring that they actually perfom any work. He noted that it is not uncommon for there are also instances of corruption, in which Ministry of Manpower representatives pressure foreign companies to hire their relatives for these "phantom" positions. In addition, the same individual may be hired by several foreign companies, receiving salaries from all of them, but not actually working at any of them.

¶8. (C) Comment: Verenex's recent discoveries in Libya are a bright spot in an otherwise uncertain firmament for companies in the exploration phase. Slumping oil prices, renewed pressure on international oil companies (IOCs) to contribute to the claims compensation fund and al-Qadhafi's recent call for possible nationalization of the oil industry are causing many companies to debate whether they will be able to ride out this

companies to debate whether they will be able to ride out this rough patch. The General Manager of Occidental recently told us he has never been as pessimistic about Oxy's operations in Libya as he is now. Much of his frustration has to do with the NOC's inefficiency in facilitating routine exploration operations. Oxy's exploration department is shutting down - after drilling 12 dry wells, it is keeping just one employee until the end of March to finish reports. But despite the challenges, our conversations with other IOC representatives suggest that there is still optimism about oil and gas opportunities in Libya, particularly for companies involved in the exploration phase. That, together with the fact that Libya is one of the few remaining areas of the world in which greenfield discoveries could yield significant additional booked reserves for IOCs - still a key factor in stock valuation - mean that (absent nationalization) Libya will remain an important venue for oil and gas producers. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI150

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI150 aka Wikileaks id #192246 ?
Subject	LIBYA: UNSCR 1540 PROGRAM OF WORK DEMARCHE DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Feb 2009 12:44 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI150.html
References	09STATE10774
History	First published on Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3495
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0150 0471244
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 161244Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4491
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0008
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0166
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0066
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5016
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000150

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND WUCHTE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , UNSC [UN Security Council] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: UNSCR 1540 PROGRAM OF WORK DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: STATE 10774

(SBU) Post delivered reftel points to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation
(MFA-equivalent), Office of United Nations Affairs on February
¶10.    We will report any substantive response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI151

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI151 aka Wikileaks id #192260 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR DECEMBER 2008 AND JANUARY 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Feb 2009 16:52 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI151.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO3549
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0151/01 0471652
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 161652Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4492
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0757
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1399
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0892
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0830
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0378
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0016
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0090
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1005
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0691
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5017
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 TRIPOLI 000151

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG,
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON,
ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON,
STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD) AND USAID (MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND
CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB (BHALLA)
CAIRO FOR FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EINV [Foreign
Investments] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR DECEMBER 2008 AND JANUARY
2009
```

ENERGY

¶1. (U) State-Owned Zwara Oil Refinery Company Has Appointed HSBC as Financial Adviser: Zwara Oil Refinery Company (Zorco) plans to develop a 200,000 barrels-a-day crude oil refinery. The development of the refinery will be tender on a build-own-operate basis. The refinery is the first major government sponsored project in the country to seek commercial finance. Earlier in 2008 bankers pulled out of talks on financing the project and Nigeria's Africa Finance Corporation and Citadel Capital of Egypt both decided against investing in the plant. The project is estimated to cost about $4 billion U.S. dollars and should be completed in 2014.[MEED, 12/4/2008]

¶2. (U) Chinese CNPC to Bid for Verenex Asset in Libya: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is bidding for Canadian energy firm Verenex Energy in a transaction valued at as much as $300 million; adding a successful bid would broaden CNPC's assets in Africa. Indonesia's state oil firm, Pertamina, had announced its interest to participate in the Libyan oil area of the Canadian energy company Verenex. [Reuters, 12/15/2008]

¶3. (U) AGOCO Announces Oil Discovery: The National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that the state-owned oil company Arabian Gulf Oil Company (AGOCO) made an oil discovery in the Ghadames Basin. The well is located approximately 500 kilometers south of Tripoli. The initial production testing established an oil rate of 5,000 barrels per day, and a gas rate of 150 million standard cubic feet per day. [HYPERLINK "http://en.noclibya.com.ly/ "http://en.noclibya.com.ly , 12/16/2008]

¶4. (U) Hess Discovers Oil in Libya Sirte Offshore: In Libya, well A1-54/01, which is located 38 miles offshore in the Sirte Basin, was drilled to a depth of 11,077 feet in 2,807 feet of water. The well encountered a gross hydrocarbon section of approximately 500 feet at various intervals. Hess holds a 12.4 percent share and the NOC holds the remaining 87.6 percent. [rigzone.com, 12/17/2008]

¶5. (U) Turkish Petroleum Overseas Company Pre-Qualifies More than Ten Companies to Provide Drilling Services: A prequalification notice had been issued, and the companies in the running, all based in Libya, now have until the end of January to make their bid quotations. The tender is for 1,500 horsepower drilling rig services in the Murzuq basin. The project comprises two firm and five optional wild cat wells to be drilled within the range of 9,000-11,000 feet. [MEED, 12/30/2008]

¶6. (U) Libya Orders to Cut Production by 270,000 Barrels per Day: Effective Jan 1, Libya ordered oil companies operating in Libya to cut production by 270,000 barrels per day, which is more than Libya is requested to do under OPEC agreement to slash the cartel's production by 2.2 billion barrels per day. [JANA, 12/30/2008]

¶7. (U) Five Firms Are Expected to Bid for an Onshore Drilling Contract: Total Exploration & Production Libya, a subsidiary of France's Total expects to formally begin the tender process in early January. Prequalification entries were accepted until early December, and around five firms were left in the running after that process ended. The contract is for the provision of onshore drilling rig services and the testing of two exploration onshore wells with possible options in the west of Libya. The proposed land rig would have a maximum drilling depth of approximately 21,000 feet. The well spud is planned for the third quarter of 2009. [MEED, 12/31/2008]

¶8. (U) Libya Gains $5.4 Billion Dollars from Altering Oil Deals: The NOC reported earnings of $5.4 billion U.S. dollars in additional oil revenues from changes to contracts with foreign companies ENI, Petro-Canada and two consortiums led respectively by U.S. Occidental and Spain's Repsol last year. The changes of deals yielded $2.4 billion U.S. dollars extra earnings during the first nine months of 2008. The companies also accepted to pay a total of $3 billion U.S. dollars as up-front payments. NOC said negotiations were underway with other companies to reach similar changes which would boost oil earnings further. [HYPERLINK "http://en.noclibya.com.ly/ "http://en.noclibya.com.ly , 1/18/2009]

¶9. (U) New Oil and Gas Discovery by Australian Woodside: NOC announced that an exploratory well drilled by Woodside in the Ghadames Basin, 900 kilometers South of Tripoli, produced oil and gas when tested. The well, F1-NC210, is the fourth discovery drilled by Woodside Energy in the contract area NC210, awarded by the NOC in May 2003. Under the contract, Woodside has a 37 percent production share and the NOC has 63 percent. [Libyaonline.com, 1/15/2009]

¶10. (U) Canadian Verenex Confirms Oil and Gas Discovery in Libya: Canadian company Verenex has made its tenth oil discovery in Libya's western region of Ghadames since drilling began in September 2006. So far, Verenex has drilled four appraisal wells, and fourteen exploratory wells. The last four wells drilled are yet to be tested. Verenex, Indonesia's Medco Energi and Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a 30-year production-sharing agreement in 2005, where the two foreign companies will take 13.7 percent of production and the NOC 86.3 percent. [Tripoli Post, 1/18/2009]

¶11. (U) Shell Awards Seismic Contract: The UK/Dutch Shell Group has awarded a seismic contract to BGP, the geophysical division of Chinese oil company China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), for a survey on the gas exploration block 89N in the onshore Sirte Basin. It is considered a difficult area to work in due to the potential risk from landmines. Shell won blocks 1 and 3 in contract area 89 in the Sirte Basin in Libya's first gas exploration licensing round in 2007. [MEED 1/20/08]

¶12. (U) Mitsubishi, Libya University to Jointly Study Green Energy: On January 28, the two parties signed a memorandum of understanding to begin joint research and development of reusable energy sources. Under the agreement, the Japanese trading company will support research into reusable energy by Libya's largest university, supplying test materials and sending specialists to the university from 2009 to 2011. The first initiative between the two will involve field-tests of solar power generation systems at the university. The plan is for the university to accumulate technology and expertise, and then cultivate leaders for the new industry. [AsiaPulse, 1/26/2009]

CONSTRUCTION

¶13. (U) South Korea's Hanil Wins a $902.5 Billion Work Order in Libya: South Korean builder Hanil Engineering and Construction said that it had secured an order worth $902.5 billion from Libya. Hanil said in a regulatory filing that Libya's Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers placed the order to build houses and infrastructure in Libya. [Reuters, 12/22/08]

¶14. (U) Indian Company Simplex Projects Ltd Gets Construction Contract in Libya: The contract is to develop a housing project in Libya, which comprises the construction of 2,000 houses, a public building, and roads, drainage and sewage systems; the project is scheduled to be completed in 36 months. This is the

first overseas project for the Indian company. [Reuters, 1/13/2009]

¶15. (U) Indian Company Wins $267 million U.S. Contract in Libya: The Libyan Housing and Infrastructure Board awarded a $267 million U.S. dollars contract to the Indian construction and engineering firm Punj Lloyd Ltd. The 40-month project involves the engineering, procurement, construction and commissioning of infrastructure networks including water mains, sewerage tunnels, and roads in the Souk Al-Juma area, in Tripoli. In early January Punj Lloyd was awarded a similar contract worth $214 million U.S. dollars in a joint venture with the Public Works Company Tripoli (PWCT). The four-year project involves upgrading the infrastructure in the Arada area of Tripoli. [The Tripoli Post, 1/18/2009]

¶16. (U) China Railway Wins $805 million dollars contract in Libya: The contract worth $805 million dollars is to build a 172 kilometer railway that will connect Tripoli with the Libya-Tunisia border. The construction of the line is expected to take around 54 months. The deal follows a $2.6 billion dollar contract, signed last year to build two other rail lines, a 352 kilometer railway along Libya's Mediterranean coast, and an 800 kilometer line in the south. The coastal railroad is slated for completion in four years, and the southern line is expected to be completed in three years. [libyaninvestment.com, 1/23/2009]

FOREIGN TRADE

¶17. (U) Italy-Libya Trade Tops 14 Billion Euros in 2008 First Eight Months: While Libya tries to enter into Eni's capital, trade relations with Italy continue to grow, with import-exports in the first eight months of the year exceeding 14 billion Euros and confirming the North African country as Italy's top trading partner in the Mediterranean. The figures emerge from a study made by the Milan Chamber of Commerce into the latest figures for import-export between Italy and 13 Mediterranean basin countries (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Malta, Turkey, Cyprus, Lebanon, Syria, Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan). In January-August imports from Libya grew by 40% compared with the first eight months of 2007, exceeding 12.4 billion Euros. Exports grew by 57%, exceeding 1.7 billion Euros. The figure makes Libya the fifth largest market for Italy in the Mediterranean. [ANSAmed, 12/09/08]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶18. (U) Libya to Take Half Million Bangladeshi Workers: Secretary of Manpower Training and Employment, Maa'touk Mohammad Maa'touk, said that Libya would take half a million Bangladeshi skilled, semi-skilled and general workers for different projects soon. Maa'touk stressed that the Embassy of Bangladesh should verify the issues of job, salary, housing and fringe benefits of every worker before they could come to Libya from Bangladesh. [www.nation.ittefaq.com, 12/13/2008]

¶19. (U) Oman, Libya Sign $500 Million JV Deal: The Sultanate of Oman and Libya have signed a $500 million deal to establish a joint investment company to be based in Tripoli. The company will invest in real estate, tourism, industrial, services and energy projects and will also set up joint stock companies to undertake different projects, according to a joint statement. The State General Reserve Fund will represent Oman in the Oman-Libya Investment Holding Company. [Khaleej Times, 12/14/2008]

¶20. (U) Global Grain Rush Under Way as Rich Nations Snap up Farmland Overseas: Under a proposed agreement with Kiev, Libya

would lease 247,000 acres of Ukraine's rich black land to grow wheat. The harvest would then be shipped back to Libya, giving

TRIPOLI 00000151 004 OF 006

the desert nation a more secure supply of food in the face of predictions about higher food prices and potential shortages in decades to come. Ukraine, in turn, would get access to Libyan oil fields, helping free it from dependence on Russia for its energy needs. [Chicago Tribune, 12/14/2008]

¶21. (U) Irrigation, Key for Africa's Food Security: On December 15, a conference on Water for Agriculture and Energy in Africa: The Challenges of Climate Change opened. It was organized by FAO together with the Libyan Government and in collaboration with stakeholders including the African Union, the African Ministers' Council on Water Development, the African Development Bank and the Economic Commission for Africa. The conference aims at setting the scene for moving from talk to action on a $65 billion, 20-year program for irrigation and hydroenergy investments required in each country. [African Press Organization (APO), 12/15/08]

¶22. (U) Trade Exchange between Libya and Tunisia Reached 2.2 Billion Libyan Dinars during 2008: The trade exchange exceeded the specified value by 10%; the Secretary of the Libyan General People's Committee said that this value is expected to hit 2.5 billion by the end of 2008. The secretary mentioned that one of the most important of these projects is laying a strategic gas pipeline that will connect Libya with Tunisia; this project will be executed by a Libyan-Tunisian Joint committee starting in 2009. Currently, there are teams working in the areas of education, trade, and investment to boost bilateral integration between the countries. [JANA, 12/27/08]

¶23. (U) Libya to Invest in Oil Refinery in Egypt: Libya will invest in an oil refinery and a number of construction projects in Egypt under a deal signed in December 2008, during a visit to Tripoli by Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Aside from the refinery, Libya will also build service stations as well as an industrial and residential complex in Egypt. The two countries are also working towards establishing a free exchange zone on their border. The number of Libyan companies working in Egypt reached 236 companies, and Egyptian investment companies are currently working in Libya. Volume of trade exchange between the two countries is expected to increase to two billion dollars. [Tripoli Post, 1/1/2009]

INVESTMENT

¶24. (U) Libyan Fund in Talks over Kaupthing Unit-Luxembourg: Talks have taken place over the possible sale of the Luxembourg arm of troubled Icelandic bank Kaupthing to a Libyan sovereign fund. Budget and Treasury Minister Luc Frieden, said there had been discussions with several possible buyers which have to be concluded by year's-end. The Libyan Investment Authority fund had emerged as the front-runner to buy Kaupthing Luxembourg. Other suitors that have been cited to have shown interest in picking up the Kaupthing's Belgian customers include online bank Keytrade Bank, a subsidiary of France's Credit Agricole and German bank Landesbank Nord. [Reuters, 12/10/2008]

¶25. (U) Libya Emerges from Sanctions with Investment: The Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) is set to complete Libya's first UK commercial property transaction since the suspension of economic sanctions at the end of the 1990s. Part of the LIA has agreed to buy a large office building in the City of London for about #120 million UK pounds from German fund manager IVG. The 172,000 square feet former Lloyds' City headquarters at 14 Cornhill will be sold for a yield of about 6 per cent. DTZ and Knight Frank are advising IVG. None of the parties involved would comment on the sale. [Financial Times, 12/12/2008]

¶26. (U) Libya to List Ten Companies on Libyan Stock Market: Libya plans to sell shares in more state-owned companies as the

government seeks to boost the economy and develop the bourse set up last year. The state-run Economic and Social Development Fund aims to offer foreign investors about 15 percent of 10 companies. Libya's Al-Jomhuria Bank is among the 10 companies that may be sold on the stock market following further sales of shares in Al Wahda Bank and Al Sahara Bank, both of which are already traded on the exchange. Arab Bank, Jordan's largest publicly traded bank, bought a 19 percent stake in Libya's Wahda Bank in February for 210 million euros. BNP Paribas SA, France's biggest bank, purchased 19 percent of Libya's state-owned Sahara Bank for 145 million euros on Oct. 4. [Bloomberg, 12/17/2008]

IT

¶27. (U) STS PayONE Voucher powers Bank of Commerce and Development in Libya: STS, MENA's leading enterprise ePayment solutions provider and system integrator, furnished Bank of Commerce and Development in Libya with an enterprise-level platform for the management and distribution of its electronic voucher service at several point-of-sale terminals located throughout the Libyan retail outlets. Bank of Commerce and Development will be able to support multiple service delivery channels including dial-up, GSM, ATMS, IVR and SMS. It provides management and dispensing capabilities for the GSM prepaid airtime, with the ability to add more services and access channels to achieve higher customer satisfaction and fulfill expansion goals. [menafn.com, 12/1/2008]

¶28. (U) UNESCO Reinforces Capacities of Public Administrations through the Use of Free Software: The Arab Federation of Technical Education, the UNESCO Office in Rabat, and ISESCO, in cooperation with the Libyan Ministry of the Labor and Training, organized a workshop at the Higher Institute of Computer Technology in Tripoli, Libya. The workshop aimed to reinforce capacities of public administrations through Free and Open Source Software (FOSS). During the three-day workshop, experts from the Maghreb countries presented best practices in using FOSS in their respective countries. This enabled participants to reinforce the capacities of universities in the field of technical education through the use of FOSS, and to develop tools in order to make public services more transparent. [UNESCO, 12/19/2008]

¶29. (U) Libya Introduces WiMAX Mobile Service: Libya Telecom and Technology (LTT) launched on January 22, the WiMAX mobile service in Libya. In the first phase, LTT aims to provide the WiMAX mobile service to 300,000 subscribers in the country. LTT worked along with Alcatel, ZTE, and Huawei companies for the realization of the project. The WiMAX service is currently available in eighteen Libyan cities. [libyaonline.com, 01/25/2009]

TRANSPORTATION

¶30. (U) Libya Buys Six Oil Tankers for $400 Million Dollars: Libya's national maritime transport company announced on Wednesday the purchase of six oil tankers valued at a total of 400 million dollars. The contracts were signed with Korean naval construction group Samsung Heavy Industries and Japanese constructor Sasebo Heavy Industries. Four tankers will be built by Samsung and the other two by Sasebo. The tankers will have a total capacity of 700,000 tons, or the equivalent of five million barrels of crude. Headed by Hannibal al-Qadhafi, the company exercises a near-monopoly in the transport of Libyan oil. Its fleet currently comprises 18 tankers with a total

capacity of 11.8 million barrels. [AFP, 12/24/08]

¶31. (U) Libya Bans Swiss Flights: Libya has banned Switzerland's national carrier, Swiss International Air Lines, from flying to Tripoli. This is the latest twist in ongoing diplomatic row

TRIPOLI 00000151 006 OF 006

between the two countries after the arrest of Muammar al-Qadhafi's son, Hannibal. Switzerland's national carrier had three weekly flights from Zurich to Tripoli until mid-July when the Libyan authorities reduced them to one, citing "technical reasons." Swiss Air Lines spokeswoman says the company received a letter saying it had to stop its last remaining flight due to technical reasons. [www.voa.com, 12/25/08]

¶32. (U) U.S. Shipping Carrier Nordana Introduces New Service in Libya: Beginning in February, Nordana will include the Port of Misurata to its services in Libyan ports. The Port of Misurata will be called on all sailings to Libya with a frequency of 17 to 18 days. Since trade relations reopened between the U.S. and Libya in 2004, Nordana has been operating regular roll on / roll off vessels and breakbulk services from the U.S. into Libya. Nordana also serves the Libyan ports of Benghazi, Marsa El Brega, and Tripoli. [breakbulk.com, 1/12/2009]

LAW

¶33. (U) Libyan Tax Authority Director Calls on Foreign Companies to Abide by Law: The Director of the Libyan Tax Authority, Mr. Al Bueshi Maa'toug Al Alafi, has called on both local and foreign companies operating in Libya to help his organization by abiding by the law and paying their taxes regularly. Mr. Bueshi advised foreign companies operating in Libya to strictly implement public laws and make sure that they are hiring competent financial managers and good lawyers who would advise them on legal matters accordingly. Mr. Bueshi made the call during a symposium on reforming the Tax System held in Tripoli. [Tripoli Post, 12/11/08]

BANKING

¶34. (U) Libyan Bank Named among the Best Emerging Market Banks in Africa 2008: Global Finance magazine has named Wahda Bank of Libya among the "Best Emerging Market Banks in Africa 2008". Global Finance editors with input from industry analysts, corporate executives and banking consultants selects the best emerging market bank based on growth in assets, profitability, strategic relationships, customer service, competitive pricing, and innovative products within the region. Wahda Bank ranked number 90 among 100 banks in Africa, but for it to be among the best emerging market banks in Africa remains an important sign that the banking system in Libya is advancing after many years of total stagnation. [Tripoli Post, 12/13/08]
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI154

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI154 aka Wikileaks id #192392 ?
Subject	LIBYA 2009 TIP REPORT SUBMISSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 17 Feb 2009 13:44 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI154.html
References	08STATE132759
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4249
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0154/01 0481344
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 171344Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4502
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1405
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0763
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0898
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0836
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0492
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0384
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0015
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0023
RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA 0060
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF LABOR WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5027
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000154

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, G/TIP, G (ACBLANK), INL, DRL, PRM, INR, AND NEA/RA (CHATTERJI)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KTIP [Trafficking in Persons] , KCRM [Criminal Activity] , KWMN [Women Issues] , KFRD [Fraud Prevention
Programs] , ASEC [Security] , PREF [Refugees] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ,
SMIG [Migration] ,
ELAB [Labor Sector Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA 2009 TIP REPORT SUBMISSION

REF: 08 STATE 132759

¶1.  (SBU) Below is Embassy Tripoli's submission for the 2009
```

¶2. (SBU) Below is Embassy Tripoli's submission for the 2009 Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report. Responses are keyed to reftel questions:

LIBYA'S TIP SITUATION

--23A. International Organizations, such as the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) are the most reliable sources for information on trafficking in persons. During the year, IOM commissioned a study on migration written by a Libyan scholar in collaboration with a high-ranking military official. The study included previously unpublished statistics and legislation on migration in general, providing a useful baseline for understanding trafficking as a phenomenon in Libya. Libya's large irregular migration problem dwarfs its trafficking issues. As such, several authorities within the government deal with trafficking-related issues and legislation ancillary to counter-smuggling work. The authorities include the General People's Committee (GPC; Ministry-equivalent) for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, the GPC for Justice, the GPC for Public Security and the GPC for Manpower and Labor. Both migrants and trafficking victims are routinely smuggled to Europe, especially Italy and Malta, en route to varied locations on the continent.

-- 23B. Libya is both a transit and destination country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. While most foreigners in Libya are economic migrants, in some cases large smuggling debts and illegal status leave them vulnerable to various forms of coercion, resulting in cases of forced prostitution and forced labor. As in previous years, there were isolated reports that women from sub-Saharan Africa were trafficked to Libya for the purposes of commercial sexual exploitation. Precise figures are unavailable, though foreign observers estimate that one-half to one percent of Libya's 1.5 to 2 million foreigners may be victims of trafficking, primarily migrants who became victims due to labor fraud or smuggling debts.

-- 23C. Migrants generally come to Libya in transit to Europe or to find employment as laborers and domestic employees. In the isolated cases of sub-Saharan African women trafficked to Libya, victims were lured to Libya with the promise of legitimate employment.

-- 23D. Economic migrants without formal contracts are at highest risk of becoming victims of trafficking through labor fraud due to their lack of legal status and protections under labor laws. International organizations report isolated cases of sub-Saharan African women being lured to Libya with the promise of legitimate work; smugglers then tried to coerce those women into sex work in Europe.

-- 23E. Libya is both a transit and destination country for economic migrants. Migrants, especially those of sub-Saharan origin, often seek the services of smugglers to cross Libya's desert border and travel onward the Mediterranean Sea to Europe. Smugglers can use their leverage over migrants to make them victims of trafficking. Labor fraud and abuse constitute the highest trafficking threat. Libyan individuals employing irregular migrants sometimes withhold payment or travel documents, creating trafficking victims out of economic migrants.

SETTING THE SCENE FOR THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-TIP EFFORTS

-- 24A. Libyan officials and citizens suffer from a general lack of awareness of trafficking as a phenomenon distinct from illegal immigration and smuggling. International organizations made some inroads with individual officials through workshops and trainings, but the lack of awareness on an institutional level continues to be the greatest obstacle to tackling the trafficking portfolio.

-- 24B. The GPC for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, the GPC for Justice, the GPC for Public Security and the GPC for Manpower and Labor are all involved in anti-trafficking efforts. The GPC for Public Security often takes the lead on trafficking-related issues, though the government lacks a formal mechanism for managing its response to trafficking.

-- 24C. Libyan officials and citizens suffer from a general lack of awareness of trafficking as a phenomenon distinct from illegal immigration and smuggling. The Government lacks a framework to both prosecute trafficking and to manage victim assistance. Corruption is thought to be a factor in smuggling operations; it is unknown whether corruption contributes to trafficking. With a migrant population estimated at over 35% of the overall population, the government lacks the capacity to effectively address trafficking.

-- 24D. Government migration records are not centralized and the government lacks capacity to systematically monitor its nascent anti-trafficking efforts. Skeptical of outside interference, the government does not publicly release records or assessments, though IOs have formed relationships with authorities who have begun to release some information privately.

INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION OF TRAFFICKERS

-- 25A. Libya does not have a single law specifically prohibiting trafficking in persons; however, it does have laws criminalizing prostitution and sexual exploitation. In addition, the 1970 labor law lays out specific rights of workers and criminalizes exploitative labor practices, such as holding an employee's passport. IOM held workshops with government officials in January and February 2009 aimed at developing new laws to effectively manage migration and reduce the level of irregular migration. One day was devoted to the phenomenon of trafficking, though no draft legislation has been distributed. IOM will execute a G/TIP grant to provide training for up to 100 prosecutors and judges to discuss strategies and frameworks for combating trafficking. A new criminal code is reportedly in draft and circulating through the GPC system. The draft has not been made available to diplomatic missions and its scope has not been publicly disclosed.

-- 25B. No information was available about specific punishments for trafficking-related sexual exploitation.

-- 25C. Libyan laws on smuggling impose stiff penalties for convicted smugglers, including confiscation of all assets, including property, located in Libya. While no information was available about specific penalties for trafficking for labor exploitation, the Government sometimes used other areas of its criminal code to prosecute perpetrators of labor fraud. Offenders were made to repatriate victims of trafficking to their country of origin and provide back pay.

-- 25D. The law criminalizes rape and forcible sexual assault; however, it does not specify a punishment.

-- 25E. The Government did not publicly release statistics on investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of traffickers. Press reports indicated that some traffickers were tried under other criminal statutes for trafficking-related offenses, though the disposition of those cases is unknown.

-- 25F. IOM manages a G/TIP grant to provide training to GOL officials to recognize, investigate, and prosecute trafficking. The Government of Italy and the European Commission sponsored

The Government of Italy and the European Commission sponsored workshops through IOM to develop strategies and legislation to manage migration in general, with sessions devoted to training on combating trafficking. IOM partnered with the Libyan NGOs the Waatasimu Charity Association and the International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief to deliver training for semi-official civil society activists.

TRIPOLI 00000154 003 OF 005

-- 25G. No information was available on the GOL's cooperation with other governments in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking cases.

-- 25H. Post is not aware of any cases in which a Libyan national has been extradited from Libya for a trafficking-related offense.

-- 25I. There is no evidence of government involvement in or tolerance of trafficking on any level.

-- 25J. There is no evidence that government officials are involved in trafficking.

-- 25K. The law criminalizes prostitution; however, the law was not consistently enforced.

-- 25L. The government does not participate in international peacekeeping operations.

-- 25M. The government does not have an identified child sex tourism problem.

PROTECTION AND ASSISTANCE TO VICTIMS

-- 26A. The government does not have a framework or standard procedure to identify and provide for victims and witnesses. In practice, the government allows international organizations assisting refugees and migrants to provide assistance to vulnerable Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis, Sudanese, and Iraqis to screen for evidence of trafficking.

-- 26B. The government maintains a network of migrant detention centers throughout the country. International observers with regular access to detention facilities described the conditions as adequate and noted improvement in detention conditions since 2005. In particular, trafficking victims in detention centers generally receive satisfactory medical care. The government does not provide victims with access to either legal or psychological services.

-- 26C. The government regularly cooperated with the IOM office in Tripoli and provided in-kind assistance with IOM-hosted anti-trafficking training. In-kind assistance included free use of government-owned conference facilities, free meals for training participants, free in-country travel for participants, and free interpretation and use of interpretation equipment. In addition, the government provides diplomatic support to the UNHCR mission in

Tripoli, which, despite the lack of a formal MOU, enjoys regular access to government facilities and migrant detention centers in which victims of trafficking sometimes intermingle with the general migrant population.

-- 26D. The government continues to fail to provide adequate protective services to victims of trafficking. Like other irregular migrants, trafficking victims may be susceptible to punishment for unlawful presence in Libya as a result of trafficking. The government does not adequately distinguish between trafficking victims in need of protective services and

other migrants.

-- 26E. Post is unaware of any long-term benefits the government makes available to victims of trafficking.

-- 26F. The government does not have a specific referral process to transfer victims detained by authorities to NGO-run facilities. In practice, NGOs and International Organizations had developed relationships with officials to provide care for some individuals identified as victims of trafficking and self-identified victims of labor fraud trafficking availed themselves of IOM-run Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration programs.

TRIPOLI 00000154 004 OF 005

-- 26G. The government continues to seek clarification on what might constitute a formal victim recognition program. Working-level officials from the GPC for Public Security and the GPC for Manpower and Labor participated in workshops designed to build awareness of the problem of trafficking and formulate responses to manage a response.

-- 26H. The government continues to seek clarification on what might constitute a formal victim recognition program.

-- 26I. Trafficking victims were susceptible to punishment for unlawful acts committed as a result of being trafficking. For instance, victims, intermingled with illegal migrants, may have been deported without receiving medical, psychological or legal aid. Detention and deportation data is not centralized and is incomplete. Statistics do not differentiate between irregular migrants and victims of trafficking.

-- 26J. The government does not actively encourage victims to participate in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking offenders.

-- 26K. During the year, the government cooperated with IOM a workshops for law enforcement officials designed to raise awareness of trafficking. The government provided in-kind assistance, including conference and catering facilities, to other training programs designed to equip prosecutors with tools to both investigate and prosecute trafficking and for GPC employees to help formulate legal and policy responses to trafficking. During the year, the government at times contacted either IOM or UNHCR to alert them to situations involving vulnerable migrants and to solicit assistance on either voluntary repatriation or resettlement to third countries.

-- 26L. Post knows of no Libyan nationals that have been repatriated as victims of trafficking.

-- 26M. IOM and UNHCR both work with potential victims of trafficking in Libya. Both organization provide training for government officials responsible for implementing counter-trafficking programs and provide protective services to vulnerable migrant populations. Both IOM and UNHCR receive adequate funding from external sources, obviating the need to seek funding from the government.

PREVENTION

-- 27A. The government did not conduct any anti-trafficking public information campaigns during the reporting period. The government allowed IOM to conduct anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking campaigns in the irregular migrant community through their civil society organizations.

-- 27B. Law enforcement officials informally screen migrants for potential victims of trafficking, focusing on nationality

for potential victims of trafficking, focusing on nationality and fraudulent documents. Detention facility managers began proactive notification of International Organizations for vulnerable populations, including potential victims of trafficking.

-- 27C. The Government designated an anti-trafficking coordinator in early 2007. Libyan bureaucracy is not regularized and depends on personal connections. The extent to which the various offices charged with managing Libya's response to trafficking coordinate action remains unknown. The death of a key official in early 2008 slowed international cooperation on migration issues.

-- 27D. The government does not have a national plan of action to address trafficking in persons.

-- 27E. No information was available on steps the government took during the reporting period to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

TRIPOLI 00000154 005 OF 005

-- 27F. No information was available on steps the government took during the reporting period to reduce participation in international child sex tourism by nationals of the country.

¶2. (U) Post spent a total of 23 hours in the preparation of the TIP report:

FS-04 Officer: 20 hours

FS-06 EFM: 1 hour

LES-9 FSN: 1 hour

FS-02 Officer: 30 minutes

FS-01 Officer: 30 minutes

¶3. (SBU) The point of contact for TIP issues is Pol/Econ Officer Chris Andino (AndinoCL@state.gov; cell phone: +218-91-220-3092).
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI155

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI155 aka Wikileaks id #192413 ?
Subject	THE FROGMAN WHO COULDN'T SWIM: A COOPERATION CAUTIONARY TALE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 17 Feb 2009 14:31 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI155.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4318
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0155/01 0481431
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 171431Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4507
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1410
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0768
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0903
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0841
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1011
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0697
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5032
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000155

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/11/2019
TAGS: MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , KCOR [Corruption and Anti-Corruption] ,
PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREF [Refugees] , LY [Libya] , IT [Italy]
SUBJECT: THE FROGMAN WHO COULDN'T SWIM: A COOPERATION CAUTIONARY
TALE

TRIPOLI 00000155  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  At a recent meeting in Tripoli, the Italian
ambassador said his government was alarmed by the sharp increase
in the number of illegal migrants transiting Libya to Italy, and
expressed frustration with difficulties Italy had encountered in
trying to cooperate with the GOL on combatting illegal
migration.  A lack of human capacity within the GOL and
pervasive corruption and nepotism present serious obstacles to
immigration enforcement, and Italian diplomats are skeptical
```

that bilateral cooperation will improve in the near-term. The recent case of a supposed Libyan security officer who was sent to Rome for specialized training in underwater explosives detection is a cautionary tale of the potential problems that can arise in bilateral cooperation in immigration and other areas. End summary.

ITALY ALARMED BY INCREASE IN NUMBER OF ILLEGAL MIGRANTS TRANSITING LIBYA

¶2. (C) At a recent meeting hosted by the U.K. Ambassador to discuss counterterrorism engagement efforts, Italian Ambassador Francesco Trupiani expressed profound frustration with difficulties Italy had encountered in trying to cooperate with the GOL on counterterrorism and combatting illegal migration (Italy views the two issues as being linked). Italy was alarmed by the marked increase in the number of illegal migrants that had arrived in Italy - primarily on the island of Lampedusa - from Libya. By way of example, he offered that 1,300 Tunisian illegal migrants traveled from Libya to Italy in 2007. In 2008, 5,900 Tunisians made landfall in Italy after departing from Libya's coast. The number of migrants from Somalia - "a derelict state" - who had arrived in Italy increased from 5,110 in 2007 to 31,764 in 2008. The number of Nigerians had increased threefold and featured a heavy contingent of prostitutes and narco-traffickers.

LIBYA DELAYING COOPERATION TO LEVERAGE EU FRAMEWORK NEGOTIATIONS?

¶3. (C) Noting that smuggling illegal migrants was highly profitable, that the GOL claimed to exercise tight control over travel within Libya, and that senior regime officials traditionally had a direct stake in highly lucrative enterprises (licit and otherwise), Trupiani said it was "implausible" that large numbers of illegal migrants had transited Libya without at least the tacit consent of GOL officials. The substantial increase in the number of illegal migrants meant a corresponding increase in the amount of money involved. He speculated that there could be a "logical nexus" between smuggling of illegal migrants, arms trafficking and movement of terrorists, and lamented that no one appeared to be holding the GOL accountable for its failure to more effectively address those inter-related problems. Worse, the GOL appeared to be deliberately delaying engagement with Italy and other European partners to leverage negotiations for a Libya-EU Framework Agreement (EU External Affairs Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner was in Tripoli February 9-10 for the latest round of negotiations).

SITUATION IN SOUTHERN LIBYA WORRYING; LIBYA'S MINISTRY OF INTERIOR-EQUIVALENT INEFFECTIVE

¶4. (C) Citing a recent visit to the remote southern city of Ghat (located in the southwest, near Libya's border with Algeria, Niger and Chad), Trupiani said the harsh desert environment and difficult economic situation (flour shortages during his visit meant there was no bread in the city, for example) were such that illegal migrants coming across Libya's southern borders had to hire local guides to navigate the desert. Many of those guides were nomadic Tuareg, who were fiercely proud of the fact that they were not Arabs and who were not uniformly loyal to al-Qadhafi's regime. Many had suffered discrimination at the hands of the Arab majority and a disproportionate number of them were poor. The fact that an ethnically different, disaffected minority played such a prominent role in facilitating flows of illegal migrants, weapons and perhaps terrorists led Trupiani to draw two conclusions: 1) some GOL elements were aware of and likely complicit in such activity, and; 2) the Tuareg's collective situation was bad enough that they could become a considerable source of opposition to the regime.

¶5. (C) Commenting on Italy's fitful efforts to engage Libya on counter-migration and counterterrorism efforts, Trupiani dismissed the General People's Committee for Public Security

dismissed the General People's Committee for Public Security (MinInterior-equivalent) as feckless and said Italy's most effective interlocutor was the External Security Organization (ESO). After five months of trying, he finally saw the

TRIPOLI 00000155 002.2 OF 002

Secretary of the GPC for Public Security in December, but was disappointed by his apparent disinterest in cooperating with Italy. Referring to violent riots against the Italian Consulate in Benghazi in 2006 (occasioned by an Italian MP having worn a t-shirt depicting a controversial Danish cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad), he said the Italian Embassy had approached the GPC for Public Security for help, but it had been "useless". By contrast, ESO Director Musa Kusa had personally traveled to Benghazi to help coordinate the overland evacuation of Italian nationals to Egypt.

THE FROGMAN WHO COULDN'T SWIM

¶6. (C) Trupiani was not optimistic that bilateral cooperation would improve in the near term. (Note: Our exchange with Trupiani pre-dated the early February visit to Libya by Italy's Minister of the Interior, Roberto Maroni, who signed an MOU to implement earlier agreements on counter-migration and counterterrorism cooperation (further details septel). End note.) He cited lack of human capacity and rampant corruption and nepotism as limited factors. In November, the GOI had funded a Libyan to participate in a training program in Rome on underwater explosives detection and demolition administered by the Italian Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Defense. After several days of classroom instruction, the candidates - it was a regional course and included students from several countries - were taken to the pool for their first practical session in the water. The instructor directed the students to don their masks and regulators and enter the deep end of the pool; however, after several minutes, the Libyan student had still not entered the water. The instructor, said Trupiani, walked up to the student, put his mask on, shoved the regulator in his mouth and pushed him into the pool. The Libyan student sank like a stone, spit out his regulator and swallowed a great deal of water. After pulling him out and pumping the water out of lungs, the Italians learned that the Libyan student could not swim and was not a member of the Libyan GPC for Public Security or any GOL entity. He was the cousin of an official tasked with selecting participants for training programs and had simply wanted a vacation in Rome.

¶7. (C) Italian Minister of Interior Maroni immediately contacted Trupiani and asked that he demarche the GOL straight away to pre-empt any Libyan accusations of mistreatment of their man. Trupiani hand-delivered a note verbale protesting the fact that the GOL had sent an unqualified candidate to participate in a program paid for by the Italian government. The next day, the Italian Embassy received a formal written reply in which the GOL frostily averred that it was the responsibility of the Italian governnment to ensure that candidates for its training programs were properly qualified, and that the Italians should have taught him how to swim.

¶8. (C) Comment: While Italian-Libyan relations are burdened by considerable historical baggage, the difficulties the Italians have encountered in trying to provide technical assistance to the GOL on counterterrorism and counter-migration issues mirrors similar experiences of other EU partners and serves as a useful reminder of how difficult it can be to get traction on engagement efforts, even on issues in which the GOL has expressed an interest. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI156

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI156 aka Wikileaks id #192545 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER: LOOKING FOR SIGNALS OF U.S. INTENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Feb 2009 10:44 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI156.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5264
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0156/01 0491044
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 181044Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4509
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1412
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0770
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0843
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0905
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1013
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0699
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5034
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000156

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER: LOOKING FOR SIGNALS OF U.S. INTENT

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: In their first meeting, Libyan National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi) and the Ambassador discussed issues relating to the bilateral relationship and his putative visit to Washington in April. Muatassim, initially nervous but cordial throughout, welcomed the Ambassador and said Libya was looking for positive movement from the U.S., especially on selling equipment (armaments) and providing training to the military, as well as cooperation in the civilian nuclear field. Libya had given up much, he argued, and it was time for the U.S. to show some trust and confidence in the relationship. The Ambassador noted that the GOL also needed to build up a trustworthy track record, especially with

respect to commitments to fully dismantle its WMD programs and precursors. The Ambassador discussed actions the GOL could take in the next several weeks in advance of Muatassim's proposed visit: facilitating a human rights dialogue, executing proposed Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training programs and supporting the Embassy's efforts to purchase land for a New Embassy Compound (NEC). Such measures, in addition to the positive step of having invited U.S. Africa Command's General Ward to visit (currently scheduled for March 10-11), would help pave the way for a successful Muatassim visit. Muatassim denounced the Human Rights Report as unfair and rejected a role for NGOs, asserting that relevant topics should remain in the government-to-government channel. He concluded by underscoring that a decision by the POTUS to meet with Muammar al-Qadhafi at the upcoming G-8 Summit in Sardinia would be interpreted by the GOL as a key signal of U.S. intent with respect to further developing the bilateral relationship. End summary.

¶2. (S) The Ambassador met with National Security Adviser (NSA) Muatassim al-Qadhafi on February 17 for a little over an hour. At Muatassim's request, the Ambassador came alone while al-Qadhafi was accompanied by his assistant, Hind Siala, and MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) Ahmed Fituri. Al-Qadhafi, uncharacteristically speaking in English (halting but passable), opened by welcoming the Ambassador and asking how the situation was in the U.S. The Ambassador described the latest developments with respect to the economic stimulus bill. Al-Qadhafi asked if the USG, in the midst of an economic crisis, would be able to focus on foreign affairs as well. The Ambassador noted the Secretary's current trip to Asia and the appointment of several special envoys as reflecting the new administration's intent and ability to focus in earnest on international affairs. Al-Qadhafi asked when we might expect a visit by the Secretary. Ambassador said he had no information on the Secretary's upcoming schedule and in any case it would be better to focus on al-Qadhafi's expected visit to Washington, notionally scheduled for late April. That visit would be an important opportunity to help the two sides chart their expectations of what "normal" bilateral U.S.-Libya relations would mean.

MUATASSIM WANTS TO SIGN A TIFA AND ECA

¶3. (S) Muatassim said he looked forward to signing a U.S-Libya Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) and an Education and Cultural Protocol during his visit. The Libyan side had comments on the wording of the latter related to the GOL's rejection of language ascribing any role for NGOs. Al-Qadhafi asserted that government-to-government contacts would be the appropriate channel for these issues and stressed that the GOL would not countenance the " ... same situation as had been the case with Egyptian NGOs". He launched into an impassioned argument against the annual Human Rights Report (HRR), arguing it did not reflect the real situation and that it was inappropriate for the U.S. to comment on the situation in Libya or in the region, where different cultural norms obtained. "You should get rid of it [the HRR]", he said. Perhaps, he suggested, the GOL should ask its embassy-equivalent in Washington to critique the human rights situation in the U.S. The Ambassador answered that the report was Congressionally-mandated and that there were strict criteria embassies worldwide followed in preparing it. Al-Qadhafi was taken aback when he learned that various domestic and international organizations regularly report on and criticize human rights issues in the U.S. such as prison conditions.

LIBYA KEEN ON BROAD SECURITY AGREEMENT AND SECURITY ASSURANCES

¶4. (S) Muatassim said Libya was keen to obtain broad security guarantees from the U.S. The Ambassador stressed that the kind of overarching document he sought was not feasible; however, the U.S. was prepared to consider separate agreements that would encompass the various areas of cooperation envisioned by the GOL

encompass the various areas of cooperation envisioned by the GOL draft and would be willing to revisit the possibility of incorporating security language in a joint communique that could

be issued in connection with Muatassim's visit. (Note: The GOL raised a broad security agreement and language on security assurances in advance of the Secretary's visit in September 2008 and in the run-up to a proposed visit by Muatassim to Washington in January 2009. End note.) Muatassim repeatedly asked why the U.S. was reluctant to provide training and weaponry to Libya, especially after the GOL had abandoned its WMD programs. Libya was "embarrassed" when asked by North Koreans and Iranians, who might potentially be looking to do the same thing, what they had received for having taken such a major step. Libya was a key partner in the fight against terrorism, but GOL officials were puzzled that the U.S. still did not seem to really trust Libya's intentions. Libya would prefer to receive equipment and training from the U.S.; however, if that was not possible, the GOL would turn to other sources. The Ambassador replied that trust needed to be built up on both sides and that such a relationship might take some time to develop.

STEPS LIBYA COULD TAKE TO ESTABLISH TRUST AND A TRACK RECORD

¶5. (S) Turning the discussion back to Muatassim's Washington visit, the Ambassador suggested that Libya could profitably take several steps now in the run-up to the visit to establish such trust. The invitation to U.S. Africa Command's General Ward to visit Libya in March was a good start. Muatassim said the GOL looked forward to the visit and that he hoped to schedule a meeting for General Ward with Muammar al-Qadhafi and Secretary of the Temporary Defense Committees (Minister of Defense-equivalent) Abu Bakr Younis. The GOL remains skeptical of U.S. Africa Command's intentions and would look for Ward to provide a definitive sketch of what he and his organization planned to do.

¶6. (S) The Ambassador continued that Libya could also take another step by inviting a team from Washington to commence the much-discussed high-level human rights dialogue. Full implementation of its commitments to give up WMD and WMD precursors, to include facilitating the return of spent highly-enriched reactor fuel to Russia, would constitute an important signal of Libya's willingness to adhere to promises. The U.S. was aware of Libya's keen interest in pursuing civilian nuclear cooperation; however, there were those in the U.S. who doubted Libya's intentions. Signing the government-to-government agreement that was required to facilitate the return of spent reactor fuel from Libya to Russia as agreed under the Trilateral Steering and Coordination Committee (TSC) would be an important step on the road to changing the minds of those who held such views. Muatassim responded that on civilian nuclear and military-to-military cooperation , Libya expected that the steps that it had already taken warranted positive cooperation from the U.S. "There is trust or there is not trust", he said. Finally, the Ambassador said the GOL needed to decide whether to accept Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) training, which required submitting the names of proposed trainees for Leahy vetting. (Note: On the eve of an upcoming land border security training program, the GOL balked at providing names, arguing that such vetting was "inappropriate" and signaled a "lack of trust". End note.) The Ambassador said he was aware of Libyan sensitivities, but we had to adhere to the vetting process, which was required of all countries.

¶7. (S) Support from the GOL for the Embassy's effort to purchase land for a NEC would constitute another positive signal, the Ambassador said. Al-Qadhafi replied that there were historical sensitivities about this issue. There was no way Libya could

agree to a "large office building on seven hectares of land". Such a facility would remind Libyans of the U.S. at Wheelus Air Base years before and be a magnet for demonstrations when, for example, crises periodically erupted over Israel's treatment of Palestinians. The issue was "not personal," [i.e., specifically directed against the U.S.] he said. No mission in Libya, including those of Russia and China, had been permitted to construct such an edifice. The Ambassador stressed that we were looking for four hectares, and that the building design would take into account the local culture and environment as well as meet strict standards of security. The U.S. was looking toward a normal relationship with Libya; if that came to be, we would need more staff and a larger space. The new embassy would reflect the new relationship. Al-Qadhafi said he would like to look at the intended design. The Ambassador replied the building had yet to be designed, but perhaps he could see if there was a general sketch of what it might look like.

AL-QADHAFI-POTUS MEETING WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT SIGNAL

TRIPOLI 00000156 003 OF 003

¶8. (S) Concluding, al-Qadhafi said he hoped President Obama would be able to meet the Leader during the July G-8 session in Sardinia. For Libya, such a meeting would be a critical signal that a page had truly been turned in the relationship. It would also be an important gesture in light of Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as Chairman of the African Union. The Ambassador undertook to convey the request to Washington.

¶9. (S) Comment: This, the first meeting between the Ambassador and Muatassim, went as well as could have reasonably been expected. After some initial nervousness, Muatassim seemed to relax and take on board our point about the need for Libya (and himself) not to focus solely on signing agreements but to build a track record prior to his planned visit. MFA A/S-equivalent Fituri subsequently called the DCM to say that he believed the chemistry was very good and that Muatassim had been pleased with the meeting. Notwithstanding the goodwill and past engagement with the GOL, it is clear that Muatassim's expectations with respect to military-to-military cooperation and security aspects of the relationship (to include a comprehensive agreement that incorporates security assurances) remain unreasonably high. The extent to which such expectations reflect the broader will of the regime is unclear; however, the suggestion that a meeting between the POTUS and Muammar al-Qadhafi at the G-8 would be an important signal likely represents a broader GOL aspiration. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI157

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI157 aka Wikileaks id #192546 ?
Subject	TOTAL BAN ON CATERPILLAR EQUIPMENT RE-IMPOSED IN LIBYA.
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Feb 2009 10:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI157.html
References	09TRIPOLI692
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI258 , 09TRIPOLI289
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5267
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0157 0491044
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181044Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4512
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0773
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0908
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0846
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1415
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0702
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1016
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5037
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000157

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE (NATE MASON) AND USTR (PAUL BURKHEAD)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/17/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TOTAL BAN ON CATERPILLAR EQUIPMENT RE-IMPOSED IN LIBYA.

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 692

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Caterpillar's principal representative for Libya, Mohamed El Fadhel Khalil, called on the Ambassador on February 16. Khalil is Managing Director of the Parenin Company, a member of the Tunisia-based Amen Group of Companies. Parenin is the principal representative of Caterpillar (CAT) in Libya and has invested considerable resources in establishing after-market sales support and maintenance facilities in Libya. (Note: Parenin is not an exclusive representative of CAT; however, the

Parenin is not an exclusive representative of CAT, however, the premium CAT places on after-market support, together with the fact that investments Parenin has made to date in constituting maintenance facilities, make it the leading representative of CAT in Libya. End note.)

¶2. (C) Khalil briefed the Ambassador on difficulties CAT has encountered in attempting to sell and service its equipment into Libya. In 2007, the GOL banned imports of all machines and parts for Mercedes, BMW and CAT. (Note: As reported reftel, credible reports at the time suggested that the GOL enacted a ban on July 28, 2007 against imports of Mercedes, BMW and CAT vehicles and spare parts, at least in part in connection with criticism by German parliamentarians of a France-Libya civilian nuclear cooperation deal. End note.) Khalil said the ban was signed by the Director of Customs. (Note: Reports at the time suggested the ban was issued by the office of Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. End note.) Muhammad Aghil, one of the wealthiest businessmen in Libya and the owner of the Mercedes franchise, was imprisoned for approximately six months in connection with the dispute and eventually relinquished the right to represent Mercedes. Several well-informed business contacts have reported that Aghil also transferred a considerable portion of his assets (some put the aggregate amount as high as two-thirds of his total worth) to interests representing the al-Qadhafi family as part of the deal by which he was released from prison and permitted to engage in (reduced) business activities. Mercedes was ultimately able to resume importing vehicles and equipment into Libya under a new (regime-blessed) representative.

¶3. (C) Khalil said a representative of the al-Qadhafi family (he did not say who) approached CAT's Vice President of Marketing for Europe, Africa and the Middle East, Paolo Fellin, shortly after the total ban was imposed with a request that a member of the al-Qadhafi family be named as CAT's principal representative in Libya. CAT demurred. In July 2007, following an appeal by CAT's local representative to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the ban on imports of CAT products was partially lifted, allowing equipment to be brought in by end-users only (vice representatives/dealers). The continuing ban on imports of equipment by the CAT's principal Libya representative (equipment for showrooms, inventory and parts) has left CAT with only an 11% market share. Without the import restrictions, Khalil estimated that CAT's market share would likely be close to 25% in a market with an aggregate value of some USD 50 million per year.

¶4. (C) Khalil said the the GOL reinstated the total ban on imports of CAT equipment approximately two weeks ago. He did not offer a reason for the reimposition of the ban. He requested USG support and advocacy, suggesting that the Embassy raise the issue directly with the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy, Trade and Investment (Minister of Economy-equivalent), Dr. Ali Essawi

¶5. (C) Comment: Different permutations of the reasons for CAT's troubles are making the rounds in Tripoli's rumor mills. A version has it that both Saadi al-Qadhafi (a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi) and Khaled al-Hmeidi (son of Free Officer and senior regime figure al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi) want to be CAT's principal representative in Libya, and that CAT's difficulties reflect (at least in part) that struggle. The re-imposition of the total ban against imports of CAT's equipment coincides with negotiations to finalize a U.S.-Libya Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, raising important questions about the extent to which Libya can be expected to honor basic free trade principles. Post will coordinate with the Department, DOC and USTR to develop a strategy for raising CAT's market access issues with the GOL. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI17

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI17 aka Wikileaks id #186698 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI SUGGESTS LIBYAN ELECTIONS MAY BE IN THE OFFING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 Jan 2009 14:21 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI17.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI227
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4720
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0017 0121421
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 121421Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4309
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1374
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0731
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0863
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0806
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0667
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0980
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4832
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000017

SIPDIS

NEA/MAG FOR JOHNSON; PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/11/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI SUGGESTS LIBYAN ELECTIONS MAY BE IN THE OFFING

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) At the end of a televised meeting on December 28 to discuss Libya's reaction to the commencement of Israeli military strikes against Gaza, Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi instructed that television and recording equipment be switched off and announced to the assembled group of political, military and security officials that Libya was entering "a new political period" and would hold elections for "some key offices (NFI) soon". (Note: Post's source for information about the meeting is a member of the Revolutionary Committees' (RevComm) branch in the western

city of Zuwara, who is a childhood friend of a member of our locally-engaged staff. End note.) The audience included the Prime Minister-equivalent, the National Security Adviser, the chiefs of staff for each of Libya's military branches, senior leaders from the External Security Organization and Internal Security Organization, key RevComm figures (including the important RevComm Office of Communications), several General People's Committee secretaries (minister-equivalents) and various representatives of the Basic and General People's Congresses. Al-Qadhafi offered no specific information about the nature of the positions that were to be filled by the elections, or about who would be candidates for them.

¶2. (C) In a move that reportedly prompted quite a stir, al-Qadhafi also said he intended to invite international monitors to observe the elections. Our contact expressed particular surprise that al-Qadhafi had called for international election monitors and was frankly skeptical that such an offer would be tendered. Al-Qadhafi asked that the meeting's participants help facilitate "the transition" and that no one oppose the elections, which he represented as a "natural part" of the Jamahiriya's process of political development. Addressing concerns about potential participation by political opposition elements, al-Qadhafi cautioned that those who "might seek to misuse the process" would be closely monitored and "dealt with later". Post's contact offered that most of the meeting's participants came away with the impression that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and Chairman of the Qadhafi Development Foundation, was organizing the elections and that the call for cooperation was intended to minimize opposition to his efforts. Although Saif al-Islam was never directly mentioned by name, some participants, including our contact, believed that he himself could be a candidate for an elected position.

¶3. (C) Comment: The Jamahiriya currently holds de facto elections to select members of the pyramid scheme of Popular Committees, Basic People's Committees, Basic People's Congresses and General People's Congresses. More transparent and direct elections for key government positions and international election monitors are issues Saif al-Islam has raised before in the context of his annual Youth Forum addresses and, more recently, during his visit to the U.S. in November-December. That said, elections are a sensitive issue in a regime in which "domestic issues" are broadly defined and in which opposition to perceived external interference in internal matters is intense. "Steadfastness" against foreign powers and their perceived machinations has been a source of legitimacy for al-Qadhafi's regime for decades; acceding to international monitoring of Libyan elections would likely be seen as a violation of revolutionary principles by at least some old guard elements. Al-Qadhafi's pre-emptive request to key regime figures likely represents a calculated gambit to temper opposition. If near-term elections are in fact being planned, it could help explain why the General People's Congress (GPC) session notionally scheduled for January 10-13 has been delayed. MFA and NSC contacts told us in late December that schedules of senior regime figures like National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi were being built around the January 10-13 window. In typical Jamahiriya fashion, dates for the GPC were never publicly announced (despite the fact that it is ostensibly a public event that all citizens may attend) and no reasons have been given for its delay. There have been rumors that the inability of minister-equivalents to agree on plans to implement government restructuring and privatization in line with reforms Muammar al-Qadhafi called for in his March 2008 GPC address (reftel) are to blame for the postponement. The exercise would become exponentially more difficult if al-Qadhafi, whose predilection for grandiose political theater is well-known, intends to time elections to coincide with the upcoming session of the GPC. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI186

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI186 aka Wikileaks id #193742 ?
Subject	BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES DEBATE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING MINISTRIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Feb 2009 11:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI186.html
References	08TRIPOLI106 , 08TRIPOLI494 , 09TRIPOLI196 , 09TRIPOLI494 , 09TRIPOLI699
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI191 , 09TRIPOLI192 , 09TRIPOLI212
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1861
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0186/01 0561153
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 251153Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4541
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5067
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000186

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ENGR, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: BASIC PEOPLE'S CONGRESSES DEBATE WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING MINISTRIES

REF: A. 08 TRIPOLI 699
B. 08 TRIPOLI 196
C. 08 TRIPOLI 106
D. 08 TRIPOLI 494

TRIPOLI 00000186 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's nearly 500 local level councils -- "Basic People's Congresses" -- concluded their deliberations February 23 over two radical proposals put forward by Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi: a plan to distribute Libya's oil wealth

Muammar al-Qadhafi: a plan to distribute Libya's oil wealth directly to the people, and a massive government restructuring that would eliminate most ministries. The weight of opinion is reportedly against the wealth distribution plan, with fears of inflation cited as the primary reason for opposing it. The BPCs' recommendations will be considered by the regional and national-level congresses in the coming days. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Muammar al-Qadhafi's celebrated reform-minded son, has formed a committee of technocrats charged with formulating plans to implement any reforms that may be adopted by the national-level General People's Congress, which is expected to convene March 2. End summary.

DESPITE EXHORTATION, ORDINARY LIBYANS UNDECIDED ON WEALTH DISTRIBUTION

¶2. (C) On the evening of February 14, Libyan TV broadcast a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and Secretaries (Minister-equivalents) of the General People's Committees in which the Leader repeated his previous calls for Libya's oil wealth to be distributed directly to the people and for the dismantling of most government ministries (refs A and B). In his speech, delivered on the eve of the Basic People's Congresses' (BPC) annual week-long deliberations, al-Qadhafi lambasted the waste and corruption endemic in the government but offered little additional detail for his vision of a new structure. Acknowledging that direct distribution of 3,000 dinars per month (2400 USD) to Libyan families could create inflationary pressures and provide a disincentive for modestly-paid government workers to continue working, he called on the BPCs to debate the merits of eight basic schemes for implementing his vision, telling the cameras, "Libyans, this is your historic opportunity to take your oil wealth, power, and full freedom".

¶3. (C) The 468 BPCs then began their deliberations, which were played live on Libyan radio throughout the week. The GOL extended the BPCs one day to February 23 after the wealth distribution question proved so contentious that other agenda items, including the government restructuring initiative, were left no time for debate. Local observers say the Congresses have been largely inconclusive and are "in a muddle". Foreign journalists on a tightly controlled tour of the BPCs were surprised to see what they described as genuine opposition to al-Qadhafi's plan, and noted that many Libyans complained that they were being asked to decide on plans bereft of details and without knowledge of how the plans would impact the Libyan economy. Even basic questions such as how the funds would be dispersed in a country that remains a cash economy with little access to commercial banking have gone unanswered. The most commonly-heard objection was that distributing large payments directly to the entire population would cause serious inflation. Yusuf Sawani, Director of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Qadhafi Development Foundation, told the DCM his impression was that "the weight of opinion" was against supporting wealth distribution. The 468 BPCs represent the lowest level of a three-tiered direct representation scheme (ref C) and the recommendations of the BPCs will next pass to regional councils -- "Sha'abiyat" -- before being presented to the national-level General People's Congress (expected to meet March 2).

LIBYAN EXPERTS ATTEMPT TO IMPLEMENT AL-QADHAFI'S VISION

¶4. (C//NF) Despite al-Qadhafi's public exhortations that "the people" own the oil wealth and should determine how to distribute it, high-ranking GOL officials have quietly begun to discuss how to implement the proposed reforms. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and the Chairman of the Economic Development Board and National Planning Council Mahmoud Jibril (who is a respected, US-educated technocrat) have established a steering committee to that end, and have asked UN Resident Coordinator Brian Gleeson (strictly protect) to sit on the board as its only non-Libyan member. The committee reportedly enjoys the support

of Secretary of the General People's Committee al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (Prime Minister-equivalent). According to Gleeson, the steering committee, comprising several GPC secretaries, is still discussing plans for implementing both the wealth distribution plan and the government restructuring; he expects that the earliest they could put forward recommendations would be June - months after the GPC meetings have concluded.

TRIPOLI 00000186 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Gleeson assesses that the limited capacity of the General People's Committee secretaries is the single biggest impediment to meaningful reform. Even reasonable interlocutors like Secretary for Economy and Trade Ali Essawi, who publicly questioned the wisdom of the proposed reforms in November 2008 (ref D), are not technocrats. Most elites owe their position to regime loyalty (vice expertise) and lack the education and savvy to fully understand the potential consequences of the proposed reforms and how to avoid adverse side effects. Conflict of interest is another problem, as several of the GPC secretaries charged with developing the plans stand to lose their ministries (and their jobs) if they are implemented. Saif al-Islam's role and his relative strength are, in Gleeson's view, key variables. Despite speculation from some quarters that his strength has been sapped by conservative regime elements - cynics cite the absence from the BPC agenda of the constitution that he has championed - Gleeson sees the steering committee as evidence that Saif is still actively engaged in the political-economic reform effort.

¶6. (C) Comment: Muammar al-Qadhafi's calls for wealth distribution and government restructuring are a populist message intended to distance himself from the widely-criticized corruption and inefficiency in the government and place him squarely on the side of the people. His radical reform agenda has met strong opposition from prominent technocrats as well as self-interested officials who stand to lose influence if government ministries are abolished. According to many of our contacts, the debates in the local councils are genuine (allowing al-Qadhafi to showcase his "people power" democracy to foreign journalists). The national-level General People's Congress, on the other hand, is expected to be tightly scripted from above. Ordinary Libyans are apprehensive about their future. If al-Qadhafi's reforms are adopted, they may be embarking on yet another era of economic uncertainty and social instability. If they had a choice in the matter, most would probably forgo the oil money in exchange for a functioning, relatively honest government that provided decent salaries, education and health care. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI188

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI188 aka Wikileaks id #194060 ?
Subject	LEAHY VETTING REQUEST FOR 24 LIBYANS FOR ATA TRAINING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Feb 2009 15:25 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI188.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI189
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3474
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0188/01 0571525
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 261525Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4544
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5070
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000188

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NESCA AND DS/T/ATA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , ASEC [Security] , PTER [Terrorists and
Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING REQUEST FOR 24 LIBYANS FOR ATA TRAINING

REF: 08 STATE 132151

¶1.  (SBU) Post requests the Department's assistance in vetting,
pursuant to the Leahy Amendment and the Foreign Assistance Act,
the following 24 Libyan candidates for a DS/ATA-sponsored Border
Enforcement Training to be held in Tripoli, Libya March 9-20
(details reftel).  POL/ECON, RSO, CONS and DAO conducted a
search of locally-maintained files and found no derogatory
information.  Results from the CLASS database that could not be
ruled out at post have been included after each name.  Post has
requested full date-of-birth information but has not yet
obtained it.

¶2.  (U) Name: Ashraf Mohammed Abdallah Ghanjou; DPOB: 1971 Zwara;
Position: Major, ISO

¶3.  (U) Name: Misbah Hadi Khalifa Hajji; DPOB: 1971 Ejmil;
Position: Major, ISO

¶4.  (U) Name: Abubakr Hashem Magura; DPOB: 1967 Tripoli;
```

Position: Major, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶5. (SBU) Name: Abdessalem Ramadan Ali Abu Amid; DPOB: 1973 Aziziya; Position: Major, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Abu Ali, Abd Al Salam DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶6. (U) Name: Ismail Jem'a Abu Halala; DPOB: 1952 Aziziya; Position: Major, Customs Office

¶7. (SBU) Name: Ali Jem'a Abdallah; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: Major, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Abdullah, Ali DOB: UNK POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Abdallah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1973(e) POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abdallah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1977(e) POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abdullah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1975(e) POB: XXX

¶8. (U) Name: Naji Masud Ajaj; DPOB: 1960 Gasr ben Ghashir; Position: Major, Customs Office

¶9. (U) Name: Zarrug Ali Ellawi; DPOB: 1971 Tripoli; Position: Major, Gen Dept for Training

¶10. (SBU) Name: Dhawi Fraj Ali Judu; DPOB: 1962 Ajilat; Position: First Lieutenant, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Ali, Faraj DOB: UNK POB: XXX 2x

¶11. (U) Name: Fadhel Amor Grira; DPOB: 1975 Zawia; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶12. (SBU) Name: Mohamed Mohamed Abu Ali; DPOB: 1973 Zawia; Position: First Lieutenant, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Ali, Muhammad DOB: UNK POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed DOB: 26-Jul-1972 POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Ali, Muhammad DOB:_____1973 POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed Abdi DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abu Ali, Muhammd DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Ali, Mohammad DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶13. (U) Name: Mohamed Ahmed Esab'e; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶14. (SBU) Name: Amer Miloud Said; DPOB: 1969 Aziziya; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Saeed, Amer DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Said, Ammar DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Saied, Aamer DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Al Saidi, Abd Al Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Al Saidi, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶15. (U) Name: Abdel-Monem Miftah Rayani; DPOB: 1983 Ryayna; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶16. (U) Name: Adel Ali Awaj; DPOB: 1975 Gasr Khyar; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶17. (U) Name: Nasreddine Mohamed Kmishi; DPOB: 1981 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶18. (SBU) Name: Abderrazzak Hesine Yahyia; DPOB: 1979 Ezzahra; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Bouyahia, Abderrezak DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶19. (U) Name: Adel Jem'a Elhakimi; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office

¶20. (SBU) Name: Ammar AbdelKader Abdallah Bhih; DPOB: 1971 Niqat el-Khams; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office. Possible

TRIPOLI 00000188 002 OF 002

CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Abdallah, Amer DOB: UNK POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Abu Abdalla, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abdullah, Umar DOB: UNK POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Abdullah, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abdallah, AbidKhidr DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶21. (SBU) Name: Abulgacem Ali Abulgacem Abid; DPOB: 1968 Sorman; Position: Assistant First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Jasim, Jasim Ali DOB: 01-jan-1968 POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abulgasem, Ali DOB: UNK POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Jasim, Ali DOB: UNK POB: XXX 4x
--DPT 00: Jassim Ali DOB: UNK POB: XXX 2x

¶22. (SBU) Name: Abubakr Mohamed Abulgacem Sola; DPOB: 1966 Sabratha; Position: First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Jasim, Muhammad DOB: ____1966 POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Jassem, Mohammed DOB: 27-Oct_1966 POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Jassim, Mohammad DOB: ____1966 POB: LBYA
--DPT 00: Jassem, Mohamed DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abd Jasim, Muhammad DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abd Jassim, Muhammed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶23. (SBU) Name: Tawfik Ahmed Kilani Yussef; DPOB: 1979 Ejmil; Position: First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Youssef, Tewfic DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Yussef, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Yusuf, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Al Yusif, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Yusef, Ahmad DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Yusef, Ahmed DOB: 01-Jan-1976(e) POB: XXX

¶24. (SBU) Name: Nasser Ramadhan Mohammed Hamed; DPOB: 1973 ElBourdi; Position: First Officer, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:
--DPT 00: Bin Hamad, Nasir DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Hamad, Nassir DOB: UNK POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Abu Hamid, Nasser DOB: _____1971 POB: XXX
--DPT 00: Muhammed, Nisar DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶25. (U) Name: Fahim Jwida Fraj Othman; DPOB: Fahim Jwida Fraj Othman; Position: Principal Corporal, ISO

¶26. (U) Post appreciates Department's continued assistance.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI189

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate



Reference id	09TRIPOLI189 aka Wikileaks id #194077 ?
Subject	LEAHY VETTING REQUEST FOR 24 LIBYANS FOR ATA TRAINING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Feb 2009 16:07 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI189.html
References	09TRIPOLI188
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3546
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0189/01 0571607
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 261607Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4546
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5072
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000189

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NESCA, AND DS/T/ATA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , ASEC [Security] , PTER [Terrorists and
Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING REQUEST FOR 24 LIBYANS FOR ATA TRAINING

REF: A. TRIPOLI 188
     B. 08 STATE 132151

¶1.   (U) This cable supercedes ref A, providing additional data
for the subject of paragraph 26.

¶2.   (SBU) Post requests the Department's assistance in vetting,
pursuant to the Leahy Amendment and the Foreign Assistance Act,
the following 24 Libyan candidates for a DS/ATA-sponsored Border
Enforcement Training to be held in Tripoli, Libya March 9-20
(details ref B).  POL/ECON, RSO, CONS and DAO conducted a search
of locally-maintained files and found no derogatory information.
 Results from the CLASS database that could not be ruled out at
post have been included after each name.  Post has requested
full date-of-birth information but has not yet obtained it.


¶3.   (U) Name: Ashraf Mohammed Abdallah Ghanjou; DPOB: 1971 Zwara;
Position: Major, ISO
```

¶4. (U) Name: Misbah Hadi Khalifa Hajji; DPOB: 1971 Ejmil; Position: Major, ISO

¶5. (U) Name: Abubakr Hashem Magura; DPOB: 1967 Tripoli; Position: Major, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶6. (SBU) Name: Abdessalem Ramadham Ali Abu Amid; DPOB: 1973 Aziziya; Position: Major, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Abu Ali, Abd Al Salam DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶7. (U) Name: Ismail Jem'a Abu Halala; DPOB: 1952 Aziziya; Position: Major, Customs Office

¶8. (SBU) Name: Ali Jem'a Abdallah; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: Major, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Abdullah, Ali DOB: UNK POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Abdallah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1973(e) POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abdallah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1977(e) POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abdullah, Ali DOB: 01-Jan-1975(e) POB: XXX

¶9. (U) Name: Naji Masud Ajaj; DPOB: 1960 Gasr ben Ghashir; Position: Major, Customs Office

¶10. (U) Name: Zarrug Ali Ellawi; DPOB: 1971 Tripoli; Position: Major, Gen Dept for Training

¶11. (SBU) Name: Dhawi Fraj Ali Judu; DPOB: 1962 Ajilat; Position: First Lieutenant, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Ali, Faraj DOB: UNK POB: XXX 2x

¶12. (U) Name: Fadhel Amor Grira; DPOB: 1975 Zawia; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶13. (SBU) Name: Mohamed M'Hamed Abu Ali; DPOB: 1973 Zawia; Position: First Lieutenant, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Ali, Muhammad DOB: UNK POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed DOB: 26-Jul-1972 POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Ali, Muhammad DOB:_____1973 POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Ali, Mohamed Abdi DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abu Ali, Muhammd DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Ali, Mohammad DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶14. (U) Name: Mohamed Ahmed Esab'e; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶15. (SBU) Name: Amer Miloud Said; DPOB: 1969 Aziziya; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Saeed, Amer DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Said, Ammar DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Saied, Aamer DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Al Saidi, Abd Al Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

TRIPOLI 00000189 002 OF 003

--DPT 00: Al Saidi, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶16. (U) Name: Abdel-Monem Miftah Rayani; DPOB: 1983 Ryayna; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶17. (U) Name: Adel Ali Awaj; DPOB: 1975 Gasr Khyar; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶18. (U) Name: Nasreddine Mohamed Kmishi; DPOB: 1981 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Passport and Citizenship dept

¶19. (SBU) Name: Abderrazzak Hesine Yahyia; DPOB: 1979 Ezzahra; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Bouyahia, Abderrezak DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶20. (U) Name: Adel Jem'a Elhakimi; DPOB: 1975 Tripoli; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office

¶21. (SBU) Name: Ammar AbdelKader Abdallah Bhih; DPOB: 1971 Niqat el-Khams; Position: First Lieutenant, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Abdallah, Amer DOB: UNK POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Abu Abdalla, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abdullah, Umar DOB: UNK POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Abdullah, Amir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abdallah, AbidKhidr DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶22. (SBU) Name: Abulgacem Ali Abulgacem Abid; DPOB: 1968 Sorman; Position: Assistant First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Jasim, Jasim Ali DOB: 01-jan-1968 POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abulgasem, Ali DOB: UNK POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Jasim, Ali DOB: UNK POB: XXX 4x

--DPT 00: Jassim Ali DOB: UNK POB: XXX 2x

¶23. (SBU) Name: Abubakr Mohamed Abulgacem Sola; DPOB: 1966 Sabratha; Position: First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Jasim, Muhammad DOB: ____1966 POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Jassem, Mohammed DOB: 27-Oct_1966 POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Jassim, Mohammad DOB: ____1966 POB: LBYA

--DPT 00: Jassem, Mohamed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abd Jasim, Muhammad DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abd Jassim, Muhammed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶24. (SBU) Name: Tawfik Ahmed Kilani Yussef; DPOB: 1979 Ejmil; Position: First Officer, Customs Office. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Youssef, Tewfic DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Yussef, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Yusuf, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Al Yusif, Ahmed DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Yusef, Ahmad DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Yusef, Ahmed DOB: 01-Jan-1976(e) POB: XXX

¶25. (SBU) Name: Nasser Ramadhan M'hamed Hamed; DPOB: 1973 ElBourdi; Position: First Officer, ISO. Possible CLASS hits:

--DPT 00: Bin Hamad, Nasir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Hamad, Nassir DOB: UNK POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Abu Hamid, Nasser DOB: _____1971 POB: XXX

--DPT 00: Muhammed, Nisar DOB: UNK POB: XXX

¶26. (U) Name: Fahim Jwida Fraj Othman; DPOB: Fahim Jwida Fraj Othman; Position: Principal Corporal, ISO

TRIPOLI 00000189 003 OF 003

¶27. (U) Post appreciates Department's continued assistance. CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI19

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI19 aka Wikileaks id #186717 ?
Subject	"CRISIS" ON CHAD-LIBYA BORDER OVER WAYWARD UN CONVOY RESOLVED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 Jan 2009 15:28 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI19.html
References	08TRIPOLI889 , 08TRIPOLI921
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4815
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0019 0121528
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 121528Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4311
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1375
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0864
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0732
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0807
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0154
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0145
RUEHLG/AMEMBASSY LILONGWE PRIORITY 0007
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0668
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0981
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4834
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000019

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/12/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , ASEC *[Security]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , SOCIA, LY *[Libya]* , CD *[Chad]* ,
SD
SUBJECT: "CRISIS" ON CHAD-LIBYA BORDER OVER WAYWARD UN CONVOY RESOLVED

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 889 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 921

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) UN Resident Representative Brian Gleeson told the Ambassador on January 12 that a three-day "crisis" on the Chad-Libyan border had just been resolved. Five World Food

Program (WFP) workers, accompanied by a group of 23 Chadian soldiers, got lost while en route to rendezvous at the border with a 53-truck WFP convoy laden with food, which they were to have accompanied to distribution centers in eastern Chad. The party strayed some 4-5 miles into Libya on/about January 9 before being surrounded by what Gleeson described as a sizeable force of Libyan security officials and military personnel. (Note: The WFP maintains a large logistics and distribution center, including dozens of heavy trucks and other vehicles, in Kufra, from which they truck food supplies into eastern Chad. End note.)

¶2. (C) Noting recent tribal conflict in Kufra and clashes between GOL forces and residents of the town (ref A), Gleeson said tensions in southeastern Libya remained high. The GOL's response to the unintended incursion by the Chadian troops was "massive" in terms of the forces it dispatched and prompted a flurry of communications between Tripoli and Ndjamena. The situation escalated when Chad dispatched an additional group of soldiers to find/reinforce the group that had gone missing, necessitating active intervention by Gleeson and other UN officials with the GOL and Chad. Despite orchestrated press junkets to Kufra and reports in Libyan state-owned press claiming that violence there had been "a minor incident" exaggerated by international media (ref B), Gleeson said tensions on the Chad-Libyan border and in the area between the border and Kufra (located some 450 kilometers north of the border) remained "very high". The heavy presence of Libyan security and military elements have constituted a significant complication for UN/WFP operations.

¶3. (C) Comment: Gleeson's readout corroborates anecdotal reports we've heard from other contacts to the effect that the situation in and around Kufra has remained tense since clashes there late last year. The fact that we have received little information from the GOL about the November clashes between Toubou and Zawiya tribesmen and developments in the area since is consistent with the regime's practice of dismissing reports of internal disturbances -- particularly those involving ethnic or tribal equities -- as inaccurate or overblown. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI190

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI190 aka Wikileaks id #194297 ?
Subject	SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 27 Feb 2009 12:10 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI190.html
References	08TRIPOLI120 , 09STATE13023 , 09TRIPOLI660 , 09TRIPOLI883
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
R 271210Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4549
INFO FBI WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000190


NOFORN

DEPARTMENT FOR DS/IP/ITA, DS/IP/NEA  POST FOR RSO

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/27/2019
TAGS: ASEC [Security] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE (SEPQ) - SPRING
2009

REF: A. A. 09 CIAWASH 542085 - ALLEGED THREAT BY AL-QA'IDA IN LANDS OF THE
ISLAMIC MAGHREB TO KIDNAP FOREIGN TOURIST IN GHAT AND GHADAMIS, LIBYA
     B. B. 08 CIAWASH 400246 - PLANS OF AL-QA'IDA IN THE LANDS OF THE
ISLAMIC MAGHREB TO ATTACK THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN TRIPOLI, LIBYA
     C. C. 08 TRIPOLI 120  -  EXTREMISM IN EASTERN LIBYA
     D. D. 09 STATE 13023  - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
(SEPQ) SPRING 2009
     E. E. 08 TRIPOLI 660  - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
(SEPQ) FALL 2008
     F. F. 07 TRIPOLI 883  - SECURITY ENVIRONMENT PROFILE QUESTIONNAIRE
(SEPQ) FALL 2007
     G. G. 07 TRIPOLI 370 - QADHAFI: "REGAN WAS CRAZY; LIBYA NOW HAS
BETTER RELATIONS WITH THE U.S.
     H. H. 07 TRIPOLI 330 - MEMORIES OF 1986 AIR STRIKE REVERBERATE AND
COMPLICATE CURRENT AGENDA
     I. I. 05 TRIPOLI 255 - ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION AT USLO TRIPOLI
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) The following Security Environment Profile Questionnaire (SEPQ) - Spring 2009 is submitted by US Embassy Tripoli via reftel format:

¶2. (U) POLITICAL VIOLENCE

I. (SBU) DEMONSTRATIONS:

A. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY CAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT SIGNIFICANT ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS?

Yes, Sunni Muslims (who are the vast majority in Libya) could be mobilized as occurred in the February 2006 demonstrations at the Italian Consulate in Benghazi in reaction to the Danish cartoons controversy. Libyan law criminalizes unauthorized demonstrations and only grants permission to demonstrations in line with revolutionary ideals. Although organized, these demonstrations can get out of hand.

i. HAVE THERE BEEN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

The Government of Libya annually commemorates with small rallies of military personnel the June 11, 1971 anniversary of the evacuation of all U.S. personnel from the former Wheelus Air Force Base and the official handover of the base to the GOL.

Previous Anti-American demonstrations included:

Unlike previous years, the April 2008 anniversary of the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi (Operation El Dorado Canyon) was relatively low-key, marked only by a speech by Muammar al-Qadhafi.

On April 15, 2007 the GOL held large, but peaceful rallies in the main square of Tripoli, the center of Benghazi and the Qadhafi compound to commemorate the 21st anniversary of the 1986 U.S. bombing of Tripoli and Benghazi (Operation El Dorado Canyon). The rallies were broadcast on Libyan television and included speeches by government officials and footage of military and youth groups performing tactical demonstrations of rappelling down buildings and engaging in hand to hand combat. This anniversary is commemorated annually. The 20th anniversary in 2006 was commemorated with an April 15 concert held at the bombing site on Qadhafi's Bab al Azizia compound in Tripoli.

10/18/2005: Anti-American demonstration at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel, then location of the US Embassy. Approximately 100 demonstrators protested President Bush's comments on October 17, 2006 concerning the case of Bulgarian medics accused of deliberately infecting Benghazi children with the AIDS virus. NOTE: On Sunday, May 18, 2008, Embassy Tripoli ceased operations at the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel. END NOTE

Spring 2005: Anti-American demonstration at the United Nations Tripoli Headquarters. This demonstration was sponsored by the GOL and was against U.S. foreign policy in Iraq. There were fewer than 500 protesters present and the event was peaceful and non-violent. There were no reported incidents.

ii. HAVE DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

Yes, as noted in section i above.

iii. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATION?

Most demonstrations are under 500 people and strictly controlled by the government, with the notable exception of the past years' April 15 demonstrations which numbered in the thousands across Libya commemorating the 1986 air strikes by the United States in response to the Libyan-backed terrorist bombing of the Berlin LaBelle nightclub, other demonstrations number fewer than five hundred people.

iv. ARE ANTI-AMERICAN DEMONSTRATIONS USUALLY TRIGGERED BY U.S. FOREIGN POLICY INITIATIVES, MILITARY ACTIONS, OR BY DOMESTIC ISSUES?

U.S. foreign policy initiatives are typically the catalyst for anti-American demonstrations. There have been demonstrations on the anniversary of military actions undertaken by the U.S. against Libya in 1986. In the past, demonstrations appeared to focus on the U.S. position on the Bulgarian medic's case, where Libyan courts had imposed death sentences on several Bulgarian nurses and one Palestinian Doctor accused of having infected over 400 children with the HIV/AIDS virus. The medics were subsequently released in July 2007.

B. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

Demonstrations are generally peaceful, non-violent, and GOL-sponsored. A February 2006 government-sponsored demonstration at the Italian Consulate in Benghazi, in response to the Danish Cartoon controversy, turned tragically violent when security forces opened fire on a mob element that broke away from the main group and set fire to the building. Official reports claimed eleven casualties. Unofficial death toll numbers, which cannot be confirmed, were significantly higher. Follow-on violence damaged civil facilities in several Eastern Libyan towns, including a police station.

i. HAVE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY OR INJURIES TO USG EMPLOYEES?

No.

ii. HAVE VIOLENT DEMONSTRATORS EVER PENETRATED OUR PERIMETER SECURITY LINE?

No.

C. HAVE ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE IN THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

Demonstrations have been planned, but the GOL has not allowed them to take place.

i. HAVE ANY ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATIONS TAKEN PLACE NEAR OR IN FRONT OF U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES?

No.

ii. WHAT IS THE AVERAGE SIZE OF AN ANTI-GOVERNMENT DEMONSTRATION?

The GOL has not allowed anti-government demonstrations.

iii. ARE DEMONSTRATIONS GENERALLY VIOLENT OR PEACEFUL?

The GOL may at times use crowd-control, up to and including lethal force, to prevent demonstrations. Demonstrators are generally peaceful, but can include rock throwing.

iv. HAVE ANY DEMONSTRATIONS RESULTED IN DAMAGE TO USG PROPERTY?

No demonstrations have resulted in damage to USG property.

II. (SBU) MACRO CONFLICT CONDITIONS:

A. IS THE HOST COUNTRY ENGAGED IN AN INTERSTATE OR INTRASTATE CONFLICT? (THIS MAY INCLUDE BATTLES BETWEEN ORGANIZED AND VIOLENT DRUG CARTELS).

No. The GOL is actively involved in trying to find a peaceful settlement in Darfur and to prevent violence from spilling over to Chad and The Central African Republic.

B. IF AN INTRASTATE CONFLICT, IS IT AN INSURGENCY LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION OR IS IT A COUNTRYWIDE CIVIL WAR?

N/A

C. IF LIMITED TO A SPECIFIC REGION, ARE ANY U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THIS REGION?

N/A

D. HAVE ANY OF THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN INTRASTATE CONFLICTS SIGNALED OR DEMONSTRATED AN ANTI-AMERICAN ORIENTATION?

No.

III. (S/NF) HOST COUNTRY CAPABILITIES

A. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES PROFESSIONAL AND WELL-TRAINED?

No. The US Embassy has been instructed by the GOL that all physical and personnel security arrangements will be coordinated through the Libyan External Security Organization (Libyan Intelligence). The ESO is responsible for all 83 foreign diplomatic facilities in Tripoli. The RSO has been unable to formally assess the host nation's response capabilities. Through direct observation of GOL assets deployed to the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel, CMR Annex, and the Villa compound Annex in support of US Embassy Tripoli operations and visiting dignitaries, the RSO has determined that the Libyan government has a multi-agency response capability which appears to lack common doctrine, equipment, and training capability.

On 02/01/2007, ESO officers interdicted two males observed taking pictures of the Villa Annex. There was an altercation which the ESO officers did not effectively and rapidly contain. The ESO security detail stationed at the Villa Annex routinely consists of two vehicles with two armed and two unarmed ESO officers, and one marked traffic police vehicle with two armed officers.

B. HAVE THEY BEEN TRAINED BY U.S. AGENCIES? IF SO, PLEASE ELABORATE ON EFFECTIVENESS OF TRAINING.

From 2005 through May 2008 the RSO has provided limited security training to the Corinthia Bab Africa Hotel security staff, some of whom are ESO officers, in support of US Embassy physical security requirements. An ATA assessment team traveled to post in March 2008. ATA is scheduled to provide 5 training courses to host government law enforcement and security starting March 2009 through September 2009. The ATA training in March 2009 may be postponed because of Libya's sensitivity to USG vetting requirements of its law enforcement and security personnel.

C. ARE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES CONFRONTED WITH SERIOUS, WIDESPREAD CORRUPTION INSIDE THEIR AGENCIES?

Yes.

D. ARE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES PROFESSIONAL AND CAPABLE OF DETERRING TERRORIST ACTIONS?

The ESO is professional and capable in deterring terrorist actions. The Director of External Intelligence has stated to various Mission officials on separate occasions that he believes

his service has a 95 per cent success rate in deterring acts of terrorism. However, in the wake of terrorist attacks over the past 12 months in Algeria, Libyan security officials have acknowledged their concerns about potential terrorist incursions across Libya's western borders and an increasing likelihood of terrorist attacks in Libya. Libyan Intelligence works effectively with other countries to counter terrorism. The Director of External Intelligence advised the Charge in January 2007 that his service worked closely with the Tunisian service to thwart a significant terrorist attack in Tunisia. Their strength seems to be using intelligence to deter acts of terrorism. Their ability to counter an attack that has already begun is less apparent because of the lack of common doctrine, equipment, and training.

E. HAVE THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BEEN COOPERATIVE WITH U.S. EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION AND SUPPORT?

As pertains to intelligence sharing, yes. As pertains to security support and repeated requests for assistance, no. Dating back to February 2005, the ESO has not responded to RSO requests to discuss a counter-assault response plan. The ESO is the lead agency for the security of all foreign missions but limits post security officers to contact with one ESO liaison individual. As a result, post's security-related requests, made through the RSO's designated ESO liaison, are often long delayed or appear to have been forgotten completely.

F. ASSUMING THERE HAVE BEEN SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST THREATS IN RECENT YEARS, HAVE HOST COUNTRY SECURITY SERVICES BEEN ABLE TO SCORE ANY MAJOR ANTI-TERRORISM SUCCESSES?

Yes. In July 2007, Libyan security forces dismantled a network in eastern Libya that was sending volunteer fighters to Algeria and Iraq and was plotting attacks against Libyan security targets using stockpiled explosives. The operation resulted in the arrest of over 100 individuals.

G. HAS HOST COUNTRY BEEN RESPONSIVE (RE: TIMELINESS AND ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES) TO EMBASSY REQUESTS FOR PROTECTIVE SECURITY?

AS of February 1, 2009, RSO has been directed to coordinate all security related issues with the Office of International Relations and Cooperation for Public Security. This new procedure and contact has expedited GOL's response to Embassy security-related issues. After numerous request through official channels over the past nine months for additional security personnel, the GOL has assigned a QRF for the Villa Compound and CMR Annex.

H. HOW DOES THE EMBASSY ASSESS THE OVERALL SECURITY AT MAJOR AIRPORTS IN THE COUNTRY? (EXCELLENT; VERY GOOD; GOOD/AVERAGE; POOR)

Based on knowledge and experience, the RSO would rate overall airport security as average.

I. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE CUSTOMS AND IMMIGRATION CONTROLS AGENCIES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE; INEFFECTIVE)

Based on knowledge and experience, the RSO would rate the Customs and Immigration Control agencies as below average. Officials do appear to effectively utilize a computerized lookout system for arrivals and departure control at Tripoli International Airport. With respect to land borders, the major issues lie in the South, where controls are thought to be ineffective. USG-sponsored ATA and EXBS training missions planned for FY09 will provide RSO with a more complete picture of host government capacities.

J. HOW EFFECTIVE ARE BORDER PATROL FORCES? (EFFECTIVE; AVERAGE;INEFFECTIVE)

AVERAGE,INEFFECTIVE)

Ineffective. The ESO has in the past advised US Embassy management that they believe this is a vulnerable area and one which they readily admit they cannot control. Libya also has a significant problem in dealing with illegal migration along its Southern border.

¶3. (U) INDIGENOUS TERRORISM

I. (S/NF) ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS:

A. ARE THERE INDIGENOUS, ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST GROUPS IN COUNTRY?

Yes.

B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

AL'JAMA'A AL ISLAMIYA AL-MUQATALA (Libyan Islamic Fighting Group/LIFG). In November 2007, the LIFG officially announced that they had merged with Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). It is not known whether there are currently active operational LIFG or Al-Qa'ida cells in Libya. The presence in Libya of Libyans who fought in the Iraq jihad and returned to Libya may increase the threat against U.S. interests and personnel in Libya. AQIM has been active and successful in recruiting Libyan extremists, many of a young age, to join the ranks of the AQIM and then undergo terrorist training in neighboring Algeria.

C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT LETHAL ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS WITHIN THE LAST 12 MONTHS?

No.

D. WERE THERE ANY OTHER ANTI-AMERICAN ATTACKS?

No.

E. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. DIPLOMATIC TARGETS?

No.

F. HAVE GROUPS ATTACKED U.S. BUSINESS, U.S. MILITARY, OR U.S.- RELATED TARGETS?

No.

G. HAVE GROUPS LIMITED THEIR ATTACKS TO SPECIFIC REGIONS OR DO THEY OPERATE COUNTRY-WIDE?

No, they operate country-wide, though mostly in Eastern regions.

H. IF ATTACKS ARE LIMITED TO REGIONS, ARE THERE ANY U.S.DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES LOCATED IN THESE REGIONS?

No.

II. (SBU) OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS:

A. ARE THERE OTHER INDIGENOUS TERRORIST GROUPS (NOT ANTI-AMERICAN) IN COUNTRY?

No.

B. IF YES, HOW MANY? PLEASE NAME GROUPS.

N/A

C. HAVE GROUPS CARRIED OUT ATTACKS IN THE CAPITAL OR IN AREAS WHERE U.S. DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ARE LOCATED?

No.

D. WERE ATTACKS LETHAL AND/OR INDISCRIMINATE?

No.

E. HAVE THERE BEEN ANY AMERICANS KILLED OR INJURED IN THESE ATTACKS?

No.

¶4. (U) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

I. (S/NF) TRANSNATIONAL TERRORIST INDICATORS:

A. ARE THERE ANY FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS THAT HAVE A PRESENCE IN COUNTRY? PLEASE PROVIDE NAMES.

In 2005, Libya provided assurances to the USG reiterating its renunciation of the use of state-sponsored terrorism as a political adjunct. There may be dormant individuals affiliated with Palestinian rejectionist groups such as the PFLP-GC and the ANO domiciled in Libya. There are Al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Islamic Magreb (AQIM) members and Libyans who fought in the Iraq jihad present in Libya.

B. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THIS PRESENCE? IS IT AN OPERATIONAL CELL? FINANCIAL CELL? SUPPORT CELL? PROPAGANDA CELL?

Palestinian rejectionist group members are residual settled members from the time of Libya's support to these groups. They are not operationally active.

AQIM has been active and successful in recruiting Libyan extremists, many of a young age, to join the ranks of the AQIM and then undergo terrorist training in neighboring Algeria.

C. IS THE HOST GOVERNMENT SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

Generally speaking, no. However, undoubtedly, there are factions within the Libyan government opposed to the reestablishment of relations between the U.S. and Libya who may be sympathetic to Palestinian rejectionist groups, but not sympathetic to Al-Qa'ida in the Maghreb (AQIM) or the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The GOL has arrested Al-Qa'ida members in the past year and reiterated its renunciation of terrorism. The GOL views extremists operating under a religious banner as a serious potential threat to the regime and have demonstrated resolve against Al-Qa'ida and its surrogates.

D. ARE THERE SUSPECT NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) IN THE COUNTRY THAT HAVE A RELATIONSHIP WITH ANY OF THESE GROUPS?

No, The GOL does not allow independent NGOs. It is not likely that support for such groups exist.

E. ARE THERE ANY ETHNIC OR RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES IN COUNTRY THAT ARE SYMPATHETIC TO THESE GROUPS?

The ESO has indicated to post officers that they have infiltrated several religious communities (mosques) in an attempt to extinguish any anti-government sentiment. The general trend in the region has also seen migration of hard core believers to Iraq. Recent indications suggest a shift to AQIM in Sahelian Africa. Iraqi Sunni groups have surfaced over the last year that appear to be in a dialogue with the Libyan Revolutionary Committees Organization (REVCOM) and other senior regime elements, dialogue that would have required the support of the Libyan leadership to occur. The nature of this dialogue is unclear.

F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE

F. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE LEVEL, INTENT, AND SCOPE OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES (IRAN, IRAQ, SYRIA, SERBIA, SUDAN, ET.AL.) IN COUNTRY RELATIVE TO POTENTIAL ANTI-AMERICAN TERRORIST ACTS?

Post does not have the capability to fully assess the type of presence, if any, of any such groups and unable to provide a measurable response to this question, based on its present capabilities to determine this particular threat. These particular groups are not well-positioned to penetrate the mission. Post adds that there is a Russian and Chinese presence in-country, who are active in the community. Iranian and Sudanese intelligence services are present in Libya. They are not well positioned to perpetuate attacks against the U.S. presence. The host government is well-known for its past acts of anti-American terrorism, but following its renunciation of terrorism and subsequent removal from the state sponsors list, the present aggressive posture of its intelligence agencies toward the US presence seems to be focused on information gathering.

G. HOW DOES POST ASSESS THE AVAILABILITY OF WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES IN COUNTRY OR FROM NEARBY COUNTRIES FOR HOSTILE TERRORIST ELEMENTS?

Libya has terminated its weapons of mass destruction program and U.S. scientific observers are monitoring the progress of other Libyan programs, such as their chemical, biological and ballistic weapons programs. Small arms and ammunition are typically difficult to obtain in Libya. One area of concern, however, is in the East, in the desert battlefields of WWII, where the indigenous population searches for buried ordinance for cooking and fishing purposes. Vast minefields on the Southern and Eastern borders are thought to be culled by smugglers who sell the explosives to rebel groups in the Sahel region. Jihadist cells that have been disrupted have also used this as a source of explosives. The GOL has difficulty controlling its southern border. As a result there is a problem with the smuggling of weapons and drugs.

¶5. (U) Point of contact for this report is RSO Tripoli Jim Eisenhut; Mobile: +218 91 220 3095; Unclassified Email: Eisenhutjp@state.gov; Classified Email: Eisenhutjp2@state.sgov.gov

CRETZ

Media

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI191

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI191 aka Wikileaks id #194320 ?
Subject	EASTERN LIBYANS FAVOR WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 27 Feb 2009 12:54 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI191.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI227
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4810
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0191/01 0581254
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271254Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4555
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1017
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0703
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5081
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000191

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EASTERN LIBYANS FAVOR WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND ABOLISHING GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 186 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 227

TRIPOLI 00000191 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Consideration of a draft constitution was on the agenda for the recently-concluded session of the Basic People's Congresses (BPC), but was apparently dropped out of concern that including it could undermine efforts to gain support for controversial wealth distribution and government re-structuring reforms proposed by Muammar al-Qadhafi. Western Libyan contacts were united in their concern that the hazily-formulated reforms

could prompt economic problems and threaten the limited reform initiatives already underway; however, the head of the largest BPC in eastern Libya told us that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya, including his, had recommended that the General People's Congress adopt wealth distribution and government re-structuring. He argued that eastern Libyans, frustrated by years of calculated neglect by the regime, believed they stood a better chance of getting a more equal share of oil revenues and having less corrupt government if they adopted al-Qadhafi's proposed reforms. In addition, eastern Libyan politicians and leaders viewed the reforms as a means by which to devolve resource allocation decisions and, to a limited extent, political authority away from the central government and toward provincial leaders, potentially facilitating their long-term goal of a return to the federal system of government that existed before the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution/coup. The fact that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya, a region not known for its love of Muammar al-Qadhafi or his regime, have reportedly supported al-Qadhafi's proposals is best understood as a reflection of the extent of their frustration with the extant political system rather than an endorsement of the ideas themselves. End summary.

CONSTITUTION DROPPED FROM AGENDA AMID CONCERNS ABOUT FOCUS ON OTHER PROPOSED REFORMS

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, Libya's 468 Basic People's Congresses (BPCs) convened February 18-23 to consider direct distribution of Libya's oil wealth to its citizens and government re-structuring that would involve dismantling most existing ministry-equivalents, proposals first posited by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref B). The Secretary of the largest BPC in eastern Libya (which represents a district of the leading eastern city of Benghazi), Abbas Ghaddar al-Mansuri al-Obeidi (strictly protect), gave a readout on his group's deliberations and recommendations to P/E Chief on February 24. Al-Obeidi said the preliminary draft agenda for the BPCs included reviewing the draft constitution prepared by a committee under the auspices of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, with the expectation that it would be put forward to the upcoming General People's Congress (GPC) in early March for consideration and (presumably) ratification. In the end, the constitution was dropped from the BPCs final agenda and was not/not considered.

¶3. (C) Al-Obeidi said concerns at the General People's Committee level (cabinet-equivalent) about apparent opposition to the core issues of wealth distribution and government re-structuring prompted the decision to drop the constitution from the agenda. The regime's concern was to ensure that BPCs ultimately recommended to the General People's Congress that it adopt wealth distribution and government re-structuring; given sensitivities about adopting a constitution (Libya currently does not have one), it was feared that considering that issue as well would dilute the BPCs focus. Al-Obeidi said the constitution was on the BPCs' agenda as recently as February 14, when Muammar al-Qadhafi hotly responded to dissent within the General People's Committee about the proposed reforms, urging BPC members and regime officials to move ahead with wealth distribution and re-structuring. Criticizing the poor performance of the General People's Committee system (of which he was the original author), he characterized the changes as part of an effort to combat endemic corruption in and underperformance by the GPCs. It is unclear whether the constitution will be considered at the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. The constitution is reportedly being reviewed by the General Peoples Committee and may be put forward by it to the General Peoples Congress, possibly a workaround devised after it was removed from the BPCs' agenda (further details septel).

MAJORITY OF EASTERN LIBYAN BPCS ENDORSE AL-QADHAFI'S PROPOSED REFORMS ...

¶4. (C) With respect to wealth distribution and re-structuring, al-Obeidi said his BPC had put forward the recommendation that both proposals be considered and adopted by the General People's Congress. (Note: The Secretary of the Benghazi Sha'abiya explained to the Ambassador on February 23 that his entity was in the process of collecting the BPCs' recommendations, which it

would distill into reports and recommendations for the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. End note.) Citing conversations on Feb 23-24 with secretaries of other BPCs, he said it appeared that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya had made similar recommendations. Wealth distribution, an idea that has sparked the imagination of many ordinary Libyans, dominated most of the proceedings. Little attention was focused on the potentially more critical issue of government re-structuring. He conceded that his BPCs' recommendations contained few specific details about how to successfully implement the initiatives. He said the Sha'abiyat and General People's Congress were responsible for coming up with such ideas. (Comment: Given the performance of Benghazi Sha'abiya representatives in their meeting with the Ambassador on February 23, this does not give cause for much hope. End comment.)

... BUT FOR REASONS THAT HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH LOYALTY TO THE REGIME

¶5. (C) Acknowledging the lack of clarity about how wealth distribution and re-structuring would be implemented, al-Obeidi stressed that his constituents were disappointed enough with the Jamahiriya's performance to give the relatively radical proposals a try. Eastern Libya had suffered until very recently from a lack of investment and government resources, part of a campaign by the al-Qadhafi regime to keep the area poor and, theoretically, less likely to develop as a viable alternative locus of power to Tripoli. Despite a recent surge in government projects in and around Benghazi (further details septel), eastern Libyans had generally not benefited from limited economic reform to the extent that those in the western province of Tripolitania had.

¶6. (C) Al-Obeidi argued that eastern Libyans calculated that they stood a better chance of getting a more equal share of oil revenues and having less corrupt government if they adopted al-Qadhafi's proposed reforms. In addition, eastern Libyan politicians and leaders viewed the reforms as a means by which to devolve resource allocation decisions and, to a limited extent, political authority away from the central government and toward provincial leaders. Al-Obeidi flatly stated that a long-term goal of most eastern Libyans was to effect a return to something akin to the federal system of government that existed before the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution/coup, in which the provinces enjoyed greater autonomy. The government re-structuring advocated by al-Qadhafi would theoretically entail dismantling the existing system of General People's Committees, potentially creating a vacuum into which provincial leaders could move.

¶7. (C) Comment: As reported ref A and previous, the consensus among contacts in and around Tripoli since al-Qadhafi first proposed wealth distribution and re-structuring last March was concern that the hazily-formulated scheme could prompt serious macro-economic distortions (hyperinflation among them) and that nascent reforms already underway would be hurt, jeopardizing the increased availability of consumer goods and other recent improvements in the standard of living for ordinary Libyans. Of particular concern to western Libyans was the proposal to scrap government support for education and health care. The Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation said as recently as February 22 that the weight of opinion at the BPC level appeared to be against supporting wealth distribution. The fact

appeared to be against supporting wealth distribution. The fact that the majority of BPCs in eastern Libya, a region not known for its love of Muammar al-Qadhafi or his regime, have reportedly supported al-Qadhafi's proposals is best understood as a reflection of the extent of their frustration with the extant political system rather than an endorsement of the ideas themselves. As such, it underscores the lack of cohesion and lingering mistrust between the three major regions that comprise modern Libya: Tripolitania (western Libya); Cyrenaica (eastern Libya); and the Fezzan (southern Libya). End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI192

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI192 aka Wikileaks id #194326 ?
Subject	FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 27 Feb 2009 13:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI192.html
References	09TRIPOLI1 , 09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI68 , 09TRIPOLI699
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
P 271312Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0705
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1019
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5083
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000192

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER, SWEET), NEA/PI (BOURGEOIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID

REF: A) TRIPOLI 133 , B) TRIPOLI 0001 , C) TRIPOLI 0068 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 699 , E) TRIPOLI 186

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Ordinary Libyans, frustrated by privations during the country's isolation under sanctions and exhausted by decades of largely failed political adventurism under the rubric of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution, appear to care more about economic reform than political change. Historically entrepeneurial, al-Qadhafi's revolution had been a "poor fit" for most Libyans. The lifting of sanctions and nascent economic reforms were a welcome relief; however, the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford (the majority are still employed by the government) has remained a problem. Static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples, have hit ordinary Libyans hard in the last two years. The tendency of greedy regime elites to

monopolize the most lucrative market sectors has had political consequences, and the pervasive culture of rent-seeking that evolved during the sanctions period, together with conspicuous consumption by regime elites, has not sat well with the silent majority of Libyans, who remain socially conservative. The fact that many young men are forced by lack of means to delay marriage is another pressing economic issue in a conservative society in which marriage is a key social anchor and indicator of status. Embassy contacts in Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk were cautiously optimistic about proposals for wealth distribution and continued economic reform, but less sanguine about proposed government re-structuring and political change. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. End summary.

LIBYANS CARE MORE ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM THAN POLITICAL CHANGE

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, Libya appears to be in one of its intermittent periods of intense political foment. As debate in the externally-based opposition press and Libya's small indigenous elite swirls around proposed wealth distribution, government re-structuring, possible adoption of a constitution and the ostensible withdrawal from politics by presumed heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, ordinary Libyans have largely eschewed politics and remained primarily focused on improving their daily standard of living. Khaled Nayyed (strictly protect), son of a prominent businessman and a successful importer of furniture in his own right, recently told P/E Chief that ordinary Libyans had been frustrated by years of sanctions-imposed privations and, more recently, by the disparity between increased availability of consumer goods and their stagnant salaries. Exhausted by years of largely failed political adventurism under the auspices of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution and the Jamahiriya (state of the masses), most Libyans do not really care about politics or political reform. "Do not give us free speech, parties, a constitution or elections - give us the ability to make and freely spend money", he said.

REVOLUTION A "POOR FIT" FOR HISTORICALLY ENTREPENEURIAL LIBYANS

¶3. (C) In a conservative society dominated by tribes, Libyans are primarily focused on providing for their families. Drawing an analogy with Russia, Nayyed said that Libyans would remain politically quiescent as long as economic conditions were "acceptable", but cautioned that "poverty is real" in Libya and that maintaining the perception of an improved daily quality of life for people was a serious political imperative for Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime. (Note: Despite the country's oil wealth, some internal government reports reportedly suggest that as many as a third of Libya's estimated one million families live at or below the poverty line. End note.) Laughingly referring to the Barbary corsairs, he noted that Libyans were historically entrepeneurial and characterized the period of revolutionary zeal in Libya between the late 1970's and early 1990's as a "poor fit" for them. Masters of tactical maneuvering and operating with tight margins, he said Libyan businessmen only needed a small window in which to flourish- the recent relaxation of rules still on the books prohibiting private ownership and governing profits had been enough to prompt a flood of consumer goods by comparison with what had been on offer only four or five years ago.

DISPARITY BETWEEN INCREASED CONSUMER PRODUCTS ON OFFER AND STATIC SALARIES

¶4. (C) A significant danger, though, was the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford. The combination of static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples (ref B), have hit ordinary Libyan families hard in the last two years. (Note: More than 60 percent of Libya's workforce are public sector employees with salaries that have not changed in years, and some 250,000 of them draw salaries but do not work, according to the minister-equivalent for Manpower, Employment and Training. Overall inflation for 2007 was 6.3 percent and 12 percent for 2008; foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco increased by 16.4 percent. End note.) The tendency of avaricious regime elites to monopolize the most lucrative market sectors (ref C) was another economic risk with attendant political consequences. (Note: Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index put Libya at 126 among the 180 countries it rated. As a point of reference, Nigeria ranked 121st. End note.) The pervasive culture of rent-seeking that had flourished during the lean sanctions period, together with the ostentatious consumerism of the regime elite, did not sit well with the silent majority of Libyans, most of whom remained conservative.

SOCIAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS A COMPLICATION IN A SOCIALLY CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY

¶5. (C) Comments by neighbors of the P/E Chief in Tripoli's Ben Ashour district echo Nayyed's analysis. The owner of a small grocery store suffers from rheumatism-related medical complaints for which treatment is unavailable in Tripoli. He must travel regularly to Tunis for costly treatment, a signficant expense.
Neither of his two adult sons - both in their late 20's - has full-time work. One is married; the other is not. Ahmed's small pension from a former government job and modest income from the store support him, his wife, their younger daughters (who are school-aged) and his adult sons. Although they believe him to be too anxious to appease western countries and too glib, Ahmed and his wife have expressed support for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his proposed political and economic reforms; however, they readily concede that they would be willing to forego political reform in exchange for more income and greater stability in terms of services provided by the state. They, like many other middle and lower-class Libyans, fear that proposed government re-structuring, which would include dismantling many existing ministry-equivalents (including those for health and education), would mean a lesser quality of life in at least the near to mid-term. While they are intrigued by the proposal to distribute oil wealth directly to Libyan citizens, they have little expectation that such will actually occur. If it were to happen, many believe that the proposed stipends would not be sufficient to defray the costs of paying for services like education and health care, which would be privatized.

¶6. (C) The owner of a tourism company in the eastern city of Benghazi shares those concerns about proposed privatization, but is willing to give it a try if the government would actually reduce its role in the lives of ordinary Libyans. Paraphrasing Muammar al-Qadhafi's remarks about the U.S. during his Revolution Day speech last August (ref D), our contact said he wanted the government " ... to be neither friend nor enemy, but merely to leave us alone". Noting that Libyans, particularly those in eastern Libyan, had a long history as successful traders and highlighting the failure of the Jamahiriya to either efficiently distribute oil wealth or develop other economic sectors, he said the sooner further privatization occurred, the better. He, too, was willing to forego political reform - "I don't give a damn about politics" - in exchange for continued economic reform. A retired government employee in the eastern city of Tobruk echoed those sentiments. Asked about proposed government re-structuring, he was dismissive. The regime, in his view, was a police state and could not be expected to willingly concede political authority. His primary concern was that his four sons, all in their late 20's and early 30's, had not been able to earn enough to get married. Like many Middle Eastern countries, it is expected that grooms and their families will provide fully furnished homes for newly-married couples.
Increased expectations about what that means - modern appliances are expensive - have made it increasingly difficult for young men to save enough to marry, delaying the age at which they do so. In a conservative society in which marriage constitutes an important social anchor and bellwether of worth, that trend has
worrying social consequences.

¶7. (C) Comment: As reported ref E, proposed direct distribution of oil wealth to the people - an idea floated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March that has captured the popular imagination
- dominated the recently concluded session of the Basic People's Congresses. An attendant proposal to dismantle most ministry-equivalents and privatize a large number of services currently managed and provided by the government was given relatively short shrift. The focus on wealth distribution reflects the fact that ordinary Libyans, exhausted by the pervasive chaos that has characterized al-Qadhafi's regime and its successive political-economic experiments, are frustrated by politics and seek the comfort of a marginally better day-to-day quality of life. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. All eyes are now on the upcoming session of the General People's Congress, expected to convene early next week. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI192

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI192 aka Wikileaks id #194326 ?
Subject	FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 27 Feb 2009 13:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI192.html
References	09TRIPOLI1 , 09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI68 , 09TRIPOLI699
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
P 271312Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4557
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0705
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1019
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5083
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000192

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER, SWEET), NEA/PI (BOURGEOIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/27/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID

REF: A) TRIPOLI 133 , B) TRIPOLI 0001 , C) TRIPOLI 0068 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 699 , E) TRIPOLI 186

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Ordinary Libyans, frustrated by privations during the country's isolation under sanctions and exhausted by decades of largely failed political adventurism under the rubric of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution, appear to care more about economic reform than political change. Historically entrepeneurial, al-Qadhafi's revolution had been a "poor fit" for most Libyans. The lifting of sanctions and nascent economic reforms were a welcome relief; however, the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford (the majority are still employed by the government) has remained a problem. Static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples, have hit ordinary Libyans hard in the last two years. The tendency of greedy regime elites to

monopolize the most lucrative market sectors has had political consequences, and the pervasive culture of rent-seeking that evolved during the sanctions period, together with conspicuous consumption by regime elites, has not sat well with the silent majority of Libyans, who remain socially conservative. The fact that many young men are forced by lack of means to delay marriage is another pressing economic issue in a conservative society in which marriage is a key social anchor and indicator of status. Embassy contacts in Tripoli, Benghazi and Tobruk were cautiously optimistic about proposals for wealth distribution and continued economic reform, but less sanguine about proposed government re-structuring and political change. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. End summary.

LIBYANS CARE MORE ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM THAN POLITICAL CHANGE

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, Libya appears to be in one of its intermittent periods of intense political foment. As debate in the externally-based opposition press and Libya's small indigenous elite swirls around proposed wealth distribution, government re-structuring, possible adoption of a constitution and the ostensible withdrawal from politics by presumed heir-apparent Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, ordinary Libyans have largely eschewed politics and remained primarily focused on improving their daily standard of living. Khaled Nayyed (strictly protect), son of a prominent businessman and a successful importer of furniture in his own right, recently told P/E Chief that ordinary Libyans had been frustrated by years of sanctions-imposed privations and, more recently, by the disparity between increased availability of consumer goods and their stagnant salaries. Exhausted by years of largely failed political adventurism under the auspices of Muammar al-Qadhafi's al-Fateh Revolution and the Jamahiriya (state of the masses), most Libyans do not really care about politics or political reform. "Do not give us free speech, parties, a constitution or elections - give us the ability to make and freely spend money", he said.

REVOLUTION A "POOR FIT" FOR HISTORICALLY ENTREPENEURIAL LIBYANS

¶3. (C) In a conservative society dominated by tribes, Libyans are primarily focused on providing for their families. Drawing an analogy with Russia, Nayyed said that Libyans would remain politically quiescent as long as economic conditions were "acceptable", but cautioned that "poverty is real" in Libya and that maintaining the perception of an improved daily quality of life for people was a serious political imperative for Muammar al-Qadhafi's regime. (Note: Despite the country's oil wealth, some internal government reports reportedly suggest that as many as a third of Libya's estimated one million families live at or below the poverty line. End note.) Laughingly referring to the Barbary corsairs, he noted that Libyans were historically entrepeneurial and characterized the period of revolutionary zeal in Libya between the late 1970's and early 1990's as a "poor fit" for them. Masters of tactical maneuvering and operating with tight margins, he said Libyan businessmen only needed a small window in which to flourish- the recent relaxation of rules still on the books prohibiting private ownership and governing profits had been enough to prompt a flood of consumer goods by comparison with what had been on offer only four or five years ago.

DISPARITY BETWEEN INCREASED CONSUMER PRODUCTS ON OFFER AND STATIC SALARIES

¶4. (C) A significant danger, though, was the increasing disparity between what Libyans saw and wanted to buy and what they could afford. The combination of static state salaries and inflation, particularly with respect to prices for food and key staples (ref B), have hit ordinary Libyan families hard in the last two years. (Note: More than 60 percent of Libya's workforce are public sector employees with salaries that have not changed in years, and some 250,000 of them draw salaries but do not work, according to the minister-equivalent for Manpower, Employment and Training. Overall inflation for 2007 was 6.3 percent and 12 percent for 2008; foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco increased by 16.4 percent. End note.) The tendency of avaricious regime elites to monopolize the most lucrative market sectors (ref C) was another economic risk with attendant political consequences. (Note: Transparency International's 2008 Corruption Perceptions Index put Libya at 126 among the 180 countries it rated. As a point of reference, Nigeria ranked 121st. End note.) The pervasive culture of rent-seeking that had flourished during the lean sanctions period, together with the ostentatious consumerism of the regime elite, did not sit well with the silent majority of Libyans, most of whom remained conservative.

SOCIAL IMPACT OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS A COMPLICATION IN A SOCIALLY CONSERVATIVE SOCIETY

¶5. (C) Comments by neighbors of the P/E Chief in Tripoli's Ben Ashour district echo Nayyed's analysis. The owner of a small grocery store suffers from rheumatism-related medical complaints for which treatment is unavailable in Tripoli. He must travel regularly to Tunis for costly treatment, a signficant expense.
Neither of his two adult sons - both in their late 20's - has full-time work. One is married; the other is not. Ahmed's small pension from a former government job and modest income from the store support him, his wife, their younger daughters (who are school-aged) and his adult sons. Although they believe him to be too anxious to appease western countries and too glib, Ahmed and his wife have expressed support for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and his proposed political and economic reforms; however, they readily concede that they would be willing to forego political reform in exchange for more income and greater stability in terms of services provided by the state. They, like many other middle and lower-class Libyans, fear that proposed government re-structuring, which would include dismantling many existing ministry-equivalents (including those for health and education), would mean a lesser quality of life in at least the near to mid-term. While they are intrigued by the proposal to distribute oil wealth directly to Libyan citizens, they have little expectation that such will actually occur. If it were to happen, many believe that the proposed stipends would not be sufficient to defray the costs of paying for services like education and health care, which would be privatized.

¶6. (C) The owner of a tourism company in the eastern city of Benghazi shares those concerns about proposed privatization, but is willing to give it a try if the government would actually reduce its role in the lives of ordinary Libyans. Paraphrasing Muammar al-Qadhafi's remarks about the U.S. during his Revolution Day speech last August (ref D), our contact said he wanted the government " ... to be neither friend nor enemy, but merely to leave us alone". Noting that Libyans, particularly those in eastern Libyan, had a long history as successful traders and highlighting the failure of the Jamahiriya to either efficiently distribute oil wealth or develop other economic sectors, he said the sooner further privatization occurred, the better. He, too, was willing to forego political reform - "I don't give a damn about politics" - in exchange for continued economic reform. A retired government employee in the eastern city of Tobruk echoed those sentiments. Asked about proposed government re-structuring, he was dismissive. The regime, in his view, was a police state and could not be expected to willingly concede political authority. His primary concern was that his four sons, all in their late 20's and early 30's, had not been able to earn enough to get married. Like many Middle Eastern countries, it is expected that grooms and their families will provide fully furnished homes for newly-married couples.
Increased expectations about what that means - modern appliances are expensive - have made it increasingly difficult for young men to save enough to marry, delaying the age at which they do so. In a conservative society in which marriage constitutes an important social anchor and bellwether of worth, that trend has
worrying social consequences.

¶7. (C) Comment: As reported ref E, proposed direct distribution of oil wealth to the people - an idea floated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March that has captured the popular imagination
- dominated the recently concluded session of the Basic People's Congresses. An attendant proposal to dismantle most ministry-equivalents and privatize a large number of services currently managed and provided by the government was given relatively short shrift. The focus on wealth distribution reflects the fact that ordinary Libyans, exhausted by the pervasive chaos that has characterized al-Qadhafi's regime and its successive political-economic experiments, are frustrated by politics and seek the comfort of a marginally better day-to-day quality of life. Despite talk of a possible constitution and perhaps even elections, Libyans are mostly sober-minded about the prospect and likely pace of political change, at least while Muammar al-Qadhafi remains alive and in control. But they are cautiously optimistic that the limited economic reforms that have been undertaken to date will continue, and that their salaries will somehow increase enough to allow them to enjoy more of the consumer goods that they were largely deprived of for more than 20 years. All eyes are now on the upcoming session of the General People's Congress, expected to convene early next week. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI196

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI196 aka Wikileaks id #194550 ?
Subject	TWEAKING THE TIGERS' TAIL: SAIF AL-ISLAM OPENS NEW HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Mar 2009 16:43 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI196.html
References	08TRIPOLI960 , 09TRIPOLI22 , 09TRIPOLI960
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI208
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6028
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0196/01 0601643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011643Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4563
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5089
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1022
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0708
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000196

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM) AND NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/1/2019
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TWEAKING THE TIGERS' TAIL: SAIF AL-ISLAM OPENS NEW HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION IN LIBYA

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 960 , B) TRIPOLI 0022

TRIPOLI 00000196 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi has established a new human rights organization, the Arab Alliance for Democracy, Development and Human Rights, whose mandate would consist of tracking human rights abuses in the Middle East, to include identifying specific individuals who perpetrate abuses and targeting them for sanctions. An initial meeting of NGO representatives from the region took place in Tripoli; Saif

representatives from the region took place in Tripoli, Saif al-Islam was elected honorary chair, and the organization is "up and running". The organization has been in touch with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about how to be an effective human rights organization, and has invited Human Rights Watch, the National Democratic Institute and the International Republic Institute to visit Libya. End summary.

SAIF AL-ISLAM ANNOUNCES NEW HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATION

¶2. (SBU) International media reported on the margins of the recent World Economic Forum in Davos that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi and Chairman of the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), had announced his intention to establish a human rights organization whose mandate would include tracking human rights abuses in the Middle East. The QDF's Executive Director, Yusuf Sawani, told the DCM on February 22 that the new organization had been established and was " ... up and running". The new entity, named the Arab Alliance for Democracy, Development and Human Rights (AADDHR), was headquartered in Tripoli and was separate from the QDF. An initial meeting, attended by NGO representatives from more than 20 countries, was held in Tripoli in mid-February. Saif al-Islam was elected Chairman of the AADDHR, an honorary position, and Dr. Ali Said Ali, a professor from Libya's Gar Younis University, was appointed General Coordinator. Saif al-Islam also recently announced that he intends to open a democracy research institute in Europe (London and Vienna, two cities he knows well, have been mentioned), which could afford a more removed platform from which to pursue issues still deemed neuralgic by some in Libya.

WHICH WILL PURSUE A "NAME AND SHAME" POLICY AND IS IN TOUCH WITH WESTERN NGOS

¶3. (C) In his announcement at Davos, Saif al-Islam said that among the new organization's goals was an initiative to develop a mechanism to identify individuals who had perpetrated human rights abuses, maintain a database listing details of those acts and target those individuals for sanctions. Sawani confirmed that organizations in attendance at the mid-February meeting had endorsed the "name and shame" policy, and said it would be initiated "soon". Before Saif al-Islam's announcement in Davos, contacts at the QDF and the affiliated Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL) told P/E Chief they were concerned that Libya could open itself to considerable criticism if the new organziation actually implemented the plan. Externally-based Libyan opposition groups have been carefully collecting information about the GOL's human rights abuses and would likely submit copious listing requests. Those contacts also expressed concern that Saif al-Islam, who has had a series of disagreements in recent months with his brother, Muatassim (the National Security Adviser), and conservative regime elements (some of whom would likely be eligible for listing as human rights abusers), could be giving his opponents within Libya another cudgel with which to beat him.

¶4. (SBU) Sawani said the AADDHR had been in touch with Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch about how to be an effective human rights organization. Following up on meetings between U.S.-based human rights NGOs and Saif al-Islam during the latter's visit to the U.S. late last year, the AADDHR has invited HRW, the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute to visit Libya. In addition, Sawani and Ali applied for U.S. visas on February 25 and expect to travel to the U.S. in the next several days to continue discussions with U.S. human rights NGOs.

EFFICACY MAY DEPEND IN PART ON SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STRUGGLE WITH CONSERVATIVE LIBYAN REGIME ELEMENTS

¶5. (C) The announcement of the new organization at Davos coincided with the arrest of Dr. Juma'a Atiaga, who was detained

on allegations that he was involved in a banned political organization and had a hand in the 1984 assasination of Libya's former Ambassador to Rome, Ammar Daw. In interviews with al-Sharq al-Awsat at the time, Saif al-Islam decried the arrest as "ridiculous". The QDF issued a statement on its website calling for Atiaga's release and criticizing GOL authorities for having arrested Atiaga while ignoring other cases involving allegations of human rights abuses that the QDF had brought to

TRIPOLI 00000196 002.2 OF 002

the attention of prosecutors. Well-informed contacts in Libya have reported that Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who has been engaged in a quiet struggle with Saif al-Islam, ordered the Prosecutor General for north Tripoli to make the arrest. Other reports suggest that National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi orchestrated the arrest through the Prime Minister's office in retaliation for Saif's encroachment on a business deal Muatassim was trying to broker. Atiaga was released on February 16, but the investigation against him continues.

¶6. (C) Comment: Human rights remains one of the most sensitive issues in Libya, particularly for conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of the late 1970's and 1980's. Most human rights initiatives backed by Saif al-Islam and the QDF (the Bulgarian nurses, families of victims of the 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre, the release of former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members) have downplayed personal responsibility and focused on compensation as a means to resolve old grievances. Identifying and seeking to hold accountable specific individuals would be a significant evolution. While the AADDHR is formally focused on events throughout the region, the fact that it is headquartered in Tripoli and operating under Saif al-Islam's auspices will make it hard for old guard elements to swallow. The extent to which it is able to effectively operate - particularly with respect to allegations of abuses involving Libyan officials - remains to be seen. Saif al-Islam has a reputation for making sensational public announcements about new initiatives and then not following through. In that regard, the QDF's fitful role as a mediator in the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (ref A and previous), and the involvement of a senior lieutenant of Saif's in recent attacks against Berbers (ref B), afford cautionary tales with respect to how much we can reasonably expect from the new-constituted AADDHR. Nonetheless, the new organization could present a useful portal for USG and foreign NGO engagement with Libya on human rights issues. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI197

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI197 aka Wikileaks id #194881 ?
Subject	LIBYA: UN APPEALS TRIBUNAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Mar 2009 10:10 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI197.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7681
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0197 0621010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 031010Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4565
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0164
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5091
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000197

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND IO/MPR (BHACKETT)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , KAWC [Atrocities and War Crimes] , KJUS [Administration of
Justice] , KUNR [UN Reform] , PREL [External Political Relations] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , UNGA/C-5 [UN
General Assembly Adm and Budget Committee, UN General Assembly Fifth Committee] , UNGA/C-6 [UN General Assembly
Legal Committee, UN General Assembly Sixth Committee] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: UN APPEALS TRIBUNAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: STATE 16254

(U) Post delivered reftel points and nonpaper to the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), Office of International
Organizations on March 1.  We well report any substantive
response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI198

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI198 aka Wikileaks id #194957 ?
Subject	BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Mar 2009 14:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI198.html
References	08TRIPOLI530
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI258 , 10TRIPOLI136
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 22 Feb 2011 17:31: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
From: CBPC, EACTAPP
Sent: Tuesday, March 03, 2009 4:33 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000198 P CO 03-MAR-09 BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD? SAADI
AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA [8590535]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO8024
PP RUEHDE RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0198/01 0621442
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031442Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4566
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0710
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1024
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0497
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1422
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0781
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0909
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0847
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0029
RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0032
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5092
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000198

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; STATE FOR NEA/MAG; PARIS FOR WALLER; LONDON
FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/2/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] ,
EINV [Foreign Investments] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EAIR [Civil Aviation] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: BLACK SHEEP MADE GOOD?  SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S EXPORT FREE ZONE IN WESTERN LIBYA

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 530
```

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 550

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Saadi al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently turned his attention to transforming an area near the western Libyan town of Zuwara into an Export Free Trade Zone. The project would include an airport, immigration and customs operations, a high tech industrial park, banks, medical centers and educational facilities. During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara late last year, he promised to help bring the project to reality; work began a few days after the visit. As with most business ventures in Libya, there are considerable political dimensions to any economic enterprise. A desire to provide tangible deliverables to a leading city of the Berbers, with whom his regime has had a historically contentious relationship, may have helped prompt al-Qadhafi's support.
Saadi's status as a son of the first family may mean that his project stands a better chance of surviving as government budgets are tightened in light of flat oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lends a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation. Regardless, the Berber-dominated town of Zuwara will benefit from the creation of new employment, both in the construction phase and later in the running of the zone.
End summary.

SAADI SETTLES IN

¶2. (C) Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, has recently spent considerable time in the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara, located in western Libya near the border with Tunisia. Saadi was married off several years ago to the daughter of prominent regime figure al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi in an effort to smooth over his turbulent personal life; however, his Polish girlfriend stayed with him for an extended period in Zuwara last year. (Note: Al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi was one of the original Free Officers who helped stage the 1969 coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi power. In the early to mid-1990's he played a leading role in Libya's security apparatus; although his direct power has since diminished, he remains a prominent figure and enjoys considerable influence. End note.) According to residents, including a locally-engaged member of Post's staff, Saadi does his own shopping and walks the streets of Zuwara's small downtown area, usually with a small security detail. A former professional footballer (he enjoyed a single season with Perugia in Italy's Serie A league, owns a significant share of al-Ahli - one of the two biggest soccer teams in Libya - and has run Libya's Football Federation) and engineer by training, Saadi's focus has drifted from soccer to the military (he was briefly an officer in a special forces unit and reportedly did well, but was bored by military life) to movies (he owns the film production company World Navigator Entertainment). He now appears to be focused on developing Zuwara into an Export Free Zone.

ZUWARA PROJECT SIZEABLE IN SCOPE

¶3. (SBU) The Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone project was initiated in 2006 when Saadi, who is Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Zuwara-Abu Kammash Development Zone, and Mohammed Ali Alabbar, Chairman of Dubai-based Emaar Properties, signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to develop the area located between the city of Zuwara and the fishing village of Ras-Ajdar. The latter is located on the Libya-Tunisia border.
The zone is intended to encourage foreign investment and prompt industrial and commercial development and tourism that will contribute to long-term economic growth. In a press release, Saadi highlighted the project as a means by which to diversify Libya's economy, reduce dependence on oil revenues, create jobs and strengthen foreign investment. The design of the project was assigned to a number of multinational companies, which have developed a phased plan for the project. In late 2008, Emirati Emaar Properties and the Government of Libya (GOL) created a joint venture company to be the main developer of Phase 1, which included developing residential, commercial, industrial, educational, healthcare, leisure and entertainment components designed to attract foreign investment and generate employment.

¶4. (SBU) If implemented, the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone would be the first of its kind in Libya. It would have unique

features such as its own harbor and airport, and immigration and customs offices to facilitate vistors' entry into Libya, and would be a fully-functioning hub for business investors. In a nod to cultural sensitivity, there would be multi-religious worship

facilities in the zone and the area would deliberately cultivate "western style" business laws with which European and American companies would be familiar. Locally-engaged Embassy staff resident in Zuwara have heard credible reports that Saadi has secured agreement to sell alcohol in the zone as part of an effort to make it attractive to potential expatriate investors and business interests. (Note: Libya is technically dry, although there is a thriving black market for alcohol and discreet drinking is tacitly accepted. A number of new hotels in Tripoli due to open soon have requested liquor licenses and believe they may get them, although there is credible reporting suggesting that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally opposes the consumption of alcohol and will not allow it so long as he remains in power. End note.)

LEADER'S VISIT SPARKS MOVEMENT ON CONSTRUCTION

¶5. (C) During a rare visit by Muammar al-Qadhafi to Zuwara in September 2008, he promised to help bring the project to fruition. His visit and interest in the project may have been partly prompted by a desire to provide tangible deliverables to the Berber community, with which his regime has had a historically contentious relationship. In 2007, the GOL showed some evidence of reversing its longstanding denial that any Berber communities exist in Libya and granted permission to the Amazigh (Berber) World Congress to host a large gathering in Tripoli in August 2007. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, and the Prime Minister made high-profile visits in August and September 2007 to predominantly Berber communities and announced major infrastructure investments; however, in March 2008 the GOL hotly criticized a request for Emboffs to visit Berber leaders in Zuwara and in May 2008 Muammar al-Qadhafi denied the existence of an ethno-linguistically distinct Berber minority in a visit to Berber tribes near Jadu (reftel).

¶6. (C) Within a few days of his al-Qadhafi's visit to Zuwara, significant work on the free trade zone project began. On a site visit to Zwara in October 2008, Econoff noticed several old buildings being torn down along the beachfront to make way for new buildings. Roads have been re-surfaced in record time and the city's main entrance from the coastal road leading to Tripoli has been spruced up with palm trees and landscaping. Local residents have remarked that their town, which had been a bit dusty and shabby, now looks like "an international city". A project to build another water desalination plant has just been awarded to a Turkish contractor and work has begun, which will directly contribute to the overall standard of living for Zuwara's residents. There is talk in the town of Zwara that the best building in town, previously owned by the National Livestock Company, will host the new joint venture company that will manage construction of the free zone.

¶7. (C) Comment: Saadi's status as a son of the first family likely means that the Zuwara Export Free Trade Zone stands a better chance of surviving as budgets are trimmed in light of flat oil prices. As reported previously, the GOL had initially pegged its 2009 national budget (now being debated at the session of the General People's Congress currently underway) to a price per barrel of USD 65; however, it recently re-calibrated the budget and significantly reduced outlays on some development projects to reflect sagging oil prices. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lend a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation. Saadi has a troubled past, including scuffles with police in Europe (especially Italy), abuse of drugs and alcohol, excessive partying, travel abroad in contravention of his father's wishes and profligate affairs with men and women. His bisexuality is reportedly a point of extreme contention with his father and partly prompted the decision to arrange his marriage to al-Khweildi al-Hmeidi's daughter. Creating the appearance of useful employment for al-Qadhafi's offspring has been an important objective for the regime. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the oldest of al-Qadhafi's children, but by his first wife)

TRIPOLI 00000198 003 OF 003

dominates the telecommunciations sector, Saif al-Islam is the presumed heir-apparent and is focused on civil society and political-economic reform, Muatassim is National Security Adviser, Hannibal (another miscreant whose recent misbehavior in Geneva is the cause of the current rupture in Swiss-Libyan
relations) has maritime shipping, Khamis is commanding officer of Libya's premier military unit and Aisha runs a quasi-governmental organization and helps mediate family disputes. The mystery candidate is Saif al-Arab, who reportedly spends most of his time in Munich, where he is involved in ill-defined business pursuits and spends much of his time partying. Regardless of any desire to appease the Berber community and/or paternalistic motives behind the GOL's support for the free trade zone, the town of Zuwara and its predominantly Berber residents stand to benefit in the end from the project. End comment.

project. End comment.
CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family’s Exploits - NYTimes.com
- WikiLeaks cables: A guide to Gaddafi's 'famously fractious' family | World news | The Guardian
- Qaddafi's Son Is Bisexual and Other Things the New York Times Doesn't Want You to Know
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI2

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI2 aka Wikileaks id #185629 ?
Subject	ORTEGA GETS NEITHER DINARS NOR PESOS FROM AL-QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 4 Jan 2009 14:54 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI2.html
References	08LAPAZ2055 , 09TRIPOLI870
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI939
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 26 Apr 2011 08:25 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Mon, 2 May 2011 23:01 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9307
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0002/01 0041454
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 041454Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4289
INFO RUEHMU/AMEMBASSY MANAGUA 0001
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 0001
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0005
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0005
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4812
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000002

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/31/2018
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KTIA *[Treaties and International Agreements]* , NU *[Nicaragua]* , BO *[Belarus]* , VZ *[Venezuela]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: ORTEGA GETS NEITHER DINARS NOR PESOS FROM AL-QADHAFI

REF: A) LA PAZ 2055 , B) TRIPOLI 870 , C) TRIPOLI O-I - 23-SEP-2008

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, A/DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega visited Tripoli December 19-22, ostensibly to promote south-south cooperation and compare notes on the "anti-imperialist" movement; however, senior contacts at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), told us the visit was largely symbolic and that Ortega devoted much of his visit trying to drum up cash for his political operation and investment in Nicaragua. Like Bolivian President Evo Morales before him, Ortega left Libya

empty-handed. While Libya seeks to balance reengagement with the U.S. with high-profile meetings with anti-U.S. leaders, it seems to lack both the capacity and the interest to pursue more substantive interaction with Latin American governments. End Summary.

ORTEGA PASSES THE CUP, LEAVES EMPTY-HANDED

¶2. (C) In a December 29 meeting, MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) told A/DCM that Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega's four-day visit to Libya was "largely symbolic" and appeared to have been largely motivated by Ortega's need for financial assistance. Fituri, who heads the Libya-Nicaragua Cooperation Committee, participated in almost all of Ortega's program, including his three meetings with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, a fellow "long-time revolutionary". Ortega highlighted consultations on developments in Latin American integration, South-South (i.e. Latin American-African) cooperation and coordination in the "anti-imperialist movement" in his remarks to Spanish-language press upon his return to Managua. According to Fituri, though, Ortega spent most of his time complaining about his tense domestic situation and seeking cash for his party, which Fituri described as "extremely cash strapped".

¶3. (C) Ortega also met privately with al-Qadhafi's Chief of Staff,Bashir Saleh, Secretary of the General People's Committee (PM-equivalent) al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) Chairman Mustafa Layas and the and the head of Libya's Great Manmade River Project. Ortega focused in those meetings on drumming up investment in Nicaragua's project to build a canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as various water treatment projects. Fituri downplayed the possibility that Libya would invest in Nicaragua, noting that the LIA did not assess the proposals as either promising or profitable and recommended against investment. Al-Qadhafi complained to that Ortega had come mostly to "cry on his shoulder" and hold out his hand for contributions, but his hopes of receiving a cash infusion apparently went unfulfilled. Fituri noted that "the days of the Jamahiriya handing out dollars - with the exception of sub-Saharan Africa - are over, even for brother revolutionaries".

LIBYA SEEKS SYMBOLIC LINKS, BUT CAN'T AFFORD DEEPER COOPERATION

¶4. (C) Ortega's visit marks the second visit to Tripoli by an ALBA president in 2008, in addition to a trip by Argentine President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner. Bolivian President Evo Morales met with al-Qadhafi on the eve of al-Qadhafi's speech commemorating the coup that brought him to power on September 1. Morales' trip inaugurated formal Libyan-Bolivian ties, but the meeting could have gone much differently. Spanish CDA Rafael Reig told Poloff that he was instrumental in facilitating the event given Boliva's lack of representation here. (Note: Bolivia has yet to send diplomatic staff to take up residence in Tripoli. End note.) In the end, al-Qadhafi met with the ambassadors of Venezuela, Cuba, and Argentina along with Morales - leaving the Spanish envoy to wait in the hotel lobby. Ortega's trip received even less attention in the diplomatic corps - none of the Spanish-speaking legations were convoked or informed of the visit.

¶5. (C) Comment: While Libya is keen to pursue symbolic alliances with anti-U.S. leaders to balance the perception that it has gone western by finalizing the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, Ortega's visit is illustrative of Libya's more pragmatic approach to relationships outside its sphere of influence. Morales' trip occasioned a hastily-prepared draft treaty calling for a "South Atlantic Treaty Organization" (ref A), but as the price of oil falls and the price of diplomatic leadership becomes more dear, Libya will focus its petrodinars on al-Qadhafi's more immediate goal of a United States of Africa. Libya's MFA boasts few English speakers and fewer

Africa. Libya's MFA boasts few English speakers and fewer
Spanish speakers and Latin American diplomats here are not
active, leaving few channels for substantive exchanges between
Libya and Latin America. Libya's interests include showing
balance after their recent reopening with the West (ref B), but

TRIPOLI 00000002 002 OF 002

they are unlikely to accept great financial or political risk in
non-neighboring relations without the promise of an even greater
reward. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI201

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI201 aka Wikileaks id #195400 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MARCH 10-11
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 5 Mar 2009 12:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI201.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0539
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0201/01 0641201
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 051201Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4571
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1425
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0785
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0912
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0850
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0022
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0148
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0158
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5097
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000201

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR CDR AFRICOM

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/3/2019
TAGS: OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders] , (WWARD), PREL [External Political Relations] ,
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] ,
KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA,
MARCH 10-11

TRIPOLI 00000201  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: J. Christopher Stevens, DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Your visit comes two weeks after the most
recent Council of Colonels meeting in Tripoli and as Libya is
faced with key decisions on its future course in both domestic
and African politics.  Libya's parliament voted on March 4 to
```

defer a decision on Muammar al-Qadhafi's controversial proposal to distribute the country's oil wealth directly to the people and disband most government ministries. On Wednesday, It also approved a cabinet shake-up with intelligence chief Musa Kusa as the new foreign minister; there were no changes in the military leadership. Last month's election to the African Union chairmanship provides al-Qadhafi with a high-profile platform from which he can trumpet his vision of Africa and rail against Western interference on the continent. Regime officials, and al-Qadhafi in particular, value relationships with high-level Western officials and your visit provides an excellent opportunity to develop the rapport necessary to cultivate future gains here. You are the first COCOM commander to visit Libya since the evacuation of Wheelus Air Force Base - now styled Mitiga Air Base and the airfield at which you will land - in the early 1970s; an historic first coming on the heels of the September 2008 visit of then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the signing of a Mil-Mil MOU in January 2009. End summary.

Key issues:

-- AFRICOM's mandate
-- Transnational terrorism (AQIM in the Sahel/Sahara) and humanitarian assistance
-- Technology and lethal weapon sales to Libya
-- Libya's African Union chair
-- African crises: Darfur, Somalia, Mauritania
-- Developing working-level ties

LIBYA: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

¶2. (S//NF) After several years of negotiation, Libya fulfilled its obligations under the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement - providing funds for the victims of Pam Am 103 and LaBelle bombings, among others - on October 31, 2008. The implementation allowed us to move forward on the Mil-Mil MOU, which was signed in Washington in January. It also increased the number of high-level visits between the two countries including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's two-week trip to the US in November and his brother Muatassim al-Qadhafi's trip to Washington planned for April. Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, several old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the re-engagement project and some facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the often mercurial inner circle. Muammar al-Qadhafi started his political life as an ardent Nasserite. He has more recently shifted to Pan-Africanism in an attempt to broaden his influence into countries where support can be purchased less dearly. He very likely believes his own rhetoric that he is a champion for a continent that suffered 400 years of colonization. More pragmatically, the Libyan leadership is wary of foreign influence inside its sphere of influence.

¶3. (S//NF) While al-Qadhafi has recently seized the African spotlight, the domestic political and economic situation is at a critical juncture as the regime weighs the benefits of modernization and opening to the West with maintaining its grip on government and industry. Al-Qadhafi routinely shifts influence between his lieutenants to keep the power structure unbalanced - a tactic he also employs with his children. Two sons - Saif al-Islam (head of the quasi-NGO Qadhafi Development Foundation) and Muatassim (head of Libya's National Security Council) - are thought to be possible heirs to their father's mantle. Muatassim, with whom you will meet, has been a proponent of improved ties with the US, and is eager to purchase US weaponry. The potential for political turmoil is compounded by prospects for economic reform. The lifting of sanctions and attendant increases in consumer spending have exacerbated the disparity between the elite and the poor. Al-Qadhafi proposed abolishing the General People's Committee system (the ministry system of which he is the author) in favor of distributing oil wealth to citizens in the form of large monthly checks, but the global financial crisis and the dramatic fall of oil prices have

global financial crisis and the dramatic fall of oil prices have caused Libyan policy makers to rethink both their domestic reform agenda and the extent to which they can purchase influence in Africa. The parliament -- "the General People's

TRIPOLI 00000201 002.2 OF 003

Congress" -- voted on March 4 to defer al-Qadhafi's wealth-distribution proposal. It also approved a new cabinet, keeping the prime minister but replacing the foreign minister, Abdulrahman Shalgam, with the head of Libya's External Security Organization, Musa Kusa. No changes were made to the military leadership.

AFRICOM'S MANDATE: LIBYA AGAINST BOOTS AND BASES

¶4. (S//NF) Since the former Secretary of State's visit to Tripoli in September, regime officials have slowly come to terms with AFRICOM as we have explained more of your mission. A clear explanation of AFRICOM's mandate and expected activities on the continent, as well as a two-way discussion on areas of military-to-military cooperation will be welcomed by your interlocutors. Reiterating AFRICOM's support and humanitarian roles while allaying their fears about American troops or bases on the continent is another message they will be keen to receive. While Libya is a strong partner on counterterrorism, the Libyans remain wary of initiatives that put foreign military or intelligence assets too close to their borders. They are unlikely to join the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, due as much to unwillingness to appear subservient to US interests as genuine distrust of U.S. intentions from certain old-guard regime elements. Negotiations on the Mil-Mil MOU stalled on Libyan insistence that the language include security assurances on par with our NATO obligations. AFRICOM's capacity-building component and support for peacekeeping forces may appease some, but we expect your military interlocutors will use your visit as an opportunity to tie their cooperation to security assurances.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

¶5. (S//NF) Libya is a top partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara and worries that instability and weak governments to their south could lead to a "belt of terrorism" stretching from Mauritania to Somalia. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on his recent initiatives with Tuareg tribes to persuade them to lay down arms and spurn cooperation with al-Qaeda elements in the border region; this is an issue worth exploring with him, while being mindful that he will oppose U.S. military activity in what he views as his backyard. He is also proud of his humantarian activities on the continent, which are directed principally on behalf of women and children. Libya recognizes that African peacekeeping and regional security forces are poorly trained and equipped and several diplomats have indicated they would be amenable to continued US assistance in these areas. Al-Qadhafi makes a distinction between "imperialist" countries and "colonizing" ones, but walks a fine line between seeking military assistance from European powers he views as responsible for Africa's ills while keeping a hard line on national sovereignty. Libya's recent "friendship treaty" with Italy held the old colonial power responsible for de-mining circa WWII ordinance still in Libya. We have proposed a US role under UN auspices on de-mining; they await an al-Qadhafi imprimatur before beginning their program and are concerned that a DOD or USG affiliation could make humanitarian assistance a tougher sell.

LIBYA SEEKS US LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT

¶6. (S//NF) Throughout the negotiations to close outstanding compensation claims and re-open to the US, Libyan officials have

been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal and non-lethal. Muatassim met with then A/S David Welch on the margins of the Secretary's September visit and Libyan officials presented "wish lists" in the context of signing the Mil-Mil MOU. Muatassim accompanied his father on a high-profile trip to Moscow in October to discuss potential deals, but his father's trips to Belarus and Ukraine were seen as an attempt to bring the price-point down for weapons deals. Their wish-lists comprise both lethal and non-lethal materiel and we have told the GOL that sales will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, particularly since not all senior USG leaders who would have a say on the subject have been appointed by the new administration. You are likely to hear two familiar refrains: that the U.S. "owes" Libya security cooperation (read: sales and security guarantees) in return for al-Qadhafi's decision to give

up his WMD aspirations; and that the U.S. should return or reimburse Libya for the C130s it purchased in the 1970s which were ultimately never delivered. In effect, the Libyans have made military sales a key litmus of US trust and future intentions. In response, you might say that the U.S. looks forward to developing the bilateral security relationship and this process will take time; the C130s are a commercial matter best pursued with Lockheed-Martin.

LIBYA'S AFRICAN UNION CHAIR

¶7. (S//NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union will be a rhetorical hurdle that AFRICOM must clear throughout the year. However, there is some distance between what al-Qadhafi says and what Libyan officials are willing and able to implement. The Leader is temperamental and makes decisions based on personal relationships. Deference for his leadership on the continent may appeal to him; the perception that the US military knows what is best for Africa will not. He has shown that he is willing to stake bilateral relationships on family honor, first with Saudi Arabia and currently in the ongoing diplomatic row caused by his son Hannibal's July 2008 arrest in Geneva. Despite his vocal rebukes of Western influence in Africa, al-Qadhafi needs his chairmanship to be seen as a success - a potentially useful opening for increased engagement. When possible, crafting programs that give Libya symbolic leadership reduces the chance that al-Qadhafi will play the spoiler.

DARFUR, SOMALIA, MAURITANIA: LIBYA'S ROLE

¶8. (S//NF) The combination of al-Qadhafi's continental ambitions, concerns about the destabilizing potential of militant Islam in the Sahel, and reticence to have foreign troops too near its borders have compelled Libya to insert itself in African crises - to mixed results. It is worth raising the crises with Libya's top leadership to give the US a better picture of Libya's potential action in these theaters. In Sudan, Libya is expected to lead the charge at the United Nations against an ICC prosecution of Bashir. Libya mediated between the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum and secured an exchange of ambassadors between the two capitals last year. Their support for rebel groups seems to have waned in the past year. The regime is upset that Qatar has diminished what Libya views as its influence in Darfur and al-Qadhafi appears to be shifting from practical diplomacy (and the cash that comes with it) to lambasting the West and Israel for causing the trouble between the Fur and Khartoum. In Somalia, the regime showed modest support for Abullahi Yusuf but shifted to Sheikh Sharif when it became clear he would take power. While al-Qadhafi has defended Somali pirates as "defenders against foreign intervention" in Somalia, Libya's actual policies remain in concert with those of the UN Security Council. Libya supports

June elections in Mauritania, but notes that the coup was a "special" coup since the parliament - and therefore the people - support the junta. Al-Qadhafi is engaged personally on the issue and has hosted senior-level Mauritanian officials from both camps in the past week.

REGULARIZING WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS

¶9. (S//NF) Libyan officials value personal relationships with high-ranking Western officials. However, they lack both a bureaucratic capacity and willingness on the working levels to manage the day-to-day business of bilateral relations. In your meetings with Libya military counterparts, it would be helpful to emphasize the important SAO role of the DAO, highlighting the DAO as the primary address for Mil-Mil engagement.

WELCOME

¶10. (C) We are confident that your visit to Tripoli will open new doors for continued cooperation. Military cooperation is a key metric to determine the extent to which the Libyan government wishes to engage with the US. We hope your visit will assuage the fears of the more conservative elements of the regime while paving the way for AFRICOM's continued success.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI202

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI202 aka Wikileaks id #195401 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MARCH 10-11
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 5 Mar 2009 12:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI202.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI401
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0540
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0202/01 0641201
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 051201Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4574
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1428
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0788
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0915
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0853
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0025
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0151
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0161
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5100
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000202

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR CDR AFRICOM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/3/2019
TAGS: OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , (WWARD), PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MARCH 10-11

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Christopher Stevens, DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Your visit comes two weeks after the most recent Council of Colonels meeting in Tripoli and as Libya is faced with key decisions on its future course in both domestic and African politics. Libya's parliament voted on March 4 to defer a decision on Muammar al-Qadhafi's controversial proposal to distribute the country's oil wealth directly to the people and disband most government ministries. On Wednesday, it also

approved a cabinet shake-up with intelligence chief Musa Kusa as the new foreign minister; there were no changes in the military leadership. Last month's election to the African Union chairmanship provides al-Qadhafi with a high-profile platform from which he can trumpet his vision of Africa and rail against Western interference on the continent. Regime officials, and al-Qadhafi in particular, value relationships with high-level Western officials and your visit provides an excellent opportunity to develop the rapport necessary to cultivate future gains here. You are the first COCOM commander to visit Libya since the evacuation of Wheelus Air Force Base - now styled Mitiga Air Base and the airfield at which you will land - in the early 1970s; an historic first coming on the heels of the September 2008 visit of then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and the signing of a Mil-Mil MOU in January 2009. End summary.

Key issues:

-- AFRICOM's mandate
-- Transnational terrorism (AQIM in the Sahel/Sahara) and humanitarian assistance
-- Technology and lethal weapon sales to Libya
-- Libya's African Union chair
-- African crises: Darfur, Somalia, Mauritania
-- Developing working-level ties

LIBYA: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

¶2. (S//NF) After several years of negotiation, Libya fulfilled its obligations under the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement - providing funds for the victims of Pam Am 103 and LaBelle bombings, among others - on October 31, 2008. The implementation allowed us to move forward on the Mil-Mil MOU, which was signed in Washington in January. It also increased the number of high-level visits between the two countries including Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's two-week trip to the US in November and his brother Muatassim al-Qadhafi's trip to Washington planned for April. Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, several old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the re-engagement project and some facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the often mercurial inner circle. Muammar al-Qadhafi started his political life as an ardent Nasserite. He has more recently shifted to Pan-Africanism in an attempt to broaden his influence into countries where support can be purchased less dearly. He very likely believes his own rhetoric that he is a champion for a continent that suffered 400 years of colonization. More pragmatically, the Libyan leadership is wary of foreign influence inside its sphere of influence.

¶3. (S//NF) While al-Qadhafi has recently seized the African spotlight, the domestic political and economic situation is at a critical juncture as the regime weighs the benefits of modernization and opening to the West with maintaining its grip on government and industry. Al-Qadhafi routinely shifts influence between his lieutenants to keep the power structure unbalanced - a tactic he also employs with his children. Two sons - Saif al-Islam (head of the quasi-NGO Qadhafi Development Foundation) and Muatassim (head of Libya's National Security Council) - are thought to be possible heirs to their father's mantle. Muatassim, with whom you will meet, has been a proponent of improved ties with the US, and is eager to purchase US weaponry. The potential for political turmoil is compounded by prospects for economic reform. The lifting of sanctions and attendant increases in consumer spending have exacerbated the disparity between the elite and the poor. Al-Qadhafi proposed abolishing the General People's Committee system (the ministry system of which he is the author) in favor of distributing oil wealth to citizens in the form of large monthly checks, but the global financial crisis and the dramatic fall of oil prices have caused Libyan policy makers to rethink both their domestic reform agenda and the extent to which they can purchase

influence in Africa. The parliament -- "the General People's Congress" -- voted on March 4 to defer al-Qadhafi's

wealth-distribution proposal. It also approved a new cabinet, keeping the prime minister but replacing the foreign minister, Abdulrahman Shalgam, with the head of Libya's External Security Organization, Musa Kusa. No changes were made to the military leadership.

AFRICOM'S MANDATE: LIBYA AGAINST BOOTS AND BASES

¶4. (S//NF) Since the former Secretary of State's visit to Tripoli in September, regime officials have slowly come to terms with AFRICOM as we have explained more of your mission. A clear explanation of AFRICOM's mandate and expected activities on the continent, as well as a two-way discussion on areas of military-to-military cooperation will be welcomed by your interlocutors. Reiterating AFRICOM's support and humanitarian roles while allaying their fears about American troops or bases on the continent is another message they will be keen to receive. While Libya is a strong partner on counterterrorism, the Libyans remain wary of initiatives that put foreign military or intelligence assets too close to their borders. They are unlikely to join the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership, due as much to unwillingness to appear subservient to US interests as genuine distrust of U.S. intentions from certain old-guard regime elements. Negotiations on the Mil-Mil MOU stalled on Libyan insistence that the language include security assurances on par with our NATO obligations. AFRICOM's capacity-building component and support for peacekeeping forces may appease some, but we expect your military interlocutors will use your visit as an opportunity to tie their cooperation to security assurances.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM AND HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

¶5. (S//NF) Libya is a top partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara and worries that instability and weak governments to their south could lead to a "belt of terrorism" stretching from Mauritania to Somalia. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on his recent initiatives with Tuareg tribes to persuade them to lay down arms and spurn cooperation with al-Qaeda elements in the border region; this is an issue worth exploring with him, while being mindful that he will oppose U.S. military activity in what he views as his backyard. He is also proud of his humantarian activities on the continent, which are directed principally on behalf of women and children. Libya recognizes that African peacekeeping and regional security forces are poorly trained and equipped and several diplomats have indicated they would be amenable to continued US assistance in these areas. Al-Qadhafi makes a distinction between "imperialist" countries and "colonizing" ones, but walks a fine line between seeking military assistance from European powers he views as responsible for Africa's ills while keeping a hard line on national sovereignty. Libya's recent "friendship treaty" with Italy held the old colonial power responsible for de-mining circa WWII ordinance still in Libya. We have proposed a US role under UN auspices on de-mining; they await an al-Qadhafi imprimatur before beginning their program and are concerned that a DOD or USG affiliation could make humanitarian assistance a tougher sell.

LIBYA SEEKS US LETHAL AND NON-LETHAL MILITARY EQUIPMENT

¶6. (S//NF) Throughout the negotiations to close outstanding compensation claims and re-open to the US, Libyan officials have been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal and non-lethal. Muatassim met with then A/S David Welch on the margins of the Secretary's September visit and Libyan officials

margins of the Secretary's September visit and Libyan officials presented "wish lists" in the context of signing the Mil-Mil MOU. Muatassim accompanied his father on a high-profile trip to Moscow in October to discuss potential deals, but his father's trips to Belarus and Ukraine were seen as an attempt to bring the price-point down for weapons deals. Their wish-lists comprise both lethal and non-lethal materiel and we have told the GOL that sales will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis, particularly since not all senior USG leaders who would have a say on the subject have been appointed by the new administration. You are likely to hear two familiar refrains: that the U.S. "owes" Libya security cooperation (read: sales and security guarantees) in return for al-Qadhafi's decision to give up his WMD aspirations; and that the U.S. should return or reimburse Libya for the C130s it purchased in the 1970s which

TRIPOLI 00000202 003 OF 003

were ultimately never delivered. In effect, the Libyans have made military sales a key litmus of US trust and future intentions. In response, you might say that the U.S. looks forward to developing the bilateral security relationship and this process will take time; the C130s are a commercial matter best pursued with Lockheed-Martin.

LIBYA'S AFRICAN UNION CHAIR

¶7. (S//NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union will be a rhetorical hurdle that AFRICOM must clear throughout the year. However, there is some distance between what al-Qadhafi says and what Libyan officials are willing and able to implement. The Leader is temperamental and makes decisions based on personal relationships. Deference for his leadership on the continent may appeal to him; the perception that the US military knows what is best for Africa will not. He has shown that he is willing to stake bilateral relationships on family honor, first with Saudi Arabia and currently in the ongoing diplomatic row caused by his son Hannibal's July 2008 arrest in Geneva. Despite his vocal rebukes of Western influence in Africa, al-Qadhafi needs his chairmanship to be seen as a success - a potentially useful opening for increased engagement. When possible, crafting programs that give Libya symbolic leadership reduces the chance that al-Qadhafi will play the spoiler.

DARFUR, SOMALIA, MAURITANIA: LIBYA'S ROLE

¶8. (S//NF) The combination of al-Qadhafi's continental ambitions, concerns about the destabilizing potential of militant Islam in the Sahel, and reticence to have foreign troops too near its borders have compelled Libya to insert itself in African crises - to mixed results. It is worth raising the crises with Libya's top leadership to give the US a better picture of Libya's potential action in these theaters. In Sudan, Libya is expected to lead the charge at the United Nations against an ICC prosecution of Bashir. Libya mediated between the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum and secured an exchange of ambassadors between the two capitals last year. Their support for rebel groups seems to have waned in the past year. The regime is upset that Qatar has diminished what Libya views as its influence in Darfur and al-Qadhafi appears to be shifting from practical diplomacy (and the cash that comes with it) to lambasting the West and Israel for causing the trouble between the Fur and Khartoum. In Somalia, the regime showed modest support for Abullahi Yusuf but shifted to Sheikh Sharif when it became clear he would take power. While al-Qadhafi has defended Somali pirates as "defenders against foreign intervention" in Somalia, Libya's actual policies remain in concert with those of the UN Security Council. Libya supports June elections in Mauritania, but notes that the coup was a "special" coup since the parliament - and therefore the people - support the junta. Al-Qadhafi is engaged personally on the

issue and has hosted senior-level Mauritanian officials from both camps in the past week.

REGULARIZING WORKING-LEVEL CONTACTS

¶9. (S//NF) Libyan officials value personal relationships with high-ranking Western officials. However, they lack both a bureaucratic capacity and willingness on the working levels to manage the day-to-day business of bilateral relations. In your meetings with Libya military counterparts, it would be helpful to emphasize the important SAO role of the DAO, highlighting the DAO as the primary address for Mil-Mil engagement.

WELCOME

¶10. (C) We are confident that your visit to Tripoli will open new doors for continued cooperation. Military cooperation is a key metric to determine the extent to which the Libyan government wishes to engage with the US. We hope your visit will assuage the fears of the more conservative elements of the regime while paving the way for AFRICOM's continued success.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Blueprint for Libya: Wikileaks Reveals the Long Plan
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI208

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI208 aka Wikileaks id #195954 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Mar 2009 16:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI208.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI494 , 08TRIPOLI564 , 08TRIPOLI592 , 08TRIPOLI679 , 08TRIPOLI870 , 09TRIPOLI134 , 09TRIPOLI196 , 09TRIPOLI198 , 09TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI494 , 09TRIPOLI564 , 09TRIPOLI679 , 09TRIPOLI870
Referenced by	09BERN104 , 09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI924 , 09TRIPOLI960
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 22 Feb 2011 01:31: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 22 Feb 2011 13:31: Publication withdrawn • Tue, 22 Feb 2011 17:31: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO4734
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0208/01 0681608
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 091608Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5108
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000208

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/4/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S SUCCESSION MUDDLED AS THE AL-QADHAFI CHILDREN
CONDUCT INTERNECINE WARFARE

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 564 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 592 , C) TRIPOLI 198 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 870 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 679 , F) 08 TRIPOLI 494 , G) TRIPOLI 196 , H) TRIPOLI 134 , I) 08 TRIPOLI 227

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State

Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: A series of events since last summer suggest that tension between various children of Muammar al-Qadhafi has increased, and that heir-apparent Saif al-Islam is arrayed against Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal, Saadi and perhaps even his own mother. Much of the tension appears to stem from resentment of Saif al-Islam's high-profile as the public face of the regime; however, deeper tension about contradictions between Saif al-Islam's proposed political-economic reforms, which would hurt his siblings' economic interests, and the old school manner by which he has tried to monopolize the most lucrative economic sectors, also play an important role. The arrest and intimidation of a number of Saif al-Islam allies since last summer, on the one hand, and moves to circumscribe Muatassim's role in military equipment procurement, on the other, suggest that the current level of discord among al-Qadhafi's children is acute. While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension comes during a particularly momentous period. Amid turmoil related to the 40th anniversary of the revolution, Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as African Union chairman, proposed political-economic reforms and persistent rumors about al-Qadhafi's health and the absence of a viable mechanism to orchestrate a succession, the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the family is able to hold on to power after the author of the revolution exits the political scene. End summary.

GREED AND BAD BEHAVIOR ...

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukhr Ghanem was approached by National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in late June 2008 with a request for USD 1.2 billion, reportedly to establish a military/security unit akin to that of his younger brother, Khamis, and to make unspecified security upgrades. In early July, Ghanem informed Muammar al-Qadhafi; however, he laughingly dismissed it. According to Ibrahim el-Meyet (strictly protect) a prominent Tripoli-based attorney and business consultant, Ghanem subsequently submitted a letter of resignation in mid-August, believing that Muatassim or his confederates would seek revenge against Ghanem and/or his family for having denied the request for funds. (Note: El-Meyet has known Ghanem for more than 40 years; the two men's families socialize together at least once a week, usually at the families' farms outside Tripoli. End note.)

¶3. (C) Ghanem's attempt to resign roughly coincided with two other disturbances of al-Qadhafi family comity: the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva in mid-July (ref B subsequent) and a visit to Rome by Saadi al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, against his father's express wishes in early August. Hannibal and Saadi both have checkered histories of unseemly behavior and public scuffles with authorities in Europe and elsewhere. Although Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly fed a carefully vetted version of the events attendant to Hannibal's arrest to help minimize the perception that Hannibal was to blame, the elder al-Qadhafi was reportedly vexed that Libya, for reasons of protecting the first family's pride, had to engage in a bilateral spat with Switzerland at a time when it was trying to move ahead with negotiations for a framework agreement with the European Union. With respect to Saadi's trip, Muammar al-Qadhafi was reportedly livid that Libyan officials had permitted him to exit the country when it was known that he was not supposed to travel. Al-Qadhafi was particularly upset that Abdullah Sanussi, a former director of military intelligence and senior regime figure who had played a role as minder of the more troublesome al-Qadhafi offspring, had not done a better job of keeping track of Saadi. (Note: Sanussi is related by marriage to al-Qadhafi and is a trusted figure. He is usually in physical proximity to

the tent in which al-Qadhafi holds meetings with visiting foreign dignitaries and, according to members of al-Qadhafi's protocol office, personally oversees al-Qadhafis' close protection detail. End note.)

... PROMPT AN AL-QADHAFI FAMILY MEETING

¶4. (C) The upshot of Muatassim's solicitation of funds, Hannibal's arrest and Saadi's jaunt was an al-Qadhafi family meeting in mid-August. Al-Qadhafi reportedly decided to reduce Sanussi's role as a minder for the most troublesome children (he is still a key adviser to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) and to

instead assign his daughter, Aisha al-Qadhafi, the task of monitoring the activities of ne'er-do-wells Saadi, Hannibal and Saif al-Arab. (Note: The latter is the least publicly know of al-Qadhafi's children; he lives in Munich, where he pursues ill-defined business interests and spends much time partying. The German Ambassador has expressed concern to us that it is only a matter of time before there is an incident involving him. End note.) At the meeting, Saadi reportedly criticized his father for having ignored him, and specifically cited the fact that his (Saadi's) efforts to establish an Export Free Trade Zone near the western Libyan town of Zuwara had not enjoyed the kind of support that Muatassim's activities as National Security Adviser or Saif al-Islam's high-profile efforts under the Qadhafi Development Foundation and Libya Youth Forum. As reported ref C, Muammar al-Qadhafi subsequently made an unusual visit to Zuwara last September and significant work on the development project began within a few days of his visit. Although the Zuwara Free Trade Zone is an ambitious and expensive project, Muammar al-Qadhafi likely views it as a relatively small price to pay if it helps occupy the notoriously ill-behaved Saadi and lends a patina of useful engagement to his otherwise less than sterling reputation.

¶5. (C) Al-Meyet and Zahri Muntasser (strictly protect), a well-connected businessman whose wife socializes regularly with Aisha al-Qadhafi and Safia al-Qadhafi (wife of Muammar al-Qadhafi), have told us that Aisha played a strong role in urging a hardline Libyan position with respect to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps over Hannibal's arrest. Separately, the Swiss Ambassador told us that Aisha's less than accurate rendering to her father of the events surrounding Hannibal's arrest and treatment by Swiss authorities helped stoke Muammar al-Qadhafi's anger, limiting the extent to which Libyan and Swiss officials could maneuver to find an acceptable compromise. The Swiss have told us that in the most recent effort between the two sides to resolve the issue in Davos, Saif had approved an agreement that had the Swiss literally bending over backwards to assuage Libyan demands. After making a phone call (to either Aisha or the leader), Saif returned somewhat chastened after several minutes to rescind the aproval. The Swiss crisis, together with other points of intra-family tension, has reportedly brought Aisha, who enjoys closer relations with Hannibal than with her other brothers, together with Hannibal, Saadi and, to a lesser extent, Saif al-Arab. Muatassim reportedly agreed with the hardline approach vis a vis the Swiss and has been closer to Aisha's end of the spectrum than to that of Saif al-Islam, who urged a more moderate approach. Muhammad al-Qadhafi (the eldest son, but by al-Qadhafis' first wife) and Khamis al-Qadhafi (fifth son by al-Qadhafi's second wife and the well-respected commander of a special forces unit that effectively serves as a regime protection unit) have remained neutral. Exacerbating family tensions is the fact that Saif al-Islam and his mother, Safia, have been on the outs since Saif al-Islam declined to accept as his bride the young woman his mother picked for him some two years ago. Safia al-Qadhafi expressed frustration as recently as two months ago to

Muntasser's wife that Saif al-Islam had not only spurned her choice, but had persisted in his hard-partying, womanizing ways, a source of concern in a socially conservative country like Libya.

INCREASED TENSION BETWEEN SAIF AL-ISLAM AND MUATASSIM

¶6. (C) Against that backdrop of tension, competition between Saif al-Islam, whom most still regard as the heir-apparent, and Muatassim, whose viability as a potential alternative successor has risen since his appointment as National Security Adviser, has increased since last fall. Several well-informed contacts with ties to family circles have reported that Saif al-Islam and Muatassim have not spoken in over three months. Saif reportedly bridled at the fact that Muatassim accompanied Muammar al-Qadhafi on the latter's visit to Moscow, Minsk and Kiev last year (ref D), and played a key role in negotiating potential weapons contracts. Muatassim (who flew back early) and his older brother Muhammad greeted Muammar al-Qadhafi at the airport upon the latter's return to Tripoli; Saif, who was in town, was pointedly absent. The Serbian Ambassador, citing conversations with National Security Council staff and members of al-Qadhafi's entourage, recently told us that Muatassim had presented a number of proposed contracts for weapons, equipment and training to the Secretary of the Temporary Interim Defense Committee (MOD-equivalent), Abu Bakr Yunis shortly after his return from Moscow. Yunis rejected them, arguing that the terms Muatassim had negotiated were not favorable and that Libya did not need

much of the equipment Muatassim had proposed buying. Muatassim interpreted Yunis's response as an attempt to freeze him out of military procurement affairs; there was a heated meeting late last December between Muatassim and Yunis, at which there was sharp disagreement about who had the lead on military procurement. Muatassim reportedly argued that he alone should make such decisions. According to the Serbian Ambassador's contacts, Muammar al-Qadhafi called a rump session of the Security Committee in December to mediate the conflict. It was reportedly decided that while Muatassim would have the clear lead in non-military security equipment procurement, Yunis and the MOD-equivalent would continue to play a role in military procurement. It was further determined that Khamis al-Qadhafi would play a larger role in military procurement, since his Khamis Regiment (the 32nd Brigade) had demonstrated some success in procurement. Muatassim, whom the Serbian Ambassador described as "a bloody man" and "not terribly bright", reportedly believed that Saif al-Islam was behind some of the pushback against his having a clear lead on military procurement, worsening the tension between them.

¶7. (C) Saif al-Islam's highly-publicized visit to the U.S. last November-December exacerbated tension with his siblings, particularly Muatassim, who viewed it as grandstanding. Saif al-Islam's high-profile role as the public face of the regime to the West has been a mixed blessing for him. While it has bolstered his image (he is probably the most publicly-recognized figure in Libya other than Muammar al-Qadhafi), many Libyans view him as self-aggrandizing and too eager to please foreigners at the expense of Libyans' interest. His role in the denouement of the Bulgarian nurses' case, in which he acknowledged in media interviews that the nurses had been tortured and the investigation into their alleged injection of the AIDS virus into Libyan children bungled, badly damaged his reputation. The fact that his recent visit to the U.S. came not long after his August 2008 Youth Forum address - in which he strongly criticized the existing Jamahiriya system of governance, (disingenuously) said that most of his proposed reforms had already been achieved, and declared his intention to withdraw from political life to focus solely on civil society issues (ref E) - reportedly irritated his siblings. Senior GOL contacts

have suggested to us that Muatassim's desire to visit Washington this spring and his seemingly overweaning focus on having meetings with senior USG officials and signing a number of agreements are driven at least in part by a strong sense of competition with Saif al-Islam.

THE KNIVES COME OUT

¶8. (C) Recent events have fueled speculation that inter-sibling rivalries, and those of the more conservative regime elements they represent, have been increasing. In what was viewed as a warning to Saif al-Islam against pressing his reform agenda too hard, regime critic Dhaw al-Mansuri was severely beaten on the street early last summer by men variously described as members of the Revolutionary Committees or security elements. The Executive Director of the QDF-affiliated Human Rights Society of Libya, Muhammad Tarnesh, was detained in late April in connection with an editorial he had written criticizing the government's poorly coordinated campaign of housing and infrastructure development that featured as its primary accomplishment the seemingly random destruction of large numbers of residences and businesses. Tarnesh told us the investigation was orchestrated by Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who had taken umbrage at the column and who has been engaged in a quiet struggle with Saif al-Islam over the latter's political-reform agenda. (Note: Al-Mahmoudi was appointed as a sop to conservative regime elements in 2006 after Shukhri Ghanem, former PM and a pro-reform protigi of Saif al-Islam, was sacked. End note.) More recently, the detention in early February of Juma'a Atiaga on charges that he was involved in a banned political organization and had a hand in the 1984 assassination of Libya's former Ambassador to Rome, Ammar Daw, has been widely interpreted by informed observers here as a run against Saif al-Islam by conservative regime elements (ref G). In interviews with al-Sharq al-Awsat at the time, Saif al-Islam decried the arrest as "ridiculous" and the QDF issued a statement calling for Atiaga's release and criticizing GOL authorities for having arrested Atiaga while ignoring other cases involving allegations of human rights abuses that the QDF had brought to the attention of authorities. Reports suggest that National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi orchestrated the arrest through the Prime Minister's office in retaliation for Saif al-Islam's recent encroachment on a business deal

Muatassim was trying to broker.

¶9. (C) Perhaps most tellingly, Saif al-Islam's longtime business partner and financial adviser, Abdulrahman Karfakh, left Tripoli under duress in January, ostensibly to study English in Australia. The shadowy Karfakh ran the National Engineering Supply and Services Company (NESSCO), a large holding company through which Saif al-Islam holds quiet partnerships in a number of foreign entities whose entry into the Libyan market he helped facilitate. Established as an oil field services companies in the late 1990's, NESSCO now owns large stakes in over 20 major joint-venture projects and runs a profitable business in providing "facilitation" (usually visas and meetings with key GOL officials) for foreign companies seeking to enter the market. Together with Saif al-Islam's quiet allotment of oil lifts from an offshore mooring point near the western Libyan area of al-Jurf, NESSCO represents his primary source of revenue and the principal means by which he finances his many activities. As reported ref H, we were told last May that Muatassim appeared to be moving to play a larger role in commercial
contracts with foreign companies, a bailiwick that had largely been reserved to that point for Saif al-Islam. Karfakh was arrested last spring on corruption charges, supposedly at Muatassim's behest, and was only released after an impassioned

plea by Saif al-Islam to his father. Housing and Infrastructure Board Chairman Abuzeid Dorda told a contact of ours that Saif al-Islam had told Muammar al-Qadhafi that if he insisted on keeping Karfakh in prison, he might as well jail him (Saif al-Islam), too. In the latest evolution, Muatassim's confederates approached Karfakh in late December/early January and warned him against interfering in Muatassim's business interests, threatening to kill him if he did not. Saif al-Islam reportedly assessed that he could no longer guarantee Karfakh's safety or protect him from arrest, and arranged for him to quietly leave Tripoli for Australia for an indeterminate period to let things settle.

¶10. (C) The contretemps over Karfakh coincided with a sharp denial by Saif al-Islam of (incorrect) western media reports that he had paid USD one million to pop singer Mariah Carey for a four song set she sang at a New Year's Eve bash on the Caribbean island of St. Bart's. Saif al-Islam was in the UAE and Thailand for New Year's. Saif's "Oea" newspaper hotly denied that their boss had been the financier and corrections were printed in western media noting that Muatassim, not Saif al-Islam, was the organizer of the party in question. (Note: A well-informed contact, who helped bring Lionel Ritchie to Libya several years ago to sing at Aicha's al-Qadhafi's birthday party, recently confirmed that he had helped put Muatassim's people in touch with Carey's manager. End note.)

¶11. (C) Comment: While internecine strife is nothing new for the famously fractious al-Qadhafi family, the recent escalation of tension between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, Aisha, Hannibal and Saadi, comes during a particularly momentous period in the Jamahiriya's history. The 40th anniversary of the revolution on September 1, 2009, together with Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent election as Chairman of the AU (ref H), proposed political-economic reforms, consideration of a constitution, and rumored elections, have contributed to a sense that Libya is in the midst of a period of particular political turbulence. The Executive Director of the QDF recently told the DCM that a draft constitution had been finished and submitted to the General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent) for approval, and that it could be submitted to the General People's Congress for ratification sometime this year. The UN Resident Representative recently told the Ambassador that Saif al-Islam had established a super-committee under the auspices of the Economic and Development Board to draw up plans to implement wealth distribution and privatization/government restructuring advocated by Muammar al-Qadhafi last March (ref I). In addition to the fact that Saif al-Islam's public calls for political-economic reforms are seemingly at odds with the old school manner in which he has attempted to monopolize the most lucrative sectors of the economy - a source of irritation for his siblings - the changes he has called for would directly and adversely impact their economic interests and those of other conservative regime elements who have few fungible skills other than political loyalty. Saif al-Islam's recent announcement of a regional organization that would publicly identify specific individuals who perpetrate human rights abuses and target them for sanctions has been interpreted by some local observers as a manifestation of his frustration with the slow pace of reforms

and as a threat to conservative regime elements, many of whom personally played a part in the most serious transgressions of the late 1970's and 1980's.

¶12. (C) Comment (continued): Persistent rumors about Muammar al-Qadhafi's declining health have lent particular urgency to questions about succession scenarios, throwing into stark relief the fact that, absent a constitution, there is no legal mechanism by which to orchestrate such an endeavor and seemingly increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. Adding to the

increasing the stakes for the sibling rivalry. Adding to the current tension is the fact that some of al-Qadhafi's children control military and security assets (Muatassim and Khamis - notably, Saif al-Islam does not). Harking back to the bloody feuds between members of the ruling Karamanli family during the Ottoman period, a well-informed contact recently noted that it is historically not a good thing when rival Libyan siblings have armed militias at their disposal. As Libya lurches forward with the effort to balance badly needed economic reform with the appearance of some political re-structuring - all against the backdrop of looming succession issues - the sharp rivalry between the al-Qadhafi children could play an important, if not determinative role, in whether the al-Qadhafi family is able to hold on to power after Muammar al-Qadhafi exits (one way or another) the political scene. End comment.
CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family's Exploits - NYTimes.com
- WikiLeaks cables: A guide to Gaddafi's 'famously fractious' family | World news | The Guardian
- Qaddafi's Son Is Bisexual and Other Things the New York Times Doesn't Want You to Know
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI21

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI21 aka Wikileaks id #186913 ?
Subject	LIBYA ON ARAB LEAGUE EMERGENCY MINISTERIAL ON GAZA AND ARAB ECONOMIC SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 14:30 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI21.html
References	09STATE3120
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5694
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0021 0131430
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 131430Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4313
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0158
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4836
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000021

SIPDIS

NEA/RA FOR SCOVITCH, NEA/MAG FOR JOHNSON, PARIS FOR WALLER,
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/13/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , KPAL [Palestinian Affairs] , KWBG [West Bank and
Gaza] , MOPS [Military Operations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , AL [Albania] , LY
[Libya] , TS [Tunisia]
SUBJECT: LIBYA ON ARAB LEAGUE EMERGENCY MINISTERIAL ON GAZA AND ARAB
ECONOMIC SUMMIT

REF: STATE 3120

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) The Ambassador conveyed reftel points to MFA Secretary
for Arab Affairs (A/S-equivalent) Muhammad Taher Siala on
January 13, underscoring the importance of supporting the
Egyptian-Israeli dialogue, avoiding any diplomatic activity that
undermines Egypt's efforts and calling for a responsible
approach to regional economic integration at the upcoming Arab
Economic Summit in Kuwait.  Siala took our points onboard, but
cautioned that there was confusion among Arab League (AL) member
states since their understanding was that there were invitations
to two separate emergency meetings on Gaza: an Arab League
Ministerial meeting to be held in Kuwait on January 16, and a
second "extraordinary summit" of AL leaders  to be held in Qatar
```

second "extraordinary summit" of AL leaders, to be held in Qatar on the same day. Some AL members had proposed combining the two events into a single meeting in Kuwait on January 16; however, it was not yet clear whether that would occur.

¶2. (C) During the meeting, Siala called Tunisian Foreign Minister Abdelwaheb Abdullah to ask who would represent Tunisia at the Arab Economic Summit (he was told President Ben Ali would), what Tunisia's position on the two January 16 events was (Abdullah believed only one was necessary and had conveyed that view to Kuwait and Qatar) and who would attend the January 16 events (Tunisia had not yet decided). Siala said the GOL had not yet determined which of the two January 16 meetings on Gaza it would attend, or who would represent it. Responding to a question from Abdullah, he said Libyan Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham was in Germany undergoing a surgical procedure and was due back in Libya on January 16; however, it was not clear whether he would attend either the emergency meeting on Gaza or the economic summit.

¶3. (C) On Gaza, Siala stressed that Libya would support any initiative that led to a ceasefire, but cautioned that any action in the absence of a ceasefire would be "meaningless". Libya assessed that Israel's goal was to destroy HAMAS and shift political facts on the ground; however, that goal was not feasible. HAMAS enjoyed wide support among Palestinians and represented a reaction to the "fact" that the peace process had demonstrably failed. The Gaza incursion had already gone on far longer than anyone in the Arab world had anticipated; a ceasefire was a "critical necessity" and should be a means to facilitate further constructive diplomacy rather than the end goal of such efforts.

¶4. (C) On the Arab Economic Summit, Siala said Muammar al-Qadhafi had not yet decided whether to attend. Abdulhafith Zlitni, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Planning (minister-equivalent) was leading a delegation to Kuwait to coordinate Libya's involvement in preparatory work for the summit. He would be joined by Ali Essawi, Secretary of the GPC for Economy and Trade, and Siala himself. Siala said there would be a preparatory meeting of Arab central bank governors and finance ministers on January 14 and a coordination meeting of Arab foreign ministers on January 15. In terms of expected deliverables, he said there would be a "Kuwait Declaration" and a related development program consisting of ten key initiatives regarding regional economic integration, which Libya would support. Key issues would include a proposed customs union and regional transportation links.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI212

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI212 aka Wikileaks id #196345 ?
Subject	GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SHUFFLES CABINET, POSTPONES WEALTH DISTRIBUTION PLAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 11 Mar 2009 15:34 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI212.html
References	08TRIPOLI106 , 08TRIPOLI166 , 08TRIPOLI688 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI896
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI222 , 09TRIPOLI223 , 09TRIPOLI242 , 09TRIPOLI273 , 09TRIPOLI274 , 09TRIPOLI658 , 09TRIPOLI886 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6575
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0212/01 0701534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 111534Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4596
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0166
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5122
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000212

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, INR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/10/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SHUFFLES CABINET, POSTPONES WEALTH
DISTRIBUTION PLAN

REF: A. 08 TRIPOLI 106
     B. 08 TRIPOLI 166
     C. TRIPOLI 186
     D. TRIPOLI 40
     E. 08 TRIPOLI 896
     F. 08 TRIPOLI 688
     G. TRIPOLI 208

TRIPOLI 00000212  001.2 OF 003
```

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Christopher Stevens, DCM.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The General People's Congress - Libya's version of a national parliament - ended its annual week-long session in Sirte March 5, approving a cabinet reshuffle that placed intelligence chief Musa Kusa at the helm of the foreign ministry and postponing Muammar al-Qadhafi's controversial proposal to disband government ministries and distribute the country's oil wealth directly to the people. Instead, the GPC consolidated some ministry-equivalents while committing wealth redistribution and economic reform to "further study". The GPC approved a national budget of USD 39 billion, a 30-percent increase over last year's budget. Italian Prime Minister Silvio Burlesconi was on hand to witness the ratification of a "friendship and cooperation" treaty that requires the Italian government to subsidize $5 billion for infrastructure projects in Libya as reparations- for the 30-year Italian occupation of Libya. Delegates did not discuss a draft constitution, which Muammar al-Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi has championed. The cabinet shuffle ousted some reform-minded luminaries from their position, retained other advocates of rational planning, but left the once-imperiled Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi in place, suggesting that reforms will come more slowly than once thought. However, as the September 1 anniversary marking the 40th year since the coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power draws closer and Libyans hold positions of international import, the leader has several opportunities to make surprise changes of direction. End Summary.

SAME FACES, FEWER CHAIRS: CONGRESS GIVES CABINET LINEUP

¶2. (S//NF) The annual session of the General People's Congress - the top level of the multi-tiered Jamahiriya direct democracy scheme (ref A) - wrapped up on March 5 leading to a major cabinet shuffle and a reorganization of some of the General People's Committees (Ministry-equivalents). The biggest change came at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) with former head Abudlrahman Shalgam stepping down to take the PermRep spot at the UN and External Security Organization (ESO; CIA-equivalent) Musa Kusa stepping in to fill the empty FM slot. Shalgam is expected in New York this week to take up the mantle of UNSC President while Kusa expects to maintain both spy-chief and chief-diplomat roles. Despite year-long murmurs that he was due to be sacked (ref B), Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi retained his top spot and his former deputy Mohammed Ali al-Hweij was picked for the Secretary of the new Committee for Industry, Economy, and Trade formed from the merger the old Industry and Mining Committee and the Economy, Trade, and Investment Committee. Ali Essawi, former head of the Committee for Economy and Trade was left without a posting - a move the French embassy claims is related to accusations of corruption. (Note: Essawi twice attempted to resign last year over disagreements with al-Mahmoudi but was convinced to stay. End Note) The youth-oriented Basic Education Committee and the Higher Education Committee were combined into the Committee for Education and Scientific Research to be chaired by Abdelkabir Mohammed Fakhri while the Committee for Youth and Sport was abolished. Still, working-level contacts in ministries remained uncertain of what the shake-up meant, with several contacts in the former Committee for Culture and Information telling APAO that they didn't know who they worked for but expect they will be absorbed into MFA's existing cultural office - and therefore under the control of Musa Kusa. See para 6 for the full list of cabinet positions.

WEALTH DISTRIBUTION PLAN TO GET "FURTHER STUDY"

¶3. (C) In the wake of broad opposition to the ill-defined wealth distribution mechanism proposed by al-Qadhafi (ref C), the GPC decided to postpone action pending "further study". A January

meeting of the GPC was cancelled to give budget-makers time to revise their figures after the precipitous fall of oil prices and the spread of the global financial crisis gave both technocrats and proponents of the distribution scheme pause (ref D). UN ResCoord Brian Gleeson (strictly protect) recently told us he had been asked to sit on a commission charged with hammering out specifics of the reform program. The status of a "shadow" committee -organized last year by Saif al-Islam

TRIPOLI 00000212 002.2 OF 003

al-Qadhafi and featuring Central Bank governor Farhat Bengadara and Ali Essawi - both of whom voiced opposition to the distribution plan on live television (ref E) - its mission to develop practical steps to reform are unknown. The Congress settled on a budget of over 49 billion dinars (39.3b USD) - a 30-percent increase over FY08. Government salaries will make up 9 billion dinars (7.2b USD), public expenditures another 4.8 billion (3.8b USD) and development projects taking the lion's share with 21.5 billion dinars (17.2b USD).

ITALY PAYS COMPENSATION FOR COLONIAL WRONGS

¶4. (C) Italian PM Berlusconi was in Sirte on March 2 (along with the diplomatic corps flown in as well as spectators) to witness the ratification of the Italy-Libya "friendship and cooperation" treaty signed last August (ref F), apologize for Italy's misdeeds (leading al-Qadhafi to raise his arms in triumph and glee), and to effect the exchange of ratifications. While the treaty calls for Italy to pay $200 million per year for 25 years to absolve it of its colonial wrong-doing, it also guarantees Italian companies preference for development projects the money will fund. Libya also agreed to implement an earlier agreement aimed at stemming illegal migration through Libya to Italy - including joint maritime patrols - but Italian DCM Lorenzo Kluzer told Poloff the treaty mirrored Italy's interests in the Jamahiriya, which he ordered as "oil, oil, oil, and migration". According to Kluzer, joint patrols could begin as early as June provided Libya follows through with implementation - something they have failed to do in previous iterations of migration agreements. Berlusconi invited Qadhafi to Italy, and to the G-8 Summit in July in Sardinia. He said one of the sessions on the third day would be devoted to Africa, hence the reason for the invite to Qadhafi, the new Chairman of the AU Assembly. The Italian PM said the summit would also deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. Qadhafi showed unprecedented hospitality for his Italian guest, being present at both the arrival and departure of Berlusconi.

WE THE PEOPLE: LIBYANS SEE NO CHANGE WITHOUT CONSTITUTION

¶5. (C) While the reparations and increased spending on development projects sit well with ordinary Libyans, several news organizations associated with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi criticized the cabinet shake-up as little more than moving pawns around a chessboard. Juma al-Usta from the Libyan Chamber of Commerce was quoted saying "the new cabinet is no different from the previous ones...the same group of people over 40 years now and they are still without a strategy or a plan". A spokesman for Saif al-Islam's Qadhafi Development Foundation decried the use of "direct appointments" saying that "the new government will not succeed and will not survive six months", adding that "there is no way to get out of this without a constitution". His view is apparently shared by commenters on opposition website Libya al-Youm who expected discussion of a draft constitution and were very critical of Musa Kusa becoming both intelligence chief and foreign minister. ESO is targeted by rights groups and opposition leaders as the organization responsible for silencing political opposition to al-Qadhafi's rule using repressive tactics that violate victims' human rights. Sami Rais, head of the Central Bank of Libya's Reserves Department shared his view with Econoff, which seems to mirror

Department shared his view with EconOff, which seems to mirror popular opinion, "at the end of the day, I don't care about government restructuring - I just want good healthcare in Libya and a good education for my kids."

LIST OF NEW COMMITTEES AND THEIR SECRETARIES

¶6. (C) A list of the current committees and their secretaries follows. Post maintains biographic information on its SIPRnet website at (http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Category:Li bya_Biography), which will be updated in the coming days to reflect the new portfolios:

- Secretary of the General People's Committee (PM-equivalent), al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Health and Environment, Mohamed Mahmoud al-Hijazi
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Planning and Finance, Abdelhafiz Zlitni
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Industry, Economy, and Trade, Mohammed Ali al-Hweij
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Facilities and Resources, Matuq Mohammed Matuq

TRIPOLI 00000212 003.2 OF 003

- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Agriculture, Livestock, and Marine Life, Abu Bakr Mabrouk al-Mansouri
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Social Affairs, Zarouk Ibrahim Sharif
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice, Mustafa Mohammad Abduljalil
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Public Security, General Abdelfatah Younis Obeidi
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, Musa Kusa
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Education and Scientific Research Abdul Kabir Mohammed al-Fakhri
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Transport Mohamed Ali Zidane
- Secretary of the General People's Committee for Popular Control and Inspection Authority, Ibrahim Ali Ibrahim
- Secretary of the Financial Review Authority, Ali Omar Hesnawi
- Secretary of the National Planning Council, Bashir Ali Belgacem Zimbeel

Ammar Mubarek Eshamikh replaced Maftah al-Kaiba as the Secretary of the General People's Congress (roughly Speaker of the House) while Suleiman Shhoumi became Secretary of the GPC for Foreign Affairs (Senate Foreign Relations chair-equivalent). National Oil Company head Shukri Ghanem will remain at the helm, as will the Housing and Infrastructure Board's Abuzeid Dorda - though both are rumored to be keen on leaving their positions and Dorda telling DCM that he will take up another position once he feels he has completed his mission. Reform-minded Mahmoud Jibril will retain his seat at the head of the Economic and Development Board but will lose his role on the National Planning Council that has been absorbed into the new Committee for Planning and Finance.

¶7. (S//NF) Comment: It is too early to judge the effects the cabinet shakeup will have on Libya's domestic reform, Libya's role in regional and international affairs, and our bilateral relationship. Musa Kusa is a useful and powerful interlocutor who has been mostly cooperative in liaison channels and key to our re-engagement. He is seen as a mentor for Muatassim al-Qadhafi, Saif al-Islam's younger brother and head of the National Security Council. At the same time, his appointment seems to come at the expense of the reform movement in Libya: the lack of discussion of a formal constitution, the retention of al-Mahmoudi as PM, and the loss of key allies in ranking

positions suggest that Saif al-Islam has come to a hurdle in his drive to secure political and economic reforms. This assessment would suggest a loss in stature relative to Muatassim, with whom he is widely rumored to be battling for power (see ref G). However, the Serbian Ambassador here (a longtime observer of the Libyan scene) shared a different view with the Ambassador assessing that retaining al-Mahmoudi, installing Zlitni, and expanding Matuq's portfolio boost Saif's "rational" economic reform agenda by putting al-Qadhafi insiders in stronger policy-making roles, while increasing Musa Kusa's reach balances Saif's gains with Muatassim's. Muammar al-Qadhafi's seats at the UN Security Council, as head of the African Union, and Leader of a revolution celebrating its 40th anniversary on September 1 present plenty of opportunity for surprise. We expect the next six months to bring more clarity - perhaps accompanied by tumult - as to the direction will head politically. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI22

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI22 aka Wikileaks id #186923 ?
Subject	REGIME-ORCHESTRATED ATTACKS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 13 Jan 2009 14:57 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI22.html
References	08TRIPOLI530 , 08TRIPOLI588 , 09TRIPOLI588
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI196 , 09TRIPOLI31 , 09TRIPOLI40
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5726
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0022/01 0131457
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 131457Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4314
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0733
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0865
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0808
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0028
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1376
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0669
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0982
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4837
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000022

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA (SKWIRAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/13/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PROP *[Propaganda and Psychological Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: REGIME-ORCHESTRATED ATTACKS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 588 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 530

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. On December 24, individuals from the Revolutionary Committees (RevComm) and Libya al-Ghad (Libya of Tomorrow) descended on the predominately Amazigh (Berber) town of Yefren, attacking the homes of Berber leaders. The attacks - parts of which were filmed and posted on YouTube and opposition web sites - included beatings of counterprotesters and property damage. While anti-Berber sentiment in Libya is not a new

phenomenon, the attacks come after a year of generally positive signals from the regime about greater respect for Berber rights. Even more curious than the timing was the joint action by conservative RevComm members and individuals purporting to represent Libya al-Ghad, an ostensibly reformist group led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On December 27, Berber opposition groups based in Morocco issued statements to London-based al-Sharq al-Awsat claiming that the predominantly Berber town of Yefren, some 150 kilometers southwest of Tripoli, had been "completely surrounded" by elements of the hard-line Revolutionary Committees and members of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Libya al-Ghad organization on December 24. Press releases from self-described oppositionists cited extensive regime-orchestrated violence against Berbers, as well as a government shutdown of all communications and travel into and out of Yefren. On January 1, the first evidence of the attacks appeared on YouTube, featuring a man identified as a RevComm member leading a group of 40-50 protesters contained by about 20 national police officers in light riot gear. (Note: Two videos are available at youtube.com/watch?v=P_P0tV693Wk and youtube.com/watch?V=YKzsQnl1im4. End Note.) During pauses between chants by the crowd of "Brother Muammar [al-Qadhafi], we are with you!", the speaker argued that Berbers are actually Arab and that Berber community leaders had sought to destroy Libya's national unity, a political "red line" that was not to be crossed. The video concluded with two protesters crossing the police line to kick the gate of a Berber leader's home. The Berber website tawalt.com reported that protestors called Berber leaders "treasonous traitors" and called for their deaths.

¶3. (C) Madghis Madi (strictly protect), an ethnic Berber/Amizigh and Libyan-American citizen currently residing in California, confirmed in a conversation with P/E Chief on January 7 that GOL elements had targeted Berbers in al-Shgarna, a suburb of Yefren. Madi is originally from al-Shgarna and most of his immediate and extended family still reside there. Madi said that an elderly woman featured in slide shows about the incident posted on tawalt.com was his mother. Citing telephone and email exchanges with relatives, Madi said seven buses and two trucks carrying individuals from the Revolutionary Committees and Libya al-Ghad arrived in Yefren on/about December 24.

¶4. (C) Madi said Abdullah al-Hwajj, Chair of Libya al-Ghad's Human Rights Committee, led the group and directed much of the activity. (Note: In pictures of the incident posted on the website, al-Hwajj is the individual wearing a bright green hat. End note.) RevComm and al-Ghad members, joined by local police, initially targeted the homes of Berber leaders Salem Madi (a close relative of Madi's), Imhemmed al-Hamrani and Isa Sijouk. Other homes and businesses were subsequently targeted as well. Madi and Hamrani had both been arrested previously in connection with their roles as leaders of the Berber community, most recently after they attended a World Amazigh Congress in Meknes, Morocco October 31-November 2, 2008. Sijouk was exiled in the 1990's to Tunis, where he lived for 13 years, and had returned to Libya several years ago. RevComm and al-Ghad members broke windows at the three leaders' homes, spraypainted the walls with epithets - including "death to you and your families" - and attempted to set at least one of the residences alight.

¶5. (C) According to Madi, RevComm and al-Ghad members threw stones at and beat al-Shgarna residents who gathered to protest the attacks on the three leaders' homes. A number of businesses and other residences were damaged, including several that were burned. Police threatened to imprison anyone who attempted to interfere with the RevComm and al-Ghad members. RevComm and al-Ghad members chanted anti-Berber slogans ("death to the Berber dogs") throughout the incident.

¶6. (C) Noting that anti-Berber sentiment in Libya was "nothing

¶6. (C) Noting that anti-Berber sentiment in Libya was "nothing new", Madi said Berber leaders and residents of al-Shgarna were nonetheless surprised by the attack and unsure about what prompted the timing of it. Yefren has been the target of regime-orchestrated, anti-Berber violence before, most recently

in 1983, when Madghis Madi's family home was destroyed and a large group of Berbers led by Salem Madi were imprisoned, some for years. Describing the recent attack as "serious", he said there was "considerable fear" in al-Shgarna, Yefren and other towns in the Jebel Nafusa that the December incidents could signal a broader round of anti-Berber violence. Noting that the GOL and the Qadhafi Development Foundation (the latter is also headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi) had sent positive signals between 2007 and mid-2008 about greater respect for Berber rights, he said Berber leaders were particularly troubled that Abdullah al-Hwajj, whom he described as "one of Saif's right hands", personally led the attacks. (Note: The GOL granted permission for the Amazigh World Congress to host a large gathering in Tripoli in August 2007; Prime Minister-equivalent al-Mahmoudi and Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi made high-profile visits to Berber communities in August and September 2007, respectively. End note.) The Morocco-based World Amazigh Congress is working to organize an emergency meeting, to be held in Geneva within the next two weeks, to review the incident and develop a public awareness campaign.

¶7. (C) Comment: While initial reports from al-Sharq al-Awsat raised doubts as to the veracity of the information, Madi was able to provide detailed information that lends the news additional credibility. The unrest does not appear to have lasted much more than a day. Locally-engaged staff with family around Yefren have been able to contact them by telephone without difficulty, and their relatives did not relay any news about the event, suggesting that it was relatively small and isolated. Emboffs passed through Yefren on January 10 as part of a scheduled trip and reported that there were no additional checkpoints on the highway or other obvious signs of recent disturbance. While there have been some positive developments since 2007 with respect to the GOL's interaction with and rhetoric about the Berber community, Post's request in March 2008 for Emboffs to visit the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara prompted a sharp warning not to interfere in internal Libyan affairs that some GOL officials believe could only have been authored by Muammar al-Qadhafi himself (ref B). That Saif al-Islam's Libya al-Ghad would join forces with RevComm members is an unexpected development. Saif has repeatedly irked hard-liners by calling publicly for political reform and a turn away from the heavy-handed tactics of the past. He is closely involved in day-to-day management of Libya al-Ghad; it is difficult to believe that Abdullah al-Hwajj would have led such an effort without at least tacit approval from Saif. His apparent tack towards the old guard may signal an effort to curry favor with his most stalwart opponents - possibly in connection with his reputed aspirations to succeed his father - by making common cause against an easily identifiable group that represents the political equivalent of low-hanging fruit. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Libya Wikileaks Cables - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI221

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI221 aka Wikileaks id #196908 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR FEBRUARY 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sat, 14 Mar 2009 14:38 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI221.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9580
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0221/01 0731438
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 141438Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4608
INFO RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0022
RUEHAR/AMEMBASSY ACCRA 0020
RUEHTO/AMEMBASSY MAPUTO 0001
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0035
RUEHMV/AMEMBASSY MONROVIA 0013
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5134
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1435
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0793
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0857
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0919
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0389
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000221

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG,
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON,
ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON,
STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD), AND USAID (MCCLOUD)
USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND
CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB (BHALLA)
CAIRO FOR FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , EPET
[Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR FEBRUARY 2009
```

ENERGY

¶1. (U) NOC Calls on Engineering Firms to Establish Libyan Presence: The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) invited foreign petroleum engineering companies to a meeting February 25 to discuss how they could establish a permanent local presence. [en.noc.com.ly, 2/8/2009]

¶2. (U) Total Accepts Lower Share of Libyan Oil Production: The Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the French oil company Total, continuing its policy of redefining old contracts under the new EPSA-IV framework. Total operates offshore the al-Jurf field and onshore the Mabruk field. Under the MoU, the NOC will get a higher share percentage of production and Total will pay a signature bonus of 500 million dollars to the NOC. Costs of exploration and development programs needed to increase production capacity will be shared equally by the NOC and Total. Total also committed to develop training programs for the local employees. Total's previous equity production in Libya averaged around 75,000 barrels of oil per day. The agreement was approved by the Supreme Oil and Gas Council on February 28 and still requires ratification by the General People's Congress (GPC). ENI, Petro-Canada, Repsol and Oxy signed MoUs under similar terms with the NOC in late 2007, and GPC ratification came in June-July 2008. [Bloomberg.com / Reuters, 2/11/2009]

¶3. (U) Libyan-European Consortium Akakus Opens Tender for Murzuq Gas-Oil Plant: Akakus Oil Operations called interested firms to the prequalification for an engineering, procurement and construction contract on a new gas-oil separation plant. The 100,000 barrel per day plant would be constructed at the consortium's IR field in the Libyan Murzuq basin, 700 kilometers from Tripoli. Akakus is owned by a consortium of Libya's NOC, Spain's Repsol, Austria's OMV, and France's Total. [MEED, 2/4/2009]

¶4. (U) Al-Jurf Oilfield Resumes Output after Accident: France's Total announced that output has resumed at Libya's offshore al-Jurf oilfield, where 45,000 barrels a day of production were halted in April after a drilling accident. There will be a gradual resumption in production from the field. Al-Jurf is located 100 kilometers offshore western Libya at a depth of 90 meters. The Libyan National Oil Corporation has a 50 percent stake, Total holds 37.5 percent and Germany's Wintershall AG owns 12.5 percent. [Bloomberg.com, 2/6/2009]

¶5. (U) Norwegian firm Yara completes 50% Joint Venture with Libya: Norway's Yara International, the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) and the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) signed an agreement to create a new joint venture called "Libyan Norwegian Fertilizer Company" (Lifeco). Yara, NOC and LIA will have ownership shares in the new company of 50%, 25% and 25% respectively. NOC will transfer to Lifeco the existing Marsa El Brega fertilizer assets, valued at $225 million dollars, while Yara contributes to Lifeco the corresponding value in cash. NOC will supply natural gas to Lifeco under a long-term agreement. Yara will handle all urea and ammonia exports from Lifeco. Lifeco will embark on an optimization and upgrading program. The closing of the deal follows approval of the required licenses under the Libyan Investment Law. [tradingmarkets.com, 2/92009]

¶6. (U) Japex to Begin Operations at Libyan Offshore Concession: Japan Exploration Company (Japex) will start drilling its first offshore exploration well in Libya by the end of February. A consortium, formed by Japanese companies Japex, Nippon Oil Exploration and Mitsubishi Corporation, acquired the offshore concession in Libya in 2005. The consortium holds an 8 percent stake and it is operated by Japex; the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC) holds the remaining 92 percent stake. Seismic

2D and 3D surveys were conducted in 2007. [MEED, 2/12/2009]

¶7. (U) Woodside Hits Oil and Gas in Libya's Ghadames Basin: Australia's Woodside found oil and gas in the Ghadames Basin. This is the fourth successful exploratory well drilled by Woodside in the area, which was awarded in May 2003. [Petroleum Africa, 2/17/2009]

¶8. (U) New Discovery for Verenex: Canada's Verenex found oil and gas in the Ghadames basin. This is the tenth oil discovery made by Verenex in the Ghadames basin. [Petroleum Africa, 2/17/2009]

¶9. (U) Libya takes delivery of two oil tankers: Libya's state-owned General National Maritime Transport Company (GNMTC) has taken delivery of two oil tankers from Cido Shipping of Japan. Each of the tankers has a capacity of approximately 830,000 barrels of oil. The two deliveries are part of a six-ship deal - with a total transport capacity of around 5 million barrels - was signed by GNMTC last December to enable Libya to expand its oil shipping capacity to 11.8 million barrels. The recent purchases bring GNMTC's total fleet to 18 tankers; of these, 13 are crude carriers, three are oil products carriers, and two are LPG carriers. [Oil & Gas Journal, 2/16/2009]

¶10. (U) CNPC Launches Bid for Verenex: China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) offered to buy Canada's Verenex Energy for $400 million dollars. CNPC's offer is subject to certain conditions, including the approval of the Libyan National Oil Corporation (NOC). The NOC had earlier approved a list of companies qualified to view the confidential technical data on assets in the Area 47 in the Ghadames Basin, northwest Libya, where Verenex has its most valuable asset - a 6.85% production share. The buyout will not include Verenex's partner in the Libya exploration plan, Indonesia's Medco Energy. [Verenex.com, 2/27/2009]

INVESTMENT

¶11. (U) Libya's Interest in Buying ENI Shares: Italy's Foreign Minister Franco Frattini announced that the Libyan government's stake in oil and natural gas company ENI SpA has not yet exceeded 2%, despite Libya's earlier announcement that it intended to acquire a 10% interest in the Italian company. Libyan Investment Authority chairman told press that the extent to which the fund may increase its stake in ENI will depend on prices and circumstances. ENI is Italy's biggest energy company by market value and has the largest operations of an international oil company in Libya. [PetroleumAfrica.com, 2/4/2009]

¶12. (U) Libya's Income From Sovereign Fund $2.3 Billion Dollars: According to a report submitted to Libya's Basic People Congresses, Libya's sovereign wealth fund investments abroad total $50.58 billion dollars and have returned profits of $2.37 billion dollars since the scheme started in 2006. $39.81 billion dollars were invested in short-term financial instruments abroad. The remaining 10.77 billion dollars were invested in long-term shares spread into stocks of 107 firms, 65 percent of which are located in North Africa, 20 percent in Asia, and 15 percent in companies in Europe and North and South America. [Reuters, 2/18/2009]

¶13. (U) More Foreign Companies in Libya: The number of foreign companies that opened branches and representative offices in Libya increased in 2009 to 817 and 80 respectively, according to the Ministry of Industry. The Ministry also announced the privatization of 36 public companies and liquidation of other 59 companies. [Libyaonline, 2/25/2009]

¶14. (U) Libya to Fill Half of Unicredit Bank Capital Gap: Libya's Central Bank, with a 4.6 percent holding, will fill half of a 500 million euros gap in UniCredit's 3 billion euros capital raising measures. Shareholders Fondazione Cassa di Risparmio di Torino (CRT) and Carimonte Holding will also take up about 230 million euros of the shortfall. The CariVerona foundation, the top shareholder in UniCredit with just over 6 percent, decided to abstain from the bank capital raising measure and left a 500 million euros shortfall in the capital raising measures. Overall, UniCredit is boosting its capital by 6.6 billion euros to improve its ability to manage risk. Other smaller foundations will take up the remaining 20 million euros. Libya's Central Bank would hold about 7 percent in UniCredit after the capital increase and become the biggest single shareholder. CRT and Carimonte together would have 9 percent voting rights. [Reuters, 2/9/2009]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶15. (U) Libya Provides Help to Boost Agriculture in Northern Ghana: The Ministry of Food and Agriculture in collaboration with the Libyan Government is providing free tractor services to farmers in the Northern Region to help boost agricultural production. The Libyan government provided 10 tractors and will bear the cost of fuel and maintenance of the tractors and the Ghanaian government is responsible for the selection of beneficiaries. [Tripoli Post, 2/5/2009]

¶16. (U) Libyan Company to Invest $45 million dollars in Liberia: The Libyan Arab African Investment Trade Company (LAAICO) has finalized plans for a $45 million dollars investment in Liberia, of which $30 million dollars would go towards the reconstruction of the Ducor Palace Hotel, a five star hotel in Monrovia which was devastated during the civil conflict. The remaining $15 million dollars will be for the establishment of a rubber processing plant in central Bong County in northern Liberia. LAAICO is also finalizing plans to construct a training center for the handicapped in the western Monrovia suburb of Virginia. [isria.com, 2/8/2009]

¶17. (U) Libya Lends Tractors to Mozambique: Under the memorandum, ten tractors will be on loan for a renewable period of a year and will be used to implement the Mozambican's Food Production Action Plan for the period 2008/2011; the plan seeks to make Mozambique self-sufficient in rice production, to reduce significantly imports of wheat, and to increase surpluses of maize. [www.allAfrica.com, 2/11/2009]

CONSTRUCTION

¶19. (U) Mitchell Architects Wins Contract in Misurata: Libyan dairy producer company, Al-Naseem, awarded English Company Mitchell Architects a $9 million dollar contract for the building of a 6,500 square meter facility in Misurata, a city located 210 km east of Tripoli on the Mediterranean coast. [Libyan Investment, 2/06/2009]

¶20. (U) Ace Hardware to Open in Libya: Oak Brook-based Ace Hardware Corporation announced that it has a deal to open six stores in Libya over the next decade. The retail cooperative has a license agreement with Technology Corner, a consortium of Libyan business people. The first two stores are scheduled to open this year in Tripoli. The stores would be the first free-standing hardware locations in Libya. Plans to open retail locations in Libya have been in the works since 2007. Ace Hardware has 4,600 stores throughout the U.S. and in 60 countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. [chicagobusiness.com, 2/24/2009]

IT

TRIPOLI 00000221 004 OF 005

¶21. (U) New WiMAX Service in Libya: Libya launched the country's first WiMAX data service. The new WiMAX network is meant to accommodate more than a quarter million users. It was built by three telecommunications equipment makers, France's Alcatel, China's ZTE and Huawei and the service will be managed by Libya Telecom and Technology Corporation (LTT), the country's primary Internet mobile services company. [North Africa Journal, 2/16/2009]

¶22. (U) Libya Invites Bids for Private Phone Licenses: Libya announced an international tender for the first private licenses for a combined fixed-line and mobile phone license. Interested parties are invited to make a bid before May 13, with the winner expected to be announced in June. The tender comes almost two years after Libya announced plans to privatize its mobile phone sector. Libya's General Post and Telecommunications Company is the monopoly supplier of fixed-line services while the mobile market is controlled by a duopoly of Libyana and al-Madar, both state-owned companies. Libya has 700,000 land lines for a population of more than six million people, and Libyana and al-Madar mobile operators have more than five million users. [AFP, 2/18/2009]

BANKING

¶23. (U) Arab Bank Wins Stake in Libya's Wahda Bank: Arab Bank has been selected as the strategic partner for the privatization of Wahda Bank, after financial offers were opened. Arab Bank submitted a price of $306 million dollars for a 19 per cent stake in the bank. The Arab Bank will now take management control of Wahda Bank and will be allowed to increase its stake to 51 percent in a three to five years period. Five banks were originally prequalified for the privatization, Intesa Sanpaolo, Arab Banking Corporation, Attijariwafa Bank, Societe Generale and Arab Bank. The privatization of Wahda Bank follows the sell-off of a 19 percent stake in Sahara Bank in September 2007. [MEED, 2/14/2009]

¶24. (U) First Moroccan Bank Opens Representative Office in Tripoli: Attijariwafa bank Group opened its representative office in Tripoli to offer a new platform of exchange for the business community of both countries as well as for all North African and Sub-Saharan businessmen. Attijariwafa bank Group has operational presence in 22 countries. [Tripoli Post, 2/21/2009]

PRESS

¶25. (U) Foreign Press to Return to Libyan News-Stands: Libyan al-Ghad company, a private media business set up by Seif al-Islam, is going to distribute 90 Arab and international newspapers and magazines, including the main British, French and U.S. dailies. The Libyan government has long maintained a tight grip on both print and broadcast media. The state-controlled media carries no opinions inconsistent with official policy. For nine months between 2006 and 2007, Libyan authorities had allowed a small number of foreign titles to be sold. In 2007, al-Ghad launched two "independent" dailies and the country's first private television channel; the two newspapers have published criticism of senior officials. The authorities have since further loosened their control over the media, allowing AFP last November to open a bureau in Tripoli and have a permanent foreign correspondent accredited, the first for a global news agency. [AFP, 2/24/2009]

FAIRS

¶26. (U) Infrastructure Libya and Oil and Gas Libya Exhibition 2009: More than 150 international specialized companies participated in the fair, including American companies. [Tripoli

TRIPOLI 00000221 005 OF 005

Post, 2/21/2009]
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI222

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI222 aka Wikileaks id #196938 ?
Subject	WILL SMALL BUSINESSES HATCH IN LIBYA? PM AL-MAHMOUDI OPENS FIRST SMALL BUSINESS INCUBATOR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 15 Mar 2009 13:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI222.html
References	08TRIPOLI937 , 09TRIPOLI212
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9801
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0222/01 0741317
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151317Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4613
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1028
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0714
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0043
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0394
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5139
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000222

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB (EGAN) AND NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON,
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY LIAISON ALEX
SEVERENS; LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/11/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , LY [Libya] , ELAB [Labor Sector
Affairs] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , BBSR [Business Services
Reporting] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism]
SUBJECT: WILL SMALL BUSINESSES HATCH IN LIBYA?  PM AL-MAHMOUDI OPENS
FIRST SMALL BUSINESS INCUBATOR

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 937 ; B) TRIPOLI 212

TRIPOLI 00000222  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (C ) Summary: Secretary of the General People's Committee
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Secretary of the General People's Committee al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (PM-equivalent) recently officially opened the first "business incubator" in Tripoli to assist small- and medium-sized businesses (SME's), diversify Libya's petroleum-dominated economy, and reduce the high unemployment rate among Libyan youth. Participants in the Business Incubator program will receive training, such as in preparing business plans, conducting feasibility studies, and access to credit if needed. End note.

LIBYA EARMARKS 16 BILLION DOLLARS TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES

¶2. (C) On March 10, Secretary of the General People's Committee al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (PM-equivalent) officially opened the first "business incubator" in Tripoli to assist small- and medium-sized businesses (SME's). Also present at the opening were Secretary Matuq Matuq (head of the General People's Committee for Facilities, an agency created in last week's cabinet shuffle reported in Ref B), the director of the National Economic Development Board (EDB), Mahmoud Jibril, as well as members of the diplomatic corps. As part of the Libyan government's efforts to reform and diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons, al-Mahmoudi's EDB has spear-headed the creation of "business incubators" with the hope of reducing unemployment (estimated at 20 percent) and creating opportunities for Libya's unemployed youth. Participants in the Business Incubator program will receive training, such as in preparing business plans, conducting feasibility studies, and access to credit. The incubators will also provide information and communication technology, office space, workshops, business and financial management training, and help entering new markets. (Note: The Embassy is currently working with the EDB to provide technical assistance to the Business Incubator program managers by partnering with the U.S. Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program. See Ref A. End note). In his remarks at the opening ceremony, al-Mahmoudi said the Government of Libya (GOL) had earmarked 20 billion Libyan dinars (about 16 billion USD) for the promotion of small- and medium-sized businesses and for a "Financial Fund" as part of the program. In a follow-up conversation with EDB staff, Econoff asked for more details on the "Fund" but staff said the modalities of how small loans would be disbursed were not yet known. In all, five incubators are planned to be opened nation-wide with some focusing on agriculture and some on industry. They will target new graduates, the unemployed (especially youth), and women.

WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE EU, TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN

¶3. (C) At the opening ceremony in Tripoli, al-Mahmoudi said that Libya was working in cooperation with the European Union, and bilaterally with Italy, to promote small business development. He noted the recently-ratified Libyan-Italian partnership agreement "required" Italy to open its markets for Libyan goods that would be produced by the new entrepreneurs from the business incubators. He said Libya hoped to exchange experiences in promoting small businesses with neighbors such as Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. The Jordanian organization, Jordanian Expertise House (JEH), is assisting the Tripoli Business Incubator in its early stages. No mention was made of plans for American technical assistance via the Commercial Law Development Plan but this could be because joint-activities are not slated to begin until this coming June. Dr. Mahmoud Jibril of the EDB also made remarks at the ceremony, in which he said the opening of Tripoli Business Incubator represented an important step in preparing youth to run their start-up businesses successfully. He noted the incubators were especially important in oil-producing countries, like Libya, where the culture of self-employment and private initiative was almost non-existent. A change in the "work culture" of Libyan youth would be a great accomplishment of the program, in his view.

BUT IT'S NOT THE FIRST TIME LIBYA HAS TRIED THIS

¶4. (C) At the reception following the ceremony, the German DCM asked whether the incubators would connect Libyan entrepreneurs to foreign companies, noting that many small- and medium-sized German firms were looking for Libyan partners. A member of the EDB staff said this had not figured into the initial plans but that eventually the incubators could serve as a clearinghouse

TRIPOLI 00000222 002.2 OF 002

for matching Libyan and foreign SME's. The French Economic Counselor told Econoff that this program was at least the third attempt to assist SMEs in Libya and his predecessor had tried to link the EDB to French organizations that help SMEs by sending Dr. Jibril to France on a study tour. He said this had not been fruitful due to the lack of institutional structures and bureaucratic capacity to help SME's in Libya.

POST-CABINET SHUFFLE: AL-MAHMOUDI TRYING TO SHOW RESULTS?

¶5. (C) Comment: Will the business incubator program succeed? This is not yet clear but it won't be for lack of funding. The reported budget of 20 billion dinars (16 billion USD) is huge but it is unclear as to how it will be allocated and whether some portions will be loans or loan guarantees. Another unknown is how micro-loans would be disbursed given that the Libyan economy is largely cash-based and banks are not widely-used, except for disbursing payrolls. Whether or not the loans would be paid back is another question mark, particularly in a country where loans from state-run banks have traditionally been given based on patronage and where there is no nation-wide credit bureau. The roll-out of the incubator program also coincides with the General People's Congress' decision to postpone al-Qadhafi's much-touted wealth distribution program. The announcement of the incubator program could be an effort to demonstrate that the government will help Libyans in other ways than distributing the country's oil revenues directly to the people. The undertone to the talk of helping unemployed youth is that the regime is under pressure to provide meaningful options for young people lest they turn to extremism and terrorism. Setting up business incubators elsewhere in Libya, particularly around Benghazi, will be especially important there since rates of unemployment are even higher than the nation-wide average of 20 percent, a potential driver of extremism in a region that has historically provided foreign fighters to al-Qaeda in Iraq. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI223

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI223 aka Wikileaks id #196940 ?
Subject	WILL SMALL BUSINESSES HATCH IN LIBYA? PM AL-MAHMOUDI OPENS FIRST SMALL BUSINESS INCUBATOR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 15 Mar 2009 13:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI223.html
References	08TRIPOLI937 , 09TRIPOLI212
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI764
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9804
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0223/01 0741318
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151318Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4615
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1030
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0716
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0045
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0396
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5141
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000223

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB (EGAN) AND NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON,
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY LIAISON ALEX
SEVERENS; LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/11/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , LY [Libya] , ELAB [Labor Sector
Affairs] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , BBSR [Business Services
Reporting] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism]
SUBJECT: WILL SMALL BUSINESSES HATCH IN LIBYA?  PM AL-MAHMOUDI OPENS
FIRST SMALL BUSINESS INCUBATOR

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 937  ; B) TRIPOLI 212

TRIPOLI 00000223  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b) , (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: Secretary of the General People's Committee al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (PM-equivalent) recently officially opened the first "business incubator" in Tripoli to assist small- and medium-sized businesses (SME's), diversify Libya's petroleum-dominated economy, and reduce the high unemployment rate among Libyan youth. Participants in the Business Incubator program will receive training, such as in preparing business plans, conducting feasibility studies, and access to credit if needed. End note.

LIBYA EARMARKS 16 BILLION DOLLARS TO HELP SMALL BUSINESSES

¶2. (C) On March 10, Secretary of the General People's Committee al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (PM-equivalent) officially opened the first "business incubator" in Tripoli to assist small- and medium-sized businesses (SME's). Also present at the opening were Secretary Matuq Matuq (head of the General People's Committee for Facilities, an agency created in last week's cabinet shuffle reported in Ref B), the director of the National Economic Development Board (EDB), Mahmoud Jibril, as well as members of the diplomatic corps. As part of the Libyan government's efforts to reform and diversify the economy away from hydrocarbons, al-Mahmoudi's EDB has spear-headed the creation of "business incubators" with the hope of reducing unemployment (estimated at 20 percent) and creating opportunities for Libya's unemployed youth. Participants in the Business Incubator program will receive training, such as in preparing business plans, conducting feasibility studies, and access to credit. The incubators will also provide information and communication technology, office space, workshops, business and financial management training, and help entering new markets. (Note: The Embassy is currently working with the EDB to provide technical assistance to the Business Incubator program managers by partnering with the U.S. Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program. See Ref A. End note). In his remarks at the opening ceremony, al-Mahmoudi said the Government of Libya (GOL) had earmarked 20 billion Libyan dinars (about 16 billion USD) for the promotion of small- and medium-sized businesses and for a "Financial Fund" as part of the program. In a follow-up conversation with EDB staff, Econoff asked for more details on the "Fund" but staff said the modalities of how small loans would be disbursed were not yet known. In all, five incubators are planned to be opened nation-wide with some focusing on agriculture and some on industry. They will target new graduates, the unemployed (especially youth), and women.

WORKING IN COOPERATION WITH THE EU, TUNISIA, EGYPT, AND JORDAN

¶3. (C) At the opening ceremony in Tripoli, al-Mahmoudi said that Libya was working in cooperation with the European Union, and bilaterally with Italy, to promote small business development. He noted the recently-ratified Libyan-Italian partnership agreement "required" Italy to open its markets for Libyan goods that would be produced by the new entrepreneurs from the business incubators. He said Libya hoped to exchange experiences in promoting small businesses with neighbors such as Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan. The Jordanian organization, Jordanian Expertise House (JEH), is assisting the Tripoli Business Incubator in its early stages. No mention was made of plans for American technical assistance via the Commercial Law Development Plan but this could be because joint-activities are not slated to begin until this coming June. Dr. Mahmoud Jibril of the EDB also made remarks at the ceremony, in which he said the opening of Tripoli Business Incubator represented an important step in preparing youth to run their start-up businesses successfully. He noted the incubators were especially important in oil-producing countries, like Libya, where the culture of self-employment and private initiative was almost non-existent. A change in the "work culture" of Libyan youth would be a great accomplishment of the program, in his view.

BUT IT'S NOT THE FIRST TIME LIBYA HAS TRIED THIS

¶4. (C) At the reception following the ceremony, the German DCM asked whether the incubators would connect Libyan entrepreneurs to foreign companies, noting that many small- and medium-sized German firms were looking for Libyan partners. A member of the EDB staff said this had not figured into the initial plans but that eventually the incubators could serve as a clearinghouse

TRIPOLI 00000223 002.2 OF 002

for matching Libyan and foreign SME's. The French Economic Counselor told Econoff that this program was at least the third attempt to assist SMEs in Libya and his predecessor had tried to link the EDB to French organizations that help SMEs by sending Dr. Jibril to France on a study tour. He said this had not been fruitful due to the lack of institutional structures and bureaucratic capacity to help SME's in Libya.

POST-CABINET SHUFFLE: AL-MAHMOUDI TRYING TO SHOW RESULTS?

¶5. (C) Comment: Will the business incubator program succeed? This is not yet clear but it won't be for lack of funding. The reported budget of 20 billion dinars (16 billion USD) is huge but it is unclear as to how it will be allocated and whether some portions will be loans or loan guarantees. Another unknown is how micro-loans would be disbursed given that the Libyan economy is largely cash-based and banks are not widely-used, except for disbursing payrolls. Whether or not the loans would be paid back is another question mark, particularly in a country where loans from state-run banks have traditionally been given based on patronage and where there is no nation-wide credit bureau. The roll-out of the incubator program also coincides with the General People's Congress' decision to postpone al-Qadhafi's much-touted wealth distribution program. The announcement of the incubator program could be an effort to demonstrate that the government will help Libyans in other ways than distributing the country's oil revenues directly to the people. The undertone to the talk of helping unemployed youth is that the regime is under pressure to provide meaningful options for young people lest they turn to extremism and terrorism. Setting up business incubators elsewhere in Libya, particularly around Benghazi, will be especially important there since rates of unemployment are even higher than the nation-wide average of 20 percent, a potential driver of extremism in a region that has historically provided foreign fighters to al-Qaeda in Iraq. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI225

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI225 aka Wikileaks id #197058 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INVITATION TO GLOBAL INITIATIVE'S 3RD EPG DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Mar 2009 13:13 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI225.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0560
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0225 0751313
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 161313Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4618
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0078
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0010
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5144
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000225

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/WMDT

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: MCAP [Military Capabilities] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , PINS [National
Security] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , KGIC [Global Initiative to Combat
Nuclear Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: INVITATION TO GLOBAL INITIATIVE'S 3RD EPG DELIVERED

REF: STATE 22354

Post delivered reftel invitation and non-paper to the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation's Office of International Organizations.  The
embassies of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Korea
have also delivered the invitation by diplomatic note.  The
Korean Embassy informed us that they are seeking a meeting to
discuss Libyan participation and we will report any response
septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI227

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI227 aka Wikileaks id #197249 ?
Subject	LIBYA RELEASES POLITICAL AND ISLAMIST PRISONERS BUT STILL BRISTLES AT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 17 Mar 2009 11:13 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI227.html
References	08TRIPOLI472 , 08TRIPOLI943 , 09TRIPOLI320 , 09TRIPOLI943
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1 , 09TRIPOLI17 , 09TRIPOLI191 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1486
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0227 0761113
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 171113Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4620
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0798
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0924
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0862
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1440
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0398
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5146
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000227

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NESCA AND DRL/IRF

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/16/2019
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , KIRF
[International Religious Freedom] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA RELEASES POLITICAL AND ISLAMIST PRISONERS BUT STILL
BRISTLES AT HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

REF: A. 08 TRIPOLI 472
     B. 08 TRIPOLI 943
     C. 08 TRIPOLI 320

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) The head of the Human Rights Society of Libya (HRSL),
Muhammed Tarnesh, confirmed to the UK Embassy on March 13 that
Jamal al-Haji and Faraj Humaid have been released from detention
and are with their families.  He did not provide information on
the terms of their release or whether legal proceedings had
concluded.  Al-Haji and Humaid were the last of eleven political
detainees sentenced to prison last June for attempting to foment
rebellion against the "people's authority system" and conducting
```

rebellion against the "people's authority system" and conducting unauthorized communications with an official of a foreign government (ref A). Al-Haji, Humaid, and twelve others - including self-described regime critic Idriss Boufayed - were arrested in February 2007 in conjunction with a planned political protest and an attendant meeting with poloff to discuss it. Most of the group were released last December (ref B), but al-Haji and Humaid were reportedly held on unnamed charges predating their 2007 arrest. Tarnesh said speculation that the final detainee - Abdulrahman al-Qutawi - had been released is premature. Al-Qutawi, who has not been seen since his February 2007 arrest and who did not undergo a public trial reportedly, remains in detention at a state security prison in or around Tripoli.

¶2. (C) At nearly the same time the GOL reportedly released the two Boufayed prisoners, the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) announced that it had secured the release of 26 members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). The QDF had previously brokered the release of some 90 individuals the Foundation identfied as LIFG detainees (ref C). Under the terms of their release, the detainees undergo rehabilitative training and are provided financial support from the QDF. They are required to pledge that they will refrain from illegal activities upon release. Tarnesh confirmed the group had been released and claimed a central role in the negotiations (Note: While the HRSL operates under the QDF umbrella, the negotiations have been managed under the auspices of the QDF's Human Rights Committee chaired by Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh with Ali al-Salabi as lead negotiator/theologian focusing on educating detainees in moderate Islam and reintegrating the detainees into Libyan society. End note.)

¶3. (C) Tarnesh told the UK embassy that he had no information on the allegations made by the U.S.-based organization, International Christian Concern, that four Arab converts to Christianity had been detained at Tripoli International Airport en route to Malta for a conference. He said he found the claims unlikely.

¶4. (C) Comment: In the past, Tarnesh has been a useful contact of the Embassy. In December, however, he cut off contact with us in protest of Israel's military strikes in Gaza. He told the UK Embassy that he is now boycotting the US Embassy in protest of what he characterized as the USG's "inaccurate" Human Rights Report. His complaint about the Human Rights Report echoes that of the GOL. We will continue to make the point to the QDF and the GOL that the best way to address their concerns is through dialogue with the Embassy. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI239

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI239 aka Wikileaks id #197534 ?
Subject	U.S. AFRICA COMMAND HEAD: ALLAYING LIBYAN FEARS ON THE MISSION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Mar 2009 14:36 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI239.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2868
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0239/01 0771436
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181436Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4633
INFO RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0863
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5160
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000239

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/16/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , MOPS [Military Operations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: U.S. AFRICA COMMAND HEAD:  ALLAYING LIBYAN FEARS ON THE
MISSION

TRIPOLI 00000239  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S) Summary:  On his first visit to Libya March 10-11, U.S.
Africa Command's General William Ward explained the Command's
mission to National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi,
reassuring the son of the Leader that the intent was not to
establish U.S. bases on the African continent, and that his
mandate was to work with willing African governments to improve
their ability to provide for their own security.  Muatassim said
there was a growing problem with terrorists in the Sub-Sahara
region and expressed interest in U.S. Africa Command assistance
in the training and equipping of the North African Standby
Force.  Muatassim 's main focus, however, was on the bilateral
security relationship.  After relinquishing its WMD programs, he
said, Libya felt vulnerable and expected the United States to
```

reciprocate by entering into a more robust bilateral security relationship, including weapons sales and security guarantees. General Ward counseled patience and continued engagement with the Africa Command, through the Embassy, to build the relationship. Muatassim expressed appreciation for the General's visit and said he hoped the General could meet his father, Muammar al-Qadhafi, on a future occasion (the Leader was in Nouakchott during General Ward's visit to Tripoli). End summary.

¶2. (S) Attendees - Libya: Dr. Muatassim al-Qadhafi, Amb. Ali Aujali, MFA Office of Americas Director Mohamed Matari, NSC Director Dr. Hend Siala, Capt. Saf Saf. US: General William Ward, Amb Gene Cretz, Col. David Crawford (Africa Command, North Africa Branch Engagements Chief), DATT LTC Linvill.

¶3. (S) Muatassim opened by expressing Libyan concern about the Africa Command's mission, including whether there were plans for American bases on the continent. General Ward explained that the intent was to focus efforts that had previously been covered by three separate commands into one. U.S. Africa Command would be more responsive to Africa's needs and seek to increase each country's ability to provide for its own security, but its formation did not portend a change in U.S. policy towards Africa, and there was no intention of introducing bases or large bodies of troops in Africa. He reassured Muatassim that the Command would be based in Germany for the foreseeable future. In response to Muatassim's questions about U.S. "bases" in southern Morocco and the Gulf of Guinea, the General explained that there were no U.S. bases in these countries. The Command had set up a training facility in Morocco under TSCTP / OEF-TS, and was assisting GoG countries, at their request, under the Gulf of Guinea Africa Partnership Station, with training related to securing their territorial waters.

¶4. (S) Muatassim expressed his interest in seeing the Africa Command assist with the development of the North African Standby Force, providing it with training, equipment, and experts. "Terrorists are everywhere," he said, "especially in the Sub-Sahara, which used to be peaceful." Ward said the NASF was a good initiative and he would provide assistance if host governments asked for it, and after he had consulted the relevant U.S. Embassies. Throughout the discussion, Ward emphasized that the Command's initiatives were undertaken only at the specific request of individual countries and with the concurrence of and close coordination with U.S. ambassadors.

¶5. (S) In response to Muatassim's question about the relationship between the Department of Defense and the Africa Command, Ward explained that the Command implemented mil-mil activities on behalf of the Secretary of Defense. The General emphasized that the DATT was in direct contact with his Command, and the Ambassador suggested that a strong link between Muatassim's office and the DATT would help the USG better interpret Libya's needs.

¶6. (S) Muatassim asked about the future of the military relationship between the U.S. and Libya, including prospects for upgrading the mil-mil MOU to a binding agreement, and for Libyan purchases of lethal equipment. Libya could pursue a security relationship with the EU, Russia, and China, but preferred a defense strategy based on a special relationship with the United States, he said. Libya had given up its WMD, leaving its 5 million populace (defenseless) against "tens of millions" in Algeria and Egypt, and needed a fulsome security relationship with the U.S. to protect against this vulnerability. It was in the U.S. interest to be responsive, he implied, if the U.S. wanted to set a positive example for Iran and North Korea. The General responded that Libya's decision to give up WMD was a good choice and showed foresight. Libya's joining the community of nations was a deterrent in itself. The advancing of the mil-mil relationship with the United States would underwrite Libya's decision

Libya's decision.

¶7. (S) Muatassim stated that he hoped to have a response soon to the list of U.S. military equipment the Libyan delegation

TRIPOLI 00000239 002.2 OF 002

presented to the Department of Defense during its visit to Washington in January. The Ambassador explained that such issues take time, but the steps Libya was taking -- including Muatassim's planned trip to Washington in May -- would help. Muatassim's planned trip and the March 12 visit by Libyan military to the USS Eisenhower would help build confidence and trust between the two sides. Muatassim noted that six years had passed since the U.S. and Libya had restored ties, and while he was unsure how the new administration would view Libya, he believed the security relationship needed to develop at a faster pace. He said Libya wanted to participate in the BRIGHT STAR exercise in Egypt. General Ward encouraged Libya to participate in PHOENIX EXPRESS 09, and said that such participation, together with other mil-mil engagement, would be positive actions he could cite in his discussions with the Congress, the Pentagon, and the State Department.

¶8. (S) Muatassim expressed his thanks and said the relationship should be based on trust and understanding. Ward said they would work through the details and build trust. Ward said his HQ was just a place for planning, and that his officers needed to travel to help build partner capacity, including mil-mil activities such as civic action, veterinary, and engineering support available. The Ambassador added that Libya was invited to join TSCTP. Muatassim said he regretted that General Ward would not have the opportunity to meet with his father on this visit, as the Leader was dealing with the crisis in Mauritania as well as the assassination in Guinea. Muatassim inquired if it would be possible for Ward to meet the Leader somewhere else on the continent. Ward demurred, saying he could not go without an invitation from the other country. Muatassim responded that as the Leader was President of the AU, he could invite Ward to visit any country in Africa.

¶9. (S) Comment: While General Ward's discussion went a long way toward alleviating some of the strong concerns the Libyans had expressed about U.S. Africa Command, the GOL continues to espouse a rejectionist public line -- "Africans reject AFRICOM" -- characterizing the Command as a vehicle for the United States to promote neo-colonial policies on the continent. Despite the negative rhetoric, Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, who reportedly personally approved General Ward's visit and delegated his son Muatassim to meet with him in his stead, views a strong military relationship with the United States as an essential element of his security strategy. At the end of the meeting, Muatassim took the Ambassador aside to strongly urge the General to take up the Leader's offer to visit him in Mauritania. To the Ambassador's reply that the General could not do that, Muatassim said, "The General must come back; I will guarantee a meeting with the Leader when he does." As Muatassim's comments demonstrate, Libya is impatient to broaden the relationship, particularly through lethal equipment purchases and "security guarantees," which they appear to be making the litmus test for the future of the relationship. The challenge will be to reduce the Libyan sense of impatience over what they believe has been U.S. foot-dragging since 2003, their starting date for the new relationship. We have said in follow-up discussions that the relationship in effect began on November 1, 2008, the day the GOL made the final payments due to the claims settlement fund. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI242

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI242 aka Wikileaks id #197648 ?
Subject	MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOARD CHAIRMAN WELCOMES U.S. COMPANIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Mar 2009 06:48 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI242.html
References	08TRIPOLI942 , 09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI63 , 09TRIPOLI942
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3452
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0242/01 0780648
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 190648Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4639
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1032
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0718
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0500
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0399
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5166
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000242

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS; ENERGY FOR
GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY
LIAISON ALEX SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* ,
ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ASEC *[Security]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME: HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE BOARD
CHAIRMAN WELCOMES U.S. COMPANIES

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 942 , B) TRIPOLI 212 , C) TRIPOLI 63

TRIPOLI 00000242 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting between Ambassador and Abouzeid Dorda, Chairman of the Libyan Housing and Infrastructure (HIB), Dorda discussed his role in encouraging American companies to work in Libya and his plans to privatize the HIB. He also offered his thoughts on the newly-reorganized government cabinet and ministries. As for U.S.-Libyan military relations, he urged the United States to move quickly in this area, noting the Russians and Europeans are already helping Libya with military matters, including sales of equipment. He reiterated his previous invitation to U.S. companies to help rebuild Libya's housing and infrastructure but pointed out that only 10 percent of HIB's projects remain available for contractors. End summary.

LIBYA AND THE U.S. MAKING UP FOR LOST TIME

¶2. (C) On March 15, Ambassador paid a courtesy call on Abouzeid Dorda, Chairman of the Libyan Housing and Infrastructure (HIB). Dorda welcomed the Ambassador and said he was taking on an "historic responsibility" as the first U.S. Ambassador to Libya in over three decades. He said he imagined Americans did not have a positive image of Libya following thirty years of separation and sanctions. Dorda said he had tried to bring the two countries together even during difficult times. As Libya's UN PermRep (1997-2003), he had encouraged American companies and universities to come and work in Libya. He said he tried to "push" Libyan politicians towards the Americans but that this did not work. Instead, he turned to American businessmen who were interested in working in Libya in order to "pull" the politicians along towards rapprochement. Noting Libya and the UK renewed diplomatic relations in 1999, Dorda said that at least seven years of U.S.-Libyan cooperation were "lost for nothing." He urged the Ambassador to therefore "speed up" our cooperation to make up for the lost time.

¶3. (C) The Ambassador outlined progress in U.S.-Libyan relations (conclusion of the compensation claims agreement, visit of former Secretary Rice, swift presentation of the Ambassador's credentials, and last week's high-level AFRICOM visit). He previewed upcoming high-level Libyan official visits to the U.S. and congressional interest in coming to Libya. In short, he said the U.S. was doing exactly what Dorda suggested. On the commercial side, a whole range of companies would like to come to Libya, to which Dorda replied they would be welcome. He noted, however, that Libyans were not going to wait as "our people need houses, ports, and airports right now."

RUSSIAN MILITARY "ALREADY HERE" AND NOT WAITING

¶4. (C) As for military cooperation and sales, Dorda stressed the United States faces competition from Russia and many European countries. He said these countries are already working in Libya and are "not going to wait." He said the Americans were welcome and Libya would issue visas.

CABINET CHANGES AND GOVERNMENT REFORMS: IT'S THE "PEOPLE'S VISION"

¶5. (C) On the recent cabinet changes and government restructuring (ref B), Dorda pointed out "there is no cabinet in Libya; all decisions are the vision of the people." Any further government restructuring would depend on the economic situation and follow the trend in Libya towards privatization. Dorda assured the Ambassador that HIB -- which has billions of dollars at its disposal to invest in national infrastructure development -- would remain in tact with himself at the helm. (Dorda denied rumor that he was headed for Paris).

IT'S LATE BUT U.S. COMPANIES SHOULD STILL PARTNER WITH HIB

¶6. (C) In terms of opportunities for U.S. companies, Dorda said HIB had signed 90 percent of its contracts with around 200

companies, with the American firm AECOM contracted to act as overall program manager (ref C). He said other sectors (electricity, transport, and telecommunications) had similar authority to sign their own contracts. He promised to provide the Embassy with a multi-sectoral plan of Libya's development needs so that the Embassy could brief U.S. companies interested in coming to Libya. Dorda said American construction firms were

TRIPOLI 00000242 002.2 OF 002

welcome to come to Libya and discuss the remaining 10 percent of contracts with HIB. Alternatively, they could go to Houston and discuss the projects with AECOM. Dorda noted that Libya lacks the technology for micro-tunneling, which is necessary for many HIB projects in urban areas. According to Dorda, other needs in Libya include solar energy, desalination, and agriculture.

¶7. (C) Comment: Dorda embodies a remarkable combination of adherence to al-Qadhafi's rhetoric of the Jamahiriya (`state of the masses') with a pragmatic outreach to Western companies. The take-away message from this meeting with him is that although HIB's contracts have almost all been allocated, American construction firms are still welcome in Libya. In post's experience, however, most American construction firms are still reticent to engage in on-the-ground work that would entail importing heavy machinery and making significant investments in an unknown environment, especially given al-Qadhafi's recent nationalization rhetoric. Dorda emphasized that the U.S. companies needed to come here quickly, assess their prospects, and begin making the personal connections necessary to work and be successful in this target-rich commercial environment. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI243

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI243 aka Wikileaks id #197803 ?
Subject	JEM REPRESENTATIVE DISOUNTS TRIPOLI REBEL UNITY AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Mar 2009 15:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI243.html
References	09KHARTOUM372
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4027
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0243 0781519
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 191519Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4641
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0171
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1441
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5168
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000243

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/18/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , SU *[Sudan]*
SUBJECT: JEM REPRESENTATIVE DISOUNTS TRIPOLI REBEL UNITY AGREEMENT

REF: KHARTOUM 372

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) According to Suliman Abdalla Ismail, the Sudanese Justice and Equality Movement's/Khalil Ibrahim Faction (JEM/KI) Tripoli-based representative, the March 15 agreement signed in Tripoli between five Sudanese rebel groups and Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud may help mediators structure peace talks more efficiently, but will likely be ineffective due to the minor role the rebel groups play in Darfur and the impunity with which the Bashir government has acted since the issuance of the ICC arrest warrant for President Bashir. In a meeting with Poloff March 16, Ismail characterized the talks (reftel) as an attempt by Libya to reassert its role in Darfur mediation. Ismail was dismissive of the rebel groups represented, noting that "most of them only represent themselves and have no

movement". SLA/Juba consisted of only a chairman, secretary general, and a military commander but lacked troops and civilian support, he said.

¶2. (C) Ismail conceded that it was important for the Government of Sudan (GOS) to engage with all rebel groups to reach cease-fire agreements and that consolidation would make that process more manageable. He downplayed, however, the potential for the "Unity Plus" coalition to engage in meaningful negotiation with the GOS since "there is not one SLA, there are 15 or 16 factions and no one has control," and the GOS was unwilling to negotiate due to the ICC prosecution of Bashir. He also warned that Egyptian and Libyan influence must be carefully monitored, saying "JEM invites discussions with neighbors to find peace. If they will only unify factions, this is okay. If they want another peace table, it will hurt negotiations".

¶3. (C) Commenting on JEM's relations with Libya, Ismail said contact with the GOL had become less frequent over the past six months. JEM/KI and SLA/Abdul Wahid were not invited to the March 15 meeting, a slight Ismail attributed to Libya's anger that JEM had sent a delegation to the U.S to discuss the Doha peace process and to lobby for sanctions against Khartoum and other measures - a no-fly zone, an "oil for food" sanction program, and a "free zone" for rebel talks. Ismail said that the US should show more support for the Doha process and be wary of Libyan intervention. "Look at what [Muammar al-Qadhafi] did in Mauritania".

¶4. (C) Comment: This was our first meeting with Ismail, who contacted the embassy through email addresses found on the embassy website. Seemingly well-informed, he dutifully "demarched" poloff on JEM talking points and was versed in Libya's Darfur activities. He was frank and openly critical of Libya's record in Darfur despite the watchful eyes of his Libyan minders a few tables away. End Comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI248

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI248 aka Wikileaks id #198349 ?
Subject	LIBYA WANTS TO SIGN AVIATION AGREEMENT, COMMENCE FLIGHTS TO U.S.
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 23 Mar 2009 15:23 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI248.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7294
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0248 0821523
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 231523Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4646
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0720
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1034
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1442
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5173
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000248

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE FOR EEB/TRA/AN; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR FAA REP;

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/22/2019
TAGS: LY *[Libya]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA WANTS TO SIGN AVIATION AGREEMENT, COMMENCE FLIGHTS TO U.S.

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. Please see para 4.

¶2. (C) On March 20, the Libyan General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) delivered a diplomatic note proposing the United States and Libya sign a bilateral aviation agreement and that state-owned Afriqiyah Airlines start regular flights to the United States in the summer of 2009. Attached to the note was an Arabic translation of a 14-page aviation agreement. The text of the

diplomatic note said the Libyan Civil Aviation Authority had expressed its initial approval of the provisions included in the agreement. This agreement appears to be an Arabic translation of the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation (MALIAT) with New Zealand, Singapore, Brunei, and Chile. The note also said that the GOL would like to sign a bilateral aviation agreement with the United States during the visit of a high-level Libyan official in late April or early May. Post has sent via unclassified e-mail the diplomatic note and attachment to NEA/MAG.

¶3. (C) Post had no prior knowledge that Libya wanted to negotiate an aviation agreement or commence direct flights by one of its state-owned airlines to the United States. (Note: Wholly-owned by the Libyan government, Afriqiyah Airlines was established in 2001 with the goal of providing air service to the African continent. Its livery features the logo, "9.9.99", a reference to the date of the "Sirte Proclamation," an agreement by African states reached in Muammar al-Qadhafi's home-town that led to the creation of the African Union. The other state-owned airline is Libyan Arab Airlines. End note)

¶4. (C) Post seeks Department's advice in responding to the GOL's request. It would be helpful to be able to address the following questions:
-If Libya wants to sign onto the 2001 Multilateral Agreement on the Liberalization of International Air Transportation (MALIAT), is it eligible to do so?
-If Libya seeks a bilateral agreement with the United States, what are the next steps?
-If Libya wants to commence direct flights between Tripoli and a U.S. airport, what requirements would need to be met?

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI249

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI249 aka Wikileaks id #198715 ?
Subject	SLA UNITY SKEPTICAL ON DOHA, SEE UNIFICATION AS INCREASE OF MILITARY STRENGTH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Mar 2009 09:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI249.html
References	09DOHA200 , 09KHARTOUM372 , 09TRIPOLI109
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI298 , 09TRIPOLI363
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9162
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0249/01 0840927
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 250927Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4647
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0155
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0025
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0164
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1443
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0173
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5174
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000249

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/22/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , SU [Sudan] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SLA UNITY SKEPTICAL ON DOHA, SEE UNIFICATION AS INCREASE OF
MILITARY STRENGTH

REF: A. KHARTOUM 372
     B. DOHA 200
     C. TRIPOLI 109

TRIPOLI 00000249  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: Representatives of the Sudan Liberation
Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction resident in Tripoli view the March 15
```

Army/Unity (SLA/U) faction resident in Tripoli view the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" as a key step to folding smaller rebel factions into the SLA/U chain of command. In their view, the biggest gain is a consolidation of military assets and civilian support networks. Despite recent calls from the GOL to participate in the Doha process, they remain distrustful of Qatari intervention and discount UN/AU mediator Djibril Bossole's ability to serve as an unbiased facilitator due to his "friendship" with Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim. Libya will help the new "Unity Plus" organize meetings with Darfuri civil society and camp leaders in Tripoli over the week of March 22, after which time SLA will determine whether to take the fight back to the field or participate in the peace process. End summary.

"CHARTER OF TRIPOLI" UNITES GROUPS BUT DOESN'T MEAN THEY WILL GO TO DOHA

¶2. (C) In a March 21 meeting with Poloff in their room at the GOL-owned Hotel Kabiir, SLA/U representatives - Osman Busra, Saayid Sharif, and London-based Mahjoub Hussein - described the two-week-long conference in Tripoli attended by SLA/U, SLA/Khamis, URF, JEM/Idris Azraq, and SLA/Juba as an SLA/U initiative facilitated by Libyan hosts (ref A). The main point was to unite the factions to strengthen their military and negotiating positions, but, contrary to the Qatari readout (ref B), they stressed that they had made no commitment to negotiate with the GOS in Doha "or in any other place". Saying, "we will destroy Khalil," Sharif viewed unification as a chance to show the Darfurian people and the international community that SLA/U is the only "real movement". Deriding Ibrahim as an Islamist who had no support from the Darfurian people, Sharif assessed the importance placed on him by the Qataris and other international actors is due to a combination of media spotlight from Arab press like al-Jazeera and that "Khalil, the regime and Turabi are all playing together [on the same team] because they are Muslim brothers".

¶3. (C) While leaving open the possibility of joining future talks in Doha, SLA/U views Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud as uninformed of the real situation on the ground. Citing al-Mahmoud's trips to Chad and Darfur where he met with JEM but not SLA/U, Sharif claimed he has been poorly guided by UN/AU mediator Djibirl Bossole. Al-Mahmoud's presence at the signing of the "Charter of Tripoli" helped him learn more, but Busra still found his credibility in doubt saying, "if a man swears by Allah too much, he is a liar". Bossole, they claim, is biased toward Khalil Ibrahim and has lost credibility with other factions by focusing on JEM and ignoring movements that have support of Darfur's internally displaced people. Dismissing the framework agreement signed between JEM and the GOS in February, Hussein noted that "an agreement without the support of the people is a big zero".

LIBYA ALLOWING SLA/U MORE FREEDOM WHILE PUSHING FOR DOHA

¶4. (C) All three representatives agreed that Libya's position on Darfur had changed since al-Qadhafi became Chairman of the African Union. Previously they enjoyed sanctuary in Tripoli but were forbidden from talking to the press. In the past month, however, they have given interviews to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Oya newspaper, al-Shababiya radio station, and al-Libya satellite channel. The biggest shift has been Libya's support of Doha as a venue for discussions. After quietly dismissing Qatari intervention from November 2008 to late February, Libyan officials began urging SLA/U to engage in the Doha process in early March. (Note: Qatari Emir Hamad visited Tripoli on March 5. End note). Despite Libya's new-found support for the Qatari initiative, Busra said Libya was a better venue for talks as field commanders and members of civil society could travel by car and there would be no chance of losing contact with military elements of the movement.

¶5. (C) Libya has also played the gracious host, allowing SLA/U to invite the groups to Tripoli with minimal GOL interference (Busra claimed that al-Mahmoud and Libyan FM Musa Kusa attended only the signing ceremony). They are also providing transportation and lodging for a number of Darfurian civil society members, IDP camp leaders, and military council supporters of the five joined movements to come to Tripoli

TRIPOLI 00000249 002.2 OF 002

during the week of March 23 to decide on a name for the combined movement, appoint a leader, and decide whether to participate in a second Doha round of talks. However, Sharif said a cease fire would only be possible if the GOS met three conditions: immediately reverse the decision to expel NGOs from Darfur, allow no-fly zones over Sudan, and release all prisoners (military and civilian) that are members of the combined SLA movement.

¶6. (C//NF) Comment: While all three representatives consider the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" as significant, they seemed certain that they would not be going to Doha any time soon. They were much more interested in consolidating their gains: they claim continued success in bringing individual military commanders previously aligned with leaders like Minni Minnawi and Abdul Wahid Nur into their organization and are proud that their fighters stay in Darfur "with the support of the Darfurian people". In our meetings, they were nakedly attempting to win greater recognition for their movement and seem jealous of the attention paid to Minni Minnawi, Abdul Wahid, and Khalil Ibrahim by Darfur watchers. They spoke at length about their democratic institutions and support from the people while dismissing other leaders as autocrats intent on replacing the Bashir regime with their own - perhaps a gambit to win USG support for their movement. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI250

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI250 aka Wikileaks id #198823 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: LIBYA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CAR REBELS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Mar 2009 15:22 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI250.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9558
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0250 0841522
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 251522Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4649
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0721
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1035
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0016
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0166
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0002
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5176
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000250

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; PARIS AND LONDON FOR AF WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/25/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , CT *[Central African Republic]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: LIBYA'S RELATIONSHIP WITH CAR REBELS

REF: STATE 24355

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Post delivered reftel points via diplomatic note on March ¶18. We will report any substantive response septel. On Central African Republic (CAR) rebel leader Abdoulaye Miskine's reported ties with the GOL, the French embassy here reports that Miskine has taken up residence at the GOL-owned Hotel Kabiir. CAR President Francois Bozize reportedly told the French Ambassador that he had raised the Miskine issue while travelling to Tripoli in December 2008. Apparently unaware that Miskine was in the country, Muammar al-Qadhafi reportedly offered to have him arrested and delivered to Bozize to take back to Bangui. Bozize declined, apparently due to concerns about how the international community would react. The French assess that al-Qadhafi is "annoyed and jealous" of Gabon's role in the peace process and sought a higher profile for al-Qadhafi as a possible joint mediator.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI251

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI251 aka Wikileaks id #198955 ?
Subject	EL-JAHMI'S HEALTH DETERIORATING, POSSIBLE TRANSFER ABROAD FOR TREATMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Mar 2009 11:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI251.html
References	09TRIPOLI47
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI260
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

P 261145Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4650
INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000251

FOR NEA AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/26/2019
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EL-JAHMI'S HEALTH DETERIORATING, POSSIBLE TRANSFER ABROAD FOR TREATMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 47

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Detained regime critic Fathi el-Jahmi remains in Tripoli Medical Center, where his health has deteriorated. The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) is coordinating with el-Jahmi's family on his transfer to Switzerland for medical treatment as soon as he is stable enough to travel and a hospital has been identified. End summary.

¶2. (C) Director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, arranged a meeting for DCM with el-Jahmi in the latter's hospital room at Tripoli Medical Center March 25. The meeting lasted one hour. Saleh and el-Jahmi's doctor, Abdulrahman Mehdy, were also present. El-Jahmi's health appeared to have sharply deteriorated since the Embassy's last visit in January (reftel). He appeared weak and emaciated and spoke haltingly and in a whisper. His doctor acknowledged the downturn in his health, attributing it to dehydration brought on by diarrhea earlier in the week. He said the dehydration had led to renal failure. He said they were addressing the problem and might transfer him to the intensive care unit if his

and might transfer him to the intensive care unit if his condition did not improve soon. El-Jahmi's underlying medical problems -- heart failure and diabetes -- persist.

¶3. (C) El-Jahmi, apparently due to his weakened physical condition, could only answer DCM's questions with one- or two-word responses. He did not initiate any conversation on his own. He acknowledged that he was not feeling well and that his son Muhammad and wife Fawzia had recently visited him (his wife visited earlier the same day; his son, Mohamed, has visited several times in the past few weeks, according to the QDF's Saleh). Asked if he would like to leave the hospital, he said yes, although he did not indicate where he wanted to go (he said he had no home, but according to Saleh, the family owns a home in Benghazi and a second home in Tripoli, where his wife and son Muhammad are currently staying).

¶4. (C) Saleh reported that the family had equivocated on whether to send el-Jahmi to Switzerland for treatment and he had pressed them to make up their minds (per reftel Saleh informed us in January that the family had agreed to treatment in Switzerland). On March 24, he said, el-Jahmi's son Muhammad informed him that the family had made a final decision that he should go to Switzerland and that his wife and Muhammad would accompany him. The family asked the QDF to identify a suitable hospital and make arrangements for their travel and el-Jahmi's care. Saleh said the QDF would underwrite the costs.

¶5. (C) DCM asked the doctor whether el-Jahmi could safely travel in his current condition. The doctor replied that he would need to be stabilized first. He hoped this could be done in the coming days. The QDF's Saleh promised to keep the Embassy posted on el-Jahmi's medical condition and on arrangements for his transfer to Switzerland.

¶6. (C) Comment: It is difficult to know whether the delay in sending el-Jahmi abroad for treatment is due to the family's indecision or other reasons. We will make the case to the QDF and GOL that the case requires their urgent attention, and that it remains a bilateral issue of serious concern to Washington. Ambassador raised the el-Jahmi situation during a meeting with Secretary of the Americas Fituri on March 26, arguing that the time had come for a decision and that the GOL needed to act quickly before the situation deteriorated any further.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI254

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI254 aka Wikileaks id #198993 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Mar 2009 13:18 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI254.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0597
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0254 0851318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 261318Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4653
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5180
XMT AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000254

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/RA (JSCOVITCH)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPAL [Palestinian Affairs] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , KWBG [West Bank and Gaza] ,
MOPS [Military Operations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political
Relations] , AL [Albania] , SU [Sudan] , XF [Middle East] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT

REF: STATE 23823

(U) Post passed reftel points to the General People's Committee
for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation's
(MFA-equivalent) offices of American Affairs and Arab Affairs on
March 26.  MFA Secretary for the Americas told the Ambassador
that a final decision had not yet been made on summit
participation, but there was a good chance that the Leader,
Muammar al-Qadhafi, would attend.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI256

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI256 aka Wikileaks id #199069 ?
Subject	LIBYA SUGGESTS FUNDING GO TO SHEIKH AHMED'S FORCES, NOT AMISOM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 26 Mar 2009 16:33 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI256.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1015
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0256 0851633
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 261633Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4655
INFO RUCNSOM/SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0175
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5182
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000256

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPKO *[United Nations Peacekeeping Operations]* , SO *[Somalia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SUGGESTS FUNDING GO TO SHEIKH AHMED'S FORCES, NOT AMISOM

REF: STATE 17205

¶1. (SBU) On March 26, Post received a diplomatic note from the MFA outlining Libya's position on peacekeeping forces in Somalia. This note responded to an earlier US demarche on the subject (see reftel). In a meeting with the Ambassador today, MFA Secretary for the Americas Ahmed Fituri said that Libya's position on the issue of support for AMISOM had been cemented during a recent phone conversation between Muammar al-Qadhafi and Sheikh Sherif Ahmed, during which Sheikh Ahmed had plead for donor funding to be directed to him, rather than to AMISOM. The Leader reportedly agreed with this position. The Ambassador will seek further clarity at a scheduled meeting with the head of the MFA department handling Somali affairs early next week. In the meantime, Post would appreciate any additional relevant

guidance on the matter that could be used in that meeting or in a written response to the dipnote below.

¶2. (U) Text of the diplomatic note:

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk), sends its compliments to the US Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya.

In response to the esteemed Embassy's diplomatic note # 09/290 dated March 3, 2009 regarding providing AMISOM with $67 million in support, and whereas the Great Jamahiriya thinks that the election of Sheikh Sharif Ahmed is the beginning of political stability in Somalia, we thus believe that the said support should rather go to the Somali forces (Army and police) which consist of more than 70,000 troops, and we deem it wrong to continue supporting AMISOM. Meanwhile we do express our gratitude to the USG for the support it wishes to provide at the amount of $67 million.

We think that the support should go to the Somali forces, and therefore we welcome the opportunity to discuss the issue among the African Union, the US government, and Somalia before providing any support or aid whether from our side or from yours.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest consideration.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)

To: US Embassy- Tripoli

Tripoli: March 26, 2009

End text of diplomatic note.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI258

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI258 aka Wikileaks id #199412 ?
Subject	NEW LIBYAN MINISTER OF ECONOMY VOWS TO STAMP OUT CORRUPTION; WELCOMES U.S. FIRMS TO INVEST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 29 Mar 2009 09:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI258.html
References	09TRIPOLI157 , 09TRIPOLI198
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1043 , 09TRIPOLI274 , 09TRIPOLI289 , 09TRIPOLI619
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3032
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0258/01 0880918
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 290918Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4657
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1036
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0722
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0401
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0502
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5184
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000258

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; STATE FOR NEA MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; MASON AND HISHAM ELKOUSTAF; CAIRO FOR TREASURY LIAISON
ALEX
SEVERENS; LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/24/2019
TAGS: LY [Libya] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural
Gas] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ETRD [Foreign Trade]
SUBJECT: NEW LIBYAN MINISTER OF ECONOMY VOWS TO STAMP OUT CORRUPTION;
WELCOMES U.S. FIRMS TO INVEST

REF: A) TRIPOLI 157 ; B) TRIPOLI 198

TRIPOLI 00000258  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: On March 24, the Ambassador met with Mohammad Ali al-Hweij, the recently-appointed Secretary of the General People's Committee for Industry, Economy and Trade (Economy ministry-equivalent) to discuss economic and trade issues as well as Libya's total ban on the import of Caterpillar's equipment. Al-Hweij said Caterpillar needed to find new agents in Libya (as the current ones were sons of government officials) and welcomed the visit of a Caterpillar representative and was confident the issue could be solved. He also said Libya wanted U.S. firms to invest in export free zones to help Libya diversify its economy away from oil. He pledged his ministry's help in securing Libyan visas for American companies. End summary.

CATERPILLAR BAN: SOLUTION IS MULTIPLE AGENTS AND NO RELATIVES OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

¶2. (C) Responding to the Ambassador's urging that the Caterpillar issue had to be resolved expeditiously, Al-Hweij said he was aware of the problem (ref A), explaining that it was not acceptable for U.S. companies to have exclusive agents; rather, the Libyans would prefer that Caterpillar work through more than one agent and have multiple distributors throughout the country. They would like to see at least three agents with one each covering Tripoli, Miserata and Benghazi. He noted the current Caterpillar agents were the sons of government officials, which constituted "corruption" according to the law. Al-Hweij welcomed the upcoming visit of Caterpillar's regional manager, inviting him to come meet with him "anytime." The Ambassador said he appreciated this approach and hoped the issue would be solved before the expected visit of National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi to the U.S. so that a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) could be signed. He also welcomed Al-Hweij's confirmation that he would act across the board against any commercial practices that violated existing laws against corruption.

U.S. COMPANIES ARE WELCOME TO INVEST IN FREE ZONES

¶3. (C) Al-Hweij said Libya would like American firms to invest in "industrial" zones, such as the Zwara Export Free Zone (ref B), and that he was ready to discuss such projects and the advantages for companies that invest. As for privatization, Libya is processing privatizing 12 companies and expects to complete this process by the end of the year. The only sectors left to privatize are Healthcare and Education which are still under the auspices of the government. He noted it would be difficult to privatize universities since the professors were considered government employees and it was not clear how they could be given "shares" in their institutions.

AL-HWEIJ PLEDGES HELP ON VISAS

¶4. (C) The Ambassador informed al-Hweij that the U.S. Embassy's consular section would be issuing U.S. visas to the general public by the end of this month. Al-Hweij welcomed this news and said he pledged his help on securing Libyan visas for U.S. business travellers who want to come to Libya.

USG PROGRAMS: COMMERCIAL LAW DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, U.S. TRADE DELEGATION, AGRICULTURE

¶5. (C) Al-Hweij said the Department of Commerce's program to improve the commercial legal environment fit into the Libyan government's program of revising its laws, including commercial laws. He said the possible visit of a U.S. lawyer with expertise in this area would be helpful in reviewing their new commercial laws. He encouraged more direct dialogue between businessmen and government officials, commenting there should be "no more Cold War!" He welcomed the visit of a high-level U.S.

Department of Commerce Trade delegation in November, as well as the visits of U.S. Trade and Development Agency and the Foreign Agriculture Service. He said Libya welcomed any assistance that could help diversify its economy away from oil, and to increase employment opportunities for young people who constituted half the population. The influx of economic immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa was another challenge for Libya.

TRIPOLI 00000258 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) Comment: The newly-appointed Secretary for Industry, Economy and Trade appears determined to resolve the Caterpillar import ban issue. The upcoming visit of the Caterpillar representative will be a good test of whether al-Hweij, who clearly understands the connection between this issue and future commercial and economic relations with the U.S., will back up his words with actions. His anti-corruption rhetoric is refreshing and laudable if he really intends to apply it across the board as he insisted. The ultimate challenge will come when he confronts the extensive commercial corruption of the political elites here, including that of the al-Qadhafi family itself.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI260

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI260 aka Wikileaks id #199629 ?
Subject	UPDATE ON FATHI EL-JAHMI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 30 Mar 2009 15:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI260.html
References	09TRIPOLI251
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

P 301511Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4660
INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000260

FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/30/2019
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON FATHI EL-JAHMI

REF: TRIPOLI 251

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Following up on a report that detained regime critic Fathi el-Jahmi's health may have sharply deteriorated since the Embassy's visit with him on March 26, Ambassador phoned Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi confidant Munder Ramadan March 29 and conveyed the message that the USG was deeply concerned about el-Jahmi's health and expected that he would receive appropriate medical care pending any arrangements that the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) might be making for his treatment abroad (see reftel).

¶2. (C) On March 30, the QDF's point-person on the issue, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, reported to us that he had met with el-Jahmi's doctor earlier in the day and according to the doctor, el-Jahmi's health was now "stable." Saleh faxed us a handwritten medical report from el-Jahmi's doctor, Abdulrahman el-Mahdi, dated March 30, which states in part: "Recently from a few days back, patient suddenly developed severe gastro-enteritis and frequent severe diarrhea on top of other precipitating factors including low oral fluid intake, attack of

hyperglycemia, and depression. Because of the above factors, complicated by severe dehydration and hypertension, [the patient suffered from] renal impairment. Then after 48 hours, everything well controlled. Patient now stable clinically and hemodynamically." (Post will fax full medical report to NEA/MAG).

¶3. (C) Comment: The doctor's report describes what he told us during our visit to el-Jahmi on March 26, i.e., that the patient's condition had worsened on/about March 23 due primarily to dehydration. The report concludes that el-Jahmi's condition is now stable. Given this supposed improvement in el-Jahmi's health, we will continue to press the QDF to proceed with making arrangements for his transfer abroad for treatment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI267

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI267 aka Wikileaks id #199779 ?
Subject	LIBYA SEES MAURITANIA CRISIS OVER, SANCTIONS UNWELCOME
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 31 Mar 2009 11:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/03/09TRIPOLI267.html
References	09STATE25557
Referenced by	09ADDISABABA753 , 09TRIPOLI272
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4939
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0267 0901102
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 311102Z MAR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4667
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0176
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5194
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000267

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/30/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , UNSC [UN Security Council] , MR [Mauritania] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA SEES MAURITANIA CRISIS OVER, SANCTIONS UNWELCOME

REF: A. STATE 25557
     B. STATE 30234

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Ambassador delivered ref A points to Idriss Abu Dib, head
of the Arab Affairs office at the General People's Committee for
Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent)
on March 29.  Abu Dib responded by asserting that al-Qadhafi had
succeeded in his diplomatic mission to Nouakchott, and that the
GOL opposed sanctions and believed the crisis would be resolved
once scheduled elections take place on June 6.

¶2.   (C) Acknowledging the apparent disparity between the GOL
position and that of the African Union on the issue of
sanctions, Abu Dib maintained that Libya's leadership roles in
the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel-Sahara States
```

the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), Community of Sahel Sahara States (Cen-Sad), and the African Union (AU), gave al-Qadhafi special "leeway" to interpret regional objectives and formulate an appropriate course of action. While it was true that the AU rejected military coups in principle, Abu Dib said it was important to understand that since the junta government controls the military, the world must deal with the the government of General Aziz directly. That said, he characterized the coup as essentially democratic in nature, saying "people in the street can still make their voice heard" - a sign democratic institutions remained intact. He asserted that the coup's longevity was a sign that the Mauritanian people support the coup's leadership. He said al-Qadhafi was satisfied that elections on June 6 would address international concerns about the democratic process in Mauritania, adding that General Aziz would need to resign his military post to stand for election.

¶3. (C) Al-Qadhafi's diplomatic intervention in Mauritania - which Abu Dis claimed enjoyed the support of the French and German ambassadors to Nouakchott - built on Libya's earlier Tripoli-based mediation, was both "secret and open". Three times repeating that "open communication can solve any problem", Abu Dib said al-Qadhafi opened communications with both sides of the conflict in order to minimize the distance between them, but conceded that both camps are inflexible. Libya would continue with its mediation in lieu of supporting the "tough approach" of sanctions. Pointedly referring to the troubled history of U.S.-Libyan relations, Abu Dib added, "you are familiar with the tough approach and the negative results that come with it". While the AU's Peace and Security Council (PSC) had recommended targeted sanctions, Abu Dis said Libya views sanctions as disproportionately impacting the Mauritanian public, leaving junta leaders to do as they like.

¶4. (C) Comment: Brushing aside diplomatic and media criticism of al-Qadhafi's Mauritania diplomacy, Abu Dib expressed the GOL position set by al-Qadhafi himself that sanctions should not be imposed against the junta government, and that the problem will resolve itself once elections take place on June 6. Post will convey ref B points regarding a UN Security Council Presidential Statement, but does not anticipate that the GOL will change its position on the issue of sanctions. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI268

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI268 aka Wikileaks id #200000 ?
Subject	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 1 Apr 2009 07:22 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI268.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Sat, 12 Feb 2011 00:17: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5976
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0268/01 0910722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010722Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4668
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0403
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0504
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5195
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000268

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/MAG
FOR CA/VO/KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD *[Fraud Prevention Programs]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , CPAS *[Passport and Citizenship]* , CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* , ASEC *[Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000268 001.2 OF 003

¶1. The following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009, only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services

on March 25, 2009. Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the host-country government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work.

b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud.

c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based IVcases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability

because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents

include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular (illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has said that it is planning to use one national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth

through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release by September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of

TRIPOLI 00000268 003.2 OF 003

Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page.

l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for

and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI269

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI269 aka Wikileaks id #200001 ?
Subject	FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 1 Apr 2009 07:22 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI269.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5983
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0269/01 0910722
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 010722Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4671
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0406
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0507
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5198
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000269

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/MAG
FOR CA/VO/KCC
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD [Fraud Prevention Programs] , CVIS [Visas] , CPAS [Passport and Citizenship] , CMGT [Consular
Administration and Management] , ASEC [Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY-TRIPOLI-MARCH 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000269  001.2 OF 003


¶1.T he following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the
full range of American Citizen Services, but until January 2009,
only processed those visas for which applicants are exempt from
biometrics and personal appearance requirements, primarily A and
G visas. As of January 25, 2009, we began to process selected
categories of nonimmigrant visas, and opened for full services
on March 25, 2009.  Because of Libya's longtime isolation, there
```

are few pull factors from the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the US is very small. Because Libya is a relatively wealthy country, push factors are also mitigated. Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated, featuring few, if any, security features, and we also have heard reports that genuine documents with apocryphal information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the host-country government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work.

b. NIV FRAUD: Because Post has only begun to process visas other than A and G, we have seen little conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. However, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have issued the visas in accord with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. one stayed far longer than his putative job as a diplomatic courier could possibly require. We continue to monitor these cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes get false job letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud.

c. IV FRAUD: Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident AmCits, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" as both birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features to speak of. We have no exposure to employment-based IVcases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, andhave placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation . We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a

of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents

include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident US citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Post has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2m irregular (illegal) migrants are present here but live outside Libyan mainstream society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the few months we have processed NIV's, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be possibly involved in smuggling or trafficking-most are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I, and Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to show relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has said that it is planning to use one national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this scheme, passport numbers

would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release by September. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of any new passport. More troubling are reports from the Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, that they have identified genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document into question. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry began the process of "correcting" the last names of

TRIPOLI 00000269 003.2 OF 003

Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. The applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. In Arabic, there are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names--more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page.

l. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular Section is not allowed by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact must be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: As we open for visa processing, we anticipate applications from Libyans for whom travel to Tunis has been a financial burden. Most of these applicants will likely be unqualified, and will have more reason to resort to fraud in their applications. We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that demand is lower than expected, and few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for

interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI272

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI272 aka Wikileaks id #200149 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUPPORTING PRST ON MAURITANIA SANCTIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 1 Apr 2009 14:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI272.html
References	09STATE25557 , 09TRIPOLI267
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6512
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0272 0911458
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 011458Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4676
INFO RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0034
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0003
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5203
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000272

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/W

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , MR [Mauritania] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUPPORTING PRST ON MAURITANIA SANCTIONS

REF: A. STATE 25557
     B. TRIPOLI 267

(U) Post delivered ref A demarche to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation's
(MFA-equivalent) office of International Organizations on April
¶1.    We will report any substantive response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI273

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI273 aka Wikileaks id #200430 ?
Subject	NEARLY 400 RESCUED BUT 200 MISSING AT SEA IN MIGRANT SMUGGLING TRAGEDY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 2 Apr 2009 16:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI273.html
References	09TRIPOLI212
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI391 , 09TRIPOLI637
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7932
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0273/01 0921636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 021636Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4677
INFO RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0800
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1446
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0409
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0510
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1038
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0724
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0013
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0003
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0003
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0079
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5204
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000273

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S-ES/O

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/31/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , KTIP *[Trafficking in Persons]* , EWWT *[Waterborne Transportation]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEARLY 400 RESCUED BUT 200 MISSING AT SEA IN MIGRANT SMUGGLING TRAGEDY

REF: A. ROME 205
B. TRIPOLI 212
C. VALLETTA 143

TRIPOLI 00000273 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Rescuers have saved nearly 400 migrants from disabled and capsized vessels off Libya's coast, although over 20 bodies have been recovered and another 100-200 people are feared lost at sea. According to the Italian Embassy, Italian authorities received the distress call on March 29. Despite arrangements outlined in Search and Rescue Agreements with both Italy and Malta, Libyan officials did not immediately respond. The boats were disabled near the Bouri offshore drilling platforms, equipped with supply ships that were pressed into service to rescue victims in the water and tow a disabled vessel to Tripoli harbor. Survivors are being held in two immigrant detention centers and a Libyan NGO is providing humanitarian assistance. The Government of Libya (GOL) has begun to contact embassies and international organizations to identify and repatriate the rescued migrants. End Summary.

ONE SHIP CAPSIZED, ONE DISABLED BUT UPRIGHT

¶2. (C) The latest tragedy to befall migrants attempting the maritime crossing from Libya to European shores began to unfold in the early hours of March 29, according to contacts at the Italian embassy. Italian officials received a distress call from a disabled ship near the ENI-operated Bouri oil platform (roughly north of Zwara, Libya). After determining that the ship was in Libyan waters, Italy attempted to notify the Libyan Coast Guard following protocols set by the two nations in a recent "friendship treaty" (ref A). Unable to make direct contact, Rome then alerted its embassy in Tripoli, which in turn notified counterparts within the GOL. Italian diplomats here characterized Libya's initial response as sluggish, but noted that a small Libyan patrol boat made contact with a disabled ship carrying a reported 356 individuals. Unable to take the migrants aboard or tow them to safety, the Libyans pressed an Italian ship - contracted by ENI to supply its offshore platform - into service to tug the seaworthy but unpowered vessel to Tripoli. In the course of that rescue, victims of another vessel carrying migrants were found in the water. Twenty-three migrants were rescued from the water and another 20 drowned bodies were recovered from the wreckage, but witnesses from among the rescued put the original manifest at 257.

¶3. (C) BBC News reported that Libyan officials have called off the search for survivors. The Italian embassy reported that two additional boats may have set off with the two stricken vessels. The GOL claims two ships are "legitimate fishing vessels" not carrying migrants, but concedes that they have no contact with either boat leading some to speculate the death count may be higher still. Television pictures emerging showed the towed vessel's return to Tripoli harbor. The daily Oyea newspaper reported that as many as 250 migrants may be declared lost at sea.

¶4. (C) According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the 356 rescued from the disabled ship have been sent to two detention centers approximately 50km west of Tripoli. The International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief (IOPCR) - a quasi-NGO facilitating both IOM and UNHCR's work in Libya - is reportedly providing humanitarian assistance, including food, blankets, and mattresses. Rescued nationalities include Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Eritrean, Somali, Syrian, Ghanaian, and Egyptian. The GOL has contacted consular officials of the nationals rescued to begin the process of identifying and potentially repatriating victims to their countries of origin. IOM expects to play a significant role in the repatriation efforts.

LIBYA RESPONSIVE TO ITALIAN REQUESTS, THOUGH OUTSIDE OF AGREED PROTOCOLS

¶5. (C) These tragic deaths and dramatic rescue come within weeks of two Search and Rescue (SAR) agreements Libya has signed with European neighbors. The Libyan-Italian "friendship treaty" included language calling on Libya to implement earlier agreements to conduct joint patrols and respond to Italian notifications of both imperiled and unidentified migrants within

TRIPOLI 00000273 002.2 OF 002

Libyan territorial waters (ref B). The Maltese Ambassador in Tripoli, whose government signed an MOU with Libya on March 18 outlining each country's SAR responsibilities (ref C), has previously complained to us that that the Libyan operations center responsible for managing response to maritime search, rescue, and interdiction would not answer the phone or respond to fax requests - even when the EU provided satellite tracking data. After a delay signing the MOU last October, the exasperated Maltese Ambassador told Poloff that the agreement called for little more than a pledge from Libya "to pick up the phone". The Italian Embassy reported similar lack of responsiveness in this case, which eventually improved after Embassy prodding.

RESCUE HIGHLIGHTS SHIFTING TREND IN MIGRATION PATTERNS, LITTLE SLOWDOWN DUE TO EU ECONOMY

¶6. (C) Comment: Photographs of the disabled vessel towed into harbor show that it was heavily laden with passengers. The recent trend here has been toward smaller, faster boats that attempt to slip through EU patrols and land migrants at Lampedusa or Malta. With larger vessels, smugglers hope only to get to EU waters, where they then disable the boat's engine and call in the SOS via satellite phone to the Italian or Maltese authorities - an approach that observers say puts lives at greater risk if conditions turn against a stranded ship. It is unclear why one of the boats capsized; an Italian military attache' described calm seas near the site of the rescue on March 29 and 30. While precise numbers are unavailable, migration experts here see a recent uptick in the number of migrants attempting the perilous trip to Europe despite the slowdown in the EU economy. An IOM project manager speculated that the weaker economy actually made transit less expensive for migrants as smugglers were willing to take lower fees due to the recession. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI274

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI274 aka Wikileaks id #200431 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S STOCK MARKET: STILL SMALL BUT GROWING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 2 Apr 2009 16:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI274.html
References	07TRIPOLI397 , 09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI258
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI618
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7939
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0274/01 0921636
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021636Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4679
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1040
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0726
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0411
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0512
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5206
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000274

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB (EGAN) AND NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON,
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR TREASURY LIAISON ALEX
SEVERENS; LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  3/31/2019
TAGS: ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign Investments] ,
LY [Libya] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S STOCK MARKET: STILL SMALL BUT GROWING

REF: (A) TRIPOLI 258 ; (B) TRIPOLI 212 ; (C) 07 TRIPOLI 397

TRIPOLI 00000274  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.     (C)  Summary: The chair of Libya's newly-created stock
```

¶1. (C) Summary: The chair of Libya's newly created stock market, Suliman Alshahomy, briefed Ambassador on plans to expand the stock market (currently 8 companies are listed), use it to distribute shares in state-owned firms to poor families, and create a television show to educate the public about investing. Using state-of-the-art computer systems, the stock markets in Tripoli and in Benghazi are connected in real-time. The headquarters moved from Benghazi to Tripoli in July 2008. Alshahomy welcomed the Embassy's help in seeking technical advice from their American counterparts, such as the New York Stock Exchange. End summary.

LIBYA'S STOCK MARKET: SMALL BUT GROWING

¶2. (C) Suliman Alshahomy, Chairman of the Libyan Stock Market, told Ambassador on March 30 that he plans to expand the stock market beyond the eight companies currently listed to eventually include Jumhuriya Bank and a cement factory. He said the state-owned companies currently being privatized (ref A) could eventually be listed on the stock exchange. Alshahomy expects 20 other private companies in different sectors to be added to the stock exchange. At present, only banks, insurance companies, and the Stock Market itself are listed. The stock market is self-regulated, although a draft law creating an independent regulator is being considered by the General People's Congress. Despite earlier reporting that the Stock Market falls under the General Peoples Committee for the Economy (ref B), Alshahomy said the Stock Market answers directly to the Prime Minister "because it is a company."

SOME RESISTERS BUT AL-QADHAFI APPROVED STOCK MARKET IDEA

¶3. (C) Even though some people still resist the idea of a stock market, Alshahomy told the Ambassador he personally explained to Muammar al-Qadhafi why Libya needed an exchange to diversify its economy and to move away from a state-owned system. Alshahomy noted al-Qadhafi "said o.k." to the plan. He said the stock market was even creating television "soap operas" that would educate the public on investing and the merits of a stock market. They are also using radio and television to encourage Libyans to invest in companies.

DISTRIBUTING SHARES TO POOR LIBYANS TOO

¶4. (C) The stock market will soon distribute shares in companies owned by the Social Security Fund to 184,000 poor families in Libya. The stock market will list those companies on a "second table" which will be separate from the "first table" listing the regular companies outlined above. The families will be able to receive dividends from the companies but they will not be able to sell their shares for at least three years. Alshahomy pointed out this program is separate from the Wealth Distribution Program (WDP), which is still being developed. He offered his personal opinion that al-Qadhafi's vision of abolishing the government and distributing oil revenues directly to the public would not happen for a very long time. People were used to having some sort of government and they would not want it to go away, he said.

U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WELCOMED

¶5. (C) Alshahomy welcomed the Embassy's offer to help tap into technical assistance for the stock market, including from its American counterparts and experts in the U.S. Government. He noted they had benefited from the advice of an American consultant in setting up the stock market (ref C). He appreciated the recent visit of a U.S. Treasury Department team in February and invited them back to provide workshops on anti-money laundering. He also liked the idea of a visit by representatives of the New York Stock Exchange. (Note: In early March, Alshahomy participated in a conference on investor education organized by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority in Washington, DC. End note).

¶6. (C) Comment: The Chairman of the nascent Libyan Stock Market enjoys high-level support for his efforts to create a modern trading body. With only eight companies and a relatively low volume of trade (around 200,000 dinars, equivalent to 160,000 USD), the stock exchange is relatively small. However, considering the Libyan private sector is still quite small, the

TRIPOLI 00000274 002.2 OF 002

stock exchange is an ambitious start. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI279

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI279 aka Wikileaks id #200816 ?
Subject	DEMARCHES DELIVERED: RESPONDING TO NORTH KOREA MISSILE LAUNCH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 6 Apr 2009 07:11 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI279.html
References	09STATE33031
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0154
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0279 0960711
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 060711Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4685
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5212
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000279

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, EAP/K, AND ISN/RA

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , UNSC [UN Security Council] ,
KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KN [Korea (North)] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHES DELIVERED: RESPONDING TO NORTH KOREA MISSILE
LAUNCH

REF: A. STATE 33031
     B. STATE 32599


_____________________________

(SBU) Post delivered reftel demarches to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation
(MFA-equivalent).  We will report any substantive response
septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI289

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI289 aka Wikileaks id #201352 ?
Subject	CATERPILLAR EDGING CLOSER TO LIFTING OF BAN?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 8 Apr 2009 09:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI289.html
References	09TRIPOLI157 , 09TRIPOLI258
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI618
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2342
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0289 0980945
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 080945Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4695
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0728
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1042
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0514
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0413
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5222
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000289

SIPDIS

ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON AND HISHAM ELKOUSTAF; CAIRO
FOR TREASURY LIAISON ALEX SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/7/2019
TAGS: LY *[Libya]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]*
SUBJECT: CATERPILLAR EDGING CLOSER TO LIFTING OF BAN?

REF: A) TRIPOLI 258 ; B) TRIPOLI 157

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) On April 6, the recently-appointed Secretary of the
General People's Committee for Industry, Economy and Trade,
Mohammad Ali al-Hweij (minister-equivalent) met with Andrew
Sheridan, Caterpillar Distribution Manager for Africa and Middle
East Region to discuss the specifics of Libya's total ban on the

East Region to discuss the specifics of Libya's total ban on the import of Caterpillar equipment (ref B). Al-Hweij welcomed all U.S. companies to the Libyan market. He explained he was personally meeting with CAT in order to introduce the company to the "behavior of the Libyan market." He raised the same two points he discussed with the Ambassador on March 24 (ref A), i.e., that CAT must have more than one sole agent in Libya, and that the current Libyan company acting as CAT's agent was headed by the sons of government officials. This constituted "corruption" and was illegal. Al-Hweij agreed with Sheridan that if the market was too small to support three dealers, two would be fine.

¶2. (C) Al-Hweij said as soon as he received a letter from CAT stating it had terminated the current dealership agreement, he would have the ban lifted. He understood it would take CAT some time to identify the new dealers and he was adamant the GOL would not make any suggestions as to potential dealers as this would be a "blatant issue of corruption." As for the timing of lifting the ban, it would have to go through the council of ministers and the prime minister, a process al-Hweij said would take around one week. Sheridan said his company was anxious to move forward on having the ban lifted quickly. CAT intended to remove its current dealer and had already begun the process; once it was completed, he promised to notify al-Hweij.

¶3. (C) Post is translating a copy of the relevant law (GPC decision number 315, dated 5/18/2008) and will forwarded via email to NEA/MAG. Separately, the director for international cooperation at the GPC for Industry, Economy and Trade, Dia Hammouda, told Commercial Officer that article 5 of the law addressed the legal issue with CAT, and that any official who runs a public institution or their relative, including spouses, children, and in-laws, was forbidden from selling goods to that institution. Hammouda said that an exclusive agency agreement is not against the law in Libya, as al-Hweij had implied, but rather, the GOL prefers that foreign companies assign multiple agents, dealers, or distributors in Libya. CAT lawyers are also studying the law in order to ensure CAT is compliant.

¶4. (C) Comment: Al-Hweij was very engaging and seemed committed to working with CAT to have the ban lifted. However, it remains to be seen whether he has the political clout to make it happen. His estimate that approval could be obtained in a week is overly optimistic given how the Libyan bureaucracy operates. Al-Hweij's arguments that the ban is proscribed by Libyan law are weak at best after an initial review of the supposed relevant law. What is clear is that the GOL is adamant that CAT terminate its current dealership arrangement. Once it does that, the ban will hopefully be lifted, allowing for equipment already in the pipeline to reach end-users. The next step will be for CAT to find new agents in Libya, which CAT has told us it fully intends to do. We will continue to work with CAT and Al-Hweij to try to find a solution to the ban. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI293

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI293 aka Wikileaks id #201446 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR MARCH 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 8 Apr 2009 14:25 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI293.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2617
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0293/01 0981425
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 081425Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4699
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1449
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0802
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0925
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0865
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5226
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000293

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON, (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS) CAS FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS) LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR MARCH 2009

ENERGY

¶1. (U) Libya Oil Holdings Changes its Label Brand in Morocco: The Libyan state-owned oil group Libya Oil Holdings (LOH), which manages a network of 182 fuel distribution stations in Morocco, will now be called "Oilibya" in Morocco. LOH is an integrated oil company involved in the shipping, trading, refining, marketing and sale of crude oil and refined petroleum products in 21 countries in Africa. [africanmanager, 3/1/2009]

¶2. (U) Tripoli Asks Oil Firms to Cut Production Share: Libya's

state-owned National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced in its website that it will negotiate with four international oil companies, - Wintershall, ConocoPhillips, Amerada Hess and Marathon Oil - operating in the country to accept a lower share of oil production. The three American firms are NOC's international partners in the Oasis Waha Oil Company. Negotiations with Wintershall started in 2008, and Wintershall expects an amicable solution, which allows both sides to reach their aims in Libya as it was done in previous renegotiations signed with other international oil companies during 2008. [MEED, 3/4/2009]

¶3. (U) Eni Opens Tender for Libyan Gas Project: Italian oil major Eni is to launch Libya's first water alternating gas (WAG) scheme as part of its program to increase reserves at the Bu Attifel field in the east Sirte basin. The enhanced oil recovery pilot project involves the alternate injection of water and gas to provide better production efficiency and reduce wastage from the injection process. Current production from the field is about 90,000 barrels a day. Eni is operator of the field as part of an equal joint venture with the state-owned National Oil Corporation. Eni says the scope of the project involves the conversion of existing deep wells to water alternating gas injectors along with a connection to an existing water injection network and new high pressure gas compressor station. [MEED, 4/5/2009]

¶4. (U) Joint Venture Firm to Manage Ras Lanuf: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) has set up a joint venture company with the UAE-based Trusta group to develop the Ras Lanuf oil refinery in Libya. The new joint venture company, named Libyan-Emirates Refining Company (LIRCO), will upgrade the refinery, Libya's largest export facility, to produce output that is easier to market in Europe. The company was formed with $375 million dollars in combined assets; the two sides look to invest nearly $2 billion dollars in the joint project. The initial agreements were signed last year. The NOC had previously announced plans for 2009 to choose a partner to revamp and possibly expand the Azzawiya Oil Refining Company, its second-largest oil processing plant; where the partner would take a 50 percent stake in the plant, which processes 120,000 barrels of crude a day, in return for funding the upgrade. [Reuters, zawya.com, bloomberg.com 3/10/2009]

¶5. (U) NOC Chairman Says "Libya Plans to Buy All of Verenex Energy": Libya plans to buy all of Canada's Verenex Energy Inc, said the chairman of Libya's National Oil Company, Shukri Ghanem. Ghanem said Libya plans to buy all of the company, not just its assets in Libya, by exercising an option to pre-empt a friendly C$10-a-share bid by China National Petroleum Corp.(CNPC), offering the same price as the agreed by CNPC. With the assumption of debt, the CNPC offer is worth $406 million dollars. So far, there is no sign Libyan authorities have taken any of the steps buyers of listed companies usually take, such as hiring advisers or issuing a formal bid, suggesting the sale may not happen quickly. [Reuters Africa, 3/26/2009]

¶6. (U) Gazprom Opens Tenders for Libyan Oil Blocks: Russian Gazprom Libya has invited contractors to prequalify for nine projects to support exploration activities in its two blocks in Libya. Gazprom won an exploration contract offshore in Libya's third licensing round in 2008 and won an exploration contract onshore in Libya's fourth licensing round. Gazprom Libya expects the basin-modeling work to run from May until November, while it expects the environmental work to start in January 2010. [MEED, 3/28/2009]

¶7. (U) Verenex to slow work in Libya's Ghadames in 2009: Canada's Verenex Energy is temporarily reducing the pace of its exploration program in Libya 40% from the original 2009 budget adopted in October 2008. Also, Verenex announced that its latest exploratory well drilled had strong gas shows and found

extensive fracturing in the hot shale, which represents a potential oil and gas resource play. [Oil & Gas Journal, 3/12/2009]

¶8. (U) Libya to invest $10-$12 Billion in Oil Projects in 2009: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) chairman, Shukri Ghanem, said that Libya will invest $10 billion to $12 billion in its oil industry in 2009, exceeding its total investment from last year. Ghanem also estimated that the oil market currently has a surplus of 1 million barrels a day of crude oil production. [Dow Jones, 3/14/2009]

¶9. (U) Libyan Center for Remote Sensing Contributes to the Publication of First Digital Geo-Mineral Map of Arab Homeland: Arab Organization for Industrial Development and Mining has announced the publication of its first digital Geological and Mineral Map of the Arab Homeland.
70 percent of the total map has been digitized. The map would help research, exploration activities and mining operations in Arab countries attracting investors in the mining sector through the definition of the mineral areas and promising areas for mining investment. [Jana, 3/15/2009]

¶10. (U) Libya Gas, Oil Bidding Unlikely This Year: On the sidelines of the 2009 Offshore Mediterranean Conference, Ahmed al-Ghaber, a senior adviser to the management committee of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), said Libya is unlikely to open an oil and gas bidding round this year, adding that the NOC is busy enough trying to consolidate recent project developments by companies working in the country. [Reuters Africa, 3/25/2009]

¶11. (U) Shell Holds a Workshop on Oil Fields Development Techniques: As part of the agreement on technology transfer between Shell Libya and the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Shell held a workshop for NOC employees on the latest techniques used in the development of oil fields. Shell's team introduced the latest techniques used in the additional recovery, and technical and commercial ways in oil fields development. [NOC website, 3/26/2009]

¶12. (U) Increase in Local Petroleum Prices: During the people's congress meeting, congress members refused GPC's latest decision related to the increase of local petroleum prices, including gasoline, starting March 1st. GPC will consider canceling the decision. [libyaninvestment.com, 2009-03-05]

BANKING

¶13. (U) Libya to Issue New Bank Notes: The Central Bank of Libya announced on Thursday that it will issue new bank notes in the form of 20 Dinar notes (1,300 Libyan Dinars = 1 U.S. dollar), 10 Dinars, 5 Dinars and 1 Dinar on the occasion of the 32nd anniversary of the proclamation of people's power in Libya celebrated on 2 March every year. The new bank notes were put into circulation alongside the former notes of the same value on March 3rd. [afriquejet.com, 3/3/2009]

¶14. (U) Increase in the Number of Bank Costumers: The number of customers who deal with banks in Libya during the years 2007-2008 increased by 7%, up to two million four hundred thousand customers. Al-Jumhuriya Bank reported that Libya has seen an economic development increase by 24% during the past five years, adding that the increase in the Libyan market competition requires all banks operating in Libya to adopt a scientific method and the advanced platform to improve its performance through training of Libyan bankers and improvement of human resources. [Libyaonline.com, 3/252009]

¶15. (U) First Conference of Libyan Bankers: The conference was organized by the Libya Central Bank under the theme "Together towards Promising Banking Sector". Topics discussed included: the financial strategies of the Libyan Central Bank for widening the banking reserve, the importance of renovating the banking role and of advancing internal auditing of banks working in Libya. [JANA, 3/21/2009]

¶16. (U) Libya to Sell 25% of Jumhuriya Bank: The Governor of Libya's Central Bank announced Libya's intention to sell at least 15 percent of Al Jumhuriya Bank on the local stock market. Jumhuriya is Libya's biggest state-owned bank with a capital of more than 1 billion dinars after merging with al-Oumma Bank, the fifth-largest state-owned bank. Financial authorities will

assess the impact of the first foreign banks in the country in more than three decades before continuing with more privatizations. [Tripoli Post, 3/25/2009]

¶17. (U) Libya Aims to Grant Licenses for Foreign Lenders to Enter Libya Next Year: The Governor of Libya's Central Bank announced that Libya will grant the licenses either alone or in partnership with Libyan investors. "Now we are working on conditions and standards to grant licenses," he said. "We are working also on the number of licenses that might be granted to foreign banks." He said the aim would be to allow competition without harming Libya's banking sector. [Tripoli Post, 3/25/2009]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶18. (U) Libya to Build 22-story, five-star Hotel in Mauritanian Capital: Libya will fund the construction of 30 million Euros hotel in Nouakchott. The hotel named "al-Fateh" will be built near the national army headquarters in Nouakchott. The construction process, scheduled to last for over 20 months, will create 450 jobs, while the hotel will create 300 jobs upon completion, including 90% of Mauritanians. The al-Fateh hotel will be built under the form of a date palm tree. The highest building in Nouakchott so far does not exceed 10 stories. [Tripoli Post, 3/14/2009]

¶19. (U) African Development Bank signs Loan Agreement with Egypt: The loan of $450 million dollars will be allocated for the implementation of the project of building thermal-steam generators near the port of Ain Sukhna, which lies 120 kilometers east of Cairo. The aim of the project is to increase production capacity strengthening the infrastructure that would allow Egypt to meet the demand for electric power. The total cost for the project is estimated at 85.1 billion dollars. [afdb.org, 3/23/2009]

¶20. (U) Libya Gives Eight Tractors to The Gambia: The provision of these tractors to The Gambia is part of the agreement between the two nations in contribution to the development of the agricultural sector in The Gambia. Libya also will provide twenty Vietnamese experts on agriculture for two years. [Allafrica, 3/25/2009]

LABOR

¶21. (U) Libya to Recruit Thousands of Bangladeshi Workers: Libya will recruit thousands of workers from Bangladesh as part of an infrastructure development plan worth more than $100 billion. The Libyan Embassy in Dhaka is issuing about 300 visas per day and that number will increase due to a huge demand for workers in Libya. Bangladesh is one of the world's poorest countries and depends heavily on remittances from expatriate workers, but host countries are facing problems with their own slowing economies. [Reuters, 3/23/2009]

INVESTMENT

¶22. (U) Libya's 2008 Balance of Payments Surplus at $44 Billion, Reserves at $136 Billion: The Central Bank of Libya announced that Libya had $44 billion balance of payments surplus in 2008. The Governor, Farhat Omar Bin Guidara, told the General People's Congress that Libya's foreign currency reserves were at $136 billion at the end of 2008. Libya is among the few countries which are free of any foreign debt, which also helps it maintain a strong balance of payments. Guidara said Libya's medium term financial situation would not be a source of concern despite the global financial crisis, and anticipated a non-oil economy growing by 5-7 percent for 2009, with government spending the main engine of growth. Libya's cumulative oil revenues were $462 billion for the 1970-2008 period, with average annual oil earnings at $11.8 billion, according to government data. The Libyan government spent $162.3 billion for the same period according to government figures released to the General People Congress. [Reuters, 3/6/2009]

¶23. (U) India and Libya to Promote Investment: India and Libya entered into an agreement to promote investment by granting each other most favored nation treatment. The Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPA) between India and Libya has been ratified in both sides. According to the agreement, both the countries will encourage and create favorable conditions for investors of each other to make investments in their region and to admit investments in

accordance with their laws. [India News Online, 3/25/2009]

¶24. (U) Libya Establishes 20 Billion Libyan Dinar Fund to Finance Medium and Small Businesses: The Tripoli Business Incubator program has been established to help Libyan graduates, unemployed and women to find suitable finance for their projects and provide them with general business assistance. Libyan authorities are to establish more business incubators in other cities. The Tripoli Business Incubator will be assisted in its early stages by the Jordanian Expertise House. [Tripoli Post, 3/14/2009]

¶25. (U) Standard & Poor's Agency Issues Credit Rating to Libya: Standard & Poor's (S&P), a U.S. ratings agency, has issued its first credit rating for Libya, assigning the country A- for its long-term prospects and an A-2 rating for the short-term. The rating is the first assigned to Libya since the country began to emerge from international isolation in 2003. The credit rating agency says the outlook for Libya is stable, noting that the country holds substantial assets and little debt. S&P notes its rating is constrained by "limited transparency of official decision-making in Libya", and remarks that private sector development remains at an early stage. [MEED, 3/18/2009]

CONSTRUCTION

¶26. (U) Marriott International to Open 370-Room Hotel in Tripoli in 2011: Marriott International announced that it would open a luxury JW Marriott Hotel in Tripoli by 2011. The 370-room JW Marriott Hotel Tripoli is owned by Daewoo Tripoli Investment and Development Co., a joint venture between Korean Daewoo Engineering and Construction and Libyan Oyia Co. and will be managed by Marriott under a long-term contract. The 36-story, innovatively-designed hotel will be located in Tripoli's new central business district. [Tripoli Post, 3/14/2009]

¶27. (U) Korean Lotte Engineering & Construction Company Wins $76 Billion Dollars Project in Libya: The project consists of the construction of facilities including roads, drainage system, water service, electricity and communications on a 415 hectares

area of land located 100 kilometers west of Tripoli. The construction is expected to take 48 months until the completion. [Einnews, 3/12/2009]

¶28. (U) Libyan Cement Company Undergoes Major Internal Upgrading: The Joint Libyan Cement Company Incorporated (JLCC), established as a Libyan company by the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) and the Austrian Asamer Group in 2008, has undergone through major internal changes, restructuring the existing management, and is undertaking an investment program to repair, modernize and upgrade the cement plants in Benghazi, Hawari and El Fathaia in order to increase production of cement to meet the market demand in the long term. All these changes are planned to be fully completed by the end of 2009. [Tripoli Post, 3/25/2009]

¶29. (U) Opening of Al-Wahat Hotel in Houn City: Houn, an oasis town 500 kilometers southeast of Tripoli, was the administrative capital of the Italian region of Fezzan and now is one of the new tourist landmarks in Libya. Al-Wahat hotel was built on an area of 40,000 square meters. [JANA, 3/25/2009]

¶30. (U) Chinese Gezhouba Wins $400 Million Dollars Contract in Libya: Chinese Gezhouba Group Corp, one of the biggest engineering and construction enterprises in China, signed a construction contract worth $406 million dollars with the Housing and Infrastructure Board of Libya on March 25. According to the agreement, Gezhouba Group will offer services of survey, evaluation, planning, design and construction of an infrastructure project in southwestern Tripoli. The project is expected to take about four years. [China Knowledge, 3/30/2009]

¶31. (U) Dubai's Drake & Scull to Set Up Libyan Unit: Dubai contractor Drake & Scull International is setting up a Libyan unit this year, its second venture in Africa, as it expands abroad and weathers a downturn at home. The construction sector is suffering a sharp slowdown in the UAE, while Libya is undertaking a $126.5 billion five-year infrastructure redevelopment plan to modernize water and sanitation facilities and build airports, schools and houses. [Reuters, 3/31/2009]

TRANSPORTATION

¶32. (U) New Airbus Planes are Delivered to Afriqiyah Airways: Afriqiyah Airways will inaugurate new lines in July, September and November according to its development plan. Starting in July, there will be two weekly flights to South Africa, Dubai and Manila; as from September, there will be three weekly flights to Congo Brazzaville and by November, two weekly flights between Tripoli and Beijing. [libyaninvestment.com, 3/5/2009]

AUTOMOTIVE

¶33. (U) Chinese Great Wall Motor Company to Export 3,300 Pickups to Libya: Chinese Great Wall Motor Company (GWM) won a Libyan government procurement order to supply 3,300 pickups for around $30 million dollars. The first batch of 1,000 pickups will arrive in the Benghazi Port at the end of March and the remaining 2,300 units will be delivered by June. The vehicles will service Libyan governmental departments including the departments of energy, electricity, medical care and sanitation, as well as traffic and transportation. GWM's technicians are already in Libya in order to develop after sales service. [Tripoli Post, 3/25/2009]

INDUSTRIAL

¶34. (U) Ace Hardware to Open Six Stores in Libya: Ace Hardware Corp., a retail cooperative, based in Oak Brook, Illinois, announced its plans to open six stores in Libya during the next 10 years, beginning with two stores this year in Tripoli. Ace Hardware agreed to terms of a license agreement with Technology Corner, a consortium of Libyan business interests. The stores would be the first free-standing hardware outlets in Libya. Ace Hardware has 4,600 stores worldwide in more than 60 countries, including Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. [Tripoli Post, 3/1/2009]
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI297

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI297 aka Wikileaks id #201572 ?
Subject	LEAHY VETTING: TWO FOR REGIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR RABAT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 9 Apr 2009 07:34 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI297.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3312
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0297 0990734
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 090734Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4709
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0870
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 0027
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5236
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000297

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NESCA, ISN/CATR AND ISN/ECC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ASEC *[Security]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LEAHY VETTING: TWO FOR REGIONAL SECURITY SEMINAR RABAT

REF: STATE 19800

¶1. (SBU) Post requests the Department's assistance in vetting, pursuant to the Leahy Amendment and the Foreign Assistance Act, the following 2 Libyan candidates for an ISN/CATR-sponsored Conventional Arms and Regional Security Seminar to be held in Rabat, Morocco April 14-15 (ref A). POL/ECON, RSO, CONS and DAO conducted a search of locally-maintained files and found no derogatory information. Post has requested full date-of-birth information but has not yet obtained it. Post regrets the short notice for this request; we just received the names from the GOL.

¶2. (U) Name: Mohamed Ali Athmuna; DPOB: 1947 Sebha, Libya; Rank: Colonel

¶3. (U) Name: Abdulkarim Touhami Ragb; DPOB: 1959 Tajoura, Libya; Rank: Captain (Naval)

¶4. (U) Post appreciates Department's continued assistance.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI298

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI298 aka Wikileaks id #201687 ?
Subject	LIBYA PLANS AU MINISTERIAL APRIL 15-16 TO DISCUSS AU INTEGRATION, POSSIBLY DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 9 Apr 2009 15:04 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI298.html
References	09TRIPOLI249 , 09TRIPOLI70
Referenced by	09NDJAMENA131 , 09TRIPOLI309
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3839
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0298 0991504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 091504Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4710
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5237
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000298

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/SPG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA PLANS AU MINISTERIAL APRIL 15-16 TO DISCUSS AU INTEGRATION, POSSIBLY DARFUR

REF: A. TRIPOLI 70
B. TRIPOLI 249

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan officials continue to prepare for an extraordinary meeting of the African Union foreign ministers in Sirte April 15-16, though embassies of member states here have downplayed the importance of the meeting. A detailed agenda has not been distributed, but Libyan officials confirm that the principal topic for discussion will be transforming the African Union Commission into a more powerful African Union Authority - which Muammar al-Qadhafi hopes to chair as its first executive. Representatives from Sudanese rebel groups have not yet been invited to participate in side discussions, though Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki has invited Special Envoy Gration for consultations in Tripoli April 17-18, perhaps a sign that Libya

consultations in Tripoli April 17-18, perhaps a sign that Libya intends to re-start its mediation in the region ahead of the regular July summit meeting for AU heads of state that al-Qadhafi hopes to host. End summary.

AL-QADHAFI SEEKS MORE POWER FOR AU EXECUTIVE

¶2. (C) Libyan officials have confirmed that the April 15-16 extraordinary meeting for African Union foreign ministers will be held in Sirte and are planning a gala opening with remarks from Muammar al-Qadhafi. In an April 8 conversation with Poloff, Ali Treiki's Chief of Staff Mahmoud Azzabi said he expected high attendance and hinted that the Tripoli-based diplomatic corps would be flown en masse to observe the proceedings. Though specifics of the agenda have not been distributed to member states, Libyan officials confirm that the main discussion item is the creation of the African Union Authority - described as a step toward al-Qadhafi's vision for the United States of Africa. Azzabi went on to say that "several studies" would be presented to outline the legal steps necessary to transform the existing African Union Commission into a more powerful executive body to be chaired by al-Qadhafi himself.

¶3. (C) Diplomats from AU member states here downplayed the importance of the meeting but expect CEN-SAD members to send delegations. According to the Egyptian Embassy, Egyptian Foreign Minister Aboul Gheit will not attend and many southern African states will send lower-ranking delegates if they attend at all. CEN-SAD will not have consultations similar to those before the AU Summit in February (ref A) - a decision an Egyptian contact described as unnecessary because Libya "already knows who is with them and who is against them."

DARFUR MEETINGS POSSIBLE, THOUGH NO ANNOUNCEMENT YET

¶4. (C) Observers here have speculated that Libya would use the AU meeting as a platform to reassert its role in Darfur mediation. When asked whether these talks were planned, Azzabi said only, "it would be customary to have these sort of talks on the margins of a meeting like that." However, representatives from both the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM/KI) and the Sudanese Liberation Army/Unity faction (SLA/Unity) deny receiving any invitation from the GOL for either Sirte or Tripoli. SLA/Unity has not yet begun its consultations with Darfuri civil society members (ref B), citing logistical difficulty getting field leaders to attend. According to the Egyptian embassy, al-Qadhafi recently encouraged President Bashir to begin criminal prosecutions of alleged human rights violators in Darfur on the national level and to permit humanitarian aid to reach the people in an effort to quiet international criticism. The MFA's Ali Treiki phoned the Ambassador on April 9 to extend an invitation for Special Envoy Gration to come to Tripoli for consultations on April 17-18, a possible opportunity to press Libya to do more to open humanitarian access.

¶5. (C) Comment: Local diplomats are skeptical that anything more than theater will come out of the April AU meeting, with several AU member state embassies reporting that it may hurt Libya's chances of hosting the July Summit meeting that was to be held in Madagascar. According to the Egyptian Embassy, Libya has nonetheless begun inviting some heads of state for July, an initiative that the Egyptians plan to help promote. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI30

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI30 aka Wikileaks id #187137 ?
Subject	LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 14 Jan 2009 14:56 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI30.html
References	08TRIPOLI984 , 08TRIPOLI988 , 09TRIPOLI5
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6676
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0030/01 0141456
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 141456Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4323
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0159
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4846
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000030

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), USUN FOR GOLDBERGER, GERMAIN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/14/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , UN *[United Nations]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , ASEC *[Security]* , IS *[Israel]* , LY *[Libya]* , EG *[Egypt]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN RESPONSE TO ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 984 , C) TRIPOLI 005

TRIPOLI 00000030 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a meeting of senior regime figures, Muammar al-Qadhafi dismissed UNSCR 1860 as ineffectual, argued that further action on Gaza through UN channels would be "meaningless", minimized the chance that the upcoming Arab League ministerial on Gaza would be helpful and said Libya must increase its unilateral efforts to assist Gazans. The meeting came on the heels of al-Qadhafi's public statement calling on Arab states to allow volunteers to fight alongside the Palestinians. Libya has sent humanitarian supplies (food, medical supplies, medicine, ambulances) to Sinai, has a team of doctors and logistics coordinators on the ground there, and has

doctors and logistics coordinators on the ground there, and has evacuated 8-10 wounded Gazans to Libya for treatment. A quasi-governmental organization headed by Muammar al-Qadhafi's daughter asked the UN to help facilitate the transfer to Libya of 1,000 Palestinian children for the duration of the fighting (the UN demurred). Protests against diplomatic missions - the UN headquarters, Egyptian Embassy and Mauritanian Embassy have all been targeted - continue as the regime tries to maintain a balance between public demonstrations of solidarity with Palestinians and private concern that its efforts on Gaza not come at too high a diplomatic cost. The regime's media efforts have helped stir public reaction, leaving it less room to maneuver as events in Gaza wear on. End comment

AL-QADHAFI: UN AND AL CHANNELS "MEANINGLESS"; LIBYA MUST GO IT ALONE

¶2. (C) Muhammad al-Wash (strictly protect), Country Director for the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), told P/E Chief on January 12 that Muammar al-Qadhafi chaired a meeting of senior regime figures, including representatives of the NSC, MFA, General People's Congress and security organizations, on/about the evening of January 10. The meeting came shortly after a statement attributed to al-Qadhafi appeared on the state-owned Jamahiriya News Agency calling for Arab states to " ... open the door for volunteers to fight alongside the Palestinians". (Note: We have seen no calls to date for Libyans to travel to Gaza to fight. End note.) Al-Wash got a readout from Khaled al-Hmeidi (strictly protect), who attended the meeting. (Note: Al-Hmeidi is the son of senior regime figure al-Hweildi al-Hmeidi and is increasingly an important figure in his own right. A confidante of both Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Muatassim al-Qadhafi, he travels regularly with Muammar al-Qadhafi - most recently to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mali - and has demonstrated an ability to work on sensitive issues such as refugee resettlement under the auspices of his quasi-governmental organization, the International Organization for Peace, Care and Relief. End note.)

¶3. (C) Al-Qadhafi told the group that the international community's unwillingness to pressure Israel had made UNSCR 1860 ineffectual, and said further action through the UN would be "meaningless". He dismissed the likelihood that the upcoming Arab League (AL) emergency ministerial on Gaza would help matters, arguing that the Arab reaction to events in Gaza had, from Libya's perspective, been as feckless as that of the rest of the international community. (Note: In recent public remarks covered in Libyan press, al-Qadhafi called Arabs' reaction to date "cowardly". End note.) Al-Qadhafi's conclusion was that Libya must increase its unilateral efforts to assist Palestinians in Gaza. He directed a "surge" in Libya's humanitarian shipments to Gaza and tasked several trusted figures, including al-Hmeidi, to manage those efforts.

EGYPT REPORTEDLY CONCERNED ABOUT IMAGE

¶4. (C) Al-Hmeidi told al-Wash that Libya would send an "air convoy" of two to three aircraft with humanitarian supplies to el-Arrish on/about January 13. Unusually, al-Hmeidi planned to accompany the convoy along with a press gaggle, underscoring the regime's concern that its efforts be properly trumpeted. Al-Wash urged al-Hmeidi to secure landing clearances from Egypt before dispatching the aircraft to avoid repeating the situation in late December, when a Libyan aircraft was initially denied permission to land at el-Arrish. Al-Wash said UN officials were having a hard time securing permission from Egyptian authorities to establish a presence near the Rafah crossing. Citing an email from the UN's ResRep in Cairo, al-Wash said Egyptian First Lady Suzanne Mubarak had effectively demanded prominent publicity for the Mubarak family's role as benefactors of Palestinians in Gaza in exchange for providing security clearances for World Food Program and other UN officials to establish a presence near Rafah and other crossing

points into Gaza. In an email message al-Wash showed to us, the UN ResRep in Egypt complained that some elements of the GOE were more concerned about appearances than facilitating humanitarian aid flows. (Note: Al-Wash stressed that the same was true of the GOL. End note.) Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdel Halim told Poloff that Egypt's initial reticence was due as much to the nature of

Libya's shipments as it was with the delivery mechanism. Contrasting Libya's attempt to airlift flour and sugar along with "three tons of medical supplies" with Egypt's offer of over 300 tons and several mobile hospital units, Abdel Halim complained that Libya was detracting from serious aid work by demanding its aid get priority delivery.

MFA SAYS LIBYAN HUMANITARIAN SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN "CONTINUOUS"

¶5. (C) Separately, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs Muhammad Taher Siala told the Ambassador on January 13 that Libyan shipments of humanitarian relief to Gaza since the beginning of violence had been "continuous". Conceding that delivering humanitarian supplies had been difficult, he said cooperation with Egypt had been "very good". (Note: We'd contrast that with the daily GOL-orchestrated demonstrations against the Egyptian Embassy in Tripoli, which at one point was attacked by 700 rock-throwing protestors. End note.) The GOL has a team on the ground in the Sinai to help coordinate delivery of humanitarian supplies (food, medicine, medicial supplies and ambulances) sent by Libya, and had secured a large warehouse in el-Arrish to store supplies until they could be delivered. (Note: The UNHCR's al-Wash, citing his conversation with al-Hmeidi, told us the GOL had not/not secured a warehouse and that supplies sent by Libya were being stored in an open-air soccer stadium and suffered rain damage. End note.) Stressing that most of the aid from Libya had been "privately collected" and that the GOL was primarily covering "freight costs" for transportation of same, Siala also said cash collections as of January 12 totaled some 10 million dollars. Individuals bearing collection boxes emblazoned with Palestinian flags have been a fixture on Tripoli's main throughfares for the past week. The GOL recently sent two ships to Sinai - one with 2,000 tons of supplies, the other with 4,000 tons - and he claimed that the GOL had staged 20-25 flights of supplies as well. (Note: The UNHCR's al-Wash put actual Libyan air deliveries at about half that. End note.)

¶6. (C) Stressing the difficulty of using the Rafah crossing, which was primarily being used to facilitate the movement of people, Siala said most of the Libyan humanitarian supplies had been sent into Gaza through "other corridors" (NFI). Libya is also running medical evacuation flights, bringing critically wounded Gazans to Libya for treatment. (Note: The GOL has used new air ambulances manufactured by U.S. companies Cessna and Bell, which it purchased last year. End note.) Siala said the GOL had experienced some difficulty securing clearances for medevac flights, which he attributed to the GOE's "embarrassment" that Egypt was unable to accommodate all of the wounded Palestinians in Egyptian hospitals. He said the GOL had so far transported 8-10 individuals to Libya for treatment.

REGIME SOLICITS UN'S HELP IN TRANSPORTING 1,000 PALESTINIAN CHILDREN TO LIBYA; PROTESTS CONTINUE

¶7. (C) UN Resident Representative (ResRep) Brian Gleeson told the Ambassador January 12 that the Waatesimu Organization, headed by Aisha al-Qadhafi (daughter of Muammar al-Qadhafi), had requested the UN's assistance in transporting 1,000 Palestinian children from Gaza to Libya for the duration of the conflict. Citing concerns about whether the children would be permitted to return after fighting had stopped, Gleeson said the UN had demurred. He said the UN headquarters building had been daily

demurred. He said the UN headquarters building had seen daily demontrations against events in Gaza during the past week. Some protests, most recently by a crowd of about 150 people on January 9, had targeted the UN building; others were target of opportunity events staged by protestors en route to Algiers Square and the Egyptian Embassy, where the largest Gaza-related protests in Tripoli have taken place so far. A group of several hundred schoolchildren paused outside the UN building on January ¶8. Protestors had presented three different letters to the UN Secretary General from Libyan organizations so far. Responding to the Ambassador's question as to why the UN would be targeted, Gleeson said Libyans equate the UN organization with the UNSC, which is perceived to be a tool of the U.S. He noted that a number of Libyans had directed remarks to his driver and other UN staff disparaging the UN's perceived role as a facilitator of ongoing violence in Gaza. Separately, demonstrations have continued against the Egyptian Embassy and the Sudanese Cultural Attache told us the Mauritanian Embassy had been the subject of a protest during the past week as well that caused some damage (NFI).

¶8. (C) Gleeson characterized GOL security forces' management of the protests as "very good", noting that in many cases national police and other security officials were in place before demonstrators arrived (suggesting a high degree of orchestration). In the few instances in which crowds had arrived before police, Gleeson and his security officer had been able to quickly muster GOL security forces via telephone calls

TRIPOLI 00000030 003.2 OF 003

to key GOL interlocutors. Protestors had attempted to erect a tent in the small square in front of the UN building; however, national police had quickly put an end to the effort.

¶9. (C) Comment: The high-profile efforts to send humanitarian supplies and carefully managed (so far) demonstrations in Tripoli reflect the regime's effort to strike a balance between public demonstrations of solidarity with Palestinians and private concern that its efforts on Gaza not come at too high a diplomatic cost. While willing to privately concede that Egypt has been fairly cooperative in facilitating flows of humanitarian aid from Libya, the regime has continued to orchestrate demonstrations against the Egyptian Embassy and other lesser lights of the diplomatic firmament (Mauritania, for instance), in part because demonstrations against the U.S. and other missions are a more risky enterprise. That said, the regime's media efforts have helped stir public reaction, leaving it less room to maneuver as events in Gaza wear on. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI301

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI301 aka Wikileaks id #201950 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUPPORTING AU EFFORTS IN MADAGASCAR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 12 Apr 2009 13:46 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI301.html
References	09STATE35767
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7949
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0301 1021346
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 121346Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4712
INFO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0001
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 0035
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5240
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000301

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/E

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , EAID [Foreign
Economic Assistance] , MA [Madagascar] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUPPORTING AU EFFORTS IN MADAGASCAR

REF: STATE 35767

(SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points to Mahmoud Azzabi,
Chief of Staff to MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki,
on April 12.  Azzabi said he would convey the points to Treiki
upon the latter's return from Mauritania on April 13.  Post will
report any substantive response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI302

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI302 aka Wikileaks id #201977 ?
Subject	LIBYA WILL SUPPORT PRST ON NORTH KOREA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Apr 2009 07:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI302.html
References	09STATE35897
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8168
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0302 1030758
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 130758Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4713
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0177
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5241
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000302

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNSC [UN Security Council] , NK, LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA WILL SUPPORT PRST ON NORTH KOREA

REF: STATE 35897

(SBU) Ambassador delivered reftel points to Mahdi al-Majrabi,
Director of International Organization Affairs at the General
People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International
Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) on April 12.  Al-Majrabi said the
GPCFLIC was still studying the draft Presidential Statement but
that he planned to recommend to FM-equivalent Musa Kusa that
Libya support it at the Security Council meeting on April 13.
Al-Majrabi offered that he was "impressed" that the P5 were able
to find common ground and that he particularly liked the final
statement of the draft language calling on Member States to
facilitate a "peaceful and comprehensive solution through
dialogue". Ambassador followed-up with Al-Majrabi morning of
April 13 and was told instructions had been conveyed to the UN
Libyan delegation to support the PRST.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external w eb sites by the ow ner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI306

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI306 aka Wikileaks id #202450 ?
Subject	NOC BLOCKS SALE OF CANADIAN OIL FIRM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 15 Apr 2009 14:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI306.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI517
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 28 Apr 2011 17:07: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0477
RR RUEHGA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0306 1051416
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151416Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4717
INFO RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY 0004
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0871
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1456
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0807
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0930
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0414
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5246
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000306

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND
CLDP (TEJTEL AND MCMANUS)
CASABLANCA FOR FCS (ORTIZ)
AMMAN FOR ESTH HUB (BHALLA)
CAIRO FOR FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , CA *[Canada]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NOC BLOCKS SALE OF CANADIAN OIL FIRM

¶1. (SBU) Summary. On April 12, the President of Canada's Verenex Energy, Jim McFarland, briefed the Ambassador on the difficulties he has encountered in attempting to sell his company to another foreign operator in Libya, the China National Petroleum Company (CNPC). The gist of the problem is that Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) has blocked the

transaction -- on questionable legal grounds, according to McFarland -- leaving Verenex in a state of limbo. Meanwhile, the NOC has demanded what amounts to a pay-off in the event it permits the transaction to proceed. End of summary.

¶2. (U) Verenex, a relatively small-scale oil producer that was awarded an exploration block in the Ghadames area five years ago, is one of the few foreign companies that has made successful discoveries in Libya. Verenex's field has estimated reserves of 2.15 billion barrels and is expected to produce 50,000 barrels of oil per day and 50 million cubic feet of gas per day by early 2011.

¶3. (SBU) In September 2008, Verenex announced a corporate sale, opened confidential technical data of its Libyan assets to 22 companies previously approved by the NOC, and received bids for the sale. After five months, Verenex announced that it had entered into an agreement with the CNPC to acquire Verenex for approx. USD 400 million. The deal, however, was subject to NOC's approval.

¶4. (SBU) McFarland said that before signing the agreement with CNPC, Verenex was pressured by the NOC to pay the NOC a "bonus" equal to 10% of the value of the transaction with CNPC. NOC assured Verenex that the corporate sale would be quickly approved. But two weeks after Verenex announced the agreement with CNPC, the NOC's chairman, Shukri Ghanem, announced that the NOC might exercise its right of first refusal on the sale of Verenex -- without indicating when it might do so. So far, the NOC has not formally informed Verenex of its intention to acquire the company, but has not approved the deal signed between Verenex and the Chinese either, leaving Verenex in limbo.

¶5. (SBU) According to McFarland, the NOC's legal basis for halting the deal is questionable. The NOC's pre-emptive right applies to the sale of the company's Libyan assets, not to the entire company, he said. Verenex's strategy is to keep advocating the NOC to approve the agreement signed with CNPC. If, on the other hand, the NOC chooses to proceed with its option to purchase Verenex, it could delay the sale further.

¶6. (SBU) Comment. Verenex's difficulties underscore the risks foreign companies in all sectors face when doing business in Libya, and with the GOL in particular, where GOL actions can be highly unpredictable and sometimes costly. McFarland agreed that there could be an anti-Chinese angle in the GOL move, but conceded that the chances were slim. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI309

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI309 aka Wikileaks id #202725 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI CALLS FOR SUPRANATIONAL AU TO INCLUDE COMMON FOREIGN POLICY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 16 Apr 2009 16:56 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI309.html
References	09TRIPOLI298
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1668
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0309 1061656
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 161656Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4720
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5249
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000309

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/16/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI CALLS FOR SUPRANATIONAL AU TO INCLUDE COMMON FOREIGN POLICY

REF: TRIPOLI 298

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) According to the Egyptian embassy, the on-going extraordinary ministerial meeting of the African Union in Tripoli has unfolded as expected - with Muammar al-Qadhafi making grandiose statements calling for a supranational body and "gradualist" states like Egypt, Nigeria, and South Africa countering that the AU must remain an intergovernmental body that respects state sovereignty. Delegates were to discuss an AU Commission report on modalities for further integration, but the Libyan hosts withdrew the report immediately before the meeting. Several states, reportedly led by Namibia, complained and called on the Commission to release the report to member states.

¶2. (C) Al-Qadhafi reportedly used the forum to call for still

greater expansion of AU executive powers - which he has previously envisaged as controlling continental defense, trade, and economy - to include a common foreign policy set by the central authority. Delegates reportedly referred the matter to a committee which is to use the withdrawn AU Commission report, the earlier Dakar report on integration, and al-Qadhafi's April 15 speech as a framework. The Egyptian embassy was unsure whether the committee's findings would be presented April 16 or at the July AU summit meeting; al-Qadhafi reportedly "promised to present a surprise" at the July meeting during his remarks. The Egyptian embassy described the proceedings as political theater that made "no progress" toward al-Qadhafi's vision of a federal United States of Africa.

DELEGATES COMMEMORATE 1986 ATTACKS ON TRIPOLI, BENGHAZI

¶3. (C) Members of the visiting delegations were also invited to the April 14 commemoration of the 1986 U.S. bombings of Tripoli and Benghazi (Operation El Dorado Canyon) - an annual event held at al-Qadhafi's Bab al-Aziziyah compound in Tripoli. Past years have featured prominent public speeches and demonstrations. In contrast, Egyptian delegates described the event as much more subdued without speeches by al-Qadhafi or the Foreign Minister Musa Kusa. Instead, guests were treated to a dinner and a special documentary on the attacks (described as "rhetorical and ideological" but not inflammatory).

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI31

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI31 aka Wikileaks id #187231 ?
Subject	SENIOR REGIME FIGURES AMBIVALENT ABOUT U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 15 Jan 2009 07:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI31.html
References	08TRIPOLI992 , 09TRIPOLI22 , 09TRIPOLI699
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7307
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0031/01 0150706
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 150706Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4326
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4849
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000031

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SENIOR REGIME FIGURES AMBIVALENT ABOUT U.S.-LIBYA RELATIONS

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 699 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 992 , C) TRIPOLI 22

TRIPOLI 00000031 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri recently expressed concern that Libya would miss a key window of opportunity for expanded cooperation and engagement with the U.S. because of limited human capacity and decision-making ability within the government and regime elites' lingering ambivalence about the nature of the relationship they want with the U.S. The "negotiations phase" to re-establish full diplomatic relations had run its course; the upcoming "cooperation phase" would in his view be even more difficult

"cooperation phase" would in his view be even more difficult. Tired of intra-GOL machinations and turf wars and skeptical about his government's ability to capitalize on the chance to expand bilateral U.S.-Libya engagement, Fituri said he personally hoped to leave his MFA post and turn to other, less frustrating pursuits. The GOL's lack of capacity and conflicted views on expanded ties with the U.S. suggest that its reaction to U.S. initiatives is likely to be inconsistent and fitful, and argue for a clear prioritization of desired programs of cooperation and engagement and a persistent yet patient approach. End summary.

GOL'S CAPACITY LIMITED

¶2. (C) In a meeting in late December, MFA Secretary for the Americas (A/S-equivalent) Ahmed Fituri shared with A/DCM his "private view" that Libya would miss its window of opportunity for expanded cooperation and engagement with the U.S. because of disorganization within the regime and lingering ambivalence about the nature of the relationship Libya wants. The U.S. and Libya had completed the "negotiations phase" of the project to re-establish full diplomatic relations with the implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement in late October; the next step should be an expanded suite of training, cooperation and engagement in what he characterized as the "cooperation phase". The problem, however, was that the Government of Libya (GOL) "lacked the capacity to coordinate" such engagement and had not decided what it really wanted to accomplish in the cooperation phase.

¶3. (C) Fituri said he had urged National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, to organize an intra-GOL meeting after the upcoming session of the General People's Congress to determine what avenues of cooperation with the U.S. the GOL wanted to pursue and which GOL entities would have the lead for those projects. Disagreements between senior regime figures and within GOL institutions about who had the lead on various aspects of the U.S.-Libya bilateral account had complicated efforts to expand engagement. The more fundamental issue was that even in instances in which the desired outcome was clear, the GOL's limited human and bureaucratic capacity had circumscribed the ability of the regime to get what it thought it wanted.

SENIOR REGIME FIGURES AMBIVALENT ABOUT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

¶4. (C) In addition to capacity constraints, senior regime elements remained conflicted about the nature of the relationship Libya wanted with the U.S., Fituri said. There were "two strains" of thinking within the GOL with respect to U.S.-Libya ties: a pro-U.S. camp and a group that remained suspicious of U.S. motives and steadfastly opposed to a broader suite of engagement. The pro-U.S. group included Muammar al-Qadhafi, Qadhafi Development Foundation Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa, senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi, and key Revolutionary Committee members and old guard fixtures Mustapha Kharrubi and al-Hweildi al-Hmeidi. Fituri said Muammar al-Qadhafi generally supported increased U.S.-Libya cooperation, but with "conditionalities" born of an abiding concern that the eventual goal of U.S. engagement with Libya was regime change. He urged the U.S. to remain mindful of al-Qadhafi's remarks during his 2008 Revolution Day speech (ref A), when he stressed that Libya seeks "neither friendship nor enmity from America, but just that they would leave us alone". The truth was more complicated than that, Fituri offered. Al-Qadhafi was keenly focused on U.S.-Libya ties, in part because it afforded him a brighter spotlight in the international arena; however, he would not be dictated to, especially on core issues like security and human rights. Kusa and Sanussi supported more robust ties "to an extent", but had argued that Libya should not allow itself to become "dependent" on the U.S. Kharrubi and al-Hmeidi had

initially opposed re-engaging with the U.S., but had become increasingly convinced that it was the correct policy since it had helped Libya begin to shed its image as an international pariah.

¶5. (C) Despite the rapid improvement in bilateral ties in 2008,

significant opposition to engagement with the U.S. remained. Notwithstanding the key role he played in aggregating funds for the U.S.-Libya claims agreement fund, Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi remained "philosophically opposed" to broader engagement with the U.S. Colonel al-Tuheimi Muhammad Khaled, Director of the Internal Security Organization, believed cooperation on counterterrorism and extremism was beneficial, but was troubled by the Embassy's efforts to develop contacts with non-official Libyans, had expressed particular concern about the Embassy's engagement on high-profile human rights cases like Fathi el-Jahmi and suggested that the eventual goal of the U.S. was to "destabilize the Jamahiriya". Fituri characterized several senior officials at the Temporary Committee for Defense (MOD-equivalent), including Minister of Defense-equivalent Abu Bakr al-Yunis and Major General Abdulrahman al-Zwayy, Director of the MOD's Bureau of Technical Cooperation and Head of the Staff College, as being essentially opposed to broader engagement with the U.S. Some of their reticence about military-to-military engagement with the U.S. stemmed from the greater degree of comfort they had with Russian/Soviet systems and doctrine; however, some of their opposition was also "ideological". (Note: See ref B for further detail on senior GOL figures' views on expanded U.S-Libya military-to-military ties. End note.)

¶6. (C) Even Abuzeid Dorda (Chairman of the powerful Housing and Infrastructure Board and a former Prime Minister), who had awarded multi-milion dollar project management contracts to U.S. companies AECOM and Tennessee Overseas Construction, had reservations about the extent to which Libya should broaden its official ties to the U.S. (Note: In a recent conversation with a visiting journalist, Dorda - whom Fituri described as a "committed Arab nationalist" - dismissed the idea that the regime had embarked on a program of political-economic reform, arguing that the only change had been that the international community, upon lifting sanctions against Libya, had beaten a path to the Jamahiriya in pursuit of profits. End note.) Finally, Fituri stressed that key elements of the Revolutionary Committees (RevComm) - which remained a force to be reckoned with despite efforts by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and, to a lesser extent, Muammar al-Qadhafi, to circumscribe their writ in the past several years - continued to oppose cooperation and engagement with the U.S. (Note: See ref C for recent reports on a joint attack by RevComm elements and members of Saif al-Islam's Libya al-Ghad (Libya of tomorrow) on Berbers, suggesting that Saif al-Islam may be balancing public calls on the regime to abandon heavy-handed tactics of the past with a quiet effort to curry favor with his most stalwart opponents. End note.)

TIRED OF THE GAME AND SKEPTICAL ABOUT CHANCES FOR SUCCESS

¶7. (C) As to his own future, Fituri flatly said he is tired of intra-regime machinations, the pervasive lack of human capacity and absence of clearly delineated lines of authority within the GOL. He was proud of his involvement in the negotiations leading to the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, but was skeptical that U.S.-Libya cooperation in the near to mid-term would develop as quickly as the two sides hoped, mostly because the GOL was too disorganized and too ambivalent to capitalize on the potential window of opportunity created by implementation of the claims deal and the recent exchange of ambassadors. He personally had no desire to "beat his head against the wall" to

personally had no desire to "beat his head against the wall" to try to expand cooperation and hoped to leave his position as A/S-equivalent after the upcoming session of the General People's Congress, at which a signficant cabinet shuffle and other key personnel changes were expected to be announced. He intends to return to his work at the UN-affiliated Africa Development Center and as director of a prestigious private school in Tripoli. Noting Libya's proposal for a broad U.S.-Libya security framework agreement, he underscored the importance of developing "in the near future" some kind of security agreement that included language referring to security assurances. Such an agreement would help regime elements supportive of expanded U.S.-Libya ties rebut the arguments of the naysayers, and would constitute an important gesture from the perspective of skeptical old guard elements opposed to engagement with the U.S.

¶8. (C) Comment: Fituri's personal relationship with Muatassim al-Qadhafi, together with the fact that he is U.S.-educated and instinctively intuits how we prefer to do business, lend him valuable perspective and make him an unusually astute observer of the bilateral state of play. His analysis of the GOL's critical lack of human and decision-making capacity is consistent with what we have experienced first-hand and heard from other well-informed interlocutors, including Dr. Mahmud Jibril, head of the National Economic Development Board and

TRIPOLI 00000031 003.2 OF 003

National Planning Council, and Ali Essawi, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Economy and Trade (minister-equivalent). Such limitations will continue to constitute a significant brake on the extent to which we are able to expand cooperation and the speed with which we are able to do so. More broadly, Fituri's remarks on regime elites' lingering ambivalence about the pace and extent of desired engagement with the U.S. suggest that the GOL's reaction to U.S. initiatives is likely to be inconsistent and fitful. That fact, together with the GOL's pronounced lack of bureaucratic capacity, argue for a tightly disciplined approach from our side, to include clear prioritization of desired programs of cooperation and engagement and a healthy dose of patience. With the arrival of the Ambassador, we will have further opportunities to gauge the GOL's desire for expanded cooperation and engagement; however, even the afterglow of finally having exchanged ambassadors has been clouded by events in Gaza and the visceral Libyan reaction, which will complicate efforts to assess the GOL's druthers with respect to the bilateral relationship itself. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI310

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI310 aka Wikileaks id #202889 ?
Subject	MUATASSIM'S WASHINGTON DEBUT: BURNISHING HIS IMAGE AND TESTING U.S. WATERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 17 Apr 2009 12:23 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI310.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2555
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0310/01 1071223
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 171223Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4721
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5250
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000310

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/17/2019
TAGS: OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , (MQADHAFI), PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MUATASSIM'S WASHINGTON DEBUT: BURNISHING HIS IMAGE AND TESTING U.S. WATERS

TRIPOLI 00000310 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S//NF) Summary: Muatassim al-Qadhafi's trip to Washington on April 20-24 will serve as a key metric for skeptical regime members to judge the success of Libya's ten-year re-engagement project with the West and as a personal "test" for him to establish his bona fides as his brother did in Washington.

After reported turbid relations with his father, Muammar al-Qadhafi, in the late 1990s, Muatassim returned from several years in Egypt in 2006 to serve as Libya's National Security Advisor - a position created especially for him. His focus on enhancing regime security through military acquisitions and broader mandates for state security services makes him a more palatable successor to his father's leadership for old guard Revolutionary Committee members than his older brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, the apparent lead contender to succeed his father. Muatassim seeks demonstrative rewards from the U.S. for Libya's decisions to give up WMD programs and support for terrorism, and is keen to garner "respect" from having met with high-level U.S. officials. His visit represents an opportunity to convey our vision for continued development in the bilateral relationship to a key insider and the potential future leader of Libya. End Summary.

MUATASSIM'S DOMESTIC PARAMETERS AND PROSPECTS FOR LEADERSHIP

¶2. (S//NF) After several years of negotiation, Libya fulfilled its obligations under the Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement - providing funds for the victims of Pam Am 103 and LaBelle bombings, among others - on October 31, 2008. The implementation of the agreement increased the level of interaction between the USG and GOL - including former Secretary Rice's visit to Tripoli in September 2008 during which she met with Muatassim and his father. Muatassim's current visit comes five months after his older brother - Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's - three-week trip to the U.S. during the final days of the Bush administration. Despite the high-level interest in deepening the relationship, old-guard regime figures remain skeptical about the benefits of re-engagement and the more critical facets of our interaction remain at the mercy of the often mercurial inner circle. September 1 will be the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power, and the two brothers are widely thought to be jostling to take on their father's mantle. For his part, the Leader has made recent personnel changes that signal he may be positioning one of the sons for the succession mantle without indicating which is the clear preference. Western-educated Saif al-Islam has been the public face of Libya's rapprochement with the West and nascent reform movement, while Muatassim enjoys support from more conservative elements drawn to his efforts to bolster Libya's military and security posture. Both, however, appear to be supportive of normalization with the U.S.

SYMBOLS OF A STRONG AND LASTING PARTNERSHIP WITH THE U.S.

¶3. (S//NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi seeks symbolic gains as much as he does substantive ones, and 2009 is full of symbolic milestones. In September, he will celebrate both 40 years as Libya's leader and 10 years since the Sirte Proclamation - a foundational document of the African Union signed in al-Qadhafi's hometown. His February election to the African Union chairmanship provides al-Qadhafi with a high-profile platform from which he can trumpet his vision of Africa and rail against Western interference on the continent and serves as confirmation of his regional importance. In March, Libya presided over the Security Council and al-Qadhafi expects to send his top Africa diplomat to preside over the 64th session of the UN General Assembly in the fall. Al-Qadhafi has played host to Tony Blair, Vladimir Putin, Nicolas Sarkozy, and Juan Carlos of Spain; but the "Holy Grail" for al-Qadhafi, a meeting with the U.S. President, has eluded him thus far. We expect Muatassim to forcefully promote a meeting between POTUS and al-Qadhafi at this summer's G-8 meeting in Italy. Similarly, Muatassim may seek other symbolic "gains" to show Libyan insiders that he is laying the groundwork for the future, including by advocating agreements on security and civilian nuclear cooperation in particular, as evidence that he can deliver diplomatically. The Libyan leadership places high priority on such deliverables during their trips; follow-up, however, is often lacking. European and Russian

colleagues here have bemoaned last-minute attempts to ready agreements for signature, with one diplomat saying, "the Libyans always want to sign everything but only implement what they want. An agreement is only valid if both sides read it the same way." The bottom line for the Qadhafi clan is respect which they believe comes from high-level interaction and formal

agreements.

AFRICOM, SECURITY ASSURANCES, MILITARY SALES, AND TRAINING

¶4. (S//NF) Muatassim's March 10 meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward seems to have quieted Libya's harsh rhetoric against AFRICOM. Muatassim, apparently influenced by Ward's presentation, encouraged the General to meet his father at the earliest opportunity. During this meeting Muatassim appeared eager to obtain security guarantees in light of Libya's decision to abandon WMD. He told Ward that Libya, an oil-rich country of approximately 5 million, faces the threat of "tens of millions" from Algeria and Egypt. He specifically mentioned upgrading the Mil-Mil MOU signed in January to a full, binding security agreement because Libya - betting on US support - had left itself defenseless. The GOL is not likely to join the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in the near-term, but is beginning to understand that AFRICOM's mission can be congruent with Libya's national interests. Red lines remain, however. According to MFA Secretary for the Americas Ahmed Fituri, who will accompany Muatassim on this trip, Muammar al-Qadhafi expressed reservations to Muatassim in November 2008 that expanded military and law enforcement cooperation would lead to having large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers in Libya - which would be untenable given that the "evacuation" of U.S. forces in 1970 is trumpeted as a key accomplishment of the revolution.

¶5. (S//NF) Libyan officials have been keen to purchase US military equipment - both lethal and non-lethal - and to secure training for Libyan military personnel. At Muatassim's behest, Libyan officials presented a "wish list" in January which included requests ranging from F-16 fighters to mobile field hospitals. Although we have yet to present the Libyans with a response, the Defense Security Cooperation Agency is developing Letters of Offer and Acceptance for some of the non-lethal items. During General Ward's visit, Muatassim requested Libyan participation in joint-training activities such as Bright Star in Egypt. In response, Ward encouraged Muatassim to accept the standing invitation to send observers to the Phoenix Express naval exercise which Libya did less than one month later. Military contacts have expressed keen interest in obtaining training for their officers, but to date Libya has not formally stated its requirements. Muatassim may have the influence to push the military bureaucracy to produce such a request.

¶6. (S//NF) Muatassim is likely to repeat two familiar refrains: that the U.S. "owes" Libya security cooperation (read: sales and security guarantees) in return for al-Qadhafi's decision to give up his WMD aspirations; and that the U.S. should return or reimburse Libya for the C-130 transport aircraft it purchased in the 1970s. Ownership of the eight planes was transferred in the United States, but the USG did not grant an export license. Lockheed Martin ceased maintenance of the aircraft and they have since become unserviceable. In effect, the Libyans have made military sales and resolution of the C-130 issue key tests of U.S. trust of and future intentions toward Libya.

LIBYA'S OUTSTANDING OBLIGATIONS ON WMD DISARMAMENT

¶7. (S//NF) Libyan officials have argued since 2006 that the Libyan example of WMD disarmament was a poor model for the rest of the world because Libya did not receive sufficient tangible

of the world because Libya did not receive substantive tangible "rewards" from the U.S. for its 2003 decision to abandon its WMD programs. Muatassim has told us that Libya has been "embarrassed" when asked by North Korea, Iran and others what Libya received for having taken such a major step.

¶8. (S//NF) Libya is still in the process of effecting the dismantlement of its WMD capacity. The logistics to ship 4.6kg of highly enriched uranium to Russia in September 2009 have yet to be set and the conversion of the Rabta chemical weapons facilities to peaceful use has suffered periodic delays. U.S. and UK members of the Tri-lateral Steering Committee charged with monitoring the disarmament report that Libyan progress is sporadic and that periodic unresponsiveness is often blamed on high-ranking regime members' perception that Libya was not getting enough in return for its actions. The GOL has repeatedly called for specific, large projects that, in their view, will demonstrate to the public (and conservative regime members) that the decision to disarm and re-engage was the right one. For example, Muatassim has recently pressed for a civilian nuclear project, mirroring earlier calls for a power-generating

or a desalination facility built by a U.S. firm. More conservative regime elements see the WMD decision as a crucial bargaining chip too easily given away and this drives the Qadhafi efforts to show that the policy change toward the U.S. was a beneficial one. If he is successful in Washington, Muatassim can be a key messenger to them that Libya will see further rewards and that further cooperation is possible.

TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

¶9. (S//NF) Libya is a vital partner in combating transnational terrorism. The regime is genuinely concerned about the rise of Islamic terrorism in the Sahel and Sahara and worries that the instability and weak governments to their south could lead to a "belt of terrorism" stretching from Mauritania to Somalia. Libya sees transnational Islamist terrorist networks as dangerous threats to regime security and continuity. Security services actively and aggressively combat threats in their sphere and cooperate with the USG and our allies through liaison channels. Muatassim is keen to receive training and, more importantly, equipment from the U.S. to help Libya detect and disable terrorist threats.

¶10. (S//NF) The USG has provided training under the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) and Export and Border Control (EXBS) rubric, and an IMET-funded English-language program for Libyan military members is a key entry point for further training assistance. After accepting ATA in early 2008, Libyan security officials received the first tranche of trainers in early March, with two additional trainings scheduled for May. While the program is still in its infancy, thanking Muatassim for helping begin the program and encouraging his continued support will do much to ensure future success.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND FATHI AL-JAHMI

¶11. (S//NF) Muatassim views U.S. interest in the human rights situation in Libya as an obstacle to further engagement on other issues. He complained to the Ambassador that the annual Human Rights Report did not reflect the real situation in Libya saying the embassy "should get rid of it". He told the Ambassador he was against NGOs operating in Libya as they could be a destabilizing force for the regime (Note: NGOs are outlawed. Saif al-Islam, who has no official government role, chairs the largest "civil society organization" operating in Libya. End Note.) and that the GOL would not countenance the "~same situation as had been the case with Egyptian NGOs." While he

has recently told us that regime critic Fathi al-Jahmi will be released "this year", his father's direct and intimate involvement in the case will leave him little latitude to depart from his talking points: "Fathi al-Jahmi is a Libyan citizen subject to Libyan laws. His case is an internal matter and foreign intervention is inappropriate and unwelcome." The Ambassador has repeatedly informed Muatassim and other senior Libyan officials that his case would continue to figure large in the bilateral relationship and that it needed to be resolved quickly to prevent any damage to the furtherance of bilateral relations. In turn, Muatassim and others have argued that according the issue high-profile media coverage could set back efforts to free al-Jahmi.

DEALING WITH MUATASSIM

¶12. (S//NF) Considered little more than a playboy just two years ago, Muatassim has surprised many observers by the seriousness with which he has taken his new responsibilities as the National Security Adviser. He has, at times, overreached - notably attempting to install security chiefs without clearance from other regime elements and requesting $1.2 billion from the National Oil Corporation to form his own special forces brigade. His mentors include members of Muammar al-Qadhafi's inner circle, notably Foreign Minister Musa Kusa. Ambitious and competitive, Muatassim realizes that he is being groomed as a potential successor to his father and that Saif al-Islam is his primary competitor. He has met with several senior U.S. officials - including former Secretary of State Rice, former NEA A/S Welch, and AFRICOM Commander Gen. Ward. He does not appear to have the depth of knowledge and analytical ability commensurate with his position but at the same time, seems to be slowly growing into the job. Libyan officials have described him as not intellectually curious, reporting that it is a struggle to get him to read custom-made abstracts on current

events, national security, and foreign affairs. Nevertheless, he is considered a serious contender to succeed his father and has proven he has the power to influence military and security decisions.

¶13. (S//NF) Muatassim last traveled to the U.S. shortly after being named National Security Advisor for the fall 2007 session of the UN General Assembly. At that time, he was closely advised by Musa Kusa who accompanied him to New York. Notably, his current delegation seems to lack a similar minder - perhaps a sign of his growing independence and stature. He speaks enough English to conduct basic meetings, but lacks the fluency to discuss complex issues.

¶14. (S//NF) Comment: The visit offers an opportunity to meet a power player and potential future leader of Libya. We should also view the visit as an opportunity to draw out Muatassim on how the Libyans view "normalized relations" with the U.S. and, in turn, to convey how we view the future of the relationship as well. Given his role overseeing Libya's national security apparatus, we also want his support on key security and military engagement that serves our interests. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI32

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI32 aka Wikileaks id #187348 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT CONFIRMS DESIRE TO SELL URANIUM YELLOWCAKE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 15 Jan 2009 14:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI32.html
References	08TRIPOLI966 , 09TRIPOLI966
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7726
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK
DE RUEHTRO #0032 0151453
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 151453Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4329
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0065
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4852
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000032

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ISN/RAA FOR HEIDLBERG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/15/2019
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PARM [Arms Controls and
Disarmament] , TRGY [Energy Technology] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , EMIN [Minerals and Metals] , ETTC [Trade
and Technology Controls] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , IR [Iran] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY ESTABLISHMENT CONFIRMS DESIRE TO SELL
URANIUM YELLOWCAKE

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 966 , B) STATE 125972

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Following up on our demarche to the MFA's International
Organizations Department on December 18 (ref A), P/E Chief met
with Dr. Ali Gashut, Secretary of Libya's Atomic Energy
Establishment, on January 15 to discuss Libya's efforts to sell
its stockpile of uranium yellowcake. (Note: The GOL took over a
month to schedule the meeting.  End note.)  We delivered ref B
```

demarche points cautioning Libya to be wary of Iranian efforts to purchase, directly or indirectly, Libya's yellowcake stocks and urging the GOL to immediately report any such efforts by Iran to the UNSC's Iran Sanctions Committee.

¶2. (C) Gashut affirmed Libya's commitment to sell its stockpile of approximately 1,000 metric tons of uranium yellowcake as part of the commitments it undertook in connection with its decision in 2003 to voluntarily abandon its WMD programs. Stressing that Libya viewed the question as primarily a commercial one, he noted that prices for uranium yellowcake on the world market had been increasing, and that Libya wanted to maximize its profit by properly timing the sale of its stockpile. Companies from the U.K., France and Canada (he did not say which) had sent representatives to Libya to negotiate for the purchase of the uranium in 2006-2007, and had subsequently tendered offers. Other companies had also expressed interest since then and the GOL had conducted discussions with them; however, only the original three British, French and Canadian companies had actually submitted formal bids to date. The GOL was currently engaged in "active, ongoing communications" with the three original companies and others, but had not yet made a decision as to which offer it was most inclined to accept.

¶3. (C) Confirming what we were told by the MFA's International Organizations Department in December, Gashut said he was not aware that Iran or any Iranian entities had expressed interest in buying Libya's uranium stockpile. Underscoring Libya's commitments to UNSCR's 1737 and 1803, he said Libya had worked hard to earn credibility with the IAEA and international community and would not jeopardize that by dealing with Iran.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI320

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI320 aka Wikileaks id #203570 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI RESPONSE TO FY09 PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS WHOSE BUDGETS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 22 Apr 2009 14:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI320.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI48
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6142
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0320 1121421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221421Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4736
INFO RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0729
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 8778 PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0515
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5265
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000320

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OMA JULIA JACOBY; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; CAIRO FOR ALEX SEVERENS; PARIS AND LONDON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]*
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI RESPONSE TO FY09 PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS WHOSE BUDGETS ARE NOT TRANSPARENT

REF: STATE 00028885

(SBU) This is a response to the request for information on the transparency of Libya's budget. Replies are keyed to reftel:

-Is the central government expected to receive or is it already receiving U.S. foreign assistance funding using FY 09 funds?
Answer: Yes.

Answer: Yes.

-Is the host country's budget publicly available?
Answer: Libya's overall budget figures are available online and in print media, mainly in official news articles with quotes from government officials. However, more precise budget details, such as expenditures by sector, are not readily available.

-Are incomes and expenditures included in the publicly-available budget?
Answer: The overall expenditures are included in the publicly-available budget information.

-What is post's assessment of the extent to which the publicly-available budget accurately reflects actual government incomes and expenditures?

-Answer: The publicly-available budget accurately reflects actual government incomes and expenditures to the best of our knowledge. Transparency of government budgeting and spending remains an issue for the Libyan government, which is reputed to suffer from corruption and inefficiency.

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI321

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI321 aka Wikileaks id #203571 ?
Subject	LIBYA: UPDATE ON DPRK SANCTIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 22 Apr 2009 14:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI321.html
References	09STATE38608
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6141
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0321 1121421
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 221421Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4737
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0178
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5266
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000321

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND IO/UNP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , UNSC [UN Security Council] , KN [Korea (North)] , LY [Libya] ,
KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation]
SUBJECT: LIBYA: UPDATE ON DPRK SANCTIONS

REF: A. STATE 38608
     B. TRIPOLI 315

(SBU) In an April 22 conversation with the Charge', the MFA's
director of international organization affairs, Mahdi Mujerbi,
said the GOL was pleased to support the U.S. on the recent PRST
on DPRK sanctions and appreciated that the US was taking into
account Libya's opposition to sanctions that could affect the
general population (see reftels).  He said the MFA was studying
the U.S. proposal for targeted measures.  He noted that the
Libyan mission to the UN was exchanging information and views on
the matter with USUN and promised to inform us when the GOL made
a decision.

STEVENS
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI331

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI331 aka Wikileaks id #203753 ?
Subject	LIBYA: KOSOVO'S MEMBERSHIP IN IMF/WORLD BANK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 23 Apr 2009 12:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI331.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7303
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0331 1131247
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231247Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4747
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0179
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5276
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000331

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OMA DAVID FREUDENWALD, EEB/IFD/ODF CHIP LAITINEN, EUR KOSOVO DESK S. SHIRATORI; TREASURY FOR DANIEL SCHMERIN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: LY *[Libya]* , KV *[Kosovo]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: KOSOVO'S MEMBERSHIP IN IMF/WORLD BANK

REF: STATE 33709

¶1. (SBU) On April 23, Econoff delivered reftel points to Mahdi Mujerbi, the Director of the Office of International Organizations at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Libya's MFA-equivalent).

¶2. (SBU) Mujerbi said he had received a message from the Libyan Mission to the United Nations in New York regarding the issue of Kosovo's membership in the IMF and World Bank. He said he had referred the matter to the General People's Committee for Planning and Finance which oversees Libya's Governors on the Board of Governors for each body, and he was awaiting further instructions. He told us he would follow-up with Post if he hears more on the issue. (Note: During a recent visit to Tripoli, Serbia's Foreign Minister told foreign press he was "sure there would be no recognition of Kosovo" by Libya. End note.)

STEVENS

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI34

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI34 aka Wikileaks id #187764 ?
Subject	UN ORGANIZES HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT GROUP WITH KEY LIBYAN ORGANIZATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 19 Jan 2009 12:58 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI34.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI602
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9994
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0034 0191258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 191258Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4331
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1379
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0735
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0867
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0810
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4854
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000034

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NEASA (SKWIRAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/15/2019
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , SOCI [Social Conditions] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: UN ORGANIZES HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT GROUP WITH KEY LIBYAN
ORGANIZATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: UN officials have quietly begun a human rights
contact group that consists of quasi-governmental organizations
with strong ties to the al-Qadhafi regime (two of groups are
chaired by children of al-Qadhafi).  The goals are to build
awareness of basic human/civil rights and expand the capacity of
quasi-governmental organizations to begin implementing human
rights programs in Libya.  The UN views the effort as one that
will likely only bear fruit in the long-term.  The decision to
focus on groups with well-connected leadership is a double-edged
sword: the groups potentially have more room for maneuver within
the GOL than others; however, their leaders' proximity to senior
GOL figures also enables the regime to closely control the
extent and pace of broader human rights engagement.  End
summary.
```

¶2. (C) United Nations officials resident in Tripoli have quietly inaugurated meetings of a human rights contact group that consists of quasi-governmental organizations. The group first met last September and has gathered twice since. The group's chair, UNHCR Chief of Mission Mohammed al-Wash, is focused on building awareness of basic human/civil rights and expanding the capacity of GOL entities and quasi-governmental organizations to begin implementing human rights programs in Libya. Al-Wash also hopes to help GOL and quasi-governmental organizations better delineate their respective areas of responsibility to avoid redundant efforts and conflicts over turf.

¶3. (C) In addition to al-Wash and representatives from the UNDP's Tripoli office, the group currently comprises the following individuals: Ahmed Kajma from the Waatesimu Foundation; Muhammad Kusa of the Organization of Youth for Voluntary Works; Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee; Khaled al-Hmeidi of the International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief (IOPCR); representatives of the World Islamic Call Society (WICS); and Hosni al-Waheish from the General People's Congress Committee for Human Rights. Significantly, the quasi-governmental groups all have strong ties to the al-Qadhafi regime. Waatesimu is chaired by Aisha al-Qadhafi, daughter of Muammar al-Qadhafi; her brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, chairs the QDF. Muhammad Kusa, who chairs the Organization of Youth for Voluntary Works, is the brother of Musa Kusa, Director of the External Security Organization. Khaled al-Hmeidi, chairman of the IOPCR, is a confidante of both Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and Muatassim al-Qadhafi, and travels regularly with Muammar al-Qadhafi - most recently to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Mali. WICS, chaired by Dr. Muhammad Sharif, has a well-funded campus at which it provides undergraduate and graduate education in Islamic studies, primarily to students from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, as a means to propagate more tolerant iterations of Islam.

¶4. (C) Representatives of foreign missions have not yet been invited to observe the meetings. Al-Wash and the UN Resident Representative, Brian Gleeson, hope to eventually expand the contact group to include diplomats and representatives of foreign NGO's (i.e., IOM); however, they do not reasonably expect that to happen soon. The approach is to develop more viable partners on the Libyan side before taking the more politically sensitive step (from the GOL's perspective) of expanding contacts between the international community and quasi-governmental Libyan entities. Al-Wash was clear that this is but the first step in a process of expanded engagement that will take years. He cautioned against efforts to push the GOL and quasi-governmental organizations in Libya to expand human rights engagement too soon, stressing that "the tiger didn't change its stripes just because the regime decided to give up WMD".

¶5. (C) Comment: The UN is able to engage in a proto-human rights dialogue in large part because it is viewed as being less threatening than diplomatic missions, but also because both UNDP and UNHCR have carefully cultivated close contacts with the quasi-governmental organizations that make up the group. Al-Wash has a sober view of the task before him, understanding that while the organizations' high-powered leadership potentially gives them more room for maneuver within the GOL than traditional NGOs elsewhere typically enjoy, their proximity to senior GOL figures also enables the regime to closely control the extent and pace of broader human rights engagement. If the regular meetings can help better coordinate the groups' efforts, it could help us and other likeminded missions better identify the addresses at which to lodge our human rights concerns and, in the long term, develop programs for cooperation and engagement on human rights issues. End comment.

CRETZ

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI358

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI358 aka Wikileaks id #204715 ?
Subject	LIBYA-UK PRISONER TRANSFER AGREEMENT IN FORCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI358.html
References	09TRIPOLI65
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2312
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0358 1191625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 291625Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4773
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1044
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0730
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5303
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000358

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , KTIA *[Treaties and International Agreements]* , LY *[Libya]* , UK *[United Kingdom]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA-UK PRISONER TRANSFER AGREEMENT IN FORCE

REF: A. TRIPOLI 65
B. LONDON 569
C. LONDON 209

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C//NF) The UK Embassy confirmed that the instruments of ratification for the UK-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) were signed on April 29 by UK Ambassador Sir Vincent Fein and Mohammed Saghrir, head of the Legal Department at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent), putting the PTA into force. British Embassy contacts anticipate that the GOL will not submit a forma request to transfer convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi to Libyan under the PTA until next week at the earliest.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI359

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI359 aka Wikileaks id #204717 ?
Subject	STATE MEDIA PULLS THE PLUG ON SAIF AL-ISLAM'S SATELLITE CHANNEL, ARRESTS MANAGER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 29 Apr 2009 16:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI359.html
References	08TRIPOLI679 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI679
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI487 , 09TRIPOLI805 , 09TRIPOLI955
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2318
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0359/01 1191629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 291629Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4774
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1459
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1045
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0808
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0931
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0872
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5304
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000359

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  4/29/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , KMDR [Media Reaction Reporting] , SOCI [Social
Conditions] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: STATE MEDIA PULLS THE PLUG ON SAIF AL-ISLAM'S SATELLITE
CHANNEL, ARRESTS MANAGER

REF: A. 08 TRIPOLI 679
     B. TRIPOLI 208

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: State media took over the quasi-independent
al-Libiyya satellite television channel on April 24 in the
middle of an interview program featuring Revolutionary Committee
(RevComm) member Mustafa Zaidi.  The state-run al-Jamahiriya
channel immediately began to simulcast its programming on
al-Libiyya's signal.  According to the opposition website Libya
al-Youm, al-Libiyya station manager and deputy director of the
al-Ghad Media Group Abdelsalam al-Mishri was arrested on the
```

al-Ghad Media Group Abdelsalam al-Mishri was arrested on the same day and the host of the program in progress was interrogated by security services before being allowed to leave the broadcast studio. Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, chairs the al-Ghad Media Group which includes al-Libiyya TV as well as two daily newspapers and a second satellite TV channel aimed at a young adult demographic. Al-Ghad newspapers covered al-Mishri's arrest and announced that al-Libiyya would relocate overseas with the help of an unnamed investor. End summary.

AL-LIBIYYA BROADCAST CUT MID-PROGRAM

¶2. (C) Management of the quasi-independent al-Libiyya satellite television channel changed abruptly on the evening of April 24 when the live broadcast of Ain Qurb ("Up Close") interview show was interrupted mid-way through the show and the station's signal was replaced by content from the state-run al-Jamahiriya channel. The show's host, Hala al-Misrati, was interviewing Revolutionary Committee member Mustafa Zaidi in a "Hardball-type" format when the feed was cut and state security officers entered the studio and started questioning her and others who were present. Station manager and deputy director of the al-Ghad Media Group Abdelsalam Mishri was reportedly detained on April 26 in conjunction with an investigation into the channel's activities. Al-Mishri's job was rumored to be in jeopardy for several months under suspicion of financial impropriety. Local press and observers, noting the timing and method of the station's shutdown, speculate that matters of programming content are more likely to blame. According to media contacts, Muammar al-Qadhafi visited the station headquarters earlier on the day of the shutdown.

¶3. (C) Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, launched al-Libiyya two years ago as part of his al-Ghad Media Group venture. While the group's assets feature more diverse programming and news coverage than the circumspect state-run outlets, they are rarely openly critical of the regime and adhere to the "red lines" delineated by Saif al-Islam. Al-Ghad retains one other satellite channel, al-Shabibiyya, and two daily newspapers, Oea (oealibya.com), and Quryna (quryna.com). Oea ran an interview with Ain Qurb host Hala al-Misrati on April 29 describing her interrupted interview with state officials. Al-Misrati downplayed the interruption of her program, saying the individuals who questioned her were not security officers and characterizing their questions as benign. She blamed differences of opinion between her guest, RevComm member Zaidi, and other RevComm members for the crisis and criticized the strictures placed on journalists in Libya by reactionary regime figures.

¶4. (C) The Saif-owned daily paper Quryna featured a front-page article on April 28 attributing al-Mishri's arrest and al-Libiyya's potential move to London to programming critical of Egypt's policies in Israel and Palestine. (Note: Al-Libiyya's closure came at the same time as Libya's Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa were leading a cabinet delegation to Cairo to discuss bilateral trade and security issues. End note.) Quryna also ran a cartoon showing a character representing the satellite channel getting off an airplane in London though remained mute on a partnership with a foreign investor announced by al-Ghad in a press release on April 25.

NEW MANAGEMENT AT AL-LIBIYYA AND AL-GHAD

¶5. (C) State press announced that al-Atti al-Mizughi took over as station manager of al-Libiyya and Mohamed Kilani as CEO in the wake of al-Misrati's dismissal. Both officials are from state-owned al-Jamahiriya's staff. In related news, opposition website Libya al-Youm reported that Salah Abdelsalam Salah was appointed director of al-Ghad Media Group. Salah also heads Saif al-Islam's Human Rights Committee under the Qadhafi

Development Foundation banner. He has facilitated visits to hospitalized regime critic Fathi al-Jahmi and personally escorted released critic Idriss Boufayed to his flight out of Libya.

TRIPOLI 00000359 002 OF 002

¶6. (C) Comment: The reasons for the government's aggressive move against al-Libiyya are unclear. One theory is that program content provoked the ire of Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi (by being too critical of his regime, and/or by angering Egypt). Another theory is that the Leader wanted to further reduce the power-base of his popular son Saif al-Islam in the lead-up to the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. After years as the heir apparent and champion of reform, Saif al-Islam has suffered a year of setbacks: government restructuring has been twice postponed; Libya's first constitution in 40 years remains in secret, draft form; his attempts to negotiate an end to the Swiss-Libyan contretemps failed; and a March 2 government reshuffle seems to have increased the influence of some who have complained about his calls for reform. His brother and chief rival for leadership, National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on the other hand, recently completed a highly-publicized visit to Washington and appears to be taking on a larger role in Libya's security, intelligence, and foreign policy spheres. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI361

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI361 aka Wikileaks id #205028 ?
Subject	LIBYA WILL NOT OPPOSE LETTERS TO IRAN, SYRIA; WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE NOTE VERBALE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 30 Apr 2009 16:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/04/09TRIPOLI361.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3629
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0361 1201642
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 301642Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4777
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0180
RUEHNC/AMEMBASSY NICOSIA 0005
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5307
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000361

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR IO/PSC (HVONBEHREN) AND NEA/MAG (AJOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , IR *[Iran]* , CY *[Cyprus]* , SY *[Syria]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA WILL NOT OPPOSE LETTERS TO IRAN, SYRIA; WILL CONTINUE TO OPPOSE NOTE VERBALE

REF: STATE 43057

¶1. (SBU) Ambassador, after coordinating with the French ambassador (UK COM was out with Tony Blair all day), raised reftel points with Mohammed Siala, Secretary for Arab Affairs of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) on April 30. Siala told the Ambassador that he was running the International Organizations branch of MFA while FM Musa Kusa was in Doha and IO Director Mahdi al-Majrabi was in Cuba, but that he was not familiar with the Monchegorsk incident. After studying the points provided by Ambassador and consulting with colleagues over P-3 demarche, Siala informed the Ambassador that Libya would not oppose sending letters to both Syria and Iran. The GOL will continue to oppose issuing a Note Verbale to all UN Member states, however, citing both lack of precedent and that there were "quieter ways" to send the same message. Siala said this position had been conveyed to UNPermrep Shalgham.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI362

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI362 aka Wikileaks id #205238 ?
Subject	MUSA KUSA SEEKS COOPERATION ON AFRICA, AL-QAEDA -- AND POTUS MEETING WITH AL-QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 3 May 2009 06:43 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI362.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI363
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4966
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0362/01 1230643
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 030643Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4778
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1047
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0731
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5308
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000362

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/2/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , SU *[Sudan]* , CD *[Chad]*
SUBJECT: MUSA KUSA SEEKS COOPERATION ON AFRICA, AL-QAEDA -- AND POTUS MEETING WITH AL-QADHAFI

TRIPOLI 00000362 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told the Ambassador on May 2 that the GOL wanted to develop US-Libyan relations further through increased bilateral visits and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, including Darfur and al-Qaeda. Kusa proposed that Muammar al-Qadhafi and POTUS meet in Italy during the G-8. The Ambassador reaffirmed the US interest in improving relations with Libya, and said he would convey the G-8 meeting request to Washington. The Ambassador urged Kusa to support the US proposal to construct an Embassy in Tripoli. In a subsequent

one-on-one meeting, the Ambassador pressed for the release of detained human rights activist Fathi al-Jahmi, noting that the issue was of paramount importance to the United States. Kusa did not/not raise the issue of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbassit al-Megrahi or the GOL's anticipated request for his return to Libya under the recently ratified Libyan-UK Prisoner Transfer Agreement. End summary.

¶2. (C) FM Musa Kusa convoked the Ambassador on May 2 for their first meeting since Kusa was appointed Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation in March (Foreign Minister-equivalent). Ambassador was accompanied by DCM; MFA Americas Desk Director Mohamed Matari and a notetaker were also present. Kusa began by noting the positive direction of US-Libyan relations and saying that the GOL wanted to develop the bilateral relationship further through high-level visits, including by congressional delegations. Such visits would help introduce key Americans to Libya and were essential, as Libya lacked an effective lobby in Washington.

Sudan-Chad Reconciliation Key to Solving Darfur

¶3. (C) Turning to specific areas of potential cooperation, Kusa, who had recently returned from Darfur-related meetings in Doha, outlined Libyan policy with respect to Darfur. In the GOL's view, achieving reconciliation between Sudan and Chad was the key to solving the Darfur conflict. Libya was working closely with the Qataris on this. Kusa said he had had good meetings in Doha with SE Gration, and supported the US efforts to achieve a Darfur ceasefire, although this would be difficult to achieve without "calming" tensions between Sudan and Chad. Those two governments continued to level accusations against each other, and it was difficult for outsiders to judge their accuracy. In the GOL's view, further agreements between Chad and Sudan were of no use; the focus should be on establishing a third-party border monitoring mechanism, similar to the one that Libya had previously participated in. Neutral third-party monitors would be in a position to judge, for example, whether JEM's Khalil Ibrahim was receiving weapons from Chad. (Kusa said he had met with a number of Darfur faction leaders while in Doha, but only JEM's Khalil Ibrahim had strength and influence, thanks to Ibrahim's tribal, political and personal connections in Sudan.) Kusa said that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally supported the border monitoring initiative and that he, Kusa, had requested US support through SE Gration. Asked by the Ambassador what type of support Libya sought, Kusa said the GOL sought US partnership in this effort, and would convey more specific requests later.

Al-Qaeda Expanding in Africa

¶4. (C) Another priority issue for US-Libyan engagement, Kusa said, was combating al-Qaeda in the Saharan and Maghreb regions. While the US focused on the Taliban, al-Qaeda was expanding its influence in the Saharan belt and north Africa. There had been 8 kidnappings in the past six months, including the two Canadian officials who were recently released in return for a ransom payment. Such payments were unfortunate and only increased the strength of al-Qaeda, he said. While many governments talked about cooperating with Libya in combating terrorists in the region, only the US was seriously engaged. He said he hoped bilateral cooperation would increase, to which the Ambassador responded urging the GOL to participate in the Trans-Sahara Counter-terrorism Initiative, noting that it would increase opportunities for Libyan engagement with the United States in this area. It would also be useful for the GOL to invite General Ward, head of the US Africa Command, to return to Libya for a visit (that invitation has now been conveyed).

Qadhafi and POTUS in Italy?

¶5. (C) The US and Libya should also confer on the policies of "other governments" that are trying to "influence events on the

[African] continent," Kusa continued (in a possible reference to China). The upcoming G-8 summit in Italy would be an appropriate venue for "high-level discussions" between Libya and the US on these subjects. Kusa said he was personally committed to improving relations between our two governments. Noting the importance in Libyan culture of personal relationships to building trust, Kusa said he hoped the State Department could

TRIPOLI 00000362 002.2 OF 002

arrange a meeting between Muammar al-Qadhafi and President Obama at the summit. The Ambassador said the US was committed to improving the relationship, as Libyan National Security Adviser Mutassim al-Qadhafi had heard from several senior USG officials during his recent visit in Washington, and that he would convey the request to Washington. As a concrete symbol of Libyan commitment to the relationship, the Ambassador urged Kusa to support the US proposal to purchase land to build a new Embassy, reminding him that the Secretary had personally made this request to Mutassim al-Qadhafi, and assuring him that the Embassy's design would take into account the Libyan environment and culture.

Human Rights: Al-Jahmi

¶6. (C) In a subsequent one-one-one meeting, the Ambassador pressed Kusa for the release of detained regime critic Fathi al-Jahmi, either to his home or abroad, emphasizing that the issue continued to be of great concern to the United States. Noting al-Jahmi's apparently deteriorating physical condition which made action all the more critical, the Ambassador said that in his view, al-Jahmi's death in custody could lead to a setback in the bilateral relationship. Kusa said it was unfortunate that the USG had publicized the issue during Mutassim al-Qadhafi's visit, and that such publicity only caused the Leader to become more inflexible. The Ambassador told Kusa to focus on the fact that the White House did not publicize the raising of the issue by NSA Jones with Mutassim and that USG officials, in raising the issue several times during the past several weeks in Tripoli and Washington, had made every effort to keep discussions regarding al-Jahmi's release private. Kusa said he understood the importance of the issue to the US, said he would "do his best," and suggested that al-Jahmi might be released after a meeting between the Leader and POTUS. The Ambassador strongly reiterated that the GOL should not wait any longer to release al-Jahmi, given the precarious condition of his health.

Comment

¶7. (C) Comment: Kusa is one of the most influential figures in the regime, and has been a proponent of improved ties with the United States. In his previous role as head of Libya's External Intelligence Organization, he was a key member of the Libyan team that negotiated the restoration of diplomatic relations with the United States and Europe (including the leadership's decisions to renounce terrorism and relinquish WMD), and he subsequently supported robust bilateral cooperation in combating al-Qaeda and stemming the flow of foreign fighters heading to Iraq. In his new role as foreign minister, he apparently will continue to advocate for strengthening relations with the US, focusing on areas of clear mutual interest such as Darfur and al-Qaeda. Securing a meeting for Muammar al-Qadhafi with the President is probably at the top of his list, given the importance al-Qadhafi places on such encounters. Interestingly, Kusa did not/not raise the matter of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbassit al-Megrahi or the GOL's anticipated request that he be returned to Libya under the recently-ratified Prisoner Transfer Agreement with the UK. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Ransom paid for Canadian diplomats, leaked cable suggests - The Globe and Mail
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI363

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI363 aka Wikileaks id #205254 ?
Subject	SLA/U CAN NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH ASSURANCES THAT JEM AND KHARTOUM WILL ALSO LAY DOWN ARMS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 3 May 2009 15:58 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI363.html
References	09DOHA283 , 09KHARTOUM583 , 09TRIPOLI249 , 09TRIPOLI362
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5051
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0363/01 1231558
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 031558Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4780
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0167
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0027
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1049
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0733
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5310
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000363

SIPDIS

NDJAMENA PLEASE PASS TO SE GRATION, DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/3/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] ,
SU [Sudan] , CD [Chad] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SLA/U CAN NEGOTIATE ONLY WITH ASSURANCES THAT JEM AND
KHARTOUM WILL ALSO LAY DOWN ARMS

REF: A. TRIPOLI 249
     B. KHARTOUM 583
     C. DOHA 283
     D. TRIPOLI 362

TRIPOLI 00000363  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: Sudan Liberation Army Unity Faction (SLA/U)
representatives back from Doha are keen to know how the USG
regards rival factions - particularly Khalil Ibrahim's Justice
and Equality Movement (JEM) - as they re-evaluate their strategy
```

after a month of setbacks. With the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" unification process quickly disbanded due to defections to the JEM, rebel leaders are casting Suliman Jamous' switch as a positive - claiming that "Khalil's best spy" was now exposed and Abdullah Yehia once again had the undisputed leadership of SLA/U. Unity representatives said they are willing to talk peace, but cautioned that if JEM continued attacking Yehia's positions as they did on April 27, SLA/U would be forced to counterattack JEM's positions in Um Jalis, Chad. The rebel leaders are eager to discern the diplomatic states of play - both in the Libya/Chad/Sudan tri-lateral talks and the U.S. role in Doha-based mediation - before committing to the peace process. End summary.

CHAD'S SUPPORT FOR JEM AND RECENT DEFECTIONS CAUSE ANXIETY

¶2. (C) In a May 3 meeting with Poloff, SLA/U representatives Sayyid Sharif and Mahgoub Hussein said they could accept further negotiations toward a cease fire in Doha only with assurances that all parties brought to the table would be held to the same standard. Sharif and Hussein were particularly concerned that they were being boxed in "from every direction" - citing Sudan's support of the Janjaweed militias and calling JEM's Khalil Ibrahim "the Chadian Minister of Defense." Both representatives agreed that the April 27-29 meetings in Doha were positive steps, but that attacks carried out against SLA/U positions by JEM-affiliated fighters on April 27 complicated an inclusive ceasefire between the SLA and both the GOS and other rebel factions.

¶3. (C) Hussein confirmed JEM's April 3 announcement that former SLA High Command member Suliman Jamous had joined up with Khalil Ibrahim but claimed Jamous took with him only 15-20 "family members" and four trucks. SLA/U representatives here have frequently complained about Jamous' attempts to cloud the leadership issue, asserting that Abdullah Yehia had a mandate from civil society. Hussein noted that Jamous and Ibrahim have a long-standing relationship. He claimed that Jamous had been accepting cash from Ibrahim since the former's release from prison and that his leaving JEM would benefit SLA/U in the long run as JEM had lost "Khalil's best spy". Despite earlier comments that the March 15 "Charter of Tripoli" had made them significantly stronger (ref A), Hussein discounted the defections of Jamous and the SLA/Juba faction as minor and "personal" - noting that while high-profile members had switched their fighters had stayed with Yehia..

JEM IS TRYING TO DESTROY YEHIA TO BECOME NEW RULER OF SUDAN

¶4. (C) The SLA/U officials also confirmed that JEM had attacked SLA/U positions an Um Rai (ref B) with "53 trucks and several hundred fighters," which were repelled by an SLA/U force consisting of just six trucks. Abdallah Yehia was at Um Rai and participated in the five-hour battle, in which nine SLA/U fighters were wounded and JEM lost six killed in action. While SLA/U still sees political solutions and peace talks in Doha as possibly productive, both warned that if JEM attacked SLA/U again, they would have no option but to attack his base camp at Um Jalis, Chad. Hussein encouraged the USG to rebuke JEM for its continued fighting and for Ibrahim's attempts to become the "new Turabi of Sudan".

SLA/U CLAIMS TO BE ONLY GROUP WITHOUT SPONSOR

¶5. (C) Holding out Chadian support for JEM and Sudanese support for janjaweed militias, Sharif claimed that SLA/U was the only rebel faction not participating in the proxy war between Chad and Sudan. According to Sharif, JEM receives, "guns, ammunition, petrol, everything" from its sponsors in N'Djamena. When asked where SLA/U got their supplies, he said their fighters capture enough of what they need as the spoils of battle. He was eager to hear if we knew the outcome of Libya's

ongoing efforts to reconcile Chad and Sudan and stand up a peacekeeping force on the border. Hussein expected to meet with Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa on May 4 or 5, and said that SLA/U had not yet received an invitation for follow-on talks in Doha planned for the same timeframe.

TRIPOLI 00000363 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) Comment: After a month of setbacks, both representatives sought explicit statements of USG support - calling immediately after returning to Tripoli on April 30 to set up the meeting. They seemed somewhat unconvinced of their own spin about the unimportance of Jamous' defection and the disintegration of the March 15 unity talks in Tripoli - which they had previously told us was a substantial increase in their military strength. Their advice-seeking seems genuine; it appears as though they are approaching talks in Doha as a question of survival of their movement in the face of JEM's ascendancy and renewed attacks on their leadership. Encouraging them to burnish their democratic and diplomatic credentials and desire to develop Darfur to serve its people by participating in Doha talks in good faith will succeed only if they feel that Chad, Sudan, and the JEM will be held to the same standard. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI364

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI364 aka Wikileaks id #205320 ?
Subject	LIBYAN DELEGATION INFORMATION FOR JUNE GICNT PLENARY AT THE HAGUE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 4 May 2009 10:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI364.html
References	09STATE35549
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5414
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0364 1241042
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041042Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4782
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0086
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5312
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000364

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ISN/WMDT AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , NL *[Netherlands]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , KGIC *[Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN DELEGATION INFORMATION FOR JUNE GICNT PLENARY AT THE HAGUE

REF: A. STATE 35549
B. TRIPOLI 313

¶1. Post received a diplomatic note on April 28 informing the Embassy of the GOL's participation in the 5th Plenary Meeting (2009 Plenary Meeting) of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) at The Hague, Netherlands on June 16-17, 2009. Attendees will be:

-- Mahdi Salah El-Mijbri, head of delegation, Director, International Organizations Department, MFA.

-- Tajuri Sharadi Tajuri, head of the International Security and Disarmament Department, MFA.

-- Sihem Youssef Shammakhi, International Organizations Department, MFA.

-- A delegate from the Atomic Energy Board, TBD.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI365

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI365 aka Wikileaks id #205376 ?
Subject	LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR APRIL 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 4 May 2009 14:02 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI365.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5620
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0365/01 1241402
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 041402Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4783
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1461
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0810
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0933
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0874
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5313
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000365

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON, (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND CLDP (TEJTEL AND

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA COMMERCIAL ROUND-UP FOR APRIL 2009

ENERGY

¶1. (U) ExxonMobil Set to Prequalify Firms for Libyan Seismic Work: ExxonMobil Libya will prequalify contractors for a 2D seismic data acquisition and onboard processing services program offshore Libya. The data acquisition will begin in the fourth quarter of 2009. [MEED, 4/1/2009]

¶2. (U) IPS Signs Contract with Waha in Libya: Invensys Process Systems (IPS), a global technology, software and consulting firm, signed a contract with Waha Oil Company (company owned by Libya's National Oil Corporation in a joint venture with ConocoPhillips, Marathon and Amerada Hess) to provide

comprehensive automation upgrades at the company's oil fields. These services and solutions will enable Waha Oil to increase production, as well as grant access to centralized, real-time information that will reduce operating and production costs. IPS is the leading automation company in Libya. [Exploration & Production Magazine, 4/1/2009]

¶3. (U) China's CNPC Eyeing Petro-Canada Assets: Top Chinese oil firm China National Petroleum Corporation announced its interest in purchasing $5 billion of assets held by Petro-Canada in Syria and Libya. Canadian companies Petro-Canada and Suncor Energy are in the process of merging and any discussions regarding the future plans of Petro-Canada and Suncor will have to wait until the merger is completed. Despite the financial crisis, Chinese state-backed oil giants are aggressively scouring Africa and South America for energy assets to secure supplies and power economic growth at home. [Reuters, 4/6/2009]

¶4. (U) Repsol and OMV Make Discovery Offshore Libya: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that Spain's Repsol and Austria's OMV have made their first discovery offshore Libya on Block NC-202. The NC-202 block was awarded in November 2003, and is operated by Repsol, which holds a 21% interest, the NOC holds 65% interest, and Austrian OMV holds the remaining 14% working interest. [PetroleumAfrica.com, 4/11/2009]

¶5. (U) Algeria's Sonatrach Finds Oil in Libya's Ghadames Region: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) announced that a hydrocarbon discovery was made by the SIPEX Libyan branch, (Sonatrach in Libya) at an exploratory well onshore in the Ghadames basin, 230 kilometers south of Tripoli. Sonatrach acquired the block in 2005 and holds a 25% stake, while the NOC holds the remaining 75% stake. [www.noclibya.com.ly, 4/13/2009]

¶6. (U) Libyan Fuel Distributor Plans to Enter Tunisia: Planning Director of al-Rahila, second fuel distributor in Libya, announced the company's plan to establish in Tunisia. The access to the Tunisian market is one of al-Rahila five-year plan. Two possibilities are on the agenda, the first is to find a strategic partner running already gas stations in Tunisia or building its own filling stations network. [African Manager, 4/15/2009]

¶7. (U) Libya Smart Energy City Project Signed: A $ 5 billion dollar contract to build a smart energy city west of Tripoli was signed between Libyan al-Niqat Al-Khams Company for Investment and Tourism Development, one of the companies affiliated with the Economic and Social Development Fund, and Gulf Funding House, one of the financial institutions in Bahrain and the Arab Gulf. Implementation of the project will start immediately. The project will be implemented jointly; the Libyan company will contribute 40% and the Gulf Funding House 60%. The city will accommodate offices for oil and gas, shipping, trade and media companies. The project will also include a tourist resort and recreational spaces, residential compounds, and a marina. [Libya Alyoum, 4/25/2009]

¶8. (U) Occidental Increases Regional Oil Production Despite Decreasing Production in Libya: American Occidental Petroleum increased its oil production in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) by 5 per cent during the first quarter of 2009. In its earnings release, Occidental said it produced 142,000 barrels a day (b/d) in the MENA region in the first quarter of 2009, compared with 135,000 b/d in the same period of 2008. Occidental's oil production in Oman rose 70 per cent; however, its production in Libya fell 63 per cent to just 8,000 barrels a day. [MEED, 4/26/2009]

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (U) 7th Round Of Joint Libyan -Tunisian Consular Committee: After the 7th round of Joint Libyan -Tunisian Consular Committee talks, a minute was signed by the Director of Consular Affairs

talks, a minute was signed by the Director of Consular Affairs

Department at General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation and the Director General of Consular Affairs at the Tunisian Foreign Affairs Ministry. The minute provides consular cooperation support between the two countries in areas covering, customs, workforce and social security as well as cooperation in security, judicial, fishing, travel and residence fields for citizens of both countries. The next round of the joint committee will be in 2010 in Libya. [Libyaonline.com, 4/4/2009]

¶10. (U) Libya Donates $1.4 Million Dollars Worth in Livestock Equipment to Mali: Libya has donated equipment, worth $1.4 million dollars, for the promotion of livestock, to Mali. The donation represents the second part of Libya's material support for Mali's annual live stock vaccination campaign for 2008-2009. The first batch of the equipment was given in late 2008 during the visit of a Libyan government delegation to Mali. [Afrique En Ligne, 4/7/2009]

¶11. (U) Libya Donates Ten Tractors to Sierra Leone to Support Sierra Leone Food Security Program: Ten tractors have been handed over to the Sierra Leone Government by the Libyan Ambassador to Sierra Leone. Libya intends to assists Sierra Leone in its food security program. The program initially provides 5,000 acres for rice cultivation. In addition to the tractors, the Libyan Government has provided 10 technicians and operators for the farmlands; the aid package also includes maintenance services and the provision of fuel and lubricants for the tractors. [Libyaninvestment.com, 4/24/2009]

TRADE

¶12. (U) 38th Round of Tripoli International Fair Held in Tripoli: 38th Round of Tripoli International Fair was held in Tripoli from April 2 - 12. 39 countries including Belorussia, France, India, Iran, Palestine, Syria, Turkey, Italy, Austria, Spain and Greece participated in the fair. [libyaonline.com, 4/4/2009]

¶13. (U) Libyan Fair Authority Sings MOU with Milano Expo 2015: The Libyan Fairs Authority signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with MilanoExpo 2015 Ltd., and the Italian Institute of Foreign Trade whereby the two parties agreed on forging cooperation between MilanoExpo 2015 and Tripoli International Fair. Libyan companies will be provided an opportunity to participate with their goods and services in MilanoExpo 2015. The MOU includes the provision of assistance to Libyans interested in participating. [Tripoli Post, 4/4/2009]

BILATERAL ISSUES

¶14. (U) Libya, Portugal Review Cooperation as International Trade Fair Opens: The Portuguese Economy and Finance minister visited Libya during the 38th Tripoli International Trade Fair, and discussed with Libyan officials means to develop economic cooperation in the fields of civil works, infrastructure and renewable energy through the establishment of joint investment projects between Libya and Portugal. [africanmanager.com, 4/4/2009]

¶15. (U) Bilateral Cooperation between Tripoli and Belorussia: A Memorandum of Understanding was signed between Libya and Belarus on the development of economic cooperation and trade between the two countries. Under the Memorandum, the countriess will support bilateral cooperation in the fields of investment, industry, oil and chemicals, planning and construction, infrastructure, urban development, transportation, health and production of medicines, food industries and scientific research. Direct flights between

Tripoli and Minsk and the facilitation of procedures for obtaining visas for nationals of both countries are also part of the agreement. [Oea, 4/6/2009]

¶16. (U) Turkish Minister Visits Libya for Business Talks: A 50-member delegation including businessmen from the sectors of construction and furniture accompanied Turkish State Minister during an official visit to Libya. The Minister held talks with Libyan officials as an effort to create new business opportunities for Turkey and to improve economic and commercial relations between the two countries. [world bulletin, 4/22/2009]

INVESTMENT

¶17. (U) Benghazi Business Incubator Launched: The Benghazi Business Incubator program comes as part of Libya's plan to diversify the economy, supporting small and medium enterprises development and promotion. The opening was attended by

TRIPOLI 00000365 003 OF 003

representatives of different economic sectors in the region. After Tripoli and Benghazi, a third business incubator program is planned for Sebha, southern Libya. [Tripoli Post, 4/11/2009]

¶18. (U) The Libyan Stock Exchange Regulated a Specialized Course in Securities Investment: In the context of promoting culture of investment in the financial markets, a session of specialized training programs in how to invest in the stock markets with the public and private companies as well as natural persons was held in Tripoli. The session included a comprehensive training program on financial markets, stock companies and the role of intermediaries in the implementation of the sale and purchase. [libyaonline.com, 4/13/2009]

¶19. (U) Opening of Libyan Center for Information of Credit: Libya Central Bank announced the establishment of the Libyan center for information of credit as the first credit office for the reformation and development of the banking sector in Libya. The Libyan center for information of credit started its services to the banks on April 15 through its website: www.lcic.ly.com. The center aims at collecting and documenting the personal and credit information of financial borrowers, providing the banks with detailed credit reports; this information will improve the banks abilities to evaluate the risks of credit. [Libyaonline.com, 4/9/2009]

IT

¶20. (U) Contract to Provide Optical Fiber Services in Libya: Libya Telecommunication and Technology (LTT) and the Chinese company Huawei Technologies Co. signed a contract to implement optical fiber technology in Tripoli. Initially 800 houses on the airport highway will be connected and then the network coverage will be expanded to other districts. LTT expects to provide more stable and more advanced broadband services. [Libyaninvestment.com, 4/9/2009]

¶21. (U) Microsoft Opens an Office in Tripoli: Microsoft Company opened its new headquarters in Tripoli and appointed a Libyan distributor for its programs as a start in the Libyan market. Representatives from Microsoft announced the company's intention to establish a long-term cooperation and relationship with its partners in Libya. [Libyaninvestment.com, 4/12/2009]

AVIATION

¶22. (U) Afriqiyah Airways Achieved "ISO" Certificate and Signed Contracts for New Planes: Afriqiyah Airways Company achieved the "ISO" certificate of IATA. Also, Afriqiyah Airways Company signed a contract with Airbus Company to purchase 23 planes

including, 11 Airbus planes A320, 6 Airbus planes A350, 3 Airbus planes A319 and 3 Airbus planes A330. Afriqiyah Airways Company announced that it will start direct flights to: Johannesburg, Manila, Beijing, Guangzhou and Parsifal. [libyaonline.com, 4/12/2009]

¶23. (U) Biman Bangladesh Airlines to Launch Flight to Libya: Biman Bangladesh Airlines announced the beginning of two new international routes. The Bangladeshi airline will start flights to Libya and China -two of the country's fastest-growing trade partners- next month as it sees a potential increase of air traffic on the routes. Biman will operate bi-weekly flights to Tripoli and Guangzhou starting in May. Demand for air travel between Dhaka and Tripoli has peaked since the Libyan government announced it will hire more than 500,000 Bangladesh workers in the construction sector. Currently, Biman travels to 18 countries around the world. [Financial Express, 4/25/2009]

MEDICAL

¶24. (U) iSOFT Secures Contract with Leading Libyan Hospital: IBA Health Group's Middle East and African iSOFT divisions have secured a two-year $100 dollars deal with al-Khadra Hospital, to deploy iSOFT's hospital information system and laboratory information system at the hospital. iSOFT has collaborated with Alshada Pharmaceutical & Medical Equipment in Tripoli, to install its system through a two-phased implementation process at the hospital. [HealthNEWS.Direct, 4/42009]
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI366

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI366 aka Wikileaks id #205487 ?
Subject	EAC ON PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC FLU OUTBREAK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 5 May 2009 09:35 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI366.html
References	09STATE43249 , 09STATE6306
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
P 050935Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4786
INFO AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMCONSUL FRANKFURT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000366

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AMGT *[Management Operations]* , AMED *[Medical Services]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , TBIO *[Biological and Medical Science]* , KFLU *[Avian and Pandemic Influenza Activities]*
SUBJECT: EAC ON PREPAREDNESS FOR PANDEMIC FLU OUTBREAK

REF: A. A. STATE 006306
B. B. STATE 043249

¶1. The Emergency Action Committee (EAC) convened on April 30, 2009, chaired by the Chief of Mission. The following attended the meeting: Deputy Chief of Mission, Regional Security Officer, Regional Affairs Officer, Defense Attachi, Community Liaison Officer, Medical Officer, Consul, Commercial Services Officer, Public Affairs Officer, and Political Officer. The committee reviewed Department guidance (reftel A) and took stock of post's preparedness for a pandemic as well as the Libyan government's response to the H1N1 virus situation.

¶2. There are no reported cases of H1N1 influenza in Libya to date. According to media reports, the Government of Libya convened a working group to monitor the potential pandemic influenza situation and the group plans to meet on a weekly basis. Officials at Tripoli's international airport have begun screening passengers. People travelling from countries with confirmed cases of H1N1 are screened for elevated temperatures

and questioned about travel and contact histories. Post medical contacts report that the Government of Libya has placed an order for 100,000 courses of Tamiflu. The Health Unit has a stock of Tamiflu and expects a supplemental shipment shortly. Post also has an adequate supply of personal protective equipment. Post expects H1N1 diagnostic kits in the near future. The Embassy community has received information on personal hygiene and H1N1 influenza. Post management has confirmed the availability of adequate emergency supplies of food and water. Major airlines serving Tripoli confirm the availability of seats with 24-48 hours notice and ten days to charter an entire aircraft.

¶3. The consular section has received few inquiries from the community about H1N1. On the EAC's recommendation, the consular section issued a warden message using the Department-recommended template (reftel B) and adding additional information about Libyan government actions to date. One visa recipient reportedly cancelled his travel to the United States over fears about the illness.

¶4. The EAC continues to monitor the situation and plans to reconvene if the situation warrants. In addition, EAC members continue to review tripwires at post and will make changes as necessary.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI37

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI37 aka Wikileaks id #188085 ?
Subject	UGANDA: QADHAFI'S CROWN TARNISHED IN COUNCIL OF KINGS CANCELLATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 21 Jan 2009 14:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI37.html
References	09FREETOWN5
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI134 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1552
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0037 0211445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 211445Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4336
INFO RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0008
RUEHFN/AMEMBASSY FREETOWN 0004
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4859
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000037

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/15/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU *[Austria]* , LY *[Libya]* , UG *[Uganda]*
SUBJECT: UGANDA: QADHAFI'S CROWN TARNISHED IN COUNCIL OF KINGS CANCELLATION

REF: FREETOWN 005

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi's campaign to create a "United States of Africa" under his leadership was dealt another blow last week by Uganda's decision to cancel a meeting between al-Qadhafi and an estimated 200 African tribal leaders that was to have taken place in Kampala. Press reports indicate that the the Ugandan government cancelled the meeting on constitutional grounds, saying that traditional leaders are banned from participating in political debate.

¶2. (C) The aborted meeting in Kamapala would have followed al-Qadhafi's August 2008 convocation of a council of African tribal kings to Benghazi to attend the annual celebration of

"Revolution Day." At that event, the kings anointed al-Qadhafi "King of Kings" and presented him with a golden crown and scepter. Local observers interpreted al-Qadhafi's convocation of the African kings as an attempt to create additional, bottom-up political pressure on African governments to support his dream of a united Africa. A visiting king was quoted in Libyan state-owned press as saying, " ... the people believe in the chiefs and kings more than they believe in their governments".

¶3. (C) Comment: While most Libyan officials take a more pragmatic approach to African unity, al-Qadhafi remains convinced of his popularity and, at least for purposes of public consumption, of the viability of a united political, economic, and defense union on the continent. His enthusiasm for the project backfires as often as not, as seen on a recent trip to West Africa (reftel). This year is particularly meaningful for al-Qadhafi: 2009 is the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought him to power and the 10th anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation at which the modern African Union was announced. With Libya angling for the AU presidency and veteran Libyan diplomat and Africa point-man Ali Treiki looking forward to a tour as the President of the UN General Assembly, a continued push for African unity by al-Qadhafi - to include traditional consultations with other African leaders and less conventional vehicles like the council of tribal leaders - will continue. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI371

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI371 aka Wikileaks id #205780 ?
Subject	ENCOURAGING CEN-SAD TO COOPERATE WITH TSCTP AND AFRICOM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 6 May 2009 15:32 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI371.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7862
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHTRO #0371/01 1261532
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 061532Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4791
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1465
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0815
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0938
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0878
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0169
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0157
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5321
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000371

SIPDIS

AFRICOM FOR POLAD, DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/6/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: ENCOURAGING CEN-SAD TO COOPERATE WITH TSCTP AND AFRICOM

TRIPOLI 00000371 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Secretary-General Mohammed al-Madani views the deepening relationship between the U.S. and Libya as a positive sign that his organization can benefit from increased cooperation with the USG on development, political, security, and cultural issues. Playing off Muatassim al-Qadhafi's recent assertion that Libya did not need to join the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) because it duplicated CEN-SAD's efforts, the

Ambassador encouraged al-Madani to re-examine the benefits of TSCTP and to develop a relationship with U.S. Africa Command to coordinate on regional security issues. Al-Madani responded that all member states would welcome training and intelligence sharing with the U.S., but that a strong "boots on the ground" presence would be unwelcome and encourage terrorist cells in the Sahara to strike U.S. and member-state interests in the region. End Summary.

AMBASSADOR PROMOTES TSCTP AS CONGRUENT WITH CEN-SAD MISSION

¶2. (C) In a May 5 courtesy call with CEN-SAD Secretary-General Mohammed al-Madani, the Ambassador urged a re-examination of Libya's participation in TSCTP. While Muatassim al-Qadhafi had stated to USG officials during his recent trip to Washington that Libya did not need a regional security partnership like TSCTP because of its CEN-SAD membership, Libyan participation in TSCTP would enhance CEN-SAD's capacity to provide regional security and counter-terrorism training and joint exercises. The Ambassador encouraged al-Madani to develop relationships with U.S. Africa Command's leadership, especially given the new administration's renewed focus on the continent. Al-Madani responded by saying that Libya "always prefers cooperation with our friends in the USA" and said U.S. support was critical to ensure that CEN-SAD governments could confront militants in their territory. While acknowledging that U.S. training was a key part of capacity building, he cautioned that American "boots on the ground" would be unwelcome by member states who valued their sovereignty, and that terrorist organizations would use any U.S. presence as a pretext to attack government installations. The Ambassador assured him that the embassy and AFRICOM were aware of the sensitivities and prepared to work with Libya to ensure "red lines" were not crossed. However, at the same time, it was unrealistic to think that an American presence could be entirely invisible if we were to engage in training and other activities.

¶3. (C) Al-Madani noted that the CEN-SAD region faced crises including terrorist networks operating in northern Mali, southern Algeria, and Mauritania. The ongoing proxy-war in Chad and Sudan left a "vacuum" of power cutting through the middle of the CEN-SAD area that could destabilize all of the neighboring states. He noted that terrorists have settled into the Sahara region and highlighted their marriages to local women as a sign that they feel no pressure to leave. His organization has responded by increasing the number of high-level fora for political, military, and intelligence leaders. He told the Ambassador that CEN-SAD would hold a forum for intelligence service directors sometime in May and that he planned to invite security officers from the U.S., the UK and Spain in an observer capacity. In turn, the Ambassador invited al-Madani to send a representative to an NDU-sponsored seminar in Dakar in June.

CHAD-SUDAN CONFLICT EXACERBATED BY KHARTOUM'S UNWILLINGNESS TO TALK

¶4. (C) Discussing the Chad-Sudan conflict, al-Madani said the situation is made more complex because the GOS leadership had no serious intention of finding a political solution with the GOC. Instead, the GOS has decided that Deby should be toppled; the GOS had no intention to observe or enforce the Doha Accord. Describing Chad as key to resolving the crisis in Darfur, he said that Libya would not let "regime change by force stand [in Chad]" and cautioned that the GOS must not play "both covert and overt roles" by fighting and talking peace at the same time. While not absolving rebel groups of responsibility, he cited the GOS' attempts to splinter and marginalize the rebels as a sign that Khartoum had no intention of meeting the rebels' "uncomplicated" demands.

¶5. (C) Comment and bio note: Mohammed al-Madani has been Secretary-General of CEN-SAD since its founding in 1998 by Libya. Muammar al-Qadhafi has described the organization as

Libya. Muammar al Qadhafi has described the organization as "the base on which the African pyramid will be built" and member-state diplomats have described it as a vehicle for Libya

TRIPOLI 00000371 002.2 OF 002

to broaden its foreign policy reach. Al-Madani previously served as Libya's ambassador to Burkina Faso and Mali and as Deputy Foreign Minister under Abdulati Obeidi. The tenor of his statements made him seem much more like a representative of the Libyan government than the executive of a 28-member regional organization. He studied law in France, but did not practice. Before joining the diplomatic corps, he served as an official in Libya's student union as the officer responsible for the union's foreign affairs. He spoke some English and seemed to understand it well, though he used an interpreter. End comment and bio note.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI386

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI386 aka Wikileaks id #206398 ?
Subject	HEAD OF LIBYAN "THINK TANK" OUTLINES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 11 May 2009 14:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI386.html
References	08TRIPOLI917
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI764
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1168
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0386/01 1311418
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111418Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4810
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5340
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000386

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS; CAIRO FOR ALEX SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/7/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]*
SUBJECT: HEAD OF LIBYAN "THINK TANK" OUTLINES HUMAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 917

TRIPOLI 00000386 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: J. Chris Stevens, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Mahmoud Jibril, Chair of the National Economic Development Board and the former head of the National Planning Council, discussed strategies for developing Libya's human resources in a recent meeting with the Ambassador. Jibril

resources in a recent meeting with the Ambassador. Jibril highlighted the need to replace the country's decrepit infrastructure and train Libyans to maintain and run their new airports, schools and hospitals. Jibril welcomed American companies, universities and hospitals to participate in this endeavor. End summary.

LIBYA'S "THINK TANK" TACKLES PROJECT PLANNING AFTER THE FACT

¶2. (C) The Ambassador discussed Libya's human development strategy in a May 6 courtesy call on Mahmoud Jibril, Chair of the National Economic Development Board (NEDB), an organization that Jibril likened to a "think tank" of multi-disciplinary experts. Before the March 2009 cabinet shuffle, Jibril was simultaneously in charge of the NEDB and the National Planning Council, but now he directs only the NEDB. He reports directly to the prime minister. A U.S.-educated PhD in strategic planning, Jibril touched on familiar themes, such as Libya's need to diversify its economy away from oil (reftel), but he also fleshed out how Libya is tracking 11,000 development projects.

¶3. (C) According to Jibril, there are 11,000 development projects in Libya spanning several sectors, with the bulk of projects focusing on infrastructure. The NEDB's role in these projects is to "pave the way" for private sector development, and to create a strategic partnership between private companies and the government. There is a still a "gap of distrust" dividing the two. As to whether Libya has a Master Plan that includes all the 11,000 projects, Jibril admitted that in the past two years, Libya had started executing projects without such a plan. However, the NEDB has been working with experts from Ernst and Young, the Oxford Group, and lately with five consultants from UNDP to advise the prime minister on the best sequencing and pacing of the projects in order to decrease poverty and unemployment. He explained they were developing a "mapping room" to show all the projects, in a similar way to how a navy tracks its submarines all over the world. This "room" will use econometric models to demonstrate the results of different plans. The NEDB also plans to publish an assessment of the projects Libya has embarked on thus far, including plans for the future, in July. Companies in various sectors that might have an interest in working in Libya would be able to review the data and decide if any of the projects were attractive enough for them to invest in. In the meanwhile, he said the General People's Committee for Planning (Ministry of Planning-equivalent) should be able to provide details on Libya's ongoing and projected projects.

BRICKS, MORTAR AND HUMAN INFRASTRUCTURE

¶4. (C) Jibril stressed that Libya needs not only new schools, houses, hospitals, and roads but also a plan to manage and maintain all these new facilities and projects. This would involve training Libyans and in effect, "rebuilding human beings." He said the United States could help by encouraging people-to-people contacts. He suggested U.S. universities be paired with Libyan ones. If a U.S. educational institution were established in Libya, in his view, this would be a lasting investment that would withstand any political changes, citing the examples of the American Universities of Beirut and Cairo.

¶5. (C) As for opportunities for U.S. companies, Jibril said Libya was "opening widely and very fast" and that the world economic crisis had not hit Libya. He characterized the economy as being "in a liquid phase, and not yet solidified," with many opportunities for foreign companies willing to take the risk to come here. He recommended U.S. firms focus on strategic projects, i.e., ones that touch people's lives, such as education and healthcare. Libya would also need help managing facilities, such as airports. He contrasted Libya to the Gulf area, which he thought would remain unstable for the next ten years due to tensions with Iran. Libya, on the other hand, has

a stable regime and is "virgin country" for investors.

¶6. (C) Regarding possible programs with the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli, Jibril noted NEDB was still reviewing six proposals from American universities to train Libyan diplomats. He expected the internal review to take another week. A U.S. proposal in the economic sphere, via the U.S. Department of Commerce Commercial Law Development Program, would send NEDB

TRIPOLI 00000386 002.2 OF 002

staff on a study tour of small business incubators in the U.S. This had to be postponed until September or October in order to give the NEDB staff time to assess the needs of their business advising program.

¶7. (C) Comment: With a PhD in strategic planning from the University of Pittsburgh, Jibril is a serious interlocutor who "gets" the U.S. perspective. He is also not shy about sharing his views of U.S. foreign policy, for example, opining that the U.S. spoiled a golden opportunity to capitalize on its "soft power" (McDonald's, etc.) after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 by putting "boots on the ground" in the Middle East. At the same time, his organization has a daunting task to tackle, in terms of rationalizing 11,000 development projects in the chaotic Libyan government bureaucracy and also, to train Libyans to work in new sectors outside of the hydrocarbons industry. Jibril has stated American companies and universities are welcome to join him in this endeavor and we should take him up on his offer. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI391

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI391 aka Wikileaks id #207082 ?
Subject	LIBYA TAKES BACK 500 ITALY-BOUND MIGRANTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 May 2009 16:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI391.html
References	09TRIPOLI273
Referenced by	09NAPLES64
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4620
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0391/01 1341638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 141638Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4817
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5347
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0517
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0416
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000391

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, PRM, AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/14/2019
TAGS: SMIG *[Migration]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , KTIP *[Trafficking in Persons]* , IT *[Italy]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA TAKES BACK 500 ITALY-BOUND MIGRANTS

REF: TRIPOLI 273

TRIPOLI 00000391 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Implementation of a key component of the Italian-Libyan "friendship agreement" has begun, as Italy has returned approximately 500 migrants rescued and interdicted at sea to Libya over the past week. Libyan authorities have notified the local offices of IOM and UNHCR before returning boats arrive in Tripoli to facilitate medical screening, identification and consular notification. The returnees are

identification, and consular notification. The returnees are then placed in immigrant detention centers. UNHCR has interviewed a number of the detained returnees, noting that only "a handful" of the 500 are likely asylum seekers - mostly of Somali and Eritrean origin; the rest are economic migrants. The GOL is expected to accept delivery of six Italian patrol vessels this week, and to start patrolling Libya's coast with a joint Libyan-Italian crew and command in June. One Italian diplomat said he hoped the Libyan cooperation would continue, but suspected that it was linked to Muammar al-Qadhafi's planned mid-June visit to Rome. End Summary.

ITALY TURNS BACK OVER 500 MIGRANTS INTERDICTED AT SEA

¶2. (C) Libya has accepted the return of three tranches of migrants interdicted or rescued at sea by Italian authorities in recent days, beginning implementation of a key component of the Italian-Libyan "friendship agreement" signed last August aimed at reducing the flow of migrants from Libya to Italy. In each case, the Italians contacted the Libyan navy, which agreed to accept their return to Libya. The Libyan navy did not/not agree to take the migrants on Libyan vessels; rather, in one case, it instructed Italian energy company ENI, which operates an offshore platform in the area, to tow an African vessel to shore; in the other cases, it permitted the Italian navy to transport the migrants back to Tripoli. Once in Tripoli, according to the Italian Embassy, the migrants were processed in an orderly fashion and sent to a detention center.

¶3. (C) The first group of 227 returnees arrived in Tripoli on May 7. A regional IOM team in Tripoli implementing a G/TIP-funded workshop to enhance Libya's response to human smuggling and trafficking was on hand to help screen the arrivals and visit one of the three detention centers where the migrants were held. The trainers described conditions in the centers as overcrowded, but noted that IOM's Libyan partner - the International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief (IOPCR) - was providing humanitarian assistance similar to that given during a recent high-profile loss of over 200 migrants in late March (ref A). IOM is assisting the GOL obtain treatment for some returnees suffering from dehydration and scabies and has asked for financial support to ensure continued care. Another boat carrying 163 arrived on May 10. IOM reported that a third ship arrived on May 9 and that IOM is receiving notice from the GOL before the ships arrive so that IOM staff can monitor the disembarkation.

A "HANDFUL" OF MIGRANTS ARE LIKELY ASYLUM SEEKERS

¶4. (C) IOM staff here characterized the recent returnees as "the usual suspects" of Nigerian, Nigerien, Ghanaian, and South Asian nationality. The UNHCR mission reportedly interviewed many of the returnees and found fewer than 10 migrants who were likely asylum seekers including "four or five" Somalis and "a handful" of Eritreans.

JOINT PATROLS TO BEGIN THIS WEEK BUT ENFORCEMENT MAY BE SHORT-LIVED

¶5. (C) Shortly after Libya and Italy exchanged instruments of ratification of the friendship and cooperation treaty in March 2009, Italian embassy contacts told us that 43 Libyans had applied for visas to collect six patrol vessels from Italy. The GOL is expected to accept delivery of the Italian vessels this week, and to start patroling Libya's coast with a joint Libyan-Italian crew and command in June. According to the Italian Embassy, there will be 15 Italian naval personnel stationed in Libya for this purpose. One Italian diplomat said he hoped the Libyan cooperation on halting illegal migration to Italy would continue, but suspected that it was a gesture to curry favor in Rome prior to Muammar al-Qadhafi's planned mid-June visit to meet PM Berlusconi.

¶6. (C) Comment: Post does not have direct access to immigrant detention centers. Over the past year, contacts have described the facilities as ranging from "poor and crowded" to "acceptable" and both IOM and UNHCR have said conditions have improved over the past 12 months. Both organizations have regular access to the facilities, but limited capacity to provide care. Conditions will likely become worse if similar numbers of migrants crowd facilities. The GOL currently keeps

TRIPOLI 00000391 002.2 OF 002

family and national groups together - in part to facilitate mass deportation by charter plane to West Africa. In the March tragedy, of the 21 rescued from the sea, all Arabs were deported and the GOL facilitated consular access for the Africans whose countries had representation in Tripoli. Others were integrated into the general population of immigration detainees, and the GOL's record-keeping shortcomings make it difficult for organizations to track these migrants. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI394

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI394 aka Wikileaks id #207397 ?
Subject	SOMALIA DEMARCHE DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 17 May 2009 16:14 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI394.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
O P 171614Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4821
INFO AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ASMARA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RIYADH PRIORITY
USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0168
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000394


E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/17/2019
TAGS: MOPS [Military Operations] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , EAID
[Foreign Economic Assistance] , ER [Eritrea] , SO [Somalia]
SUBJECT: SOMALIA DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: STATE 50262

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)


(S) Ambassador telephoned Libyan Secretary for African Affairs
Dr. Ali Treiki May 17 and delivered reftel points.  Treiki
responded that the GOL agreed with the US position and said that
he was convoking the Eritrean Ambassador to urge Eritrea to end
support for insurgents opposed to the Transitional Federal
Government.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI40

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI40 aka Wikileaks id #188284 ?
Subject	LIBYA POSTPONES GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WALKS BACK FROM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND PRIVATIZATION PLANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 22 Jan 2009 12:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI40.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI719 , 08TRIPOLI842 , 08TRIPOLI889 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 08TRIPOLI917 , 08TRIPOLI936 , 09TRIPOLI17 , 09TRIPOLI22 , 09TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI699 , 09TRIPOLI896
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI63 , 09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72 , 09TRIPOLI805
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2760
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0040/01 0221241
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221241Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4339
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4862
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000040

SIPDIS

DEPT NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR (HOFSTATTER)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA POSTPONES GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS, WALKS BACK FROM WEALTH DISTRIBUTION AND PRIVATIZATION PLANS

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 227 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 719 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 699 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 896 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 842 , F) 08 TRIPOLI 917 , G) 08 TRIPOLI 936 , H) TRIPOLI 0017 , I) 08 TRIPOLI 889 , J) TRIPOLI 0022

CLASSIFIED BY: GENE A. CRETZ, AMBASSADOR, U.S. EMBASSY - TRIPOLI, U.S. DEPT OF STATE.
REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: A SESSION OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC), LIBYA'S SUPREME LEGISLATIVE BODY, THAT WAS TO HAVE CONVENED IN EARLY JANUARY TO REVEAL PLANS FOR PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING, HAS BEEN POSTPONED UNTIL FEBRUARY/MARCH, OSTENSIBLY BECAUSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL

CRISIS AND ONGOING EVENTS IN GAZA. PRIVATELY, CONTACTS TELL US THAT THE VISION FOR REFORM ARTICULATED BY MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI LAST MARCH HAS BEEN SIGNIFIANTLY MODIFIED. HE IS EXPECTED TO ANNOUNCE THAT A CONTROVERSIAL PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF OIL WEALTH HAS BEEN "POSTPONED" AND THAT GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING HAS BEEN "MODIFIED". AT THE SAME TIME, THE GOL HAS BEEN FORCED TO RECALCULATE ITS NATIONAL BUDGET IN LIGHT OF FALLING OIL PRICES AND RECONSIDER THE EXTENT OF HIGH-PROFILE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DESIGNED THAT WERE TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE REVOLUTION IN SEPTEMBER 2009. QUESTIONS ABOUT WHETHER PUTATIVE HEIR APPARENT SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI, SON OF MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI, WILL TAKE A MORE FORMAL GOVERNMENT ROLE, TOGETHER WITH RELATED REPORTS THAT A CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS FOR ILL-DEFINED "KEY POSITIONS" MAY BE IN THE OFFING, CONTRIBUTE TO THE SENSE THAT THE REGIME IS IN THE MIDST OF ONE OF ITS PERIODIC PERIODS OF POLITICAL FERMENT. IN THAT REGARD, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EVENTS IN GAZA ARE, FROM THE GOL'S PERSPECTIVE, WELL-TIMED AND AFFORD A REGIME HAMPERED BY LIMITED BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY ADDITIONAL TIME AS IT STRUGGLES TO ADOPT A PLAN FOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM. END SUMMARY.

¶2. (C) SENIOR GOL CONTACTS TOLD US IN CONNECTION WITH THE PUTATIVE TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON IN EARLY JANUARY OF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI (SON OF MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI) THAT A SESSION OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (GPC) WAS SCHEDULED TO TAKE PLACE JANUARY 10-13 IN SIRTE. IN ADDITION TO A WIDELY ANTICIPATED CABINET SHUFFLE, IT WAS EXPECTED THAT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI WOULD ANNOUNCE DURING HIS CUSTOMARY ADDRESS TO THE GPC PLANS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE DRAMATIC PROGRAM OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING HE ADVOCATED AT THE LAST GPC SESSION IN MARCH 2008 (REF A). IN THAT SPEECH, AL-QADHAFI CALLED FOR THE SYSTEM OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES THAT HAVE FORMED THE BASIS OF GOVERNMENT SINCE THE LATE 1970'S TO BE DISMANTLED BY THE END OF 2008, AND FOR THE DIRECT TRANSFER OF OIL REVENUES TO LIBYANS AND FOR RADICAL PRIVATIZATION OF LIBYA'S LARGELY STATIST ECONOMY. VIRTUALLY ALL SOCIAL SERVICES WOULD BE PRIVATIZED AND MOST GOVERNMENT JOBS WOULD BE ELIMINATED; THE PROPOSAL TO ELIMINATE THE LAST VESTIGES OF LIBYA'S CREAKY HEALTH CARE AND EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS WAS PARTICULARLY WORRISOME FOR ORDINARY LIBYANS, FOR WHOM CRADLE-TO-GRAVE SUBSIDIES HAVE TACITLY CONSTITUTED COMPENSATION FOR POLITICAL QUIESCENCE.

GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS SESSION POSTPONED; PROPOSED REFORMS TO BE SCALED BACK

¶3. (C) IN CUSTOMARY FASHION, DATES FOR THE JANUARY MEETING OF THE GPC WERE NOT FORMALLY ANNOUNCED AND, IN THE EVENT, THE SESSION WAS NOT HELD. UN RESIDENT REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN GLEESON TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 12 THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TWO GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE SECRETARIES (MINISTER-EQUIVALENTS) ON JANUARY 11 THAT THE JANUARY SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD NOT BE HELD AT ALL; THE NEXT SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD BE THE REGULARLY SCHEDULED MEETING IN MARCH. (NOTE: THE LIBYAN SYSTEM NOMINALLY CALLS FOR TWO SESSIONS OF THE GPC IN A GIVEN YEAR - ONE IN JANUARY, AT WHICH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE CABINET-EQUIVALENT DURING THE PREVIOUS YEAR IS REVIEWED, AND ONE IN MARCH, AT WHICH THE ANNUAL BUDGET AND PROGRAMS OF WORK ARE ESTABLISHED. END NOTE.) GLEESON'S CONTACTS TOLD HIM THE DELAY WOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND THE ONGOING CRISIS IN GAZA, AND THAT AL-QADHAFI WOULD ANNOUNCE IN MARCH THAT THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM HAD BEEN "POSTPONED" IN LIGHT OF SAGGING OIL PRICES AND THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS. IN ADDITION, THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES (MINISTRY-EQUIVALENTS) FOR HEALTH, BASIC EDUCATION AND HIGHER EDUCATION WOULD NOT/NOT BE DISMANTLED AT THE MARCH SESSION OF THE GPC. THE DIRECTOR OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL WAS ALSO TOLD THAT THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS WOULD NOT MEET UNTIL MARCH AND THAT THE GPC FOR BASIC EDUCATION WOULD NOT BE DISMANTLED.

DELAY PARTLY PROMPTED BY NEED TO RECALCULATE NATIONAL BUDGET IN LIGHT OF FALLING OIL PRICES

LIGHT OF FALLING OIL PRICES

¶4. (C) SEPARATELY, MFA SECRETARY FOR ARAB AFFAIRS MUHAMMAD TAHER SIALA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 13 THAT THE GPC SESSION HAD BEEN POSTPONED IN PART BECAUSE THE GOL HAD TO RECALCULATE ITS ENTIRE NATIONAL BUDGET. BUOYED BY PRICES WELL IN EXCESS OF USD 100 PER BARREL IN MID-2008, THE GOL HAD CALIBRATED ITS OPERATING BUDGET FOR 2009 AGAINST A PRICE PER BARREL OF USD 65; HOWEVER, WITH ACTUAL PRICES CURRENTLY IN THE RANGE OF USD 35-40 PER BARREL, GOL OFFICIALS WERE NOW SCRAMBLING TO RECALCULATE THE ENTIRE BUDGET AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

PROGRAM OUTLAYS AGAINST A PRICE POINT OF USD 40-45 PER BARREL. SIALA OFFERED THAT THE GOL HAD HAD TO "RECONSIDER" (I.E., REDUCE) THE SCOPE OF CERTAIN INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS, AND THAT THE EXTENT OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RE-STRUCTURING THAT WOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN LINE WITH AL-QADHAFI'S VISION HAD ALSO BEEN "MODIFIED". HE CONFIRMED THAT THE JANUARY SESSION OF THE GPC HAD BEEN CANCELLED, AND THAT A SINGLE SESSION OF THE GPC WOULD BE HELD IN LATE FEBRUARY OR EARLY MARCH.

AL-QADHAFI UNHAPPY THAT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IMPACTED BY SAGGING OIL REVENUES

¶5. (C) STRESSING THE SANCTITY OF LIBYA'S BUDGET ALLOCATION PROCESS AND DECRYING CLAIMS THAT IT WAS LESS THAN TRANSPARENT, SIALA SQKEY GPC SECRETARIES (MINISTER-EQUIVALENTS) HAD RECENTLY REJECTED A PROPOSAL BY AL-QADHAFI TO "BORROW" FROM LIBYA'S SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND TO OFFSET BUDGET DEFICITS AND AVOID SCALING BACK INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. (NOTE: AFTER YEARS OF LITTLE TO NO SPENDING ON HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE, THE GOL INITIATED A MASSIVE CAMPAIGN OF PROJECTS IN 2007, MANY OF WHICH ARE SUPPOSED TO BE COMPLETED IN TIME FOR THE SEPTEMBER 1, 2009 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE MILITARY COUP THAT BROUGHT MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI TO POWER AS SYMBOLS OF THE TANGIBLE BENEFITS OF THE "AL-FATAH REVOLUTION" AND THE JAMAHIRYA SYSTEM OF GOVERNANCE. END NOTE.) SEPARATELY, IBRAHIM EL-MEYET (STRICTLY PROTECT) TOLD US THAT SHUKHRI GHANEM, CHAIRMAN OF LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION, WAS ASKED BY AL-QADHAFI ABOUT TEN DAYS AGO WHETHER THERE WERE ANY ADDITIONAL SOURCES OF OIL-GENERATED REVENUE THAT COULD BE TAPPED TO PRECLUDE DELAYING INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. GHANEM'S ANSWER WAS THAT THERE WERE NOT, AND THAT FLAT OIL PRICES WOULD CONTINUE TO HURT LIBYA'S REVENUE STREAM, WHICH IS ALMOST ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON HYDROCARBON EXPORTS.

MODIFICATION OF POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORMS FORETOLD

¶6. (C) THE TIMELINE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF AL-QADHAFI'S VISION HAS SLIPPED SEVERAL TIMES ALREADY. IN MARCH 2008, HE SAID PLANS WOULD BE ANNOUNCED AT HIS REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH IN AUGUST AND WOULD BE EFFECTED BY YEAR'S END; HOWEVER, HE DISAPPOINTED HOPES THAT HE WOULD ANSWER KEY QUESTIONS ABOUT GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING, PRIVATIZATION AND POLITICAL REFORM AND INSTEAD FOCUSED ON BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE UNITED STATES (LIBYA HAD AT THAT POINT JUST SIGNED A COLONIAL COMPENSATION TREATY WITH ITALY AND AN AGREEMENT TO COMPENSATE U.S. VICTIMS OF TERRORISM). COMING CLOSE ON THE HEELS OF A MAJOR ADDRESS IN MID-AUGUST BY HIS SON (REF B), SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI (WHO DECLARED THAT MOST GOALS OF HIS POLITICAL-ECONOMIC REFORM EFFORT HAD ALREADY BEEN ACHIEVED AND ANNOUNCED THAT HE WAS BOWING OUT OF POLITICS), THE REVOLUTION DAY SPEECH LEFT OBSERVERS AND ORDINARY LIBYANS UNCERTAIN ABOUT THE EXPECTED PACE OF GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION (REF C).

¶7. (C) PRIVATELY, SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS TOLD US AS EARLY AS SEPTEMBER 2008 THAT THE EXTENT OF PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING WOULD BE LESS DRAMATIC THAN WHAT AL-QADHAFI INITIALLY PROPOSED, PARTLY BECAUSE OF BITTER DEBATE ABOUT THEIR FEASIBILITY, AND PARTLY BECAUSE OF ONGOING CONTRETEMPS BETWEEN REFORMIST AND OLD GUARD ELEMENTS. AS REPORTED REF D, IN A

MEETING BROADCAST ON STATE-OWNED TELEVISION IN NOVEMBER, SENIOR GOL OFFICIALS OPENLY DISAGREED WITH AL-QADHAFI ABOUT HIS PROPOSED REFORMS, EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT DIRECT DISTRIBUTION OF OIL WEALTH WOULD FUEL INFLATION, DEVALUE LIBYA'S CURRENCY, CREATE A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS DEFICIT AND ERODE REAL INCOME LEVELS WITHOUT CONTRIBUTING TO INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY. STRIKING A POPULIST TONE, AL-QADHAFI BLASTED THE OFFICIALS, CLAIMING THAT THEY WANTED TO MAINTAIN THE STATUS QUO TO KEEP THEIR POSITIONS AND CONTINUE PROFITING FROM CORRUPTION, AND INSISTED THAT THE PROPOSED REFORMS BE IMPLEMENTED. DESPITE AL-QADHAFI'S RHETORIC, THE CENTRAL BANK GOVERNOR, MINISTER OF ECONOMY-EQUIVALENT, MINISTER OF LABOR-EQUIVALENT AND THE HEAD OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND NATIONAL PLANNING COUNCIL PRIVATELY TOLD US THAT PRIVATIZATION AND GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING WOULD BE DELAYED CONSIDERABLY AND WOULD BE LESS AMBITIOUS THAN THE VISION AL-QADHAFI ARTICULATED (REFS E, F).

SUCCESSION, A DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND POTENTIAL ELECTIONS ADD TO FERMENT

¶8. (C) MORE RECENTLY, CONTACTS HAVE TOLD US THAT A DRAFT LIBYAN CONSTITUTION CIRCULATED RECENTLY MAY BE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AT THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS (REF G), PERHAPS OFFERING ANOTHER REASON TO DELAY THE SESSION. THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS SOCIETY OF LIBYA TOLD P/E CHIEF THAT A REVISED ITERATION OF A DRAFT CONSTITUTION HAD BEEN CIRCULATED TO A SPECIAL CONSTITUTION COMMITTEE IN MID-NOVEMBER FOR REVIEW, AND WAS EXPECTED TO BE FORWARDED TO THE BASIC PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES IN EARLY 2009 BEFORE BEING SUBMITTED TO THE GPC FOR CONSIDERATION

AND POTENTIAL RATIFICATION. YUSUF SAWANI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION, TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JANUARY 15 THAT THE GROUP - WHICH LARGELY COMPRISED ACADEMICS AND OTHER INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE GOVERNMENT AND IS HEADED BY A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE, MET IN LATE DECEMBER AND AGREED TO CIRCULATE THE DRAFT TO THE BASIC PEOPLE'S COMMITTEES "IN THE SPRING" FOR REVIEW. SAWANI SAID THE DOCUMENT WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS A "CONSTITUTION" (A PHRASE THAT HAS PROMPTED CONTROVERSY AMONG OLD GUARD MEMBERS, WHO CLAIM THAT NO SUCH DOCUMENT IS NEEDED OR APPROPRIATE IN THE JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM), AND THAT THE GROUP'S UNDERSTANDING WAS THAT IT WOULD BE A "TEMPORARY" OR "TRANSITIONAL" DOCUMENT THAT WOULD EVOLVE OVER TIME.

¶9. (C) AL-QADHAFI ADDED FURTHER FUEL TO THE FIRE OF SPECULATION ABOUT WHAT MIGHT TRANSPIRE AT THE GPC SESSION WHEN HE TOLD KEY REGIME FIGURES IN LATE DECEMBER (REF H) THAT LIBYA WAS ENTERING "A NEW POLITICAL PERIOD" AND WOULD HOLD ELECTIONS FOR "SOME KEY OFFICES SOON". REGIME FIGURE KHALED AL-HMEIDI, WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING, TOLD UNHCR COUNTRY DIRECTOR MUHAMMAD AL-WASH (STRICTLY PROTECT) THAT "IT WOULD HAVE BEEN EASIER IF HE (AL-QADHAFI) HAD JUST TOLD US THAT THERE WOULD BE ELECTIONS TO FINALLY GIVE SAIF AL-ISLAM A POSITION". AL-HMEIDI, WHO IS CLOSE TO SAIF, STRESSED TO AL-WASH THAT HE DID NOT REASONABLY EXPECT ELECTIONS ANYTIME SOON, AND SPECULATED THAT AL-QADHAFI'S INTENT WAS TO GET SENIOR REGIME FIGURES THINKING ABOUT THE IDEA SO THAT IT WOULD COME AS LESS OF A SHOCK IF AND WHEN ELECTIONS WERE ACTUALLY ORGANIZED. AL-WASH AND OTHER WELL-INFORMED CONTACTS ARE NOT CONVINCED THAT SAIF WILL BE TAPPED FOR A FORMAL GOVERNMENT POSITION AT THE GPC (HIS ONLY CURRENT POSITION IS AS HEAD OF A QUASI-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION); HOWEVER, THE DRUMBEAT OF SPECULATION THAT HE WILL BE GIVEN A MORE FORMAL ROLE AS PART OF AN EFFORT BY THE REGIME TO PAVE THE WAY FOR HIS EVENTUAL SUCCESSION HAS INCREASED IN RECENT WEEKS. FINALLY, BUSINESSMAN MUHAMMAD AL-OBEIDI (STRICTLY PROTECT) RECENTLY RELAYED TO US REPORTS THAT NEW LEGISLATION WOULD BE INTRODUCED AT THE MARCH GPC SESSION TO RESTRICT THE SIZE OF COMPANIES AND AMOUNT OF WEALTH INDIVIDUALS COULD ACCRUE. HIS INFORMATION WAS THAT WHILE THE INITIATIVE WOULD BE DESCRIBED AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION MEASURE, IT WAS ACTUALLY DESIGNED TO BREAK UP "MONOPOLIES" THAT WERE PERCEIVED TO BE EMERGING IN CERTAIN SECTORS AND TO REDUCE THE WEALTH AND INFLUENCE OF PROMINENT BUSINESSMEN SUCH AS HUSNI BEY AND HASSAN

TATTANAKI, WHO WERE PERCEIVED TO BE POTENTIAL POLITICAL THREATS TO THE AL-QADHAFI REGIME.

¶10. (C) COMMENT: THE SENSE IN TRIPOLI IS THAT THE REGIME IS IN THE MIDST OF ANOTHER OF ITS PERIODIC EPISODES OF POLITICAL FERMENT. THE FAILURE TO REACH AGREEMENT ON HOW TO IMPLEMENT AL-QADHAFI'S GOVERNMENT RESTRUCTURING AND PRIVATIZATION PROPOSALS, TOGETHER WITH INCREASINGLY PERSISTENT SPECULATION ABOUT SAIF'S ROLE AND THE RELATED ISSUES OF A CONSTITUTION AND POSSIBLE ELECTIONS, HAVE RAISED DIFFICULT QUESTIONS FOR A REGIME POSSESSED OF LIMITED BUREAUCRATIC CAPACITY. DOMESTIC DISCORD HAS ALSO RECENTLY BUBBLED TO THE SURFACE AGAIN, WITH TRIBAL VIOLENCE IN KUFRA (REF I) AND ATTACKS BY REGIME ELEMENTS AGAINST BERBERS IN YEFREN (REF J). IN THAT REGARD, THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS AND EVENTS IN GAZA HAVE COME AT AN OPPORTUNE TIME FOR A REGIME STRUGGLING TO FORMULATE A PLAN FOR THE WAY AHEAD ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REFORM, GIVING IT A PLAUSIBLE PRETEXT TO POSTPONE PUBLICLY DECLARING ITS HAND. MORE CYNICAL LOCAL OBSERVERS HAVE SPECULATED THAT AL-QADHAFI'S PLAN ALL ALONG WAS TO PROPOSE DRAMATIC REFORMS AS A WAY TO SHIFT THE GOALPOSTS OF EXPECTATION, ALLOWING HIM TO LATER APPEASE RELUCTANT OLD GUARD ELEMENTS BY SCALING BACK THE EXTENT OF THE CHANGES TO SOMETHING CLOSER TO WHAT THEY (AND HE) ARE COMFORTABLE WITH WHILE SIMULANEOUSLY CLAIMING TO WOULD-BE REFORMISTS (INCLUDING SAIF AL-ISLAM) THAT HE DIQS BEST TO OVERHAUL THE JAMAHIRIYA SYSTEM. END COMMENT.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI401

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI401 aka Wikileaks id #207568 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA, MAY 21
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 18 May 2009 15:49 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI401.html
References	09TRIPOLI202
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7122
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0401/01 1381549
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181549Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4828
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1468
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0818
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0942
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE 0880
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5358
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000401

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR CDR U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/18/2019
TAGS: OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders] , (WWARD), PREL [External Political Relations] ,
PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] ,
MCAP [Military Capabilities] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , PINR [Intelligence] ,
AU-I, CD [Chad] , SU [Sudan] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF GENERAL WILLIAM WARD TO LIBYA,
MAY 21

REF: TRIPOLI 202

TRIPOLI 00000401  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: The two months since your last visit to Tripoli have been marked by key developments in the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship and in regional security affairs. Your meeting with Muammar al-Qadhafi will afford a key opportunity to engage at the strategic level, explain U.S. Africa Command's mission and potentially mitigate possible Libyan obstruction of the Command's efforts on the continent. Al-Qadhafi is unlikely to become a vocal supporter of U.S. Africa Command, but his tacit acquiescence to its mission will be critical to deeper engagement. His desire for a successful chairmanship of the African Union could afford a useful point of leverage to gain quiet acceptance of U.S. Africa Command's efforts. During then-Secretary Rice's September 2008 visit, al-Qadhafi warned that U.S. military intervention on the continent concerned Africans and could encourage popular support for terrorism. Africa, he said, would be "greatly comforted" if U.S. Africa Command continued to base its operations in Europe. Your meeting with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa is a chance to engage in both a strategic discussion and a dialogue about specific potential areas of cooperation, which he can cast in terms palatable to Libya's leadership. National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi met with Secretary Clinton and National Security Advisor Jones, as well as the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security and the Deputy Director of CIA, during his April 21-24 visit to Washington. He asked for greater defense cooperation, speedy resolution to Libya's request to procure lethal military equipment and greater support for counter-terrorism (CT) and border security efforts. He reiterated Libya's aversion to membership in Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), saying the Tripoli-based Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) and the North Africa Standby Force (NASF) obviated TSCTP's mission. Your meeting with Muatassim will afford an opportunity to discuss specific cooperation opportunities and programs, including NASF. End summary.

Key issues:

-- Meeting with Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi
-- Al-Qadhafi's Tenure as African Union Chairman: Promise & Peril
-- Musa Kusa's growing Africa portfolio;
-- Meeting Muatassim al-Qadhafi after his Washington visit;
-- Engagement opportunities: North Africa Standby Force/Chad-Sudan Border Force;
-- Lethal weapon sales to Libya

MEETING WITH LEADER MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI

¶2. (S/NF) Al-Qadhafi is a famously mercurial interlocutor: his comportment ranges from quiet and difficult to engage - he will sometimes go so far as to avoid eye contact altogether - to holding forth in rambling, non-linear fashion. He is keenly focused on African issues and credible reporting suggests that he genuinely aspires to be the founding father of a United States of Africa. He will be interested in hearing your views, but will be suspicious of U.S. Africa Command's potential ulterior motives and wary of how those could complicate his own efforts to strengthen his leadership role on the continent. As in his meeting with then-Secretary Rice, he will likely prefer a strategic and even philosophical discussion rather than an exchange focused on details.

¶3. (S/NF) Al-Qadhafi views himself as a man of particular historical importance and has long sought to leverage leadership of Libya into a more prominent trans-national role. His interest in Africa dates to the late-1980's and early 1990's, when it became clear that efforts to posit Libya as a leading Arab state were unlikely to succeed. Al-Qadhafi prides himself on Libya's humanitarian activities on the continent, which are primarily focused on improving conditions for women and children. In the mid-1970's, Libya established the Tripoli-based World Islamic Call Society (WICS), an educational

institution mandated to provide Arabic language and religious training to foreign candidates for the Islamic clergy as a means to propagate more moderate iterations of Islam in sub-Saharan Africa and Asia. Al-Qadhafi and senior regime officials often point to WICS when claiming that Libya was ahead of the international community in recognizing the dangers of Islamic fundamentalism (invariably described as "Wahhabism") and moving to actively counter it. Libya also has significant commercial investments in sub-Saharan Africa, and has leveraged those as

part of its "dinar diplomacy" approach to managing relations on the continent.

¶4. (S/NF) In public remarks, al-Qadhafi excoriates European states for having colonized Africa and strongly argues against external interference in internal African affairs. He is marginally less strident in private and has negotiated a colonial compensation treaty with Italy and accepted EU assistance to counter illegal migration and bolster border security; however, a defining event for his regime was the expulsion of U.S. and British forces from the Wheelus and al-Adem airbases, respectively. The presence of non-African military elements in Libya or elsewhere on the continent remains a neuralgic issue for al-Qadhafi. In a meeting of CEN-SAD intelligence chiefs in Tripoli earlier this week, Libya's new External Security Organization Director decried as latter-day colonialism Western attempts to "interfere" in African security and intelligence affairs and argued that Africans could and should undertake counter-terrorism and intelligence efforts themselves. (Note: Despite that stated position, Libya seeks "support" in the form of training and equipment. End note.)

¶5. (S/NF) That said, Libya recognizes that African peacekeeping and regional security forces are poorly trained and equipped and may be amenable to U.S. assistance in these areas. Another area of potential cooperation is de-mining: we have proposed U.S. assistance (under UN auspices) for Libyan de-mining efforts. The UN is waiting for al-Qadhafi's approval (some contacts say he is reluctant to give up extensively mined zones on the Chadian and Egyptian borders) and is concerned that a DoD/U.S. affiliation could complicate the effort. Libya's recent efforts to persuade Tuareg tribes in the Libya-Chad-Niger-Algeria-Mali area to surrender their arms and publicly spurn cooperation with al-Qaeda elements in the Sahel is another potential area to explore, although he will likely resist offers of U.S. military cooperation in what he views as his backyard.

AL-QADHAFI'S TENURE AS CHAIRMAN OF THE AFRICAN UNION

¶6. (S/NF) Al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union represents the fulfillment of a long-term, closely held personal goal and coincides with an important period for the regime. Significant political events in 2009 also include the tenth anniversary of the Sirte Declaration that brought the AU into being, Libya's non-permanent UNSC chair, the likelihood that longtime Africa hand Ali Treiki will serve as President of the UN General Assembly, and the 40th anniversary of the bloodless coup that brought al-Qadhafi to power. Libya will seek to use al-Qadhafi's chairmanship to aggrandize him and promote his United States of Africa proposal; some sub-Saharan states appear to have already written off 2009-2010 as a "lost year" in terms of AU initiatives. That notwithstanding, it will be important to show appropriate deference to him and his perceived leadership role on the continent. Despite his warnings against Western interference in Africa, al-Qadhafi needs his AU chairmanship to be seen as a success - a potentially useful opening for increased engagement. When possible, crafting programs that give Libya a symbolic leadership role reduces the chance that al-Qadhafi will play the spoiler.

MUSA KUSA'S EXPANDING AFRICA PORTFOLIO

¶7. (S/NF) Musa Kusa was named Foreign Minister just before your last visit, and was dual-hatted as External Security Organization (ESO) chief for several weeks before a new External Security Organization Director was named. (Note: The extent to which Kusa has relinquished control of day-to-day intelligence operations remains unclear. The new ESO Director, Abuzeid Dorda, is a former Prime Minister and most recently served as the Chairman of the high-profile Housing and Infrastructure Board; however, he does not have experience in intelligence and security issues. End note.) Kusa frequently travels with Muammar al-Qadhafi and is a principal advisor on security matters. He is Western-educated - he holds an M.A. from Michigan State - and is seen as a strong supporter of re-engagement with the West. The Ambassador and GRPO have met him frequently and he has played a prominent role in U.S.-Libya relations and, more broadly, in Libya's foreign affairs. Since becoming Foreign Minister, he has assumed several portfolios previously held by other prominent regime figures, notably replacing Dr. Ali Treiki as point man for Chad-Sudan mediation. Kusa co-chaired a May 3 meeting in Doha with Qatari leaders at

TRIPOLI 00000401 003.2 OF 003

which the two governments signed a normalization agreement, and co-chaired with the Qatari Minister of State a March 15 meeting in Tripoli aimed at uniting smaller Darfur rebel factions to facilitate peace talks with the Government of Sudan.

¶8. (S/NF) Kusa is a key mentor for Muatassim and served as his "minder" during the latter's first trip to the U.S. in September 2007 to attend the UN General Assembly. Muatassim made his latest trip without Kusa, but the two likely consult extensively on matters of security and intelligence. Kusa previously served (circa 2004-2006) as a mentor to Muatassim's brother and potential rival to succeed their father, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, and reportedly remains close to him. Kusa is the rare Libyan official who embodies a combination of intellectual acumen, operational ability and political weight. Promoting specific areas of cooperation with him is an opportunity to have him cast that message in terms palatable to Libya's leadership.

MEETING MUATASSIM POST-WASHINGTON

¶9. (S/NF) Muatassim visited Washington to meet high-level representatives from State, DoD, DHS, NSC and the CIA in late April. His talking points will be familiar to you: 1) Libya and its regional partners need U.S. training and equipment to adequately secure its borders and fight transnational terrorism; and 2) Libya has not been adequately compensated for its decision to give up its WMD programs and abandon terrorism in 2003. He stressed that Libya is anxious for a U.S. response to its request to procure lethal and non-lethal military equipment, and for resolution of the eight C-130s in Marietta, Georgia. State and DoD interlocutors urged him to initiate the proposed Political-Military Dialogue - the first round is provisionally scheduled to take place later this year at the Assistant Secretary-level - and noted that it is the appropriate venue in which to articulate a plan for bilateral military cooperation, to include procurement. Your Libyan interlocutors will be listening for a reaffirmation of a willingness to move the military component of the bilateral relationship forward.

SPECIFIC ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: STANDBY & BORDER FORCES

¶10. (S/NF) While in Washington, Muatassim again demurred when pressed on Libya's potential membership in TSCTP. He argued that the Tripoli-based (and Libyan-controlled) CEN-SAD already performs TSCTP's proposed mission and has the additional benefit of being led by African countries. In your last meeting with

him, Muatassim asked for training and technical assistance for the North Africa Standby Force (NASF). Discussing specifics of proposed NASF-AFRICOM cooperation and stressing that capacity building is a major component of TSCTP would be helpful. In his meeting with Secretary Clinton, Muatassim characterized Darfur and the Chad-Sudan conflict as Libya's biggest security threat. Libya's efforts on Chad-Sudan include Libyan command of a 2,000-member border monitoring force (1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan). While results of Libya's mediation have been mixed, proposing AFRICOM cooperation with the force may be an opportunity to demonstrate AFRICOM's capacity building focus to a skeptical Libyan audience. An additional issue to raise with Muatassim is proposed U.S. support for de-mining efforts under UN auspices.

TECHNOLOGY & WEAPONS SALES TO LIBYA

¶11. (S/NF) Muatassim raised the issue of the eight C-130s in Georgia with State's Political-Military (PM) office. PM said the U.S. would look favorably on requests for new aircraft (C-130J's), but the USG position remains that there will be no compensation for the old aircraft and Libya should work directly with Lockheed Martin to resolve the matter. He inquired about the status of Libya's outstanding requests for lethal and non-lethal equipment, warning that Libya would pursue acquisitions in other foreign markets if the USG is unable to respond soon. State and DoD have draft responses for many of the items, but some sales will be blocked due to ITAR concerns. The Embassy has submitted a draft end-use and transfer agreement to the MFA to enable some of the sales, but training Libyan procurement officials on U.S. legal requirements is essential to enable proposed sales.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI409

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI409 aka Wikileaks id #207841 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI'S AFRICA HAND ON SOMALIA, MAURITANIA, MADAGASCAR AND AU SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 May 2009 06:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI409.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
O 200646Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4840
INFO SOMALIA COLLECTIVE
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
CJTF HOA
CIA WASHDC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ASMARA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000409

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , AU-I, SO *[Somalia]* , MA *[Madagascar]* , MR *[Mauritania]* , AFU, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S AFRICA HAND ON SOMALIA, MAURITANIA, MADAGASCAR AND AU SUMMIT

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Ambassador had a wide-ranging discussion on African issues with Libya's senior Africa expert. Topics included: Somalia (Libya urged quick UNSC action to bolster the Transitional Federal Government and blunt the current al-Shabaab offensive); Chad/Sudan (Libya blamed both sides for incursions in violation of the recent agreement); Mauritania (no one wants former President Abdellahi back, opposition to allowing military leaders to stand for election is unreasonable and the international community should send election observers);

Madagascar (Libya has not recognized Andry Rajoelina or his government, which plan to hold elections next spring); and the upcoming AU Summit (to be held in the Libyan town of Sirte). End summary.

SOMALIA: LIBYA URGES UNSC ACTION

¶2. (C) The Ambassador met with one of Muammar al-Qadhafi's trusted Africa hands, MFA Secretary for African Affairs Dr. Ali Treiki, at the latter's request on May 18. Treiki's focus was on the evolving situation in Somalia - he interrupted his conversation with the Ambassador to take a call from Somali President Sheikh Sharif, who provided an update on the situation and asked for Libya's help. Describing the situation as "very bad and really dangerous", Treiki said Libya was consulting with AU Commisioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra, who was in Tripoli for consultations. Libya's Ambassador to Asmara had conveyed a message to the Eritrean government (NFI), and had been assured that Eritrea was not/not providing material or other support to al-Shabaab. According to Treiki, officials in Asmara claimed that because Eritrea was not a Muslim country, there was no logical reason for it to support Islamic fundamentalists in Somalia.

¶3. (C) Offering that AU peacekeeping forces in Somalia were "insufficient", Treiki repeatedly pressed the Ambassador as to what could be done to shore up Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and blunt the current al-Shabaab offensive. Libya asked the AU Commission for Peace and Security to convene an emergency meeting on May 19 to discuss the situation, but believes UN Security Council action is warranted and necessary. Noting that Libya is ready and eager to cooperate with potential UNSC efforts on Somalia, he urged the U.S. to consult with P-5 counterparts and act quickly. When pressed, Treiki was unclear on whether Libya advocated a Presidential Statement or a UNSCR.

CHAD/SUDAN: LIBYAN ENVOYS IN KHARTOUM AND CHAD

¶4. (C) Treiki said Libya blamed both Khartoum and N'djamena for the quick collapse of the recent agreement on non-interference between the two. Treiki was to travel to Khartoum May 19 to "deliver a message" (NFI) to President Bashir. He said another Libyan envoy (NFI) was to travel in parallel to N'djamena with a message for President Deby. Conceding that recent cross-border attacks into Chad from Sudan had not been helpful, he noted that both Bashir and Deby were expected to be at the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya July 1-3, which could afford an opportunity for positive engagement.

MAURITANIA: FOCUS ON JUNE ELECTIONS

¶5. (C) On Mauritania, Treiki said he had accompanied Senegal's President Abdoulaye Wade and AU Commisioner for Peace and Security Lamamra on joint mediation visit to Nouakchott last week. The delegation met with deposed President Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdellahi, junta leader-turned-presidential candidate Muhammad Ould Abdelaziz and opposition leader Ahmed Ould Daddah, as well as members of Parliament and the opposition. He said that agreement had been reached on the contours of an interim national government that would include members of the opposition. Claiming that "90 percent of the Parliament" and " a clear majority of the people" were in favor of the coup, he flatly said the return to power of former President Abdellahi was impossible. "The reality of the situation - despite the fact that coups are bad - is that no one wants the old president back", he said.

¶6. (C) Treiki said the exigent issue now was getting through national elections, currently scheduled for June 6. Based on conversations during the delegation's visit, Libya and the AU believed the opposition must be "more cooperative" and abandon its objection to allowing military leaders to stand as candidates. Characterizing the opposition leaders' position as

candidates." Characterizing the opposition leaders' position as "unreasonable", he claimed the Mauritanian constitution permitted any military officer or judge who had resigned 45 days or more before a poll to be eligible for election. (Note: We defer to Nouakchott on whether that is indeed the case. End note.) Mauritania's coup leaders had assured Libya and AU members that it would accept all delegations of election observers. Treiki said the AU, Arab Maghreb Union, Arab League, European Union and Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD) would send observers and encouraged the U.S. to do so as well.

MADAGASCAR & AU SUMMIT: LIBYA HAS NOT RECOGNIZED RAJOELINA GOVERNMENT; SIRTE THE VENUE FOR AU MEETING

¶7. (C) Regarding the May 17 meeting in Tripoli between Muammar al-Qadhafi and Madagascar's would-be president, Andry Rajoelina, Treiki confirmed that Libya had observed AU consensus and not/not recognized Rajoelina's government. Coverage of the visit in Libyan state-owned media was muted - RajoelinaQ pointedly referred to only by name or as "the man who declared himself the head of the High Transitional Presidency", and was not described as the president. According to Treiki, Rajoelina told al-Qadhafi he would hold elections in Madagascar in April/May 2010. On the upcominQummit, Treiki said the venue would be the Libyan town of Sirte (media reports and an AU press release subsequentlQirmed that). Members of the AU PermReps Committee will meet June 24-26, the Executive Council (Ministerial) will convene June 28-30, and the Assembly (summit) will meet July 1-3. Delegations, which the Libyans have asked not exceed 10 persons, are expected to stay in Sirte and the GOL will stage special flights to/from Tripoli. Separately, UK diplomats said the FCO's Minister for African Affairs, Lord Malloch-Brown, will attend the AU Summit.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI410

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI410 aka Wikileaks id #207842 ?
Subject	CHAD AMBASSADOR: LIBYA CAN DO NOTHING IF SUDAN UNWILLING TO KEEP PROMISES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 May 2009 06:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI410.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8640
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0410 1400646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 200646Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4842
INFO RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0173
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0161
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0030
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5372
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000410

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/14/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SU *[Sudan]* , CD *[Chad]* , LY *[Libya]* , AU-I
SUBJECT: CHAD AMBASSADOR: LIBYA CAN DO NOTHING IF SUDAN UNWILLING TO KEEP PROMISES

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Chadian Ambassador Daoussa Deby called on the Ambassador on May 14 to provide an update on recent fighting in eastern Chad and denounce Sudan's recurring efforts to destabilize his country. Deby said his government had "no problem with Sudan", but was instead a victim of problems in Darfur. Nonetheless, Deby complained that Sudan had repeatedly reneged on its commitment to peace negotiations in Tripoli, Dakar, Khartoum, and Doha, adding that Libya could "do nothing" with a government that was unwilling to fulfill its obligations. Citing Khartoum's swift violation of the core principles of the February 17 Doha agreement between the GOS and JEM, he noted that Sudan's willingness to violate accords extended beyond bilateral agreements, .

¶2. (C) Deby reported that Chad was very satisfied with the USG

position and support of the recent PRST condemning UFR attacks and GOS support for the rebels. He said the UFR invaded with over 800 trucks and that fighting was ongoing, but that Chad's armed forces had captured fighters, vehicles, weapons, and "many documents" from the rebels. While he characterized Libya's position on the PRST as "unfriendly", he said relations between Chad and Libya were still normal and that President Idriss Deby and Muammar al-Qadhafi had a close relationship. Chad deferred to Libya's desire to move the May 28-30 CEN-SAD summit to the Libyan town of Sirte, and supported Libya's efforts to move the July 1-3 AU Summit to the same location.

¶3. (C) Comment and bio note: Deby spoke largely in general terms and stuck to points already delivered to Embassy N'Djamena. He mentioned that al-Qadhafi's chief of staff, Bashir Saleh, helped manage Libya's relationship with various rebel groups, but did not discuss his own relationship with JEM's Tripoli representative, Suliman Abdalla Ismael. Deby said he had been in Tripoli only 10 days since presenting his credentials. While he did not request specific support, Deby spent much of the meeting recounting how he had previously represented Chad as their Ambassador to Libya from 1997-2003. Claiming a weak facility with English, he conducted most of the meeting in French. His ability to speak and understand Arabic seemed advanced. End comment and bio note.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI413

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI413 aka Wikileaks id #208047 ?
Subject	LIPSTICK ON A PIG: LIBYA RENAMES CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 21 May 2009 08:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI413.html
References	08DOHA286 , 09TRIPOLI139 , 09TRIPOLI99
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO9691
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0413/01 1410807
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 210807Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4845
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5375
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000413

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND L (SCHWARTZ); COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON;
ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; CAIRO FOR ALEX SEVERENS; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA
WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , LY *[Libya]* , QA *[Qatar]*
SUBJECT: LIPSTICK ON A PIG: LIBYA RENAMES CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND

REF: A) TRIPOLI 99 ; B) TRIPOLI 139 , C) DOHA 286

TRIPOLI 00000413 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) recently
convoked the major international oil companies (IOCs) in Libya
and presented a new law establishing a fund for charitable

and presented a new law establishing a fund for charitable contributions. While the stated purpose of the law is to gather contributions to support charitable, social and humanitarian aid programs, NOC officials - including Chairman Shukri Ghanem - openly conceded that the new law was the government's latest attempt to prompt IOCs to make "voluntary" contributions to the fund established under the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Compensation Agreement, which is to compensate victims of terrorism and their families. Citing concerns about potential violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), IOC heads here told the Ambassador and emboffs they do not plan to make any contributions to the new fund. IOCs in Libya are already obligated under the terms of their contracts to spend a certain amount on social programs and have initiated programs to fight diabetes (a growing problem in Libya), and promote road safety. End summary.

LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY CALLS INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES TO CARPET

¶2. (C) On May 4, the National Oil Company (NOC) convoked the Libyan deputy managers of IOCs to a presention on a new law establishing a charitable contribution fund (Decision number 148-2009). (Note: In Libya, the deputies of IOCs must be Libyan nationals. End note). The stated purpose of the law is to gather donations to support charitable, social and humanitarian aid programs. The fund would manage and monitor charity contributions coming from all foreign companies and would encourage them to contribute grants, donations, and support to the fund. The fund is to be managed by a Management Committee comprised of a General Manager and four members nominated by the General People's Committee (cabinet-equivalent). In addition to "voluntary" contributions, 40 per cent of environmental fines paid by foreign companies, including oil companies, would go into the fund.

NEW "CHARITY FUND" A THINLY-VEILED VERSION OF OLD CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND

¶3. (C) The NOC officials chairing the meeting admitted the law was the government's latest attempt to spur the IOCs to make "voluntary" contributions to the fund created under the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Compensation Agreement (see refs A and B). The deputy managers were told their companies would get 'better treatment' if they made early contributions to the charity fund. In discussing potential consequences if they declined to make such contributions, it was suggested that the companies could be fined for infringing Libya's environmental laws, or their employees could be stopped by police for (alleged) traffic infractions. (Note: The latter is a common practice here. Police frequently stop vehicles with foreign commerical license plates and fine their drivers on the spot. End note.) Since the meeting, the major IOCs have remained resolute and have not contributed to either the old compensation fund or the new charity fund. There are persistent rumors, however, that Gazprom and a few small oil services companies have contributed to the compensation fund and possibly to the new charity fund as well. (Note: Gazprom Chairman Alexei Miller announced publicly earlier this week that Gazprom expected to conclude an agreement with the NOC in the near future to develop a large gas field. End note.)

SHUKHRI GHANEM TO MARATHON: BE A "GOOD NEIGHBOR" AND GIVE TO THE NEW FUND

¶4. (C) In a recent meeting, NOC Chair Shukhri Ghanem admitted to a senior visiting Marathon Oil official (strictly protect) that the GOL had simply renamed the old compensation fund and presented it as a charity fund. Noting that neither the Libyan government nor the USG had wanted to contribute to the fund, he said it had become apparent that IOCs were not inclined to contribute to it, either. He blamed the refusal of American companies to pay for the reluctance of other IOCs to contribute.

Ghanem explained that the new charity fund would give companies an opportunity to show they are "good neighbors" by supporting charitable, social and humanitarian aid programs. The issue of IOCs contributing to the fund had been elevated to the highest levels and went beyond just the NOC, he said, in an implicit reference to Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. Separately, senior British Gas executives and a Libyan contact with excellent ties to Ghanem recently told Emboffs that Ghanem and the NOC were

TRIPOLI 00000413 002.2 OF 003

under pressure from Muammar al-Qadhafi and Prime Minister al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi. (Note: The latter was tasked immediately after finalization of the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Compensation Agreement with "accreting" contributions to the fund for victims of terrorism. End note.) Those contacts, who expressed shock that the NOC had been so candid in admitting that they had simply re-named the fund, speculated that Ghanem was under such pressure to generate contributions that he and his staff weren't thinking clearly.

¶5. (C) The senior Marathon executive told the Ambassador his company did not see any way it could participate in the new fund since its lawyers assessed that contributions could violate the Foreign Corrupt Practises Act (FCPA). Marathon's leadership was worried that if they contributed to the fund this time, it would establish a dangerous precedent for further solicitations in Libya and elsewhere. (Note: Post read with interest ref C, which suggests the Qataris and Libyans may be using the same play book. End note.) The Oasis Group (also known by its Arabic name as the Waha Group), which includes Marathon, Amerada Hess, and ConocoPhillips, already paid Libya USD 1.8 billion in signing bonuses to re-enter Libya. The request for additional payment to the charity fund is not something Marathon is in a position to do. According to Marathon's manager in Libya (strictly protect), the company is strongly committed to fulfilling its corporate social responsibility obligations, but is unwilling to simply hand out cash to a less-than-transparent charity fund. Some provisions in the new law call for using the fines paid by companies for breaching environmental codes to fund sustainable development programs. Contacts at Marathon said this would not affect Marathon or its Waha partners since they are only investors (vice operating companies). In addition, Waha's operations are onshore, vice offshore, and therefore less prone to environmental infractions.

THE VIEW FROM OTHER IOCS

¶6. (C) Hess' General Manager (strictly protect) agreed that the new fund is simply a new name for the old compensation claims fund. He noted Hess is already devoting resources to social programs in Libya, including a diabetes awareness and treatment project with experts affiliated with Harvard University. To require the company to "voluntarily" pay into a new fund would be a non-starter for Hess. Chevron's GM (strictly protect) wondered why the government did not simply levy a new tax on the IOCs rather than create the new fund. While the companies would not have liked this, it would have simplified collecting the funds and provided a more tenable approach with respect to FCPA issues. Shell's GM (strictly protect) told the Ambassador he was concerned by the NOC's decision to convoke Libyan national deputy GM's, an approach he viewed as "targeting" Libyan colleagues in the belief that they would be more susceptible to strong-arm tactics. (Note: He personally assessed that his locally-engaged staff were even more loyal to the IOCs than the expatriate staff. End note.) He noted that the NOC typically convoked expatriate general managers. Even though Shell in Libya was not directly impacted by the Lockerbie compensation issue, Hope agreed the IOCs needed to "hold rank" and not succumb to pressure to pay into the new fund. As Shell is only involved in onshore exploration, its susceptibility to potential environmental fines is also slight

susceptibility to potential environmental fines is also slight. He noted Shell is already supporting several social programs in Libya. They are proud of their road safety program and believe this program could be partly credited with the government's recently-enacted requirement that drivers wear seat-belts not only on highways but also within Tripoli. They also have a program to help young people start and run their own businesses. Payments into the new fund would be very difficult to justify to Shell's shareholders and lawyers, who are concerned with the bottom line and FCPA issues, respectively.

¶7. (C) Comment: Efforts to solicit contributions under the new law reflect the intense pressure Ghanem and the NOC are under from the most senior levels - likely including Muammar al-Qadhafi himself- to generate money for the claims compensation fund. If the law for the new charity fund had been rolled out a few months from now and had not been blatantly connected to the compensation fund, IOCs may have been able to seriously consider contributing. In addition to the fact that the NOC didn't bother to try to maintain the fiction that the new fund was different from the claims compensation fund, slumping oil prices, the global recession and disappointment with meager oil and gas discoveries in Libya by IOCs to date make it difficult to impossible for IOCs to seriously entertain

TRIPOLI 00000413 003.2 OF 003

this latest demand. End comment.
CRETZ

Media

- Three Little Words: WikiLeaks, Libya, Oil
- Kickbacks between Libya and the west have helped Gaddafi cling to power
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI415

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI415 aka Wikileaks id #208508 ?
Subject	FM KUSA SUPPORTIVE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH U.S. AFRICA COMMAND -- WITHIN LIMITS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 25 May 2009 13:12 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI415.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2135
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0415/01 1451312
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 251312Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4850
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5380
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000415

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/22/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , MOPS *[Military Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FM KUSA SUPPORTIVE OF ENGAGEMENT WITH U.S. AFRICA COMMAND --
WITHIN LIMITS

TRIPOLI 00000415 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa told visiting Commander of U.S. Africa Command General William Ward that Libya supports engagement with the U.S. military to tackle the continent's security problems, but draws the line at "no U.S. troops" in Africa. A visible U.S. military presence would do more harm than good, and serve as an attractive target for terrorists. Kusa welcomed U.S. support in the form of equipment and training. Kusa placed high importance on the effectiveness of national security/intelligence agencies in combating terrorism, and said Libya actively supports regional security cooperation through the African Union and Cen-Sad (Community of Sahelian and Saharan States). Gen. Ward's meeting with Col. Muammar al-Qadhafi reported septel. End Summary.

¶2. (S) On May 21, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC)

(Foreign Minister) Musa Kusa hosted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William "Kip" Ward (Gen. Ward) at the GPCFLIC for an hour-long meeting. Also in attendance were Secretary for American Affairs Dr. Ahmed Fituri, Ambassador, U.S. Defense Attache, COS, and members of Gen. Ward's staff.

¶3. (S) After a brief exchange of pleasantries, Kusa asked Gen. Ward for his views on Africa. Gen. Ward replied that the African continent is home to much diversity and complexity, and that throughout his travels across numerous countries he has come away with the clear sense that Africans have a strong desire for peace and stability. Kusa responded that it is true that Africans are a proud people who share a sense of pan-Africanism, solidarity, sovereign independence, and unity against external parties. Citing the example of Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe and the intense pressure levied against him by the international community, he noted that most African nations sided with Mugabe, despite Mugabe's mistakes. Kusa asserted that in Africa, Africans stay together to oppose external interference. Similarly, he said, when the United States imposed sanctions on Libya, the Arab world turned its back on the Libyan leader, but the Africans never did.

¶4. (S) Turning to security issues, Kusa said that he naturally was well aware of security issues affecting the continent as he had spent the better part of the last ten years as the director of the Libyan External Security Organization (ESO). He added that he has shared his views frequently and openly with his U.S. contacts in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Department of State. He said that Libya and the Libyan people have been and will remain committed to the counterterrorism (CT) mission. He said that the Libyan ESO continues to do a good job with CIA and that cooperation between the two agencies was very good. He had also endeavored to encourage other African nations to work more closely together on CT. He highlighted the May 17-18 CEN-SAD (Community of Sahelian and Saharan States) meeting of the directors of security services hosted by the ESO in Tripoli, which he noted COS had attended. He said that the directors of 27 countries had met to discuss increasing cooperation.

¶5. (S) Kusa said that Libya remains committed to such engagements and to encouraging multilateral cooperation, emphasizing that he has long been a proponent of multilateral cooperation through organizations that are legally established within the framework of the African Union (AU) or other internationally recognized bodies such as the United Nations (UN). Kusa said that the U.S.' support was indeed needed to bolster such programs, particularly those affecting the Sahelian areas. Strengthening cooperation must be done in stages and one of the key outcomes of the CEN-SAD meetings was to focus on building the capabilities of host nation security services. In this regard, AFRICOM could provide equipment or training, he said, as Libya has limited resources and thus could not act alone.

¶6. (S) Kusa said that the presence of U.S. forces in Africa could be more harmful than helpful, as they would likely draw young extremists or would-be terrorists to consider attacking them. Kusa emphasized that North Africa has been a source of foreign fighters headed to Iraq and governments in the region have exerted tremendous efforts to stem this flow. However, the very presence of U.S. troops inside Africa could turn this flow inward into the continent which in turn would bring instability to the region. Kusa said that existing CT efforts are effective and that a low profile must be maintained.

¶7. (S) Addressing the overall bilateral military to military relationship, Kusa said that son of the Libyan leader and National Security Advisor Dr. Mu'tassim Billah al-Qadhafi had fully briefed him on U.S. military engagements conducted through the Libyan National Security Council (NSC). Kusa said that he was supportive of what Mu'tassim briefed and noted that the

was supportive of what Mu'tassim briefed and noted that the scope of work was good. Although Mu'tassim was not in Libya on this day, Kusa conveyed the message that efforts should be made to continue on the track that has been set with the NSC.

TRIPOLI 00000415 002.2 OF 002

¶8. (S) In response, Gen. Ward said that he appreciated the good meetings that he had with Mu'tassim and that he appreciated Kusa's comments on the region and CT cooperation. He agreed that host nations should be in a position to handle the threats facing them, and providing equipment and training was important. Gen Ward stated that it was important for nations to work together to establish a framework of cooperation that would deny safehaven to terrorist groups on the continent. AFRICOM shares this vision and nations that share similar security concerns should work together to this end; the Trans-Sahel Counterterrorism Program (TSCTP) and Operation Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahel (OEFTS) are intended to support these goals.

¶9. (S) Kusa commented that he saw areas of possible cooperation where both sides shared common objectives, especially regarding political and security matters, to be considered at the AU level. Kusa stated that the AU intended to call for the formation of a unified AU military contingent that would be presided over by an AU Secretary for the Military. Kusa opined that perhaps the United States could engage the AU and discover areas of potential military cooperation with the AU unified military command. Working through the AU construct would be beneficial to the U.S. and cooperation on the political level would support policies directed at unifying the African states. Kusa said that the union of African states was the most effective and beneficial solution for all African nations.

¶10. (S) Kusa raised what he characterized as the threat posed by the increasing presence of Chinese in Africa. Although Chinese do not interfere in internal political affairs, which is why African leaders find it easy to work with them, the Chinese have begun to indirectly interfere in the sovereignty of nations. The Chinese population in Africa is significant and growing, and China is intent on imbedding itself through its economic programs to build infrastructure, schools, etc.

¶11. (S) Kusa concluded the meeting by stating that the U.S. military engagement with Libya is positive and should continue. The Libyan leadership is supportive of these endeavors.

¶12. This cable was cleared by the U.S. Africa Command.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI417

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI417 aka Wikileaks id #208699 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI: NO LONGER RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE WITH AFRICOM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 26 May 2009 14:54 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI417.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Thu, 24 Feb 2011 17:31: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2956
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0417 1461454
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261454Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4853
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5383
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000417

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 5/25/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , MOPS *[Military Operations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: NO LONGER RELUCTANT TO ENGAGE WITH AFRICOM

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi told visiting Commander of U.S. Africa Command General William Ward that Libya supported the establishment of common African institutions, such as an African Ministry of Defense, and expressed hope that the Obama administration would not pursue a policy of military intervention in Africa, as he felt a U.S. military presence on the continent could be a trigger for terrorism. Al-Qadhafi said he hoped President Obama could travel to Libya in early July to address the African Union summit, as well as meet him at the G-8 conference in Italy later in the month. Al-Qadhafi expressed a desire for cooperation with U.S. Africa Command in the fields of counter-terrorism and counter-piracy. Gen. Ward's meeting with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa reported septel. End Summary.

¶2. (S) On the afternoon of May 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi, hosted U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander General William "Kip" Ward (Gen. Ward) in his tent at the Bab al-Aziziyah complex in Tripoli for an meeting that ran slightly over an hour. Also in attendance were Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC) (Foreign

Minister) Musa Kusa, Secretary for American Affairs Dr. Ahmad Fituri, Ambassador, U.S. Defense Attache, and a member of Gen. Ward's staff.

¶3. (S) After exchanging pleasantries, al-Qadhafi noted that during Gen. Ward's earlier trip to Libya, he had been visiting Mauritania, where a political crisis was ongoing. "Every time we put out a fire in Africa, another one breaks out. We used to say this was a US conspiracy, but not anymore." Al-Qadhafi then began a lengthy monologue during which he related the stages of governance in Africa from revolutionary liberation, to dictatorship, to multi-party elections, concluding that now was the time to establish common African institutions, such as a Ministry of Defense, that would better represent African interests before the world.

¶4. (S) Al-Qadhafi turned to U.S. and Chinese involvement on the continent, characterizing the Chinese approach as soft, the U.S. as hard, and predicting that China would prevail because it does not interfere in internal affairs. He criticized what he said was a U.S. tendency to place military bases near energy sources, observing that the U.S. did this in the Gulf of Guinea, it would spark terrorism. Turning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, al-Qadhafi questioned what he characterized as U.S. support for Israel at the expense of Palestine, and advised that it would be in the best interest of the U.S. to support the Palestinians. He cautioned against trusting the advice of Arab leaders in the Gulf and Levant and offered to play a role in that region if the U.S. desired. The Leader concluded his remarks by expressing a desire for President Obama to come to the African Union Summit in Libya in July, and after that meet him in Italy at the G-8 conference.

¶5. (S) In response to Gen. Ward's profession of respect for the sovereignty of African countries, al-Qadhafi said he understood the U.S. position, but questioned the U.S. military presence in Djibouti, noting military power would be used by extremists to justify terror. He then proceeded to identify two sources of terrorism, Wahabism and Switzerland. Qadhafi stated that the Swiss banking system was used to fund terrorists, and proposed that Switzerland be split among its neighboring countries, according to language.

¶6. (S) On the topic of Somali piracy, al-Qadhafi asserted that "foreign entities" had violated Somalia's territorial waters. The solution to the problem of Somali piracy was therefore to forge an agreement between the countries exploiting Somali waters and the pirates. Al-Qadhafi offered to identify a pirate spokesman and broker this agreement.

¶7. (S) Al-Qadhafi emphasized that as Libya now presides over the AU, there was a possibility for cooperation with AFRICOM in combating terrorism in the Sahara and piracy. He said that he could deal with "the new America without reservation", now that the United States was governed by "a new spirit of change."

¶8. (U) This cable was cleared by U.S. Africa Command.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- LeTemps.ch | Dossier Swiss Papers
- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI427

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI427 aka Wikileaks id #209102 ?
Subject	STATUS OF AGREEMENT ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 28 May 2009 15:34 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/05/09TRIPOLI427.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI543
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5037
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0427 1481534
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 281534Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4868
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5398
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0079
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0067
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000427

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR ISN/NESS D. FENSTERMACHER; DOE-M FOR M. TSIKLAURI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , TRGY [Energy Technology] , LY [Libya] , RS
[Russia; Wrangel Islands]
SUBJECT: STATUS OF AGREEMENT ON SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL

REF: STATE 52146

(SBU) Per reftel, Ambassador on May 28 queried MFA Secretary of
the Americas Department, Ahmed Fituri, on the status of the
government-to-government agreement for spent nuclear fuel,
stressing the importance of finalizing the agreement as soon as
possible.  Fituri said the agreement had moved from the MFA to
the General Peoples Committee (GPC) (equivalent to the prime
minister's office), for final approval.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI436

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI436 aka Wikileaks id #210171 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S HEALTH MINISTER WELCOMES U.S. COOPERATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Jun 2009 12:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI436.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI621 , 09TRIPOLI886
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0439
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0436/01 1551238
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041238Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4876
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA PRIORITY 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5407
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000436

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE FOR ISN/CTR: DA BROWN;  LONDON AND
PARIS
FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KHIV [Emerging Infectious Diseases and HIV/AIDS Program] , LY
[Libya] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , WHO [World Health Organization]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S HEALTH MINISTER WELCOMES U.S. COOPERATION

TRIPOLI 00000436  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (C)  Summary: In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, the
Secretary of the General People's Committee for Health and
Environment (Minister of Health-equivalent) asked for help in
sending Libyan doctors to the U.S. for training in hospital
administration and family practice, acknowledged that Libya
needs to improve its healthcare system from top (hospitals) to
```

bottom (primary health care) and conceded that positive change will be difficult given persistent structural issues, such as poor pay and working conditions, in Libya's state-run healthcare system.
He was unaware of the proposed Regional Nuclear Medicine Center (RNMC), a joint U.S.-Libya project to create a state-of-the-art center for treating cancer patients with nuclear medicine. The Ambassador recommended that the Secretary consult with his colleagues at the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, who have communicated extensively with U.S. experts on the project. End summary.

A WELCOME (BACK) TO THE AMERICANS

¶2. (C) On Monday May 25, the Ambassador met for the first time with Mahmoud Mohamed al-Hijazi, Secretary (Minister-equivalent) of the General People's Committee for Health and Environment. Al-Hijazi welcomed the visit, commenting he had not heard from the Americans since the visit a few years ago of a delegation from the State Department and Health and Human Services (HHS). He also noted Libya had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the University of Texas, focusing on cancer. He also stressed that due to the important role the Libyan government in ensuring overall health policy and supervision, any cooperative activities in health would need to be negotiated government-to-government and not between the private and public sectors. Libya has a five-year plan to improve the health sector. It includes: 1) training family doctors to improve primary healthcare, and; 2) rationalizing (and possibly decreasing) the number of primary health care centers (there are 1400) based on the number actually needed.

WHAT AILS LIBYANS?

¶3. (C) Al-Hijazi explained the major health problems in Libya were chronic diseases (particularly hypertension and diabetes), infectious diseases, cancer and smoking and traffic accidents. He admitted many Libyans go abroad to venues like Tunisia and Europe in search of better healthcare. Al-Hijazi said the Libyan private healthcare was also an option, but that the quality of care was uneven. He noted his ministry was in the process of evaluating the level of care in these private centers and that some of the 67 private clinics and 1,500 private pharmacies might be shut down if they continued to provide sub-standard care.

UNAWARE OF REGIONAL NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER PROPOSAL?

¶4. (C) Al-Hijazi and his staff had no knowledge of the proposed Regional Nuclear Medicine Center (RNMC), a proposed joint U.S.-Libya project to create a state-of-the-art center for treating cancers with nuclear medicine. (Note: The strategic plan for the center was submitted to the Libyans in late 2008 by a visiting delegation from State's ISN Bureau, but has still not been formally approved by the Libyan side. Health professionals told Emboffs the proposal is fine from a technical standpoint; however, it is currently being held up due to a lack of political approval. End note). The Ambassador suggested that al-Hijazi contact Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, for an update on the proposed center.

TRAINING FOR DOCTORS NEEDED, ESPECIALLY IN ADMINISTRATION AND FAMILY PRACTICE

¶5. (C) When asked how the United States could help in Libyan healthcare, al-Hijazi said Libya had 220 medical university graduates in need of more specialized training, especially to become hospital administrators. Others needed further training in family practice. Al-Hijazi admitted he was more used to dealing with European countries and so, had not initially thought of the United States as a possible training venue. But after Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi,

suggested he send Libyan doctors to the U.S., al-Hijazi said he was now considering the U.S., along with Egypt and Jordan.

HEALTH INSURANCE: U.K. IS A GOOD MODEL FOR LIBYA

¶6. (C) There is a push to develop a system of health insurance

TRIPOLI 00000436 002.2 OF 002

in Libya and al-Hijazi said a new law would be presented "soon" in this regard. He said all Libyans would have to enroll in the new system, which would be governed by a fund or company. After studying health insurance systems in many countries, including the U.S., Canada and France, al-Hijazi decided to model Libya's system after that of the United Kingdom, which he said fit best with Libya's needs.

A SMALL WORLD: AL-HIJAZI HEARD PRESIDENT OBAMA'S DOCTOR IS LIBYAN

¶7. (C) Al-Hijazi added that Libya is reaching out to Libyan doctors living and working overseas to recruit them to come back to Libya. While many of them are now established in the U.S. and elsewhere, he said they would be welcomed home, even for short-term stints. He said he had even heard that a member of President Obama's medical team was Libyan. The Ambassador told him the Embassy could facilitate contact with associations of healthcare professionals, including Arab American medical associations. Al-Hijazi promised to designate a member of his staff to act as point of contact for following up on the request for training for doctors in the U.S. as well as linking the ministry to doctors of Libyan and Arab descent who might be able to return to Libya.

¶8. (C) Comment: Today's meeting was a useful opportunity to renew ties and explore future cooperation with the GPC for Health, especially given the Science and Technology Agreement signed with Libya last year. Al-Hijazi's main message was that he needed help in training doctors, particularly in hospital administration and family practice. Improving Libya's healthcare will not be an easy task, however, as serious structural problems remain. A real-world example of this is that among our locally-engaged staff at post, there are at least three trained doctors and dentists who have foregone working in their fields due to better pay and work conditions. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI437

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI437 aka Wikileaks id #210174 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S FORMER NUCLEAR CENTER DIRECTOR RESURFACES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Jun 2009 12:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI437.html
Referenced by	09STATE74778 , 09TRIPOLI621 , 09TRIPOLI886 , 10TRIPOLI136
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0465
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0437/01 1551244
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041244Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4878
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0068
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5409
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000437

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/20/2019
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S FORMER NUCLEAR CENTER DIRECTOR RESURFACES

TRIPOLI 00000437  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C)  Summary: Dr. Abdelkarem Mgeg, who until early this year
had been Director of Libya's Tajura Nuclear Research Center
(TNRC), was suddenly replaced in late January.  In a recent
meeting, Mgeg said he was happy to not be working on "anything
nuclear" and is developing a "strategic roadmap" for Libya's
fledgling alternative energy sector; he hopes to attract U.S.
investors and to pull others (in Libya) along with good ideas
for alternative energy applications.  Mgeg also outlined the new
organizational chart of Libya's nuclear and energy
establishment.  While it is unfortunate that Mgeg was moved out
of the TNRC (he was one of post's most energetic interlocutors),
```

his lack of political sway had hampered his ability to engage effectively on more politically-charged issues, such as securing visas for visiting U.S. technical experts. His denouement is an important reminder that we need to engage the Government of Libya (GOL) at both he working and senior policy levels, even on technical programs, to ensure that there is the requisite political approval for proposed cooperation programs. End summary.

FORMER NUCLEAR CENTER DIRECTOR NOW WORKING FULL-TIME ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

¶2. (C) On May 19, Econoff met with Dr. Abdelkarem Mgeg, who until recently, was director of the TNRC. In January, post learned that Mgeg had been replaced by Dr. Ahmed al-Habrush. At the time, Mgeg told the P/E Chief that he planned to be engaged in a combination of "consulting work" with Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment (LAEE) and "private business". In his more recent meeting with EconOff, Mgeg said he was happy to not be working on "anything nuclear" and was developing a "strategic roadmap" for Libya's fledgling alternative energy sector. While Mgeg still technically reports to Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the LAEE, he appears to be working independently and has set up an office at Tripoli's International Exhibition Center. His office was supposed to be co-located with Gashut's in the LAEE's headquarters, but he had refused to avoid being "bothered by menial administrative tasks". Mgeg, who holds a PhD in Electronics from UCLA, started in 2007 as general manager of the then-Renewable Energies and Water Desalination Research Center (REWDRC) and Nuclear Research Center at Tajura. (Note: Since Mgeg's departure, the center has reverted to its previous name, the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. End note.) Mgeg was replaced by al-Habrush in part because he was perceived to have worked too independently and had not kept Gashut (his supervisor) informed of his activities. Mgeg said the fact that he was not a member of the LAEE, whereas al-Habrush is, was also cited as a pretext for his dismissal. Without naming names, Mgeg said that several senior figures in the LAEE (he implied, but did not say, that they included Gashut) were "not visionary" and focused only on day-to-day tasks. Mgeg, who enjoys a reputation as a more future-focused thinker, explained that he is working on a strategic plan for Libya for the next 30-40 years.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART FOR THE LAEE

¶3. (C) Mgeg outlined the organizational chart of the newly-restructured nuclear and energy establishment which is comprised of three divisions, all answering to the LAEE, which is headed by Gashut. Gashut in turn reports directly to Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. The divisions include: Chemical Engineering (with the Petrochemical Institute) headed by Dr. Mansour (no first name given); the Tajura Nuclear Center, headed by Dr. Ahmed al-Habrush; and the Alternative Energy Research Center, headed by Dr. Salem Ghurbal. Although Mgeg is working on alternative energy, he reports directly to Gashut instead of thruogh Dr. Ghurbal. Ghurbal is responsible for research projects in alternative energy whereas he (Mgeg) is working on Libya's strategic roadmap for pursuing alternative energy. He described his replacement at Tajura, al-Habrush, as "risk averse." He characterized his relationship with Gashut as still "friendly", but conceded that some underlying tensions clearly remain. Mgeg said he preferred to work on technical matters and was not interested in a political job. (Note: In a separate meeting, we learned that Dr. Mohammad Ennami, formerly science advisor to the Secretary for Infrastructure Matuq Matuq, is now Gashut's deputy at the LAEE. End note).

PUSHING FOR ALTERNATIVE ENERGY

¶4. (C) In his new position, Mgeg said one of his goals is to

attract U.S. investors to the alternative energy sector. He explained his task was to "pull" others in Libya along with good ideas (rather than pushing them), and to persuade them to embrace new alternative energy technologies. He argued that new technologies may be expensive now, but in the long run, the cost will decrease due to increased efficiencies, whereas the price

TRIPOLI 00000437 002.2 OF 002

of oil will always fluctuate. Libya should husband its hydrocarbon resources for export and should begin producing more power from alternative energy sources. He noted Libya has tremendous potential in solar and wind power and could contribute to the power needs of the entire Mediterranean area. American companies and universities are welcome to come to Libya and do conduct research and help train Libya's next generation of specialized engineers. He thought in 30 years, the alternative energy sector would be "big," including a 1,000 megawatt wind-powered electricity station. He noted that there are already plans to build a 15 megawatt combined solar/hydro plant in Sirte, and a German firm was conducting a feasibility study for the project. Mgeg expressed admiration for Germany, which produces 20 per cent of its energy needs through alternative sources. He cited German laws and tax credits as important factors in meeting this goal.

¶5. (C) Mgeg plans to organize an international conference on alternative energy that would bring together decision-makers, investors and scholars, and asked for Post's help in attracting American participants. He cautioned, however, the conference had not yet been officially-approved on the Libyan side. Mgeg also asked for help in identifying examples of good environmental laws from the U.S. that he could use in recommending new environmental laws for Libya.

¶6. (C) Comment: It is unfortunate, but telling, that Mgeg was moved to sidelines. One of post's most energetic interlocutors in terms of scientific and technical cooperation, he eschewed the stifling official Libyan bureaucray and was in direct contact with U.S. scientists and officials. As an example, he never required formal permission from Protocol officials for Emboffs to accompany other USG visitors to the Tajura Nuclear Research Center. By contrast, during a recent visit by DOE experts to Tajura, Mgeg's successor did not allow Econoff to enter the facility since prior permission had not been granted (although we had sent a formal request, we had never received an answer). On the other hand, Mgeg was not always successful in obtaining visa approvals for would-be USG experts, which may have reflected his lack of political sway. He himself admitted that he was not interested in playing the political games that feature so prominently here. Elevating Muhammad Ennami to serve as Gashut's deputy reflects the fact that in Libya, formal title is often less important than personal political contacts. We expect Ennami to continue to play an important behind-the-scenes role in Libya's nuclear affairs. Mgeg's departure from the TNRC is an important reminder that Post and other USG actors need to engage the Libyans at both the working and policy (i.e., Gashut) levels to ensure that there is political approval for proposed cooperation programs. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI438

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI438 aka Wikileaks id #210184 ?
Subject	FRENCH TOTAL-LED CONSORTIUMS ACCEPT LOWER PRODUCTION SHARES IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Jun 2009 13:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI438.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO0501
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0438/01 1551307
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041307Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4880
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1479
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0886
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0825
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0948
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0418
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0738
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1058
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5411
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000438

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA
ERIKSON, (NATHAN MASON), ADVOCACY CTR (REITZA), AND CLDP (TEJTEL
AND MCMANUS)
CAS FINANCIAL ATTACHE (SEVERENS)
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHER

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/4/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , EFIN [Financial
and Monetary Affairs] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FRENCH TOTAL-LED CONSORTIUMS ACCEPT LOWER PRODUCTION SHARES
IN LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C/NF) Summary: Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC)
renegotiated the terms of its production sharing agreements with
France's Total and its partners in Libya (Germany's Wintershall
```

and Norway's StatoilHydro), adjusting the existing stand-alone contracts to bring them into compliance with the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) rubric. The renegotiation of Total's contract is of a piece with the NOC's effort to renegotiate existing contracts to increase the Libya's share of crude oil production. An interesting corollary is that one of the affected fields is that from which Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, periodically obtains oil lifts, which he sells to finance his various activities. Depending on whether his lifts had been coming out of the NOC's production share or Total's (it's not clear what the arrangement was), the renegotiated agreements could adversely impact his revenue stream. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) The NOC had already renegotiated its agreements with other international oil companies (IOCs) producing in Libya to align those contracts with the EPSA-IV framework. Under EPSA-IV terms, IOCs commit to upfront signing bonuses to the NOC, a lower share of produced oil and gas, technology transfers, training of local employees and investment to re-develop existing fields. Italy's Eni, Canada's Petro-Canada, a European consortium headed by Spain's Repsol, and a consortium headed by U.S. Occidental ("Oxy") signed renegotiated agreements under similar terms with the NOC in June-July 2008. Those companies cumulatively paid the NOC USD 5.4 billion in upfront bonus payments as part of the renegotiation process.

¶3. (SBU) The renegotiated Total agreements cover production at the Mabruk field (jointly operated by Total and StatoilHydro) and the al-Jurf field (jointly operated by Total and Wintershall). Under the new agreement, the Total-Statoil and Total-Wintershall consortiums will pay a signing bonus of USD 500 million to the NOC - USD 200 million at the signing and the remaining USD 300 million when the viability of gas exploitation in al-Jurf field is confirmed. The consortiums also committed to develop more robust training programs for local employees. Exploration and development costs associated with increasing production capacity of the Mabruk and al-Jurf fields will be shared equally by the NOC and the consortiums.

¶4. (SBU) Each consortium will take 27 percent of oil production, down from the 50 percent take they had under the previous agreement. For gas, the consortium will take a 40 percent share (down from 50 percent), which will be reduced in the future to 30 percent. For the Mabruk field, which is located in the Sirte basin and produces some 20,000 barrels of oil per day, the new production share is 73 percent for the NOC, 20.25 percent for Total and 6.75 percent for StatoilHydro. The contract's expiration date has been extended from 2027 to 2032. For the offshore al-Jurf field, which produces 45,000 barrels of oil per day, the new share is 73 percent for the NOC, 20.25 percent for Total and 6.75 percent for Wintershall. Natural gas produced at al-Jurf will be split as follows: 60 percent for the NOC, 30 percent for Total and 10 percent for Wintershall. The al-Jurf contract has been extended from 2017 to 2032.

¶5. (C/NF) Comment: The new production share percentage accepted by Total and its partners is still considerably larger than those obtained by other IOCs in renegotiating their existing contracts. It is also larger than the production shares of companies who won contracts in the most recent EPSA-IV bid rounds. The new agreement still guarantees Total, Wintershall and StatoilHydro longer access to existing Libyan reserves and further field development opportunities, with the potential of increasing oil production. An interesting potential corollary is that al-Jurf is reportedly the field from which Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, periodically obtains oil lifts, which he sells to finance his various activities. It is not clear whether those allotments have come from the production share of the NOC or Total (Saif has strong ties to senior French business and government figures). If his take has been coming from Total's production share, there could be a reduction in the number of lifts he is consigned and a

reduction in the number of lifts he is consigned and a

corresponding decrease in his bank account's bottom line. The timing is particularly bad, coinciding with other recent setbacks for Saif al-Islam that include the March cabinet shuffle that did not favor his reform efforts, his brother's successful visit to Washington (viewed as a threat to his perceived primacy on the U.S.-Libya account) and the recent nationalization of his al-Libia satellite television channel.
End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Three Little Words: WikiLeaks, Libya, Oil
- Kickbacks between Libya and the west have helped Gaddafi cling to power
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI47

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI47 aka Wikileaks id #188333 ?
Subject	FATHI EL-JAHMI AND FAMILY DECIDE HE SHOULD TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 22 Jan 2009 15:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI47.html
References	08TRIPOLI960 , 08TRIPOLI969 , 09TRIPOLI960
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI251 , 09TRIPOLI57
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2636
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0047/01 0221547
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 221547Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4347
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1380
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0736
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0868
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0811
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0984
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0671
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4871
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000047

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON, NARDI) AND DRL/NESCA (KWIRAM, JOHNSTONE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FATHI EL-JAHMI AND FAMILY DECIDE HE SHOULD TRAVEL TO SWITZERLAND FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 960 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 969

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and his family have decided that they would like him to travel to Switzerland for medical treatment. The Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) would pay for el-Jahmi's travel and medical expenses. The family needs to orchestrate several decisions to facilitate the travel: 1) reach agreement with el-Jahmi's treating physician in Libya that he is medically fit to be

discharged and travel (likely the hardest part); 2) identify the Swiss medical facility at which el-Jahmi wishes to be treated, and; 3) identify which el-Jahmi family members would accompany him on the trip. Representatives from the QDF, el-Jahmi's family and the Embassy are to meet next week to discuss next steps. End summary.

¶2. (C) Following up on our meeting with detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi in December (reftel), P/E Chief met on January 22 with Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Human Rights Committee of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF). Saleh said he had met with Muhammad el-Jahmi, Fathi el-Jahmi's eldest son, on/about December 23 and early in January to discuss the case, and had been in regular contact with him by telephone. According to Saleh, el-Jahmi and his family had decided that el-Jahmi should travel to Switzerland for medical treatment. (Note: The other options were to remain at his family home in Tripoli and pursue outpatient care, or to transfer from the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) to a private clinic in Libya. End note.) Saleh said el-Jahmi's wife, Fawzia, and several of his daughters had traveled to Tripoli from the family's home in Benghazi shortly after New Year's, and had been able to visit el-Jahmi daily at the TMC.

¶3. (C) Saleh identified several decisions that Muhammad needed to orchestrate to facilitate the proposed medical travel. First, Muhammad needed to reach agreement with el-Jahmi's treating physician, Dr. Abdulrahman Mehdy, that el-Jahmi was medically fit to be discharged from the TMC and to travel. (Comment: We judge this to be a bit of a canard. Dr. Mehdy has told us that he was under considerable pressure not/not to certify that el-Jahmi was fit to be discharged. His understanding, and that of el-Jahmi's family, is that the QDF and other regime elements have delayed allowing Mehdy to discharge el-Jahmi to buy time to orchestrate the political aspects of the case. End comment.) In our meeting on December 13, Dr. Mehdy told us three things needed to happen before el-Jahmi could be discharged: his blood sugar levels should be stabilized; the vascular issues in his legs needed to be analyzed; and, he needed consultations with neuromedical specialists regarding the pain in his extremities. Saleh told us on January 22 that el-Jahmi's vascular issues had been analyzed and that he was receiving treatment for the pain in his legs. His understanding was that el-Jahmi's cardiac condition was satisfactory, but he had no information about el-Jahmi's blood sugar levels.

¶4. (C) Saleh said the family also needed to decide which Swiss medical facility they wanted el-Jahmi to be treated at, and which family members would accompany him. As in the case of recently released regime critic Dr. Idriss Boufayed, who also traveled to Switzerland for treatment of his cancer (ref B), the QDF intends to underwrite el-Jahmi's travel and medical expenses. Saleh said it was currently anticipated that Muhammad el-Jahmi and his mother, Fawzia, would accompany el-Jahmi on his medical travel. Saleh said several of el-Jahmi's daughters were also considering whether to go, but had not yet decided. (Comment: An issue for the daughters is that their husbands and children would not likely be permitted to travel, theoretically ensuring their return to Libya and also ensuring that al-Jahmi would not be so outspoken if he were able to leave. End comment.). Muhammad el-Jahmi's passport has expired and would need to be renewed; it is not clear whether other potential travel companions from the family have valid travel documents. Saleh said the QDF would facilitate issuance of passports and travel permissions to family members accompanying el-Jahmi to Switzerland.

¶5. (C) Saleh is to meet again next week with Muhammad el-Jahmi to discuss el-Jahmi's medical condition, the Swiss hospital at which the family wishes el-Jahmi to be treated and to determine who will travel. P/E Chief proposed that he join the meeting, as agreed in our earlier exchange on December 13. Saleh agreed

and said he would call after he had scheduled the meeting with Muhammad.

TRIPOLI 00000047 002 OF 002

¶6. (C) Comment: In light of the ongoing Libyan-Swiss contretemps occasioned by the arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, in Geneva last July, it is ironic that Switzerland has apparently become the preferred venue for medical treatment of ailing Libyan political prisoners. Whether the TMC agrees to actually discharge el-Jahmi will be the critical litmus test as to the regime's real intention to let el-Jahmi go. We noted that the case had already drug on for far longer than it should have and underscored that the GOL would be serving its own best interests if it quickly made good on the promise to facilitate el-Jahmi's travel for treatment. Saleh took our points on board and gave assurances that he was personally handling the case and would be in touch. Saleh and the QDF continue to characterize Muhammad el-Jahmi as being diffident about his father's case and to blame him for the slow progress in the case; however, it is clear that Muhammad remains under a great deal of pressure from the regime, which has reversed course several times in el-Jahmi's case. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI475

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI475 aka Wikileaks id #212377 ?
Subject	ASSESSING AL-QADHAFI'S HEALTH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Jun 2009 14:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI475.html
References	07TRIPOLI1033
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Wed, 8 Dec 2010 14:14: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
O P 161408Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4917
INFO AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
CIA WASHDC
CIA WASHINGTON DC
DIA WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000475


NOFORN

DEPT FOR INR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/16/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PINR [Intelligence] , KBIO, LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: ASSESSING AL-QADHAFI'S HEALTH

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 1033

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: A German diplomat assessed reports that
Muammar al-Qadhafi was suffering from cancer as "unreliable" and
speculated that they may have been prompted at least in part by
information from a German businessman who claimed regular direct
access to al-Qadhafi, but whose actual contact was much more
limited and indirect.  Separately, a relative of one of
```

al-Qadhafi's personal physicians told us he was not suffering from cancer, but was hypertensive and borderline diabetic. Al-Qadhafi was described as "a hypochondriac", who insisted that all examinations and procedures be filmed and then spent hours reviewing them with physicians whom he trusted. While the specific nature of his physical ailments remains unconfirmed, it does appear that al-Qadhafi is not entirely well. Contacts on al-Qadhafi's personal protocol staff recently told us al-Qadhafi's schedule of meetings - especially at night - is less intensive than it used to be and that he spends more time resting during the day, complicating the process of scheduling meetings for him. End summary.

GERMAN DIPLOMATS ASSESS CANCER REPORTS AS "UNRELIABLE"

¶2. (S/NF) German Deputy Head of Mission Jens Gust (protect) told P/E Chief on June 11 that he assessed reports that Muammar al-Qadhafi was suffering from cancer as "unreliable". Gust said he had heard from various contacts -- none of whom had first-hand information -- that al-Qadhafi suffers from throat or prostate cancer. He offered that an elderly German businessman who visits Libya regularly in connection with his commercial activities may have been responsible for initiating and perpetuating reports that al-Qadhafi has cancer of the throat.

¶3. (S/NF) The businessman, Herbert Bauer, was in his 80s and claimed to have been a pilot with German General Erwin Rommel's Afrika Corps during the German-British battles in the Western Desert during World War II. Bauer, who had since become a successful German entrepeneur, had visited Libya regularly for several decades in connection with unspecified business activities. Bauer claimed regular access to al-Qadhafi and told Gust and German intelligence officials approximately six to seven months ago that al-Qadhafi had cancer of the throat and was "very ill". However, Gust had since learned that while Bauer had regular access to one of al-Qadhafi's interpreters and had been able to pass messages to/from al-Qadhafi through that individual, he did not regularly see al-Qadhafi and had not done so for over a year at the time he reported he was suffering from throat cancer. Gust said he believed Bauer, who is well-connected to senior Libyan business figures and members of the expatriate community, was responsible for propagating at least some of the persistent reports that al-Qadhafi had cancer. Gust noted that when he saw al-Qadhafi at the March session of the General People's Congress, the latter had appeared to be overweight, but was "clear-eyed and very focused".

A PERSONAL PHYSICIAN OF AL-QADHAFI SAYS HYPERTENSION & DIABETES, BUT NOT CANCER

¶4. (S/NF) Separately, the daughter-in-law of Dr. Mohamed Abubaker Ahmed, Director of the Central Hospital of Tripoli (strictly protect source), told P/E Chief in early June that al-Qadhafi was not suffering from cancer. Ahmed, a gastroenterologist, is one of al-Qadhafi's personal physicians and is reportedly well-trusted by the regime because, unlike many medical professionals in Libya, he is not seen to be corrupt. (Note: Ahmed is a serious physician and academic, has reportedly not accepted bribes in connection with his official duties and has not sought to exploit his position as a hospital director to obtain commissions on lucrative medical equipment purchases. End note.) Ahmed is often summoned to see al-Qadhafi by senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi, who quietly handles many of the Leader's medical arrangements. (Note: Sanussi is al-Qadhafi's brother-in-law and is the Director of Military Intelligence. End note.) Ahmed noted that he is often summoned to be present when al-Qadhafi was attended to by other physicians, even when the issues at hand are outside his area of medical expertise, because he is trusted by al-Qadhafi and is willing to give him (medical) news he does not want to hear. Ahmed described al-Qadhafi to his daughter-in-law as "a hypochondriac" who obsesses about his physical ailments and

insists that all examinations and procedures be filmed. He recounted how he had recently had to clear an entire afternoon's worth of appointments to spend several hours with al-Qadhafi reviewing film of an endoscopic examination the Leader had undergone.

¶5. (S/NF) Ahmed recently told his daughter-in-law that al-Qadhafi suffered from hypertension and was borderline diabetic, but that he did not suffer from cancer. Ahmed, whose first wife was a German citizen with family members in the medical profession in Germany, had recently helped identify and arrange for a German medical specialist to travel to Tripoli to examine al-Qadhafi and supervise treatment for an unspecified medical condition. (Note: Ahmed said the medical condition was not cancer, but did not specify what it was. There have been reports that a medical specialist, usually described as either Austrian or Swiss, recently traveled to Libya to supervise cancer therapy for al-Qadhafi. End note.) Ahmed avoided directly confirming whether al-Qadhafi had suffered a stroke circa May-June 2007, as has been widely reported, but noted that shortly before the period in question, al-Qadhafi -- whom he described as "extremely vain" -- had botox treatments. He said the attendant loss of control of facial muscles could have been misinterpreted as a sign that al-Qadhafi had suffered a stroke. In addition, al-Qadhafi had within the past year had hair implants; however, he had suffered a rare auto-immune reaction to the procedure and the plugs had had to be removed.

¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Speculation about al-Qadhafi's health is a perennial feature of the rumor mill here. Post noted in televised coverage of al-Qadhafi's June 10 arrival in Rome that he appeared to be tentative in descending the steps from his aircraft to the tarmac. As reported reftel, Spanish diplomats told us in the run-up to al-Qadhafi's visit to Spain in December 2007 that GOL officials had insisted that the Leader not be housed above the first floor of the hotel in which he stayed and that his room have as few stairs as possible. When pressed, GOL officials conceded that al-Qadhafi had difficulty physically negotiating stairs. While the specific nature of his physical ailments remains unconfirmed, it does appear that he is not entirely well. Emboffs who visited Libya in 2004-2005 and participated in meetings with al-Qadhafi have noted that his face is much heavier and more slack in appearance now than it was then, and that he appears to have more difficulty moving. Contacts on al-Qadhafi's personal protocol staff recently told us al-Qadhafi's schedule of meetings - especially at night - is less intensive than it used to be and that he spends more time resting during the day, complicating the process of scheduling meetings for him. That said, he is 67 and maintains a very active international travel schedule. A contact who saw him circa late May during a visit to a local elementary school said he appeared to be fit. End summary.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI476

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI476 aka Wikileaks id #212392 ?
Subject	UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Jun 2009 15:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI476.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI482 , 09TRIPOLI886
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9823
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0476/01 1671520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161520Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4919
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1485
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0892
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0832
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0954
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0420
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0016
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 5453
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000476

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/9/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI

TRIPOLI 00000476 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Ukraine to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and

higher education. The Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and the two sides discussed establishing an investment center in Ukraine to oversee Libyan projects related to oil, gas and agriculture in Ukraine. The next step is ostensibly for Libyan officials to visit Ukraine in July for discussions under the rubric of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee; however, the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting will occur as scheduled. Given the slow pace at which Libyan-Ukrainian ties have progressed to date, it is unlikely that many of the projects discussed during the visit will be implemented soon. The Ukrainian Ambassador was reportedly told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about the proposed deals because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and the perception that Ukraine was not a stable investment venue. End Summary.

AGREEMENTS SIGNED

¶2. (C) During the mid-May visit of Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and higher education. Russian DCM Anatoly Martynov told P/E Chief in early June that he had received a readout from Ukraine's Ambassador to Tripoli shortly after Tymoshenko's visit. The military-technical agreement had been under discussion since 2004 and provided a basic framework for military cooperation and training. Ukraine wanted to sign it during the March 2008 visit to Tripoli of Ukraine's President, but the Libyan side was unprepared to do so. During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian side also proposed establishing a center in Libya to refurbish Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters; however, the GOL deferred a decision. The protocol on the exchange of sensitive information was described as essentially being an agreement by both sides not to disclose military or intelligence information obtained from the other without securing prior permission to do so.

¶3. (C) The nuclear energy cooperation agreement was discussed during the March 2008 visit by Ukraine's president. Libya has already signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement wtih France and a memorandum of understanding with Russia that commits Russia and Libya to conclude a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy. (Note: Libya's efforts to establish nuclear power generating capability do not appear to be moving quickly. Dr. Mohammed Ennami, Deputy Director of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, told Econoff that Libyan officials were to have visited France in April to follow-up on the France-Libya nuclear deal, but there are no indications that the project has progressed. End note.) The GOL appears to be soliciting civilian nuclear cooperation from a number of different potential bilateral partners.

LIBYA INVESTING IN UKRAINE'S DOWNSTREAM OIL SECTOR ...

¶4. (C) During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and Tymoshenko said she expected all 17 to be finalized and signed during a putative meeting of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee in Kiev in July. The Ukrainian Ambassador said the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting would take place as scheduled. Casting doubt on the projects' viability, he told Martynov that he should add the phrase "it would be nice if ..." as a prelude to the text of each proposed contract reported in the press. The parties held preliminary talks on establishing a Libyan investment center in Ukraine to oversee joint projects related to oil, gas and agriculture. In the energy sector, the proposed projects are for the supply of 600,000 tons of Libyan oil to Ukraine's Kremenchug refinery, the

construction of an oil refinery in Ukraine, the building of ten fuel stations, the modernization of Ukrainian thermoelectric power stations, and the participation of Libyan investment funds in the privatization of the Odessa Port-Side Plant.

... AND POSSIBLY IN WHEAT PRODUCTION

TRIPOLI 00000476 002.2 OF 002

¶5. (C) Martynov said Tymoshenko wanted to approve an agreement for Libya to cultivate 100,000 hectares of Ukrainian land for production of wheat that would be exported to Libya; however, the Ukrainian Ambassador told him the proposal would likely encounter stiff opposition in the Ukrainian parliament. Press reports quoted Ukrainian officials as saying implementation of the deal could be bogged down by difficulties over land legislation and ownership. The government of Ukraine does not own sufficiently large tracts and the private companies that own the land do not need government assistance to work with any foreign investor. (Note: Libya imports nearly all of its food, including wheat and flour, and has recently purchased and leased tracts in sub-Saharan Africa with the stated goal of securing stable supplies of food staples. End note).

¶6. (C) Comment: Even factoring in our Russian colleagues' obvious motivations for down-playing the visit (Martynov stressed that the GOL had assured Russia in the run-up that Libya was "not siding with Ukraine"), Tymoshenko's trip appeared to have been of a piece with the many high-level visits hosted by Tripoli. That is to say that it was long on ceremony and announcements, but short on real substance. While cooperation on civilian nuclear energy could be a long-term strategic move by Libya to maximize revenues from oil exports by generating electricity through nuclear energy for domestic needs, it remains unclear whether any of its agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation, to include that with Ukraine, will bear fruit. The scheme for Libya to grow wheat in Ukraine appears to have been ill-conceived. Martynov said the Ukrainian Ambassador had been told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about many of the proposed Libyan deals in Ukraine because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and perceptions that it was not a stable investment venue. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI477

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI477 aka Wikileaks id #212393 ?
Subject	UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Jun 2009 15:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI477.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9820
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0477/01 1671520
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161520Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4921
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1487
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0894
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0834
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0956
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0422
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0018
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 5455
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000477

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON, ENERGY FOR GINA ERIKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/9/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: UKRAINIAN PRIME MINISTER'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: During the recent visit of the Prime Minister of Ukraine to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and higher education. The Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and the two sides discussed establishing an investment center in Ukraine to oversee Libyan projects related to oil, gas and agriculture in Ukraine. The next step is ostensibly for Libyan officials to

visit Ukraine in July for discussions under the rubric of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee; however, the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting will occur as scheduled. Given the slow pace at which Libyan-Ukrainian ties have progresed to date, it is unlikely that many of the projects discussed during the visit will be implemented soon. The Ukrainian Ambassador was reportedly told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about the proposed deals because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and the perception that Ukraine was not a stable investment venue. End Summary.

AGREEMENTS SIGNED

¶2. (C) During the mid-May visit of Ukrainian Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko to Libya, the two countries signed agreements on military-technical cooperation, sharing sensitive information, civilian nuclear cooperation, sharing sensitive information and higher education. Russian DCM Anatoly Martynov told P/E Chief in early June that he had received a readout from Ukraine's Ambassador to Tripoli shortly after Tymoshenko's visit. The military-technical agreement had been under discussion since 2004 and provided a basic framework for military cooperation and training. Ukraine wanted to sign it during the March 2008 visit to Tripoli of Ukraine's President, but the Libyan side was unprepared to do so. During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian side also proposed establishing a center in Libya to refurbish Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters; however, the GOL deferred a decision. The protocol on the exchange of sensitive information was described as essentially being an agreement by both sides not to disclose military or intelligence information obtained from the other without securing prior permission to do so.

¶3. (C) The nuclear energy cooperation agreement was discussed during the March 2008 visit by Ukraine's president. Libya has already signed a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement wtih France and a memorandum of understanding with Russia that commits Russia and Libya to conclude a formal cooperation agreement on civilian uses of nuclear energy. (Note: Libya's efforts to establish nuclear power generating capability do not appear to be moving quickly. Dr. Mohammed Ennami, Deputy Director of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, told Econoff that Libyan officials were to have Libyan officials were to have visited France in April to follow-up on the France-Libya nuclear deal, but there are no indications that the project has progressed. End note.) The GOL appears to be soliciting civilian nuclear cooperation from a number of different potential bilateral partners.

LIBYA INVESTING IN UKRAINE'S DOWNSTREAM OIL SECTOR ...

¶4. (C) During Tymoshenko's visit, the Ukrainian delegation presented 17 commercial contracts for Libya's consideration and Tymoshenko said she expected all 17 to be finalized and signed during a putative meeting of the Ukraine-Libya Steering Committee in Kiev in July. The Ukrainian Ambassador said the Ukrainian summer holiday season and Libya's hosting of the upcoming African Union Summit make it unlikely that the meeting would take place as scheduled. Casting doubt on the projects' viability, he told Martynov that he should add the phrase "it would be nice if ..." as a prelude to the text of each proposed contract reported in the press. The parties held preliminary talks on establishing a Libyan investment center in Ukraine to oversee joint projects related to oil, gas and agriculture. In the energy sector, the proposed projects are for the supply of 600,000 tons of Libyan oil to Ukraine's Kremenchug refinery, the construction of an oil refinery in Ukraine, the building of ten fuel stations, the modernization of Ukrainian thermoelectric power stations, and the participation of Libyan investment funds in the privatization of the Odessa Port-Side Plant.

... AND POSSIBLY IN WHEAT PRODUCTION

TRIPOLI 00000477 002 OF 002

¶5. (C) Martynov said Tymoshenko wanted to approve an agreement for Libya to cultivate 100,000 hectares of Ukrainian land for production of wheat that would be exported to Libya; however, the Ukrainian Ambassador told him the proposal would likely encounter stiff opposition in the Ukrainian parliament. Press reports quoted Ukrainian officials as saying implementation of the deal could be bogged down by difficulties over land legislation and ownership. The government of Ukraine does not own sufficiently large tracts and the private companies that own the land do not need government assistance to work with any foreign investor. (Note: Libya imports nearly all of its food, including wheat and flour, and has recently purchased and leased tracts in sub-Saharan Africa with the stated goal of securing stable supplies of food staples. End note).

¶6. (C) Comment: Even factoring in our Russian colleagues' obvious motivations for down-playing the visit (Martynov stressed that the GOL had assured Russia in the run-up that Libya was "not siding with Ukraine"), Tymoshenko's trip appeared to have been of a piece with the many high-level visits hosted by Tripoli. That is to say that it was long on ceremony and announcements, but short on real substance. While cooperation on civilian nuclear energy could be a long-term strategic move by Libya to maximize revenues from oil exports by generating electricity through nuclear energy for domestic needs, it remains unclear whether any of its agreements on civilian nuclear cooperation, to include that with Ukraine, will bear fruit. The scheme for Libya to grow wheat in Ukraine appears to have been ill-conceived. Martynov said the Ukrainian Ambassador had been told by Libyan officials that the GOL was frankly skeptical about many of the proposed Libyan deals in Ukraine because of tension between the Ukrainian Prime Minister and President and perceptions that it was not a stable investment venue. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI48

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI48 aka Wikileaks id #188336 ?
Subject	LATEST ROUND OF TALKS WITH IMPRISONED LIFG MEMBERS CONCLUDES, NEXT ROUND SCHEDULED FOR LATE FEBRUARY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 22 Jan 2009 15:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI48.html
References	08TRIPOLI577 , 08TRIPOLI993 , 09TRIPOLI320
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2652
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0048 0221553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221553Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4349
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1382
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0738
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0870
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0813
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0986
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0673
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4873
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000048

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER), LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/22/2019
TAGS: PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LATEST ROUND OF TALKS WITH IMPRISONED LIFG MEMBERS CONCLUDES, NEXT ROUND SCHEDULED FOR LATE FEBRUARY

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 993 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 577 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 320

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Human Rights Committee Director of the quasi-governmental Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), told P/E Chief on January 22 that the latest round of talks with imprisoned members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), which began in late December (ref A), had concluded on/about January 20. Saleh said that he and Ali al-Salabi led the QDF's delegation for most of the latest round. Former LIFG member Noman Ben Othman, who is based in London and who has played a

Numan Ben Othman, who is based in London and who has played a prominent role in earlier rounds of the talks, did not participate and QDF Chairman Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, only took part in the opening session(s). The talks took place at the Abu Salim prison.

¶2. (C) The talks are part of what QDF officials describe as "an ongoing dialogue" under the personal patronage of Saif al-Islam with individuals described as former LIFG members . As reported refs B-C, QDF officials say the dialogue has so far resulted in the release of 131 former LIFG members, the most recent tranche of which was let go in June. Media reports characterize the individuals released so far as former LIFG "fighters"; however, the extent to which they were committed extremists who actively bore arms against al-Qadhafi's regime, as opposed to less dangerous individuals who associated with extremists or were less active functionaries in the LIFG, is unknown. As reported, ref B, Saleh told us that the only thing required of LIFG members was a willingness to renounce political violence and a commitment not to resume extremist activities. As reported ref A, he told us in December that the recently concluded round of talks had been delayed when questions arose about the sincerity of some former LIFG members' renunciation of political violence.

¶3. (C) Saleh said the next round of talks was scheduled to begin in mid to late-February, and that another tranche of former LIFG members (he put the number remaining in Libyan prisons at 90-100 individuals) could be released in late February to early March.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI482

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI482 aka Wikileaks id #212563 ?
Subject	RUSSIAN NSC DELEGATION TO VISIT LIBYA JUNE 22-24
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 17 Jun 2009 12:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI482.html
References	09TRIPOLI476
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI886
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
P 171259Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4927
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000482

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/16/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , RU *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN NSC DELEGATION TO VISIT LIBYA JUNE 22-24

REF: TRIPOLI 476

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Russian DCM Anatoly Martynov told P/E Chief June 11 that a Russian National Security Council (NSC) delegation is scheduled to visit Libya June 22-24. According to Martynov, the visit is at the invitation of Libyan National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi) and stemmed from a meeting in mid-May in Sochi between Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and Libyan Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. The delegation is expected to meet with Muammar

al-Mahmoudi. The delegation is expected to meet with Muammar al-Qadhafi, Muatassim al-Qadhafi and Prime Minister al-Mahmoudi. The principal subject to be discussed, according to Martynov, is military training and the potential sale of military equipment to Libya (including heavy-lift and tactical cargo aircraft, helicopters, attack aircraft, light armored vehicles, small coastal patrol craft and night vision equipment). Responding to the Ambassador's question about the status of the Russia-Libya Highly-Enriched Uranium/Low-Enriched Uranium (HEU-LEU) Agreement to facilitate the return to Russia of spent nuclear fuel from Libya, the Russian Ambassador said he believed the agreement was now with the General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent) for approval. He suggested that the NSC delegation would seek to discuss the agreement with GOL interlocutors during the upcoming visit.

¶2. (C) The NSC visit comes on the heels of a visit last week by a senior Russian trade delegation headed by Ara Abramyan. Abramyan co-chairs the Russia-Libya Inter-Governmental Commission and, according to Martynov, orchestrated the mid-May meeting of PMs in Sochi. Key subjects of discussion during the trade delegation's visit were the establishment of a commercial center for refurbishment of Soviet-era Libyan military equipment and a series of factories in Libya under the rubric of a joint venture investment scheme. Martynov said Libyan officials had asked in the course of Abramyan's visit whether Russia was interested in making a counter-proposal to Ukraine's offer to establish a center in Libya to refurbish Soviet-era Mi-8 helicopters (reftel).

¶3. (C) Comment: Russia-Libya cooperation has continued apace since the November 2008 visit to Moscow by Muammar al-Qadhafi, his first in the post-Soviet era. In addition to cooperation in establishing an international gas cartel akin to OPEC and increased activity by Gazprom in Libya, there appears to have been an uptick in military-to-military discussions, which have principally been conducted on the Libyan side by the National Security Council. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI483

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI483 aka Wikileaks id #212564 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION CONFIRMS RELEASE OF POLITICAL PRISONER MUHAMMAD BOUSIDRA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 17 Jun 2009 12:59 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI483.html
References	08TRIPOLI993
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
P 171259Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4928
INFO AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000483


DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON) AND DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION CONFIRMS RELEASE OF POLITICAL
PRISONER MUHAMMAD BOUSIDRA

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 993

¶1.  (C) Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Chairman of the Qadhafi
Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee, confirmed
to us that longtime political prisoner Dr. Muhammad Bousidra was
released on June 14 and had returned to his family home in
Benghazi.  Opposition website Libya al-Youm reported on June 8
that Bousidra had been released; however, Saleh said the
organization had misinterpreted his conversation with them and
that Bousidra had not yet been released at that time.  The
premature announcement by Libya al-Youm had then prompted Libyan
security officials - who had been unaware that he was to be set
free - to balk, delaying his release until the QDF could secure
the necessary permissions.

¶2.  (C) According to opposition websites, Bousidra was a
religious cleric and political activist who was arrested in
January 1989 and held for over ten years without being charged.
```

He is described as having been the longest-serving, living political prisoner in Libyan custody. Bousidra was hastily tried in late 1999/early 2000 by a specially-convened "People's Court"on charges that he had sought to undermine the al-Fatah revolution and was sentenced to life imprisonment. He was re-tried in 2005 and sentenced to 10 years imprisonment on the original charges, which dated to actions in 1988. He had already served 17 years in prison at the time of the re-trial and it was argued he should be released; however, Saleh said the Internal Security Organization (ISO) had refused to let him go.

¶3. (C) Saleh said the QDF, which is chaired by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, recently brokered Bousidra's release as part of a broader program of dialogue with former religious extremists, which has led to the release of some former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (reftel and previous). He said Bousidra had been provided with financial compensation, allowed to return to his home and would be assisted in trying to find a job and "regain his life". Saleh was evasive on the question of whether Bousidra remained under house arrest. In a formulation we've heard before in connection with the case of Fathi el-Jahmi, he conceded that Libyan security officers were posted at Bousidra's house, ostensibly to protect him from irate citizens and conservative regime elements who might otherwise seek to do him harm in retaliation for his alleged activities to topple al-Qadhafi's regime.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI485

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI485 aka Wikileaks id #212566 ?
Subject	HERE COMES THE JUDGE: LIBYAN JUDGES RESPOND POSITIVELY TO AMERICAN JUDGE'S WORKSHOP ON ARBITRATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 17 Jun 2009 13:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI485.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1043
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1237
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0485/01 1681302
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171302Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4930
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5464
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000485

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR ITA: NATE MASON, AND CLDP: MARC
TEJTEL, HISHAM ELKOUSTAF, AND MARAM TALAAT; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/17/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MEPI, PREL
[External Political Relations] , EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: HERE COMES THE JUDGE: LIBYAN JUDGES RESPOND POSITIVELY TO
AMERICAN JUDGE'S WORKSHOP ON ARBITRATION

REF: 07 TRIPOLI 707

TRIPOLI 00000485  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (C )  Summary:  Under the Department of Commerce's
Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP), a U.S. federal judge
conducted a workshop for 30 Libyan judges and attorneys on
```

conducted a workshop for 30 Libyan judges and attorneys on international arbitration from June 3-4 in at the High Judicial Institute in Tripoli. The program represents the first step in a program to expose Libyan judges to international arbitration best practices. Our Libyan interlocutors warmly welcomed the judge on her first trip to Libya, asked her to return to Libya for future programs and told Emboffs that the High Judicial Institute could directly coordinate future training sessions without working through the MFA or MinJustice equivalents. Holding the workshop at the judicial institute provided a window into Libya's otherwise largely opaque judicial system, and could in the future afford a channel in which to address more sensitive topics such as human rights and judicial reform. End summary.

¶2. (C) Under the auspices of the CLDP, Judge Delissa Ridgway (U.S. Court of International Trade) traveled to Libya May 30-June 4 to conduct a two-day workshop for Libyan judges and state attorneys on international arbitration. Funded by the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the workshop represents the first step in a program to expose Libyan judges to international arbitration best practices, a topic the Libyan General People's Committee for Justice (MOJ-equivalent) had indicated was a priority. Proposed future activities include connecting the judges to their counterparts in Tunisia, where there is an arbitration center, and to judges and courts in the U.S. Strengthening the Libyan judges' expertise in this area is expected to contribute to the long-term improvement of the commercial legal environment,creating better conditions for U.S. companies operating in Libya.

¶3. (C) Before the arbitration workshop, the Embassy's main point of contact for commercial law programming was the International Cooperation Department at the GPC for Justice. In three preparatory trips to Libya (between November 2008 and February 2009), Commercial Law Development Program staff were unable to meet with the Libyan body responsible for actually training judges, the High Judicial Institute; however, once Judge Ridgway arrived, a meeting was hastily arranged by the GPC for Justice with the Chief Inspector of Judges, Juma Bouzaid, and the Director of the High Judicial Institute, Dr. Nouredeen Alakrmi. Bouzaid, who speaks fluent English, was curious about the U.S. judicial system and asked a series of cogent questions about immunity for judges, how U.S. judges are evaluated and how the Supreme Court decides which cases to hear. He noted that in Libya, judges (and state attorneys) have full immunity and that the Supreme Court would (theoretically) hear any case that had been appealed in a lower court. The Director of the High Judicial Institute, Alakrmi, admitted he had no prior knowledge of the CLDP workshop (reflecting the lack of coordination on the GOL side), but said he would quickly arrange for the workshop to take place over the next two days. He added that in Libya, there is a great interest in learning more about the "Anglo-Saxon" and U.S. judicial approaches. (Note: 75 Libyan judges are currently undergoing training in the U.K. under a GOL-funded program to teach them English for nine months, and to then provide training in international law. End note.)

¶4. (C) On June 3, approximately 30 judges and state-attorneys showed up for the first day of the workshop. The original proposal from CLDP called for a smaller group of judges (around 20) from all over Libya, with a gender balance. The Embassy also asked for a list of participants prior to the workshop in order to tailor the sessions to their backgrounds and level of experience; however, no list was provided in advance. The group was also intended to include only judges; however, the institute staff explained that in Libya state attorneys could be rotated into positions as judges on an annual basis, so it would be beneficial to include them in the workshop as well. Approximately half the group were women and half men; most of the judges were men. At the coffee break, one of the female attorneys admitted to Econoff that she did not want to become a judge because it would take up too much time, and she needed a

more regular schedule in order to take care of her family. Very few of the participants spoke English - the justice ministry provided an English-speaking employee to interpret, but since he was not a trained interpreter the quality was spotty. (Note: In the future, it may be useful to consider funding a professional interpreter for similar USG-funded workshops. End note).

¶5. (C) The workshop comprised an overview of the U.S. judicial

system and a presentation on international commercial arbitration, with an emphasis on the concept that in international commerce, the two parties are free to enter into a contract as equals and the court's role is to enforce the contract. The importance of predictability was stressed as a key to attracting foreign investment; the role judges and lawyers play in ensuring fair application of the law is therefore important in creating the perception of a favorable business environment. Questions from the Libyan participants included how U.S. courts would deal with General Motors' bankruptcy and when "public order" in a sovereign nation takes precedence over a contract. Alakrmi, the director of the judicial institute, commented that "judges must be brave" and give greater consideration to international public policy than to domestic politics. Concepts such as the sanctity of contracts and the choice of law and forum were discussed. Even though Libya is not yet a party to the New York Convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitration awards, Libyan judges said most of them were familiar with the convention since five Arab countries are already parties to it. The presentation was followed by practical exercises involving real cases in order for the participants to actively discuss how they would handle various cases - Judge Ridgway said she was impressed by their level of participation and enthusiasm.

¶6. (C) During the week in Tripoli, the CLDP visitors were also able to meet with members of the construction and energy sectors. Shell's Country Manager admitted that his company would "move heaven and earth to avoid litigation," particularly in Libya. They viewed their relationship as being with "Libya, Inc." and assess that going to arbitration could seriously that relationship and their long-term investments. Noting that Shell had gone through an arbitration case in Qatar, he said it had taken many years for the company to get back on track there. He noted that while Shell's contracts with the National Oil Company are written under Libyan law, its contracts with international oil service contractors are usually under U.K. law. He offered that no one trusted the Libyan judiciary, which was less than transparent in its decisions, especially after the saga of the Bulgarian nurses accused of deliberately infecting Benghazi children with the AIDS virus (see reftel). In Libya, it was still the case that relationships and negotiations take precedence over the legal system.

¶7. (C) By holding the workshop at the judicial institute, CLDP and the Embassy gained a better understanding of the legal education system in Libya. Only about 110 students (out of 500 applicants) a year are admitted to the institute. Successful completion of the institute's curriculum is a requirement to become a state attorney, which is the stepping-stone to a judgeship. Before candidates are admitted to the institute, they must study law for four years after graduating from high school and then pass written and oral exams. The other alternative is to enter a private law practice and work as a trainee for two years before becoming a lawyer. The salary for a government lawyer ranges between 500 and 1,000 dinars a month (equivalent to USD 400-800 a month), whereas a private attorney can earn approximately 3,000 dinars a month (USD 2,400) or more.

¶8. (C) Comment: The CLDP workshop on arbitration was a good

18. (C) Comment: The CLDP workshop on arbitration was a good first step in forging a working relationship with the judicial education system in Libyan. It also provided access to the otherwise-opaque system of justice here. The judicial institute's director welcomed Judge Ridgway to come back to Libya and said the Embassy could be in direct contact with him to discuss future cooperation projects. These could include the travel of Libyan judges to the arbitration center in Tunis, as well as a visit to the U.S. Court of International Trade. The enthusiasm and candor of the director were a welcome relief from the more cautious norm, and could help pave the way to broach more sensitive topics such as human rights and judicial reform in the context of future training programs. Experience has shown that while we forge a new relationship with the judicial institute, it will also be important to double-track future projects with the Ministry of Justice. In addition, the source of funding for this program (MEPI) was not discussed during this visit; MEPI remains a neuralgic issue for conservative regime elements, who regard it as a vehicle for regime change. Most of the judges and attorneys who participated in the workshop had little or no previous direct experience with the U.S. and therefore represented a new target audience for Embassy outreach. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI487

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI487 aka Wikileaks id #212712 ?
Subject	THE KNIVES COME OUT? NATIONALIZATION OF SAIF AL-ISLAM'S MEDIA GROUP A BLOW TO WOULD-BE REFORMERS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Jun 2009 06:22 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI487.html
References	08TRIPOLI374 , 08TRIPOLI494 , 09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI494
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI678 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
O P 180622Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4933
INFO ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000487

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD AND INR/NESA; NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/17/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , KDEM *[Democratization]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THE KNIVES COME OUT? NATIONALIZATION OF SAIF AL-ISLAM'S MEDIA GROUP A BLOW TO WOULD-BE REFORMERS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 359 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 494 , C) TRIPOLI 374 , D) TRIPOLI 414 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Following in the takeover of quasi-independent satellite TV station al-Libia, the Government of Libya (GOL) also recently nationalized the remaining assets of Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group. It is hard to interpret the move as anything but the end of nominally independent media in Libya and a further degradation of press freedom in a country already ranked 160th out of 173 countries worldwide by Reporters Without Borders. Perhaps more significantly, it represents

Without Borders. Perhaps more significantly, it represents another serious blow against Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, who personally established the al-Ghad Group two years ago, and highlights the limits of the "soft power" approach he has taken in his effort to effect political-economic reform. His brother and reported rival, National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, may have helped orchestrate the timing (and perhaps more) of the government decree nationalizing the al-Ghad Group with Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, who has been at daggers drawn with Saif al-Islam over the latter's proposed reforms for over a year. How it all plays out remains to be seen, but in this round of jockeying in what remains a very old-school state, hard power appears to have trumped soft power. End summary.

OPENING SALVO ...

¶2. (C) As reported ref A, the state-owned Jamariya Arab News Agency (JANA) satellite television channel took over the quasi-independent al-Libia satellite channel on April 24. Al-Libia's manager and the former Deputy Director of the al-Ghad Media Group, Abdelsalam al-Mishri, was arrested and remains under investigation in connection with the channel's activities and alleged financial improprieties. The newspaper "Quryna" featured front-page articles on April 28 attributing al-Mishri's arrest and al-Libia's reported efforts to move its newsroom and broadcasting to London to al-Libia's reports by sensationalist Egyptian reporter Hamdi Kandil on Egypt's role in enforcing the blockade of Gaza and ties between Egypt and Hezbollah.

¶3. (C) The seizure of al-Libia coincided with a visit to Cairo by Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa to discuss bilateral trade and security issues. Egyptian Political Counselor Ahmed Abdel Halim recently confirmed that Ahmed Qadhafadam, cousin of Muammar al-Qadhafi and a leading Libyan interlocutor on Egyptian-Libyan affairs, had brokered a call between President Mubarak and Muammar al-Qadhafi during al-Mahmoudi and Kusa's visit to complain about al-Libia's reports on Egypt. Later that evening and shortly before the takeover, Muammar al-Qadhafi himself briefly visited al-Libia's broadcasting facility. The receptionist on duty described for us the bizarre episode: Al-Qadhafi entered the waiting room/reception area with a large entourage of security personnel, walked around the perimeter looking at the photographs and art, smiled cryptically at the receptionist and staff who had been quickly mustered to greet him, and then nodded and walked out without having spoken a word. Shortly thereafter, state-owned Jamahiriya TV began to simulcast its programming on al-Libia's signal.

... LEADS TO A BROADER BARRAGE AGAINST PRESS FREEDOM IN LIBYA

¶4. (C) In what Reporters Without Borders described as "a retrograde measure", Libya's state-owned media announced on June 1 that it was nationalizing the remaining assets of the al-Ghad Media Group (also known as the "1/09 Media Group"), which was established in 2007 by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi (son of Muammar al-Qadhafi). Opposition website Libya al-Youm posted a copy of Decree 226 of 2009, issued by Libya's General People's Committee (GPC -- Libya's Cabinet-equivalent), which "liquidated" the al-Ghad Media Group and established a new National Center for Media Services. The Center, to be funded by the GPC, will be "under the supervision of the GPC" and will "annex" all of al-Ghad's former assets. The al-Ghad Group comprised al-Libia TV, al-Shabibiya TV (focused on youth programming), al-Libia Radio and two daily newspapers, "Oea" and "Quryna". The newspapers were groundbreaking in the context of Libya's sterile media environment, and had quickly established credibility and a loyal readership (they effectively became the newspapers of record) by publishing criticism of senior officials and discussing taboo subjects such as Islamic extremism and opposition elements among Libya's diaspora population. (Note: While forward-leaning by local standards, coverage was largely

in line with state-owned media and criticism of officials was measured and, in many cases, tepid. End note.)

¶5. (C) Tension between Saif al-Islam's supporters and more conservative regime elements unaccustomed to and unhappy with such coverage had increased steadily during the past year. As reported ref B, columnist and Human Rights Society of Libyan Executive Director Muhammad Tarnesh (strictly protect) was arrested in April 2008 after the "Maal wa 'Amal" newspaper published an article he authored that was mildly critical of PM al-Mahmoudi and the poorly-coordinated raft of housing and infrastructure development projects being funded by the GOL. (Note: Saif al-Islam intervened to have Tarnesh released from custody. End note.) Al-Libia's hortatory coverage of Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent visit to Italy suggests that the channel's content has quickly been brought into line with that of the more staid JANA. The channel devoted much less extensive coverage to al-Qadhafi's visits to Madrid, Paris and Moscow in 2007 and 2008. Al-Libia's coverage of Saif al-Islam has been reduced since the nationalization as well.

MUATASSIM - NOT HIS BROTHER'S KEEPER?

¶6. (C) The local correspondents for BBC News and the Syrian Arab News Agency (strictly protect sources) told us shortly after the nationalization was announced that they had been hearing for more than a week that it was coming. Their information was that Libyan authorities had only been "waiting for an official decree" from the GPC. Well-informed contacts have told us that Prime Minister al-Mahmoudi orchestrated at least the timing (and perhaps more) of the decree nationalizing the al-Ghad Group with National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, brother and reported rival of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Al-Mahmoudi and Saif al-Islam have been engaged in a mostly quiet struggle over the latter's proposed political-economic reforms for over a year. A contact with direct access to External Security Organization Director Abuzeid Dorda said she had been told by him that Mubarak's call to al-Qadhafi to complain about al-Libia's reports on Egypt had afforded the regime a useful pretext to do what it had intended to do for some time anyway - nationalize the al-Ghad Group.

AL-LIBIA LOOKS OFFSHORE, BUT HAVING TROUBLE FINDING A VENUE

¶7. (C) Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Chairman of the Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee (and, according to Libya al-Youm, the new Director of the al-Ghad Group) claimed to P/E Chief on June 17 that al-Ghad had not/not been nationalized; however, he did confirm that al-Libia was actively looking for an alternative venue in which to house its news bureau and from which to broadcast. Confirming reports we'd heard previously, he said al-Libia had narrowed the choices down to London, Dubai and Amman and were leaning toward the latter. (Note: We have heard from employees of al-Libia that negotiations with the company's potential Jordanian counterpart have encountered some difficulty and that it is unlikely that al-Libia will secure approval from the Jordanian Government -- which is anxious to avoid angering the GOL, particularly in the wake of the Fathi el-Jahmi case (refs C,D) -- to broadcast from Amman. End note.) Saleh did not respond when asked to explain the interruption of al-Libia's broadcast on April 24 and reports on June 1 (including the text of the government decree) that the rest of the al-Ghad Group had been nationalized.

¶8. (C) Comment: Informed observers here agree that it is difficult to interpret the nationalization of the al-Ghad Group as anything but the end of nominally independent media in Libya and a serious blow against Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. The annexation of al-Libia and the "Oea" and "Quryna" newspapers represents a further degradation of press freedom in a country already ranked 160th out of 173 countries by Reporters Without Borders. It also comes on the heels of an unwelcome (from Saif

al-Islam's pespective) Cabinet shuffle, the failure of the General People's Congress to adopt a draft constitution he shepherded, Muatassim's successful visit to Washington in April (Saif al-Islam had wanted to maintain primacy on the U.S. account), Muatassim's premier role at his father's side during the recently-concluded Rome visit, and threats to Saif al-Islam's confidantes and business interests. His longtime business partner and adviser, Abdulrahman Karfakh, left Tripoli quickly earlier this year after having been threatened by Muatassim's confederates in connection with competition for a lucrative commercial contract. Karfakh is now in Houston "training" with U.S. project management company AECOM, but things have not yet quieted down enough for him to return to Libya.

¶9. (C) Comment (continued): The seizure of the al-Ghad Group is a significant development in the context of the ongoing struggle for primacy between Saif al-Islam and Muatassim, and is perceived as a signal to Saif al-Islam that his open criticism of conservative regime elements had gone too far. It is of a piece with the view that while Muatassim's star is waxing at the moment, Saif's is waning. Despite his high-profile involvement in the regime's most sensitive affairs (the Bulgarian nurses, the U.S.-Libya Claims Compensation Agreement, negotiations to resolve the Libyan-Swiss contretemps), Saif al-Islam holds no official title and has largely depended to date on "soft power" (the media group, the quasi-governmental QDF, his Youth Forum). The media group was a powerful asset that ensured that he was both the single most recognized figure in Libya after his father, and was seen as an agent of the reform that many Libyans quietly hunger for. It has been admittedly something of a mixed blessing, politically, for Saif: many Libyans viewed him as being too enamored of his role as a media darling, particularly since that was seen as further evidence that he was too Western and less authentically Libyan. While he has taken on conservative regime elements and eschewed a formal role, Muatassim has taken his position as National Security Adviser and quietly aggregated more traditional "hard power", to include involvement in the Security Committee (which coordinates sensitive security issues) and military procurement (his primacy in the latter has not yet been definitively determined). How it all plays out remains to be seen, but in this round of jockeying in what remains a very old-school state, hard power appears to have trumped soft power. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI49

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI49 aka Wikileaks id #188573 ?
Subject	GOL PROTESTS AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 23 Jan 2009 15:15 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI49.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI110 , 09TRIPOLI133
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3711
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0049/01 0231515
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 231515Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4350
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1383
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0814
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0871
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0739
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0987
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0674
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4874
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000049

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), DRL/NESCA (JOHNSTONE, KWIRAM)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GOL PROTESTS AMBASSADOR'S PUBLIC MENTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: A senior official with the MFA Americas
Department demarched us to protest the Ambassador's remarks on
human rights in a recently published interview in which he
addressed the state of U.S.-Libya relations and the issues on
which he intends to focus.  The Ambassador's mention of the case
of released regime critic Idriss Boufayed and his call for the
release of political prisoners and those of Boufayed's group who
remain in detention constituted "unacceptable interference in
Libya's internal affairs", our interlocutor said.  The
Ambassador should be careful in what he discusses publicly, else
there would be serious repercussions for the bilateral
relationship.  Libya was willing to discuss human rights, but
```

relationship. Libya was willing to discuss human rights, but such discussions should be restricted to suitable (i.e., private) fora. The timing of the intervention suggests that the GOL wanted to attempt to intimidate the recently arrived Ambassador and reiterate that any public mention of human rights constitutes unacceptable interference in internal Libyan affairs. End summary.

¶2. (C) Responding to an interview with the recently-arrived Ambassador published by Reuters on January 14, which prompted "alot of reaction within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other quarters of the government", MFA Americas Department Director Muhammad Matari delivered a strongly-worded demarche to P/E chief on January 22. Reading from a handwritten set of notes he said had been prepared by Foreign Minister Shalgham in consultation with Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, Matari said that while the article contained positive remarks on the overall U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship, the Ambassador's comments on human rights issues and the case of recently released regime critic Idriss Boufayed were "not conducive to a positive relationship". (Note: The Ambassador's interview with the Reuters correspondent was lengthy and covered a broad range of issues that the Ambassador hoped to focus on during the first several months of his tenure; however, the article focused only on potential military-to-military cooperation and human rights issues. End note.)

¶3. (C) Stressing the GOL's view that U.S.-Libya relations were "very fragile", notwithstanding implementation of the U.S.-Libya claims agreement last October and the recent exchange of ambassadors, Matari cautioned that both sides should be "extremely careful" about whether and how they raised sensitive issues such as human rights, particularly in dealing with the media. It was hypocritical for the U.S. to publicly raise human rights in light of events in Gaza and the fact that detainees remained in Guantanamo Bay.

¶4. (C) Matari took particular issue with mention of Boufayed and his group, characterizing the Ambassador's comments as an "inappropriate interference in Libya's internal affairs". (Note: The Ambassador noted that Boufayed's release to travel abroad for medical treatment was "positive" and, consistent with press guidance and previous remarks by senior USG officials, called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners, including members of Boufayed's group who remain in detention. He did not mention the more sensitive case of detained human rights critic Fathi el-Jahmi in light of progress quietly being made in the Embassy-Qadhafi Development Foundation channel. End note.) Matari stressed that Libya did not have political prisoners; individuals described as such by western media and governments were actually "radicals and terrorists" who had attempted to use religion and violence to gain political power, and who would impose a fundamentalist Islamic regime if they were allowed to come to power. If Libya had political prisoners, then the detainees at Guantanamo Bay must also be described as political prisoners, he said. "We are not angels", he conceded, "but neither are you".

¶5. (C) Characterizing the U.S. approach to human rights and democratization as "naive", Matari claimed that Libya's political thinking had "transcended" that of western countries. Libya remained a tribal society; the proliferation of political voices and parties the U.S. appeared to support could be counterproductive, as it had been in Iraq. Noting that the Ambassador had arrived recently, he urged him to refrain from giving "bold remarks" on human rights and other sensitive issues to the media. If the Ambassador were to persist in making such comments publicly, it would have "serious repercussions" for the bilateral relationship. The GOL's sensitivity on public mention of human rights did not mean that the two sides could not discuss the issue, but such conversations should be restricted to "suitable and appropriate" (i.e., private) fora. Claiming

that the most recent iterations of the Human Rights Report,

Religious Freedom Report and Trafficking in Persons Report were inaccurate in their representations of the situation in Libya, he complained that an alleged offer in 2005 to send Libyan officials to the U.S. to brief Department officials had gone unheeded. Saying that the upcoming editions of those reports would be read particularly closely by GOL officials to see whether the recent re-establishment of full diplomatic ties had born fruit, he claimed that negative language could "jeopardize" bilateral ties during what the GOL still regarded as "a delicate period"

¶6. (C) P/E Chief countered that the Ambassador's remarks were consistent with what USG officials, including Secretary Rice, had said previously. Human rights and good governance were key issues that USG officials discussed with all bilateral partners around the world, and the extent to which the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship was able to fulfill both sides' expectations would depend in part on the GOL's willingness to engage with us in a more candid manner on those issues. The Ambassador had stressed that human rights would be part of a dialogue based on mutual respect, and had not mentioned the more sensitive case of Fathi el-Jahmi in light of progress quietly being made on that case in the Embassy-Qadhafi Development Foundation channel.

¶7. (C) The HRR, IRF and TIP reports, P/E Chief explained, were based on Embassy reporting and input, and that engagement by the GOL to refute accusations of human rights violations should in the first instance be with the Embassy. Such cooperation had not been forthcoming; our repeated requests for official information and for meetings to discuss those issues had been ignored. An ideal forum in which to address such issues would be a high-level human rights dialogue, an initiative Libya had endorsed under the agreement by which bilateral ties were restored after Libya abandoned WMD and renounced terrorism. Senior USG officials - most recently former NEA A/S David Welch and Secretary Rice during their visit last September - had raised the issue with senior GOL officials, including Muammar al-Qadhafi. GOL officials had agreed to move forward with the dialogue, but we had seen no movement from the Libyan side. (Note: Matari claimed the GOL was ready to initiate a high-level human rights dialogue and that the Human Rights Committee of the General People's Congress would have the lead; Post will follow up. End note.)

¶8. (C) Comment: One of our less ideological interlocutors, Matari was clearly uncomfortable delivering some of the stronger points (i.e., claiming that detainees at GTMO were political prisoners and that Libya's political thinking "transcended" that of western countries), but was sincere in stressing that human rights remains an neuralgic issue for the regime. The timing of the intervention strongly suggests that the GOL's goals were to: 1) attempt to intimidate the recently arrived Ambassador, and; 2) reiterate that any public mention of human rights, be it of specific cases or general themes, constitutes unacceptable interference in internal Libyan affairs. The Ambassador is scheduled to see MFA A/S-equivalent early next week for a readout of the latter's recent visit to Washington and to discuss next steps in the bilateral relationship, and will underscore with him that while we will make good on our stated intention to be respectful, human rights and good governance will remain a component of our bilateral dialogue. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI490

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI490 aka Wikileaks id #212777 ?
Subject	ITALY SAYS GOL DELIBERATELY STALLING ON SIGNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION CONTRACT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Jun 2009 10:40 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI490.html
References	09STATE59827
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI795 , 09TRIPOLI886
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
O 181040Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4938
INFO NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE
DIA WASHINGTON DC
CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000490


DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CB (FERGUSON); NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/18/2019
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] , OPCW, LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: ITALY SAYS GOL DELIBERATELY STALLING ON SIGNING CHEMICAL
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION CONTRACT

REF: STATE 59827

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)


¶1.   (S) This message contains an action request (para 4).
Italian Deputy Head of Mission Lorenzo Kluzer (protect) told P/E
Chief June 17 that the Italian Embassy in Tripoli assessed that
the Government of Libya (GOL) was deliberately delaying the
implementation of its commitments under the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) to destroy its remaining stockpile of declared
chemical weapons (approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860
MT of chemical agent precursor chemicals).  The deadline
established by the CWC Conference of the States Parties for the
destruction of Libya's mustard stockpile is December 31, 2010;
```

destruction of Libya's mustard stockpile is December 31, 2010; destruction of the remaining inventory of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than December 31, 2011. The Italian company SIPSA has been working with the Libyan side to design and build the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility at which the destruction is to take place; however, the GOL has repeatedly delayed signing a contract with SIPSA. SIPSA has continued its work, but recently told Kluzer it judged that even if construction were to begin immediately, it was highly unlikely that the GOL would meet the deadlines for destruction of its mustard agent and precursors.

¶2. (S) Kluzer said he recently spoke with an Italian businessman who has been resident in Libya for over 30 years, who is a personal friend of Libyan Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and who has been retained as a consultant by SIPSA. Kluzer's contact said PM al-Mahmoudi recently told him he was ready and eager to sign the contract with SIPSA and that the General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent) supported him; however, al-Mahmoudi had been personally instructed by Muammar al-Qadhafi to not/not sign the agreement. Al-Mahmoudi told the consultant that his understanding was that al-Qadhafi wanted to "play cat and mouse" with the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in an effort to secure further, unspecified compensation for Libya's decision to abandon its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Kluzer offered his assessment that Italy and other European states parties were inclined to view the delay in signing the SIPSA contract as a strictly technical issue for the OPCW, an approach he judged to be mistaken. He said the collective assessment of the Italian Embassy in Tripoli was that the GOL was deliberately slow-rolling implementation of its WMD commitments, including the SIPSA contract; however, Rome had been reluctant to raise the issue with the GOL because of the premium it attached to keeping bilateral relations on an even keel in the run-up to al-Qadhafi's recent visit to Rome.

¶3. (S) Comment: The GOL has been credited with having largely met its WMD commitments; however, the recent track record is worrisome and suggests that it may be deliberately delaying implementation of commitments it has undertaken under the rubric of the U.S.-U.K.-Libya Tri-lateral Steering and Coordination Committee (TSCC) and multi-lateral mechanisms such as the OPCW. The GOL has delayed since November 2007 signing a U.S.-Libya agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel (the HEU-LEU agreement); delayed signing a parallel Russia-Libya agreement; given no detail on plans to sell its uranium yellowcake stockpile; delayed signing the SIPSA contract and delayed providing greater detail on its proposed retention of the sandbag enclosure at the Rabta facility.

¶4. (S) Action request: Reftel instructs Post to demarche appropriate Libyan officials to urge greater transparency with respect to the status of preparations to destroy its chemical weapons and its proposed retention of the sandbag enclosure. We have requested a meeting with Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, head of Libya's National CW Authority, to convey the demarche and related non-paper. Post requests guidance from the Department as to whether and how to incorporate the information above on the SIPSA contract and al-Qadhafi's reported intervention into the demarche.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI492

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI492 aka Wikileaks id #212829 ?
Subject	QADHAFI IN ROME: THE 'MAN OF HISTORY' VISITS THE ETERNAL CITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 18 Jun 2009 14:01 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI492.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2200
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0492/01 1691401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 181401Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4940
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0525
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1492
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0839
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0961
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0899
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5474
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000492

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/18/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , KTIA *[Treaties and International Agreements]* , IT *[Italy]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI IN ROME: THE 'MAN OF HISTORY' VISITS THE ETERNAL CITY

TRIPOLI 00000492 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi brought hundreds of companions and his trademark sensational fanfare with him on his first trip to Italy - Libya's former colonial master. In a read-out to the Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador (protect) described the myriad near misses and embarrassments: the visit was nearly canceled while Qadhafi's plane circled due to PM Berlusconi's back pain, denizens of the Eternal City were embarrassed by Qadhafi's frequent and public statements decrying

Italy's occupation, and Italians were angered by Qadhafi's implication that U.S. airstrikes against Tripoli and Benghazi in 1986 were akin to the September 11 attacks. On substantive issues, leaders discussed African and migration issues, with Qadhafi suggesting that EU payments of 1 billion Euros per year to Libya would enable him to solve the root problems that cause migration. The two nations signed several agreements addressing double taxation, maritime resources, an MOU on visa issuance, and an Italian-funded scholarship for 100 Libyan students. While Qadhafi's provocative statements and protocol demands proved a difficult pill to swallow, the Italians are hopeful that his historic trip was the last piece of the re-engagement puzzle and will allow them to close a painful and difficult chapter in the Libyan-Italian bilateral relationship. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Just returned from his accompanying the Libyan delegation of Colonel Qadhafi to Rome (June 10-13), Italian Ambassador Francesco Trupiano briefed the Ambassador and EU diplomats on June 17 on the historic visit's results. Trupiano said his mission had issued over 446 visas for the delegation (not including those officials who already had multi-entry permits) which traveled in 4 airplanes and ferried all vehicles and an ambulance as well. Interestingly, Trupiano also said -- given the close relationship between PM Berlusconi and Qadhafi -- that arrangements for the trip had been made by direct contact between their two offices. There had been several trips by senior Libyan officials in the past several weeks to firm up the program for the visit.

¶3. (C) Qadhafi's core delegation consisted of National Security Adviser (and son) Muatassim, Qadhafi, cousin and envoy on Egyptian affairs Colonel Ahmed Qaddafadam, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs Mohammed Siala, interpreter Fuad Zlitney, and National Oil chairman Shukri Ghanem. Trupiano pointed out that Muatassim clearly played a prominent role, always seated next to his father and attending all of the important meetings.

¶4. (C) As expected, Qadhafi managed to provoke controversy from the start. His emerging from his aircraft, his uniform adorned with the picture of Libyan resistance leader Omar al-Mukhtar in chains in Italian custody, followed by Mukhtar's son and other survivors of the Italian occupation (1911-1942) set Italian heads spinning. Trupiano said he and the Italians present knew that the son would be present along with the others but were unaware there would be a pectoral picture.

¶5. (C/NF) In a subsequent discussion with the Ambassador, Trupiano said that PM Berlusconi suffered acute back pain the day of the visit and had asked for a shot of cortisone to help him get dressed. That initial shot apparently did little good to alleviate the pain and the Italians then notified Qadhafi's plane (which was circling Rome airport) that Berlusconi might not be present at the airport arrival. The Libyans reportedly threatened to cancel the visit if Qadhafi was not met by Berlusconi or President Napolitano (a non-starter for Italian protocol given Qadhafi's lack of equivalent head-of-state title). At that point, Berlusconi asked for and received a second cortisone shot which enabled him to make the airport arrival, though Trupiano said that several times while waiting, the PM almost collapsed from the intense pain.

¶6. (C) In addition to the Omar al-Mukhtar picture, Qadhafi violated protocol standards by immediately introducing to Berlusconi all of the individuals who also wore pictures around their necks of relatives who had suffered Italian cruelty or of themselves. Each told a brief story to the PM. In every venue in which he spoke, Qadhafi referred to the cruelty of the European (especially singling out the Italians and the French occupation of Algeria) colonial period, tailoring his remarks to each audience. He noted to his official interlocutors that the Libyan-Italian rapprochement is one that can be used as a model

Libyan-Italian rapprochement is one that can be used as a model for other colonial powers who might wish to reconcile and turn a new page with their former colonies.

TRIPOLI 00000492 002.2 OF 002

¶7. (C) During his meeting with President Giorgio Napolitano, Qadhafi reportedly focused on African issues, noting that with respect to Eritrea and Ethiopia, there had been an agreement on the border but that it needed implementation. He invited Italy to work with Libya to mediate the conflict. On Somalia, Qadhafi reiterated his theme that piracy was caused by international commerce depriving Somalis of a living by fishing in their waters and argued that Somalia should have the right to extend its Exclusive Economic Zone to 200 miles. The Leader said Libya would submit a proposal at the upcoming UNGA whereby the world would recognize the economic rights of Somalia and pay a fee for fishing in return for a Somali effort to end piracy. Qadhafi also urged continued reform of the UNSC to reduce its influence in favor of the UNGA. He also advocated for a permanent UNSC seat for the African Union.

¶8. (C) Qadhafi and PM Berlusconi, according to Trupiano, discussed the migration problem, with Qadhafi asserting that there were in fact no real political refugees emerging from the "deserts of Africa." The vast majority fled for economic reasons and Qadhafi said that as a follow-up to the EU-Libyan meeting of November 2006, the EU should pay Libya 1 billion euros every year which Libya would use to help African nations solve their economic issues which would lead to a solution of the illegal migration issue. Libya, said Qadhafi, is doing its part to resolve this difficult issue between itself and the EU, especially Italy; several government officials and soldiers had been arrested recently for trafficking in illegal migrants.

¶9. (C) Among the agreements signed between the two sides were one on avoiding double taxation, an economic/scientific/technical agreement on marine resources (Italy refused to acknowledge Libya's effort to have the Italians recognize Libyan territorial claims of 74 miles), agreement by the Italians to fund 100 scholarships for Libyan students, and an MOU on facilitating the issuance of visas. The meeting with Italian industrialists resulted in a Libyan pledge to abolish discriminatory practices and to weed out corruption to enable companies to operate better in Libya.

¶10. (C) Trupiano asserted that the Italians were extremely embarrassed by Qadhafi's remarks, and especially angered by those seemingly equating the "state-sponsored terrorism" of the 1986 U.S. air attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi with al-Qaeda's attacks on 9/11. The Mayor of Rome affirmed the importance of the U.S.-Italy relationship and implicitly criticized Qadhafi's comments. That exchange reportedly caused Qadhafi to cancel without official reason the subsequent speech to the Italian parliamentarians. Qadhafi also insisted that he be the only male in the room during his discussion with 700 Italian women who questioned him on the real status of women in Libya. During a university discussion with students, Qadhafi avoided the hard questions by continually asking "clarifying questions" but never answering.

¶11. (C) Comment: The Italians are obviously relieved that the visit, which left Romans extremely angry at the Libyans and the government for the massive traffic tie-ups and the expense of hosting the Libyans, is over. Trupiano expressed the hope that while the Italians had to swallow hard on Qadhafi's unrelenting mention of the occupation, they believed that perhaps the Libyans would finally be able to close this chapter and begin a new relationship. Qadhafi was clearly taken with the historical import of his trip, making unscheduled stops throughout to see various moments and places connected to the Italian occupation,

including the place from which Mussolini spoke during his reign. According to Trupiano, the Italians were continuously frustrated by their inability to control Qadhafi's provocative comments on terrorism, the need to abolish political parties, and on the historical factors which led to female emancipation in the West. At the end of the day, the Italians here believe that despite the bells and flourishes and announcements of all manner of agreements, that matters will return to normal and there will be little if any implementation or follow-up. The Italians will have another opportunity to experience the Qadhafi roadshow when he visits the G-8 Summit in July in his capacity as Chairman of the African Union. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI494

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI494 aka Wikileaks id #213225 ?
Subject	FM KUSA NONCHALANT ON RETURN OF LIBYAN GTMO DETAINEES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Jun 2009 06:53 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI494.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI487
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5415
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0494 1730653
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 220653Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4943
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0963
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE 0841
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 1495
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5477
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000494

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG AND S/WCI; NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/21/2019
TAGS: KBTR, PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] ,
PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PINR [Intelligence] , PINS [National Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FM KUSA NONCHALANT ON RETURN OF LIBYAN GTMO DETAINEES

REF: State 027279

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.    (S/NF) During a June 21 meeting, Ambassador pressed FM Musa
Kusa to establish a more direct mechanism to provide regular
U.S. Embassy access to returned GTMO detainees and information
on their legal status, saying the GOL's cooperation could
improve prospects for the return of other Libyan detainees.

¶2.    (S/NF) Kusa said the GOL had cooperated with the U.S. on
apprehending and questioning al-Qaeda terrorists since the
```

September 2001 attacks in New York. Kusa and other Arab security chiefs (Kusa was head of Libya's External Security Organization until his appointment as Foreign Minister this year) had expected the USG to return the al-Qaeda suspects to their countries of origin after questioning by the U.S., but this had not transpired. The GOL understands that the USG is "under pressure" from human rights groups not to return the suspects to certain countries. While Libya wants to be helpful, it is not pressing for the return of the remaining Libyan detainees to Libya. "We are not overly concerned about them," he said.

¶3. (S/NF) If the USG does decide to transfer the detainees to Libya, Kusa asked that the GOL be informed in advance. The detainees would be incarcerated and referred to the Qadhafi Development Foundation (headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi), which operates a rehabilitation program for extremists in Libya's security prisons. The detainees would be entitled to family visits like other prisoners. Kusa warned that some of the Libyan detainees might return to violence if they were released. The Ambassador pressed several times for Kusa's commitment to provide regular Embassy access and information on the current returnees' legal status, but Kusa did not make any specific commitments in this regard.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: Kusa's comments reflect no change in Libya's policy of providing limited access and information regarding detainees returned to Libya. The GOL appears reluctant to agree to a formal mechanism to provide regular access and detailed information on detainees' legal status -- issues it considers to be sensitive internal matters. That said, the GOL has granted the Embassy access to the two returnees currently in Libyan custody on a case-by-case basis (the access has at times been timely, but more often has come after significant delay) and has continuted to offer assurances that the detainees are being treated humanely. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI495

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI495 aka Wikileaks id #213238 ?
Subject	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Jun 2009 07:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI495.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5453
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHTRO #0495 1730754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 220754Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4944
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0842
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1496
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5478
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000495

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD AND CA/VO/F/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS

¶1. (SBU) During a June 21 meeting with FM Musa Kusa, Ambassador noted that the U.S. had begun full visa operations for Libyans in Tripoli and had already issued over 800 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with limited wait times. By contrast, the GOL still followed a restrictive visa policy when it came to Americans, including an apparent ban on American tourists, lengthy delays and high fees for American business people, and a long record of visa denials for USG-sponsored cultural and academic visitors. Now that the US and Libya had restored bilateral relations, the USG expected to see greater reciprocity in visa policy.

¶2. (SBU) Kusa acknowledged that US visa policy was generous with respect to most Libyans, although there had been delays in the cases of certain Libyan officials. He said the GOL had opened the door to American business people, investors and employees of US oil and gas companies. These applicants often received

multiple entry visas, he noted (in contrast to the US's more limited single-entry visas for Libyan business people). To the extent there were delays, it was due to the small consular section in the Libyan Embassy in Washington. When the Ambassador pointed out that the US Embassy continued to hear stories of extortionate fees being demanded of US business people by Libyan middle-men, Kusa said he was aware of the problem, which he characterized as "corruption," and was trying to stamp it out. The Ambassador also noted there were other obstacles, both bureaucratic and personnel, that may also be contributing to an apparent virtual standstill in visa issuance for Americans. He asked Kusa to look into these as well.

¶3. (SBU) As for American tourists, Kusa said Libya's restrictive policy was security-related. He recounted a time two years ago when a cruise ship with several hundred Americans onboard had attempted to unload the passengers in the eastern Libyan town of Darna, the locus of foreign fighters heading to Iraq. As head of Libya's security organization at the time, he immediately ordered the ship not to let the Americans disembark, given the presence of so many extremists in the town. His point, he said, was that Americans remained vulnerable to attack by extremists, due to controversial US policies over the past several years. He was also concerned about "adventure tourists" who wanted to explore Libya's deserts. Sometimes these people got lost; so far none had been kidnapped, as had occurred in neighboring countries. The GOL, he said, was still looking for two missing foreigners -- Italian and Japanese -- who disappeared in the desert during a motorcycle expedition.

¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador asked why the GOL could not at least treat Americans as they do Europeans and allow tourists to come either in groups or in connection with organized tours by authorized Libyan tour companies. Kusa dismissed this idea, saying that Americans remained a more attractive target for terrorists than Europeans. Under the Obama Administration, Kusa said, he expected attitudes toward Americans to eventually improve, especially if progress could be made in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, in his view, opening up Libya to increasing numbers of American visitors had to be a "step by step" process.

¶5. (SBU) On USG-sponsored exchange visitors and on other non-responses to requests, Kusa agreed to review the situation. Ambassador offered to provide a list of visa denials in these cases.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: We find Kusa's justification for the total ban on American tourists to be unconvincing. A few years ago, Libya did in fact briefly permit Americans to visit Libya, provided they came as part of an organized tour or aboard a cruise ship. In these cases, the GOL has advance notification of the visit itinerary and can provide appropriate security, as it does in the case of European and other visitors. We will need to continue to test his assertions regarding Libya's "open doors" to American business visitors, and to assist the GOL to weed out corrupt middle-men by providing information on such practices to the GOL as it becomes available. On USG-sponsored exchange visitors, we will follow up by providing the MFA with our long list of aborted visits and attempt to determine whether this is a policy decision or the work of lower-level personnel who oppose U.S. engagement with Libyans in Libya. The good news here is continued GOL interest in U.S. visas and a commitment to look into the problematic issues we raised regarding lack of visa issuance. We will now press the MFA to make good on its commitment to establish an interagency working group to discuss these issues with us.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI496

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI496 aka Wikileaks id #213239 ?
Subject	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Jun 2009 07:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI496.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5454
PP RUEHAG RUEHAST RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDF RUEHFL RUEHIK RUEHKW RUEHLA
RUEHLN RUEHLZ RUEHNP RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSK RUEHSL RUEHSR RUEHVK
RUEHYG
DE RUEHTRO #0496 1730754
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 220754Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4945
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0843
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1497
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5479
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000496

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD AND CA/VO/F/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS

¶1. (SBU) During a June 21 meeting with FM Musa Kusa, Ambassador noted that the U.S. had begun full visa operations for Libyans in Tripoli and had already issued over 800 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with limited wait times. By contrast, the GOL still followed a restrictive visa policy when it came to Americans, including an apparent ban on American tourists, lengthy delays and high fees for American business people, and a long record of visa denials for USG-sponsored cultural and academic visitors. Now that the US and Libya had restored bilateral relations, the USG expected to see greater reciprocity in visa policy.

¶2. (SBU) Kusa acknowledged that US visa policy was generous with respect to most Libyans, although there had been delays in the cases of certain Libyan officials. He said the GOL had opened the door to American business people, investors and employees of US oil and gas companies. These applicants often received

multiple entry visas, he noted (in contrast to the US's more limited single-entry visas for Libyan business people). To the extent there were delays, it was due to the small consular section in the Libyan Embassy in Washington. When the Ambassador pointed out that the US Embassy continued to hear stories of extortionate fees being demanded of US business people by Libyan middle-men, Kusa said he was aware of the problem, which he characterized as "corruption," and was trying to stamp it out. The Ambassador also noted there were other obstacles, both bureaucratic and personnel, that may also be contributing to an apparent virtual standstill in visa issuance for Americans. He asked Kusa to look into these as well.

¶3. (SBU) As for American tourists, Kusa said Libya's restrictive policy was security-related. He recounted a time two years ago when a cruise ship with several hundred Americans onboard had attempted to unload the passengers in the eastern Libyan town of Darna, the locus of foreign fighters heading to Iraq. As head of Libya's security organization at the time, he immediately ordered the ship not to let the Americans disembark, given the presence of so many extremists in the town. His point, he said, was that Americans remained vulnerable to attack by extremists, due to controversial US policies over the past several years. He was also concerned about "adventure tourists" who wanted to explore Libya's deserts. Sometimes these people got lost; so far none had been kidnapped, as had occurred in neighboring countries. The GOL, he said, was still looking for two missing foreigners -- Italian and Japanese -- who disappeared in the desert during a motorcycle expedition.

¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador asked why the GOL could not at least treat Americans as they do Europeans and allow tourists to come either in groups or in connection with organized tours by authorized Libyan tour companies. Kusa dismissed this idea, saying that Americans remained a more attractive target for terrorists than Europeans. Under the Obama Administration, Kusa said, he expected attitudes toward Americans to eventually improve, especially if progress could be made in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, in his view, opening up Libya to increasing numbers of American visitors had to be a "step by step" process.

¶5. (SBU) On USG-sponsored exchange visitors and on other non-responses to requests, Kusa agreed to review the situation. Ambassador offered to provide a list of visa denials in these cases.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: We find Kusa's justification for the total ban on American tourists to be unconvincing. A few years ago, Libya did in fact briefly permit Americans to visit Libya, provided they came as part of an organized tour or aboard a cruise ship. In these cases, the GOL has advance notification of the visit itinerary and can provide appropriate security, as it does in the case of European and other visitors. We will need to continue to test his assertions regarding Libya's "open doors" to American business visitors, and to assist the GOL to weed out corrupt middle-men by providing information on such practices to the GOL as it becomes available. On USG-sponsored exchange visitors, we will follow up by providing the MFA with our long list of aborted visits and attempt to determine whether this is a policy decision or the work of lower-level personnel who oppose U.S. engagement with Libyans in Libya. The good news here is continued GOL interest in U.S. visas and a commitment to look into the problematic issues we raised regarding lack of visa issuance. We will now press the MFA to make good on its commitment to establish an interagency working group to discuss these issues with us.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI497

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI497 aka Wikileaks id #213240 ?
Subject	FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Jun 2009 07:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/06/09TRIPOLI497.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5452
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0497 1730754
ZNR UUUUU
P R 220754Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI LY
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000497

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD AND CA/VO/F/P

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FM KUSA: "STEP BY STEP" APPROACH TO VISA FOR AMERICANS

¶1. (SBU) During a June 21 meeting with FM Musa Kusa, Ambassador noted that the U.S. had begun full visa operations for Libyans in Tripoli and had already issued over 800 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with limited wait times. By contrast, the GOL still followed a restrictive visa policy when it came to Americans, including an apparent ban on American tourists, lengthy delays and high fees for American business people, and a long record of visa denials for USG-sponsored cultural and academic visitors. Now that the US and Libya had restored bilateral relations, the USG expected to see greater reciprocity in visa policy.

¶2. (SBU) Kusa acknowledged that US visa policy was generous with respect to most Libyans, although there had been delays in the cases of certain Libyan officials. He said the GOL had opened the door to American business people, investors and employees of US oil and gas companies. These applicants often received multiple entry visas, he noted (in contrast to the US's more limited single-entry visas for Libyan business people). To the extent there were delays, it was due to the small consular section in the Libyan Embassy in Washington. When the Ambassador pointed out that the US Embassy continued to hear

stories of extortionate fees being demanded of US business people by Libyan middle-men, Kusa said he was aware of the problem, which he characterized as "corruption," and was trying to stamp it out. The Ambassador also noted there were other obstacles, both bureaucratic and personnel, that may also be contributing to an apparent virtual standstill in visa issuance for Americans. He asked Kusa to look into these as well.

¶3. (SBU) As for American tourists, Kusa said Libya's restrictive policy was security-related. He recounted a time two years ago when a cruise ship with several hundred Americans onboard had attempted to unload the passengers in the eastern Libyan town of Darna, the locus of foreign fighters heading to Iraq. As head of Libya's security organization at the time, he immediately ordered the ship not to let the Americans disembark, given the presence of so many extremists in the town. His point, he said, was that Americans remained vulnerable to attack by extremists, due to controversial US policies over the past several years. He was also concerned about "adventure tourists" who wanted to explore Libya's deserts. Sometimes these people got lost; so far none had been kidnapped, as had occurred in neighboring countries. The GOL, he said, was still looking for two missing foreigners -- Italian and Japanese -- who disappeared in the desert during a motorcycle expedition.

¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador asked why the GOL could not at least treat Americans as they do Europeans and allow tourists to come either in groups or in connection with organized tours by authorized Libyan tour companies. Kusa dismissed this idea, saying that Americans remained a more attractive target for terrorists than Europeans. Under the Obama Administration, Kusa said, he expected attitudes toward Americans to eventually improve, especially if progress could be made in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Consequently, in his view, opening up Libya to increasing numbers of American visitors had to be a "step by step" process.

¶5. (SBU) On USG-sponsored exchange visitors and on other non-responses to requests, Kusa agreed to review the situation. Ambassador offered to provide a list of visa denials in these cases.

¶6. (SBU) Comment: We find Kusa's justification for the total ban on American tourists to be unconvincing. A few years ago, Libya did in fact briefly permit Americans to visit Libya, provided they came as part of an organized tour or aboard a cruise ship. In these cases, the GOL has advance notification of the visit itinerary and can provide appropriate security, as it does in the case of European and other visitors. We will need to continue to test his assertions regarding Libya's "open doors" to American business visitors, and to assist the GOL to weed out corrupt middle-men by providing information on such practices to the GOL as it becomes available. On USG-sponsored exchange visitors, we will follow up by providing the MFA with our long list of aborted visits and attempt to determine whether this is a policy decision or the work of lower-level personnel who oppose U.S. engagement with Libyans in Libya. The good news here is continued GOL interest in U.S. visas and a commitment to look into the problematic issues we raised regarding lack of visa issuance. We will now press the MFA to make good on its commitment to establish an interagency working group to discuss these issues with us.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI5

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI5 aka Wikileaks id #185650 ?
Subject	LIBYAN REACTIONS TO GAZA: PUBLIC OUTRAGE, PRIVATE PRAGMATISM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 5 Jan 2009 07:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI5.html
References	08TRIPOLI984 , 08TRIPOLI988
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI30
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9503
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0005 0050702
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 050702Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4293
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4816
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000005

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; USUN FOR GOLDBERGER, GERMAIN; DS/IP/NEA;
DS/TIA/ITA AND DS/ICI/PII

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/5/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , UN *[United Nations]* , ASEC *[Security]* ,
KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN REACTIONS TO GAZA: PUBLIC OUTRAGE, PRIVATE
PRAGMATISM

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 988 , B) TRIPOLI 984

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Public and press reaction in Libya to events in Gaza has
largely tracked wider Arab responses, with growing coverage in
local media decrying "Zionist aggression". Authorities have
authorized several demonstrations in the past week, including
protests in front of the Palestinian, Jordanian, and Egyptian
embassies. On December 29, Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdul Halim
told Poloff that embassy personnel had been ordered to remain in
their houses due to the disturbances, but stressed that the
GOL's security presence around the embassy had been sufficient

to control the crowd. There have been daily protests since Israeli airstrikes against Gaza began; the high water mark so far came on December 28, when a crowd estimated at about 700 individuals threw rocks for an hour and a half at the Egyptian Embassy. Television coverage of the protests showed crowds of boys in school uniforms milling about while smaller groups of more spirited protesters railed against Egypt's supposed complicity in the border blockade. (Note: Most school uniforms are in the style of military fatigues, lending a martial air to the televised protests. End Note.) Post's FSNI attempted to approach the Egyptian embassy on January 4 to monitor the protests, but was turned back at a police checkpoint about two blocks from the scene, reflecting the fact that the "spontaneous" protests are (so far) tightly orchestrated.

¶2. (C) Al-Jazeera.net reported online that "human rights activists and members of the Palestinian community" staged a demonstation in Benghazi on January 3 calling on the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) to expel the recently arrived U.S. Ambassador, claiming his presence "desecrates the pure Libyan land". A statement passed to MFA representatives noted that the Ambassador's previous overseas post had been Tel Aviv, claimed he was a spy and drew a line between his service in Tel Aviv and "Zionist crimes committed with American weapons and under American political and diplomatic cover". Neither of post's two locations have been targeted for protests to date and we have received no notice in diplomatic or security channels to date advising us that protests against U.S. interests are in the offing.

¶3. (C) Libyan officials have focused their remarks against Israel and Egypt, the latter for its role in denying the trans-shipment into Gaza of some humanitarian relief shipments from Arab states. Statements by GOL officials and state-owned media have equated Egypt's control of the al-Errish border crossing with enforcing Israel's blockade of Gaza. At a meeting in Tripoli on December 30 of foreign ministers from Maghreb states, ministers from Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia called for an immediate end to Israel's "brutal and barbarous aggression". Muammar al-Qadhafi called the situation "very shameful" and promised that Libya would continue to send aid as it would in any disaster. He used his comments to renew his intermittent role as a would be pan-Arab leader, saying " ... [Gaza] is not a natural disaster...the response is not with blankets and medicines ... the response is by action, which the Arabs either do not want or are unable to do". One of al-Qadhafi's sons, Hannibal al-Qadhafi (who has been beleaguered since his arrest in Geneva in mid-July for beating his household help), told al-Jazeera after a Libyan aircraft carrying relief supplies was denied permission by Egypt to land in the Sinai that Libya would continue to attempt aid shipments even if it meant sending planes and aircraft on "suicide missions". Further tensions were averted on December 31 when part of that shipment was delivered to Gaza.

¶4. (C) Comment: Public demonstrations and statements to date suggest that the GOL is attempting to strike a difficult balance between being seen as responsive to the Arab street, its position as the only current Arab member of the UNSC and its desire to navigate the Gaza crisis with minimal collateral diplomatic damage. With respect to the latter, there is particular concern that recently improved U.S.-Libya ties - made manifest by the recent implementation of the U.S.-Libya comprehensive claims agreement and the imminent exchange of ambassadors - not be jeopardized. The expulsion of the first U.S. Ambassador in 36 years a week after his arrival appears to be beyond the level of political theater the regime is currently willing to indulge as a nod to popular sentiment; however, as the the crisis wears on, domestic and external pressure on the GOL to take more direct action will increase. Post understands that Foreign Minister Abdulrahman Shalgham is currently en route to New York, where he will join several Arab foreign ministers

in urging the UNSC to adopt a resolution calling for an immediate end to Israeli military action in Gaza. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI517

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI517 aka Wikileaks id #214828 ?
Subject	BUSINESS IS POLITICS IN LIBYA: CANADIAN OIL FIRM VERENEX STILL TRYING TO SELL COMPANY TO THE CHINESE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 1 Jul 2009 16:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI517.html
References	09TRIPOLI148 , 09TRIPOLI306
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI741 , 09TRIPOLI778
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3891
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0517/01 1821602
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011602Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4972
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0025
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0005
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5507
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000517

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/25/2019
TAGS: EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , LY *[Libya]* , CA *[Canada]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]*
SUBJECT: BUSINESS IS POLITICS IN LIBYA: CANADIAN OIL FIRM VERENEX STILL TRYING TO SELL COMPANY TO THE CHINESE

REF: A) TRIPOLI 148 ; B) TRIPOLI 306

TRIPOLI 00000517 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Verenex, a Canadian oil firm, continues to experience delays from the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) on

experience delays from the Libyan National Oil Company (NOC) on approving the proposed sale of Verenex to China National Petroleum Company International Ltd (CNPCI) in a deal estimated at 400 million U.S. dollars. In the latest round of stalling, the NOC introduced allegations of misconduct during Verenex's initial bid. The head of Verenex believes the Libyan authorities are trying to force down the proposed share price (10 Canadian dollars) in order to buy the company itself. The reasoning behind the NOC's stone-walling remains elusive, but may be related to a number of issues, including: Libyan concerns about the Chinese offer, NOC's interest in accumulating funds for the Compensation Fund agreed to with the U.S., or bureaucratic incompetence. Regardless of the NOC's reasoning (or lack thereof), Verenex's troubles may have broad implications for other foreign firms doing business here, as GOL's actions to stall the sale appear to violate the sanctity of its contract with Verenex. End summary.

¶2. (C) On April 23, Jim McFarland (strictly protect), President of Verenex, a relatively small Canadian oil firm with exploration activities in Libya, provided an update on the proposed sale of Verenex to CNPCI. As reported in Refs A and B, the proposed sale requires the approval of Libya's NOC under the terms of Verenex's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the NOC and contains a clause allowing the NOC to pre-empt any bid that has been offered. McFarland believes that the Libyans are dragging out the approval process in an attempt to drive down Verenex's share-price and pre-empt the CNPCI offer of 10 Canadian dollars per share (a deal that would amount to roughly $400 million USD). He also stated that while the Libyans have political concerns about the Chinese offer, they want to avoid offending the Chinese government.

¶3. (C) The sizable profit that NOC stands to gain in acquiring Verenex could be intended to repay the GOL entity (reportedly NOC) for its contributions to the Libyan terrorism compensation fund agreed to by the U.S. and Libya and completed on October 31, 2008. NOC Ghanem has reportedly been under intense pressure to make up for the Libyan funding that resolved the issue. Marathon Oil GM Steve Guidry told Pol/Econ Chief on June 28 that NOC is developing various creative ways to try to collect money from the IOCs for the fund. NOC's acquisition of Verenex's fields would be consistent with that goal. On April 23, McFarland noted that an NOC-owned subsidiary, African Gulf Oil Co. (AGOCO), which previously operated in Verenex's block, may be trying to re-acquire the area.

¶4. (C) McFarland said the consideration of the proposed sale of Verenex has shifted from the NOC to the General People's Committee (GPC), which is led by the Secretary of the GPC (prime minister-equivalent) al-Baghdadi Ali al-Mahmoudi. McFarland commented that the chair of the NOC Shukri Ghanem, had been straightforward with him regarding the deal and wanted to avoid tarnishing the NOC's reputation.

¶5. (C) In addition to regular meetings with al-Baghdadi, Verenex is now meeting with the GPC's legal counsel. The lead attorney is Ahmed Messalati. Verenex's lawyers "did some checking" on Messalati, including asking the State Department about him. It appears he was one of the main negotiators on the 2008 claims compensation agreement between the U.S. and Libya. McFarland said the reports he received about Messalati were positive and that Verenex appreciated knowing that a serious interlocutor would be working on the case. Verenex also expects Messalati to be a shrewd negotiator, who will try to win the best deal for the Government of Libya (GOL).

¶6. (C) McFarland said Verenex had recently received letters from the NOC saying the legal authorities in Libya were investigating allegations that Verenex was improperly pre-qualified to bid in the EPSA IV first bid round in January 2005, under which Verenex acquired its rights to its exploration zones (Area 47) in Libya (see Ref A). McFarland called this a

"bogus investigation," and opined that it was a pressure tactic to bring down the share price. He believes the investigation is being carried out by the auditors of the GPC, as part of their review of the Verenex "file." He said they had had plenty of time to investigate the deal, including since last September when the process for selling Verenex began. He noted the first EPSA bidding round did not have clear criteria in the first place; thus, GPC allegations had no real basis.

TRIPOLI 00000517 002.2 OF 002

¶7. (C) Verenex is also keeping the Canadian Embassy informed of the progress of their negotiations and the ongoing challenges. The Canadian Ambassador told the Ambassador that he has raised the Verenex issue with high-level officials in Tripoli and has requested a meeting with Muammar al-Qadhafi to discuss Verenex, among other issues. Verenex has also kept the UK Ambassador apprised of the latest developments, given the important role British companies play in the oil and gas sector in Libya.

¶8. (C) Comment: A number of reasons could be driving GOL's blocking of the Verenex sale, including Libyan concerns about the Chinese offer, NOC's interest in accumulating funds for the compensation fund, revenge on the part of Libyan stakeholders whose ox had been gorged by the initial permission for Verenex to operate, or simple bureaucratic incompetence. While it would appear the Verenex saga is not of direct concern to us (although there are a considerable number of American shareholders) given its status as a small Canadian company that perhaps entered the Libyan market to make a quick profit and then exit, the case has broader implications for other foreign firms doing business here. GOL's stone-walling of Verenex's sale to the Chinese, and the last-minute introduction of allegations of misconduct in initial bidding rounds, raise strong concerns about Libya's commitment to the sanctity of contract, a principle that is essential for companies operating in Libya. We intend to raise this troubling aspect of the case in future discussions with GOL officials. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI535

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI535 aka Wikileaks id #215300 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI ENCOURAGES U.S. ROLE IN CHAD-SUDAN PEACE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 6 Jul 2009 16:03 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI535.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0814
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0535 1871603
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 061603Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4991
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0162
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0174
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5526
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000535

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/6/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI ENCOURAGES U.S. ROLE IN CHAD-SUDAN PEACE

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S//NF) Following his discussion in Sirte on July 2 with Abdullah Sanussi (Director of Military Intelligence and long-time al-Qadhafi confidant) in which they discussed U.S. initiatives to bring peace and relief to Sudan (septel), Special Envoy Scott Gration was called back to Sirte from Tripoli on July 3. After another discussion with Sanussi and other African officials, Gration (accompanied by the Ambassador, GRPO Chief, and Gration Deputy Tim Shortley) met with Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi who had just finished chairing a non-stop, ten-hour closing session with African leaders. The meeting took place on the dais from which al-Qadhafi had presided over the session.

¶2. (S) The Special Envoy briefly reviewed what he had been discussing with Libyan officials regarding new U.S. initiatives in the region and potential new cooperation with Libya. He said

he was pleased that the U.S. and Libya might be able to be true partners in this endeavor and thanked al-Qadhafi for his efforts to bring peace to the region.

¶3. (S) Al-Qadhafi expressed his support for U.S. actions in the region and welcomed Washington's and Gration's efforts to resolve problems and bring peace and stability to the area. Al-Qadhafi believed that there was great potential for U.S. resources to be brought to bear positively in what appeared to be a new approach by Washington towards problems on the continent. He lamented that resources had been squandered in the past. The Libyan leader was very optimistic regarding the new tone set by President Obama and said that Libya now trusted Washington's word and America could count on Libya's help and support. He urged Gration to maintain close contact with Libyans involved in these issues. Al-Qadhafi acknowledged that in the past he had differences with the U.S., made it known at those times and "confronted" the U.S. where he believed he had to. Now, he said, that page had turned and the two countries were friends.

¶4. (U) Special Envoy Gration did not have the opportunity to clear this message.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI540

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI540 aka Wikileaks id #215668 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI: INTERIM RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE REQUEST - OPPOSITION TO THE ITSO DIRECTOR GENERAL'S PUSH FOR AUTHORITY TO INITIATE ARBITRATION AGAINST THE US GOVERNMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 8 Jul 2009 14:50 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI540.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9495
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0540 1891450
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 081450Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4996
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0528
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5531
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000540

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/CIP/TS DOUGLAS MAY; STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , ECPS [Communications and
Postal Systems] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , INTELSAT [International Telecomsatellite Consort] , KTIA
[Treaties and International Agreements] , TSPA [Space Activities]
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI: INTERIM RESPONSE TO DEMARCHE REQUEST - OPPOSITION
TO THE ITSO DIRECTOR GENERAL'S PUSH FOR AUTHORITY TO INITIATE
ARBITRATION AGAINST THE US GOVERNMENT

REF: STATE 68508

¶1.    (SBU)  As per demarche request in reftel, post sent the
suggested talking points via diplomatic note July 7.  Post will
send in any updates as soon as we receive a response.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI543

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI543 aka Wikileaks id #215799 ?
Subject	POWER PLAY ON LIBYA'S HEU TRANSFER COMMITMENTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 9 Jul 2009 08:55 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI543.html
References	09TRIPOLI427
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6127
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0543 1900855
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 090855Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0080
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0070
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5535
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000543

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; ISN/NESS D. FENSTERMACHER; DOE-M FOR M.
TSIKLAURI

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/8/2019
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , TRGY [Energy Technology] , LY [Libya] , RS
[Russia; Wrangel Islands]
SUBJECT: POWER PLAY ON LIBYA'S HEU TRANSFER COMMITMENTS

REF: A. STATE 52146
     B. TRIPOLI 427

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF)  Summary:  Working-level Government of Libya (GOL)
representatives reported that preparations were underway for
transfer of Libya's highly enriched uranium (HEU), with shipment
planned for September 29.  Based on their extensive preparations
for the transfer, working-level GOL representatives believe PM
al-Mahmoud al-Baghdadi will sign the bilateral agreement to
transfer the HEU to Russia, but MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri
separately told us that Al-Baghdadi could prove to be an
obstacle.  Fituri nevertheless was confident that the agreement
would be signed.  End summary.
```

MOVING SLOWLY...BUT IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION?

¶2. (S/NF) During a June 27-29 DOE visit to the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center, Dr. Ali Gashut, Secretary of the National Authority for Scientific Research, said that the GOL's nuclear spent fuel-return agreement was currently with PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, whom Gashut believed would sign the agreement on behalf of the GOL. Gashut indicated that al-Baghdadi would sign the agreement, which has been in his office since May (ref B), within a week. Meanwhile, a Russian Department of Energy counterpart indicated to the DOE team that the GOL's parallel agreement with Russia to accept Libya's nuclear spent fuel was also in al-Baghdadi's office, although the Russian did not have any other specific information regarding that agreement.

FLIGHT OF THE TOXIC WASTE

¶3. (S/NF) The Tajoura facility is planning to receive DOE containers in late July, which will be used to transport the nuclear spent fuel to Russia for final disposal. DOE and the Tajoura facility are preparing the final shipment to take place early in the morning of September 29, via an Antonov 124-100 stretch plane that will fly out of Metiga Air Base. The shipment is expected to arrive in Russia on the evening of September 29.

¶4. (S/NF) The GOL has made clear that it does not want its high-level waste to return to Libya after it has been treated in Russia. The GOL has already agreed to pay a fee of USD $30,000 to have the Russians bury it in a secure location.

BUREAUCRACY AT WORK

¶5. (S/NF) MFA A/S-equivalent Fituri tempered Gashut's optimism regarding the GOL's nuclear spent fuel-agreement during a July 6 meeting with the DCM. After Gashut had interrupted the meeting to seek Fituri's clearance on the GOL's draft response to ISN DAS Mitman's letter regarding the transfer agreement, Fituri hinted that PM al-Baghdadi had put a hold on moving the agreement forward for reasons he did not know, adding that the PM was being obstructionist in other areas as well. During a brief encounter in Sirte on July 3, the Ambassador stressed to the Prime Minister that he needed to resolve this issue very quickly if we were to move to expand further cooperation. Fituri said that he had pointed out how problematic the issue was for FM-equivalent Musa Kusa. Fituri thought their next move would be to raise the matter with Colonel al-Qadhafi during his visit to Italy for the G-8 Summit, in order to obtain his backing to overrule al-Baghdadi's decision. In a separate July 8 meeting, Fituri clarified that FM Kusa had recommended approval of the transfer and predicted that Libya would meet its obligations, although the timing may be a bit later than desired (septel).

¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Fituri's comments hint at power-jockeying within the Libyan bureaucracy, and post expects to receive positive news on the agreement once the dust settles. The GOL is fully aware that there will be no movement on further cooperation in the civilian nuclear field until Libya fulfills its commitments on the shipment. Post will continue to press the GOL to fulfill its nuclear program agreements and to raise the seriousness of the issue at the highest possible levels. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI554

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI554 aka Wikileaks id #216194 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: ERITREA DEFENDS SOMALIA POLICY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 12 Jul 2009 15:02 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI554.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5101
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0554/01 1931502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121502Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5009
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1070
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0746
RUEHAE/AMEMBASSY ASMARA 0065
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0169
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0184
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5547
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000554

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ER [Eritrea] , SO [Somalia] , AU-
1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: ERITREA DEFENDS SOMALIA POLICY

TRIPOLI 00000554  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.( C) Summary:  Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie
Carson met Eritrean ruling party Political Chief Yemane Ghebreab
```

and Foreign Minister (FM) Osman Saleh on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya July 2 to discuss the crisis in Somalia and waning prospects for renewed reinvigorated bilateral relationship between the United States and Eritrea. Carson charged the Government of Eritrea (GSE) with providing financial and logistical assistance to al-Shabaab, playing a spoiler role in Somalia, and using Somalia as a battlefield for its proxy war with Ethiopia. He said the United States is reaching out to Eritrea, but warned Eritrea's top officials that GSE's current path will lead to further international isolation and possible sanctions. Yemane denied providing assistance to al-Shabaab and claimed their issues with Ethiopia are separate from the situation in Somalia. End Summary.

RESPONSE TO GSE'S ONGOING DENIALS

¶2. (C) A/S Carson opened the meeting by expressing USG's desire to improve the bilateral relationship with the GSE and urged Eritrea to stop immediately from playing a spoiler role in Somalia by proving financial and logistical assistance to al-Shabaab.

¶3. (C) Yemane welcomed Carson's offer for a renewed relationship and said it is long overdue. He then firmly denied providing support to al-Shabaab and said the GSE is playing a constructive role in Somalia. In response, A/S Carson stated, "We categorically reject that you are innocent and believe you are the supplier of resources going into the hands of al-Shabaab." He directly linked Eritrea to al-Shabaab's success in Somalia, and called on Eritrea to cease supporting violent extremists, not only in perception but in reality, if a reinvigorated and positive bilateral relationship with the U.S. is truly a priority for the GSE. "The choice is yours. The only thing we can do is encourage you to do the right thing," Carson added. In response, Yemane and FM Osman Saleh continued Eritrea's longstanding denial of GSE support of al-Shabaab. The FM further retorted that linking Eritrea to al-Shaabab is unacceptable.

PROXY WAR WITH ETHIOPIA

¶4. (C) A/S Carson detailed the USG position in support of the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and the Djibouti peace process. He noted that the GSE appears to be supporting al-Shabaab not because Eritrea is pro-extremist but because it is fighting a proxy war with Ethiopia. The GSE officials stressed their issues with Ethiopia are separate from the situation in Somalia and accused A/S Carson of recycling the same language as Ethiopia by referring to Eritrea as a spoiler.

GSE's POSITION ON SOMALIA

¶5. (C) Yemane defined the GSE's objective as creating a strong, unified Somali state, then faulted Ethiopia for dividing Somalia. Yemane insisted the only way forward was to establish an all-inclusive (including Somaliland and Puntland), Somali-driven dialogue supported by the international community. He asserted that all other methods have failed. Yemane criticized the Djibouti talks for not allowing other Somali political players to accompany TFG President Sheikh Sharif to the meetings. By lending its support to Sheikh Sharif, he claimed the international community was sending the wrong message. This message, he stated, encouraged Sheikh Sharif to pursue a military option rather than negotiate with opposition. Yemane called AMISOM a "weak peacekeeping force" that will not succeed without the support of all protagonists in Somalia. A/S Carson rejected Yemane's analysis, accused the Eritreans of not supporting a more inclusive Somali process and challenged the GSE to help build an all-inclusive dialogue within the TFG framework.

framework.

US DIALOGUE ATTEMPTS REBUFFED BY GSE

TRIPOLI 00000554 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) When Yemane expressed GSE's interest in sending a delegation to the U.S. to discuss bilateral relations, A/S Carson pointed out that recent USG attempts to engage Eritrea were rebuffed by the GSE. Secretary Clinton's effort to reach out to Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki in a June telephone call was met with no response from Isaias' office and the Eritrean Embassy in Washington refused to issue A/S Carson a visa for his proposed trip to Asmara to meet with Isaias, Carson continued. Yemane denied that A/S Carson's visa had been rejected, claiming instead that it was only "not yet approved." Yemane said before such a call by the Secretary or visit by Carson could take place, the GSE believes that working level meetings must occur to discuss Somalia and lay the groundwork for an improved bilateral relationship.

¶7. (C) Carson closed the meeting by encouraging the GSE to speak out against al-Shabaab, end its support for Somali extremists and move forward with constructive actions. Yemane replied, "We will be constructive. Regardless of our relationship with the United States, Somalia is very important to us and we will work toward a peaceful solution."

¶8. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI555

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI555 aka Wikileaks id #216196 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUSA KUSA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 12 Jul 2009 15:04 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI555.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5104
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0555 1931504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121504Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5011
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1072
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0748
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0171
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0186
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5549
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000555

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ER *[Eritrea]* , ET *[Ethiopia]* , SO *[Somalia]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH LIBYAN FOREIGN MINISTER MUSA KUSA

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.(C) In a brief meeting on July 2 on the sidelines of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya, Libyan Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (FM-equivalent) Musa Kusa said Libya had used the AU summit to bring Ethiopian and Eritrean

leadership together in an effort to end their proxy war in Somalia. Kusa encouraged A/S Carson to have the U.S. promote security in the Sahel at the July 8-9 G8 meeting in Italy. A/S-equivalent for American Affairs Ahmed Fituri agreed that if Somalia's Transitional Federal Government were to lose ground to al-Shabaab, transnational terrorist organizations would gain a key foothold on the African continent that could quickly spread through the Sahel. Fituri remarked that POTUS' upcoming Africa trip was very important and wished A/S Carson success in his remaining travel schedule. Neither Kusa nor Fituri pressed for a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at the G8 Summit.

¶2. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI558

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI558 aka Wikileaks id #216254 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON MEETING WITH FRENCH MFA AFRICA DIRECTOR GOMPERTZ
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI558.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5471
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0558/01 1940934
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130934Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5014
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1073
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0749
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0172
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0187
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5552
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000558

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AF/W, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/12/2019
TAGS: PREF [Refugees] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , FR [France; Corsica] , SO [Somalia] , ML [Mali] ,
NG [Niger] , MA [Madagascar] , GV [Guinea] , IV [Cote D&#039;Ivoire] , AU-1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON MEETING WITH FRENCH MFA AFRICA
DIRECTOR GOMPERTZ

TRIPOLI 00000558  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for African  Affairs Johnnie
Carson met with French Ministry of Foreign Affairs AF Assistant
```

Secretary-equivalent, Stephane Gompertz, and French Ambassador to Ethiopia, Jean-Christophe Belliard, on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit on July 1 in Sirte, Libya. In a wide-ranging discussion, the two sides reviewed the political crises across the African continent and efforts by Washington, Paris, the AU, and others to find solutions and prevent violence and unconstitutional changes of government. Both Paris and Washington are committed to helping the Somali Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) security forces with some combination of cash for salaries, weapons, and training. They agreed on the need to tackle the growing drug traffic on the continent, a scourge that has the potential to bring down governments. End Summary.

Somalia

¶2. (C) In his meeting with the Quai d'Orsay's top Africa specialist, A/S Carson identified Somalia as the principal concern for the USG recently. He underscored U.S. support for the Djibouti peace process and the TFG, noting that President Sheikh Sharif was "in a struggle for his existence." Al-Shabaab is "ruthless and unrelenting" in their struggle to overthrow Sharif. In Carson's estimation, now is the "last best chance" in the foreseeable future to restore stability in Somalia. "If the TFG fails, it will be a while before another political process is in place and capable of supplanting al-Shabaab," he said. Even if al-Shabaab were to emerge victorious, they would eventually fragment, allowing al-Qaida to expand its presence in Somalia, Carson said.

¶3. (C) Carson continued that the unrest in Somalia has spawned a refugee crisis in Kenya, piracy in the Red Sea, smuggling operations throughout East Africa, and internal strife, the impacts of which are being felt across the region. Carson reviewed for Gompertz the amount and kind of assistance the USG has provided to the TFG, including cash to pay salaries and purchase weapons for TFG forces. The United States has also urged African states, such as Uganda, Burundi, and Algeria, to contribute personnel and other support to AMISOM. The USG has actively assisted Ugandan and Burundian troops to prepare them for their mission. For his part, Gompertz said that France intended to train Somali security forces in Djibouti starting in August.

¶4. (C) Gompertz asked whether Carson believed AU member states would seek to impose sanctions on Eritrea to punish it for supporting al-Shabaab. Carson acknowledged that African states were increasingly worried about Eritrea's negative role.

Mali

¶5. (C) Gompertz said France's greatest preoccupation in Africa at the present time is Mali, and this is because of the serious threat posed by al-Qaida in the Maghreb. France is still evaluating whether Mali is at a turning point. The GOF is supplying equipment, including two light aircraft, to President Amadou Toumani Toure to counter al-Qaida. Carson opined that Toure would do his best. He cautioned, however, that the Malians should not make the mistake of targeting the Tuareg as part of their campaign against al-Qaida. The Tuareg problem is historically distinct and should be handled as such, Carson advised Gompertz. Gompertz agreed that it would be a big mistake to treat the two issues as one problem.

Niger

¶6. (C) Developments in Niger worry both France and the United States. President Mamadou Tandja's attempts to change the constitution in order to extend his mandate do not bode well for Niger, where the courts, public opinion, and even some in

for Niger, where the courts, public opinion, and even some in the military oppose Tandja. Gompertz said President Sarkozy is upset with Tandja for "infringing on the rules of democracy" and that France fears a coup if Tandja persists. The AU's

TRIPOLI 00000558 002.2 OF 002

Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ramtane Lamamra, also has expressed his concern to the French. Carson and Gompertz discussed the need for even stronger statements condemning Tandja's attempt to change the constitution and possibly dispatching a special envoy to Niamey to deliver a strong message to him.

Madagascar

¶7. (C) On Madagascar, Gompertz made clear that his government does not want to harm the Malagasy population and explained that French humanitarian services will continue to be provided but only through NGOs. Carson said U.S. assistance has already been scaled back more than 40 percent and the Millennium Challenge Account has been terminated. Gompertz signaled the approach of an International Contact Group meeting as the next opportunity to bring the principal stakeholders together.

Drug Trafficking

¶8. (C) The meeting also contained a discussion on the growing narco-trafficking problem on the African continent and how this scourge has had a deleterious effect on countries such as Guinea-Bissau and Guinea. Both sides conceded that their governments have neglected Guinea-Bissau for the past decade and that greater engagement is called for. Gompertz urged the USG to re-open its embassy in Bissau. Carson agreed that an American presence was needed. With regard to drug traffickers, Carson said the United States has urged West African states to turn over drug traffickers to the United States and other western nations for prosecution. He cited the examples of Sierra Leone and Cape Verde where Latin American traffickers have been delivered to the U.S. justice system rather than being returned to their countries of origin. In a related issue, Gompertz expressed his country's concern that consumption of crack cocaine may be on the rise in cities like Ouagadougou and Bamako, boding ill for future drug addiction problems in those countries.

Guinea

¶9. (C) Carson opined that Guinea's coup leader, Dadis Camara, would not hold elections before the end of the year nor would he give up power. "He is not a transformational figure," he said. The upcoming International Contact Group meeting will cover ways of applying more pressure on the junta, Gompertz said. Both Gompertz and Carson assessed that Dadis was a volatile personality who had to be treated with care.

Cote d'Ivoire

¶10. (C) On Cote d'Ivoire, there was agreement that President Laurent Gbagbo likely will not deliver on his promise to hold elections by the end of the year, particularly if he determines that he may lose.

¶11. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI559

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI559 aka Wikileaks id #216255 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH DJIBOUTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YOUSSOUF
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:35 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI559.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5478
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0559/01 1940935
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130935Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5016
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0903
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1075
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0751
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0174
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0189
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5554
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000559

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , DJ *[Djibouti]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH DJIBOUTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER YOUSSOUF

TRIPOLI 00000559 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie

Carson and Djiboutian Foreign Minister Mahamoud Ali Youssouf met July 1 on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya. Their discussion focused on the conflict in Somalia, the potential spread of extremism throughout the Horn of Africa, and the unhelpful role that Eritrea is playing by allowing funds and weapons to be funneled through its territory to al-Shabaab forces fighting the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Djibouti is prepared to commit one battalion to AMISOM if necessary. End Summary.

¶2. (C) A/S Carson opened the meeting by expressing the USG's gratitude to the Djiboutian government for our good relationship and for providing facilities to CJTF-HOA at Camp Lemonier. Turning to Somalia, Carson outlined U.S. support for the Djibouti peace process, the TFG, and Somali President Sheikh Sharif. Sharif and the TFG represent a "real possibility for stability over the long run," said Carson. Sharif has no political baggage and no prior affiliation with warlords, and he genuinely wants to bring peace to his country, Carson added. The Assistant Secretary reviewed the level of USG support to the TFG, including materiel support and training for the security forces. The United States has urged AMISOM troop contributing countries, Burundi and Uganda, to hold fast, and it has urged other states to live up to their pledges made in Brussels in May. However, U.S. support would not go as far as placing U.S. forces on Somali soil, Carson said.

DJIBOUTIAN FM: FOREIGN TERORISTS INFILTRATING SOMALIA

¶3. (C) Djibouti's Foreign Minister Youssouf, accompanied by Djibouti's Ambassador to Ethiopia and the AU Ismael Goulal Boudine, underscored his country's major security concern related to the conflict in Somalia. Djibouti has witnessed an infiltration of international terrorists, he told Carson. Sharif reportedly told Djiboutian authorities that more than 2,000 foreign fighters were now in Somalia. Youssef noted that these fighters have come to the Horn of Africa from Afghanistan and Pakistan in search of a safe haven. "They brought with them their terrorist techniques -- kamikaze raids and car bombs," he said.

AL SHABAAB "JIHADISM" A THREAT TO THE REGION

¶4. (C) Youssef noted Djibouti's fears that the ideology embraced by al-Shabaab will spread across Somalia's borders into neighboring states, threatening Djibouti, Ethiopia, and Kenya. "Their aim is to expand jihadism and their extremist ideology," he said.

ERITREA FUELING AL-SHABAAB INSURGENCY

¶5. (C) Eritrea poses a further threat, Youssouf told Carson. Eritrea is fueling the insurgency in Somalia by funneling arms to al-Shabaab. The Eritrean government continues to deny any involvement, but the Djiboutians are persuaded of Eritrea's negative role. (Note: Eritrea's Presidential Adviser Yemane Ghebreab and Foreign Minister Osman Mohammed Saleh came to the AU Summit to lobby AU member states and international partners with the goal of blocking an initiative alleging Eritrean complicity in backing al-Shabaab and threatening Eritrea with sanctions. Their lobbying failed as the AU adopted a resolution calling on the UN to impose sanctions on Eritrea. End note.)

¶6. (C) Youssouf said his government was ready to "help the Somali government stand on its feet." If the international community fails to support the TFG, "it will be a big mess," Youssouf said. He was critical of Libyan diplomacy for "protecting" the Eritreans and for failing to understand the danger al-Shabaab poses to the region.

¶7. (C) Carson noted that Eritrea is supporting al-Shabaab's insurgency in Somalia as part of a proxy war with Ethiopia. Eritrea, he said, was providing a safe haven for al-Shabaab

TRIPOLI 00000559 002.2 OF 002

fighters. Among the foreign fighters coming to Somalia are Americans of Somali origin, Carson told Youssouf. In countering al-Shabaab, the USG has encouraged Kenya to employ measures to prevent al-Shabaab supporters from entering Somalia from Kenya.

FM URGES INCREASE IN AMISOM TROOP LEVELS

¶8. (C) Youssouf told Carson that the TFG and AMISOM could gain the upper hand against al-Shabaab, a force that strikes its target then melts into the local population. He advocated for modifying AMISOM's rules of engagement to allow troops more offensive capability. He also said that efforts must be made to increase AMISOM troop strength to their mandated level of 8,000. Youssouf said the TFG forces cannot be relied upon if they do not get paid regularly and do not receive adequate weapons and ammunition. President Sharif reportedly told Youssouf a day earlier that he did not want mercenaries fighting in Somalia, but preferred to build up a professional army. To that end, several former Somali officers now living in the diaspora have indicated their willingness to return to Somalia to serve their armed forces again. In addition, Djibouti is prepared to commit a battalion to AMISOM, Youssouf said.

¶9. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI560

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI560 aka Wikileaks id #216256 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN MINISTER AHMED ABOUL GHEIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI560.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5485
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0560/01 1940938
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130938Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5018
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1077
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0753
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1502
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0176
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0191
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5556
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000560

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ER [Eritrea] , SO [Somalia] , EG
[Egypt] , AU-1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH EGYPTIAN FOREIGN
MINISTER AHMED ABOUL GHEIT

TRIPOLI 00000560  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit
agreed with Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson's assessment that
Somalia's Transitional Federal Government (TFG) was the victim
```

of an ongoing proxy war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In a July 2 meeting on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit, Aboul Gheit told A/S Carson that Egypt was not in a position to offer Somalia any lethal weapons to fight al-Shabaab, but had promised TFG President Sheikh Sharif training opportunities in Egypt for loyal TFG police units in May. Aboul Gheit reiterated the offer on July 1 but was awaiting Somalia's response. The minister forcefully urged the USG to cut off al-Shabaab's funding via Eritrea "at the source" in Qatar and other Gulf countries, arguing that only the USG had the leverage and relationship to force governments there to comply with international interests. End summary.

SOMALIA: NEED TO CUT OFF ERITREAN AND QATARI SUPPORT FOR AL-SHABAAB

¶2. (C) A/S Johnnie Carson met Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit on the second morning of the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. Peppering A/S Carson with questions about the USG's assessment of the situation in Somalia, he pointedly asked whether the TFG could survive long enough for adequate support to be delivered to help the TFG hold on and then al-Shabaab. A/S Carson answered that their only chance was maximum effort and increased support, coupled with ending al-Shabaab's financing by Eritrea through pressure and sanctions on their leadership. Aboul Gheit questioned whether countries like China or Russia would comply with AU or UN calls to sanction Eritrean leaders. He told A/S Carson that the AU Peace and Security Commission had drafted language on sanctions that he expected would be adopted.

¶3. (S) Noting the deteriorating conditions in Somalia and the rise of Islamist influence, A/S Carson said that urgent intervention was needed to prevent an even worse situation. Aboul Gheit and A/S Carson agreed that Eritrea's support of al-Shabaab was not rooted in their support for extremism but rather their ongoing tensions and proxy war with Ethiopia. Aboul Gheit asked A/S Carson whether Eritrea was solely responsible or whether Gulf countries bore some blame for the current situation. A/S Carson responded that the USG knew that the Emir of Qatar was a principal supporter of Eritrea.

¶4. (C) Asking whether the State Department was taking that message to "the Gates Foundation, Congress, and CENTCOM", Aboul Gheit forcefully urged the USG to take a hard line against Qatar's support for President Isaias and, indirectly, al-Shabaab. According to Aboul Gheit, the U.S. is the only actor that has the leverage to force Qatar to fall in line "or else". Egypt can't influence Qatar's behavior, but the U.S. -- with its CIA and airbase in Qatar -- can convince the Emir that he is endangering U.S. and regional interests by destabilizing Somalia. Encouraging power politics, Aboul Gheit stated that should pressure not work, the U.S. could threaten Qatar into compliance. The minister said that official support from Qatar was not the only danger, rather zealots campaigning around Gulf mosques pleading, "pay for Somalia" could raise small sums from individual sympathizers that could quickly reach USD $100,000 -- more than enough to fight in a small country.

EGYPT OFFERS TRAINING TO LOYAL TFG UNITS

¶5. (C) The Egyptians hosted TFG President Sheik Sharif in early May and offered training for vetted and loyal TFG units, to include artillery and urban combat training. Aboul Gheit said he had reiterated the offer to Sharif on July 1 but worried that Sharif would be faced with so much trouble upon departing Sirte that he would be unable to furnish a list to the GOE. A/S Carson described the USG's unprecedented support for TFG forces in the form of cash for salaries, weapons, and ammunition. Aboul Gheit reported that Egypt was not in a position to offer

Aboul Gheit reported that Egypt was not in a position to offer lethal weapons and said he was worried by the repeated refrain

TRIPOLI 00000560 002.2 OF 002

from TFG leaders that they have no money -- expressing hesitation that funds were being skimmed by unscrupulous commanders and political leaders. A/S Carson said he had been pleased to meet Sharif in a July 1 meeting (septel); Aboul Gheit said Sharif was reasonable but cautioned A/S Carson that the TFG was "not like you and me" but rather an organization filled with Islamist leaders. Called away to another meeting, the Foreign Minister invited A/S Carson to visit Cairo soon to meet and coordinate with Egyptian diplomatic and intelligence leaders on the situation in Somalia.

¶6. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI561

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI561 aka Wikileaks id #216259 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH SOMALI PRESIDENT SHEIKH SHARIF
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI561.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5495
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0561/01 1940944
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130944Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5020
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0905
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0031
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 0003
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0031
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0178
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0193
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0755
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1079
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5558
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000561

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations] , SO [Somalia] , ER [Eritrea] , ET [Ethiopia] , KE [Kenya] , AU-1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH SOMALI PRESIDENT SHEIKH
SHARIF

TRIPOLI 00000561  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
```

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson and Somali President Sheikh Sharif met July 1 on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya. Their exchange included an assessment of the Somali Transitional Federal Government's (TFG) capacity to repel al-Shabaab's forces. Sharif appealed for international financial and military support to win the war. Carson expressed the USG's readiness to broaden its support for Sharif's government, and he encouraged the Somali President to show more political resolve to issue more strong statements about his determination to rid Somalia of extremism. Both sides agreed on the necessity for the government to restore stability so that it can deliver more services to the Somali people. They also concurred that Qatari and Eritrean support for al-Shabaab must end. End Summary.

¶2. (C) A/S Carson opened by telling President Sharif that the Secretary was pleased to have had a telephone conversation with the Somali President in late May. Carson also expressed his condolences for the loss of TFG's security minister and Mogadishu's police commissioner in separate assassinations recently. Carson assured Sharif that the United States "believes very strongly in what you are doing and what you represent." He reaffirmed the importance of the Djibouti peace process.

SHARIF ACCUSES QATAR AND ERITREA OF SUPPORTING AL-SHABAAB

¶3. (C) President Sharif, who was accompanied by Somalia Transitional Federal Government (TFG) Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdullahi Omaar and Chief of Staff and Senior Adviser Abdulkareem Jama, thanked the USG for its support. Reviewing his government's efforts to repel al-Shabaab's forces, Sharif said the TFG has implemented every mechanism to stabilize Mogadishu, but al-Shabaab's support remains strong and has the backing of al-Qaida. Sharif blamed certain governments, including Qatar, of providing financial assistance to al-Shabaab, and he accused Eritrea of funneling these funds as well as weapons to al-Shabaab. Despite these challenges, the TFG intends to remain in Somalia to defend the country, the Somalia President said.

TFG PAYING SALARIES WHILE AL-SHABAAB TERRORIZES CITIZENS

¶4. (C) Somalia's population is terrorized by al-Shabaab, Sharif continued. Somalis cannot speak freely, and those who do are tortured, maimed, and burned. The TFG is offering Somalis hope, Sharif maintained. His government has proposed a budget and is in the process of establishing a central bank and financial institutions. For three consecutive months, the TFG has been able to maintain salaries to civil servants. More resources are needed to fight the war, he said. He also implored the international community to help the TFG counter the external forces that are backing al-Shabaab.

¶5. (C) Carson reviewed with Sharif recent USG assistance to the TFG, including $1.5 million in cash and substantial quantities of military equipment, and he noted the U.S. commitment to provide additional funding for training, equipment, and salaries for TFG security forces. The United States also wants to provide non U.S. contractors who could send tactical trainers and advisors to work with TFG Forces in Mogadishu. In addition, the United States continues to assist troop contributing countries and others to lend their support. Carson said he had sent an AF bureau DAS to the Middle East to encourage states that had pledged support to the TFG to make good on their pledges. At USG request, Kenya has agreed to interdict flights from Kenya going into Mogadishu that might include weapons and other resources for al-Shabaab. Eritrea, Carson said, is playing a spoiler role by supporting al-Shabaab and serving as a conduit for money and foreign fighters. U.S. pressure on Eritrea would continue, he

foreign fighters. U.S. pressure on Eritrea would continue, he told Sharif.

¶6. A/S Carson also applauded Sharif for issuing strong public

TRIPOLI 00000561 002.2 OF 002

statements about his determination to keep fighting al-Shabaab and urged him to improve the conditions on the ground for all Somalis. "You represent peace for Somalia. Al-Shabaab represents violence and a return to the past," Carson said.

¶7. (C) If the TFG can ensure stability, the USG is prepared to further support the government's efforts to provide services, such as education and health care, Carson told Sharif. This will demonstrate to the Somali people that your administration is capable of assisting them and improving their lives. In the coming months, the TFG must win on the battlefield as well as in the court of public opinion, Carson added. He urged the TFG to publicize al-Shabaab's negative actions, such as the cutting off of hands of thieves. "There are things I think the Somali people do not want to see come to their country." The U.S. will offer the TFG assistance with crafting appropriate media messages to counter the extremists.

SHARIF URGES BROADER MANDATE AND MORE TROOPS FOR AMISOM

¶8. (C) The Somali President returned to the issue of al-Qaida's role in Somalia. The number of foreign fighters is "not insignificant" and they have experience with this type of warfare, Sharif asserted. That said, al-Shabaab may have miscalculated and have been dealt a significant blow. The TFG has information that foreign fighters are now regrouping and reviewing their plans and methodologies. Sharif said that al-Shabaab will never give up. Given that they are intent on war, the TFG must take the initiative on offense. In this context, AMISOM should be given a more robust mandate and the rules of engagement should be modified to allow the AMISOM troops greater flexibility and capacity to confront al-Shabaab. He also called for increasing the number of AMISOM troops.

¶9. (C) A/S Carson noted that other African countries had shown hesitancy about committing troops to AMISOM. Uganda was prepared to send more troops but wanted additional resources to do so. Kenya was not willing to send troops across the Somali border. Carson said the USG would study the question of strengthening AMISOM's mandate and rules of engagement, but that the TFG and the AU could count on U.S. support for assisting the AMISOM forces. The United States also wants the TFG to be more inclusive in order to build up its political support. The USG will also study IGAD's resolution that calls for a naval blockade of the port of Kismayo, al-Shabaab's power base. (Note: The AU had adopted a similar resolution by the time the Summit concluded. End note.)

SHARIF URGES USG ENGAGEMENT WITH QATAR

¶10. (C) President Sharif and his aides requested USG intervention with the Emir of Qatar to persuade him to stop playing a negative role in Somalia. The United States may need to appeal to the Emir's vanity, the aides said, recalling his peacemaker role in other parts of the Middle East and in Sudan. (Note: A/S Carson offered to meet with the Emir, whom Libyan Leader Moammar Qadhafi had invited for the AU Summit opening ceremony, but the Emir departed Sirte immediately after the ceremony. End note.)

¶11. (C) The meeting concluded with President Sharif's request for a brief meeting with POTUS on the margins of the next UNGA session in September. A/S Carson said he would look into the

possibility of a brief meeting with the Secretary.

¶12. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI562

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI562 aka Wikileaks id #216265 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH AU COMMISSION LEADERSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:48 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI562.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 5 Feb 2011 10:01: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5507
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0562/01 1940948
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130948Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5022
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0024
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0907
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1081
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0757
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0180
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0195
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5560
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000562

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/W AND AF/RSA; PARIS/LONDON FOR AF
WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , AU-1 [African Union] , SO
[Somalia] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH AU COMMISSION
LEADERSHIP

TRIPOLI 00000562  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
```

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson and African Union (AU) Commission Chairperson Jean Ping met July 2 on the margins of the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. They reviewed successful efforts by the AU and its international partners to reject military coup perpetrators, pledged to do more to restore order in Guinea-Bissau and fight narco-traffickers that threaten some African governments, and considered how to avert a political crisis in Niger. On Somalia, both sides agreed on the need to support the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and President Sheikh Sharif, and the urgent need to persuade Eritrea and Qatar to stop providing support to al-Shabaab. End Summary.

¶2. (C) A/S Carson opened his meeting with the AU Commission's leadership by expressing his condolences to Chairperson Ping for his fellow countryman, the late Gabonese President Omar Bongo. Ping noted the close relationship between Gabon and the United States. When asked about the possibility of his succeeding Bongo, Ping chuckled and said he was not unemployed.

UNCONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT -- MAURITANIA, GUINEA, MADAGASCAR

¶3. (C) Carson lauded Ping for his strong position against unconstitutional changes of government in Mauritania, Guinea, and Madagascar. "The stand and the leadership you have exhibited have elevated the status of the AU on the issue of democracy," Carson said. Ping, who was accompanied by Deputy Chairperson Erastus Mwencha, Commissioner for Peace and Security Ramtane Lamamra, and other senior AU Commission staff, returned the compliments, saying the United States had consistently held the line on democracywhile the Europeans, and particularly the French, were "dancing the tango." By maintaining a strong position in the various international contact groups established by the AU in the wake of the coups, the international community has ensured that none of the coups within the past year have succeeded, Ping said.

GUINEA BISSAU: ELECTIONS AND NARCO-TRAFFICKING

¶4. (C) On Guinea-Bissau, Ping said the AU was monitoring post-election developments closely. A second round of voting on July 26 will pit ruling party leader and former president Malam Bacai Sanha, who finished first with 39 percent of the vote in the first round, against another former president, Kumba Yala, who garnered 29 percent of the vote. President Joao Bernardo Vieira was killed by mutinous troops in March. Ping discussed establishing a stabilization force composed of Nigerians and Angolans, although Bissau has rejected this proposal. Drug trafficking is central to Guinea-Bissau's problems, Ping continued. The AU will need cooperation from Latin America, as well as Europe, to tackle the problem effectively and prevent it from spreading across the continent, Ping added. Carson agreed on the need for greater cooperation and urged more African states to turn over suspected traffickers to American and European authorities rather than simply expelling them. Ping said he would raise this issue with ECOWAS.

NIGER: CONCERNS ABOUT TANDJA

¶5. (C) Turning to Niger, both sides expressed deep concern about President Mamadou Tandja's attempts to prolong his mandate by changing the constitution -- over the objections of the courts, much of Nigerien public opinion, and some in the military. The risk of a coup is real. Carson asked what measures the AU might adopt to prevent a coup. Ping suggested getting Nigeria to engage more forcefully on the issue. The AU prefers a quiet approach so as not to embarrass Niger. Former Ghanaian president John Kufuor was asked to go to Niamey, but he was

president, John Kufuor, was asked to go to Niamey, but he was unable to do so, but when the AU sent a team from its Abidjan office, Tandja reportedly rejected their demarche.

TRIPOLI 00000562 002.2 OF 002

SOMALIA: ERITREA SUPPORT FOR AL-SHABAAB A PROXY WAR

¶6. (C) Carson and Ping also discussed the situation in Somalia. A/S Carson detailed the USG position in support of President Sheikh Sharif, the Somali Transitional Federal Government, and the Djibouti process. U.S. support has come in the form of weapons and cash for TFG security force salaries, but also in the form of encouragement to troop contributing countries Burundi and Uganda, and follow-up with various countries to fulfill their pledges in Brussels in May. Carson briefed the AU leadership on U.S. efforts to persuade Eritrea to stop meddling in Somalia. There is a growing body of evidence to prove that Eritrea is both a conduit of money and provider of funds to al-Shabaab, Carson told Ping. Eritrea's President, Isaias Afewerki, appears to be supporting al-Shabaab not because he is pro-extremist, but because he is fighting a proxy war with Ethiopia. Qatar's role in support of al-Shabaab has also been unhelpful. Ping said the AU has openly complained about Eritrea's negative role, and it has asked the Arab League to investigate. (Note: The AU Summit concluded with African leaders adopting a resolution asking the UN to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of armed groups. The same resolution asked the UN to impose a sea blockade and no-fly zone. End note.)

¶7. (C) Ping emphasized that the AU cannot afford to be defeated in Somalia, and called on the Arab League to stand with the AU since Somalia belongs to both organizations. Qatar, he said, is a partner with the AU in trying to resolve the Darfur crisis and could be similarly helpful with regard to Somalia. Ping told Carson that he has advised Eritrea to recognize the change in U.S. policy toward Asmara, but that if the Government of Eritrea does not make amends, it will miss a unique opportunity. Carson said the United States is reaching out to Eritrea, but Asmara risks further international isolation. Ping concurred, saying that frustration was spreading. "Even Zambia is fed up," he said. Ping said he intends to go to Asmara himself to pursue the diplomatic track with Afewerki.

¶8. (C) Carson warned of a "cascading set of problems" in the Horn of Africa should Somali President Sheikh Sharif fall to al-Shabaab. He cited more foreign fighters, humanitarian challenges, refugees, smuggling, piracy, and political chaos. Ping pledged AU cooperation to prevent the Somali situation from worsening. He applauded the USG for taking a risk by sending cash to the TFG for its security forces and other support. Ping still believes Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Malawi will make good on promises to contribute troops to AMISOM. Lamamra voiced concern that European partners may withhold support if AMISOM receives an enforcement mandate rather than remaining a protective mission.

PING APPEALS FOR POTUS TO ATTEND NEXT AU SUMMIT

¶9. (C) The meeting concluded with Ping renewing an earlier invitation for POTUS to address the next AU Summit. Ping appealed to the Obama Administration to include Africa's voice at international fora, such as the G-20. He also praised POTUS for his Cairo speech to the Muslim world, and said Africans looked forward to POTUS' expected speech in Ghana on July 11. "We count on you. We are ready to go with you," Ping told Carson.

¶10. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI563

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI563 aka Wikileaks id #216266 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH SPANISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 09:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI563.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI71 , 09TRIPOLI72
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5510
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0563 1940949
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 130949Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5024
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1083
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0759
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0049
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0182
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0197
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5562
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000563

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA; LONDON/PARIS FOR AF WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/12/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , SO *[Somalia]* , SP *[Spain; Balearic Islands; Canary Islands; Mallorca]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH SPANISH MINISTER OF STATE FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson met with Spanish Minister of State for African Affairs Carmen de la Pena on July 1 on the margins of the African Union (AU)

Summit in Sirte, Libya. De la Pena told A/S Carson she had written a letter of congratulation on his appointment and included a book -- Spanish Plan: Africa 2009-2012 -- in the hopes of deepening Spanish-U.S. coordination in African affairs. She reported that Spain had opened six new embassies in Africa over the past four years: Mali, Niger, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry and the Gambia. Noting that Spain was the closest European country to Africa, she highlighted a mid-June summit between Spanish President Zapatero and ECOWAS leaders as evidence of Spain's increased focus on peace and security issues.

¶2. (C) A/S Carson discussed USG efforts to combat transnational crime - particularly counternarcotics efforts - in West Africa and expressed pleasure that Spain shared our goals. Shifting to East Africa, A/S Carson laid out USG priorities in Somalia. De la Pena said that Spain had provided six million Euros to the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) police through the AU, but was still waiting for that organization to take a decision on how to spend the money. De la Pena was interested in USG views on how to handle Somali piracy, particularly our position on judicial action against pirates. A/S Carson said that Kenya had so far borne much of the responsibility, but noted that the U.S. had taken swift action against the surviving MAERSK ALABAMA hijacker in U.S. courts. A/S Carson urged Spain to arrest and convict Somali pirates who were apprehended attempting to hijack Spanish owned or Spanish flagged vessels. De la Pena sought clarification on Africa Command's role on the continent. The Assistant Secretary said that the Command was still evolving but would in time become like EUCOM and PACOM - focusing more on mil-mil cooperation, training peace keepers, and building professional militaries that would operate under civilian constitutional rule and focus on external defense.

¶3. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI564

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI564 aka Wikileaks id #216373 ?
Subject	SE GRATION URGES LIBYA'S TREIKI TO ORGANIZE CONTACT GROUP IN KHARTOUM BY END OF JULY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 13 Jul 2009 16:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI564.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI765 , 09TRIPOLI99
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6046
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0564/01 1941612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131612Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5025
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0163
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0175
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5563
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000564

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/USESS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/7/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , SU [Sudan] , CD
[Chad] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SE GRATION URGES LIBYA'S TREIKI TO ORGANIZE CONTACT GROUP IN
KHARTOUM BY END OF JULY

TRIPOLI 00000564  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: In a July 1 meeting on the margins of the
African Union Summit in Sirte, Libya's top Africa diplomat Ali
Treiki told Special Envoy Scott Gration that Libya was taking
steps to secure peace on the Chad-Sudan border and effect a
political solution between the two governments.  Treiki
complained that none of the actors involved were fully behind
the peace process but argued that openings existed within the
rebel movements and the Government of Chad (GOC) to encourage
people to negotiate.  SE Gration described his comprehensive
approach to achieving peace and stability in Sudan -- tackling
North-South, Darfur, and Chad-Sudan issues simultaneously as
```

variables in the same system. He encouraged Libya to use its leverage with the governments in Chad and Sudan to work for a ceasefire agreement and end President Deby's support for the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM). Treiki said he would use his position as UNGA President to promote international cooperation to solve the problem of Darfur. End Summary.

RECENT REBEL LOSES CREATE OPENING FOR CEASE FIRE

¶2. (C) Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration met with top Libya diplomat just after the opening ceremony of the 13th African Union (AU) Summit on July 1. SE Gration provided a read out of his June 29 meeting with Chadian President Idriss Deby (ref NDJ 264) and said progress must be made on humanitarian, security, and political fronts in advance of Sudanese elections scheduled for April 2010 and the North-South partition referendum slated for 2011. Treiki agreed and reported that a 2,000-member peacekeeping force comprised of 1,000 troops from both Chad and Sudan was ready to deploy, under Libyan command, to 10 points along the border. Noting that both sides are hesitant to sign and implement ceasefire agreements ongoing fighting along the border, Treiki viewed the Libyan-led peacekeepers as an essential step to bring Deby to the negotiating table.

¶3. (C) Treiki and Gration agreed that the Contact Group should take the symbolic step of meeting in Khartoum, with Treiki seeing a Sudan-based meeting as an opportunity to renew direct contacts between the Chadian and Sudanese governments. SE Gration asked Treiki to help organize the meeting quickly as recent developments provided a possible opening to reach agreement: the GOC's recent military victories over Chadian rebels had increased confidence in its military and reduced its reliance on the JEM while the JEM's late-May attacks in Sudan had weakened that group militarily. SE Gration said that increased pressure was needed on President Bashir to not only end his support for Chadian -- including providing weapons and mines. Treiki reported that Sudan had enlisted Ukrainian and Algerian mercenaries in the border war and that the desert area would remain sensitive for some time.

¶4. (C) In Treiki's view, Deby had lost control over JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim. Deby's near ouster at the hands of Chadian rebels in February 2008 caused him to intensify support for JEM's Zaghawa leadership based on tribal affiliation. Treiki saw this tactic as short-sighted, commenting that "you cannot control a country with only 4% of the population with you". SE Gration argued that Chad would be unable to promote the development and security initiatives it needed if Deby continued spending large sums on his eastern frontier trying to defeat Salah Gosht. Treiki agreed, noting that "even China or the U.S. can't control the deserts if the [governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum] aren't ready". Treiki promised to speak with Chadian FM Moussa Faki during the AU Summit to push him toward a negotiated peace settlement.

¶5. (C) Turning to UN/AU Joint Mediator Djibril Bossole, Treiki complained that the mediator had spent too much time talking without achieving any results. Treiki discounted the Doha process as ineffectual, saying that Fur leaders considered the Qatar government too close to Bashir and worried about travel to the Gulf. He reiterated a need to restart the stalled Sirte process of rebel-government peace talks, though the SE questioned whether rebel leaders like Abdul Wahid would travel to Libya. Treiki was impressed that SE Gration had met with major rebel leaders like Minni Minnowi, Khalil Ibrahim, and Abdul Wahid and noted that each had significant flaws that would make dealing with them more difficult. Minni seemed undecided as to whether he would stay with the Khartoum government or resume his rebellion. Khalil's ambition to control all of Sudan makes him less likely to negotiate while losing the ability to claim leadership over the Fur people. As for Abdul Wahid, Treiki agreed that he "lives in his own universe" in Paris.

SUDAN: UNITY GOVERNMENT IN NAME ONLY

¶6. (C) Treiki assessed the relationship between Khartoum (GOS) and Juba (GOSS) as better than Darfur, but still quite

TRIPOLI 00000564 002.2 OF 002

troublesome. The GOL recently opened a consulate in Juba and was closely monitoring relations between North and South Sudan. Treiki cautioned that a federal government made up of two clashing points of view (i.e. the NCP and SPLM) could not function and said that Government of National Unity (GNU) Foreign Minister Deng Alor needed to respect government decisions "wrong or right". SE Gration agreed that the GNU was dysfunctional but said that the international community needed to push the two parties to cooperate. Noting that the GOSS was more interested in tanks than roads, SE Gration said that diversification of the GOSS' oil-based economy would be essential to promoting unity between Khartoum and Juba. SE Gration envisioned a food-exporting, educated Sudan that could serve as a net contributor to regional stability rather than a major source of violence.

¶7. (C) Treiki offered to help as he could, using both his Libyan platform and the bully pulpit of the UNGA Presidency. He said that Libya stood ready to provide aid and expertise in development projects to Sudan as it had in other African nations like Malawi. SE Gration pressed him to use his leverage over Bashir to encourage a Contact Group meeting in Khartoum before the end of July. He also asked that Treiki support efforts to increase MINURCAT's troop level and expand its mandate. Treiki said he was available to help in Libya through the end of July, after which he would travel to New York to undertake his duties there.

¶8. (U) This message has been cleared with S/USSES.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI566

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI566 aka Wikileaks id #216447 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S AND SE GRATION'S MEETING WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 14 Jul 2009 08:28 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI566.html
Referenced by	09CAIRO1616
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6575
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0566/01 1950828
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140828Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5029
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1084
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0760
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0183
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0198
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5567
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000566

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, AF/FO, AF/E AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/14/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ER [Eritrea] , SO [Somalia] , SU
[Sudan] , KSUM [Summit Meetings] , AU-1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S AND SE GRATION'S MEETING WITH THE
ARAB LEAGUE

TRIPOLI 00000566  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  During a July 1 meeting on the margins of the
```

African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya, Arab League (AL) Secretary General Amr Moussa told Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Johnnie Carson and Special Envoy for Sudan Scott Gration that he would press member states to financially support stability initiatives in Somalia and Sudan but cautioned that Arab nations would need to see dramatic reductions in violence if they were to provide troops for peacekeeping operations. Moussa offered to intervene on the USG's behalf with Qatar in order to stem that country's support for Eritrea and its proxy war with Ethiopia in Somalia, and highlighted AL support for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). On Sudan, he congratulated the Special Envoy on his coordination efforts to solve the crisis there and noted the gradual reduction in tensions in Darfur over the past five months. Moussa said he appreciates the USG's comprehensive approach to the situation in Sudan -- seeking security, humanitarian assistance, and political stability at the same time. Moussa laid out the AL's support for North-South unity in Sudan after the 2011 referendum on partition and asked that the USG coordinate with other international donors to ensure that development assistance to Sudan would be effective in promoting political and economic unity within the nation. End Summary.

ARAB LEAGUE SUPPORT FOR SOMALIA WILL BE FINANCIAL

¶2. (C) AL Secretary General Amr Moussa told A/S Carson that he would continue to vocally support the TFG in Somalia as he had in a speech at the opening of the 13th AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. Moussa views al-Shabaab as "destructive" and agreed that if they were allowed to topple the TFG, Somalia would be "back at square one." According to Moussa, the AL has a duty to help Somalia move from chaos to promise.

¶3. (C) Moussa said that the AL has maintained an active interest in Somalia since 1991, and many member states viewed the situation there through a lens of fear, aversion, and concern. For his part, Moussa has tried to explain to Arab states that the new TFG is different than the one led by Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed. The AL Secretariat has sent funds to Sharif through formal channels and is encouraging members to do the same. However, the AL's experience with financial support has been negative -- Moussa complained that Somali ministers have long taken for their personal use money donated for security forces. A/S Carson detailed the USG's recent assistance in the form of weapons, ammunition, and cash to pay salaries. Moussa said Arab nations would be able to provide financial and technical assistance -- including Iraq which is ready to provide Sheikh Sharif with $5 million -- but were unable to have their troops "thrown into the fire." He added that the AL would not achieve any success in getting members to provide peacekeepers without a Security Council resolution specifically calling for them.

¶4. (S) A/S Carson encouraged Moussa to use his position to condemn spoilers like Eritrean President Isaias, who has used Somalia as a proxy battleground for its on-going political disagreements with Ethiopia. A/S Carson held out the Emir of Qatar as one of the primary supporters of Eritrea and al-Shabaab, noting that he had sent one of his deputies to Doha in mid-May to discuss the issue with the Qatari MFA, only to have the meeting request denied. Moussa mentioned that he had raised the issue on that same day with the Emir, who shared the dais with him at the opening ceremony of the AU summit. The Emir categorically denied he was supporting al-Shabaab via Eritrea and said that whatever funds Qatar had paid were official and for investment purposes. Moussa told the Emir that he had heard many Africans talking about Iranian and Qatari support for Eritrea's proxy war in Somalia and encouraged the Emir to state publicly his denial of improper support. He told A/S Carson that he was surprised by the Qatari MFA's refusal to meet USG officials and promised to intercede with them to persuade them to listen to our points. A/S Carson asked Moussa

to also make the point that supporting al-Shabaab would not be in Qatar's interest, either, and their rise would lead to decreased stability in Horn of Africa and the Red Sea.

MOUSSA APPRECIATES NEW US POSITION ON SUDAN, SEEKS NORTH-SOUTH UNITY

¶5. (C) Turning to SE Gration, Moussa congratulated him on a recent CPA conference in the U.S. and said he appreciated the USG's new comprehensive approach to peace in Sudan. SE Gration thanked Moussa for his counsel and stressed that the limited time before the April 2010 elections and 2011 referendum on North-South partition called for urgent action. SE Gration provided Moussa with a read out of his recent activities, including meetings with all major rebel factions and a late-June trip to N'Djamena to seek rebel unity and buy-in from President Deby to push for a cease fire and non-aggression pact. Gration noted that Libya had been helpful in getting the governments in N'Djamena and Khartoum to talk, and added that more should be done to accelerate the 2008 Doha Accord.

¶6. (C) The Special Envoy provided a road map for future engagement in Sudan, including looking over the horizon and forecasting the need to plan for resettlement of IDPs now and the provision of reconstruction and development assistance in areas subjected to decades of violence. He laid out three desired objectives: helping the North and South to govern better and make unity an attractive option, getting the Sudanese to make peace between tribes to instill hope for a better future among the people, and managing the transition from war to peace to create a prosperous Sudan that grows surplus crops and brings them to market efficiently.

¶7. (C) Moussa said he was closely monitoring the situation in Sudan and congratulated SE Gration on the "immense difference" he saw in U.S. policy vis-a-vis Sudan in recent months. Moussa commented that the comprehensive peace solution contrasted against previous policy that sought to corner and punish the Khartoum government and that the new approach would foster an environment in which Sudanese officials could be persuaded to cooperate. Moussa stated that a late-May trip to Darfur left him with high hopes, noting that there seemed to be less tension on the ground. Saying that the Chad-Sudan border was little more than a "crossing point that brings violence", he encouraged increased dialogue within the framework of the Doha and Abuja agreements to create a mood that allows for peace.

¶8. (C) Moussa said the AL would continue to support North-South unity in Sudan and has supported investment and development aimed at making unity the most desirable option before the 2011 referendum. Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia have all restarted infrastructure projects -- mostly roads -- but coordination was so far lacking. Instead of building roads connecting major population centers, all countries were competing and building "10 parallel roads one-tenth of the way". SE Gration agreed and lamented that the GOSS should increase their focus on development as opposed to weaponry, particularly given that 80% of their teachers are untrained and 85% of their population illiterate.

¶9. (C) Following on SE Gration's comments, Moussa argued that since 85 percent of Southern Sudanese can't read, "we must decide [the issue of referendum] for them." Adding that the USG and the AL were now like-minded on policies in the Horn of Africa, Moussa pressed for U.S. backing for Sudanese unity. The AL hopes to hold a meeting by the end of 2009 to discuss proposals for assistance to Sudan and will invite the UN, US, EU, and other actors. Recognizing that "you can't work without

20, and other debts. Recognizing that "you can't work without the U.S.", Moussa also expressed a desire to promote Sudanese debt forgiveness. Recalling the AL's 2004 decision to suspend Sudan's debt and a unilateral decision by Japan to do the same, Moussa hoped more countries could examine forgiveness while simultaneously building economic capacity through infrastructure development, without which, he argued, the international community was simply promoting already rampant corruption. SE Gration concluded by reaffirming in clear terms the right of the South to vote for separation or unity under the CPA. The choice was one for the South to decide.

¶10. (U) A/S Carson and SE Gration have cleared on this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI567

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI567 aka Wikileaks id #216458 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: MUGABE REMAINS DEFIANT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 14 Jul 2009 09:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI567.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI134 , 09TRIPOLI579
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6608
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0567/01 1950906
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 140906Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5031
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1086
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0762
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0185
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0200
RUEHSB/AMEMBASSY HARARE PRIORITY 0002
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5569
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000567

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/W AND AF/RSA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/13/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ZI *[Zimbabwe]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: MUGABE REMAINS DEFIANT

TRIPOLI 00000567 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a July 2 meeting with AF A/S Carson, President Robert Mugabe emotionally defended his stewardship of Zimbabwe over the last 26 years, heatedly denouncing "outside

interference," claiming he would implement the Global Political Agreement (GPA) "in my own way," and insisting Zimbabwe is "my country." Mugabe's responses to Carson's questions became increasingly agitated and he abruptly ended the meeting by jumping up and storming out. Mugabe's obvious discomfort with what amounted to 10 minutes of low key questions about the GPA, human rights, and his legacy was preceded by his 35 minute monologue on British perfidy and American untrustworthiness. The prospects for Zimbabwe's democracy appear bleak if Mugabe's extreme sensitivity to questions is any indication of his commitment to the GPA. End Summary.

¶2. (C) A/S Carson and President Mugabe met July 2 on the margins of the AU Summit in Sirte, Libya. Mugabe was accompanied by Foreign Minister S.S. Mumbengegwi and Zimbabwe's Ambassador to Libya George Vengesa. A/S Carson was accompanied by desk officer Maria Beyzerov.

MUGABE ANNOYED WITH TSVANGIRAI VISIT TO U.S.

¶3. (C) Mugabe said he was "astonished" that Walter Mzembi (Minister of Tourism and the recent Tsvangirai delegation's only ZANU-PF member) was not invited to Tsvangirai's June 12 meeting with President Obama. Mugabe said this led him to question USG support for the unity government. He asserted that U.S. assistance to Zimbabwe would "end up in the hands of the British," and noted we were free to spend our money this way if we chose. Mugabe also claimed MDC-Tsvangirai was not genuinely popular and claimed they made gains in the most recent election by bribing voters with food.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GPA

¶4. (C) Carson congratulated Mugabe on the conclusion of the GPA and asked Mugabe for his assessment of progress to date. Mugabe said things were going well but ZANU-PF and the MDC had different backgrounds "but we are free to determine our future." When asked about his commitment to fully implement the GPA, Mugabe angrily snapped back, "We'll do it our own way and not in accordance with the likes and dislikes of the United States." Mugabe called the question itself "rude" and noted he had signed the agreement, which meant he will implement it. He concluded, "it's the outside subjectivity that we don't want" and insisted that "outside interference" is not welcome.

THE ECONOMY AND MUGABE'S LEGACY

¶5. (C)Mugabe continued in this vein when asked to consider his legacy, especially with regard to Zimbabwe's economy. He replied in an angry tone, "the legacy I want to leave behind is Zimbabwe without outside interference."

¶6. (C) Carson said the international community did not expect Zimbabwe to fall into economic despair. Mugabe said Zimbabwe is not in despair and is doing better than some countries which do not face sanctions. Mugabe repeatedly blamed the economic problems that exist in Zimbabwe on sanctions. Carson clarified that the reason behind Zimbabwe's economic problems was Mugabe's mismanagement style and not sanctions.

USG READY TO WELCOME ZIMBABWE INTO COMMUNITY OF DEMOCRATIC NATIONS

¶7. (C) Carson emphasized that the United States is ready to welcome Zimbabwe back into the circle of democratic nations but cannot do so as long as the current situation continues. "Keep your money, keep your power, and keep away from us. You can

pass that message to Obama," Mugabe replied. He angrily insisted that Zimbabwe was his country and warned all outsiders to stay out.

TRIPOLI 00000567 002.2 OF 002

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES

¶8. (C) In response to Carson's question about human rights violations in Zimbabwe, Mugabe said, "what violations?" Speaking loudly, Mugabe blamed the British for organizing riots in Zimbabwe and said, "did you expect me to just sit back and watch?" Mugabe claimed that the security forces used appropriate measures to keep order.

¶9. (C) Carson then suggested that Mugabe allow the international press into Zimbabwe so the world can see what is really happening on the ground. If in fact there are no ongoing human rights violations and the economic crisis is not as bad as we think, the press will document the facts and inform the rest of the world. Mugabe said he will not allow international press in since all they are interested in is "false reporting." He shouted that as an outsider it's not Carson's place to tell him what to do in "his country" and stormed out of the meeting.

MUGABE'S HISTORY LESSON

¶10. (C) Mugabe's outbursts were preceded by a 35-minute monologue of revisionist history about Zimbabwe's past, from the arrival of British colonials, through the liberation war, and up until the present. Sinking into his chair, Mugabe talked about British Prime Minister Tony Blair's response to Zimbabwe's "fast track" land reform. Mugabe implied that former President Bush supported the British in their post independence "war against Zimbabwe" as a quid pro quo for Blair's support of the U.S. in the Iraq war. He described Blair as Zimbabwe's number one enemy and Bush as "enemy number two."

COMMENT

¶11. (C) Mugabe is an angry and defiant man caught up in a time warp. Nearly thirty years after Zimbabwe's independence, he still blames Britain for all of his country's past and current problems. He adamantly refuses to accept any blame for Zimbabwe's sharp economic decline and fall from political grace. He also continues to view Morgan Tsvangirai's MDC as a creation and puppet of the British government. Mugabe's obsession with the British, his low regard for the MDC and his emotional reaction to outside criticism do not bode well for the future. Our assessment is the MDC's ability to fully implement the GPA -- and the health and credibility of Zimbabwe's democracy -- is probably limited as long as Mugabe remains in power.

¶12. (U) A/S Carson has approved this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI57

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI57 aka Wikileaks id #188824 ?
Subject	LIBYA REITERATES REQUEST FOR RETURN OF LIBYAN DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 26 Jan 2009 14:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI57.html
References	09STATE6516 , 09TRIPOLI47
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI76
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5123
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0057/01 0261449
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 261449Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4362
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4886
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000057

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI, L (SCHWARTZ, POMPER) AND NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2019
TAGS: KBTR, PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA REITERATES REQUEST FOR RETURN OF LIBYAN DETAINEES AT GUANTANAMO BAY

REF: A) TRIPOLI 47 , B) STATE 6516

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) This message contains a guidance request - please see para 3. In a meeting on January 22 to discuss the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi (ref A), Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee passed P/E Chief a copy of a letter from QDF Executive Director Youssef Sawani to the International Committee of the Red Cross (text below). In it, Sawani expresses concern about Libyan nationals detained at Guantanamo Bay and requests the ICRC's assistance in obtaining

information about their legal status and facilitating their return to Libya. The letter indicates that the QDF is acting with the official blessing of the GOL. Saleh underscored the GOL's keen interest in having the Libyan nationals remaining in Guantanamo repatriated to Libya, and asked that the USG provide information concerning the legal status of Libyan detainees and whether and what steps could be taken to facilitate their return. We undertook to convey the request for information to the Department and reminded Saleh that while we had formally requested information on the status of legal proceedings against two Libyan detainees already returned from GTMO to Libya (diplomatic notes were most recently sent in June, August and November 2008), we had never received a response. Saleh agreed to follow up with the General People's Committee for Justice (ministry-equivalent) and security organizations to obtain that information. We also reminded Saleh that we had still not received a response to our request in November for access to the two returned detainees.

¶2. (SBU) Also on January 22, Saleh gave an interview to Agence France Presse in which he said Libya had reiterated its request that the U.S. repatriate Libyan nationals still held at Guantanamo Bay, and that the QDF had asked the ICRC to help obtain information on the legal status and health of those detainees. In the article, Saleh said the GOL and QDF were "very concerned by the lack of information about ... Libyans held in Guantanamo". P/E Chief contacted Saleh and conveyed ref B points, highlighting that the ICRC was a channel through which the QDF and GOL could work to obtain further information regarding Libyan nationals at GTMO.

¶3. (SBU) Request for guidance: Post requests guidance as to what further information we might convey to the QDF and GOL about the legal status and health of their detainees and what steps, if any, the GOL can take to help facilitate their repatriation to Libya.

(SBU) (Begin text of letter)

Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation

Date: Jan 20, 2009
Ref: 09/107

To: Mr. Chairman of the International Committee of the Red Cross

Dear Mr. Chairman

Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation sends its greetings and assurances to you and to your working teams for the humanitarian efforts you are making in many places around the world, and which reflect the great need for concerted efforts to face the conditions hostile to human rights and man's right to a decent life in freedom and peace.

Within the framework of these concerns that occupy a priority on the list of GDF concerns and interests, and further to our previous correspondence regarding the Libyan nationals detained in Guantanamo, we would like to turn to you again to express our concerns over the absence of accurate info on the rest of the Libyan detainees.

Dear Mr. Chairman,

The foundation truly trusts your appreciation of the validity of this concern, and the significance of the role you can play in this regard, and specifically to enable the Foundation - which has an official authorization from the GPCFLIC - to learn directly of their health and psychological conditions and status and to follow up their legal rights and to verify the extent to which guarantees are implemented to secure the requisites for those conditions and rights.

those conditions and rights.

It is perhaps necessary in this regard to remind of the contents of the reports made by the UN Anti-torture Committee and in which the Committee expressed its concern over the conditions of

TRIPOLI 00000057 002 OF 002

the American prisons, and especially Guantanamo and its call to shut it down.

The reports by this esteemed Committee and the Third Geneva Convention regarding treatment of war prisoners do in fact consolidate the Foundation's request to assume oversight of the file of the Libyan nationals detained in Guantanamo.

Based on its humanitarian role, the Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation reaffirms the need to have access to communicate with the Libyan nationals detained in Guantanamo; and to take the above considerations seriously and extradite them to the Libyan State in case there are any grounds for their indictment and following the example of other countries' nationals.

Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation avails itself of this opportunity to reiterate its highest respect and consideration, and its willingness to open new cooperation horizons with you on issues of mutual interest.

Sincerely yours,

Dr. Youssef Mohammed Sawani
Executive Director
Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation

(End text of letter)
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI570

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI570 aka Wikileaks id #216752 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S AU SUMMIT SCORECARD: VICTORY (OF SORTS) FROM JAWS OF DEFEAT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 15 Jul 2009 14:48 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI570.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI715
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8071
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0570/01 1961448
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 151448Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5036
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5574
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000570

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/E (MBEYZEROV); AFRICOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/15/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S AU SUMMIT SCORECARD: VICTORY (OF SORTS) FROM JAWS OF DEFEAT

TRIPOLI 00000570 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's hosting of the 13th African Union Summit faced myriad troubles from both political and logistical standpoints, but last-minute developments on both fronts helped Muammar al-Qadhafi snatch a victory from the jaws of defeat. On AU business, the headlines were often more impressive than the substance: the much-heralded push for African unity took a symbolic step forward, while allowing states to stall on implementation; and member states reiterated their call to have the International Criminal Court indictment against Sudan's President Bashir -- though there was no agreement for the 30

African parties to the court to withdraw. A potential walk-out by Western diplomats was averted when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad cancelled his trip to the Summit's opening at the eleventh hour. That Libya was able to house and feed all attendees was a minor miracle, enabled by the hosts paying hefty sums on hospitality on the eve of the Summit. The pageantry was likely aimed at currying favor with African guests, while providing a not-so-subtle reminder of Libya's oil wealth for countries hesitant to join with al-Qadhafi's aggrandizing vision of unification but equally wary of losing out on Libya's dinar diplomacy. End Summary.

LIBYA'S OUTCOMES FROM THE SUMMIT -- WHERE'S THE BEEF?

¶2. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi's chairmanship of the African Union (AU) Assembly has from the start served as a platform for the Libyan leader to burnish his international credentials and cement his position as a self-proclaimed "man of history". In a year flush with symbolic milestones -- the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought him to power, the 10th anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation leading to the formation of the African Union, Libya's seat on the UN Security Council, and senior Libyan diplomat Ali Treiki's presidency of the UN General Assembly all align in September -- al-Qadhafi has vigorously pursued his vision of a "United States of Africa" to secure his spot in the pantheon of great leaders. The push for unity, however, has been light on technical details and implementation. The 13th Ordinary Summit of the AU heads of state held July 1-3 in Sirte offered the unpredictable al-Qadhafi a "home-field advantage" to exert greater pressure on leaders to pay lip service to his continental ambitions.

¶3. (C) With his usual predilection toward controversy, al-Qadhafi made waves with his choices of invited guests. Embattled Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's scheduled but unfulfilled speaking role caused Western diplomats to scramble for guidance on how to react to expected rants against foreign intervention in Iran. (Note: Poloff saw several members of Libyan protocol guiding Iranian officials around the Summit venue on June 30 and members of the Spanish and Dutch delegations reported that Iranian officials were booked on the same cruise ship in which they had sought accommodation. End Note.) Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak was also a last-minute cancellation, as the Egyptian Ambassador waited at Sirte airport expecting his arrival until at least 10am on July 1. During open sessions, al-Qadhafi's remarks were uncharacteristically brief, though his talking points were suitably delivered by a Ghanaian representative of the "traditional kings" of Africa, who called on the assembled to unify Africa per al-Qadhafi's vision.

¶4. (C) While the Summit was ostensibly aimed at agricultural development and food security in Africa, nearly all delegations arrived expecting a continuation of al-Qadhafi's forceful push for a supranational African Authority. After two days of closed-door session with little progress toward securing al-Qadhafi's agenda, several Tripoli-based ambassadors of AU member states told Poloff that they had been told to expect late-night meetings with the Leader on the evening of July 2. The Egyptian Ambassador told us that night that he expected that Libyan-sponsored initiatives for unity and withdrawal from the International Criminal Court (ICC) would fail if al-Qadhafi was unable to propose a face-saving, compromise position.

¶5. (C) Talks with delegation heads and a 14-hour final session apparently led to such a compromise. Press reports announced "milestone" decisions toward unity and a strong rebuke of the ICC. However, the final draft of a decision to form an AU Authority to replace the current secretariat provides little by way of detail and leaves an opportunity to leave the agreement unimplemented while still allowing al-Qadhafi to claim a measured victory. Diplomats from AU countries in Tripoli said

the Libyans "invented" decisions taken at the April Extraordinary Summit to make unity a "fait accompli" and derided Qadhafi's vision for unity as "a dream that is out of touch with the needs of Africans". Several observer delegations obtained early drafts of an ICC motion that called on member states to not cooperate with the Court. The final vote, however, did

TRIPOLI 00000570 002.2 OF 002

not/not call on States Party to withdraw from the Rome Statute and called for non-cooperation only in the case of Sudan's President Bashir. Qadhafi's heavy-handed tactics left several delegations bristling, with South African President Jacob Zuma and Botswanaian Vice President Merafhe publicly deriding the Leader's stewardship of the Summit and expressing doubt that the agreements would amount to progress toward unity. Other business, including a resolution calling on the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Eritrea for its support of al-Shabaab, was reportedly shepherded by the AU Commission and not/not the Libyan hosts.

SUMMIT PLANNING: ALMOST PERFECT, BUT NOT QUITE

¶6. (C) From the beginning, it was clear that Libyan officials sought to promote a Qadhafi-centric dog-and-pony show vice the Summit's stated goals of Agriculture and Infrastructure Development. Diplomatic missions in Tripoli were given various moving dates for when "everything about the Summit" would be explained. A June 17 meeting to explain logistics attended by dozens of ambassadors ended abruptly when the Summit Organizing Committee chair left the dais to answer a phone call without providing details to the assembled diplomats. The Beninese ambassador, who had been given the microphone to ask a question, repeated "I demand to be acknowledged by the [now absent] chair" for at least five minutes while the rest of the crowd filed out.

¶7. (C) On a June 20 tour of Sirte, it was clear that neither detail nor substance had featured prominently in Libyan planning. Apartments reserved for delegations (and planned for handover as public housing after the Summit) were in various stages of construction and no provision had been made for food, transportation to Sirte (a six-hour drive from Tripoli), or ground transportation during the Summit. Hotels and villas reserved for African heads of state and ministers, on the other hand, were prominently shown to assuage African embassies that their delegations would be accommodated in opulence befitting Libya's comfortable financial position. Delegations arriving during the Peace and Security Commission meeting June 24-26 or the Ministerial meetings on June 28-30 reported that food was difficult to locate, with one delegate informing USAU colleagues that she had slept in a chair for the first two nights of the proceedings.

¶8. (C) By the afternoon of June 30, however, Libyan officials apparently decided to open the purse strings to complete all last-minute details. Light shows, electronic signs, and free food met attendant pomp as heads of state arrived in Tripoli. Shuttle jets between Tripoli and Sirte began operations, bringing in planeloads of foreign diplomats and "traditional African kings". Foreign workers abounded: hundreds of Turkish and Greek hospitality staff manned kitchens, buffets, temporary coffee tents, and floating hotels. One waiter told Poloff that he had been notified of his travel to Libya less than 24 hours before getting on a plane to Sirte. Throughout the conference, foreign laborers continued public works projects near delegation lodging sites, including paving sidewalks and building beachfronts.

¶9. (C) Comment: That Libya did not suffer the embarrassment of public derision for their handling of the AU Summit is a testament to the power of its purse. African delegations were well cared for -- ministers and heads of state were housed in

expansive villas. Observers lived in a much more Spartan manner, on foam beds in public housing flats. Libya's goal of catering to its African guests likely served a dual purpose: currying favor with African leaders while not-to-subtly reminding them of Libya's wealth. At the same time, the Sirte venue allowed the GOL to "hold hostage" delegations reluctant to go along with al-Qadhafi's aggrandizing vision. In the end, Libya's last-minute preparations may have been a blessing in disguise; many African delegations indicated that they decided to focus on bilateral meetings due to pessimism on the official agenda. The Libyan summit experience is one we may see again, as some GOL interlocutors have begun laying the groundwork for yet another Extraordinary Summit, to be held coincident to the 40th anniversary of the Qadhafi revolution, which will be marked September 1. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI579

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI579 aka Wikileaks id #217232 ?
Subject	EU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT HANGS ON ICC, TRADE, MIGRATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 19 Jul 2009 15:43 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI579.html
References	08TRIPOLI567 , 09TRIPOLI567
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI637
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1051
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0579/01 2001543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 191543Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5046
INFO RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0187
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5584
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000579

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/16/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EFIS [Commercial Fishing and Fish Processing] , EUN [European Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: EU FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT HANGS ON ICC, TRADE, MIGRATION

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 567

TRIPOLI 00000579  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, a.i., US
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C/NF) Summary: The latest round of EU-Libya Framework
Agreement negotiations hit snags over sensitive political issues
and were slowed by Libya's inefficient technical bureaucracy.
The Libyans denounced the International Criminal Court and
decreed that any language similar to the Rome Statute was off
limits.  Trade talks stalled when the Libyans announced that
they had not examined the draft paper (presented in early 2009)
and were unable to produce trade statistics from 2007/2008 or
```

and were unable to produce trade statistics from 2007/2008 or provide data on the Libyan tariff system. Talks on migration went more smoothly than expected, but significant issues remain before the agreement could be given to member states for approval. EU diplomats in Tripoli are skeptical that the EC will be able to get an agreement that can be implemented by both sides within the remaining two rounds of talks. Learning from Libya's negotiating tactics with the EC will be key to ensuring US-Libya agreements are both signed and implemented. End Summary.

POLITICAL DIALOGUE: THE EC DANCES ON LIBYA'S "RED LINE"

¶2. (C/NF) Representatives of the European Commission (EC) based in Brussels conducted the latest round of Framework Agreement negotiations July 13-14 in Tripoli with sessions focused on political dialogue, trade and commerce, and migration. Diplomats from EU member states -- participating as observers to the EC-Libya negotiations -- said that discussions on the political framework were particularly heated. Libyan negotiator Mohammed Siala railed against language stating that the two parties agreed to discuss crimes against humanity in an international context, angrily stating that any mention of the International Criminal Court (ICC) or text similar to that of the Rome Statute would cause a total breakdown of the framework negotiations. According to the UK embassy, nothing in the political dialogue paper is binding on either party and is merely agenda-setting for future discussions. EC negotiators were not/not pushing for Libya to accede to the ICC.

¶3. (C) In contrast to the ICC discussions, the Libyan delegation readily agreed to the EC's proposed language regarding civil society, leading one EC negotiator to speculate that the Libyan delegation did not fully understand the text. However, the same negotiator also noted that the EC civil society text did not include any mention of non-governmental organizations.

TRADE AND MIGRATION: HITS AND MISSES

¶4. (C) A planned session on trade and commerce was largely postponed after Libyan lead negotiator Abdulati al-Obeidi informed the EC that Libya had not fully examined the draft paper presented to them in early 2009. Obeidi said information requested by EC negotiators on trade statistics for 2007 and 2008 were unavailable and that Libya was unable to provide technical details of its tariff schedule as it was "in flux" due to a restructuring movement. Technical-level discussions on trade and commerce are slated for September in Brussels -- one month ahead of the next negotiating round. Italian and British diplomats reported that the main policy disagreement on trade and commerce was over Mediterranean fisheries, with Libyan negotiators stating strong opposition to the Law of the Sea. On migration, the chief EC negotiator told EU diplomats that the negotiations were a "step forward" and that more progress was made than expected with no major objections from either side on the draft as presented.

¶5. (C) The sides have two more regular rounds of negotiation in October and December. Libyan officials had previously seemed keen on signing the agreement in advance of the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power on September 1. With that milestone out of reach and with several member states holding out the possibility of vetoing the agreement based on bilateral calculus, some local diplomats expect the negotiations to run several more rounds.

COMMENT

¶6. (C/NF): It is worth studying the outcomes of negotiations between the technically minded EC negotiators and their symbolically driven Libyan counterparts as we examine our own, more limited agreements. Smaller EU countries seem eager to

take a hard-line on political and technical approach that could drive the Libyans away from the table. Diplomats from the UK, France, Italy, and Germany see two possible end states: the Libyans will either rush to sign an agreement that they don't intend to implement in order to "close the file" with Europe or will extend indefinitely negotiations on what is essentially a non-binding agenda for future engagement. According to diplomats here, the EC team seems more concerned about the

TRIPOLI 00000579 002.2 OF 002

latter. This tack may encourage Libya to succumb to the former in a continuation of previous failures to fully implement agreements. As we pursue our own agreements such as a TIFA with Libya, maintaining negotiating flexibility and strategic patience will be key to ensuring a signed -- and implement-able -- document. End comment.
POLASCHIK

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI583

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI583 aka Wikileaks id #217297 ?
Subject	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 20 Jul 2009 10:25 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI583.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1454
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0583/01 2011025
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 201025Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5050
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0529
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0202
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5589
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000583

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA ACTING A/S FELTMAN; ALSO PM/RSAT (MMILLER),T/ISN,NEA/MAG,DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/20/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MARR [Military and Defense
Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PHUM [Human Rights] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , ABLD
[Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , LY [Libya] , UN [United Nations]
SUBJECT: BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA
RELATIONSHIP

TRIPOLI 00000583  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.(  S/NF) Summary. Your visit to Libya will set the tone and
agenda for the bilateral relationship over the next several
months.  Libyan officials seek clarification of the
Administration's policy toward Libya, especially after their
mishandling of the Fathi al-Jahmi case, and are unsure of the
degree of engagement they can expect.  They continue to complain
that Libya has not been adequately "rewarded" for previous
policy decisions to give up its WMD programs and support for
```

terrorism, yet they are remiss in meeting key WMD deadlines. You can lay out the path toward increased engagement in the wake of the new Washington consensus and press for real progress. Potential deliverables from the visit include: a statement announcing the intention to engage in a Human Rights Dialogue and a Political-Military Dialogue with high-level State officials; Libya's signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement; formation of a visas working group to discuss bilateral visa problems; and setting a date to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). You can also privately raise the notion of establishing a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue, incumbent upon GOL signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. The Libyans will be looking for a concept of how we envision conducting the human rights dialogue and assurances regarding the possibility of a meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. They will also continue to press for security assurances. End Summary.

PRESSING LIBYA TO FULFILL ITS WMD COMMITMENTS

¶2. (S/NF) The GOL has been credited with having largely met its WMD commitments; however, the recent track record is worrisome and suggests that it may be deliberately delaying implementation of commitments it has undertaken under the rubric of the U.S.-U.K.-Libya Trilateral Steering and Coordination Committee (TSCC). The GOL has delayed since November 2007 signing a U.S.-Libya agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel (the HEU-LEU agreement); delayed signing a parallel Russia-Libya agreement; and given no details on plans to sell its uranium yellowcake stockpile. If work on the spent nuclear fuel transfer to Russia is not completed by September 30, 2009, the Department of Energy's work to complete the program may be delayed for upwards of two years. The GOL has also delayed the implementation of its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to destroy its remaining stockpile of declared chemical weapons (approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860 MT of chemical agent precursor chemicals). The deadline established by the CWC Conference of the States Parties for the destruction of Libya's mustard stockpile is December 31, 2010; destruction of the remaining inventory of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than December 31, 2011.

¶3. (S/NF) A proposed visit by ISN DAS Mitman in late June to discuss Libya's WMD obligations and rewards was scrapped at the eleventh hour when the GOL failed to issue visas to the delegation. GOL interlocutors recently blamed the Prime Minister for slow-rolling on Libya's WMD commitments. A GOL official told the DCM that the Foreign Minister planned to address the issue with Qadhafi and that he understood that inaction by the Prime Minister-equivalent, who still views renewed bilateral relations with suspicion, is detrimental to the relationship. Post believes the GOL is slow-rolling, in part, as leverage against a guarantee to discuss security assurances. We urge you to press your interlocutors on the need to expeditiously sign the agreement, linking that action (the signing of the HEU shipments) to any future discussions regarding cooperation in the civil nuclear field and a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue.

ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

¶4. (S/NF) During a recent meeting with the Ambassador, FM-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed agreement on behalf of the GOL to launch a Human Rights Dialogue, whereby the U.S. and GOL would discuss sensitive human rights issues - in both a general and specific sense - and provide a forum for joint-action in the human rights sphere. You should lay out for the FM a concept of how we envision the dialogue and get agreement for the official launch of the dialogue next month by a team of USG officials. MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri has hinted that the GOL may press for inclusion of the Human Rights Dialogue as part of a broader strategic dialogue. The meeting with Musa Kusa may be the appropriate venue to publicly announce our intention to initiate the human rights dialogue.

VISAS AND NSEERS

¶5. (S/NF) Post began full nonimmigrant visa operations for Libyans in April. Since that time, we have issued over 1000 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with wait times that range from a

few days to several weeks due to Security Advisory Opinion requirements. The GOL continues to adhere to restrictive visa issuance policies vis-a-vis Americans, including an apparent virtual ban on tourist visas for Americans, lengthy delays and exorbitant fees for American business people, and a long record of visa refusals for USG-sponsored visitors for academic, cultural, science, economic, and other programs. The GOL has agreed, in principle, to the idea of forming a bilateral visa working group to resolve these issues, including visa reciprocity. During a July 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Musa Kusa maintained that visas for Americans would continue to receive the most scrutiny of any foreign visitors to the Jamahiriya, for security reasons. Your underscoring for the Libyans that the current imbalance in visa issuance is not sustainable will show your interlocutors that the issue has been raised to high levels in Washington.

¶6. (S/NF) An ostensibly related issue involves the treatment of Libyan travelers at U.S. ports of entry, particularly Libyan officials, who are routinely separated from other passengers at ports of entry and questioned extensively about their travel. GOL officials, who view the issue as a personal affront, will raise it with you. Musa Kusa and UNPermREP Shalgham are only two of the several high level Libyan officials who have been "mistreated" at our ports of entry, and their experiences have engendered deep resentment here. Your recent letter to DHS described the issue well; we believe that we will not be able to make significant process on visa reciprocity until we make some headway here. A DHS delegation is scheduled to visit Tripoli in late July to address treatment of Libyan officials at U.S. ports of entry/NSEERS issues with GOL counterparts, among other issues. However, the GOL has not yet granted visas to the delegation.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

¶7. (S/NF) USTR has been working with the GOL to finalize a TIFA text for over a year. The GOL last invited Emboffs to review the draft text on November 24, 2008. Despite post's attempts to discuss TIFA with Libyan trade officials at every possible opportunity, the text has languished on the Libyan side. We would like to press the GOL to sign a TIFA as soon as possible. We concur with USTR view that the signing should take place even in light of renewed problems regarding Caterpillar and potential problems involving the Chevrolet dealership. We may have a better hand to play on these issues when we can argue them out in this formal framework.

MEGRAHI

¶8. (S/NF) The Megrahi case is likely to be an agenda item for your interlocutors. Qadhafi raised the issue during his July 9 meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown, and recent press reports suggest that Megrahi's physical condition is deteriorating (although the UK Embassy was not able to corroborate such reports during a July 19 meeting with the CDA). If the issue is raised, we recommend that you remind Libyan officials that the decision to allow a Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) for Megrahi is a matter for the Scottish Government to decide. UK Embassy officials believe that a PTA decision could be forthcoming in mid-August. We defer to the Department's view on a possible request for Megrahi's compassionate release.

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (S/NF) While Libya's regional focus at present seems to have concentrated primarily on its pan-African agenda, Qadhafi has skillfully leveraged the AU Chairmanship to ingratiate himself with European and South American leaders - most recently Silvio Berlusconi. His visits to Moscow, Madrid, Paris, Lisbon, and Rome have afforded him opportunities to sign military-to-military agreements and to engage on civil-nuclear issues, as well as to negotiate commercial energy and investment deals. He has even exploited EU, especially Italian, concerns about illegal immigration to press forward his security and political agendas. As Qadhafi's engagement as an African leader has expanded, he has notably decreased his efforts in the Arab world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians - "Isratine" - including during his May meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward. The Libyans will appreciate anything you can relate regarding the work of Special Envoy Mitchell and how we see Administration policy playing out in the peace process.

TRIPOLI 00000583 003.2 OF 003

POTUS-QADHAFI MEETING

¶10. (S/NF) The desire on the Libyan part for a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at UNGA in New York is palpable. In our discussions here, we have implicitly linked a "good atmosphere" for that meeting to Libyan agreement on the human rights dialogue. With their assent to that proposal and the handshake in L'Aquila, the Libyans will seek assurances that the meeting will happen. To the extent you can bring any further clarification on that, the more warmly you will be welcomed by your interlocutors.

BUILDING A HOME BASE

¶11. (C/NF) On the embassy front, we have experienced significant personnel changes, and the new team is settling in nicely. We are disappointed that the move of the entire embassy to the villa site has been pushed back by several weeks, but we are looking forward to the time when the mission will be united. We have a good LES staff, but they have not been fully integrated into the embassy ethic given the distance between the two sites.

¶12. (C/NF) We continue to need high-level engagement from the GOL to facilitate our efforts to purchase a property for a New Embassy Compound (NEC) and close the deal on compensation for our seven U.S. properties here in Tripoli. You may want to remind Libyan officials that a New Embassy Compound will be an important symbol of our growing relationship. You may also want to seek the Prime Minister's assistance in resolving outstanding payments due under the compensation agreement for our seven properties. The Land Registry Office claims that it has not received funds to implement the agreement, while the Ministry of Finance claims that the Land Registry Office has the funds. We believe the Prime Minister's intervention will be needed to resolve this standoff.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI584

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI584 aka Wikileaks id #217358 ?
Subject	BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 20 Jul 2009 15:04 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI584.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1621
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0584/01 2011504
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 201504Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5053
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0532
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0205
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5592
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000584

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA ACTING A/S FELTMAN; ALSO PM/RSAT (MMILLER),T/ISN,NEA/MAG,DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/20/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MARR [Military and Defense
Arrangements] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PHUM [Human Rights] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , ABLD
[Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , LY [Libya] , UN [United Nations]
SUBJECT: BEYOND LOCKERBIE: WRITING THE NEXT CHAPTER OF THE US-LIBYA
RELATIONSHIP

TRIPOLI 00000584  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.(  S/NF) Summary. Your visit to Libya will set the tone and
agenda for the bilateral relationship over the next several
months.  Libyan officials seek clarification of the
Administration's policy toward Libya, especially after their
mishandling of the Fathi al-Jahmi case, and are unsure of the
degree of engagement they can expect.  They continue to complain
that Libya has not been adequately "rewarded" for previous
policy decisions to give up its WMD programs and support for
```

terrorism, yet they are remiss in meeting key WMD deadlines. You can lay out the path toward increased engagement in the wake of the new Washington consensus and press for real progress. Potential deliverables from the visit include: a statement announcing the intention to engage in a Human Rights Dialogue and a Political-Military Dialogue with high-level State officials; Libya's signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement; formation of a visas working group to discuss bilateral visa problems; and setting a date to sign a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). You can also privately raise the notion of establishing a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue, incumbent upon GOL signing of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. The Libyans will be looking for a concept of how we envision conducting the human rights dialogue and assurances regarding the possibility of a meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. They will also continue to press for security assurances. End Summary.

PRESSING LIBYA TO FULFILL ITS WMD COMMITMENTS

¶2. (S/NF) The GOL has been credited with having largely met its WMD commitments; however, the recent track record is worrisome and suggests that it may be deliberately delaying implementation of commitments it has undertaken under the rubric of the U.S.-U.K.-Libya Trilateral Steering and Coordination Committee (TSCC). The GOL has delayed since November 2007 signing a U.S.-Libya agreement for the return of spent nuclear fuel (the HEU-LEU agreement); delayed signing a parallel Russia-Libya agreement; and given no details on plans to sell its uranium yellowcake stockpile. If work on the spent nuclear fuel transfer to Russia is not completed by September 30, 2009, the Department of Energy's work to complete the program may be delayed for upwards of two years. The GOL has also delayed the implementation of its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) to destroy its remaining stockpile of declared chemical weapons (approximately 25 MT of mustard agent and 860 MT of chemical agent precursor chemicals). The deadline established by the CWC Conference of the States Parties for the destruction of Libya's mustard stockpile is December 31, 2010; destruction of the remaining inventory of precursor chemicals is to be completed no later than December 31, 2011.

¶3. (S/NF) A proposed visit by ISN DAS Mitman in late June to discuss Libya's WMD obligations and rewards was scrapped at the eleventh hour when the GOL failed to issue visas to the delegation. GOL interlocutors recently blamed the Prime Minister for slow-rolling on Libya's WMD commitments. A GOL official told the DCM that the Foreign Minister planned to address the issue with Qadhafi and that he understood that inaction by the Prime Minister-equivalent, who still views renewed bilateral relations with suspicion, is detrimental to the relationship. Post believes the GOL is slow-rolling, in part, as leverage against a guarantee to discuss security assurances. We urge you to press your interlocutors on the need to expeditiously sign the agreement, linking that action (the signing of the HEU shipments) to any future discussions regarding cooperation in the civil nuclear field and a Civil-Nuclear Dialogue.

ENGAGEMENT OPPORTUNITIES: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

¶4. (S/NF) During a recent meeting with the Ambassador, FM-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed agreement on behalf of the GOL to launch a Human Rights Dialogue, whereby the U.S. and GOL would discuss sensitive human rights issues - in both a general and specific sense - and provide a forum for joint-action in the human rights sphere. You should lay out for the FM a concept of how we envision the dialogue and get agreement for the official launch of the dialogue next month by a team of USG officials. MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri has hinted that the GOL may press for inclusion of the Human Rights Dialogue as part of a broader strategic dialogue. The meeting with Musa Kusa may be the appropriate venue to publicly announce our intention to initiate the human rights dialogue.

VISAS AND NSEERS

¶5. (S/NF) Post began full nonimmigrant visa operations for Libyans in April. Since that time, we have issued over 1000 non-immigrant visas to Libyans with wait times that range from a

few days to several weeks due to Security Advisory Opinion requirements. The GOL continues to adhere to restrictive visa issuance policies vis-a-vis Americans, including an apparent virtual ban on tourist visas for Americans, lengthy delays and exorbitant fees for American business people, and a long record of visa refusals for USG-sponsored visitors for academic, cultural, science, economic, and other programs. The GOL has agreed, in principle, to the idea of forming a bilateral visa working group to resolve these issues, including visa reciprocity. During a July 6 meeting with the Ambassador, Musa Kusa maintained that visas for Americans would continue to receive the most scrutiny of any foreign visitors to the Jamahiriya, for security reasons. Your underscoring for the Libyans that the current imbalance in visa issuance is not sustainable will show your interlocutors that the issue has been raised to high levels in Washington.

¶6. (S/NF) An ostensibly related issue involves the treatment of Libyan travelers at U.S. ports of entry, particularly Libyan officials, who are routinely separated from other passengers at ports of entry and questioned extensively about their travel. GOL officials, who view the issue as a personal affront, will raise it with you. Musa Kusa and UNPermREP Shalgham are only two of the several high level Libyan officials who have been "mistreated" at our ports of entry, and their experiences have engendered deep resentment here. Your recent letter to DHS described the issue well; we believe that we will not be able to make significant process on visa reciprocity until we make some headway here. A DHS delegation is scheduled to visit Tripoli in late July to address treatment of Libyan officials at U.S. ports of entry/NSEERS issues with GOL counterparts, among other issues. However, the GOL has not yet granted visas to the delegation.

TRADE AND INVESTMENT FRAMEWORK AGREEMENT

¶7. (S/NF) USTR has been working with the GOL to finalize a TIFA text for over a year. The GOL last invited Emboffs to review the draft text on November 24, 2008. Despite post's attempts to discuss TIFA with Libyan trade officials at every possible opportunity, the text has languished on the Libyan side. We would like to press the GOL to sign a TIFA as soon as possible. We concur with USTR view that the signing should take place even in light of renewed problems regarding Caterpillar and potential problems involving the Chevrolet dealership. We may have a better hand to play on these issues when we can argue them out in this formal framework.

MEGRAHI

¶8. (S/NF) The Megrahi case is likely to be an agenda item for your interlocutors. Qadhafi raised the issue during his July 9 meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown, and recent press reports suggest that Megrahi's physical condition is deteriorating (although the UK Embassy was not able to corroborate such reports during a July 19 meeting with the CDA). If the issue is raised, we recommend that you remind Libyan officials that the decision to allow a Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) for Megrahi is a matter for the Scottish Government to decide. UK Embassy officials believe that a PTA decision could be forthcoming in mid-August. We defer to the Department's view on a possible request for Megrahi's compassionate release.

REGIONAL ISSUES

¶9. (S/NF) While Libya's regional focus at present seems to have concentrated primarily on its pan-African agenda, Qadhafi has skillfully leveraged the AU Chairmanship to ingratiate himself with European and South American leaders - most recently Silvio Berlusconi. His visits to Moscow, Madrid, Paris, Lisbon, and Rome have afforded him opportunities to sign military-to-military agreements and to engage on civil-nuclear issues, as well as to negotiate commercial energy and investment deals. He has even exploited EU, especially Italian, concerns about illegal immigration to press forward his security and political agendas. As Qadhafi's engagement as an African leader has expanded, he has notably decreased his efforts in the Arab world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians - "Isratine" - including during his May meeting with AFRICOM Commander General Ward. The Libyans will appreciate anything you can relate regarding the work of Special Envoy Mitchell and how we see Administration policy playing out in the peace process.

TRIPOLI 00000584 003.2 OF 003

POTUS-QADHAFI MEETING

¶10. (S/NF) The desire on the Libyan part for a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at UNGA in New York is palpable. In our discussions here, we have implicitly linked a "good atmosphere" for that meeting to Libyan agreement on the human rights dialogue. With their assent to that proposal and the handshake in L'Aquila, the Libyans will seek assurances that the meeting will happen. To the extent you can bring any further clarification on that, the more warmly you will be welcomed by your interlocutors.

BUILDING A HOME BASE

¶11. (C/NF) On the embassy front, we have experienced significant personnel changes, and the new team is settling in nicely. We are disappointed that the move of the entire embassy to the villa site has been pushed back by several weeks, but we are looking forward to the time when the mission will be united. We have a good LES staff, but they have not been fully integrated into the embassy ethic given the distance between the two sites.

¶12. (C/NF) We continue to need high-level engagement from the GOL to facilitate our efforts to purchase a property for a New Embassy Compound (NEC) and close the deal on compensation for our seven U.S. properties here in Tripoli. You may want to remind Libyan officials that a New Embassy Compound will be an important symbol of our growing relationship. You may also want to seek the Prime Minister's assistance in resolving outstanding payments due under the compensation agreement for our seven properties. The Land Registry Office claims that it has not received funds to implement the agreement, while the Ministry of Finance claims that the Land Registry Office has the funds. We believe the Prime Minister's intervention will be needed to resolve this standoff.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI587

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI587 aka Wikileaks id #217520 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RESULTS OF U.S.-RUSSIA PRESIDENTIAL SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 21 Jul 2009 15:20 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI587.html
References	09STATE71326
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2553
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0587 2021520
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 211520Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5058
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5597
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000587

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/RUS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: RESULTS OF U.S.-RUSSIA PRESIDENTIAL
SUMMIT

REF: STATE 71326

¶1.  (SBU) Post delivered reftel points to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Relations and International Cooperation's
(MFA-equivalent) Office of International Organizations on July
¶21.   GOL expressed appreciation for the message and commented on
the need for developed nations to recognize the need for
developing nations to develop nuclear energy for peaceful means.

JPOLASCHIK
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI588

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI588 aka Wikileaks id #217526 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH BOTSWANA'S VICE PRESIDENT MOMPATI MERAFHE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 21 Jul 2009 16:01 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI588.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI22
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2608
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0588/01 2021601
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 211601Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5059
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1088
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0764
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY 0189
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0208
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5598
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000588

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/E, AF/RSA, AF/S

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/21/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , BC [Botswana] , ZI [Zimbabwe] , MA
[Madagascar] , EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , LY [Libya] , KSUM [Summit Meetings]
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH BOTSWANA'S VICE
PRESIDENT MOMPATI MERAFHE

TRIPOLI 00000588  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson met with
```

Botswana Vice President (VP) Mompati Merafhe on July 2, 2009 on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya. The discussion focused on the global financial crisis, recent accomplishments made by the Government of Botswana (GOB) in the agricultural sector, the new USG global food security initiative, and political leadership in South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar. End Summary.

BOTSWANA STRUGGLES DURING GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

¶2. (C) VP Merafhe asked the Assistant Secretary for his opinion on the state of the global financial crisis and economy. Carson expressed his belief that the recession in the United States was close to bottoming out and could settle sometime between June-September next year. However, U.S. employment, housing, and auto industry figures all continue to indicate a slump.

¶3. (C) VP Merafhe noted that Botswana was "struggling" as a result of the global recession, citing high-end tourism and the diamond industry as particularly hard hit. As part of a larger effort to save jobs in the industry, Botswana has had to close one diamond mine due to decreased sales and lower prices. The GOB is also in the process of concluding establishment of a diamond trading consortium including DeBeers, Anglo America, and Namibia that would, once complete, consolidate 30% of global diamond trade in Botswana. The GOB will hold an 80% stake under the partnership.

¶4. (C) Merafhe also discussed the GOB's decision to run a budget deficit through which government spending would be used to stimulate the economy (Note: the African Development Bank [ADB] recently approved a loan of USD $1.5 billion in Botswana, marking the first such debt that Botswana had accrued in over 17 years. End Note.)

AGRICULTURAL SECTOR REFORM A HIGH PRIORITY

¶5.(C) VP Merafhe explained that the GOB has more than doubled sorghum production in the last year, increasing yields from 43,000 metric tons to 93,000 metric tons using a locally developed model that could be replicated in other countries. Ensuring the sustainability of agricultural sector investment and the accomplishments that have been achieved, is a high priority for the GOB, Merafhe continued.

¶6. (C) Carson noted that the USG was in the process of launching a new, global food security initiative in which Africa would be featured prominently. In particular, USG agricultural assistance funding will double to $1 billion during FY2010, with an approximate total of $3.5 billion provided by the USG within the next three years. Carson explained that host country partnership, innovation, and ownership of planned agricultural sector interventions are USG priorities in its approach to implementing the new initiative.

ENERGY PRODUCTION: SEEKING SELF-SUFFICIENCY

¶7. (C) Carson asked about the status of coal production and energy resources in Botswana. Merafhe noted that the GOB was working to harness Botswana's overall energy resources to achieve self-sufficiency, and that China will enter the market to help Botswana further exploit its coal production capabilities. There are no plans, at present, to develop wind or solar energy resources.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

¶8. (C) When asked about domestic politics, Merafhe said he was

confident about the prospects for his party in upcoming national elections to be held in October, noting that under the GOB system the president is not directly elected but instead chosen by the political party with the highest number of seats in Parliament. Merafhe does not expect new opposition candidates

TRIPOLI 00000588 002.2 OF 002

to enter the election campaign.

VP MERAFHE: SOUTH AFRICA'S ZUMA IS "INTERNALLY FOCUSED"

¶9.(C) Moving to regional issues, A/S Carson asked the Vice President for his impression on the recent election of Jacob Zuma in South Africa. Merafhe said it was too early to tell, but the initial indications suggested that Zuma appeared to be "internally focused." Merafhe also noted that he had no prior knowledge of, or contact with, the new South African Minister of Foreign Affairs but that she appeared to be solid

ZIMBABWE

¶10.(C) On Zimbabwe, Merafhe said that he does not know how the situation will "resolve itself," but that the honorable thing for "the old man" (Mugabe) to do was quit. Mugabe, however, is "determined to stay on." A/S Carson noted that POTUS saw Zimbabwe Prime Minister Tsvangirai during his recent travel to Washington, and said that helping the Prime Minister without aiding Mugabe will be a challenge. A/S Carson also said that the USG would remain engaged in Zimbabwe and continue to channel foreign assistance in support of the people of Zimbabwe through non-governmental organizations. USG support for humanitarian assistance, HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, and democracy and governance programs in Zimbabwe will all continue under the USG foreign assistance program. Agricultural sector inputs and education programming are also anticipated as new USG foreign assistance components.

¶11.(C) A/S Carson asked if SADC would increase pressure on Zimbabwe for Mugabe to exit. VP Merafhe said "no," as Mugabe "must be eased out" since he is both a "part of the problem as well as the solution."

MADAGASCAR: WAY FORWARD REMAINS UNCLEAR

¶12.(C) VP Merafhe said that Madagascar was also a "nasty situation." A/S Carson noted that the AU will repeat efforts to assemble the four political parties in Madagascar in an effort to proceed with presidential elections and restore constitutional governance. A/S Carson noted that Rajoelina is presently too young to secure the presidency under the Malagasy constitution and that the overall way forward in resolving the political impasse in Madagascar was still not clear.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support

of the external w eb sites by the ow ner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI589

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate



Reference id	09TRIPOLI589 aka Wikileaks id #217537 ?
Subject	QADHAFI'S CAUSE DU JOUR - UN REFORM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 21 Jul 2009 16:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI589.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2652
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0589 2021649
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 211649Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5061
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0210
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5600
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000589

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/21/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AORC *[International Organizations and Conferences]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , AU *[Austria]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI'S CAUSE DU JOUR - UN REFORM

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Director of the MFA's International Organizations Department, Mahdi Al-Majribi, elaborated July 21 on the UN reform agenda laid out in Qadhafi's July 15 speech at the NAM Summit. Absent NAM agreement on the way forward for expanded UNSC membership, Al-Majribi expected Qadhafi to call for the addition of an African Union seat to the UNSC as an "interim" plan until the UNSC is ready to add seats for other nations or groups of nations representing the developing world. Al-Majribi hinted that he found Qadhafi's plan unrealistic, but said the UN bureaucracy needed to be "stirred." Al-Majribi appears to be one of the principal Libyan players on UN reform issues. End summary.

UNSC EXPANSION AT TOP OF LIBYA'S UNGA AGENDA

¶2. (C) During a July 21 meeting with the CDA and P/E Chief,

Director of the MFA's International Organizations Office, Mahdi Al-Majribi, hinted at Libya's likely agenda for the UNGA presidency. Prefacing his comments by saying that the UNGA agenda is not set unilaterally by the UNGA president, he noted that UN reform would likely be a top priority for the 64th General Assembly. He said that he had been studying UN reform for several years, and had "contributed information" on the UN reform process to various parts of the GOL.

¶3. (C) Al-Majribi pointed to Qadhafi's July 15 NAM conference remarks and their focus on UN reform -- and expansion of the Security Council -- as indicative of Libyan goals for the UNGA. Al-Majribi, who accompanied Qadhafi to the NAM Summit, said that although the NAM countries agreed in principle on the need for expanded UNSC membership, they had not arrived at a consensus regarding the proper representational breakdown - whether it be individual representatives of each continent or groups of nations represented by regional organizations such as the African Union (AU). As an interim solution, Al-Majribi said that Qadhafi proposed adding an AU seat, the representation of which would be decided within the AU secretariat. Al-Majribi hinted repeatedly that he found the prospects for an AU seat on the Security Council to be unrealistic, pointedly noting that the UN Charter did not call for regional organizations to be represented on the Security Council.

¶4. (C) Al-Majribi underlined Qadhafi's belief that the UNSC was comprised of World War II winners, none of which understand the contemporary positions and needs of the developing world. As such, Al-Majribi believed that Qadhafi would press for the UNSC to add seats, first for the AU, then for the rest of the developing world - which Al-Majribi specified as Latin America and Asia (outside of China). Mjribi likened the UN to a still lake, which needed to be stirred in order for life to resurface - though he offered a pragmatic assessment that true reform of the UN, whether on the order of the GA or SC, would be a long-term process.

ANOTHER AU SUMMIT - MAYBE, BUT LIKELY

¶5. (C) Although Al-Majribi did not have specific information regarding GOL plans to hold a second extraordinary AU Summit on the margins of the 40th Anniversary of Qadhafi's September 1 Revolution, he did say that if a summit were to take place, it would most likely be a day-long event in Sirte. [Note: This information correlates with what Ali Treiki told the Ambassador July 15 and with rumors we have heard from other interlocutors (septel). End note.] Al-Majribi stated that the AU Secretariat may have to endorse the idea of holding another extraordinary summit.

¶6. (C) Comment and Bio Note: While reluctant to divulge too much information, Al-Majribi seemed to be an intelligent, skilled interlocutor on UN issues. He said that he has spent 30 years working on multilateral issues for the Libyan Government, including 9 years in multilateral missions abroad, including Vienna. Given the depth of his comments on UN reform and his detailed knowledge of the UN Charter and structure, he is likely one of the principal players within the Libyan bureaucracy on UN reform. Although he struck an extremely pragmatic tone in his discussion with us, he also was very careful to parrot and elaborate upon the points Qadhafi made in Sharm El Sheikh. It will be interesting to observe how much of Al-Majribi's pragmatism makes it into Libyan negotiations during UNGA. End comment.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI59

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI59 aka Wikileaks id #189005 ?
Subject	SWISS AMBASSADOR: OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA IS DEAD
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 27 Jan 2009 14:15 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI59.html
References	08TRIPOLI592 , 08TRIPOLI851 , 08TRIPOLI926 , 08TRIPOLI994
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI606 , 09TRIPOLI714 , 09TUNIS562
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5960
OO RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0059/01 0271415
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 271415Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4365
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0030
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1386
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0741
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0873
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0816
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4889
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000059

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , KTIA *[Treaties and International Agreements]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS AMBASSADOR: OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH LIBYA IS DEAD

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 994 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 592 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 926 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 851

TRIPOLI 00000059 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: John T. Godfrey, PolEcon Chief.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Despite concluding a bilateral investigation into the events surrounding last July's arrest in Geneva of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, the Swiss Ambassador judges that Swiss-Libyan relations are "dead". A senior Swiss delegation recently visited Tripoli, but was unable to overcome an impasse regarding differing interpretations of

the legality of Swiss police officers' actions and the timeliness of the consular notification. Characterizing the affair as an exercise in saving face for the al-Qadhafi family, the Ambassador said he now realizes the initial Swiss position was too soft, and that Switzerland has little leverage with which to negotiate a satisfactory resolution. The GOL has so far not taken action to enforce an order that all Swiss companies cease operations in Libya before January 31; several of those companies intend to raise a complaint under the terms of a Swiss-Libyan Investment Protection Agreement. The Swiss embassy expects Hannibal's older brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi to conduct quiet bilateral talks on the margins of the Davos Summit later this week, but hold little hope that there will be a breakthrough. The Libyans have also inexplicably decided to send their charge back to Bern, an action the Swiss are unable to decipher. The GOL apparently seems content to sacrifice their relationship with Switzerland in the near to mid-term in what it views as a campaign to protect the al-Qadhafi family's image. Doing so is a high-stakes approach, however, as it risks providing other European countries with ready evidence that deals with Libya can easily be voided if the notoriously ill-behaved and capricious first family changes its mind. That is not a message EU members will welcome as they gear up for another round of EU Framework Agreement negotiations in Tripoli next month. End summary.

NO AGREEMENT ON FACTS OF THE CASE

¶2. (C) Swiss Ambassador Daniel von Muralt (strictly protect) told the Ambassador on January 26 that a January 21-22 visit by a senior Swiss delegation had failed to resolve the diplomatic crisis that has raged between Tripoli and Bern since Muammar al-Qadhafi's son, Hannibal, was arrested in Geneva last July . The bilateral commission charged with investigating the incident concluded its work without achieving consensus on the language of its final report. While Swiss negotiators were prepared to criticize Geneva police for using "unnecessary and humiliating" measures to detain Hannibal, the Libyans have insisted on a finding of legal culpability for the officers involved (ref A). Libya is also seeking a Swiss admission that Geneva authorities violated Hannibal's human rights and their duties under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Von Muralt told the Ambassador the Geneva police notified the Libyan People's Bureau (embassy-equivalent) within 50 hours of Hannibal's arrest, well within the 5-day window for notification that the Swiss consider to be the norm; however, the GOL has insisted that the Convention calls for notification within 24 hours. (Note: The GOL rarely provides consular notification in arrest cases involving foreign nationals or access for foreign missions to their detained citizens. End note.)

¶3. (C) Insisting that the Libyans continued to misrepresent the basic facts of the case, von Muralt presented the Ambassador with a three-page note, apparently written by Geneva canton officials, describing the events surrounding the arrest (ref B). GOL negotiators decried Hannibal's inhumane treatment, claiming he was removed from the hotel premises with a hood over his head after police officers broke down the hotel room door. In fact, police entered with a hotel key and Hannibal was escorted - wearing only handcuffs, not a hood - to an armored Mercedes usually reserved for visiting heads of state. Defending what the GOL has characterized as an "aggressive" response by police, von Muralt cited Hannibal's previous arrests in Paris (for allegedly beating his pregnant girlfriend and then brandishing a firearm when stopped by traffic police) and in Rome (for attacking an individual with a fire extinguisher and injuring police officers). Officers in Geneva waited outside the hotel door for an hour and a half for Hannibal to surrender before deciding, based on his history of violent behavior, to take action lest the situation become more explosive. Adding insult to injury was the rumor circulating that Saudis (with whom Qadhafi has had troubled relations) had photographed Hannibal's arrest and distributed the images around.

arrest and distributed the images around.

WITH NO SENSE OF IRONY, LIBYA TAKES SWITZERLAND TO TASK ON RULE OF LAW

¶4. (C) Libya now seems intent on slowing reconciliation on legal grounds. Bemused, but insulted that the GOL would doubt the

competency and transparency of Switzerland - a model "state of laws" - von Muralt explained that the Swiss federal government could not assume original jurisdiction of the Geneva case. Even if the GOL was disappointed with a Geneva court's hypothetical ruling on the legality of police action, Libya could appeal to Swiss federal courts in Bern, and then to the EU Court of Justice. According to von Muralt, Switzerland does not recognize a legal precedent in international law defining consular notification without delay, but in practice notifies within five days. Swiss authorities notified the Libyan People's Bureau within 50 hours of Hannibal's arrest and allowed him to make a telephone call. As reported ref B, he tellingly chose not to call his father, whose wrath he had previously endured after his arrests in Paris and Rome, but rather his sister, Aisha al-Qadhafi, who arrived in Geneva within 48 hours of his arrest and immediately undertook a media campaign in which she accused Swiss authorities of having acted inappropriately. Von Muralt joked that he was tempted to tell the Libyans to try their luck at the Hague on the issue of consular access.

SWISS GIVE A YARD, LIBYA DEMANDS A MILE

¶5. (S/NF) Acknowledging that the Swiss diplomatic response and misperception of the Libyan playbook had exacerbated the situation, von Muralt pointed fingers at the DFA, up to the level of Foreign Minister Micheline Calmy-Rey. Bern's misunderstanding of Libya's cultural perspective - one simply does not arrest or otherwise publicly disgrace a member of the al-Qadhafi family - compounded by the readiness of the al-Qadhafi family to stake the bilateral relationship on a face-saving mission, led to a situation in which "[the Swiss] gave the tips of our finger and they want our whole arm". Alluding to the GOL's aggressiveness, von Muralt added, "We started off much too soft and are probably too soft now - if we stay in this situation, they will continue to increase their demands". He didn't expect the Swiss Federal Government to develop a coordinated response to the crisis, due in part to Calmy-Rey's reticence to offend her Geneva constituency. (Note: Von Muralt summarized the Minister's position by quoting her as having said "Geneva will be Geneva," which he laughed off as being "typically Swiss" thinking. End Note.)

PROGNOSIS: RELATIONSHIP "DEAD" OR ON LIFE SUPPORT?

¶6. (C) Von Muralt was not hopeful that the two sides could find a way forward, calling the diplomatic relationship "dead" and saying it was nearly pointless to maintain a mission in Tripoli as Swiss diplomats could not process visas, undertake commercial advocacy or perform normal diplomatic functions. On the other hand, he noted positively that Khaled Qa'im, Undersecretary-equivalent at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) regularly called him in as a "back-channel" after visits from Bern. Two Swiss nationals whom the GOL has refused to give permission to leave the country (because they are under investigation for alleged commercial misdeeds) are still living at the Swiss Embassy compound and Swiss DCM Francois Schmidt told us the GOL has continued its campaign of harassment of Swiss officials.

¶7. (C) With respect to the deadline for Swiss companies to cease

operations in Libya and liquidate their assets fast approaching (it nominally expires on January 31), von Muralt doubted that the Libyans would strictly enforce the ban. Unnamed Swiss executives were considering lodging a complaint under an Investment Protection Agreement between the two countries, though they would have little recourse if Libya ignored their grievance. The best the Swiss could hope for, in von Muralt's view, would be for the GOL to realize that the al-Qadhafi family's game had put other potential international agreements, especially a EU Framework currently under negotiation - in jeopardy.

WITH LITTLE LEVERAGE, SAIF MAY BE LAST HOPE

¶8. (C) After six months of meeting Libya's demands, Switzerland has little leverage left with which to negotiate. According to von Muralt, Switerland's DFA realized too late that visa issuance was a powerful carrot they failed to dangle before joining the Schengen area in December. (Note: Before the kerfuffle began last July, the Swiss embassy here issued approximately 10,000 visas to Libyans, who traveled regularly to Switzerland to take advantage of safe banking and advanced medical facilities. End Note.) Nationalizing Libyan-owned Tamoil, which has two refineries and over 300 filling stations

TRIPOLI 00000059 003.2 OF 003

in Switzerland, could only happen if the Swiss government declared a constitutional state of emergency, and seizing privately-held bank accounts was too dangerous a game to play. At the same time, Libya can do little more to damage the relationship: all direct flights between the two countries have been cancelled and commercial activity has largely wound down. According to von Muralt, Libya would be hurt more by a Tamoil shutdown due to Swiss flexibility and the fungibility of petrol on the world market. With the relationship on its last legs, the Swiss embassy hopes Hannibal's older brother, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, can effect a breakthrough during meetings on the margins of this week's Davos Summit. .

¶9. (C) Comment: Swiss diplomats here see the negative trajectory since last July as a product of Hannibal's misrepresentation of what actually occurred, sister Aisha's enmity to the West, and the al-Qadhafi family's willingness to use the tools of state in a misguided attempt to protect the family name, whatever the cost. A large part of the clan's willingess to do so stems from the fact that to compromise with the Swiss would be a tacit acknowledgment that Hannibal's behavior was less than exemplary. Rumors that a constitution may be considered for adoption and questions about succession make family matters particularly important in the context of Libyan domestic politics. Unless a high-level (i.e., Qadhafi family member) interlocutor can help ease the tension, the GOL seems content to sacrifice their relationship with Switzerland in the near to mid-term in what it views as a campaign to protect the al-Qadhafi family's image. Doing so is a high-stakes approach, however, as it risks providing other European countries with ready evidence that deals with Libya can easily be voided if the notoriously ill-behaved and capricious first family changes its mind. That is not a message EU members will welcome as they gear up for another round of EU Framework Agreement negotiations in Tripoli next month. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI590

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI590 aka Wikileaks id #217545 ?
Subject	THE CAST OF THE JAMAHIRIYA: BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR NEA AA/S FELTMAN'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 21 Jul 2009 17:26 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI590.html
References	08TRIPOLI960 , 08TRIPOLI993 , 09TRIPOLI960
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2715
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0590/01 2021726
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 211726Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5062
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1090
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0766
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0535
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0081
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0211
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5601
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000590

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; DRL/NESCA; AND PM/RSAT (MIKE MILLER)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/21/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PINR
[Intelligence] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , LY [Libya] , ABLD
[Buildings and Grounds]
SUBJECT: THE CAST OF THE JAMAHIRIYA:  BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR NEA
AA/S FELTMAN'S VISIT TO TRIPOLI

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 960  ; B) 08 TRIPOLI 993

TRIPOLI 00000590  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
```

[illegible], Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Personalities and relationships play an extremely important role in Libya's opaque system of government. Your visit will bring you face-to-face with the ambiguity of the Libyan bureaucracy and will enable you to initiate relationships with the GOL's key decision-makers: Muammar al-Qadhafi, FM Musa Kusa, PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and the sons who are rivaling to carry their father's mantle -- Muatassim and Saif al-Islam. While Musa has taken a larger foreign policy role, he still appears to hold sway on certain intelligence and security issues. Whereas Musa has served as a proponent of an expanding US-Libya relationship, the PM has been more reluctant and has reportedly slow-rolled fulfillment of GOL WMD commitments. As National Security Advisor, Muatassim's role has been to herald the call for security assurances as Libya's compensation for giving up its WMD program. While Saif has ostensibly retreated to the shadows, his influence seems to be continually present in business and social realms. In spite of the different personalities vying for influence in Libya, pleasing the Leader is still the end goal. End summary.

MUAMMAR AL-QADHAFI: SELF-STYLED LEADER OF AFRICA

¶2. (S/NF) Qadhafi is a famously mercurial interlocutor: his comportment ranges from quiet and difficult to engage (sometimes avoiding eye contact) to holding forth in rambling, non-linear fashion. His latest interactions with the West, including during his most recent visit to Rome, reflect his desire to have his ego fed. He has capitalized on his AU chairmanship by participating in nearly every international meeting to which he has been invited over the last six months, including the Arab League Summit and the G8 Summit in L'Aquila. Local press reports indicate that Qadhafi was honored by his handshake with POTUS at L'Aquila and his subsequent meeting with UK PM Gordon Brown. Nevertheless, he has reflected his insecurity about national security by seeking military, security and procurement agreements with the likes of Russia, France, and Italy. He will want to hear from you the new administration's views on the bilateral relationship, particularly assurances on peaceful USG motives in Libya.

¶3. (S/NF) Qadhafi views himself as a man of particular historical importance and has long sought to leverage leadership of Libya into a more prominent international role. His role as African Union Chair has provided both a convenient forum to raise his international profile and to promote his long-standing policy goals for the continent. Qadhafi's interest in Africa dates to the late-1980's, when it became clear that efforts to position Libya as a leading Arab state were unlikely to succeed. Libya has significant commercial investments and development projects in sub-Saharan Africa, and has leveraged them as part of its "dinar diplomacy" approach to managing relations on the continent. Qadhafi is keenly focused on African issues and seems to genuinely aspire to be the founding father of a United States of Africa. He has expressed willingness to assist U.S. efforts in Darfur, Somalia, and in ending the Chad-Sudan conflict.

¶4. (S/NF) Qadhafi's increased international profile as AU Chair coincides with the 40th anniversary of the Fatah Revolution (September 1) and the tenth anniversary of the Sirte Declaration that created the AU (September 9). Libya's current roles on the UNSC and as UNGA President add to the importance of this year for Qadhafi. Libyan officials will be looking toward Qadhafi's appearance at UNGA as the capstone of an extraordinary year; any potential interaction with POTUS will have long-lasting implications for our bilateral relationship.

MUSA KUSA'S EXPANDING PORTFOLIO

¶5. (S/NF) Musa Kusa was named Foreign Minister in March, and was dual-hatted as External Security Organization (ESO) chief for

several weeks before a new External Security Organization Director was named. (Note: The extent to which Kusa has relinquished control of day-to-day intelligence operations remains unclear. The current ESO Director, Abuzeid Dorda, is a former Prime Minister and most recently served as the Chairman of the high-profile Housing and Infrastructure Board; however, he does not have experience in intelligence and security issues. End note.) Kusa frequently travels with the Leader and is a

TRIPOLI 00000590 002.2 OF 003

principal advisor on security matters. He is Western-educated, holding an M.A. from Michigan State, and is seen as a strong supporter of reengagement with the West. The Ambassador and GRPO have met him frequently. He has played a prominent role in U.S.-Libya relations and, more broadly, in Libya's foreign affairs. Since becoming Foreign Minister, he has assumed several portfolios previously held by other prominent regime figures.

¶6. (S/NF) Kusa is a key mentor for Muatassim al-Qadhafi and served as his "minder" during the latter's first trip to the U.S. in September 2007 to attend the UN General Assembly. Muatassim made his latest trip without Kusa, but the two likely consult extensively on matters of security and intelligence. Kusa previously served (circa 2004-2006) as a mentor to Muatassim's brother and potential succession rival, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, and reportedly remains close to him. Kusa is rare among Libyan officials -- he embodies a combination of intellectual acumen, operational ability, and political weight. When the USG has promoted specific areas of cooperation with Kusa, he has been willing to cast the USG message in terms palatable to Libya's leadership.

AL-BAGHDADI AL-MAHMOUDI: THE SKEPTIC

¶7. (S/NF) Prime Minister Dr. al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi has been described as having limited influence with Muammar al-Qadhafi, though he is a key decision-maker within the regime. We have had limited contact with al-Mahmoudi. GOL sources have told us that he is seen as an obstacle to deepening bilateral engagement and have hinted that he is personally responsible for holding up the GOL's signing of the HEU-LEU agreement. Head of the Americas Desk (A/S-equivalent) Ahmed Fituri recently stated that Kusa intended to intervene with Qadhafi to overrule al-Mahmoudi on the HEU-LEU issue. We have not yet seen evidence of a change in the GOL position. Al-Mahmoudi also is a key player in resolving the standoff between the Land Registery Office and Ministry of Finance regarding payment for our seven USG properties in Tripoli.

MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI'S ROLE AND INTERESTS

¶8. (S/NF) Muatassim's visit to Washington was seen here as further evidence that he is being groomed as a potential successor to his father's throne. His meeting in March with AFRICOM Commander Ward reflected skepticism about the role of the Africa Command and a desire for security assurances. The points he raised with Ward are likely to preview the issues he will raise with you: 1) Libya has not been adequately compensated for its decision to give up its WMD programs and abandon terrorism in 2003; 2) Libya wants security assurances in the form of a defensive alliance with the United States; and 3) Libya needs U.S. training and equipment to adequately secure its borders and fight transnational terrorism. Muatassim also stressed to Ward that Libya is eager to procure lethal and non-lethal military equipment and to resolve the case of Libya's eight C-130's in Marietta, Georgia. The GOL recently sent two amendments to the military-to-military MOU, requesting security guarantees and rehabilitation and return of Libya's eight C-130's.

¶9. (S/NF) When Muatassim raised the issue of Libya's C-130's with the Political-Military (PM) Bureau, PM responded that while the U.S. would look favorably on requests for new aircraft (C-130J's), the USG position remains that there will be no compensation for the old aircraft, and Libya should work directly with Lockheed Martin to resolve the matter. Regarding Libya's requests for lethal and non-lethal equipment, Post has submitted a draft end-use and transfer agreement to the MFA to enable some of the sales, but the Libyans have not responded with an acceptance of the agreement.

¶10. (S/NF) During his visit to Washington, USG interlocuturs urged Muatassim to initiate a Political-Military Dialogue and marked it as the appropriate venue to develop plans for political-military cooperation. Muatassim will be listening for a reaffirmation of our willingness to move forward on the military component of the bilateral relationship, to include security assistance. Post continues to urge the GOL to discuss outstanding security concerns within the framework of a

TRIPOLI 00000590 003.2 OF 003

Political-Military Dialogue.

SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI -- MOVING BEHIND THE SCENES

¶11. (S/NF) Whereas Saif al-Islam ostensibly retreated from political life nearly one year ago, his influence remains palpable within the country. Saif stands behind the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), which holds one of the most extensive investment portfolios in the country. His oil company NESSO is a member of one of the few successful oil production consortiums in the country, and he is the primary investor in Libya's Coca-Cola operation, among other ventures. Saif also plays a lead role in Libya's quasi-civil society. His Qadhafi Foundation oversees the International Society for Peace and Relief (which focuses on refugee assistance) and a new organization entitled the Arab Alliance for Democracy, Human Rights, and Development (which he launched at in February at the Davos Forum to
"name and shame" regional human rights abusers). Our contacts report that Saif continues to play an influential role with his father and within the regime. Some observers view him as retreating strategically from the limelight, after having overstepped boundaries with his expansive reform agenda. Nevertheless, he has played an enduring role behind the political scene by brokering dialogue in late-2008 on the release of former LIFG fighters and facilitating our access to Fathi el-Jahmi in prison (refs a, b). We believe that Saif and the Qadhafi Foundation could be helpful in pushing the Human Rights Dialogue forward and in creating the buy-in necessary for the regime to actively engage in areas that are of priority concern to us, including rule of law; the detention and treatment of minorities and refugees; human trafficking; and religious freedom.

¶12. (S/NF) Comment: We have requested meetings for you with all of the personalities outlined above. Because the roles that Musa, Muatassim, and Saif play are fluid and influential with Qadhafi in different ways, you will have the opportunity to lay out USG policy priorities as outlined in septel with each of them. A clear, unified message that explicitly links achievement of our goals to engagement on their priorities will speak most effectively to the Qadhafi regime. End comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI599

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI599 aka Wikileaks id #218329 ?
Subject	MOVING FORWARD ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 27 Jul 2009 16:34 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI599.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI621 , 09TRIPOLI638 , 09TRIPOLI639 , 09TRIPOLI696
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO7414
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0599/01 2081634
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 271634Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5073
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0214
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5612
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000599

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; ENERGY FOR
GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/27/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , CVIS
[Visas] , ABLD [Buildings and Grounds] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , PARM [Arms
Controls and Disarmament] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON THE BILATERAL AGENDA WITH LIBYA

TRIPOLI 00000599  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: FM-equivalent Musa Kusa assured visiting
Acting A/S Feltman July 27 that the Government of Libya was
```

prepared to launch a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue; would sign the HEU-LEU agreement in time to meet the September deadline to transfer its nuclear spent fuel; was ready to move forward on security cooperation, including signing the end-use monitoring agreement; was prepared to take a second look at some kind of participation in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP); and was discussing a plan to expedite the visa approval process for U.S. officials, business travelers, and technical experts. On signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), Kusa did not give a clear answer but stated that strategic dialogue was possible in the international sphere. Kusa confirmed that the GOL was planning to host a one-day AU Summit meeting in Tripoli August 31 to discuss crisis spots in Africa. Kusa also noted that counterterrorism and Darfur would be on the Leader's agenda for any possible meeting with POTUS on the margins of the upcoming UN General Assembly. Feltman asserted that any potential meeting would be enhanced by Libyan agreement to the several issues raised and that the Libyan side would be well-advised to make efforts to temper Qadhafi's rhetoric while in New York to the extent possible. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) During a July 27 visit to Tripoli, Acting A/S Feltman (accompanied by Ambassador and Pol/Econ chief) reviewed with FM-equivalent Musa Kusa U.S. strategic goals for the NEA region and specific areas for expanded bilateral engagement. Feltman opened the nearly two-hour initial interaction between the two with an overview of the priorities set out by POTUS during his Cairo speech, emphasizing the need to build strategic partnerships throughout the region. Kusa commented that the current positions of the U.S. vis-a-vis the Arab world were notably different than under the previous Administration and noted that U.S. policy toward the region led to the rift in U.S.-Libya relations. Kusa seized the opportunity to offer advice, explaining that the U.S. must be "fair and equal" in solving the problems of the Arab world. He said POTUS should "forget about the kings" and deal directly with the people (a clear allusion to Libya's "Jamahiriya" concept of direct governance by the people). Terrorism, he warned, stems from the people's grievances and can be controlled by shifting the mentality of the people rather than working with governments.

¶3. (S/NF) Kusa noted that the U.S. must treat Libya differently from other Arab nations, specifying that we could not treat Colonel Qadhafi the same way we treat Ben Ali in Tunisia or Mubarak in Egypt, given his unique background and experience. He commented that a man of Qadhafi's "caliber" could not be placed on equal footing with the King of Jordan or other traditional Arab rulers. Kusa stated that leaders in Egypt, Algeria, Turkey, and Pakistan could not rule without the support of their military establishments and that while Qadhafi had started out as a military figure, he had been able to change into a political figure. Kusa advised that a deep, correct understanding of Qadhafi's visions and aspirations would be of more benefit to the U.S. regionally than would engagement with other Arab statesmen.

¶4. (S/NF) Turning to bilateral issues, AA/S Feltman noted the U.S. desire to press the relationship forward by establishing a series of dialogues on human rights, political-military relations, trade and investment, and civil-nuclear engagement. Kusa commented that the U.S.-Libya relationship was at an "acceptable" level but that the pace of engagement was a point of concern. He reiterated the GOL's familiar refrain about the criticism it has received for its decision to give up its WMD program and, in its estimation, not having been adequately compensated for that decision. However, he emphasized that Libya had made the correct decision and had done so with awareness and conviction. He acknowledged that giving up WMD was the safest decision for Libya.

HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

¶5. (S/NF) Kusa stated that the GOL had no objections to engaging in the bilateral human rights dialogue, a proposal that had previously been raised by the Ambassador, but he wanted to ensure that both governments would be "on equal footing" within the conduct of that dialogue. Confusing the goal of the dialogue with the Congressionally-mandated annual human rights report, he suggested that the GOL should be able to insert into any report on Libya's human rights situation comments on U.S.

TRIPOLI 00000599 002.2 OF 003

human rights issues. The AA/S explained that the human rights dialogue was designed to create a discreet bilateral forum for discussion on a broad range of issues, including specific cases of concern, which would be based on mutual respect. Kusa said that the GOL would agree to host the initial team of experts within the dialogue framework. He explained that the GOL did not disagree with the concept of a dialogue but was concerned about the manner in which the U.S. reported on human rights issues in Libya. Kusa insisted that all discussion of human rights issues should be done in diplomatic channels within the framework of the human rights dialogue and noted his disapproval of embassy attempts to collect information directly from the public (i.e., human rights reporting). Feltman urged Kusa to agree to a DRL-led interagency visit for one-day between August 10-20 to formally launch the dialogue. Kusa asked A/S-equivalent for the MFA Americas Department Ahmed Fituri to follow-up on scheduling.

SIGNING THE HEU-LEU AGREEMENT

¶6. (S/NF) Feltman urged the GOL to sign the HEU-LEU agreements with the U.S. and Russia as soon as possible in order to meet the September deadline for transfer of Libya's highly enriched fuel to Russia and in order to remove an obstacle to future cooperation in the civilian nuclear energy field. Kusa assured the AA/S that the GOL had already made the decision and indicated that meeting the September deadline would not be a problem.

SECURITY COOPERATION - TSCTP and 505 END USE AGREEMENT

¶7. (S/NF) The AA/S explained that one way to address Libya's requests for technical assistance was via the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), clarifying that TSCTP was not a multilateral organization but rather a simple funding mechanism. The AA/S also noted the need for GOL signing an end-use monitoring agreement, which the GOL had been reviewing for several months in order to move forward on our military and security relationship. Kusa asked the embassy to provide additional information via Fituri's office on TSCTP and to follow-up directly with Fituri on the end-use monitoring agreement.

VISAS AND EMBASSY TRIPOLI ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

¶8. (S/NF) Highlighting that over 1000 U.S. visas had been issued to Libyans by the embassy since it began full non-immigrant visa services on April 2, Feltman urged Kusa to work with us to improve the visa situation for American travelers and help establish a more transparent Libyan system. Kusa agreed that the visa issue needed to be addressed and assured the AA/S that the GOL was developing a plan to offer special processing services to U.S. officials, business travelers, and technical experts. Feltman reiterated the importance of the GOL's approval of a NEC site and for finalization of the deal to compensate the USG for expropriated properties. Kusa advised us to follow-up with Fituri.

Trade and Investment Framework Agreement

¶9. (S/NF) In response to Feltman's inquiry on GOL readiness to

¶9. (S/NF) In response to Feltman's inquiry on GOL readiness to move forward on signing a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, Kusa stated generally that the GOL was ready to develop investment opportunities and mentioned the possibility for strategic dialogue in the international arena.

ANOTHER AU SUMMIT: FOCUS ON PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA

¶10. (S/NF) Feltman highlighted that African issues represented an intersection of interests between the U.S. and Libya. Kusa said that Libya was planning to host a special one-day AU Summit in Tripoli on August 31 that would focus on regional crises, particularly in Darfur, Somalia, and Ethiopia-Eritrea. He explained that the GOL was considering extending invitations to a number of regional and European leaders and ministers, and that an invitation may be forthcoming to Secretary Clinton. He highlighted that U.S. participation as a regional partner would be significant.

POSSIBLE POTUS-QADHAFI MEETING AT UNGA

¶11. (S/NF) On the possibility of a POTUS-Qadhafi meeting at

TRIPOLI 00000599 003.2 OF 003

UNGA, the AA/S said any meeting, if it were able to be arranged, would be significantly enhanced by GOL progress in the above areas, particularly on the launching of the bilateral human rights dialogue and the signing of the HEU-LEU agreement, noting that those two issues would provide substance and a reason for the meeting to take place. Feltman also urged that the Leader respect U.S. sensitivities during his remarks at UNGA, specifically avoiding any provocative language about the events of September 11. Kusa indicated his agreement that a potential POTUS-Qadhafi meeting should be substantive, and he noted that issues for discussion from the Libyan side might include counterterrorism in the Sahel, the crises in Darfur and Somalia, and Qadhafi's overall vision for Africa and peace in the Middle East.

OTHER ISSUES - GUANTANAMO, WESTERN SAHARA

¶12. (S/NF) In responding to Feltman's assertion that the Libyan side could raise any human rights concerns it had about U.S. practices, Kusa mentioned that the embassy could work with the Qadhafi Development Foundation to address any Guantanamo-related issues.

¶13. (S/NF) The AA/S noted the U.S. interest in promoting greater regional cooperation and asked for Kusa's thoughts on the Western Sahara issue, especially how to improve relations between Algeria and Morocco so as to promote Maghreb unity. Kusa explained that Libya was trying to play a role in the situation in order to maintain the integrity of the Maghreb Union. Libya had spoken in detail with both Morocco and Algeria and thought the 5+5 Group may be the best negotiating forum for the issue. Kusa predicted that if the issue was not solved under Algerian President Bouteflika, then it would not be solved.

¶14. (S/NF) Comment: The meeting with Musa Kusa was positive and clearly signaled that the new administration was prepared to deal seriously with the Libyans to continue the normalization process. The GOL's agreement to participate actively in a bilateral human rights dialogue represents a significant step forward and will create a forum to address specific cases of concern as well as to press Libya to meet its international human rights commitments more broadly. Kusa clearly got the point that any potential meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi at UNGA would be enhanced greatly by agreement to the several issues Feltman raised. He also understood the necessity of finding a way to control Qadhafi's rhetoric while in New York; however, he did not promise anything on that score. Post will

follow-up with the MFA on scheduling a one-day visit by a DRL-led interagency team between August 10-20 to launch the human rights dialogue; GOL's signing of the HEU-LEU agreement; approval on TSCTP; approval of the 505 end-user agreement; improvement of the bilateral visa situation; TIFA; and launching a political-military dialogue. End Comment.

¶15. (U) Acting A/S Feltman did not have the opportunity to clear this message prior to departure.
CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI600

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI600 aka Wikileaks id #218330 ?
Subject	LIBYAN OFFICIALS CONFIRM AUGUST 31 AU MEETING IN TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 27 Jul 2009 16:35 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI600.html
References	09TRIPOLI1
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7418
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0600 2081635
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271635Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5076
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0538
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5615
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000600

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AU-1 [African Union] , KSUM [Summit Meetings] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN OFFICIALS CONFIRM AUGUST 31 AU MEETING IN TRIPOLI

¶1.  (SBU) In a July 26 meeting with NEA Acting Assistant
Secretary Feltman (septel), Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa
Kusa extended a verbal invitation for American officials to
attend an African Union extraordinary session on August 31
focused on continental crises, specifically Sudan and Somalia.
On July 27, Protocol chief Nuri al-Mismari told the Ambassador
that the one-day session would be held in Tripoli and that the
GOL was in the process of chartering ships to serve as floating
hotels to house the expected delegates.  The proposed
ministerial-level meeting would be the day following a planned
visit of Italian PM Silvio Berlusconi to mark the signing of the
2008 Italian-Libyan "Friendship Treaty" on August 30 and the
40th anniversary of the coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to
power on September 1.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI602

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI602 aka Wikileaks id #218398 ?
Subject	UN WRAPS UP HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT GROUP WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT GAINS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 28 Jul 2009 09:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI602.html
References	09TRIPOLI34 , 09TRIPOLI759
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7993
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0602/01 2090933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 280933Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5078
INFO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0018
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 0007
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1506
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0844
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0966
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0909
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5617
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000602

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/27/2019
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: UN WRAPS UP HUMAN RIGHTS CONTACT GROUP WITHOUT SIGNIFICANT
GAINS

REF: A. TRIPOLI 34
     B. 07 TRIPOLI 759

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: UN officials recently completed a series of five
meetings with prominent quasi-nongovernmental organizations in
Tripoli focused on raising awareness of basic human and civil
rights while building capacity for the organizations.  The
organizations, all chaired by people close to the al-Qadhafi
inner circle, have been key proponents of Libya's fitful
politico-economic reform program.  The organizations owe their
existence to al-Qadhafi and are constrained by his "red lines",
```

but some NGO-led attempts at fostering reform have met with failure due to lack of institutional expertise and capacity. UN officials see the successful completion of the series as an outcome in itself. They reported that participants concluded that awareness of human and civil rights was nearly non-existent in Libya and, critically, that the organizations had no government counterpart with whom to implement improvements. The nine-month contact group is unlikely to develop further in the short term: the UN is losing its two prime interlocutors to new postings and the role of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi -- a key enabler of civil society organizations -- is less certain than when the group formed in September 2008. End Summary.

CHARITY ORGANIZATIONS DOMINATED BY REGIME INSIDERS

¶2. (C) Outgoing UNHCR Chief of Mission Mohammed al-Wash (strictly protect) told us on July 23 that he has concluded the fifth meeting of a human rights contact group begun in September 2008 (ref a) with prominent members of Libya's nascent civil-society circle. (Note: Al-Wash is awaiting agrement from Caracas to take the UNHCR COM position there. End note.) Charity groups -- the regime-approved nomenclature for NGOs -- require direct approval by the Prime Minister-equivalent to form. As such, they are led by people close to the al-Qadhafi inner circle: al-Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam chairs the Qadhafi Development Foundation; Aisha al-Qadhafi, the Leader's daughter, chairs the Waatesimu Foundation; Mohammad Kusa, brother of Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, runs the Organization of Youth for Voluntary Works; and Khaled al-Humeidi, director of the International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief, serves as a personal aide to al-Qadhafi and is reportedly close with both Saif and Muatassim al-Qadhafi. These groups were joined by Hosni al-Waheish from the General People's Congress' Human Rights Committee and representatives from the World Islamic Call Society at the roundtable discussions that were held quietly without press or diplomatic observers.

¶3. (C) Al-Wash reported that all members of the group agreed that implementing human rights programming and dialogue between the GOL and actors like the US and EU would be hampered in the short term by a general lack of awareness of human rights issues by both GOL officials and the Libyan public. Representatives reportedly complained that several initiatives had been stalled by a lack of government interlocutors to establish modalities for implementing humanitarian and reform programs. According to al-Wash, the groups' closeness to the regime affords them more space to carry out "benign" programs and provides the government assurance that so-called "red lines" outlined in ref B -- Islamic traditions, Libya's security and stability, territorial integrity, and the primacy Muammar al-Qadhafi -- are not threatened.

¶4. (C) According to al-Wash, organizing the group and developing the high-level contacts through sustained dialogue is seen as a successful outcome in itself. However, other goals such as delineating areas of responsibility between different charity groups and normalizing interaction between international non-governmental organizations and the GOL remain outstanding. While the UN hopes to continue the dialogue, al-Wash recognized that their measured success had been based on the personal relationships that he and recently departed Resident Coordinator Brian Gleeson had leveraged to begin the conversation. He was negative on the prospects for an expected Yemini TDY ResCoord's chances of building on the meetings. He predicted that Libya would frustrate Western interlocutors because Libya is only prepared to engage at the symbolic level but noted that passing symbolic milestones before attempting broader talks was a necessary exercise with Libyan officials.

¶5. (C) Comment: Al-Wash and Gleeson were able to develop excellent contacts within Libya's small but growing civil society community in part due to their organizational

affiliation. The UN is viewed by the GOL as less threatening than bilateral engagement and is able to build relationships by implementing programs with the proto-NGOs as side-by-side

partnerships vice the contracted partner model Western governments prefer. Their limited success, however, is more evidence that some dissention remains between hard-line regime members and more reform-minded actors as to how open Libya should be with the West, particularly in sensitive issues like political reform and human rights. With Gleeson and al-Wash departing post, the UN is left without leaders with political saavy and understanding of the strictures of the Jamahiriya and will likely see a slowing of direct engagement on human rights.
End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI606

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI606 aka Wikileaks id #218493 ?
Subject	LIBYAN (MIS) CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 28 Jul 2009 16:27 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/07/09TRIPOLI606.html
References	09TRIPOLI59
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8446
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0606 2091627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 281627Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5084
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0041
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0020
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5623
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000606

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/28/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , TS *[Tunisia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN (MIS) CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS

REF: TRIPOLI 59

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: During a year of regional prominence for the Jamahiriya, Libya has nevertheless continued to create bilateral rifts with previously close countries - namely Switzerland and Tunisia. In the Swiss case, the Qadhafi family was insulted when the Geneva police had the "audacity" to arrest one of the Leader's sons (Hannibal) for allegedly beating his household staff. While the situation with the Swiss seems to be slowly nearing a possible resolution, Libya is now threatening its relationship with Tunisia by levying a "tax" on incoming trucks,

an action which reportedly resulted from a "personal" slight to the Leader by President Ben Ali. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Newly-arrived Swiss Charge d'Affaires, Stefano Lazaratto, informed the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief July 28 that he was hoping to be able to remain in his position but that he had not yet been informed by the GOL that he would be allowed to stay. Lazaratto, who arrived ten days ago, reported that Bern was fairly optimistic that a resolution to the Swiss-Libyan imbroglio was now within possible reach (reftel). According to Lazaratto, the Swiss are waiting for an invitation from Libya for President Pascal Couchepin to come to Libya to resolve the issue personally, perhaps during a meeting with the Leader. Lazaratto expects the situation to be resolved after the Swiss president offers a formal apology to Qadhafi, although he and other Swiss officials are acutely aware that what they may interpret as a final agreement with the Libyans may be subject to change even after the Swiss leader's possible arrival in Tripoli.

¶3. (S/NF) Proving that an offense or insult to the Leader -- regardless of how minor -- is worthy of a strong reaction, Qadhafi has also apparently decided to provoke an escalating bilateral crisis between Libya and Tunisia. Contacts tell us that the problem began when Tunisian President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali did not attend the Community of Sahel and Saharan States (CEN-SAD) Summit May 28-30, hosted by Qadhafi in Sabratha. The GOL, insulted at the slight, ordered that stiff fees be levied on the hundreds of Tunisian trucks crossing the Tunisian-Libyan border everyday, causing this important trade to come to an almost dead halt. The "tax" is reportedly 250 dinars per truck (approximately 200 USD). Ben Ali was reportedly incensed by the action, especially given that it is an election year. The Tunisians insist that Libya's unfriendly actions also contravene longstanding bilateral agreements on border issues. The action has prompted Tunisia to withdraw Ambassador M. Mohamed Brahem, who took up his post in January 2005. Brahem will reportedly depart on an extended vacation, leaving open the possibility of his return should the disagreement be resolved. Neither the Tunisians nor the Libyans have publicly signaled a formal rupture of relations, although there is considerable anger on the side of the Libyans, who understand the true meaning of the ambassador's departure.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: The two cases reflect the Leader's track record of blowing events out of proportion no matter what the political cost, especially when an offense has been caused to himself or his family (e.g., his continuing battle with Saudi King Abdullah who openly snubbed him at an Arab League Summit several years ago). We understand that the decision to take action against the Tunisians would not have been made unless condoned by Qadhafi himself, who takes a close, hands-on and personal interest in Libya's dealings with Tunisia and Egypt. End Comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI618

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI618 aka Wikileaks id #219234 ?
Subject	CATERPILLAR NEGOTIATIONS INCHING ALONG
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Aug 2009 14:14 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI618.html
References	09TRIPOLI274 , 09TRIPOLI289
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI619 , 09TRIPOLI706
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3348
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0618/01 2151414
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031414Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5095
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5635
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1094
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0769
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0424
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0539
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000618

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; COMMERCE FOR ITA NATE MASON;
COMMERCE FOR THE ADVOCACY CENTER; ENERG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/3/2019
TAGS: ETRD [Foreign Trade] ;, ECON [Economic Conditions] ;, PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ;, EPET
[Petroleum and Natural Gas] ;, LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CATERPILLAR NEGOTIATIONS INCHING ALONG

REF: A) TRIPOLI 289 ; B) TRIPOLI 274

TRIPOLI 00000618  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: As of a few months ago, it appeared the
```

¶1. (C) Summary. As of a few months ago, it appeared the Government of Libya (GOL) was committed to allowing the U.S. firm Caterpillar's ("CAT") heavy machinery and spare parts to enter Libya. However, recent talks with the GOL have stalled due to the mandate that CAT work only with the state-owned Economic and Social Development Fund for its dealership in Tripoli. GOL implicitly threatened to reinstate a previous ban on CAT imports. As a result, CAT is considering pulling out of Libya altogether, which would jeopardize millions, if not billions, of dollars of infrastructure projects due to be completed by September 1 for the 40th Anniversary of Qadhafi's coup. The situation is illogical from a business standpoint, but as with most prestigious and potentially lucrative deals in Libya, the decision-making in the CAT negotiations appears to be happening at the highest levels of the regime, with Qadhafi family members (namely, sons Saif and/or Muatassim) standing to gain from a GOL-owned dealership. (See septel for latest developments.) End summary.

BACK WHERE WE STARTED

¶2. (C) As previously reported in Ref A, as of a few months ago, it appeared the GOL was committed to allowing Caterpillar ("CAT") heavy machinery and spare parts to enter Libya. Until now, CAT products have been entering the country, but recent events indicate that a previous ban on CAT imports may be reinstated. Previously, as a condition of lifting the ban, CAT had severed all business ties with its Libyan agent (Sahil Company). CAT was forced to take this step in order to overcome accusations made by the Secretary of Industry, Economy and Trade (Ministry of Economy-equivalent) that the CAT dealership was operating illegally and corruptly, as its Libyan partners were the sons of current government officials. The Secretary referenced Article 5 of the General People's Committee Decision No. 315 of 2008 on Regulations Regarding Commercial Agencies (distributorships), which prohibit distributors to partner with government officials. Once CAT severed its ties to the Sahil Company, the GOL lifted the ban on May 3, and CAT equipment was once again allowed to flow into Libya. Even though the GOL said it would not tell CAT who its partner must be, the GOL rejected CAT's proposed new partner and has mandated that CAT's dealer in Tripoli be the state-owned Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF). CAT agreed to allow the ESDF to hold a 40 percent share in the dealership, but the ESDF, promptly rejecting CAT's offer, insisted on 100 percent ownership. CAT representatives traveled to Tripoli the week of July 12 to meet with GOL officials and negotiate a settlement before the July 15 deadline imposed by the GOL. While the July 15 deadline has come and gone without GOL-imposition of a new ban, negotiations have reached an impasse, and a ban may be reimposed at any time and without notice.

PERSPECTIVE OF CAT'S TUNISIAN REPRESENTATIVE: PARENIN

¶3. (C/NF) On July 12, Mohamed El Fadhel Khalil, the Tunis-based Managing Director of Parenin Company, CAT's partner in North Africa, briefed the Ambassador on CAT's efforts to quickly renegotiate its representation in Libya, particularly in light of the July 15 deadline. After severing its relationship with the Libyan company, Sahil, CAT asked the GPC for Industry, Economy and Trade (GPCIET) for a short-list of possible new partners. Secretary Mohammed Ali al-Hweij declined to give a list, saying it would constitute an act of "corruption." CAT then contacted other Libyan businessmen and negotiated with one of them to manage the Tripoli dealership and for another to manage the dealership in Benghazi. The GOL rejected the proposal, recommending instead that ESDF be the sole owner of the Tripoli dealership, while a private company could manage the Benghazi dealership. Khalil noted that while CAT would prefer to work only with the private sector, it would accept a deal in which ESDF held a portion of the dealership (up to 40 percent) but not 100 percent. ESDF rejected CAT's counter-offer.

¶4. (C/NF) ESDF's interest in the CAT dealership remains unclear. Khalil said CAT's annual sales in 2008 (prior to the import ban) amounted to 38 million USD. He suspects that the ESDF incorrectly believes CAT's sales figures to be much higher, on the order of 300 million USD. Khalil said that CAT had heard the deal was of 'great interest' to Muammar al-Qadhafi's sons, specifically Saif al-Islam and Muatassim al-Qadhafi. Khalil asked the Ambassador to raise the CAT issue with the Qadafhi

sons, particularly with Muatassim in his capacity as a government official. [Note: Saif is widely known to be involved in the ESDF, which falls under his purview as a driving force behind economic reform in Libya. In the past (Ref A), other influential figures have been rumored to be interested in the CAT deal (namely, Qadhafi's son Saadi al-Qadhafi and Khaled al-Hmeidi, son of Free Officer and senior regime figure al-Khweidi al-Hmeidi). End note.] Khalil said CAT's competitors, such as the Koreans, Chinese, British, etc., are allowed to sell their products in Libya with few problems. However, in his view, they do not provide the same level of customer service as CAT provides. He was not aware of any other cases of the ESDF owning a 100 percent stake in a similar dealership. [Note: In a separate conversation with the Volkswagen dealer in Tripoli - a private, Libyan-owned company - Econoff learned that the ESDF moved about a year and a half ago to take 30 percent of the shares of private automobile dealerships operating in Libya, for the ostensible purpose of redistributing those shares to poor Libyan families. The companies refused and have not been approached again. However, the Libyan Stock Exchange is moving forward in implementing a program in which poor Libyan families will receive stocks in ESDF-owned companies as part of a government program to widen ownership in government companies (Ref B). End note.]

CAT MEETS WITH ECONOMY AND TRADE OFFICIALS...

¶5. (C) During a July 13 meeting with Andrew Sheridan, of CAT's Middle East regional office, and Acting Senior Commercial Officer Nate Mason, GPCIET Secretary Mohammed Ali al-Hweij explained that partners from Tunisia, Malta, Egypt or Saudi Arabia were unacceptable in any potential CAT dealership even as managers or agents but that "European and American" partners were acceptable. He also said CAT could work with ESDF on the Tripoli dealership and partner with other Libyan entities on the Benghazi portion. [Note: CAT has told us this would likely be a non-starter as the company expects the Benghazi dealership to outperform an ESDF-connected Tripoli dealership, simply based on projected sales; if this happened, the GOL would most likely shut down the Benghazi operation. End note.] Hweij claimed that the ESDF is a private sector company, "100 percent" unrelated to the GOL, and that CAT could negotiate with ESDF like it would with any other private firm. [Note: The ESDF answers directly to the General People's Committee which is the Libyan equivalent of the prime minister's cabinet and is clearly a government entity. End note.]

...AND GETS STONE-WALLED BY THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT FUND

¶6. (C) On July 14, Sheridan met with Hamed Hoderi, Head of ESDF. Hoderi reiterated ESDF's insistence on 100 percent ownership of the CAT dealership without negotiation. According to Hoderi, the European "partners" mentioned by Hweij would be limited to management functions with no ownership rights. Hoderi indicated that the GOL and ESDF planned to use the CAT deal as a template for all other heavy equipment and auto dealerships. Hoderi repeatedly pressed CAT for a quick decision, which Sheridan understood to be an implied threat to reinstate the ban on CAT imports.

THROWING THE RAILROAD PROJECT INTO THE MIX

¶7. (C) If a ban is reinstated, CAT stands to lose as much as 40 million USD. CAT has negotiated a 30 million USD deal with Russian Railways Company to provide equipment for their railroad construction project along the coast from Sirte to Benghazi, a deal that hinges on a guarantee that CAT equipment is allowed to enter the country. CAT is also expecting orders totaling 7-8 million USD to enter Libya over the next few months. On July 20, Sheridan reported that the GPCIET official Dia Hammouda, told him the only way to guarantee this would be to conclude the deal with ESDF - another indication of the GOL's reinstatement of the import ban. Barring a compromise by ESDF to allow for a true partnership, CAT expects to have to exit the Libyan market, at which point CAT expects the GOL to reinstate the import ban. CAT is now planning to change its strategy from negotiating a solution to one of damage control in response to a potential import ban.

¶8. (C) Comment: At this juncture, it appears that CAT will pull out of Libya altogether, and the GOL is likely to reimpose its

TRIPOLI 00000618 003.2 OF 003

previous ban on CAT imports. While the USG may not be able to influence the outcome of CAT's negotiations on a dealership, we can make the GOL aware of the multitude of problems that would result from the imposition of discriminatory market access barriers. Moreover, a decision to ban CAT equipment will go against GOL interests - many construction companies (of various nationalities) are depending on CAT equipment to complete infrastructure projects on time, particularly in the lead up to pageantry planned for the 40th Anniversary of Qadhafi's coup September 1. However, as we have seen in this most recent series of meetings in Tripoli, the decisions affecting CAT's future are clearly being made several levels above the Secretary of Industry, Economy and Trade, perhaps by the Qadhafi sons. The GOL's treatment of CAT demonstrates why a TIFA is badly needed to defend the rights and interests of the private sector in Libya. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI619

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI619 aka Wikileaks id #219244 ?
Subject	THE CURIOUS CONTINUING CASE OF CATERPILLAR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Aug 2009 14:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI619.html
References	09TRIPOLI258 , 09TRIPOLI618
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI620
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3404
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0619/01 2151434
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031434Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5098
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1097
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0772
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0542
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0427
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5638
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000619

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; COMMERCE FOR ITA NATE MASON; COMMERCE FOR THE ADVOCACY CENTER; ENERG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: THE CURIOUS CONTINUING CASE OF CATERPILLAR

REF: A) TRIPOLI 618 ; B) TRIPOLI 258

TRIPOLI 00000619 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met with Minister-equivalent of

¶1. (C) Summary. The Ambassador met with Minister-equivalent of Economy, Mohammed Ali al-Hweij, August 2, to address stalled CAT negotiations; to set a date for a TIFA signing; to solicit support for a U.S. Executive Trade Mission in November; to encourage forward movement on the Commercial Law Development Program; and to seek the Minister's help in securing visas for U.S. business travelers. Al-Hweij told the Ambassador that a resolution to stalled Caterpillar (CAT) negotiations was on the horizon and was also positive on the possibility of concluding a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) before the UN General Assembly. He agreed in principle to support a U.S. Trade Mission visit in November, as well as to moving forward with the Commercial Law Development Program. Regarding visa support for U.S. business travelers, the Minister referred the Ambassador to the Prime Minister-equivalent's office for resolution. End Summary.

CAT NEGOTIATIONS COMPLICATED BY FIVE-YEAR-OLD LAW

¶2. (C/NF) Minister-equivalent of Economy, Mohammed Ali al-Hweij, told the Ambassador, Pol/Econ Chief, and FCS August 2 that an end was in sight for stalled CAT negotiations (Ref A). Backing down from prior demands that the local, quasi-governmental Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF) take full ownership of a would-be CAT distributorship in Tripoli, al-Hweij reported that he had personally instructed the ESDF to offer CAT a 60-percent/40-percent split deal, with the ESDF holding the controlling share. Qualifying his statement, al-Hweij noted that this would be the agreed-upon arrangement "at least for the first five years." Al-Hweij emphasized that CAT must comply with a 2004 law governing foreign distributors that the government had recently decided to enforce (septel) , whereby all such companies would have to work with Libyan-owned and operated trade agents in order to sell their products within the country. Al-Hweij emphasized that this law would be applied to all foreign companies across the board in an attempt to regulate the market and prevent terrorist finance networks from exploiting the heretofore unregulated environment.

¶3. (C/NF) Al-Hweij informed the Ambassador that the ESDF had already sent CAT's Regional Director, Andrew Sheridan, the new proposal. [Note: Sheridan later told FCS that he received the proposal by email only hours before the Ambassador's meeting with al-Hweij. End Note.] Al-Hweij went out of his way to prove the veracity of his statement, personally calling the head of ESDF, Hamed Hoderi, by phone in order for the Ambassador to hear firsthand that the proposal had been extended. The Ambassador pressed al-Hweij on the Ministry's previous implicit threats to reimpose a ban on CAT imports, stating that discriminatory market barriers would not be viewed favorably. Al-Hweij reassured the Ambassador that a ban on CAT imports would not be reimposed, stating that he hoped his Ministry and our Embassy would cooperate effectively to resolve any future issues in order to avoid such drastic measures. He designated his deputy for international cooperation, Dia Hammouda, as the point person for addressing bilateral, trade-related issues of concern. Al-Hweij expressed an interest in meeting more often with the Ambassador to review the status of bilateral trade relations - an idea that the Ambassador welcomed.

POSITIVE SIGNALS ON BILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION

¶4. (C) Al-Hweij was also positive on TIFA, saying that the text was approved and only a date needed to be set. The Ambassador noted that we want the agreement signed before UNGA and stated that setting a date for the signing was more important than the location. In response, the Minister promised to have the agreement finalized before UNGA.

¶5. (C) Al-Hweij agreed in principle to support a Department of Commerce Executive Trade Mission visit in November, requesting a formal program proposal via diplomatic channels. He also asked us to resubmit information on the Commercial Law Development

Program to improve the commercial legal environment for businesses.

¶6. (C) Regarding visa support for U.S. business travelers, al-Hweij requested additional information regarding the difficulties that U.S. businesses face in attempting to obtain visas for travel to Libya. Making sure not to tread outside of his boundaries, he also advised the Ambassador to raise the visa

TRIPOLI 00000619 002.2 OF 002

issue with the Prime Minister's office. [Note: During the Ambassador's first meeting with al-Hweij in March, the latter pledged to help business travelers to secure visas - a pledge he has not been able to uphold. (Ref B) End Note.]

¶7. (C/NF) Comment: The fact that the CAT negotiation process was taking place at the same time that the Ministry was trying to impose a five-year-old law involving distributorships undoubtedly complicated the negotiations. Al-Hweij's apparent actions to press the ESDF to compromise on the CAT deal are positive and demonstrate that he has at least some authority to be able to make decisions within the business sector. His pledge not to reimpose the ban on CAT equipment and to see that a compromise is achieved is also a positive signal. Al-Hweij seemed genuinely interested in improving the environment for foreign investment and in regulating local markets for goods and services. Post will follow-up on al-Hweij's requests for additional information regarding an Executive Trade Mission visit and the Commercial Law Development Program. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI620

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI620 aka Wikileaks id #219249 ?
Subject	TWO STEPS BACKWARD? GOL ENFORCES 2004 LAW ON FOREIGN DISTRIBUTORS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Aug 2009 14:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI620.html
References	09TRIPOLI619
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3439
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0620/01 2151450
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 031450Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5100
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1099
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0774
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0544
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0429
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0044
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0009
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0011
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0026
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5640
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000620

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; COMMERCE FOR ITA NATE
MASON; COMMERCE FOR THE ADVOCACY CENTER; ENERGY F

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/3/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EFIN
[Financial and Monetary Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: TWO STEPS BACKWARD? GOL ENFORCES 2004 LAW ON FOREIGN
DISTRIBUTORS

REF: TRIPOLI 619

TRIPOLI 00000620  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
```

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. Pol/Econ Chief and FCS were summoned, along with a handful of other foreign diplomats, to the Prime Minister-equivalent's office August 2 for a meeting with his director for cooperation and Ministry-equivalent of Economy officials to discuss the latter ministry's implementation of a law dating back to 2004, which stipulates that all foreign distributors must work through 100-percent Libyan-owned and operated trade agents in order to operate in Libya. The officials emphasized that the law had not yet been implemented in order to give companies an "opportunity to adjust their practices" independently. According to the law, all foreign distributors must work with Libyan agents only - no third country nationals - and must develop plans for expansion from Tripoli to the cities of Benghazi, Sebha, and Sirte. The law is likely to create conditions that prohibit small and medium sized distributors from investing in Libya and may cause some foreign companies to withdraw from the market. This and other efforts to impose old and new regulations may reflect a stepped-up effort by the GOL to gain some control over its helter skelter approach to development which enabled a rush of foreign companies to enter the country. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The Prime Minister-equivalent's (PM) office summoned Economic/Commercial Counselors from the Italian, German, French, Chinese, South Korean, and Japanese embassies, in addition to Pol/Econ Chief and FCS, August 2 for an unplanned meeting to discuss "trade-related issues." [Note: The PM's office first summoned the ambassadors of the above listed countries, later downgrading attendance after it was clear that the PM would not be able to attend the meeting. End Note.] Chaired by the PM's director for cooperation, Issam Zawia, and Dia Hammouda, the director of the same office at the Ministry-equivalent of Economy (MOE), the purpose of the meeting was to clarify the meaning and intent of Law Number Six of 2004, which governs transactions between foreign distributors and local trade agents in Libya. The law stipulates that each foreign distributor seeking to introduce its product in Libya must deal with a 100-percent locally owned and operated trade agent. Specifically, Hammouda wanted to ensure that the embassies representing the "industrialized nations" in Libya were aware that the Ministry was in the process of executing the law and would be preparing enforcement mechanisms to ensure compliance. The purpose of the late imposition of the law, according to Hammouda, was to allow foreign companies the time necessary to adjust their operating practices independently. As few companies had done so, the Ministry decided that it was time to enforce the law. Hammouda outlined his Ministry's interest in both creating a regulated, favorable, and transparent operating environment for foreign investors, as well as fighting corruption. He said that he would convene other meetings with the directors of foreign distributorships currently operating in Libya, as well as with local agents, in the near future. In response to an inquiry from one of the diplomats in attendance, Hammouda set a nominal deadline of the end of the year for compliance with the law but later backed away from that date.

¶3. (C) In addition to the first point of law that Hammouda highlighted, he noted that Law Number Six required each foreign distributor to develop plans to establish distribution facilities in four areas: Tripoli, Benghazi, Sebha, and Sirte. Moreover, each distributor must deal with a distinct trade agent in each city, for the purpose of expanding investment across the country. When several diplomats protested the difficulties that companies would face in trying to establish multiple operation sites with unrelated agents, Hammouda clarified that companies must merely have plans for expansion and that the government did not expect foreign distributors to open four sites at once. He stated that distributors would have time to settle into the local market before expanding and that expansion could be down slowly, in consultation with the MOE.

¶4. (C) Several diplomats debated the logic of the law with Hammouda for the greater part of two hours, particularly regarding the expansion requirement in four different areas with four different agents. The South Korean diplomat also noted the difficulties that companies might face if forced to break long-term contracts with local agents. The German diplomat

TRIPOLI 00000620 002.2 OF 002

noted that many countries around the world allow foreign distributors to write exclusive contracts with a single local agent in order to better organize their business plans, to which Hammouda responded "Libya is not like other countries" and must develop its own laws to fit its environment.

¶5. (C) Comment: Hammouda seemed intent on Libya's enforcing the 2004 law, though his backtracking on a deadline and lack of a clear enforcement strategy reflected some confusion regarding whether the law could actually be implemented. It was also clear that the MOE lacks a strategy for confronting the problems that will arise when the law is implemented. The most immediate effects of the law for U.S. trade will be seen in the Caterpillar negotiations (reftel), in terms of whether the MOE will force the company to abide by the expansion requirement. The positive news, if any, is that the law will be applied across the board among the major investors in Libya (though the lack of UK participation in the meeting was notable). A well-connected contact in the business and government world here believes this is yet another in a series of GOL attempts (haphazard as they are) to gain control over the helter-skelter approach it has taken to developing its infrastructure through its heretofore open welcome-mat for foreign companies. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI621

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI621 aka Wikileaks id #219255 ?
Subject	RARE MEETING WITH LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY CHIEF LEAVES KEY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 3 Aug 2009 15:13 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI621.html
References	09STATE74778 , 09TRIPOLI436 , 09TRIPOLI437 , 09TRIPOLI599
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI674
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3455
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0621/01 2151513
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031513Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5102
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1101
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5642
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000621

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, ISN AND OES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/3/2019
TAGS: PINR *[Intelligence]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , AORC *[International Organizations and Conferences]* , IAEA *[International Atomic Energy Agency]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: RARE MEETING WITH LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY CHIEF LEAVES KEY QUESTIONS UNANSWERED

REF: A) TRIPOLI 437 ; B) STATE 74778 ; C) TRIPOLI 436 ; D) TRIPOLI 599

TRIPOLI 00000621 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: On July 23, Libya's elusive top nuclear official, Dr. Ali Gashut, met with Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff to discuss U.S.-Libya scientist redirection programs. While he was cordial and welcoming, Gashut did not take responsibility for any of the delays in progress on joint projects, such as the

any of the delays in progress on joint projects, such as the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center and the installation of water desalination equipment for the pilot project at Tajura. As for the signing of an agreement with the U.S. to repatriate spent nuclear fuels (Highly-Enriched Uranium), he said it would be ready "soon," without providing any precise timeframe. He also blamed the lack of visa approvals for USG visitors on the Libyan MFA. Although Gashut said he viewed the U.S.-Libya science program as a "model of cooperation," he repeated the familiar refrain that Libya has not sufficiently benefited from its abandonment of weapons of mass destruction. Gashut said the arrangement since 2004 for him to be the Libyan focal point for joint activities had worked well and he looked forward to continuing this with new ISN staff. He also noted that an official response to Acting DAS Mitman's letter would be forthcoming. End Summary.

GASHUT: "I AM THE POINT OF CONTACT" FOR ALL U.S.-LIBYA NUCLEAR ISSUES

¶2. (S) Dr. Ali Gashut met with Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff to review the status of U.S.-Libya scientist redirection programs, at the Embassy's request July 23. The Embassy has not had a face-to-face meeting with Gashut since last January and two diplomatic notes requesting meetings with his staff at Tajura Nuclear Center have gone unanswered. As reported in Ref A, Gashut is the Secretary of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment. His deputy, Dr. Mohamed Ennami, was not available to join the meeting. Gashut said that since 2004, there had been an "operating agreement" that he would be the focal point on the Libyan side for joint activities, while the manager for Libya-related programs in the Bureau for International Security and Nonproliferation (ISN) would play the same role on the U.S. side. He said this had worked well, and he looked forward to continuing this arrangement with new ISN staff. To that end, he noted that he had prepared an official response to Acting DAS Mitman's letter, which he believed would be forwarded to the embassy within a week. [Note: Post received Gashut's response - dated July 12 - on July 24; we have forwarded the text via email to NEA/MAG.]

¶3. (S/NF) Gashut outlined his team's composition, noting that he is in charge of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment (LAEE). Gashut confirmed Mohamed Ennami is his deputy; Ahmed al-Habrush is in charge of Tajura Nuclear Center; Dr. Musa Mohammed is in charge of Renewable Energy (mainly Solar), replacing Dr. Salem Ghurbal; and Dr. Husein Mansour is in charge of a small training center for Chemical Technologies (bio details provided in response to Ref B).

STATUS OF HEU/LEU GOVERNMENT-T0-GOVERNMENT AGREEMENT

¶4. (C) Gashut said he expected the government-to-government agreement for the repatriation of the HEU/LEU material from Tajura to Russia to be signed in the near future, without providing any specifics. The Pol/Econ Chief thanked him for his help in securing multiple-entry visas for two Department of Energy officials to travel to Libya in conjunction with the repatriation program. She told him Acting Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman would be visiting Tripoli the week of July 26 and he would raise the need for a signed agreement during his meetings (Ref D).

REGIONAL NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER

¶5. (S) Gashut highlighted the proposed Regional Nuclear Medicine Center (RNMC) as a good symbol of U.S.-Libya cooperation - one which would demonstrate to the Libyan people that they have benefited from Libya's renunciation of its Weapons of Mass Destruction program. In Gashut's view, the Center would provide badly-needed healthcare services. He said he and his colleagues were waiting for "good news" from the U.S. side on whether the project could move forward, adding that land near the Tripoli

Airport had been identified for the Center. He noted that Dr. Omran Shammam, Director of the Tripoli Medical Center, had a "few remarks" regarding the strategic plans for the project, but Gashut believed these could be resolved through discussions between the two sides. He said he was waiting to hear whether the U.S. side had a budget in place for the Center. The Pol/Econ Chief told him the U.S. side was in fact, waiting for approval from the Libyans to move forward, prior to requesting funds from Congress for the completion of the project.

TRIPOLI 00000621 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (S/NF) [Note: In November 2008, a draft strategy was passed to the Libyan government for approval to start the architectural design for the RNMC. In a meeting last May, Dr. Shammam told EconOff that the draft strategy passed a technical review; he believed it was then sent to the MFA for approvals. Gashut told Emboffs the proposal had not been properly vetted by the General People's Committee for Health (Ministry of Health-equivalent). However, in a June meeting between the Ambassador and the Secretary of the GPC for Health, neither the Secretary nor his colleagues had ever heard of the Center proposal (Ref C). In his April meetings in Washington, DC, Gashut said that the time-line contained within the RNMC proposal was too long and needed to be sped up. To date, however, the Embassy has not received an official response to the submitted proposal. End note.]

SISTER LAB

¶7. (C) Emboffs conveyed disappointment that visas were not approved for the June Sister Laboratory visit. Gashut insisted that visa approvals remained within the purview of the MFA.

WATER DESALINATION PILOT PROJECT

¶8. (S) Gashut informed Emboffs that the water desalination project was stalled because his team could not access the necessary equipment to proceed. He said that some of the equipment for the desalination project and analytic laboratory had arrived but that other equipment had not yet cleared customs because the Libyan shipping agent had not received the original bill of lading from the U.S.-based shipping company. Econoff assured Gashut that a new "original" bill of lading was being sent to Tripoli via the U.S. Embassy. Gashut said once the equipment was in place, the Department of Energy officials (Malynda Cappelle and Randy Everett) could visit to verify all equipment had arrived and to provide training to the desalination project staff. Emboffs reviewed an ISN-supplied list of program areas that required completion by Gashut's team, including the need to ensure the accuracy of the wiring for the housing of the desalination project. In response, Gashut said he had forwarded relevant emails to the desalination project staff. He asked us to send him an email with other outstanding items, such as whether a radioactive waste tracking database was completed and pledged to review the points with relevant Tajura staff.

RENEWABLE ENERGY ACTIVITIES

¶9. (S/NF) Earlier this month, two officials (Musa Mohamed and Khairy Agha) of the Renewable Energy Research Center received funding from the ISN Bureau to attend a conference on alternative energy in California. Gashut said the trip was useful and he seemed pleased the two were able to participate. He noted Dr. Musa Mohamed was now the director of the Renewable Energy Research Center (replacing Dr. Salem Ghurbal) who, it has been rumored, is ill and suffers from diabetes. [Note: as Emboffs were leaving Gashut's office, they passed Ghurbal, who said hello but did not elaborate on his current employment

status; he did not appear terribly ill. End note.]

¶10. (S/NF) Gashut noted that an Alternative Energy/Desalination Study Tour had been proposed two years ago, in talks between the U.S. and Libya. He said a delegation had been all set to go the U.S. but blamed the trip's cancellation on what he described as the lengthy U.S. visa approval process. [Note: Other reasons given to Emboffs in the past include the inability of delegation members to travel to Tunis for visa interviews, which no longer pose a problem since U.S. nonimmigrant visas are now being processed in Tripoli. End note.] Gashut noted that the project had now shifted to the Libyan Water Authority, headed by Omar Salem. He suggested the Embassy follow-up with Salem on the status of the delegation.

¶11. (S/NF) Comment: While it was helpful to have this rare, face-to-face meeting with Gashut, many unanswered questions remain, such as the status of the HEU repatriation agreement, and whether future USG visitors will be able to receive visas to come to Libya. Gashut was cordial and polite but not particularly effusive. He refused to commit to regular meetings, such as on a monthly basis, with Emboffs, yet insisted on directing all USG communication with Tajura officials. One can only surmise that our scientific engagement, like all of our other engagement, is being dictated from the highest levels of the Qadhafi regime. As such, Gashut's ability to influence policy, including visas for U.S. officials, is limited. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI63

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI63 aka Wikileaks id #189156 ?
Subject	RISKY BUSINESS? AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION FIRM ENTERS JOINT VENTURE WITH GOL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 28 Jan 2009 10:42 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI63.html
References	07TRIPOLI1053 , 08TRIPOLI942 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI942
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI242
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
From: CBPC, EACTAPP
Sent: Wednesday, January 28, 2009 12:33 PM
To: EACTTripoli
Subject: TRIPOLI 00000063 P CO 28-JAN-09 RISKY BUSINESS? AMERICAN
CONSTRUCTION FIRM ENTERS JOINT VENTURE WITH GOL [8466936]

CONFIDENTIAL

VZCZCXRO6748
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0063/01 0281042
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281042Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4371
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0989
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0676
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4895
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000063

SIPDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE (MASON), DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA
WATCHERS, CAIRO FOR TREASURY ATTACHE SEVERENS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/25/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] ,
ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ASEC [Security] , CVIS [Visas] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: RISKY BUSINESS? AMERICAN CONSTRUCTION FIRM ENTERS JOINT VENTURE WITH GOL

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 942 , B) TRIPOLI 40 , C) 07 TRIPOLI 1053

TRIPOLI 00000063  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
```

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: U.S. project management company AECOM, which already has a large American expatriate presence and a large role in running housing and infastructure projects, recently signed a contract for a joint venture (JV) with Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB). The new JV would allow several thousand HIB employees to leave the employ of the GOL and enter the private sector; it would also prompt a sizeable increase in the number of expatriate Americans working in Libya under AECOM's auspices. The JV would initially focus on projects in Libya; however, the long-term goal is to implement projects throughout the African continent under a Libyan banner. AECOM will capitalize the new JV and despite the fact that plummeting oil prices have prompted the GOL to recalculate its entire national budget, AECOM believes funding for its existing projects and the new JV is secure. Nonetheless, AECOM's success to date has stemmed largely from the relationship of its chairman with the influential chairman of the HIB, who is rumored to be a potential candidate to take over as Prime Minister in an expected cabinet shuffle at the upcoming session of the General People's Congress in March. That possibility, together with the fact that AECOM's increased profile will make it a larger target for those seeking to extract rents, make the new JV a potentially risky proposition. End summary.

ROLLING THE DICE

¶2. (C) In a January 22 presentation to the Ambassador, the President of AECOM Libya Housing and Infrastructure, Jim Thompson, announced his company had just signed a contract for a JV between AECOM and Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB). (Note: As reported ref A, HIB's chairman previewed the JV with us in a meeting in December. End note.) HIB holds a 24 percent stake, AECOM and subsidiary private shareholders hold a
76 percent share. The JV's board comprises four members - three from AECOM and one from HIB. It is expected that 2,000 to 3,000 HIB staff will leave the GOL's payroll and be hired (at least
initially) by the new JV, effectively privatizing the HIB's project management function. Thompson said HIB could be down to 40-50 employees within two years if the project goes according to plan. The new JV would initially focus on projects in Libya; however, the long-term goal is to implement development projects throughout the African continent under a Libyan banner to demonstrate that Libya "can add meaningful expertise, not just cash" to development efforts. According to Dorda, some of the best real estate in Tripoli had been "reserved" for commercial development under the auspices of the new JV.

¶3. (C) AECOM will provide most, if not all, of the funds for initial capitalization and registration of the new JV (estimated at USD 1.5 to 2 million). Despite the fact that plummeting oil prices have prompted the GOL to recalculate its entire national budget (ref B) and scale back its massive infrastructure development program, AECOM believes funding for its existing projects and the new JV is secure. Thompson explained that, as overall program manager for HIB, AECOM inherited hundreds of contracts that HIB had signed with various construction firms.
There was little to no oversight of the process and many contracts were awarded on the basis of personal connections rather than winning companies' technical capacity. Since winning the contract with HIB to serve as overall program manager, AECOM had had to revise nearly all of these old contracts. (Note: In addition, as many of the contracts AECOM inherited were based on old development master plans, which were also inadequate and had to be revamped as well. End note.)

DEVELOPING LIBYAN HUMAN CAPACITY IS THE KEY

¶4. (C) An additional issue was that many HIB staff had been poorly trained to do their jobs. Thompson joked that AECOM could have implemented the entire housing and infrastructure development program more cheaply and quickly had they been able to do so with no GOL involvement. Another AECOM executive described the Libyan approach to project management as "execute, plan, and then assess", rather than "assess, plan, and execute".
But AECOM's mandate from Dorda and the GOL is to not only produce tangible results, but to simultaneously overhaul HIB and train the next generation of skilled cadres.

¶5. (C) Many HIB employees had the right credentials on paper, but had never received relevant on-the-job training. With the new JV, HIB and AECOM hoped to create a new entity in which international and American standards of transparency, performance and merit would obtain. A major component of AECOM's contract with HIB involves the transfer of knowledge to

Libyan staff. As part of the intiative, AECOM will train over 100 HIB executives,

Libyan staff. As part of the initiative, AECOM will train over 100 HIB executives, engineers, and technical specialists on program management, construction management and design.
Currently, three HIB executives are participating in a one-year program to hone their project- and construction-management skills through curricula developed by the University of Houston and Rice University. In addition, HIB engineers currently managing infrastructure projects already underway are participating in sessions of a 12-week environmental engineering student training program.

A BIGGER, MORE VISIBLE U.S. FOOTPRINT IN LIBYA

¶6. (C) Thompson said AECOM anticipates bringing in an additional 100-200 U.S. expat employees (and their families - several hundred Americans in all) to Libya in the next 6-12 months as part of the new JV. AECOM already has 75-100 expatriate employees in-country - some on a permanent basis and some on TDY-equivalents - to manage a multi-million contract it secured in In December 2007 to manage HIB's housing and infrastructure projects, which are cumulatively worth some 50 billion U.S. dollars (ref A). With offices in Tripoli, Benghazi, Misurata and Sabha, AECOM currently has the largest U.S. private sector footprint in Libya, one that will grow considerably with the new JV. AECOM already represents the largest single group of Americans present in Libya since the early 1970's. As the geographic range of AECOM's projects and the number of Americans employed by the company increase, its profile and attendant security risks will increase.

¶7. (C) While savvier than many companies operating here, AECOM employees have found Libya a particularly challenging venue in which to work. Recruitment was an early issue; however, the recent economic downturn in the U.S., particularly in the construction sector, has been a boon. Abiding by bans on alcohol and pork are challenging for some, as is the company's policy of forbidding expatriate staff to drive themselves, largely because of the high number of traffic accidents in Libya. Housing, schools, security and visas are key issues for AECOM. Expatriate AECOM employees are currently issued six-month, multiple-entry visas, with the facilitation of the HIB, but must leave the country every six months to renew them at Libyan People's Bureaus (embassy-equivalents) abroad. The process is not smooth; the most recent tranche of AECOM employees were held up for three weeks, waiting for their Libyan visas to come through.

¶8. (C) Comment: AECOM took a considerable risk by coming to Libya before many other U.S. construction firms. Thompson conceded that it had been a steep learning curve during the past year and a half for Americans and Libyans. The new JV will take time to come together, but AECOM is entering the deal with a much better understanding of the environment than it had in December 2007. That said, AECOM's success to date has stemmed largely from Thompson's relationship with HIB chairman Abuzeid Dorda, who is rumored to be a potential candidate to take over as Prime Minister in March. While personal relationships are key in Libya, even if Dorda were to stay on at HIB, he is not universally well-liked by other influential members of the regime, a key issue in a regime in which housing and infrastructure projects are viewed (rightly) as a prime target for extracting rents. In addition, a number of other significant GOL entities - the Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers, the Ministry of Planning, the General Electric Company of Libya, the Economic and Social Development Fund - have infrastructure projects of their own and are in de facto competition with HIB. Those realities, together with the very real increased security equities that come with a more sizeable American presence, make the new JV a potentially risky proposition. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI632

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI632 aka Wikileaks id #219450 ?
Subject	INVITATION FOR THE SECRETARY TO ATTEND 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF QADHAFI'S REVOLUTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 4 Aug 2009 15:56 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI632.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI638 , 09TRIPOLI639
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4471
RR RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0632 2161556
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041556Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5114
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5654
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000632

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/4/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , OPDC *[Diplomatic Correspondence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: INVITATION FOR THE SECRETARY TO ATTEND 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF QADHAFI'S REVOLUTION

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 5.

¶2. (U) In an August 4 meeting, MFA Americas Division Director Mohamed Al Matari gave the DCM a formal invitation from Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa for the Secretary to attend the Libyan Government's 40th anniversary celebration of Qadhafi's Al Fateh Revolution, planned for September 1 in Tripoli. DCM promised to convey the invitation to the Department. Original Arabic-language invitation was faxed to NEA/MAG on August 4; informal embassy translation of the invitation follows in para ¶6.

¶3. (C) The Libyan Government began a slow rollout of the 40th

anniversary invitations around July 29, calling in individual embassies to receive personalized invitations. Several of our EU colleagues and the Japanese reported their governments have been invited to participate at the head of state level. We have heard that the Libyans approached the Italians some time ago to clarify when Berlusconi would visit Libya. The Libyans reportedly pushed for his attendance at the September 1 date when given the choice of his attending only one event (August 30 is also the first anniversary of the Libyan-Italian friendship treaty and the Libyans would have liked him there for that as well).

¶4. (C) The MFA's Matari told us that he could not confirm at what level EU members had been invited but that some African and Latin American states -- "Libya's friends" -- had been invited at the head of state level. When asked why the U.S. was invited at the Ministerial level, Matari responded that the Libyan Government was certain that POTUS would not be able to attend.

¶5. (C) Comment and Action Request: Qadhafi views the 40th anniversary celebration as the key moment in a year characterized by his and Libya's "achievements" in gaining international prominence. Rather than opt for what they knew was an almost certain negative response on POTUS attendance, they chose to invite the Secretary. They undoubtedly hope that the Secretary will attend to help them garner the respect and international legitimacy that they crave. The Department's guidance on how to respond to the invitation is requested.

¶6. (U) Informal embassy translation of the invitation follows:

TO: H.E. Secretary Hillary Clinton
U.S. State Department Secretary

Dear Secretary:

On the first of September this year, the Libyan people are celebrating the 40th anniversary of the Great Al Fateh Revolution that delivered it from ignorance, poverty and backwardness, placed it on the track of progress and prosperity and enabled it to contribute actively in the efforts to consolidate peace, stability and security in all parts of the world.

On this occasion celebrated by the Libyan people and the rest of free people in the world, we have the honor to invite your Excellency to attend the celebrations that will be held in Tripoli on September 1, 2009.

We are fully confident that your acceptance of this invitation and attending these celebrations in person will be very much appreciated by the Libyan people, and would allow us the opportunity to discuss ways to develop bilateral relations between our two countries so as to achieve the common interests of our two friendly peoples in Libya and in the United States of America.

Signature:
Musa Kusa
Secretary of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation.
July 30, 2009

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI637

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI637 aka Wikileaks id #219593 ?
Subject	UN OFFICIAL SAYS LIBYA, ITALY SHIRKING HUMAN RIGHTS RESPONSIBILITIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 5 Aug 2009 13:50 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI637.html
References	09TRIPOLI273 , 09TRIPOLI579
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5318
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0637/01 2171350
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 051350Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5119
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0546
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0431
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0021
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST 0003
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5659
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000637

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, PRM/A (SHEINLEIN), DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  7/28/2019
TAGS: PREF [Refugees] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , IT [Italy] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: UN OFFICIAL SAYS LIBYA, ITALY SHIRKING HUMAN RIGHTS
RESPONSIBILITIES

REF: A. TRIPOLI 579
     B. 08 STATE 112873
     C. TRIPOLI 273

TRIPOLI 00000637  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary:  The top UNHCR official in Tripoli voiced
concern that Italian-Libyan cooperation to return migrants
```

interdicted in the Mediterranean to Libya was violating the migrants' human rights and endangering bona fide asylum seekers. He noted that some migrants had been forcibly and violently returned by Italian officials, leaving several migrants in need of urgent medical care. Libya, in turn, did not grant UNHCR officials access to screen returned migrants for asylum seekers until several days after their return. UNHCR remains hopeful that the European Commission will lean on both Italy and Libya to fulfill their commitments under international conventions and will press Libya to sign a formal MOU allowing UNHCR to operate normally in the country. UNHCR reported that it was focusing more attention on resettlement to the U.S. and expects the first visit of the regional Overseas Processing Entity (OPE) to visit Libya shortly after Ramadan (early October). The Chief of Mission asked that the USG remain open to resettlement via UNHCR-run processing centers in Europe and asked for further guidance on whether migrants screened by the OPE and subsequently transferred to Romania would need to begin the entire resettlement process again. End summary.

UNHCR: REFUGEE CRISIS AS SOURCE OF RIGHTS VIOLATIONS FROM ITALY, LIYBA

¶2. (C//NF) In a July 28 meeting with Pol/Econ chief and Poloff, UNHCR Chief of Mission Mohammed al-Wash complained that Italy was breaking its commitments to support UN and EU charters on human rights by returning asylum seekers to Libya with other economic migrants, and strongly denounced the Italian Coast Guard's tactics while forcing migrants to return. He cited the example of the return of 80 migrants -- including several refugees registered with UNHCR in Tripoli, Addis Ababa, and Cairo -- interdicted by Italy on or around July 1 who later related their story to UNHCR staff. When the vessel carrying the migrants was stopped, three Eritrean representatives reportedly asked to speak with the Italian ship's commander to inform him of their refugee status. Several on the boat produced their UNHCR attestations for the commander. Replying that he was under strict orders from his government to return migrants to Libya, the Italian commander reportedly ordered that all migrants - including those registered with UNHCR -- be removed from their vessel for transport to Libya. Some of the migrants refused, leading to physical altercations between the migrants and the Italian crew that ended with the Italians beating some Africans with plastic and metal batons, leaving at least six injured. Migrants on the boat reportedly filmed the incident with their mobile phones, leading the Italian crew to confiscate phones, documents, and personal belongings that have not yet been returned.

¶3. (C//NF) The migrants were eventually delivered to an oil platform (operated by ENI) off the coast of Libya on or around July 2, from which point they were delivered to Libya's Zawiya detention center. After two days of asking for access, UNHCR was allowed to visit Zawiya detention center (approximately 25 miles west of Tripoli) to visit 13 women and children from the group. One pregnant woman was in urgent need of medical care. Two days later, UNHCR was granted access to the men in Zwara detention center (approximately 80 miles west of Tripoli), where they interviewed migrants with fresh stitches on their heads and faces who recounted the events surrounding their forced return to Libya. UNHCR then submitted these claims to the GOI in Rome and has not yet received a response.

¶4. (C//NF) Al-Wash alleged that the Italian government was intentionally stonewalling the UN. According to al-Wash, Italian Ambassador Francesco Trupiano refuses to meet with UNHCR and told al-Wash that he was a "troublemaker." Al-Wash believed that that Trupiano was single-mindedly focused on returning migrants to Libya and claimed to be unaware that Rome had agreed in principle to accept 63 refugees for resettlement from Libya. UNHCR has also submitted to the GOI a list of 93 refugees that have been returned since Italy and Libya began joint patrols in

May. According to al-Wash, Rome agreed to accept "20 or 30" of the 93 refugees, provided EU states committed to a burden-sharing agreement, though states did not seem eager to undertake one. Al-Wash was hopeful the EC would intercede to bring Italy in line, citing the EC's inclusion of Libya signing an MOU with UNHCR as part of its requirements for a Framework Agreement (ref A) and a recent letter from the Commission to the

Italian Interior Ministry, reminding it of its obligations under the EU's Human Rights Charter.

REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT: UNHCR PLANNING FOR IN-COUNTY PROCESSING

¶5. (C) Al-Wash reported that the Tripoli office was shifting its focus to beginning refugee resettlement to the U.S. via the standard processing route, i.e. pre-processing by IOM Cairo before in-country DHS interviews. Al-Wash said he had already been in touch with IOM Cairo, which will send a team of five Egyptian officers to Tripoli in early October to begin screening the first tranche of refugees. Since early June, UNHCR Tripoli has submitted over 80 cases to the regional hub in Beirut with an eye toward resettlement in the U.S. in early 2010. He said they were continuing to locate and identify new cases each day in the hopes that they could have all 120 cases allotted by the USG (ref b) ready for screening this fall.

¶6. (C) Al-Wash noted, however, that the change in tack would not be without challenges. He highlighted that there were no official interpreters for Tigrinya or Afar in Libya, necessitating the use of informal translators from the community. Those community members would need to be trained and made to sign codes of conduct regarding confidentiality and accuracy. With only three weeks remaining before a month-long break for Ramadan, al-Wash is eager to finalize plans with the regional OPE to prevent last-minute surprises. Without a functioning International Committee of the Red Cross office in Libya, UNHCR would also need to obtain travel documents from Tunis, adding both time and complication to the resettlement process.

¶7. (C) On a more positive note, al-Wash said several Eritrean refugees slated for resettlement in the U.S. had been released from detention in Misrata (approximately 125 miles east of Tripoli) and were now located in Tripoli, making both prescreening and eventual DHS interviews significantly less complicated. Poloff stressed that continuing those efforts would be key as DHS would not be able to interview refugees in detention during the scheduled visit December 6-22. While al-Wash was hopeful that recent developments would make in-country processing possible, he asked that the USG remain open to processing migrants via Romania or a new facility in Eastern Europe. Anticipating that last-minute surprises could derail efforts to resettle to the U.S. via in-country processing, al-Wash sought guidance as to whether refugees pre-screened by IOM Cairo would be forced to begin the process anew were they to be subsequently transferred to Romania, or whether DHS would be able to conduct their screening there more quickly due to the in-country pre-screen.

¶8. (C//NF) Comment: Stemming the flow of migrants to Italy was a key component of the Italian-Libyan "Friendship Treaty" signed last August. In recent G-8 coordination meetings with the UN, Italian diplomats boasted that they had finally gotten Libya to fulfill that obligation; this incident seems to indicate the Italy may be pushing Libya to do so at the expense of both countries' obligations regarding the protection of UN-protected asylum seekers. Libya appears to be caught between two strong desires: to reduce the strain that foreign migrants and refugees cause on its prison and security systems, while at the same time seeking to improve relations with Italy. Both of these

pressures - internal and external - may ultimately create a political opening for Libya to regularize the processing of UNHCR-recognized refugees and accept refugee resettlement to the United States. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI638

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI638 aka Wikileaks id #219616 ?
Subject	PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 5 Aug 2009 15:34 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI638.html
References	09TRIPOLI599 , 09TRIPOLI632
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI639
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5429
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0638/01 2171534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 051534Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5121
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0217
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1103
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0548
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0776
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5661
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000638

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS), ISN; TREASURY FOR PAUL
BURKHEAD

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , UNGA [UN
General Assembly] , ABLD [Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , MASS [Military Assistance
and Sales] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 599 ; B) TRIPOLI 632

TRIPOLI 00000638  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b) , (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: FM-equivalent Musa Kusa told the Ambassador August 5 that Libya was ready at any time to host the U.S. interagency delegation that will launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in Tripoli and agreed that the dialogue could take place as early as next week. He assured the Ambassador that the agreement to transfer Libya's highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium (HEU/LEU) would be finalized by August ¶15. Kusa emphasized that he and his staff were under a lot of pressure due to the extensive preparations they needed to undertake in advance of the August 31 AU Summit, the 40th anniversary commemoration of Qadhafi's seizure of power on September 1, the Leader's participation in the UN General Assembly, and Libya's potential participation in the Africa-South America Summit in Caracas at the end of September. Kusa requested the Ambassador's personal assistance in postponing U.S. delegations - apart from the visit of the Human Rights Dialogue delegation - until after September 1. He also asked the Ambassador to ensure high-level U.S. official representation at the September 1 celebration and noted the importance of setting the agenda soon for a potential POTUS-Qadhafi meeting in New York. End Summary.

ARGUING FOR IMMEDIATE START OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

¶2. (S/NF) During an August 5 meeting with Libya's Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa, the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol/Econ chief) pressed for action on time sensitive and critical issues on the bilateral agenda. These included launching a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue; signing of the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement; signing of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; approval of the end-use monitoring agreement for military assistance; approval of an NEC site; and resolution of Libya's payment for seven U.S. properties. The Ambassador reviewed developments in the relationship that had led to the proposal for commencing the Human Rights Dialogue and stressed that it was essential that the Libyans host the interagency delegation and launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue prior to UNGA. The commencement of the Human Rights Dialogue would help facilitate progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship. It would also help contribute to a more substantive and rich discussion between POTUS and Colonel Qadhafi, if that were able to be arranged, on the margins of UNGA. He reminded Kusa that Acting NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman had presented the same points during his July 26 visit to Libya (Ref A).

HEU/LEU: AUGUST 15 REAL DEADLINE

¶3. (S/NF) The Ambassador also reiterated that Libya had to sign the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement by August 15. He emphasized that August 15 was a real deadline, given that the USG had other commitments in this area and there were not enough transport materials available to allow for a Libyan delay. If Libya did not initial the agreement by that date certain, it risked being relegated to a position on the list that would allow the shipment to be completed only after a few years. If the Libyans allowed that to happen, they would not be able to fulfill their WMD commitments.

SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THE NEC

¶4. (S/NF) On the NEC, the Ambassador said that we now had one site that we were exclusively looking at and that we might need to expend a considerable sum of money to convince the landlord to take the property off the market while we did a full assessment of it. We therefore needed GOL permission - as soon as possible - to buy the property if that was the decision we reached after the assessment. We did not, in any case, want to be in a position of having spent that money for the assessment and then having the GOL refuse us permission to purchase it. Kusa said he would have a governmental committee look into the issue. The Ambassador also asked for Kusa's assistance in

seeking to free up the payment (5.2 million dollars) for the seven USG properties, which appeared to be stuck somewhere between the Land Registry Office and the Ministry of Finance.

¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador also reviewed for Kusa the planned visits of Special Envoy Gration (since postponed), the McCain CODEL (August 13-14), and the Meeks CODEL (August 29), stressing that Kusa should make an effort to inform us as soon as possible

whether the Leader would be available to meet any, if not all, of the delegations.

READY TO HOST HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE DELEGATION

¶6. (S/NF) Kusa told the Ambassador that Libya was ready to proceed on all of the proposals he outlined and was ready to receive the interagency Human Rights Dialogue delegation. He noted that he was under several time constraints that could interfere with the GOL's ability to move quickly. Kusa expressed concern about receiving a large number of different delegations at the same time the GOL was preparing for the AU Summit on August 31, the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coming to power on September 1, Qadhafi's travel to New York for UNGA, and Qadhafi's possible travel to Caracas in September for an Africa-South America Summit. Kusa emphasized that he accorded priority to the launching of the Human Rights Dialogue within the bilateral agenda and stated that the GOL delegation would be ready to receive the delegation as early as next week. Kusa explained that the Libyan side of the dialogue would include representatives from the Justice Ministry-equivalent, the General People's Congress, and the Human Rights Department within the Foreign Ministry-equivalent.

¶7. (S/NF) He asked the Ambassador several times to postpone other visits, including those by the congressional delegations, until after September 1. However, without any guarantees, he agreed to look into the possibility of arranging a meeting between CODEL McCain and the Leader, and he said he would consider receiving other delegations after hosting the Human Rights Dialogue delegation. Kusa took note of the Ambassador's comment that congressional recess ends at the beginning of September, and therefore the chances of congressional travel after that time would be problematic.

TABLING OTHER ISSUES

¶8. (S/NF) Regarding the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement, the FM confirmed that the GOL was in the process of moving it forward and that he was considering transferring the file to the National Security Council (i.e., Muatassim al-Qadhafi) for further development. The other issue areas the Ambassador addressed could be discussed at another sitting, he said, noting that the Human Rights Dialogue was the most important issue of the day.

MUSA KUSA'S CONCERNS: VISAS FOR DIPLOMATS AND SEPTEMBER 1 ATTENDANCE

¶9. (S/NF) Kusa then proceeded to highlight two areas of concern: delayed visas for Libyan diplomats assigned to work at Libya's Embassy in Washington and Mission to the UN in New York; and securing high-level U.S. official attendance at the September 1 celebration. He asked the Ambassador to look into the status of delayed visa applications for several Libyan diplomats, which he said had been pending for a month. He then turned to the subject of high-level invitations which had been carefully thought out and proffered by Libya to the USG but for various reasons had been refused. He said that the Leader had personally extended an invitation to POTUS to attend the July AU

Summit in Sirte ("but for some reason he could not come") and had personally invited Special Envoy George Mitchell to visit Tripoli ("but for some reason he could not come"). Kusa said that now he had invited the Secretary to attend the September 1 anniversary events (Ref B). He expressed Libya's hopes for high-level U.S. attendance, as it would be very meaningful to Libya and an important signal of the USG commitment to the bilateral relationship. He noted that several presidents of African and Arab nations were expected to attend, as well as some European heads of state. Kusa asked the Ambassador to take personal care to ensure that a high-level U.S. official is present, implying that yet another rejection would not be well-received.

¶10. (S/NF) Kusa concluded by asserting the need to set the agenda in the near future for a potential meeting between POTUS and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. The Ambassador said that he would reach out to Washington for guidance and discuss this and other issues with Kusa when he (Ambassador) returned from leave at the end of the month.

TRIPOLI 00000638 003.2 OF 003

¶11. (S/NF) Comment: Kusa's readiness to move forward on the Human Rights Dialogue reflected his understanding that the initiative was critical on two points for Libya: that it would open up other channels of cooperation and was needed if there were to be any possibility of a high-level meeting in NYC. It is also clear that Kusa is under some pressure to produce high-level USG representation at the September 1 festivities, especially in light of "hurt" Libyan feelings over past "rejected" invites. We look forward to receiving guidance regarding the USG position on attendance at the 40th anniversary celebration. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI639

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI639 aka Wikileaks id #219627 ?
Subject	PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES -- CORRECTED COPY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 5 Aug 2009 16:27 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI639.html
References	09TRIPOLI599 , 09TRIPOLI632 , 09TRIPOLI638
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI696
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5507
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0639/01 2171627
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 051627Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5124
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0220
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1106
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0551
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0779
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5664
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000639

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NEASA (CHARRIS), ISN; TREASURY FOR PAUL
BURKHEAD

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , UNGA [UN
General Assembly] , ABLD [Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , MASS [Military Assistance
and Sales] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: PRODDING LIBYA TO ACTION ON TIME SENSITIVE ISSUES --
CORRECTED COPY

REF: A) TRIPOLI 599 ; B) TRIPOLI 632 ; C) TRIPOLI 638

TRIPOLI 00000639  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State
```

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) CORRECTED COPY: This cable replaces and supercedes ref C. Substantive revision in para 9.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary: FM-equivalent Musa Kusa told the Ambassador August 5 that Libya was ready at any time to host the U.S. interagency delegation that will launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue in Tripoli and agreed that the dialogue could take place as early as next week. He assured the Ambassador that the agreement to transfer Libya's highly enriched uranium and low enriched uranium (HEU/LEU) would be finalized by August ¶15. Kusa emphasized that he and his staff were under a lot of pressure due to the extensive preparations they needed to undertake in advance of the August 31 AU Summit, the 40th anniversary commemoration of Qadhafi's seizure of power on September 1, the Leader's participation in the UN General Assembly, and Libya's potential participation in the Africa-South America Summit in Caracas at the end of September. Kusa requested the Ambassador's personal assistance in postponing U.S. delegations - apart from the visit of the Human Rights Dialogue delegation - until after September 1. He also asked the Ambassador to ensure high-level U.S. official representation at the September 1 celebration and noted the importance of setting the agenda soon for a potential POTUS-Qadhafi meeting in New York. End Summary.

ARGUING FOR IMMEDIATE START OF HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE

¶3. (S/NF) During an August 5 meeting with Libya's Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa, the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol/Econ chief) pressed for action on time sensitive and critical issues on the bilateral agenda. These included launching a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue; signing of the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement; signing of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; approval of the end-use monitoring agreement for military assistance; approval of an NEC site; and resolution of Libya's payment for seven U.S. properties. The Ambassador reviewed developments in the relationship that had led to the proposal for commencing the Human Rights Dialogue and stressed that it was essential that the Libyans host the interagency delegation and launch the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue prior to UNGA. The commencement of the Human Rights Dialogue would help facilitate progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship. It would also help contribute to a more substantive and rich discussion between POTUS and Colonel Qadhafi, if that were able to be arranged, on the margins of UNGA. He reminded Kusa that Acting NEA Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman had presented the same points during his July 26 visit to Libya (Ref A).

HEU/LEU: AUGUST 15 REAL DEADLINE

¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador also reiterated that Libya had to sign the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement by August 15. He emphasized that August 15 was a real deadline, given that the USG had other commitments in this area and there were not enough transport materials available to allow for a Libyan delay. If Libya did not initial the agreement by that date certain, it risked being relegated to a position on the list that would allow the shipment to be completed only after a few years. If the Libyans allowed that to happen, they would not be able to fulfill their WMD commitments.

SEEKING PERMISSION FOR THE NEC

¶5. (S/NF) On the NEC, the Ambassador said that we now had one site that we were exclusively looking at and that we might need to expend a considerable sum of money to convince the landlord to take the property off the market while we did a full assessment of it. We therefore needed GOL permission - as soon as possible - to buy the property if that was the decision we reached after the assessment. We did not, in any case, want to

be in a position of having spent that money for the assessment and then having the GOL refuse us permission to purchase it. Kusa said he would have a governmental committee look into the issue. The Ambassador also asked for Kusa's assistance in seeking to free up the payment (5.2 million dollars) for the seven USG properties, which appeared to be stuck somewhere between the Land Registry Office and the Ministry of Finance.

TRIPOLI 00000639 002.2 OF 003

¶6. (S/NF) The Ambassador also reviewed for Kusa the planned visits of Special Envoy Gration (since postponed), the McCain CODEL (August 13-14), and the Meeks CODEL (August 29), stressing that Kusa should make an effort to inform us as soon as possible whether the Leader would be available to meet any, if not all, of the delegations.

READY TO HOST HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE DELEGATION

¶7. (S/NF) Kusa told the Ambassador that Libya was ready to proceed on all of the proposals he outlined and was ready to receive the interagency Human Rights Dialogue delegation. He noted that he was under several time constraints that could interfere with the GOL's ability to move quickly. Kusa expressed concern about receiving a large number of different delegations at the same time the GOL was preparing for the AU Summit on August 31, the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coming to power on September 1, Qadhafi's travel to New York for UNGA, and Qadhafi's possible travel to Caracas in September for an Africa-South America Summit. Kusa emphasized that he accorded priority, within the bilateral agenda, to the launching of the Human Rights Dialogue and stated that the GOL delegation would be ready to receive the delegation as early as next week. Kusa explained that the Libyan side of the dialogue would include representatives from the Justice Ministry-equivalent, the General People's Congress, and the Human Rights Department within the Foreign Ministry-equivalent.

¶8. (S/NF) He asked the Ambassador several times to postpone other visits, including those by the congressional delegations, until after September 1. However, without offering any guarantees, he agreed to look into the possibility of arranging a meeting between CODEL McCain and the Leader, and he said he would consider receiving other delegations after hosting the Human Rights Dialogue delegation. Kusa took note of the Ambassador's comment that congressional recess ends at the beginning of September, and therefore the chances of congressional travel after that time would be problematic.

TABLING OTHER ISSUES

¶9. (S/NF) Regarding the HEU/LEU fuel transfer agreement, the FM confirmed that the GOL was in the process of moving it forward. Regarding the end-use assurance for military assistance (505 agreement), he was considering transferring it to the National Security Council (i.e., Muatassim al-Qadhafi) for further development. The other issue areas the Ambassador addressed could be discussed at another sitting, he said, noting that the Human Rights Dialogue was the most important issue of the day.

MUSA KUSA'S CONCERNS: VISAS FOR DIPLOMATS AND SEPTEMBER 1 ATTENDANCE

¶10. (S/NF) Kusa then proceeded to highlight two areas of concern: delayed visas for Libyan diplomats assigned to work at Libya's Embassy in Washington and Mission to the UN in New York; and securing high-level U.S. official attendance at the September 1 celebration. He asked the Ambassador to look into the status of delayed visa applications for several Libyan diplomats, which he said had been pending for a month. He then

turned to the subject of high-level invitations which had been carefully thought out and proffered by Libya to the USG but for various reasons had been refused. He said that the Leader had personally extended an invitation to POTUS to attend the July AU Summit in Sirte ("but for some reason he could not come") and had personally invited Special Envoy George Mitchell to visit Tripoli ("but for some reason he could not come"). Kusa said that now he had invited the Secretary to attend the September 1 anniversary events (Ref B). He expressed Libya's hopes for high-level U.S. attendance, as it would be very meaningful to Libya and an important signal of the USG commitment to the bilateral relationship. He noted that several presidents of African and Arab nations were expected to attend, as well as some European heads of state. Kusa asked the Ambassador to take personal care to ensure that a high-level U.S. official is present, implying that yet another rejection would not be well-received or understood.

¶11. (S/NF) Kusa concluded by asserting the need to set the agenda in the near future for a potential meeting between POTUS

TRIPOLI 00000639 003.2 OF 003

and Qadhafi on the margins of UNGA. The Ambassador said that he would reach out to Washington for guidance and discuss this and other issues with Kusa when he (Ambassador) returned from leave at the end of the month.

¶12. (S/NF) Comment: Kusa's readiness to move forward on the Human Rights Dialogue reflected his understanding that the initiative was critical on two points for Libya: that it would open up other channels of cooperation and was needed if there were to be any possibility of a high-level meeting in NYC. It is also clear that Kusa is under some pressure to produce high-level USG representation at the September 1 festivities, especially in light of "hurt" Libyan feelings over past "rejected" invites. We look forward to receiving guidance regarding the USG position on attendance at the 40th anniversary celebration. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI64

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI64 aka Wikileaks id #189200 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 28 Jan 2009 14:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI64.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI36 , 08TRIPOLI481 , 08TRIPOLI515 , 08TRIPOLI530 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 08TRIPOLI936 , 08TRIPOLI994 , 09TRIPOLI17 , 09TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI37 , 09TRIPOLI896
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI805
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0588
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0064/01 0281420
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 281420Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4373
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4897
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000064

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER) AND S/P
(BEHRMAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* ,
EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN

REF: A) TRIPOLI 37 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 994 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 0036 ,
D) 08 TRIPOLI 481 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 530 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL),
F) 08 TRIPOLI 515 , G) 08 TRIPOLI 227 , H) 08 TRIPOLI 896 ,
I) 08 TRIPOLI 936 , J) TRIPOLI 0017

TRIPOLI 00000064 001.2 OF 004

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Despite a carefully cultivated image as a philosopher-king with no formal title and persistent rumors that he is passing day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an orchestrated succession by one of his sons, Muammar al-Qadhafi remains intimately involved in the regime's most sensitive and critical portfolios. He has used an influential but obscure administrative entity to politically vet commercial contracts involving GOL funds and ensure that opportunities to extract rents from those contracts are distributed to key regime allies. In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues undermine the claim that he is an oracle above the fray. He personally briefed GOL officials before their discussion with U.S. counterparts on the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft Libya purchased in the 1970's, but never took delivery of because of deteriorating bilateral ties. He has taken a close interest in sensitive human rights cases, and appears to be the author of the regime's position on detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and the GOL's hot response to Emboffs' request to visit a predominantly Berber town. Although he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also played an active role in the process of political-economic reform currently under discussion in Libya, to include personally selecting members of a committee reviewing a draft constitution and urging conservative regime elements not to oppose possible upcoming elections. Part of his involvement stems from the fact that the Jamahiriya system has few formal decisionmaking structures and opaque lines of authority. Another aspect is that Libya is a kleptocracy in which the regime has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of tactical maneuvering has kept him in power for nearly 40 years; however, the unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based is ultimately limiting. Squaring the circle between an old guard whose livelihood depends on the status quo and a new, more predictable and transparent system in which a greater number of ordinary Libyans can productively participate is the key challenge facing al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The reality is that no potential successor currently enjoys sufficient credibility in his own right to maintain that delicate equilibrium and keep the project going of transforming (at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. In that regard, al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded cage and cannot yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even if he wants to. End summary.

BACKGROUND: REVOLUTIONARY TURNED SAGE

¶2. (C) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has since the early 1990's sought to propagate his image as "Guide of the Revolution". While the de facto head of state, he holds no formal title or position, and has periodically made public remarks to the effect that while he is a sort of uber-political counselor to the revolution and its offshoot, the Jamahariya, he is not involved in day-to-day decisionmaking. Al-Qadhafi was part of a group of self-described Free Officers who staged a bloodless military coup on September 1, 1969, wresting power from King Idriss al-Sanussi, who was then on holiday in Ankara. Al-Qadhafi was appointed President of the Revolutionary Command Council on September 13, 1969. In March 1977, he announced that a new "Jamahiriya", described as "a state of the masses" would replace the Libyan Arab Republic. The new entity, officially titled the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, theoretically allowed the people to govern directly through the General People's Congress, of which al-Qadhafi became Secretary General (Prime Minister-equivalent). In 1979, he resigned his positions and authored the Green Book, in which he articulated the "Third Universal Theory", which purports to be the logical corollary of (and improvement on) socialism and capitalism. In 1989, al-Qadhafi declared himself Guide of the Revolution and adopted the de facto role of head of state, but without formal portfolio or responsibilities. With the imposition of

portfolio of responsibilities. With the imposition of international sanctions in the early 1990's, al-Qadhafi largely withdrew from the media limelight, and only re-emerged in earnest after sanctions were lifted in 2003-2004. He has since advocated various trans-national agendas, most recently for a proposed unified African government, and has cultivated the image of an international philosopher-king, a la Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel. On the margins of last year's Revolution Day festivities in Benghazi, a visiting group of African tribal leaders bestowed upon him the title "King of Kings", together with the requisite golden crown and scepter.

TRIPOLI 00000064 002.2 OF 004

AL-QADHAFI: SHOW ME THE MONEY

¶3. (C) Notwithstanding his carefully cultivated image as a man of history above pettifogging details, a protege of Abuzeid Dorda, former Prime Minister and now the influential Chairman of the Housing and Infrastructure Board, recently told us that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally reviewed all contracts involving GOL funds that were worth more than USD 200 million and exercised a great deal of influence over which foreign companies were awarded contracts through the Committee for Oversight and Audit. The Committee for Oversight and Audit, known as the 'riqaba' committee, is a powerful GOL entity that reviews all contracts involving public funds, ostensibly to ensure that they are fairly awarded and consistent with Libyan law. In reality, after the contracts are approved at the level of the General People's Committees (ministry-equivalents) and, in the case of particularly large contracts, at the level of the General People's Congress (typically by the office of the Prime Minister-equivalent), the contracts are sent to the 'riqaba' committee for what amounts to political vetting.

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee to ensure that political patronage is properly distributed, i.e., that GOL entities headed by regime loyalists administer particularly plum contracts, ensuring that they are well-positioned to extract rents from foreign companies. He also uses it to direct contracts to companies from countries with which he has good relations as a tangible symbol of goodwill, and to prevent large contracts from being awarded to companies from countries with which he has political issues. Several well-informed contacts have told us that when cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were re-published in a Danish magazine in 2007, al-Qadhafi reached out through the 'riqaba' committee to direct that contracts for management of infrastructure projects worth tens of millions of dollars that had initially been awarded to two Danish firms be given to other companies. In addition, the 'riqaba' committe and Prime Minister's office acted swiftly to prevent imports of Danish goods (Danish butter only recently reappeared on the shelves after an absence of more than a year). More recently, al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee, together with the office of the Prime Minister, to harass Swiss companies after the arrest in Geneva last July of his son, Hannibal al-Qadhafi, and the ensuing Swiss-Libyan contretemps. As reported ref B, Swiss companies were informed last December that they had to liquidate all their assets within a month. U.S. companies experienced a surge in harassment by the GOL, some of it reportedly directed personally by al-Qadhafi, in the wake of a decision by a U.S. judge in January 2008 to award roughly $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans killed in Libya's 1989 bombing of a French-operated UTA passenger plane (ref C). (Note: The situation improved after a comprehensive U.S.-Libya claims agreement was signed in August 2008 and implemented in October 2008. End note.) Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, reportedly with the knowledge and at least tacit blessing of al-Qadhafi, has mounted a campaign through his office and the 'riqaba' committee against the Tripoli branch of U.K. department store Marks and Spencer as

a means to harass longtime rival Husni Bey, a partner in the Tripoli branch.

¶5. (C) A well-connected Libyan national employed with a U.S. company operating here confirmed that al-Qadhafi is deeply involved in the work of the 'riqaba' committee. Although the nominal threshold for a contract to be reviewed by al-Qadhafi is USD 200 million, the reality is that he reviews a large number of contracts of lesser value. Typically, al-Qadhafi focuses on contracts with foreign companies of particular concern, including the U.S., Britain, Russia, China, Italy, Egypt and Tunis. Our contact told us al-Qadhafi personally directed Abuzeid Dorda to reduce the number of infrastructure and development contracts awarded to Turkish companies for a raft of projects in December 2007 to avoid giving the impression that Libya favored "the Ottomans". Al-Qadhafi ignored Dorda's protest that the Turkish companies had submitted the most competitive bids and were best-qualifed, suggesting that political credentials count for at least as much as technical ability.

¶6. (C) In addition, our contact said the 'riqaba' committee's writ extends far beyond auditing and review and into actual project management and contract execution, which has ironically better allowed 'riqaba' members to extract rents and bribes. Its officials, most of whom are appointed for political loyalty rather than technical expertise (many are members of the Revolutionary Committees and/or relatives of senior regime

TRIPOLI 00000064 003.2 OF 004

figures), are not well-qualified to play such a role. Noting senior regime officials' "paranoia" about being "cheated" by foreign companies and the extreme sensitivity to pervasive rumors that senior regime elements are corrupt, our contact said an inordinate amount of time and energy is spent by foreign contractors justifying their expenses and operational decisions.

AL-QADHAFI AS POLITICAL BOSS

¶7. (C) In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues undermine the claim that he is an oracle above the fray. As reported ref D, a senior MFA interlocutor told us on the margins of a meeting last May to discuss the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft Libya purchased in the 1970's (but never took delivery of because of deteriorating bilateral ties), al-Qadhafi personally met with Libya's team to stress that any movement on resolving the issue must be contingent on securing USG guarantees that export licenses would be granted for those items. Al-Qadhafi was fully conversant with details of the case and was concerned that U.S.-Libya engagement on C-130's was a deliberate ruse or an issue on which the USG would ultimately be unable to deliver because of opposition from Congress, either of which would greatly embarrass the regime and strengthen the hand of conservative regime elements skeptical of re-engagement with the U.S. In December, a key contact told us that while other senior regime officials supported broader military-to-military cooperation with the U.S., al-Qadhafi was concerned about having large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers present in uniform in Libya given that "evacuation" of U.S. forces from Libya in 1970 was seen as a key accomplishment of the regime.

8 (C) Al-Qadhafi also actively follows sensitive human rights issues. In March, a request for GOL assistance in facilitating a visit by an Emboff to the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara prompted an angry demarche in which our interlocutor hotly denied that there was a Berber minority in Libya, decried the Embassy's "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs and threatened Emboffs with physical harm if they

affairs and threatened Embolis with physical harm if they visited the town (ref E). A key MFA interlocutor told us that only al-Qadhafi himself could have authored such a sharply worded message in official correspondence. As reported ref E, a senior regime official cautioned the Embassy in June against pushing too hard on the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi. Claiming that al-Qadhafi had personally authored the regime's policy on el-Jahmi, he made it clear that al-Qadhafi had closely tracked (and taken issue with) the Embassy's engagement with el-Jahmi's family and visits to him by P/E Chief. Later, a senior MFA interlocutor, citing a conversation with National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi (Muammar al-Qadhafi's son), said Muammar al-Qadhafi was personally following el-Jahmi's case and was "upset" that the U.S. kept raising it (ref F). (Note: El-Jahmi's public criticism of al-Qadhafi and his stewardship of Libya prompted el-Jahmi's arrest. End note.)

¶9. (C) Although he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also played an active role in the process of political-economic reform currently under discussion in Libya. In March 2008, he called for a program of radical privatization and government restructuring (ref G), and has since been actively involved in the debate about whether and how to implement his vision (ref H). Describing al-Qadhafi's decision to scale back privatization and government restructuring, the HIB's Dorda told us that " ... al-Qadhafi is a philosopher, but he is also responsible". More recently, well-informed contacts told us that al-Qadhafi quietly supported efforts by a special committee to develop a draft Libyan constitution, and had personally selected about half of the members of the committee (ref I). Al-Qadhafi has reportedly kept his role quiet to allow his son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to play a leading role in what could be a popular reform initiative and to afford himself maximum latitude to cajole reluctant old guard members into accepting it. At the end of a televised meeting on December 28 to discuss Libya's reaction to the commencement of Israeli military strikes against Gaza, al-Qadhafi instructed that television and recording equipment be switched off and announced to the assembled group of political, military and security officials that Libya was entering "a new political period" and would hold elections for "some key offices (NFI) soon" (ref J). Most recently, al-Qadhafi conducted a DVC with students at Georgetown University on January 21, in which he addressed a variety of domestic and international issues, and published an editorial in

the New York Times on January 22. The editorial focused on al-Qadhafi's proposed single state "Isratine" solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

¶10. (C) Comment: Despite persistent rumors that he is in ill health and/or delegating day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an orchestrated succession by one of his sons (most bet it will be Saif al-Islam), al-Qadhafi remains actively involved in the regime's most sensitive and critical portfolios, and in many that are not obviously so important. Part of that is because the Jamahiriya system of which he is the original author features few formal decisionmaking structures and opaque lines of authority, placing a premium on personal fiefdoms and delicate relationships between regime figures who have been in power for decades. A further complication is the fact that Libya is a kleptocracy in which the regime - either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies - has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning. Referred to in Libyan parlance as "the politics of the black hand", it is the tried and true method of indulging - and even encouraging - corruption by favored regime officials, in part so that al-Qadhafi has a cudgel with which to beat them to help ensure their political loyalty. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of tactical maneuvering in what remains an essentially tribal

society (with the attendant complication of family/clan ties) has allowed him to remain in power despite a notoriously fractious and inchoate body politic for nearly 40 years; however, the unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based is ultimately limiting. Senior members of the regime have made a handsome living by dint of political loyalty and a skill set - smuggling, bribes, extortion, and the more prosaic winning of contracts by virtue of connections alone - that are not as saleable or lucrative in a transparent economy in which the rule of law obtains. Squaring the circle between an old guard whose livelihood and political standing will be seriously impacted by proposed political-economic reforms and a new, more predictable and transparent system in which a greater number of ordinary Libyans can productively participate is the key challenge facing al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The reality is that neither Saif al-Islam nor any other potential successor currently enjoys sufficient credibility and power in his own right to maintain that delicate balance and keep going the project of transforming (at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. In that regard, al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded cage and cannot yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even if he wants to - and it is far from clear that he does. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI643

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI643 aka Wikileaks id #220037 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DIRECTOR GENERAL STEFANO MANSERVISI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 9 Aug 2009 14:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI643.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8262
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0643/01 2211436
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 091436Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5131
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1111
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0784
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0193
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0225
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5671
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000643

SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/FO, AF/E, AF/RSA, AND EUR/ERA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , EUN *[European Union]* , SO *[Somalia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT: A/S CARSON'S MEETING WITH THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION'S DIRECTOR GENERAL STEFANO MANSERVISI

TRIPOLI 00000643 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: On July 2, Assistant Secretary Johnnie Carson met with the European Commission's (EC) Director General for Development, Stefano Manservisi, on the margins of the African Union (AU) Summit in Sirte, Libya. Manservisi requested the meeting to discuss current U.S. priorities in Africa and share information about evolving EC engagement with the AU. The meeting focused largely on security in the Horn of Africa and

prospects for the Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG). End Summary.

SHARED SUPPORT FOR THE FRAGILE TFG

¶2. (C) A/S Carson noted his primary objective in attending the Summit was to generate "maximum support" for the TFG and President Sheik Sharif, adding that the USG would do everything it could to support the Djibouti process and "help the TFG survive." While A/S Carson acknowledged that the TFG had become "extremely fragile" in the last six to seven weeks, a post-TFG Somalia government could potentially represent a greater threat to region.

¶3. (C) A/S Carson explained that the USG would try to broaden the policy dialogue on Somalia to include issues beyond counterterrorism. In particular, he highlighted several regional concerns including the exodus of Somali refugees to Kenya, the "proxy" conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the need to isolate Eritrea as a supporter of the conflict in Somalia.

¶4. (C) Director General Manservisi agreed with A/S Carson's perspective on Somalia and thanked the USG for trying to find a solution to the ongoing Somali conflict. He noted that support for the TFG, security, development, and humanitarian assistance are the main pillars of European support in Somalia. Manservisi discussed the EC's plans to create a working group to continue the dialogue on Somalia and identify projects that would advance the EC's strategy in the region.

AMISOM AND TFG DELIVERY OF SERVICES CRUCIAL FOR TFG SURVIVAL

¶5. (C) The Director General and A/S Carson talked about their shared perspective that the TFG would not collapse as long as Ugandan forces remained engaged under AMISOM. Manservisi further noted his belief that UNDP operations in Somalia were not working well. On behalf of the EC, Manservisi promised to support police training and work with AMISOM to increase the number of soldiers contributed to the force.

ERITREA: NO FORMAL EC POSITION

¶6. (C) Manservisi said the EC had encouraged representatives from Somalia and Eritrea attending the AU Summit to talk and acknowledge the "political reality behind the conflict." Although the EC has not yet publicly stated their position on Eritrea, Manservisi promised the EC would do so soon. Manservisi discussed his observations that Eritrea "was listening" but not taking steps to withdraw its support for al-Shabaab, and noted that the EC would, as a result, work to increase multilateral pressure on Eritrea "to deliver results." EC's efforts will focus on identifying feasible actions to this end.

¶7. (C) Manservisi also explained his belief that the imposition of sanctions on Eritrea would worsen the situation in Somalia and that a mere threat of sanctions would serve as a more effective means of getting Eritrea back on the right path. Efforts to address regional factors in the Somalia conflict must also include the Gulf states and related financing, and take into account the fact that Somalia is not "just Mogadishu", Manservisi added.

EC: ETHIOPIA "PLAYING THE SAME GAME AS ERITREA"

¶8. (C) Manservisi said Ethiopia is "playing the same game as Eritrea" in pursuing conflicting national interests on Somalia. Politically, Manservisi continued, the EC believes that

Politically, Manservisi continued, the EC believes that returning Ethiopian troops to Somalia would "kill the peace process" there and that "AMISOM must be made into a credible

deterrent."

WEST AFRICA DESERVES MORE ATTENTION

¶9. (C) Inquiring about other USG concerns in Africa (beyond Somalia and related issues), Manservisi noted that increasing fragility and political backsliding in Niger and Guinea are of particular interest to the EC. In response, A/S Carson agreed that West Africa deserves more attention from the international community, and discussed the alarming potential for increased drug trafficking in the region. The USG is encouraging West African partner countries to turn apprehended drug traffickers over to us and/or Europeans for prosecution whenever possible, A/S Carson added.

CONCLUSION

¶10. (C) The meeting concluded with Manservisi noting the EC was in early stages of an "ambitious relationship" with the AU, which includes engagement on security assistance, political leadership, economic development, governance and climate change. He added the EC was experiencing particular difficulty in its efforts to work with the AU Regional Economic Communities and would welcome the opportunity to share information with the USG upon completion of assessments presently underway. The financial absorption capacity of the AU and its ability to successfully identify common interests and develop partnerships with the EC were cited as specific EC concerns.

¶11. (U) A/S Carson has approved this cable.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI648

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI648 aka Wikileaks id #220165 ?
Subject	SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MCCAIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 10 Aug 2009 17:39 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI648.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI677
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Mon, 21 Mar 2011 21:56: Publication withdrawn • Wed, 23 Mar 2011 01:53: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8901
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0648/01 2221739
ZNY EEEEE ZZH
P R 101739Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5137
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1113
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0786
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0554
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5677
```

Hide header

UNCLAS E F T O SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000648

SENSITIVE NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; H (H PLEASE PASS TO CODEL MCCAIN)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , OREP *[U.S. Congressional Travel]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL MCCAIN'S TRIP TO LIBYA

TRIPOLI 00000648 001.2 OF 003

¶1. (SBU/NF) Summary: Embassy Tripoli warmly welcomes your visit and believes it will be an important occasion to advance the bilateral relationship in several key areas. Following the signature of the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Agreement in October 2008, the United States and Libya established full diplomatic relations, including the exchange of

Ambassadors in January 2009 for the first time in 37 years. The normalization of relations has provided the United States and Libya with increasing opportunities to push for progress in areas of mutual concern, such as counterterrorism efforts, military-to-military cooperation, regional stability in greater Africa, and trade and investment. However, significant challenges remain, particularly in ensuring Libya meets its disarmament commitments and in encouraging the government to expand political space through a human rights dialogue. We believe it would be very helpful if you emphasized to your Libyan interlocutors the importance the U.S. places on progress in these key areas, and share your vision of how the relationship could develop once outstanding issues are resolved. End summary.

¶2. (SBU/NF) Your visit represents the highest-level visit by a U.S. Government delegation since former Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice's historic and well-received visit in September 2008. The Libyan Government is taking great pains to ensure that you have a positive experience as well, and will be listening for cues on the future direction of the relationship. Your visit comes just three weeks before the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup on September 1, and falls within a year of unprecedented international prominence for Libya and for Muammar al-Qadhafi. Qadhafi, who sees himself as a man of particular historical importance, currently holds the chairmanship of the African Union (AU), and is expected to lead his country's delegation to New York this fall, as his country takes on the presidency of the 64th UN General Assembly. Qadhafi has leveraged his position as AU Chair to improve Libya's relations with European nations, paying recent state visits to France, Russia, and Italy, among other nations. As a sign that he has normalized relations with Libya's former colonial ruler, Qadhafi will host Silvio Berlusconi for a Libyan-Italian "Friendship Day" at the end of the month. A meeting with POTUS on the margins of UNGA would be the capstone of Qadhafi's historic year, but Embassy and high-level State Department officials have emphasized that Libya must take specific actions to move forward the bilateral relationship prior to a potential meeting.

SECURITY

¶3. (SBU/NF) Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs and to renounce its support for terrorism opened the door for a wide range of cooperation in areas of mutual concern. Libya has acted as a critical ally in U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and Libya is considered one of our primary partners in combating the flow of foreign fighters. Our strategic partnership in this field has been highly productive and beneficial to both nations. We have begun some successful training programs to assist Libya in improving its security capabilities, under the rubrics of anti-terrorism assistance and border security. However, the government has not wanted to commit to participate in the Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) due to an incorrect perception that TSCTP is a regional organization, designed to provide U.S. foreign assistance to countries in need. Libya is very sensitive to receiving foreign aid, insisting that it is not a needy country but rather a patron nation of others. We believe it would be helpful if you could clarify the importance of TSCTP for obtaining congressional funding for bilateral security programs in Libya.

¶4. (SBU/NF) Libya has stated its number one priority, in return for relinquishing WMD, is a security guarantee by the U.S. against foreign aggression. To that end, Libya has expressed an interest in purchasing lethal weapons from U.S. firms. It would be helpful if you could provide congressional perspectives on lethal sales to Libya and the security commitments that must be fulfilled prior to any U.S. consideration of lethal sales. The GOL has also expressed a desire to receive in operational order the eight C-130 planes that Libya purchased in the 1970's, which were never delivered to Libya. Although the USG views the case

as a strictly commercial matter between Libya and Lockheed Martin, the manufacturer of the C-130s, the aircraft are stored at a U.S. airbase, and the U.S. Air Force is encouraging Lockheed Martin to propose a compromise. Notably, the GOL has not yet agreed to end-use monitoring or security of U.S. technology agreements - two necessary steps for expanded

military-to-military cooperation, such as International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs.

WMD COMMITMENTS

¶5. (SBU/NF) Progress in other areas of the bilateral relationship will depend on Libya's continued progress toward fulfillment of its WMD-related commitments. The U.S. is ready to launch a civil-nuclear dialogue as a framework for discussing ways in which we can expand our nuclear cooperation in areas such as the establishment of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, cooperative threat reduction, scientist engagement and redirection programs, and civil-nuclear engagement. However, we are unable to consider expanded cooperation until Libya makes good-faith efforts to meet the following critical deadlines for destruction and/or disposal of its WMD and related materials:

-September 2009: Transfer of highly enriched uranium fuel to Russia, and beginning destruction of SCUD Bs;
-2010: Conversion of Rabta chemical site to a pharmaceutical plant, and destruction of precursor chemicals;
-2011: Destruction of mustard agent.

¶6. (SBU/NF) The most pressing issue remains Libya's signing of the agreement to transfer its highly enriched uranium to Russia for treatment and disposal, an action that must be taken prior to August 15, 2009, if Libya is going to meet the September deadline for disposal. The GOL is keenly interested in the establishment of the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center as an example of the success of the bilateral relationship. Your interlocutors may raise the issue of U.S. funding for the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, which is a request that the Department of Energy is currently preparing for submission to Congress.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

¶7. (SBU/NF) Libya's strategic geographical position and current role as chair of the African Union make it a significant player on the continent. Libya has thus far cooperated with U.S. efforts to foster peace in Darfur and a foundational effort to forge a ceasefire between Sudan and Chad. The USG continues to support Libya's efforts within the AU Peace and Security Commission to promote good governance and rule of law. Qadhafi has used his role as Chair of the African Union to attempt to mediate conflicts in the sub-Saharan region, to include Sudan-Chad, Somalia, and Eritrea-Ethiopia. Libya hosted an African Union Summit in July, during which it advocated to strengthen the AU, and it is preparing to host another summit on regional peace and security on August 31.

¶8. (SBU/NF) As Qadhafi has broadened his engagement as an African leader, he has notably minimized his efforts to affect policy in the Arab world. Nevertheless, he continues to tout his vision for a one-state solution between the Israelis and the Palestinians: "Isratine." The Libyans will appreciate any information you would like to share regarding how Congress views Africa, the Arab world in general and the Middle East peace process in particular.

HUMAN RIGHTS, MEGRAHI

¶9. (SBU/NF) Human rights remains a sensitive topic in the

¶9. (SBU/NF) Human rights remains a sensitive topic in the bilateral relationship, particularly in the wake of Fathi el-Jahmi's death in May. The Libyan Government has agreed to host an interagency team of USG officials August 17-19 to launch a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. This first meeting will set the agenda for the dialogue, which will include general discussion on a broad range of issues, such as international conventions to which both the U.S. and Libya are party; refugees and migration; prisons and detention facilities; international bodies and international NGOs; as well as specific cases of concern from both sides. The USG delegation will be led by the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, and will include representatives from the NSC, OVP, and State Department. The Embassy views this dialogue as an important step forward in our relationship. It would be very helpful if you could share your views on the importance of human rights to bilateral engagement.

¶10. (SBU/NF) The Government of Libya has not officially raised the case of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi with the Embassy at any level. We do not expect the issue to be raised during your visit, but if it is, we believe the most

helpful response would be to note that this is an issue for the Scottish Executive and that it would not be constructive to discuss the case as a bilateral issue. Libya requested compassionate release for Megrahi on July 24, but the Scottish courts have not yet issued a decision on granting his release.

HOMELAND SECURITY: VISAS AND PORT-OF-ENTRY PROCEDURES

¶11. (SBU/NF) As part of our effort to expand relations and facilitate greater people-to-people exchanges, Embassy Tripoli began full non-immigrant visa services in April 2009. Unfortunately, we have not seen reciprocal movement on the Libyan side. The Embassy is coordinating a bilateral working group with GOL counterparts to discuss visa issues, including non-issuance of visas to U.S. diplomats and official visitors, business travelers, and tourists. It would be helpful if you could underscore with Libyan officials the importance of a fully normalized visa regime to the implementation of fully normalized relations with the United States.

¶12. (SBU/NF) Libyan officials may complain about Department of Homeland Security regulations and practices governing the way that they are received at U.S. ports-of-entry. Libyan travelers - including senior Government officials, in contravention of DHS procedures - are routinely pulled into secondary questioning due to Libya's status as an NSEERS country. DHS regulations dating back to 1983 also prohibit the travel to the U.S. of Libyan nuclear scientists and aircraft pilots and mechanics. Libyan officials may not be aware of these latter regulations, but they must be changed in order to move forward on the full range of civil-nuclear and security cooperation that we envision.

COMMENT

¶13. (SBU/NF) The Embassy has received positive signs from the Libyan Government regarding your requested meeting with Qadhafi. Your visit will be seen as an important opportunity for Libya to prove that it is worthy of respect as a bilateral partner. Qadhafi will be looking to you for insight into how Congress views Libya and the future of the bilateral relationship. Thank you in advance for any assistance you can provide in pushing forward our strategic agenda. We look forward to welcoming you in the Libyan Jamahiriya.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Libya's arms bid revealed in leaked cables - World News - World - General - The Canberra Times
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI65

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI65 aka Wikileaks id #189254 ?
Subject	PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 28 Jan 2009 17:00 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI65.html
References	08TRIPOLI994
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI358
History	First published on Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30 UTC (original) Removed on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 21:01 UTC (diff from original) Re-added without modification on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7211
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0065/01 0281700
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 281700Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4377
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0991
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0033
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0678
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4901
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000065

NOFORN
SIPDIS

LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR WALLER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , LY *[Libya]* , UK *[United Kingdom]*
SUBJECT: PAN AM BOMBER AL-MEGRAHI: THE VIEW FROM TRIPOLI

REF: A) LONDON 209, B) 06 TRIPOLI 0055, C) 08 TRIPOLI 994

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: While Libya has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate, the case of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi is arguably the regime's most sensitive political subject, in part because it involves a firm timeline in the form of the ailing el-Megrahi's approaching death. Through remarks by senior officials suggesting that

al-Megrahi is innocent and a steady diet of publicity about his case, the regime has limited its room for political maneuver. U.K. Embassy interlocutors here are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi's transfer to Libya. The U.K. Embassy expects a sharply negative GOL reaction if al-Megrahi dies in prison or if the Scottish Executive and/or FCO oppose his transfer. The U.K. Embassy has recommended dramatic pre-emptive measures, to include drawing down their mission in Tripoli, if either of those possibilities occurs. If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi's release - or is perceived to be complicit in a decision that results in al-Megrahi remaining in prison - the U.S. Embassy and private Americans in Libya could face similar consequences. End summary.

AL-MEGRAHI'S CASE IS THE GOL'S MOST SENSITIVE AT PRESENT

¶2. (C/NF) Consistent with information reported reftel, U.K. Emboffs here have interpreted the lengthy and repeated visits to the U.K. by MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Abdulati Obeidi and External Security Organization Director Musa Kusa in connection with the matter of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbasset al-Megrahi as reflecting the great political importance the GOL attaches to successfully resolving (from the GOL's perspective) the case. Contacts here have told us that Ahmed el-Msellati, a senior regime legal adviser/fixer who played a pivotal role in finalizing and implementing the U.S.-Libya claims compensation agreement, has also visited the U.K. to consult with al-Megrahi's defense team and FCO officials. While the GOL has a number of other pressing foreign policy issues on its plate - moving forward with re-established U.S.-Libya ties, reacting to the Gaza crisis, managing its role as the only current Arab member of the UNSC, mediating between Chad and Sudan, resolving its contretemps with the Swiss, and initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa - al-Megrahi's case is arguably the most critical and sensitive political subject at present. That is so because the regime has widely publicized developments in his case and because, unlike other foreign policy priorities, al-Megrahi's situation involves an immutable timeline in the form of his approaching death from cancer. In media interviews last August, senior regime figure Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi said al-Megrahi was innocent and that Libya had accepted responsibility for Pan Am 103 and allowed al-Megrahi and co-defendant al-Amin Khalifah Fhima to be tried in order to facilitate Libya's re-assimilation into the international community after years of isolation under international sanctions. Those comments, together with a steady diet of articles in Libyan state-owned newspapers about al-Megrahi's case and the travails of his family in Glasgow, have raised expectations among ordinary Libyans that the regime will secure his release, and have limited the GOL's room for political maneuver.

U.K. EMBASSY FOCUSED ON TRANSFER UNDER PTA AND SECURITY POSTURE

3. (C/NF) U.K. Embassy interlocutors here tell us they are planning for a scenario in which the U.K.-Libya Prisoner Transfer Agreement (PTA) is ratified in early March and the GOL makes application shortly thereafter for al-Megrahi's transfer to Libya. They do not anticipate that GOL officials will pursue another application for bail, and said they had no information from the FCO to suggest that al-Megrahi's application for compassionate release, which was denied in November, would be re-submitted in light of his deteriorating medical condition. U.K. Emboffs began consulting with us in December about deliberations concerning their security posture and tripwires for action should al-Megrahi die in Scottish prison. Consistent with information reported reftel, GOL officials have warned U.K. Emboffs in demarches here that the consequences for the U.K.-Libya bilateral relationship would be "dire" were al-Megrahi to die in Scottish prison. Specific threats have included the immediate cessation of all U.K. commercial activity

included the immediate cessation of all U.K. commercial activity in Libya, a diminishment or severing of political ties and demonstrations against official U.K. facilities. GOL officials also implied, but did not directly state, that the welfare of U.K. diplomats and citizens in Libya would be at risk.

¶4. (C/NF) Citing demonstrations in Benghazi against the Italian

consulate in 2006 that rapidly turned violent (ref B) and the quick curtailment of direct air links in the ongoing Swiss-Libyan dispute (ref C), the U.K. Embassy has reportedly recommended to London that the following pre-emptive measures be taken immediately if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were to be denied: 1) close the British School; 2) close the British Council; 3) issue a travel advisory/warden message-equivalent advising British nationals to exercise extreme caution and/or leave Libya; and 4) draw the U.K. mission down to only essential personnel. The failure of Switzerland and Libya to resolve the dispute prompted by the arrest of Muammar al-Qadhafi's son, Hannibal, last July has convinced U.K. Emboffs that the consequences if al-Megrahi were to die in prison or if the transfer under the PTA were denied would be harsh, immediate and not easily remedied.

IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. INTERESTS

¶5. (C/NF) If the USG publicly opposes al-Megrahi's release (or is perceived to be complicit in a decision to keep al-Megrahi in prison), Post judges that U.S. interests could face similar consequences, including regime-orchestrated demonstrations against the Embassy, retaliation against U.S. business interests and possible obstruction of the travel of official and private Americans, as occurred in the case of the Swiss. (Note: Unlike recent demonstrations against the Swiss (Swiss-Libyan dispute) and Egyptian embassies (in connection with Gaza), in which the regime mustered crowds that dutifully went through the paces, al-Megrahi's case is a genuinely emotive one for ordinary Libyans; demonstrations would likely be more energetic and harder for the GOL to control. End note.) Some variation of that scenario is possible, though not as likely, if al-Megrahi were to die in prison without the USG having declared a position. The fact that the GOL did not orchestrate and apparently did not sanction protests against U.S. facilities in connection with events in Gaza gives cause for cautious optimism that the GOL might distinguish between U.S. and U.K. interests in such a case, although the GOL essentially views the Pan Am 103 case as a joint U.S.-U.K. issue.

¶6. (C/NF) Comment: Despite the GOL's strategic decision in 2003 to take steps to facilitate its acceptance back into the community of nations, the regime remains essentially thuggish in its approach, particularly on issues it perceives to involve domestic political equities. The over-reaction of Muammar al-Qadhafi to what amounted to a matter of pride involving a verbal spat with then-Crown Prince Abdullah at the 2003 Arab League Summit, together with the more recent deterioration of Swiss-Libyan ties, are illustrative of what may happen should al-Megrahi die in prison. The regime understands that we have equities in this case: on the margins of the former Secretary's visit to Tripoli in September, senior regime figure Abdullah Sanussi asked former NEA A/S David Welch to influence Pan Am 103 families not to oppose al-Megrahi's transfer (Welch demurred). The issue of al-Megrahi is sensitive enough for the regime that there may be repercussions for our interests here even if we remain neutral; there will almost certainly be consequences if we publicly take a position opposing his transfer. By contrast with the Swiss problem, which is seen as an issue over the reprehensible behavior of Hannibal al-Qadhafi, al-Megrahi is effectively viewed as something of a folks hero in the eyes of the regime and many ordinary Libyans. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI650

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI650 aka Wikileaks id #220244 ?
Subject	LIBYA HOSTING SEPARATE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS FOR JEM, SLA/U
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 11 Aug 2009 11:42 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI650.html
References	09KHARTOUM372
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9508
OO RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0650 2231142
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 111142Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5141
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA PRIORITY 0034
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1116
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0789
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5681
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000650

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, S/USSES AND AF/C

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SU *[Sudan]* , EG *[Egypt]* , QA *[Qatar]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA HOSTING SEPARATE HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS FOR JEM, SLA/U

REF: Khartoum 372

¶1. (U) This is an action request. Please see para 4.

¶2. (SBU) Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi hosted a meeting August 11 with UN/AU Joint Moderator Djbril Bassole, Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud and six members of the Sudan Liberation Army/Unity faction (SLA/U). SLA/U representative Sayyid Sharif provided a brief readout of the meeting to poloff via telcon, saying the parties discussed modalities for an August 18 meeting in Addis Ababa between SLA/U and members of Abdul Wahid's faction to move forward on rebel unification. Separately, the Egyptian embassy said their Special Envoy also participated in the meeting, though was unable to provide further detail -- including whether Sudanese Presidential Advisor Ghazi Salaheddin Atabani participated in

the meeting. SLA/U representative Osman Bushra confirmed that SLA/U chairman Abdullah Yehia was not present in the meeting. Instead, six members from the "Unity Plus" agreement signed in Tripoli March 15 (reftel) were represented: Sayyid Sharif and Mahjoub Hussein from SLA/U, Masahra (phonetic) from SLA/Juba, Ashraf from JEM/Idris Azraq, and a member of the SLA/Bakhit group.

¶3. (SBU) The Justice and Equality Movement's (JEM) Tripoli representative Suliman Abdalla Ismail confirmed that JEM President Khalil Ibrahim arrived in Tripoli on August 10 and expected to meet Muammar al-Qadhafi some time on August 10 or ¶11. JEM and SLA/U representatives told poloff they were aware the rival faction was in town for high-level meetings, but SLA/U said they would not meet with Khalil Ibrahim unless the JEM publicly acknowledged SLA as a viable resistance movement operating in Darfur -- a condition they did not expect to be met in the short term.

¶4. (SBU) Comment and action request: Charge has requested an official read-out from MFA-equivalent officials here. Both rebel factions expected they would be called for several more meetings over the course of the day August 11, and requested meetings with poloff August 12. We would appreciate the Department's guidance on USG views on this latest round of negotiations and any upcoming travel related to the unification initiative.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI657

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI657 aka Wikileaks id #220445 ?
Subject	MFA REACTION TO PROPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE AGENDA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Aug 2009 13:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI657.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0579
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0657/01 2241306
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121306Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5151
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5692
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000657

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL; PLEASE PASS NSC AND OVP

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/12/2019
TAGS: PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: MFA REACTION TO PROPOSED HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE AGENDA

REF: Harris/Polaschik email 8/11/09

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (U) This is an action request; see para 6.

¶2.    (C) Summary:  MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri told CDA
August 12 that the proposed agenda for the August 18 Human
Rights Dialogue was "fine."  Fituri, who had reviewed the agenda
with FM-equivalent Musa Kusa on August 11, said the Libyan
delegation would be led by the Minister of Justice-equivalent
and would include representatives from the MFA's Americas,
International Organizations, and Refugees and Migration
Departments, as well as the General People's Congress.  Fituri
said the MFA did not intend to announce the dialogue in advance
but was fully committed to issuing a joint statement at the
conclusion of the talks.  FM Kusa had requested that the
statement indicate that the Human Rights Dialogue is the first
in a series of regular meetings, "one part of a broader
dialogue."  Fituri suggested that the U.S. submit a proposed
```

draft statement for consideration by August 16. MFA officials - including Kusa himself - appear to understand the importance of this dialogue to the broader relationship, but Fituri warned that other elements - including the General People's Congress - may seek to use the occasion to embarrass the U.S. on its own human rights record. Fituri stressed that pragmatic engagement by the U.S. will be key to the dialogue's long-term sustainability. End summary.

¶3. (C) CDA presented the proposed agenda for the first round of the U.S.-Libya Human Rights Dialogue (ref) in an August 12 meeting with MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri and Americas Desk Director Mohammed Matari. Fituri, who had reviewed the agenda with FM Musa Kusa on August 11, said the proposed agenda was "fine" and that the Libyan Government did not have any changes. Fituri also promised to provide the Libyan delegation list no later than August 13, along with information on the timing and venue for the August 18 dialogue. Fituri said the Libyan Delegation most likely would be led by the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice (Minister of Justice-equivalent), and would include the MFA's Matari, representatives from the MFA's International Organizations Department and Refugees and Migration Department, as well as a representative from the General People's Congress' Human Rights Commission. Fituri stressed that he had spoken personally with Minister-equivalent of Justice Mustafa Muhammad Abd-al-Jalil concerning the dialogue and that Abd-al-Jalil was "fully on board" with the initiative.

¶4. (C) Fituri said the Foreign Ministry viewed this dialogue as a sensitive undertaking and wanted to ensure its success and continuation over time. To that end, the MFA did not intend to announce the dialogue in advance. However, the GOL is fully committed to issuing a joint statement at the conclusion of the talks. Fituri noted that he had discussed this issue with FM Kusa on August 11, and that Kusa had asked that the dialogue be announced as the first in a series of regular meetings, "one part of the broader dialogue." Fituri agreed that language noting that the human rights meeting was held "in the context of the agreement between our two countries to expand cooperation across a range of issues" would be very appropriate, and asked that the U.S. present a proposed draft statement for consideration by the MFA as early as Sunday, August 16, in order to facilitate the internal Libyan Government approval process.

¶5. (C) Fituri cautioned that although the MFA understood the importance and utility of these talks, there are others in the Libyan Government who may seek to use the dialogue to embarrass the U.S. Government on its own human rights record. Fituri noted that the General People's Congress representatives are likely to raise issues such as Guantanamo Bay and alleged torture cases. Fituri urged the U.S. Delegation to use this initial round of the dialogue to define the terms of reference for the talks, and to seek common ground on areas of mutual concern to both Libya and the United States. He said it would be very helpful if the U.S. could explain some of the concrete areas in which it could provide assistance to the Libyans, such as refugee and migration issues. Fituri believes that this sort of pragmatic engagement is essential to ensuring the dialogue's long-term continuity.

¶6. (C) Comment and action request: MFA officials - including FM Kusa himself - appear to understand the importance of the human rights dialogue to the broader relationship and, as evidenced by Kusa's August 11 meeting with Fituri, are making serious preparations for the talks. We agree with Fituri's assessment that the first session of the dialogue will be most effective if it focuses on a broader discussion of U.S. and Libyan goals for the dialogue and results in a clear, agreed framework for future talks. To help smooth the way for the joint statement, we recommend that the interagency develop a proposed joint statement that could be shared with the MFA on August 16, as requested by Fituri. We will submit our

August 10, as requested by Treasury. We will submit our
suggestions via email to NEA/MAG and request the Department's

guidance by August 16.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI658

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI658 aka Wikileaks id #220471 ?
Subject	WHERE HAVE ALL THE SIGNS GONE?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 12 Aug 2009 14:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI658.html
References	09TRIPOLI212
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0676
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0658/01 2241444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 121444Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5153
INFO RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0557
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0433
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5694
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000658

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; LONDON AND PARIS FOR
NEA WATCHERS; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/12/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* ,
EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: WHERE HAVE ALL THE SIGNS GONE?

REF: TRIPOLI 212

TRIPOLI 00000658 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: A Libyan Government attempt to enforce a 2007
decree specifying requirements for shop signs and advertisements
has stirred confusion within the main commercial areas of
Tripoli recently, as businesses have torn down or covered up
their signs in an effort to avoid taxation. Shops located

outside Tripoli's commercial centers, as well as those in other cities, have managed to maintain their original signs. In true Jamahiriya ("state of the masses") fashion, there is little clarity on either the goal of enforcing the decree or on the compliance process. Expatriate business owners believe the sudden rush to cover up signs is due solely to GOL preparations for the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's revolution, and they expect the situation to return to normal after September 1. End summary.

WHERE DID ALL THE SHOP SIGNS GO?

¶2. (SBU) Several weeks ago, signs on shops in Tripoli suddenly began to disappear, with the fashionable shopping area along Gagaresh Street particularly hard hit. Many clothing stores, high-end furniture stores, and restaurants now appear nameless. Only pharmacies and private dental clinics are still displaying their signs. The sign removal campaign appears to be focused on Tripoli, at least for the moment. On a recent drive through Zouera, the last large town on the coast before the Tunisian border, Econoff did not see any shops without signs or with signs covered-up.

SIGNS BEING REMOVED DUE TO 2007 DECREE

¶3. (C) The sign removal campaign appears to be the result of a recent GOL attempt to enforce a 2007 decree (Number 504) outlining requirements for advertising and promotional signs and billboards. The decree stipulates that all words and figures on signs and billboards be written in Arabic and "must not conflict with the achievements, logos, or purposes of Qadhafi's revolution." Businesses must receive clearance of sign content from the General People's Committee for Culture and Information (Ministry of Culture/Information-equivalent) prior to displaying their signs. Furthermore, said signs and billboards must not violate "public decency and morals." The decree also lists complicated size and registration requirements but does not clarify annual fee calculations. Finally, the decree warns that all signs in contravention of these rules will be removed at the owner's expense ten days after the notification of the violation. The Lebanese manager of a new cafe told us that the expatriate business community believes this formerly obscure decree is being enforced solely in preparation for the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's revolution. He fully believes that businesses will be allowed to return to business as usual after the September 1 festivities.

BUSINESS OWNERS SCRATCH THEIR HEADS...

¶4. (C) A variety of businesses have been caught up in the frenzy to abide by the sign decree. The owner of an exercise equipment business told Econoff that he had applied for permission to display his sign three months ago. Even so, the commercial inspector for his area directed the sign to be covered up. The owner commented that the sign was in Arabic, not in English, so he did not understand why it had to be covered; he attributed this action to the whims of the individual commercial inspector. While the lack of a sign has not greatly affected his business, the owner commented that having a sign would make it easier for new customers to find his shop.

¶5. (C) Emboffs have observed no discernible consistency to the application of the decree. Along a primary business avenue, some signs remain, as do the names of shops that are affixed directly onto the front of stores (such as on the local outlet for Mango apparel). Even the Starbucks look-alike sign for a local coffee shop, Caracalla coffee, has its name (in English) painted directly onto its front window. On a popular block containing a string of inexpensive carry-out restaurants, however, employees had no idea why their signs had been removed. A new Chinese carry-out restaurant's sign had displayed the name of the restaurant in English, Chinese, and Arabic script,

but the sign was abruptly removed without explanation. After the sign was taken down, the creative staff clandestinely taped a small sign written in Chinese and English to their window, reading "Chinese Take-Away." An Egyptian cook at the barbeque restaurant next door believed that the row of restaurants was slotted for demolition by a government actor wanting to take over the land to build something new in the prime business

TRIPOLI 00000658 002.2 OF 002

location.

¶6. (C) Even private offices have been affected by the sign removal campaign: a Libyan oil services company had displayed a sign on a main road for their office that is located on a nearby side street. Even though their sign was in Arabic, it was torn down and thrown into a gutter. The manager of the company commented that he did not know how to seek permission to replace his sign. In terms of the effect on their business, another employee noted that most visitors already knew the location of the office and any newcomers would find it according to landmarks or directions. (Note: There are no real addresses or prominently marked street names in Tripoli - thus, the removal of shop signs renders the entire city nameless. Most Libyans find new locations according to well-known landmarks, and many local Embassy contacts seem to be apathetic about the absence of signs, simply explaining it away as one of the many bizarre aspects of living under the Qadhafi regime. End note).

...WHILE BILLBOARDS ABOUND

¶7. (C) In contrast to the preponderance of nameless stores in Tripoli, the 2007 decree does not seem to apply to the removal of billboards, as many new billboards have appeared with advertisements for consumer goods, in Arabic and also in English. A preponderance of the new billboards feature new images of Qadhafi, in celebration of the upcoming anniversary of his 40 years in power (on September 1). One billboard is particularly colorful, featuring the flags of Africa along the borders with Qadhafi - the "king of kings of Africa" - as the centerpiece.

¶8. (C) Comment: While the practical effects of the sign removals on Tripoli businesses may be somewhat limited, the haphazard implementation of the 2007 sign and billboard decree is yet another example of the hoops the small private sector must go through here in their daily operations. One Libyan businessman commented the latest sign removals are simply another measure to keep people "off balance" and make them wonder what hindrance to businesses may be coming next. The willy-nilly enforcement of the sign law may be a means for commercial inspectors to extract "fees" from business owners, in an operating environment that is known for graft at all levels of the government. It remains to be seen whether implementation of this decree will prove to be yet another barrier to doing business or whether creative shopkeepers, such as the Chinese take-away owner, will be able to maintain business via alternative means of marketing their products. End comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI660

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI660 aka Wikileaks id #220696 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MEDIA SUBDUED ON MEGRAHI MEDIA BUZZ
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 13 Aug 2009 15:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI660.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI190 , 09TRIPOLI684
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1725
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0660 2251546
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 131546Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5156
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1117
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0790
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0559
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5697
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000660

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE, L, AND H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/13/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , KMDR *[Media Reaction Reporting]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MEDIA SUBDUED ON MEGRAHI MEDIA BUZZ

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) Although press reports from international media outlets are swirling regarding the possible release next week of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, local state-run media outlets have not yet offered any commentary on the rumors, although they have reported them. "Oya," a popular and widespread media outlet run by Qadhafi's son Saif al-Islam, as well as the smaller "Al Watan" newspaper simply detailed that the Scottish press had printed an article regarding Megrahi's possible imminent release. Meanwhile, online outlet "Libya al-Youm" reprinted a Reuters article summarizing the news, with one notable exclusion - the local article, translated into Arabic, deleted quotes made by family members of Pan Am 103

victims that were included in the original Reuters piece. Other popular local media sources such as "Qurina" (print) and "Jana" (online) did not report anything related to Megrahi. Unnamed Libyan officials were cited in the press reports as having acknowledged an agreement with the Scottish Executive to refrain from comment on the case until Megrahi is released and returned to Libyan soil.

¶2. (C) The subdued reaction in Tripoli most likely reflects Libya's commitment not to comment on the case before any official decision is made. Local contacts did not react to the international media reports, stating that the news was not, in fact, new, and that rumors regarding Megrahi's release have been circulating for months. Post will continue to monitor local reactions - in the press, on the street, and within the government - to the possibility of Megrahi 's release in the near future.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI661

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI661 aka Wikileaks id #220867 ?
Subject	CODEL MCCAIN RAISES MEGRAHI WITH LIBYAN LEADER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:37 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI661.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2594
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0661/01 2261237
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 141237Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5157
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1118
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0791
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0560
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5698
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000661

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE, H, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/14/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN RAISES MEGRAHI WITH LIBYAN LEADER

REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 656; B) 07 TRIPOLII 695

TRIPOLI 00000661 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 14 meeting, CODEL McCain told Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi that the possible release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison is a very sensitive issue for the American public, and strongly urged the Libyan Goverment to handle the release - if it happens - in a way that would strengthen the growing relationship

between our two countries, rather than hinder its progress. While Muatassim al-Qadhafi bristled at the message, Muammar al-Qadhafi calmly made the point that Megrahi was, in the eyes of several international organizations, a "political captive" who was gravely ill. Both Qadhafis likened Megrahi's case to that of the Bulgarian nurses, who were released from a Libyan prison last year, and also argued that the Libyan Government could not control popular reaction to Megrahi's potential release. We believe the CODEL's message was helpful to our goal of laying down a marker for a measured GOL response to Megrahi's release. Other topics discussed in the meetings will be reported septel. End Summary.

MUATASSIM INSISTS MEGRAHI IS INNOCENT

¶2. (C) During an August 14 meeting with National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, CODEL McCain conveyed the message that the decision that is expected to be made in Scotland next week regarding the release of Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi will be very sensitive to the American public. The Senators emphasized that, as friends, the United States and Libya must address the issue openly. Senator Lieberman explained that Libya's official response to the possible release of Megrahi would influence bilateral relations - positively or negatively - and could represent a step backwards if Libya offers Megrahi a hero's welcome. Muatassim reacted defensively, telling the CODEL that Megrahi "is an innocent man, and we believe it." Muatassim then compared Megrahi's case to that of the Bulgarian nurses convicted in Libya of intentionally infecting 400 Libyan children with the HIV virus, arguing that they had been welcomed in Bulgaria as returning heroes even though they had been sentenced to life in prison (Ref A). He stressed that the Libya-EU MOU involving the transfer of the Bulgarian nurses specified that they would complete their life sentences in prison. "They were released even before they arrived at the airport," he lamented (Ref B). Regarding Megrahi's potential homecoming, Muatassim stressed that the people govern Libya and as such, "they will express their will in whichever way they like." He stated that Libyan officials "cannot stop the people if they celebrate in freedom."

QADHAFI SAYS THE LIBYAN PEOPLE WILL DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND ON MEGRAHI

¶3. (C) Stressing that they were raising the issue in the strongest spirit of friendship and respect, the Senators addressed the potential release of Megrahi with Muammar al-Qadhafi during their follow-on meeting with him. Senator Lieberman forecasted that a hero's welcome for Megrahi would represent the first crisis in the renewed U.S.-Libya relationship and that both sides would have to work hard to ensure that it does not damage the relationship. The elder Qadhafi's reaction to the Senators' comments regarding Megrahi was much more measured than that of his son, though his words were similar. He began by commenting that all of the decisions made by international organizations and groups - including the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the African Union - regarding Megrahi described him as a "political captive," who had taken the fall - in a political verdict - in place of the "real culprit." Stating that Megrahi was at the disposal of the U.S. and UK, he calmly argued that Megrahi had not been given the chance to see a doctor regularly and was now "gravely ill," explaining that he was serving out his death sentence in the most literal sense.

¶4. (C) Qadhafi, who remained relaxed throughout Senator Lieberman's remarks and pointedly shushed Muatassim when he tried to intervene, told the CODEL that he understood the Senators' need to speak on behalf of the American people. Noting that the Libyan Government also must be responsive to public opinion, Muammar al-Qadhafi proceeded to compare Megrahi's case to the Bulgarian nurses, reiterating his son's remark that the

nurses were released from their sentences even before they reached the airport to return to their home country. Calling them murderers, he remarked in a tone of disbelief that they were welcomed home by the Bulgarian President himself. Qadhafi emphasized that if Megrahi was released, neither he nor any other Libyan official could control the manner in which the Libyan people reacted. "They could even demonstrate against me,"

TRIPOLI 00000661 002.2 OF 002

he said. Lieberman noted Qadhafi's views but stressed that he hoped the two sides could manage this issue. Qadhafi ended the conversation by stating that "we have to accept the challenge and face it."

CODEL PRESS STATEMENT

¶5. (SBU) The CODEL later echoed these remarks in its August 14 press availability. (Note: The CODEL's written statement, delivered by Senator McCain, was sent by email to NEA/MAG and NEA/PPD. End note.) In his remarks, Senator Lieberman further underscored the Megrahi message, noting that this "possibly could be the first crisis in our bilateral relationship." He had prefaced this statement with very positive comments about the bilateral relationship that praised Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programs, highlighted ongoing cooperation, and expressed hope for the possibility of expanded security cooperation.

COMMENT

¶6. (C) Comment: To the best of our collective knowledge, this is the first time that any U.S. official has raised Megrahi's potential release with Muammar al-Qadhafi. Senior MFA contacts had strongly urged CDA to encourage the CODEL not to raise the issue with Qadhafi, arguing that the issue was extremely sensitive and could have negative repercussions for the relationship. (Note: We had advised the CODEL that this was indeed a sensitive issue, but that it was entirely their call as to whether and how to raise the issue. End note.) Judging from his body language, Qadhafi did not appear to take any immediate offense to the discussion, and the meeting continued for another 10-15 minutes without any discernable change in tone.

¶7. (C) Comment continued: Both Qadhafis seemed to appreciate the need for the CODEL to share the views of the American people, and made it clear that Libya's response to any potential Megrahi release would in turn be determined by the Libyan people. Left unspoken, of course, was the huge role that the Libyan Government plays in orchestrating popular opinion and churning out the masses for public rallies. We believe the CODEL's message was very helpful to our goal of laying down the marker for a measured GOL response to Megrahi's release, and it could be a useful buildling block for any future messages from the Department.

¶8. (U) CODEL McCain did not have the opportunity to clear this message prior to departure.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI662

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI662 aka Wikileaks id #220869 ?
Subject	CORRECTED COPY: CODEL MCCAIN RAISES MEGRAHI WITH LIBYAN LEADER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 14 Aug 2009 12:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI662.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI663 , 09TRIPOLI677 , 09TRIPOLI684
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2613
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0662/01 2261253
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 141253Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5159
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1120
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0793
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0562
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5700
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000662

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE, H, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/14/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: CODEL MCCAIN RAISES MEGRAHI WITH LIBYAN LEADER

REF: A) 07 TRIPOLI 656; B) 07 TRIPOLII 695

TRIPOLI 00000662 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In an August 14 meeting, CODEL McCain told Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi that the possible release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi from a Scottish prison is a very sensitive issue for the American public, and strongly urged the Libyan Goverment to handle the release - if it happens

- in a way that would strengthen the growing relationship between our two countries, rather than hinder its progress. While Muatassim al-Qadhafi bristled at the message, Muammar al-Qadhafi calmly made the point that Megrahi was, in the eyes of several international organizations, a "political captive" who was gravely ill. Both Qadhafis likened Megrahi's case to that of the Bulgarian nurses, who were released from a Libyan prison in 2007, and also argued that the Libyan Government could not control popular reaction to Megrahi's potential release. We believe the CODEL's message was helpful to our goal of laying down a marker for a measured GOL response to Megrahi's release. Other topics discussed in the meetings will be reported septel. End Summary.

MUATASSIM INSISTS MEGRAHI IS INNOCENT

¶2. (C) During an August 14 meeting with National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, CODEL McCain conveyed the message that the decision that is expected to be made in Scotland next week regarding the release of Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi will be very sensitive to the American public. The Senators emphasized that, as friends, the United States and Libya must address the issue openly. Senator Lieberman explained that Libya's official response to the possible release of Megrahi would influence bilateral relations - positively or negatively - and could represent a step backwards if Libya offers Megrahi a hero's welcome. Muatassim reacted defensively, telling the CODEL that Megrahi "is an innocent man, and we believe it." Muatassim then compared Megrahi's case to that of the Bulgarian nurses convicted in Libya of intentionally infecting 400 Libyan children with the HIV virus, arguing that they had been welcomed in Bulgaria as returning heroes even though they had been sentenced to life in prison (Ref A). He stressed that the Libya-EU MOU involving the transfer of the Bulgarian nurses specified that they would complete their life sentences in prison. "They were released even before they arrived at the airport," he lamented (Ref B). Regarding Megrahi's potential homecoming, Muatassim stressed that the people govern Libya and as such, "they will express their will in whichever way they like." He stated that Libyan officials "cannot stop the people if they celebrate in freedom."

QADHAFI SAYS THE LIBYAN PEOPLE WILL DECIDE HOW TO RESPOND ON MEGRAHI

¶3. (C) Stressing that they were raising the issue in the strongest spirit of friendship and respect, the Senators addressed the potential release of Megrahi with Muammar al-Qadhafi during their follow-on meeting with him. Senator Lieberman forecasted that a hero's welcome for Megrahi would represent the first crisis in the renewed U.S.-Libya relationship and that both sides would have to work hard to ensure that it does not damage the relationship. The elder Qadhafi's reaction to the Senators' comments regarding Megrahi was much more measured than that of his son, though his words were similar. He began by commenting that all of the decisions made by international organizations and groups - including the Arab League, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the African Union - regarding Megrahi described him as a "political captive," who had taken the fall - in a political verdict - in place of the "real culprit." Stating that Megrahi was at the disposal of the U.S. and UK, he calmly argued that Megrahi had not been given the chance to see a doctor regularly and was now "gravely ill," explaining that he was serving out his death sentence in the most literal sense.

¶4. (C) Qadhafi, who remained relaxed throughout Senator Lieberman's remarks and pointedly shushed Muatassim when he tried to intervene, told the CODEL that he understood the Senators' need to speak on behalf of the American people. Noting that the Libyan Government also must be responsive to public opinion, Muammar al-Qadhafi proceeded to compare Megrahi's case

to the Bulgarian nurses, reiterating his son's remark that the nurses were released from their sentences even before they reached the airport to return to their home country. Calling them murderers, he remarked in a tone of disbelief that they were welcomed home by the Bulgarian President himself. Qadhafi emphasized that if Megrahi was released, neither he nor any other Libyan official could control the manner in which the

TRIPOLI 00000662 002.2 OF 002

Libyan people reacted. "They could even demonstrate against me," he said. Lieberman noted Qadhafi's views but stressed that he hoped the two sides could manage this issue. Qadhafi ended the conversation by stating that "we have to accept the challenge and face it."

CODEL PRESS STATEMENT

¶5. (SBU) The CODEL later echoed these remarks in its August 14 press availability. (Note: The CODEL's written statement, delivered by Senator McCain, was sent by email to NEA/MAG and NEA/PPD. End note.) In his remarks, Senator Lieberman further underscored the Megrahi message, noting that this "possibly could be the first crisis in our bilateral relationship." He had prefaced this statement with very positive comments about the bilateral relationship that praised Libya's decision to abandon its WMD programs, highlighted ongoing cooperation, and expressed hope for the possibility of expanded security cooperation.

COMMENT

¶6. (C) Comment: To the best of our collective knowledge, this is the first time that any U.S. official has raised Megrahi's potential release with Muammar al-Qadhafi. Senior MFA contacts had strongly urged CDA to encourage the CODEL not to raise the issue with Qadhafi, arguing that the issue was extremely sensitive and could have negative repercussions for the relationship. (Note: We had advised the CODEL that this was indeed a sensitive issue, but that it was entirely their call as to whether and how to raise the issue. End note.) Judging from his body language, Qadhafi did not appear to take any immediate offense to the discussion, and the meeting continued for another 10-15 minutes without any discernable change in tone.

¶7. (C) Comment continued: Both Qadhafis seemed to appreciate the need for the CODEL to share the views of the American people, and made it clear that Libya's response to any potential Megrahi release would in turn be determined by the Libyan people. Left unspoken, of course, was the huge role that the Libyan Government plays in orchestrating popular opinion and churning out the masses for public rallies. We believe the CODEL's message was very helpful to our goal of laying down the marker for a measured GOL response to Megrahi's release, and it could be a useful buildling block for any future messages from the Department.

¶8. (U) CODEL McCain did not have the opportunity to clear this message prior to departure.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI663

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI663 aka Wikileaks id #220992 ?
Subject	CONFLICTING MESSAGES ON PENDING RELEASE OF ABDEL BASSETT AL-MEGRAHI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 16 Aug 2009 15:40 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI663.html
References	09TRIPOLI662
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI685
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Publication withdrawn • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO3710
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0663/01 2281540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 161540Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5161
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1122
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0795
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0564
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5702
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000663

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE, H, AND L

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/16/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CONFLICTING MESSAGES ON PENDING RELEASE OF ABDEL BASSETT AL-MEGRAHI

REF: TRIPOLI 662

TRIPOLI 00000663 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa told the British Ambassador August 15 that convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al Megrahi is a very ill man, too ill for anything but a quiet return to his family. While the British Ambassador, who had raised the Megrahi case on instructions from London, was

who had raised the Megrahi case on instructions from London, was encouraged by Kusa's comments, he also noted that only one man -- Muammar al-Qadhafi -- would decide Megrahi's true reception in Libya. Building on Qadhafi's comments to CODEL McCain (ref), the Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF) told us August 16 that the Libyan Government "as a democracy" could not control any spontaneous demonstrations by the people in support of Megrahi's return. The Libyan Government may be gearing up for a two-pronged approach on Megrahi's return: an official policy of no celebrations, coupled with a disingenuous denial of any involvement in "spontaneous" celebrations that could erupt upon Megrahi's return. It may be useful to engage Foreign Minister Musa Kusa on this issue. End summary.

UK AMBASSADOR: MUSA KUSA INDICATES A QUIET RETURN

¶2. (C) UK Ambassador Sir Vincent Fean told the Charge August 15 that he had met Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa earlier on the same day, on instructions from London, to discuss the potential release from a Scottish prison of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al Megrahi. Stressing that he had addressed the issue as a hypothetical scenario, Fean said that he had urged the Libyan Government to handle Megrahi's possible release in a very low-profile manner. According to Fean, Kusa responded that Megrahi is a very sick man, and is too ill for anything but a quiet return to his family. While the British Ambassador interpreted Kusa's response as positive, he also noted that only one man -- Muammar al-Qadhafi -- would determine Megrahi's true reception in Libya. He expects to receive a personal letter from Prime Minister Gordon Brown to Qadhafi on this issue, for delivery this week.

¶3. (C) The British Ambassador expressed relief that Megrahi likely would be returned to Libya under the compassionate release program. He noted that a refusal of Megrahi's request could have had disastrous implications for British interests in Libya. "They could have cut us off at the knees, just like the Swiss," Fean bluntly said. He also expressed hope that the Megrahi issue would not have a negative impact on U.S.-UK relations, commenting that "we have lots of other issues on the agenda right now." The Ambassador stressed that he had no further information on timing for Megrahi's possible release but said that he expected a decision "soon."

QADHAFI FOUNDATION: THE PEOPLE WILL DECIDE HOW MEGRAHI IS RECEIVED

¶4. (C) During an August 16 meeting, QDF Executive Director Yusuf Sawani passionately argued on behalf of Megrahi's right to receive compassionate release from the Scottish judicial system. Stating that "everyone in Libya was more than surprised by the official USG reaction on the issue," he argued that the United States, as a civilized, democratic nation, should not stand in the way of an official decision made by the Scottish judicial system. He described the U.S. justice system as infamous for making mistakes and jailing innocent people but emphasized that even convicted criminals were entitled to certain rights within the U.S. legal system. Referring to CODEL McCain's recent press statements, he said that he understood that U.S. congressmen must respond to the positions of their constituencies, but he did not understand why members of the U.S. Administration would object to Megrahi's release on compassionate grounds. He accused the U.S. Administration of attempting to interfere politically with the Scottish judicial system, in an effort to exact "revenge" on Megrahi for his crimes.

¶5. (C) The Charge reminded Sawani that the U.S. position remained unchanged: while we will not interfere in the Scottish procedures, we continue to believe that Megrahi should serve out the remainder of his life sentence in a Scottish prison. Noting that the repatriation of Megrahi was recently unveiled by the QDF as one of its three priority objectives, the Charge strongly

urged Sawani and the QDF to treat Megrahi's potential return in a low-key manner. Sawani expressed agreement that the official Libyan Government response to a Megrahi release should be quiet, but he insisted that the Libyan people would ultimately decide how to react to Megrahi's return. Although he denied that the QDF would play any role in organizing any demonstrations in support of Megrahi, Sawani asked heatedly whether the U.S. would demand that the Libyan Government set up barricades and send

TRIPOLI 00000663 002.2 OF 002

police to quell demonstrations in honor of Megrahi's return. "No one can object to Libyans expressing their feelings if Megrahi comes back," he said, "this is democracy." Sawani warned that U.S. objections to Megrahi's release would resurrect Libyans' former views of the U.S. as a "tyrant nation," to which the Charge responded that a hero's welcome for Megrahi undoubtedly would elicit a similarly strong reaction among the American people. Sawani conceded that it would be important for both sides to carefully manage this extremely sensitive issue.

¶6. (C) Comment: Based on comments from Kusa and Sawani, the Libyan Government may be gearing up for a two-pronged approach on Megrahi's return: an official policy of no celebrations, coupled with a disingenuous denial of any involvement in "spontaneous" celebrations that could erupt upon Megrahi's return. The latter scenario makes sense in the context of Muammar and Muatassim al-Qadhafi's comments to CODEL McCain that the GOL could not prevent the Libyan people from giving Megrahi a hero's welcome (ref). Given Foreign Minister Musa Kusa's pragmatic understanding of the broader strategic interests at stake, it may be useful to engage him on this issue. End comment POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- WikiLeaks cables: Lockerbie bomber freed after Gaddafi's 'thuggish' threats | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI674

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI674 aka Wikileaks id #221258 ?
Subject	LIBYA INDICATES READINESS TO SIGN NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 18 Aug 2009 13:18 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI674.html
References	09TRIPOLI621
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI677 , 09TRIPOLI696
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5213
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0674 2301318
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 181318Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5170
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1124
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0797
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0566
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0084
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0071
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5714
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000674

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/NESS; DOE-M FOR M. TSIKLAURI

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA INDICATES READINESS TO SIGN NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL AGREEMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 621

¶1. (SBU) MFA Secretary of the Americas Department, Ahmed Fituri, told Charge August 17 that Libya was ready to sign the government-to-government agreement on spent nuclear fuel (highly enriched uranium-low enriched uranium). However, Fituri said the MFA was unsure which agreement to sign and requested the latest versions in English and Arabic. Post has provided the Libyan Government with an English translation of the mutually-acceptable version of the agreement and is working with

mutually acceptable version of the agreement and is working with the Department of Energy to obtain another official Arabic translation of the agreement for the MFA.

¶2. (SBU) As a sign that Libya is ready to move forward on the final steps of the agreement, the MFA renewed visas for the two DOE technical experts who are leading U.S. cooperation on the nuclear spent fuel project with Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment. The DOE experts will travel to Libya next week to conduct final preparations of Libya's nuclear spent fuel for shipment to Russia for treatment and disposal.

¶3. (SBU) Post will continue to report on Libya's progress in transferring its nuclear spent fuel to Russia by the September 2009 deadline. Department's assistance in obtaining an official Arabic language translation of the agreement would be greatly appreciated.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI677

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI677 aka Wikileaks id #221439 ?
Subject	CODEL MCCAIN MEETS MUAMMAR AND MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 19 Aug 2009 15:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI677.html
References	09TRIPOLI648 , 09TRIPOLI662 , 09TRIPOLI674
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI748
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO6358
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0677/01 2311536
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 191536Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5173
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1125
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0798
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0567
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5717
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000677

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/19/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PINS *[National Security]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CODEL MCCAIN MEETS MUAMMAR AND MUATASSIM AL-QADHAFI

REF: A. TRIPOLI 662 ; B. TRIPOLI 674 ; C. STATE 43049; D. TRIPOLI 648

TRIPOLI 00000677 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) CODEL McCain discussed security, counterterrorism, and civil-nuclear cooperation during August 14 meetings with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his son, National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, stressing the need for Libya to fulfill

Muatassim al-Qadhafi, stressing the need for Libya to fulfill its WMD-related commitments and to approve a Section 505 end-user agreement in order to move forward on bilateral military and civil-nuclear engagement. While Muatassim al-Qadhafi reiterated long-standing Libyan requests for security assurances from the United States and emphasized Libya's interest in the purchase of U.S. lethal and non-lethal military equipment, Muammar al-Qadhafi was notably silent on these subjects. The elder Qadhafi made a point of expressing his satisfaction with the improved U.S relationship and his hope that the relationship would continue to flourish. CODEL McCain's discussion of the Megrahi case was reported ref A. End summary.

THE MEETING

¶2. (SBU) CODEL McCain (R-Az), including Senator Joe Lieberman (I-CT), Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC), Senator Susan Collins (R-SC) and Senate Armed Services Committee Staffer Richard Fontaine held back-to-back meetings August 14 with Libyan National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi and Libyan leader Muammar Al-Qadhafi. Libyan officials NSC Director Dr. Hend Siala, MFA Department of Americas Secretary Ahmed Fituri and MFA Office of Americas Director Mohamed Matari also attended the meetings, as did Charge and Pol/Econ Chief (notetaker).

MUATASSIM MEETING SECURITY FOCUSED

¶3. (C) Characterizing the overall pace of the bilateral relationship as excellent, CODEL McCain opened its August 14 meeting with National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi by noting the drastic change that the relationship had undergone over the last five years. "We never would have guessed ten years ago that we would be sitting in Tripoli, being welcomed by a son of Muammar al-Qadhafi," remarked Senator Lieberman. He stated that the situation demonstrated that change is possible and expressed appreciation that Libya had kept its promises to give up its WMD program and renounce terrorism. Lieberman called Libya an important ally in the war on terrorism, noting that common enemies sometimes make better friends. The Senators recognized Libya's cooperation on counterterrorism and conveyed that it was in the interest of both countries to make the relationship stronger. They encouraged Libya to sign the Highly Enriched Uranium transfer agreement by August 15 in order to fulfill its obligation to transfer its nuclear spent fuel to Russia for treatment and disposal. [Note: The Libyan Government subsequently informed us of its intent to sign the agreement on August 17 and has begun taking good-faith steps to do so (ref B). End note.]

¶4. (C) Muatassim welcomed the high-level visit, describing it as a good sign for the relationship - a relationship that Libya wants to develop. He explained to the Senators the recent requests that the National Security Council had made to procure defense equipment. He stated that there were three categories of requests: one which was approved by the USG, another which awaited congressional approval, and a third which waited USG agreement. He reiterated the refrain he conveyed to Secretary Clinton during his April visit (ref C) -- Libya has not been adequately rewarded for its decision to give up WMD and needed some sort of security assurance from the United States. He emphasized the need for Libya to purchase U.S. non-lethal equipment in order to enhance its defense posture. Muatassim requested the "highest level of help possible" to obtain military supplies, including mobile hospitals and uniforms. He also requested assistance with upgrading Libya's equipment, including helicopters. "We can get [equipment] from Russia or China, but we want to get it from you as a symbol of faith from the United States," he said. He described the security threats that Libya could possibly face as a result of its geography - "There are 60 million Algerians to the West, 80 million Egyptians to the East, we have Europe in front of us, and we face Sub-Saharan Africa with its problems to the South."

Muatassim stressed that Libya wanted security assurances from the United States as a sign that the United States was still committed to Libya. He pledged to work with the MFA on approval of the Section 505 end user agreement, as well as the signing of the nuclear spent fuel (highly enriched uranium-low enriched uranium) transfer agreement.

¶5. (C) Senator McCain assured Muatassim that the United States wanted to provide Libya with the equipment it needs for its

security. He stated that he understood Libya's requests regarding the rehabilitation of its eight C130s (ref D) and pledged to see what he could do to move things forward in Congress. He encouraged Muatassim to keep in mind the long-term perspective of bilateral security engagement and to remember that small obstacles will emerge from time to time that can be overcome. He described the bilateral military relationship as strong and pointed to Libyan officer training at U.S. Command, Staff, and War colleges as some of the best programs for Libyan military participation.

ELDER QADHAFI QUIETLY LISTENS

¶6. (C) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, who joined the group in the same tent in which Muatassim had met the CODEL, likewise highlighted the strength of the U.S.-Libya relationship. Qadhafi commented that friendship was better for the people of both countries and expressed his desire to see the relationship flourish. He thanked the Senators for their visit and described America as a race rather than a nationality, explaining that many Libyans are dual citizens because they were born in the United States. Senators McCain and Graham conveyed the U.S. interest in continuing the progress of the bilateral relationship and pledged to try to resolve the C130 issue with Congress and Defense Secretary Gates. The Senators expressed appreciation for Libya's counterterrorism cooperation in the region. They urged Libya to fulfill the remainder of its WMD commitments. Senator Graham reiterated the need for improved U.S. Embassy security and urged Qadhafi to approve the site for a New Embassy Compound (NEC) as a way to fortify the relationship. Qadhafi remained quiet throughout the discussion and did not respond specifically to any of the issues with the exception of Megrahi (ref A). He indicated that the National Security Council would be charged with addressing the security-related issues.

COMMENT

¶7. (C) CODEL McCain's meetings with Muammar and Muatassim al-Qadhafi were positive, highlighting the progress that has been made in the bilateral relationship. The meetings also reiterated Libya's desire for enhanced security cooperation, increased assistance in the procurement of defense equipment, and resolution to the C130s issue. Although Muatassim al-Qadhafi repeated Libya's familiar complaint that it has not received enough recognition and support in exchange for its decision to abandon its WMD programs, Muammar al-Qadhafi was notably silent on this issue. Qadhafi's silence on these issues may have been part of his reaction to the CODEL's discussion of the pending release of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (ref A), an issue that reportedly is of great personal concern to Qadhafi.

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

¶8. (C) Senior Libyan officials confided that the CODEL's meeting with Qadhafi took place so late in the evening (nearly 11 pm) because the Leader had been fasting and usually takes a nap after breaking his fast. The Libyan officials told us that

Qadhafi often fasts on Mondays and Thursdays and is doing so now, in the run up to the holy month of Ramadan. Qadhafi appeared as if he had been roused from a deep slumber for the meeting. He showed up with rumpled hair and puffy eyes, and was casually dressed in a short-sleeved shirt patterned with the continent of Africa, wrinkled pants and slip-on shoes. In spite of his appearance, Qadhafi was lucid and engaged throughout the meeting. Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on the other hand, revealed his lack of strategic depth throughout the meeting, referring to "the 52 countries of America -- or is that Africa?" and asking MFA officials to clarlify Libya's role in the upcoming UN General Assembly.

¶9. (C) Muatassim conducted his meeting in English, while his father used an interpreter for his meeting. The elder Qadhafi appeared to understand some of the CODEL's English-language remarks and offered a few comments in English.

¶10. (U) CODEL McCain did not have the opportunity to clear this message prior to departure.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- WikiLeaks cables show Graham as senator-diplomat | McClatchy
- Blueprint for Libya: Wikileaks Reveals the Long Plan
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI678

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI678 aka Wikileaks id #221561 ?
Subject	QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION LAYS OUT GOALS, BUT SAIF TO REMAIN OFFICIALLY OUTSIDE OF POLITICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 20 Aug 2009 10:22 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI678.html
References	08TRIPOLI679 , 09TRIPOLI487 , 09TRIPOLI679
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI955
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6968
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0678/01 2321022
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 201022Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5175
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1127
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0800
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0569
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0177
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5719
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000678

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, DRL/NESCA (KARI JOHNSTONE), PM/RSAT (MIKE MILLER), L (ROBERT HARRIS),
AND INR

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/20/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PINR
[Intelligence] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI DEVELOPMENT FOUNDATION LAYS OUT GOALS, BUT SAIF TO
REMAIN OFFICIALLY OUTSIDE OF POLITICS

REF: A. Tripoli 487  ; B. State 129000; C. 08 Tripoli 679

TRIPOLI 00000678  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b) , (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary. Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation Executive Director Yusuf Sawani discussed with the Charge and Pol/Econ Chief the foundation's human rights work, its overall workplan, and preparations for its annual youth rally August 20. He stated unequivocally that Saif would not attend the youth rally, but noted that he may broadcast remarks via satellite from Europe. [Note: Other reporting indicates that Saif does/does plan to return to Tripoli around August 20.] He confirmed that Saif al-Islam's new satellite TV station, "Al Mutawasat/The Mediterranean," would begin broadcasting from the UK on August 20. Sawani claimed not to know whether Saif planned to return to Tripoli for the 40th anniversary of his father's coup and insisted that that although Saif was involved in the government's "rehabilitation" efforts of Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members, he would continue to operate outside of the official political sphere. Sawani did not comment on Saif's recent 1.5 million pound sterling donation to the Center for the Study of Global Governance at the London School of Economics. Sawani's comments on Saif's interest in repatriating Abdel Basset al-Megrahi were reported in ref A. End Summary.

¶2. (C) In an August 16 meeting with Charge and Pol/Econ Chief, Yusuf Sawani, the Executive Director of Saif al-Islam's Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), commended the U.S. initiative to launch a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue, noting that Saif had recommended during his November 2008 visit to Washington the establishment of a joint commission to investigate and report on bilateral human rights issues (ref B). Sawani said that Saif thought it was necessary to orient the Libyan Government toward areas where it should focus its attention, including human rights, via direct discussions between the nations. Sawani thought the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue would be a valuable mechanism for minimizing areas of disagreement and encouraging transparency within the relationship.

¶3. (C) Regarding the recent statement of objectives that QDF distributed the week of August 10, Sawani noted that the three issue areas highlighted in the statement were ongoing projects for the Foundation that it intended to bring to completion in the short-term. Those areas include: work to complete compensation payments to families of those killed in the Abu Salim prison riots; assistance to families affected by Libya's participation in Chad's civil war and demining efforts in Chad; and work on the release and repatriation of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (ref A). Sawani set a deadline of June 2010 for completion of compensation payments to families of those killed at Abu Salim prison. Noting that demonstrations still take place at the prison site, he explained that QDF was working to obtain government permission to demolish the prison in order for resolution to be achieved. Similarly, he said that QDF wanted the government to be involved and do more to push forward QDF's efforts in Chad. QDF will establish a new charitable organization to lead its efforts to provide social services -- basic health services, education, clean water -- to the hundreds of Libyan families affected by Libya's involvement in the Chadian civil war (i.e., the families of Libyan soldiers who died for the cause). He stated that the GOL had designated an office within the Ministry of Defense to address the needs of the Libyan families, which he called corrupt and incompetent. Through the QDF affiliate "Demining Society," the Foundation also plans to continue to support demining efforts in Chad. Sawani noted that work had already been done in the valley of Ojanga and will continue in the Wadi Edoom valley.

¶4. (S/NF) Sawani was notably reticent in response to our inquiries about plans for QDF's annual youth rally. He said that Saif would not return to Libya to speak at the August 20 rally, as he was busy vacationing in London or Vienna (Sawani claimed not to know) and also was preoccupied with his new (undefined) role at the Center for Global Governance at the London School of Economics. [Note: Other reporting and Embassy

political and economic contacts with independent relations to QDF have indicated that Saif will return to Libya on/around August 20. End Note.] Sawani agreed with local reports estimating that 100,000 youth are expected to attend the QDF youth rally. He confirmed that the rally will take place in Tripoli. The opening of youth day will also coincide with the launching of Saif's latest media channel - "Al Mutawasat/The Mediterranean," which will begin broadcasting from London August ¶20. Sawani mentioned that Saif may broadcast remarks via satellite, perhaps using his new television channel -- or

TRIPOLI 00000678 002.2 OF 002

perhaps not -- to deliver his annual message to Libya's youth. He said the youth rally program would include distribution of gifts, such as computers, to attendees. When asked whether Saif would return for the 40th anniversary of his father's revolution, Sawani claimed not to know. He took the opportunity to emphasize that Saif had no intention of returning to political life.

¶5. (C) Sawani willingly commented on recent press reports that Saif was working to reform the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and had succeeded in urging them to adopt a more moderate doctrine. Sawani said that QDF had provided reading and reference material to LIFG members being held in Libyan detention facilities, in order to teach them more moderate views of Islam. He said that Saif's work with the LIFG, coupled with the Leader's political backing, had succeeded in reforming the LIFG platform. The group produced a 400-page doctrine stating its revised goals and outlining a more moderate Islamic philosophy. Sawani noted that QDF had facilitated meetings between LIFG members and well-respected Islamic scholars such as Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali Asalabi. Sawani noted that the LIFG in Libya claimed never to have had ties to Al Qaeda networks. He affirmed that he had read press reports from UK and Switzerland-based LIFG networks announcing a severance of ties to Al Qaeda, although he claimed not to have further insight into those decisions.

¶6. (C) Comment: Although Saif al-Islam has claimed time and again that he is a non-political figure and will remain outside of politics, his recent moves to reform the LIFG, secure Megrahi's release, and work to compensate victims of the Abu Salim prison riots all appear to be political overtures. His status as a non-governmental entity may benefit his chances for succession, as he would take after his father's role as extra-governmental "Leader" of the people's Jamahiriya, and may therefore be in his best interest. His humanitarian agenda also lends him a good platform for dealing with the West and building relations with reform-minded individuals within Libya. While Saif has been steadily withdrawing from the public scene since last year's youth rally (ref C), a confluence of high-profile events - including the Megrahi release, the August 20 youth rally and launch of his new satellite television station, and the September 1 anniversary of the revolution - could throw him back into the spotlight. End Comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI679

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI679 aka Wikileaks id #221569 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING: AUGUST 20, 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:06 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI679.html
References	08TRIPOLI375
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI678
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7042
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0679 2321106
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 201106Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5177
INFO RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1129
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5721
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000679

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/20/2019
TAGS: ASEC [Security] , AMGT [Management Operations] , CASC [Assistance to Citizens] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI EMERGENCY ACTION COMMITTEE MEETING:  AUGUST 20,
2009

REF: TRIPOLI 375

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, Executive, Department of
State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) The Charge convened an Emergency Action Committee
(EAC) on August 20, 2009 at 0915 hours to review tripwires and
emergency planning procedures in light of the expected
announcement of the release and return to Libya of convicted Pan
Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett Al-Megrahi. The Charge, Acting
DCM/CONS, GRPO, CLO, MGT, DAO, PAO, FCS, RSO and POL/ECON
attended the meeting. The EAC reviewed the tripwires reported
reftel, and agreed that they were still valid.  While the EAC
agreed that one tripwire had been crossed (public USG opposition
to Megrahi's release), Megrahi's expected return to Libya
significantly lowered the security ramifications of the public
USG opposition.  However, the EAC expressed concern about the
strong, negative reaction we are hearing from some Libyan
Government officials about recent public USG statements
```

government officials about recent public USG statements regarding Megrahi's release. Although the Embassy has not detected any anti-American tone in local press coverage of the pending return, the EAC agreed that there is a possibility that Megrahi's return could spark some anti-American protests if/if the Libyan Government or people take umbrage at USG public statements. In order to ensure Embassy staff's safety, the EAC decided to release staff at 2:00 pm today. The Embassy did not link the early release to this issue, noting instead that this was being done in recognition of the Embassy staff's work on two recent high-level delegations and to allow the staff time to begin Ramadan preparations. Separately, the EAC agreed to draft a warden notice (for release after the public announcement) warning American citizens to be vigilant and avoid large crowds that could develop for a planned August 20 youth rally in Tripoli and in response to Megrahi's return. The EAC agreed to monitor events tonight and reconvene if needed on August 21.

¶2. (U) The EAC meeting ended at 0945.

¶3. (U) Point of contact for this cable is RSO Rob Kimbrough, email KimbroughRB@state.gov. or KimbroughRB2@state.sgov.gov or by cellular phone at 218-91-220-3095

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI68

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI68 aka Wikileaks id #189342 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 29 Jan 2009 09:00 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI68.html
References	08TRIPOLI227 , 08TRIPOLI36 , 08TRIPOLI481 , 08TRIPOLI515 , 08TRIPOLI530 , 08TRIPOLI896 , 08TRIPOLI936 , 08TRIPOLI994 , 09TRIPOLI17 , 09TRIPOLI227 , 09TRIPOLI37 , 09TRIPOLI896
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI192
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7810
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0068/01 0290900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 290900Z JAN 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4381
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4905
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000068

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (JOHNSON), INR/NESA (HOFSTATTER) AND S/P (BEHRMAN)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , KCOR *[Corruption and Anti-Corruption]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI: THE PHILOSOPHER-KING KEEPS HIS HAND IN

REF: A) TRIPOLI 37 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 994 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 0036 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 481 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 530 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 478 (NOTAL), F) 08 TRIPOLI 515 , G) 08 TRIPOLI 227 , H) 08 TRIPOLI 896 , I) 08 TRIPOLI 936 , J) TRIPOLI 0017

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Despite a carefully cultivated image as a philosopher-king with no formal title and persistent rumors that he is relinquishing day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an orchestrated succession by one of his sons, Muammar al-Qadhafi

orchestrated succession by one of his sons, Muammar al-Qadhafi remains intimately involved in the regime's most sensitive and critical portfolios. He has used an influential but obscure administrative entity to politically vet commercial contracts involving GOL funds and ensure that opportunities to extract rents from those contracts are distributed to key regime allies. In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues undermine the claim that he is an oracle above the fray. He personally briefed GOL officials before their discussion with U.S. counterparts on the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft Libya purchased in the 1970's, but never took delivery of because of deteriorating bilateral ties. He has taken a close interest in sensitive human rights cases, and appears to be the author of the regime's position on detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi and the GOL's heated response to Emboffs' request to visit a predominantly Berber town. Although he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also played an active role in the process of political-economic reform currently under discussion in Libya, to include personally selecting members of a committee reviewing a draft constitution and urging conservative regime elements not to oppose possible upcoming elections. Part of his involvement stems from the fact that the Jamahiriya system has few formal decisionmaking structures and opaque lines of authority. Another aspect is that Libya remains a kleptocracy in which the regime has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of tactical maneuvering has kept him in power for nearly 40 years; however, the unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based is ultimately limiting. Squaring the circle between an old guard whose livelihood depends on the status quo and a new, more predictable and transparent system in which a greater number of ordinary Libyans can productively participate is the key challenge facing al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The reality is that no potential successor currently enjoys sufficient credibility in his own right to maintain that delicate equilibrium and keep the project going of transforming (at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. In that regard, al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded cage and cannot yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even if he wants to. End summary.

BACKGROUND: REVOLUTIONARY TURNED SAGE

¶2. (C) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi has since the early 1990's sought to propagate his image as "Guide of the Revolution". While the de facto head of state, he holds no formal title or position, and has periodically made public remarks to the effect that while he is a sort of uber-political counselor to the revolution and its offshoot, the Jamahariya, he is not involved in day-to-day decisionmaking. Al-Qadhafi was part of a group of self-described Free Officers who staged a bloodless military coup on September 1, 1969, wresting power from King Idriss al-Sanussi, who was then on holiday in Ankara. Al-Qadhafi was appointed President of the Revolutionary Command Council on September 13, 1969. In March 1977, he announced that a new "Jamahiriya", described as "a state of the masses" would replace the Libyan Arab Republic. The new entity, officially titled the Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, theoretically allowed the people to govern directly through the General People's Congress, of which al-Qadhafi became Secretary General (Prime Minister-equivalent). In 1979, he resigned his positions and authored the Green Book, in which he articulated the "Third Universal Theory", which purports to be the logical corollary of (and improvement on) socialism and capitalism. In 1989, al-Qadhafi declared himself Guide of the Revolution and adopted the de facto role of head of state, but without formal portfolio or responsibilities. With the imposition of international sanctions in the early 1990's, al-Qadhafi largely withdrew from the media limelight, and only re-emerged in earnest after sanctions were lifted in 2003-2004. He has since

advocated various trans-national agendas, most recently for a proposed unified African government, and has cultivated the image of an international philosopher-king, a la Nelson Mandela or Vaclav Havel. On the margins of last year's Revolution Day festivities in Benghazi, a visiting group of African tribal leaders bestowed upon him the title "King of Kings", together with the requisite golden crown and scepter.

AL-QADHAFI: SHOW ME THE MONEY

¶3. (C) Notwithstanding his carefully cultivated image as a man of history above pettifogging details, a protege of Abuzeid Dorda, former Prime Minister and now the influential Chairman of the Housing and Infrastructure Board, recently told us that Muammar al-Qadhafi personally reviewed all contracts involving GOL funds that were worth more than USD 200 million and exercised a great deal of influence over which foreign companies were awarded contracts through the Committee for Oversight and Audit. The Committee for Oversight and Audit, known as the 'riqaba' committee, is a powerful GOL entity that reviews all contracts involving public funds, ostensibly to ensure that they are fairly awarded and consistent with Libyan law. In reality, after the contracts are approved at the level of the General People's Committees (ministry-equivalents) and, in the case of particularly large contracts, at the level of the General People's Congress (typically by the office of the Prime Minister-equivalent), the contracts are sent to the 'riqaba' committee for what amounts to political vetting.

¶4. (C) Al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee to ensure that political patronage is properly distributed, i.e., that GOL entities headed by regime loyalists administer particularly plum contracts, ensuring that they are well-positioned to extract rents from foreign companies. He also uses it to direct contracts to companies from countries with which he has good relations as a tangible symbol of goodwill, and to prevent large contracts from being awarded to companies from countries with which he has political issues. Several well-informed contacts have told us that when cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad were re-published in a Danish magazine in 2007, al-Qadhafi reached out through the 'riqaba' committee to direct that contracts for management of infrastructure projects worth tens of millions of dollars that had initially been awarded to two Danish firms be given to other companies. In addition, the 'riqaba' committe and Prime Minister's office acted swiftly to prevent imports of Danish goods (Danish butter only recently reappeared on the shelves after an absence of more than a year). More recently, al-Qadhafi has used the 'riqaba' committee, together with the office of the Prime Minister, to harass Swiss companies after the arrest in Geneva last July of his son, Hannibal al-Qadhafi, and the ensuing Swiss-Libyan contretemps. As reported ref B, Swiss companies were informed last December that they had to liquidate all their assets within a month. U.S. companies experienced a surge in harassment by the GOL, some of it reportedly directed personally by al-Qadhafi, in the wake of a decision by a U.S. judge in January 2008 to award roughly $6 billion in damages to families of seven Americans killed in Libya's 1989 bombing of a French-operated UTA passenger plane (ref C). (Note: The situation improved after a comprehensive U.S.-Libya claims agreement was signed in August 2008 and implemented in October 2008. End note.) Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, reportedly with the knowledge and at least tacit blessing of al-Qadhafi, has mounted a campaign through his office and the 'riqaba' committee against the Tripoli branch of U.K. department store Marks and Spencer as a means to harass longtime rival Husni Bey, a partner in the Tripoli branch.

¶5. (C) A well-connected Libyan national employed with a U.S. company operating here confirmed that al-Qadhafi is deeply involved in the work of the 'riqaba' committee. Although the nominal threshold for a contract to be reviewed by al-Qadhafi is

nominal threshold for a contract to be reviewed by al-Qadhafi is USD 200 million, the reality is that he reviews a large number of contracts of lesser value. Typically, al-Qadhafi focuses on contracts with foreign companies of particular concern, including the U.S., Britain, Russia, China, Italy, Egypt and Tunis. Our contact told us al-Qadhafi personally directed Abuzeid Dorda to reduce the number of infrastructure and development contracts awarded to Turkish companies for a raft of projects in December 2007 to avoid giving the impression that Libya favored "the Ottomans". Al-Qadhafi ignored Dorda's protest that the Turkish companies had submitted the most competitive bids and were best-qualifed, suggesting that political credentials count for at least as much as technical ability.

¶6. (C) In addition, our contact said the 'riqaba' committee's writ extends far beyond auditing and review and into actual project management and contract execution, which has ironically better allowed 'riqaba' members to extract rents and bribes. Its officials, most of whom are appointed for political loyalty rather than technical expertise (many are members of the Revolutionary Committees and/or relatives of senior regime figures), are not well-qualified to play such a role. Noting senior regime officials' "paranoia" about being "cheated" by foreign companies and the extreme sensitivity to pervasive rumors that senior regime elements are corrupt, our contact said an inordinate amount of time and energy is spent by foreign contractors justifying their expenses and operational decisions.

AL-QADHAFI AS POLITICAL BOSS

¶7. (C) In addition to his activist role in commercial affairs, al-Qadhafi's recent interventions in other high-profile issues undermine the claim that he is a remote seer. As reported ref D, a senior MFA interlocutor told us on the margins of a meeting last May to discuss the disposition of eight C-130H aircraft Libya purchased in the 1970's (but never took delivery of because of deteriorating bilateral ties), al-Qadhafi personally met with Libya's team to stress that any movement on resolving the issue must be contingent on securing USG guarantees that export licenses would be granted for those items. Al-Qadhafi was fully conversant with details of the case and was concerned that U.S.-Libya engagement on C-130's was a deliberate ruse or an issue on which the USG would ultimately be unable to deliver because of opposition from Congress, either of which would greatly embarrass the regime and strengthen the hand of conservative regime elements skeptical of re-engagement with the U.S. In December, a key contact told us that while other senior regime officials supported broader military-to-military cooperation with the U.S., al-Qadhafi was concerned about having large numbers of U.S. advisers and trainers present in uniform in Libya given that "evacuation" of U.S. forces from Libya in 1970 was seen as a key accomplishment of the regime.

8 (C) Al-Qadhafi also actively follows sensitive human rights issues. In March, a request for GOL assistance in facilitating a visit by an Emboff to the predominantly Berber town of Zuwara prompted an angry demarche in which our interlocutor hotly denied that there was a Berber minority in Libya, decried the Embassy's "unacceptable interference" in Libya's domestic affairs and threatened Emboffs with physical harm if they visited the town (ref E). A key MFA interlocutor told us that only al-Qadhafi himself could have authored such a sharply worded message in official correspondence. As reported ref E, a senior regime official cautioned the Embassy in June against pushing too hard on the case of detained human rights activist Fathi el-Jahmi. Claiming that al-Qadhafi had personally authored the regime's policy on el-Jahmi, he made it clear that al-Qadhafi had closely tracked (and taken issue with) the Embassy's engagement with el-Jahmi's family and visits to him by P/E Chief. Later, a senior MFA interlocutor, citing a conversation with National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi

(Muammar al-Qadhafi's son), said Muammar al-Qadhafi was personally following el-Jahmi's case and was "upset" that the U.S. kept raising it (ref F). (Note: El-Jahmi's public criticism of al-Qadhafi and his stewardship of Libya prompted el-Jahmi's arrest. End note.)

¶9. (C) Although he has done so quietly, al-Qadhafi has also played an active role in the process of political-economic reform currently under discussion in Libya. In March 2008, he called for a program of radical privatization and government restructuring (ref G), and has since been actively involved in the debate about whether and how to implement his vision (ref H). Describing al-Qadhafi's decision to scale back privatization and government restructuring, the HIB's Dorda told us that " ... al-Qadhafi is a philosopher, but he is also responsible". More recently, well-informed contacts told us that al-Qadhafi quietly supported efforts by a special committee to develop a draft Libyan constitution, and had personally selected about half of the members of the committee (ref I). Al-Qadhafi has reportedly kept his role quiet to allow his son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to play a leading role in what could be a popular reform initiative and to afford himself maximum latitude to cajole reluctant old guard members into accepting it. At the end of a televised meeting on December 28 to discuss Libya's reaction to the commencement of Israeli military strikes against Gaza, al-Qadhafi instructed that television and recording equipment be switched off and announced to the assembled group of political, military and security officials that Libya was entering "a new political period" and would hold elections for "some key offices (NFI) soon" (ref J). Most recently, al-Qadhafi conducted a DVC with students at Georgetown University on January 21, in which he addressed a variety of domestic and international issues, and published an editorial in the New York Times on January 22. The editorial focused on al-Qadhafi's proposed single state "Isratine" solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

¶10. (C) Comment: Despite persistent rumors that he is in ill health and/or delegating day-to-day decisionmaking as part of an orchestrated succession by one of his sons (most bet it will be Saif al-Islam), al-Qadhafi remains actively involved in the regime's most sensitive and critical portfolios, and in many that are not obviously so important. Part of that is because the Jamahiriya system of which he is the original author features few formal decisionmaking structures and opaque lines of authority, placing a premium on personal fiefdoms and delicate relationships between regime figures who have been in power for decades. A further complication is the fact that Libya is a kleptocracy in which the regime - either the al-Qadhafi family itself or its close political allies - has a direct stake in anything worth buying, selling or owning. Referred to in Libyan parlance as "the politics of the black hand", it is the tried and true method of indulging - and even encouraging - corruption by favored regime officials, in part so that al-Qadhafi has a cudgel with which to beat them to help ensure their political loyalty. Al-Qadhafi's mastery of tactical maneuvering in what remains an essentially tribal society (with the attendant complication of family/clan ties) has allowed him to remain in power despite a notoriously fractious and inchoate body politic for nearly 40 years; however, the unholy alliance of corruption and cult-of-personality politics on which the system has been based is ultimately limiting. Senior members of the regime have made a handsome living by dint of political loyalty and a skill set - smuggling, bribes, extortion, and the more prosaic winning of contracts by virtue of connections alone - that are not as saleable or lucrative in a transparent economy in which the rule of law obtains. Squaring the circle between an old guard whose livelihood and political standing will be seriously impacted by proposed political-economic reforms and a new, more predictable and transparent system in which a greater number of ordinary Libyans can productively participate is the key challenge facing

al-Qadhafi in the autumn of his reign. The reality is that neither Saif al-Islam nor any other potential successor currently enjoys sufficient credibility and power in his own right to maintain that delicate balance and keep going the project of transforming (at least superficially) the Jamahiriya. In that regard, al-Qadhafi is the architect of his own gilded cage and cannot yet relinquish day-to-day decisionmaking, even if he wants to - and it is far from clear that he does. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI683

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI683 aka Wikileaks id #221608 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: ENCOURAGING A MEASURED RESPONSE TO MEGRAHI'S RELEASE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 20 Aug 2009 14:09 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI683.html
References	09STATE86640
Referenced by	09STATE88783
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO7217
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0683 2321409
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 201409Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5181
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1130
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0802
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0571
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5725
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000683

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/WE (NIMA ABBASZADEH), L/LEI (PETER GUTHERIE)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/20/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , UK [United Kingdom] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED:  ENCOURAGING A MEASURED RESPONSE TO
MEGRAHI'S RELEASE

REF: STATE 86640

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S) Summary:  Charge delivered reftel demarche regarding the
release of Abdel Basset al Megrahi to Foreign Minister Musa Kusa
on August 20, concurrent with the Scottish Executive's
announcement of the decision.  Kusa, who listened attentively to
our message, assured the Charge that Megrahi would be met at the
airport only by his family and that the reception would be
low-key.  Emphasizing that the U.S. is concerned not only with
Megrahi's reception today but also with the way he will be
```

Megrahi's reception today but also with the way he will be treated in the future, Charge underscored our request that Libya enforce the terms of Megrahi's life sentence. Kusa responded that this was not part of the Scottish decision but that he "would see about it." Separately, the UK Ambassador informed us that he had passed a similar message urging restraint to Libyan External Security Organization Director Dorda, and was seeking a meeting with Muammar Qadhafi to deliver a personal letter from PM Gordon Brown, also urging restraint. End Summary.

¶2. (S) Charge (accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, notetaker) delivered ref points to Foreign Minister Musa Kusa at 1410 local time, just as the Scottish Executive was announcing its decision to release Abdel Basset al Megrahi from prison. After listening attentively, Kusa responded that Megrahi would be met at the airport only by his family in a low-profile manner. Charge emphasized that the U.S. was concerned not only with Megrahi's reception today but the way he would be treated in Libya today, tomorrow, and for the rest of his life. Charge underscored that we are asking the Libyan Government to enforce the terms of Megrahi's life sentence by ensuring that he remain in prison or under house arrest. Kusa, who raised his eyebrows at this point and did not look happy when it was repeated, responded that this was not part of the Scottish decision but that he "would see about it."
Kusa agreed that the issue of Megrahi's return was very serious for the bilateral relationship and that both sides should work to ensure that it did not jeopardize the progress made thus far.

¶3. (C) Separately, UK Ambassador to Libya Vicent Fean told Charge August 20 that a team of at least three Libyan officials - MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Obeidi, Qadhafi's translator and personal aide Fuad Zlitny, and Libya's Charge d'Affaires in London - was in Scotland preparing for Megrahi's return to Libya. Fean expects the plane carrying Megrahi will depart Scotland at 1500 Tripoli time, arriving around 2000. Fean told the Charge that he had a personal letter from PM Gordon Brown to Muammar Qadhafi, urging restraint on Megrahi's return and that he was seeking a meeting with Qadhafi today to deliver the letter. Fean planned to convey the same message to External Security Organization Director Abuzaid Dorda, with whom Fean coincidentally had a previously scheduled meeting. Fean noted that FM David Miliband planned to call Kusa with a similar message.

¶4. (S) Comment: Kusa took time for this meeting out of what appeared to be a very busy day, receiving us in the Prime Minister's office and bumping us ahead of a gaggle of waiting officials. He seemed to take our message seriously, and nodded in agreement with the points about the importance of this issue to the bilateral relationship. In our view, Kusa genuinely understands and appreciates the sensitivity and importance of this issue, but Qadhafi will be the ultimate decision maker on Megrahi's role in Libya after his return. We continue to monitor the situation. End Comment.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI684

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI684 aka Wikileaks id #221620 ?
Subject	MEDIA REACTION: RELEASE OF PAN AM 103 BOMBER MEGRAHI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 20 Aug 2009 14:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI684.html
References	09TRIPOLI660 , 09TRIPOLI662
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7254
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0684 2321433
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 201433Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5182
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1131
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0803
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0572
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5726
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000684

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, EUR/WE (NIMA ABBASZADEH), L/LEI (PETER GUTHERIE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/20/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KMDR *[Media Reaction Reporting]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MEDIA REACTION: RELEASE OF PAN AM 103 BOMBER MEGRAHI

REF: A. Tripoli 662 ; B. Tripoli 660

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's state-run media outlets are reporting that convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al Megrahi is expected to be released today, Thursday, August 20, from a Scottish prison on medical grounds. Libya's most widely distributed print publication, "Oya" features an article in which a cancer specialist who visited Megrahi called for his return to Libya. English newspaper "The Tripoli Post" features a human interest story on Megrahi's mother as a front page article. Local press have not reported on the official U.S.

position against Megrahi's release and have not republished articles from Western media outlets that predict a negative U.S. reaction. Internet commentary from Libyan readers to international web press reports is generally supportive of Megrahi's release. Post has received no indication that the local response to Megrahi's release will be anti-American. End Summary.

¶2. (U) Local state-run media outlets, including "Libya Al Youm" and "Libya Watanona" are reporting on the impending release of Megrahi in a factual manner, without commentary or specification of the U.S. response to the Scottish decision. Print outlet "Oya" featured an article that quotes a cancer specialist as calling for Megrahi's release on medical grounds after having examining him.

¶3. (U) Libya's weekly-printed English language newspaper, "The Tripoli Post," features a front-page article profiling Megrahi's 95 year-old mother, entitled "Al Megrahi Calls Mother Who Says She Keeps Door Open, Expecting Him to Enter at Any Time." The article describes his mother, Hajja Fatma, as "frail but upbeat," and explains that her family thinks it best for her health not to tell her that Megrahi's condition is terminal. In the article she explains that she never locks her door in hopes that her son will return home after his ten year absence.

¶4. (U) Internet commentary from Libyan citizens in response to a UK press article on Megrahi's release primarily reflects support for the decision, although one reader called on Libya to take action to release prisoners of conscience. Several readers expressed religious praise for Megrahi's release, while others called the conviction of Megrahi "political" and a "conspiracy." One reader described his release as confirmation of his innocence.

¶5. (C) Comment: While "The Tripoli Post" article created a human interest story out of the experience of Megrahi's mother, other local media outlets continue to report factually on the matter and have neither reprinted nor commented on any international opinions about Megrahi's release. "The Tripoli Post" article will likely engender sympathy among readers for Megrahi's ill condition and that of his mother, although the Libyan web responses show that sympathy for Megrahi already exists among the local population. The characterization of Megrahi's conviction as "political" or conspiratorial corresponds to the dominant opinion on the Libyan street, as well as to the statements Qadhafi made to CODEL McCain on the issue (ref A). We have not seen any indications that the public response to Megrahi's return will be anti-American or anti-Western. We continue to monitor the situation. End Comment.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI685

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI685 aka Wikileaks id #221747 ?
Subject	MEGRAHI RETURNS TO LIBYA ACCOMPANIED BY SAIF AL-ISLAM QADHAFI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 21 Aug 2009 11:14 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI685.html
References	09TRIPOLI663
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI686 , 09TRIPOLI76 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO8105
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0685/01 2331114
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 211114Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5183
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1132
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0804
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0573
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5727
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000685

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/21/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ASEC *[Security]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MEGRAHI RETURNS TO LIBYA ACCOMPANIED BY SAIF AL-ISLAM QADHAFI

REF: TRIPOLI 663

TRIPOLI 00000685 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi returned home to a warm welcome at Tripoli's Mitiga Air Base August 20 at around 2045hrs. Accompanied by Qadhafi's son and potential successor, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Megrahi

son and potential successor, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, Megrahi appeared frail as he emerged from a private plane owned by quasi-independent Air Afriqiyah. Libyan Government representatives were notably absent from the homecoming and reportedly hastily removed a much larger throng of supporters following POTUS' statement critical of Megrahi's return. Although Libyan local press coverage of Megrahi's return was low-key, a concurrent huge youth rally in downtown Tripoli -- technically unrelated to Megrahi's return -- created the perception of a hero's welcome and certainly played to Qadhafi's own domestic equities. Megrahi appears to have gone directly from Metiga Air Base to his home, where he may have met Muammar Qadhafi. The Libyan Government has not publicly responded to POTUS' call for Megrahi to remain under house arrest. There was no indication of anti-American or anti-Western sentiment in the day's events. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi emerged from a private plane owned by Libya's quasi-independent Afriqiyah Airlines at Mitiga Air Base (former U.S. Wheelus Air Base), at 2045 local time on August 20, wearing a fez and a white traditional Libyan outfit. As he exited the plane, he supported Abdel Basset al-Megrahi, raising his hand and acknowledging Megrahi's family and a large crowd awaiting his arrival. The crowd of about 100 people, mostly men, hailed Megrahi's return and carried Libyan and Scottish flags and the ubiquitous press photo of a young Megrahi. Notably, Megrahi was not greeted by Libyan Government officials. In Saif's remarks to the press upon arrival, he noted "our efforts have succeeded," citing evidence of Megrahi's innocence, and thanking the Scottish Government for its courageous decision. The arrival coincided with a text message to all Libyana mobile phone network (one of two major carriers in Libya) subscribers announcing the "release of the national hero Megrahi," lauding him as the man who sacrificed himself so that Libya could have sanctions lifted. Saif's television station "Al Mutawassit" was the only Libyan channel given rights to broadcast Megrahi's return. [Note: Embassy sources report that local satellite networks did not carry the station, and only those with international satellite receivers were able to access the broadcast. End note.]

¶3. (C) An AP reporter who had been bussed into Metiga Air Base -- along with other international correspondents -- to cover Megrahi's return told us today that the Libyan Government appeared to have dramatically shifted gears for its planned welcome for Megrahi following POTUS' statement on Megrahi's return. The international press corps was held on a bus for more than three hours and not allowed access to the tarmac to cover the return. The AP reporter said that he observed the Libyan Government hastily removing "thousands" of people who had gathered to welcome Megrahi while the Libyan Government kept the plane closed and waiting on the tarmac for a more subdued welcome scene. The GOL reportedly limited the crowd to approximately 100-200 youth movement members (those seen on TV wearing matching shirts and hats). The AP reporter believes that the youth movement representatives were allowed to remain on the scene as a nod to Saif al-Islam's involvement in the return.

¶4. (C) At the same time Megrahi was landing at Metiga, a crowd of thousands of Libyan youth gathered on Green Square in the center of downtown Tripoli for the occasion of the "Fourth Annual Youth Movement," sponsored by the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), chaired by Saif al-Islam Qadhafi. Embassy contacts who attended the rally reported a heavy security presence and said that participants were expecting Saif to deliver remarks, as he does annually, at the event. Neither participants nor event organizers made linkages between the Megrahi release and the rally. Embassy contacts report that some participants did not realize that Megrahi had been released from prison. Attendees were not allowed to carry cell phones into the rally grounds and would not have received the "Libyana" message of Megrahi's release

until after the event. The event, for which crowds of youth began to gather at around 1900hrs, ended in an anti-climatic fashion at around 2300hrs, without the anticipated speech by Saif al-Islam. Independent website "Libya al-Youm" described Saif's absence as "strange," although QDF Director Sawani had told us August 16 that Saif al-Islam did not plan to attend the rally (reftel). In an August 21 telephone conversation with the Charge, QDF Executive Director Yusuf Sawani declined to comment

TRIPOLI 00000685 002.2 OF 002

on Saif's return to Libya with Megrahi or on the August 20 rally, telling us tersely and repeatedly that "everything that happened was televised."

¶5. (C) Although rumors are swirling that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi met Megrahi at some point after his return, we are not able to confirm these reports. The Libyan press reported that Qadhafi had been looking at economic projects in Sebha -- Megrahi's hometown -- on August 19, and Libyan Government officials told the UK Ambassador (who had been seeking a meeting with Qadhafi to deliver a message from PM Brown on this issue) that Qadhafi had not returned to Tripoli by 1830 local time on August 20. We assume that Qadhafi stayed in Sebha to greet Megrahi in his hometown but do not yet have any information to verify this assumption. Local press has not yet mentioned any interaction between Muammar Qadhafi and Megrahi.

¶6. (SBU) Local press did not report on the U.S. position to Megrahi's release or on President Obama's calls for Megrahi to remain under house arrest. Rather, state-owned television station "Al Jamahiriya" and Libyan news agency "JANA" reported that Libya was "crowned" by Megrahi's release and return home from Scotland. "JANA" noted that "the position of the Jamahiriya that al-Megrahi should be released since he was a political hostage has attracted widespread international support," citing statements made in the past by the Arab League, African Union, and the Non-Aligned Movement. Notably, Libyan state-owned television did not carry live coverage of Megrahi's return and covered the return only during late-night news broadcasts, well after the actual event.

¶7. (C) Comment: The Libyan Government appears to be trying to manage the optics of Megrahi's return for two different audiences: the U.S. and Libya's own domestic constituencies. By keeping Libyan Government officials away from Megrahi's return at Metiga Air Base, hastily removing the assembled throngs, and limiting live domestic coverage of the event, the GOL may believe and argue that it technically has stuck to its pledge that the welcome would be "low-key." Yet Saif al-Islam's role in Megrahi's return, coupled with the huge --albeit technically unrelated -- rally in downtown Tripoli, sends an undeniable message of Qadhafi family (and hence Libyan Government) involvement in and feting of Megrahi's return. Qadhafi may well have felt that this second message was important for his own domestic political considerations.

¶8. (C) Comment continued: As far as the Embassy is aware, Megrahi was transported directly to his home after his arrival. The government has not publicly responded to POTUS' call to maintain Megrahi under house arrest. As August 21 marks the first day of Ramadan, we suspect government officials will keep a low-profile during the day, although evening television programming -- widely watched during Ramadan -- may reveal more information about the Libyan Government's posture. We will continue to monitor and report on the situation. End Comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI686

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI686 aka Wikileaks id #221905 ?
Subject	QADHAFI PERSONALLY WELCOMES LOCKERBIE BOMBER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 23 Aug 2009 13:34 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI686.html
References	09TRIPOLI685
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI689
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 7 Dec 2010 21:30: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Publication withdrawn • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO9122
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0686/01 2351334
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 231334Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5185
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1134
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0806
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0575
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5729
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000686

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/23/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ASEC *[Security]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , KMDR *[Media Reaction Reporting]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: QADHAFI PERSONALLY WELCOMES LOCKERBIE BOMBER

REF: Tripoli 685

TRIPOLI 00000686 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi personally met and welcomed convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi

and welcomed convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi in the latter's home in Sebha August 21. In press statements, Qadhafi thanked the Scottish government for its "courage and independence" despite "unnecessary and unacceptable pressure," and criticized the reaction of the "other side" as "double standard politics," "encroachment," and "arrogance and contempt." Qadhafi's public, personal involvement will make it extremely difficult for more pragmatic Libyan officials to try to manage the fallout from the mishandling of Megrahi's return. Separately, the UK Ambassador categorically denied Saif al-Islam's claims that the UK agreed to Megrahi's return in exchange for business deals, and said the UK was reconsidering its representation at the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup September 1. End Summary.

MEGRAHI WELCOMED WITH A WARM EMBRACE

¶2. (SBU) Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi met convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al-Megrahi on August 21, in Megrahi's hometown of Sebha. [Note: Qadhafi had traveled to Sebha on August 19 to review some economic projects, and apparently stayed there until the August 21 meeting. End note.] The widely televised meeting, preceded by a warm embrace between Qadhafi and Megrahi, also included several poems expressing congratulations to Qadhafi on the 40th anniversary of the "Great al-Fatah Revolution," on the start of Ramadan, and for "the return home of brother, Abdel Basset al-Megrahi." Qadhafi delivered remarks to local and international press after his tete-a-tete with Megrahi, which he addressed to "friends" and "those who objected to these friends." Qadhafi thanked the Scottish Government, including the PM and FM, for their "courage," stating that they "have proven to be independent in spite of all unnecessary and unacceptable pressure they faced." He went on to thank his "friend Brown," the British Prime Minister, his government, Queen Elizabeth, and Prince Andrew, who "against all odds encouraged this brave decision." Qadhafi noted that the UK efforts would positively affect "exchange" between the two countries.

¶3. (SBU) Addressing "the other side," Qadhafi derided comments that the USG had made concerning the sensitivity of Megrahi's release to the families of Lockerbie victims, stating "Are we without feelings, and they have feelings? Are we donkeys and they are humans?" Qadhafi referred to the U.S. opposition to Megrahi's release as "double standard politics," calling it "encroachment" and "arrogance" and "contempt for other nations, their public opinion, and humanity." Qadhafi further stated that the U.S. position was responsible for injustice and terrorism. He said, "Terrorism has its justifications, which is double standard politics."

MEGRAHI'S RELEASE AND UK BUSINESS DEALS

¶4. (C/NF) On August 20 Qadhafi's son and potential successor to the throne, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi issued a statement through his quasi-governmental organization, the Qadhafi International and Charity Foundation, praising his own efforts and success in achieving Megrahi's release from prison. He thanked the Scottish and British governments and stated that the friendship between Libya and both nations would be "forever consolidated." Saif al-Islam went on to address the families of Lockerbie victims, saying that although Megrahi withdrew his appeal, his innocence would one day be proved. During Saif al-Islam's remarks to his new television station "Al Mutawassit" August 20, which were reprinted August 21 in state-owned newspaper "Oya," he linked Megrahi's release to UK business contracts, asserting that Megrahi's case was raised during all negotiations of UK-Libya commercial, oil, and gas deals. Saif al-Islam implied that former UK PM Tony Blair had raised Megrahi with the Libyan leader in connection with lucrative business deals during Blair's 2007 visit to Libya. [Note: Rumors that Blair made linkages between Megrahi's release and trade deals have been longstanding among Embassy contacts. End note.] The UK

Ambassador in Tripoli categorically denied the claims during a conversation with the Charge August 21. He also stated that the British government was reconsidering its decision to send Prince Andrew to September 1 events in Libya.

PREPARING FOR A GRANDER AFFAIR?

¶5. (C) While the Qadhafi family and government officials have not had any public interaction with or comment on Megrahi since

TRIPOLI 00000686 002.2 OF 002

the September 21 meeting, banners are being unfurled in Tripoli's Green Square - the site of the upcoming 40th anniversary celebrations - hailing Megrahi's homecoming and the Libyan leader's support of his release. Rumors among Embassy contacts suggest that Megrahi will be honored officially by Qadhafi during the 40th anniversary events. The state-run "Al Watan" website claimed that the Libyan People's Congress would award Megrahi a medal of honor for his "bravery and patience" in turning himself over to the "states of international arrogance" for the sake of his nation.

¶6. (C) Comment: Qadhafi's personal, warm welcome of Megrahi and strongly worded statement critical of U.S. opposition to Megrahi's release are a powerful indication of the importance that Qadhafi attaches to the issue. Qadhafi likely viewed Megrahi's return as vital to his own domestic politics: a boon to the influential Megrahi tribe and, more importantly, a major victory for the hardliners who have been critical of his engagement with the West. Qadhafi's very public, personal involvement in this issue will complicate the efforts of pragmatic Libyan officials seeking to manage the fallout from Megrahi's return, as they now have very little political cover to make the case for a muted response. We continue to monitor the situation. End Comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- WikiLeaks cables: Lockerbie bomber freed after Gaddafi's 'thuggish' threats | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI689

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI689 aka Wikileaks id #222216 ?
Subject	LIBYAN OFFICIALS "DISAPPOINTED" WITH MEGRAHI RECEPTION, WORKING BEHIND SCENES TO PREVENT SEPTEMBER 1 REPEAT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 25 Aug 2009 15:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI689.html
References	09TRIPOLI686
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI699
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO0650
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0689/01 2371517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 251517Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5189
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1136
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0808
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0577
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5733
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000689

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/25/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , UK [United Kingdom] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN OFFICIALS "DISAPPOINTED" WITH MEGRAHI RECEPTION,
WORKING BEHIND SCENES TO PREVENT SEPTEMBER 1 REPEAT

REF: TRIPOLI 686

TRIPOLI 00000689  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Libya Protocol Chief (and Qadhafi confidante)
Nuri al-Mismari told A/DCM August 24 that FM Musa Kusa,
A/S-equivalent for Europe Abdulati al-Obeidi and Qadhafi's
Security Chief Izzedine al-Hinshiri agreed that Abdel Basset
```

Security Chief Izzedine al-Hinshiri agreed that Abdel Basset al-Megrahi's high-profile reception in Libya had been a "big mistake" and had met the same day to discuss the ramifications. According to Mismari, Megrahi is not on the "seating chart" for the September 1 anniversary of Qadhafi's coup. Mismari pledged to work within Libyan Government channels to ensure this remains the case. Obeidi had a similar conversation with the UK Ambassador August 24, expressing surprise at Megrahi's reception and agreeing that it is "important to avoid anything that makes the situation worse." Based on a conversation between Saif al-Islam and "someone in London," the UK Ambassador believes he has "fairly strong" assurances that Megrahi will not be present at the September 1 festivities. Nevertheless, the UK Ambassador acknowledged that only Muammar al-Qadhafi would make the final decision on Megrahi's participation. We share his view. End summary.

CHIEF OF PROTOCOL DISAPPOINTED WITH MEGRAHI RECEPTION

¶2. (C) During an August 24 meeting with A/DCM to discuss visa issues, Nuri al-Mismari, the chief of Libyan Protocol (a ministerial-level position) and a close advisor to Qadafhi, launched into an unprompted 15-minute lament about "the trouble" resulting from Megrahi's release. Literally wringing his hands, Mismari noted that he "strongly disagreed" with Megrahi's reception in Libya and stressed that "if I had been here rather than traveling, this would have been handled differently." Commenting that he had just come from a 1.5 hour long interagency meeting on the topic of Megrahi, Mismari said that he, FM Musa Kusa, A/S-equivalent for European Affairs Abdulati al-Obeidi and former Minister of Interior and current head of Qadafhi's security Izzedine al-Hinshiri were all in agreement that Megrahi's reception had been a "big mistake," and were concerned about the international ramifications for Libya. Sighing deeply, Mismari mused that during his upcoming trip to New York for the UN General Assembly session, Qadafhi "could have had meetings with President Obama and many Congressmen, but now, I know that is impossible."

¶3. (C) A/DCM highlighted the negative USG reaction to Megrahi's release, reiterating the White House and Secretary's comments. Underscoring the President's public remarks about house arrest, she said Megrahi's presence at any upcoming September 1 celebrations would be highly problematic. Mismari, nodding in agreement opined, "Megrahi is a sick man, and it would be best if he was particularly sick, and bedridden, on September 1." He noted that he had reviewed the September 1 "seating chart" earlier in the day, and that Megrahi's name was not on it. Mismari said he did not know Megrahi well, and so did not feel he could personally reach out to him, but pledged to contact both Head of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi, who he asserted is from the same tribal confederation as Megrahi, as well as another unnamed MFA official who Megrahi's relative: "I will tell them to ask Megrahi not to request an invitation to any September 1 events, and that if he does receive an invite, for the good of the country, he must make the sacrifice and not attend." A/DCM inquired if recent Libyan press reports that Megrahi may receive a medal of honor from the Libyan People's Congress were correct (reftel). Mismari replied that he had not heard of any such plans, but grimacing and rolling his eyes upwards in an apparent reference to Qadafhi, remarked that "anything can happen, although inshallah, it will not."

SIMILAR MESSAGE FROM OBEIDI TO THE UK

¶4. (C) UK Ambassador Vincent Fean reported that he had a similar conversation with Obeidi on August 24. Fean had met with Obeidi on instructions from London, to express the UK's disappointment at Megrahi's reception and to urge the Libyan Government to avoid any further public activity for Megrahi. Fean said that Obeidi made no effort to defend Megrahi's reception but said that he and Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had been "surprised" by the scene at the airport. Obeidi told the UK Ambassador that

"enough is enough; it is important to avoid anything that will make the situation worse." Obeidi promised to convey this message to higher-level officials.

¶5. (C) Fean said the UK has "fairly strong" assurances that Megrahi will not be present at the September 1 festivities marking the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup. Both Prime Minister Al Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi

TRIPOLI 00000689 002.2 OF 002

had separately provided these assurances to the British Government: Al Bagdadi in response to UK PM Brown's letter to Qadhafi, and Saif al-Islam in a telephone conversation with "someone in London." Fean said that Saif al-Islam's pledge had been somewhat convoluted, as Saif al-Islam said simply: "If we need to say Megrahi will not be there, we will not contradict that." When pressed, Fean acknowledged that Al Baghdadi's assurances might also be less than ironclad, as he made them in the same conversation in which he had pledged that only Megrahi's family would greet him at the airport, a promise that clearly had not been kept. Fean also acknowledged that only Muammar al-Qadhafi would make the final decision on Megrahi's participation.

¶6. (C) Comment: Mismari, Kusa, Obeidi, and other officials who favor continued engagement with the West are savvy operators who fully appreciate the damage caused by Megrahi's high-profile reception. It is good to know that they are working to mitigate the effects and to prevent any further inappropriate gestures by the Libyan Government. We believe it would be useful to share with Kusa and his deputy Ahmed Fituri a frank assessment of current sentiment in the U.S., as well as the risks to continued engagement if Megrahi is feted on September 1. Yet while Kusa, Mismari and others play key advisory roles, only one man - Muammar al-Qadhafi - will make the decision on Megrahi's role on September 1. End Comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Wikileaks: Inside story of Megrahi's return home - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: John McCain: Senator issued warning over celebrations - Scotsman.com News
- Wikileaks: Moussa Koussa: Foreign minister held in esteem by US diplomats - Scotsman.com News
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI692

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI692 aka Wikileaks id #222349 ?
Subject	LIBYAN PROTOCOL CHIEF ON PLANS FOR SEPTEMBER 1, NEW YORK ACCOMMODATIONS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Aug 2009 11:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI692.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI157 , 09TRIPOLI695 , 09TRIPOLI699
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1351
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0692 2381118
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 261118Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5193
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1138
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0810
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0579
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5737
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000692

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/26/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ASEC *[Security]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , UK *[United Kingdom]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN PROTOCOL CHIEF ON PLANS FOR SEPTEMBER 1, NEW YORK ACCOMMODATIONS

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) In an August 26 meeting, Libyan Protocol Chief and Qadhafi confidante Nuri al-Mismari pressed A/DCM for information on who would "replace" the Secretary at Libya's September 1 celebration of the 40th anniversary of Muammar al-Qadhafi's coup. Mismari asserted that he had "made the Leader [Qadhafi] understand that Secretary Clinton not attending is not an insult, but please do not send just some low-level representative, as he will take that badly." Striking a conspiratorial tone, Mismari advised that the U.S. should send

"at least an assistant secretary or deputy" in order to "keep things on the right footing." A/DCM replied that the issue of USG representation was currently being discussed in Washington. [Note: We had transmitted the Department's letter to FM Kusa, declining the Secretary's invitation to the September 1 festivities, in an August 12 meeting with A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri. At that time, Fituri told us that he understood the Secretary's decision and commented that it would be better for senior officials to come at a different time, when there would be greater opportunities for substantive talks.]

¶2. (C) Mismari, raising the topic himself, noted that he was "fairly confident" that convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi would not be in attendance at the September 1 celebrations. "I think we have taken care of that issue," he said. Mismari also raised Qadhafi's accommodations during his upcoming visit to the US. Commenting that, "we fully understand that New Jersey is unworkable," he said the problem was now finding "appropriate" lodging in Manhattan, as Qadhafi "will not use elevators, and cannot walk up more than 35 stairs, so we must find a hotel that has a suite on the first floor."

¶3. (SBU) Mismari provided an Arabic copy of the official GOL schedule of events for September 1; Embassy's translation has been sent via unclassified e-mail to NEA/MAG.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI694

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI694 aka Wikileaks id #222407 ?
Subject	BILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE HAS DIFFICULT START
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 26 Aug 2009 15:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI694.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1697
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0694/01 2381525
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZFR
P R 261525Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5195
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1139
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0811
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0580
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5739
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000694

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, L (BOB HARRIS), DRL (KARI JOHNSTONE).  DEPT
PLEASE PASS TO NSC (SCOTT BUSBY) AND OVP (HERRO MUSTAFA).

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/26/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: BILATERAL HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE HAS DIFFICULT START

TRIPOLI 00000694  001.4 OF 005


PLEASE ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 IMI ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 AND ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS.  REFTEL WAS SENT IN ERROR.

TRIPOLI 00000694  002.4 OF 005


PLEASE ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 IMI ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 AND ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS.  REFTEL WAS SENT IN ERROR.

TRIPOLI 00000694  003.4 OF 005
```

PLEASE ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 IMI ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 AND ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS. REFTEL WAS SENT IN ERROR.

TRIPOLI 00000694 004.4 OF 005

PLEASE ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 IMI ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 AND ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS. REFTEL WAS SENT IN ERROR.

TRIPOLI 00000694 005.4 OF 005

PLEASE ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 IMI ZFR TRIPOLI 00694 AND ALL ASSOCIATED
MCNS. REFTEL WAS SENT IN ERROR.

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI695

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI695 aka Wikileaks id #222600 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MFA REQUESTS DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S PLANE, TAKES STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 27 Aug 2009 15:29 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI695.html
References	09TRIPOLI692
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI697
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO2570
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0695/01 2391529
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 271529Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5200
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1144
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0816
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0585
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0227
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5744
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000695

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/27/2029
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , OVIP [Visits and Travel of Prominent
Individuals and Leaders] , ABLD [Buildings and Grounds] , CVIS [Visas] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA REQUESTS DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S
PLANE, TAKES STEPS TO DEMONSTRATE COMMITMENT TO RELATIONSHIP

REF: TRIPOLI 692

TRIPOLI 00000695  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (U) This is an action request; see para 3.
```

¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 8.

¶2. (S) Summary: MFA A/S-equivalent Fituri convoked CDA August 27 to formally request that Muammar al-Qadhafi's Ifriqiyah Airways plane be granted full diplomatic clearance -- including privileges and immunities normally granted a head of state -- for Qadhafi's trip to the UNGA. CDA noted that this was not the only unresolved issue surrounding the trip, and urged the Libyan Government to find an appropriate solution to the Englewood house controversy and to ensure that Lockerbie bomber Megrahi was not featured in the September 1 festivities. Fituri said the MFA understood these issues and was working to ensure Qadhafi's inner circle did as well. Fituri also briefed CDA on GOL plans to demonstrate its commitment to the bilateral relationship: payment for the seven USG properties in Tripoli; approval of the uranium transfer agreement; approval of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement; approval of the Section 505 Agreement; progress on the visas working group; and approval of land to build a New Embassy Compound. We have seen progress on some of these issues in recent days. While it is reassuring that the MFA understands the negative impact of Megrahi's reception and is actively working to address the damage, Fituri also seemed painfully aware that Qadhafi's personal whims could scuttle the MFA's efforts. He seemed to want quick resolution of the Ifriqiyah plane issue for this reason, and also emphasized that a U.S. presence on September 1 would be an important sign of our continued commitment to the relationship . End summary.

QADHAFI'S PLANE

¶3. (SBU) MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri convoked CDA August 27 to deliver a diplomatic note formally requesting that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's Ifriqiyah Airways plane be granted full diplomatic clearance -- including privileges and immunities -- for Qadhafi's upcoming trip to New York for the UNGA. Citing Libyan Ambassador Aujali's August 25 meeting with Department officials, Fituri said the Libyan Government is concerned that Ifriqiyah is not registered with U.S. civil aviation authorities. The Libyan Government, Fituri said, believes that the Ifriqiyah plane needs full diplomatic privileges and immunities, and should have "the same status as any other head of state." Charge promised to convey the message to Washington. (Informal embassy translation of the note was emailed to NEA/MAG.)

ENGLEWOOD HOUSE

¶4. (S) CDA noted that the Ifriqiyah plane was not the only unresolved issue surrounding Qadhafi's trip to New York. As NEA A/S Feltman had discussed with FM Kusa, we also hoped the Libyan Government would work to manage the controversy surrounding Qadhafi's plans to stay at the Libyan Perm Rep's residence in Englewood, New Jersey. Fituri said that Kusa and the MFA understand the problems posed by the Englewood house and are working to make sure that they also are understood by the Leader's inner circle. Fituri thought the Perm Rep's New York residence could be a good option, but also seemed to be unaware of Qadhafi's requirement to stay in ground-floor accommodations, a point Protocol Chief Mismari shared with us yesterday (reftel).

REPAIRING THE DAMAGE

¶5. (C) Asking MFA Americas Director Matari to leave the room, Fituri then said that he had met one-on-one with FM Kusa for several hours on August 26, under orders to quickly take concrete steps that could demonstrate the Libyans' desire to keep the U.S. relationship moving in the right direction. Fituri pulled out a confidential briefing paper and walked CDA through the following steps:

- Payment for the seven USG properties in Tripoli. (Note: This is a long-standing issue; the GOL had promised to provide

payment earlier this year. MGT Officer was called to a 1:00 pm meeting with the Land Registry Office and is reporting details septel.)

- Approval and implementation of the HEU-LEU transfer agreement. Fituri said Dr. Gashut and his team at the Tajura Nuclear Center are fully authorized to finish the negotiations and initial the document. Fituri noted that the Libyans have approved and signed the Russian agreement as well, and that is now being reviewed by Moscow. Fituri commented that "It is

TRIPOLI 00000695 002.2 OF 002

extremely important that we get this done, particularly with the September 24 UNSC session on nonproliferation."

- Approval and signature of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). (Note: Post has transmitted the latest Libyan edits to USTR.)

- Approval of the Section 505 End-user Agreement. While Fituri insists that the end-user agreement has been "approved," he acknowledged today that it is stuck in the Libyan bureaucracy. Fituri said that, following his meeting with CODEL McCain, Muatassim Al-Qadhafi had ordered the MOD to gin up the necessary paperwork. Although the MOD took prompt action, the MFA was required to send the dip note back to Muatassim for final approval, where it has languished for at least one week.

- Visas working group. The MFA has instructed its consular department to hold a meeting on visa reciprocity arrangements with the Embassy as soon as possible.

- Land for a New Embassy Compound (NEC). Although the MFA included this on the list, Fituri did not anticipate progress on the issue. Fituri said that when he brought up the NEC with Kusa, Kusa told him: "You were in the meeting between Clinton and Muatassim, right? Muatassim has discussed this with his father." Fituri then commented with a shrug, "This is a father-son issue."

¶6. (S) CDA underscored that, while we welcomed this progress and shared the Libyan Government's desire to keep the relationship moving forward, Megrahi's reception in Libya was a serious problem. It is vitally important that the Libyan Government take appropriate steps to manage this issue. Charge reiterated that the U.S. needs an appropriate resolution of the Englewood house issue, and also needs to ensure that Megrahi will be neither a guest at nor a featured theme at the September 1 festivities. CDA noted that the Embassy had seen the banners around Green Square lauding Megrahi as a hero and added that, even if Megrahi were not present for the festivities, we would object to rhetoric honoring him.

U.S. PRESENCE IMPORTANT ON SEPTEMBER 1

¶7. (C) Fituri said he understood our views and that the MFA was working to ensure the September 1 celebrations were not a problem for the bilateral relationship. He also said it was very important, from the MFA's perspective, to have a U.S. presence at the September 1 celebration. "Your absence would be problematic," Fituri emphasized. Stressing that no decisions had been made regarding U.S. representation, CDA countered that it would be still more problematic if the U.S. had to walk out of the ceremonies during a speech praising Megrahi. Fituri nodded in agreement, and added that although the MFA recognized that high-level representation was not likely, the presence of the CDA at the September 1 event would an important sign of our commitment to the relationship.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

¶8. (C) Comment and Action Request: FM Kusa and his like-minded colleagues at the MFA clearly understand the negative impact that Megrahi's warm reception in Libya has had on the bilateral relationship. It is important that they are working to manage the impact and, if they can deliver on the agenda laid out in para 5 (which reflects the agenda laid out in NEA A/S Feltman's July 26 meeting with Kusa), this will be a reassuring sign of the Libyan Government's commitment to maintaining our improved relationship. We have seen some progress on these issues in recent days. Yet the possibility remains that the personal whims of Libya's very unpredictable leader could scuttle the efforts of the pro-engagement camp. Fituri seemed painfully aware of this reality and extremely anxious to head off any potential new controversies through quick resolution of the Ifriqiyah plane issue. Department's guidance on this issue is requested.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI696

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI696 aka Wikileaks id #222606 ?
Subject	LIBYA MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 27 Aug 2009 15:55 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI696.html
References	07TRIPOLI1065 , 09TRIPOLI599 , 09TRIPOLI639 , 09TRIPOLI674
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI794
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2610
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0696 2391555
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 271555Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5202
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 0072
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0818
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1146
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0587
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0085
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5746
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000696

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, ISN/NESS, AND L. DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DOE-M FOR
M. TSIKLAURI.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/27/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , TRGY *[Energy Technology]* , IAEA *[International Atomic Energy Agency]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , TSPL *[Science and Technology Policy]* , TPHY *[Physical Sciences]* , TNGD *[Engineering Research and Development]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA MOVING FORWARD ON NUCLEAR SPENT FUEL AGREEMENT

REF: A) TRIPOLI 674 ; B) 07 TRIPOLI 1065 ; C) TRIPOLI 599 ; D) TRIPOLI 639

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Libya is moving toward completion of its
commitment to return its highly-enriched uranium to Russia under
the rubric of the tri-lateral agreement (TSCC) and, at this
point, appears likely to meet the September 30 deadline for fuel

point, appears likely to meet the September 30 deadline for fuel transfer. The MFA informed the Charge August 27 that FM Musa Kusa had vested all authority to Dr. Ali Gashut, head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, to complete negotiations on the agreement with U.S. counterparts and to arrange for a signing of the agreement within the coming weeks. As details of the agreement remain under negotiation, Gashut signed two other agreements allowing the Department of Energy to ship fuel casks to the Tajoura Nuclear Research Facility in order to prepare the fuel for transfer to Russia before September 30. Gashut approved the parallel Libya-Russia agreement for fuel transfer on behalf of the GOL on August 24. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The MFA informed the Embassy via diplomatic note August 20 that the Government of Libya had changes to the government-to-government nuclear spent fuel agreement (ref B) and formally presented those changes to visiting DOE experts August 24 during their visit to the Tajoura Nuclear Research Facility. The changes proposed involved auditing requirements after the fuel transfer, which DOE reviewed with the State Department's Legal Advisor on August 24. Dr. Ali Gashut, head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment and GOL lead on negotiating the agreement, said that he was informed that fifty percent of the GOL edits were acceptable to the USG. Gashut expressed preliminary approval of the compromise but requested a formal copy of the final agreement as approved by the USG. Embassy received a formal MFA request to the same effect via diplomatic note on August 27. MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Department Ahmed Fituri informed the Charge August 27 that Dr. Gashut had been given full authority to complete negotiations on the agreement by FM Musa Kusa and had been charged with completing the agreement in time for Libya to meet its September 30 deadline for transferring its nuclear spent fuel to Russia for treatment and disposal (septel).

PARALLEL LIBYA-RUSSIA AGREEMENT MOVING FORWARD

¶3. (C) During the August 24 meeting between Gashut and DOE experts, Gashut approved the parallel Libya-Russia agreement on the fuel transfer with Russian interlocutors, who were also present during the meeting. The Russian interlocutors passed the agreement back to Moscow for formal approval and issuance of a formal decree regarding the Russian commitment to treat and dispose of Libya's nuclear spent fuel. The Russian team expects the Government of Russia to send a high-level representative to Tripoli for a formal signing ceremony with Musa Kusa after the decree has been issued. [Note: Gashut asked the GOR to send PM Putin or President Medvedev for the signing, which the Russian side thought was unlikely to happen. End note.]

PREPARATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER DEADLINE

¶4. (C) While the U.S.-Libya agreement was being ironed out and prepared for signature, Gashut agreed to allow the DOE to send immediately to the Tajoura facility the fuel casks that will contain the nuclear spent fuel. He also assured the DOE experts that he would work to expedite their visa renewal requests in order to allow them to return to Tripoli to prepare the casks and train Libyan scientists to pack the casks during the third week of September.

¶5. (C) Comment: The GOL is working quickly to meet the September 30 deadline for nuclear fuel transfer. The MFA has proposed that we first initial the agreement at the experts-level, to ensure that work proceeds while arrangements are made for a later, formal signing ceremony between the FM and the Ambassador. The MFA is also preparing to sign the parallel Libya-Russia agreement on fuel transfer with a similarly formal ceremony. Libya's efficient work over the last month, and since A/S Feltman and the Ambassador raised the urgency of the issue with the FM (refs C, D), has been impressive. The Embassy is pleased that Libya is committed to fulfilling its nuclear spent fuel obligations as a sign of its desire to maintain positive

momentum in the bilateral relationship. We will continue to
work closely with the Libyan authorities to ensure the September
30 deadline is met. End Comment.

POLASCHIK

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI697

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI697 aka Wikileaks id #222618 ?
Subject	LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S PLANE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 27 Aug 2009 16:38 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI697.html
References	09TRIPOLI695
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2643
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0697 2391638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 271638Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5203
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0229
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5747
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000697

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN DIPLOMATIC NOTE REQUESTING DIPLOMATIC CLEARANCE FOR QADHAFI'S PLANE

REF: TRIPOLI 695

¶1. (SBU) As reported reftel, MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri convoked CDA August 27 to formally request that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's Ifriqiyah Airways plane be granted diplomatic clearance -- including full privileges and immunities -- when Qadhafi travels to New York for the UNGA. Embassy's informal translation of the diplomatic note follows.

¶2. (SBU) Begin translation:

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk), sends its compliments

to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya, and has the honor to refer to the meeting that took place between the Secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington and Ms. Margaret Nardi, Head of Arab Maghreb Department to discuss details relative to the Leader's visit to the United States, and especially the pretexts that she enumerated regarding the difficulty of securing a diplomatic authorization for the plane transporting Brother the Leader and his accompanying delegation, and notably the fact that Ifriqiyah Airlines is not registered to fly in the American airspace; this is unacceptable. We hereby emphasize the need to address this issue because the diplomatic authorization is normally offered to the person on board of the plane, and we note that an aircraft registered under the name of this company has previously obtained the required diplomatic authorization.

We stress that this aircraft has to be offered all the services and privileges that other head of states' planes usually have, including the parking spot. This is highly important and we cannot compromise it or accept an alternative to it.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations Office) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)

To: US Embassy- Tripoli

Tripoli: August 27th, 2009

(end text)

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI699

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI699 aka Wikileaks id #222620 ?
Subject	FRENZIED PREPARATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 1 ANNIVERSARY REVEAL FEW HINTS OF MEGRAHI'S POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 27 Aug 2009 16:58 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI699.html
References	09TRIPOLI689 , 09TRIPOLI692
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI186 , 09TRIPOLI192 , 09TRIPOLI31 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
TelegramC O N F I D E N T I A L   TRIPOLI   00000699
VZCZCXRO2664
PP RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0699/01 2391658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 271658Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5205
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1147
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0819
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0588
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5749
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000699

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/27/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] , KSUM
[Summit Meetings] , AU-1 [African Union] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FRENZIED PREPARATIONS FOR SEPTEMBER 1 ANNIVERSARY REVEAL FEW
HINTS OF MEGRAHI'S POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION

REF: A) Tripoli 692 ; B) Tripoli 689

TRIPOLI 00000699  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b) , (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (U) This is an action request. See paragraph 7.

¶2. (C) Summary. Tripoli is awash in frenzied preparations for the 40th anniversary of Muammar al-Qadhafi's "Al Fateh Revolution," a four-day extravaganza that will include the new "Libya-Italian Friendship Day" (to be attended by Italian PM Berlusconi), an extraordinary African Union Summit, and two days of military parades, speeches and concerts celebrating Qadhafi's coup. We expect high-level diplomatic representation for the events, including: Jordan's King Abdullah, Hugo Chavez, Hosni Mubarak, and Pakistan's PM Yousuf Gilani. Banners in Green Square extolling Pan Am 103 bomber Megrahi as a hero (leftover from the August 20 youth rally) are the only hint of Megrahi's possible participation in the festivities. We are hopeful that Libyan officials are taking efforts to ensure Megrahi is not featured in the events. However, given the importance that Megrahi has played in Libya's domestic politics, there is a possibility that Megrahi could be a physical or rhetorical presence in the celebration. End Summary.

PRE-EVENT ATMOSPHERICS

¶3. (C) Two miles of Tripoli's waterfront are being repurposed for what promises to be a grand celebration. A 150-foot-wide stage towers at least 50 feet above former park land in front of the state-owned Hotel Kabeer, with a half-dozen Jumbotron screens stretching back to the historic red fort of Tripoli. Tents and dozens of trailers stretch 100 yards backstage as greenrooms for the yet-undisclosed program. A large, covered reviewing stand for the planned military tattoo has been erected in front of that fort between the infamous "Mussolini balcony" and the mast of the USS Philadelphia. Green Square itself, normally a 400-car parking lot, sits empty. A stage and thousands of plastic chairs set up for an August 20 youth rally have been taken down, but banners with the Libyan Youth Foundation's logo hailing Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi's release and which refer to him as a "political hostage" and victim of "contradictory international standards" (in Arabic) feature prominently on walls separating pedestrians from the last-minute work.

¶4. (C) In typical Jamahiriya fashion, organizers seem to have waited for the last possible moment to implement their grand plans. As young Libyan men fasting for the holy month of Ramadan lounge in parks near the event sites, hundreds of migrant workers hastily construct roads, tents, and stages in the 105-degree sun. The Corinthia, Tripoli's main hotel, has had all bookings taken over by Libyan Protocol. A second international-class hotel operated by Radisson will be opened two months ahead of schedule to house AU Summit delegates. Dozens of workers are frantically putting finishing touches as an army of movers places furniture in the guest rooms. The site for the AU Summit, to be held August 30 and 31, lies on what was three weeks ago a harbor-side amusement park. Two tents, each approximately 5,000 square feet, and a few side halls indicate that Libya will likely keep delegate counts much lower than July's summit in Sirte. The Summit tents are situated on a jetty separating Tripoli's commercial harbor from a naval/coast guard station. During a site visit on the morning of August 27, Poloff observed two military helicopters circling the site, along with several small patrol boats in formation.

GUESSING GAME - WILL MEGRAHI ATTEND?

¶5. (C) In spite of the left over banners from the August 20 Qadhafi Development Foundation youth rally, the stage setting for September 1 does not indicate that Megrahi will be a theme, nor does the official program provided by MFA Protocol (ref A) feature activities focused on Megrahi. GOL interlocutors have also provided assurances that Megrahi will not be present on September 1 (ref B). Those contacts have hinted that Megrahi's return was important to Qadhafi's domestic audiences -

particularly key tribal and Revolutionary Committee (RevComm) figures who keep Qadhafi in power. As stated in previous reporting, GOL interlocutors are attempting to pressure Megrahi not to attend the September 1 events if invited, as they realize that they cannot control Qadhafi's actions (ref B). Even if Megrahi does not attend, however, the question remains whether Qadhafi will hail him as a hero during his remarks.

LIKELY PARTICIPATION

TRIPOLI 00000699 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) Press reports and diplomatic contacts indicate strong head of state/government attendance: Jordan's King Abdullah, Hugo Chavez, Hosni Mubarak, Pakistan PM Yousuf Gilani, and President of The Philippines Gloria Arroyo are among the probable attendees. Many Western nations will also send high-level delegates, including the Spanish Foreign Minister, the French Minister of Cooperation, the Italian Minister of Defense, and the Head of the Russian Duma. The September 1 events will be the pinnacle of a week-long gala that begins on August 30 with Libyan-Italian Friendship Day, PM Berlusconi's state visit, and the preparatory meetings for the extraordinary Summit of the AU Summit. Several nations are sending military demonstration units to perform during the week and participate in a large tattoo on September 2, including aerial demonstrations units from Italy and Jordan and cultural performers to include Ukrainian, Moroccan, Algerian, Tunisian, and Egyptian dancers. Despite persistent rumors, there is no indication that international pop acts, such as Beyonce, Celine Dion, or Shakira will perform.

U.S. PARTICIPATION

¶7. (C) As the Department considers possible U.S. attendance at the September 1 event, we note that we are hopeful that GOL officials are in fact taking measures to ensure Megrahi will not feature prominently in the program. But even if Megrahi himself is not physically present, it is possible that some of the speeches or other events could make reference to him. Should the Department instruct us to attend the September 1 event, we request guidance on how to handle Megrahi's presence -- physical or rhetorical -- in the program. UK Ambassador informed us that, if he is authorized to attend, he will be under instruction to walk out if Megrahi attends.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI70

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI70 aka Wikileaks id #189444 ?
Subject	LIBYA EXPECTS TO WIN CHAIRMANSHIP OF AU ASSEMBLY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 29 Jan 2009 15:09 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI70.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI109 , 09TRIPOLI134 , 09TRIPOLI298
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8136
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0070 0291509
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 291509Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4386
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4910
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1389
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0744
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0876
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0819
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0993
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0680
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0162
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000070

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/29/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]* , EG *[Egypt]* , AU-1 *[African Union]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA EXPECTS TO WIN CHAIRMANSHIP OF AU ASSEMBLY

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Libya appears to have secured North African support for its bid to take over chairmanship of the African Union in 2009. In a January 26 consultative meeting of Cen-Sad ministers held in Tripoli, Libya gained the "unanimous support" of all present, according to Egyptian PolCouns Ahmed Abdul Halim, who served as his delegation's notetaker. With the regional rotation of the chairmanship falling to North Africa in 2009, Abdul Halim sees no obstacles to Muammar al-Qadhafi achieving his goal of holding the AU chairmanship during the tenth anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation. While Libya's representatives at the meeting did not mention the upcoming election, each visiting delegation

not mention the upcoming election, each visiting delegation voiced support for Libya's candidacy, leading Abdul Halim to assume Libya had coordinated the message with Sahel representatives prior to the meeting.

¶2. (C) Seemingly on track to secure the chairmanship, Libyan representatives focused on building support for proclamation of a "United States of Africa" at the 12th session of the AU Assembly. Libyan diplomats view the AU Assembly agenda - which devotes an entire day's discussion on Feburary 1 to the subject of integration - as a victory for Muammar al-Qadhafi's vision of a united Africa. Abdul Halim reported that MFA Secretary for African Affairs Ali Treiki passionately argued that Cen-Sad members should support installing al-Qadhafi as the President and name a Vice-President during the February summit, with other departments to be formed in time. Senegalese, Gambian, and Chadian representatives reportedly responded favorably to the proposal.

¶3. (C) Comment: While there is little chance that Libya will achieve al-Qadhafi's vision of a United States of Africa in the short term, chairmanship of the AU will be a significant symbolic victory for al-Qadhafi, who sees himself as the father of both the AU and an eventual united African government. In typical Libyan fashion, the GOL's efforts are long on rhetoric and short on proposals to address the political, legal and logistical quandaries that constituting a United States of Africa will entail, or of the bureaucratic capacity that would be required for the GOL to effectively capitalize on having al-Qadhafi declared as President of a notional United States of Africa within the next year. We expect the calls for African unity, which have been relatively subtle to date (by Jamahiriya standards), to give way to a surge of cash and backroom deals to secure consensus for Libya's position. Lending urgency to the project is the fact that the GOL is on the clock: Libya seeks a high-profile announcement of progress - real or imagined - toward implementation of al-Qadhafi's vision of pan-African by September, which marks the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought him to power and the 10th anniversary of the founding Proclamation of the AU. End Comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI705

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI705 aka Wikileaks id #222907 ?
Subject	RATS BE GONE: UK PEST ERADICATION FIRM RENTOKIL EXPANDING IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 30 Aug 2009 17:04 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI705.html
References	08TRIPOLI635
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4491
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0705/01 2421704
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 301704Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5212
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1151
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0823
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0592
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0435
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5756
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000705

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA
WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  8/30/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , EIND [Industry and Manufacturing] ,
EINV [Foreign Investments] , SENV [Environmental Affairs] , TPHY [Physical Sciences] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: RATS BE GONE: UK PEST ERADICATION FIRM RENTOKIL EXPANDING IN
LIBYA

REF: 08 TRIPOLI 635

TRIPOLI 00000705  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy
Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
```

¶1. (C) Summary: One of the UK's top pest eradication firms has won a contract with the Libyan government to exterminate rodents in the cities of Tripoli, Sirte, and Benghazi, to fill a gap that the government-run pest control program has been unable to address. When a Bubonic Plague outbreak hit Tobruk a few months ago, Rentokil was asked to extend its work-zone to that city. The general manager of Rentokil told Econoff he sees a great need for pest eradication companies in Libya. His firm plans to expand its operations from the public to the private sphere in October by launching a new joint-venture with a local Libyan company. End summary.

RENTOKIL - FROM EXTERMINATION TO CARTOGRAPHY

¶2. (C) Rentokil, one of the UK's top pest eradication firms, was contracted in July 2008 by the GOL's General People's Committee for Infrastructure (Ministry-equivalent), headed by Secretary Matuq Matuq, to exterminate rodents in the cities of Tripoli, Misurata, and Benghazi. According to Richard Jones, General Manager of Rentokil's branch office in Libya, there is a huge need for not only rodent control services but also for eradicating roaches and other insects in Libyan cities. He said the need was so great that other companies, including U.S. firms, would be welcome support in the effort.

¶3. (C) In January 2008, the GOL contacted Rentokil in search for a pest control company to help eradicate a growing rodent population across the country. Until that point, the GOL had operated its own pest control technician teams, but recognized that its traditional methods of controlling the pest and rodent populations were no longer effective. The Libyan authorities suspected that the rodent population had developed a resistance to the anti-coagulant used by the GOL teams. According to Rentokil, the rodents act as vectors for serious diseases in Libya, including Bubonic Plague, Leptospirosis, Salmonella, Enterica Serovar Typhimurium, Esosinophilic Meningitis, and rat bite fever. Additionally, the vector for Leschmaniasis, the sand fly, harbors on a rodent known as Psammomys Obesus, or the fat sand rat. The GOL therefore created a "National Program for the Control of Rodents Harmful to Health" in 2008 to combat the country's growing rodent and pest problem. After a few months of negotiations, Rentokil concluded a contract with the GOL in July 2008.

¶4. (C) In Tripoli, Rentokil has 150,000 bait stations set-up to eradicate rats. Rentokil staff monitor the numbers of dead rodents they find on ground surfaces, which then allows them to estimate the numbers of rodents killed who have retreated to their holes in the ground. They have developed a grid system, using state-of-the-art information technology systems. The staff also use hand-held PDA devices to keep track of the data in the field. To overcome the challenge of Libya's lack of street addresses or mapping grids, Rentokil has developed a mapping system using Satellite imagery and Google Earth; all the bait stations are plotted onto this system.

¶5. (C) Rentokil inherited many employees from the Libyan government and had to retrain people in their techniques and also had to provide English language training so the Libyans could communicate with the Rentokil staff from the UK (which include 32 expatriates). Jones noted they have had to deal with significant attrition as the Libyan government staff was "not used to working that hard," and some employees have left without advanced notice. Rentokil is attempting to limit its attrition rates by tripling the government salaries of former GOL employees.

PLAGUE OUTBREAK IN TOBRUK: RENTOKIL BROUGHT IN TO HELP

¶6. (C) Touching on the outbreak of the Bubonic Plague in Libya's eastern city of Tobruk earlier this summer, Hill explained the rodents had moved into populated areas after

construction projects upset piping systems. This resulted in the death of more rodents than usual, and the fleas on those animals jumped onto livestock and other animals living near people, spreading disease to the human population. Hill estimated that up to 20 people died as a result of this outbreak. He said Rentokil was asked to go to Tobruk to help

TRIPOLI 00000705 002.2 OF 002

exterminate the rodents, although the city was not part of their original scope of work.

RENTOKIL'S LESSONS LEARNED

¶7. (C) Having heard that the GOL was famous for late payments, Jones told Econoff that Rentokil required a sizeable up-front payment, which allowed the firm to begin the set-up of operations, including finding office space and housing, recruiting staff, and shipping supplies to Libya. They also require all communications to be in writing with their client, the General People's Committee for Infrastructure, headed by Secretary Matuq Matuq. Jones told Econoff that the pest control sector in Libya is dominated by academics, many of whom approach their work from a theoretical perspective. Through Rentokil's retraining of Libyan government staff, they have emphasized a more practical, hands-on approach that has taken more time but proven to be worthwhile in the end. Jones noted there are very few private companies working in pest control in Libya and he sees room for other companies, including U.S. firms, to pursue opportunities here.

¶8. (C) Now that Rentokil is established in Libya, it plans to expand to the private sector and will enter into a joint venture with Libyan company, Shahdi, in October. Shahdi already provides motorpool services for the American construction management firm AECOM but will be new to the pest control market. Rentokil will hold 65 percent of the new joint venture. Jones noted that it has taken four to five months to register the company.

¶9. (C) Comment: Rentokil's success thus far in Libya is encouraging, as it demonstrates there are opportunities for service provider companies in key sectors, such as pest management, which is a critical component for safeguarding environmental health. This UK-based company has seized upon an unmet need and used it as a spring-board for forming a private joint venture company with a Libyan partner. U.S.-based companies may be able to emulate Rentokil not only in the pest management sector but in other areas, such as healthcare, urban planning, and wastewater treatment. End comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI706

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI706 aka Wikileaks id #222929 ?
Subject	CHEVROLET SURVIVES LIBYA'S REGULATORY GAUNTLET
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 31 Aug 2009 07:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/08/09TRIPOLI706.html
References	09TRIPOLI618
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4698
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0706/01 2430717
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 310717Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5214
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1153
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0825
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0594
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0437
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL 0013
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5758
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000706

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR FOR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/31/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: CHEVROLET SURVIVES LIBYA'S REGULATORY GAUNTLET

REF: TRIPOLI 618

TRIPOLI 00000706 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Marwan Muntasser, the Chairman of the Libyan company with exclusive rights to import Chevrolet and General Motors vehicles into the country described to Econoff August 12 the process by which he was able to avoid a forced closure of his dealership by the Government of Libya (GOL). Muntasser

claimed that the GOL's reasoning was based on inaccurate information about his business and appreciated the GOL's willingness to reverse a decision based on financial and legal data. Muntasser also confirmed that the GOL had shut down the Jordanian-owned Ford dealership based on a law that prohibits foreign ownership of distributorships and dealerships (reftel). End Summary

¶2. (C) Marwan Muntasser, chairman of the Libyan firm that holds the exclusive rights to import Chevrolet and General Motors vehicles into Libya, told Econoff August 12 that he was summoned by Mohammed al-Hweij, Minister-equivalent of Economy, to a meeting the week of August 2 in order to discuss GOL plans to shut down the dealership. The reason, according to al-Hweij, was that the dealership was not 100-percent Libyan-owned, a requirement for all dealerships in Libya (reftel). [Note: The GOL imposed a ban on the import of GM vehicles at the end of July on the same charges. End note.] Muntasser said that al-Hweij also believed the dealership's sales were almost twice as high as the firm's actual sales figures. Whereas Muntasser's sales figures proved that he had sold 14,000 units in 2006, al-Hweij believed that the actual figure was nearly double that amount.

¶3. (C) In response to al-Hweij's accusations, Muntasser provided documentation proving that his company was 100-percent Libyan owned, as well as financial accounts data that demonstrated the firm's actual imports and sales in Libya. According to Muntasser, al-Hweij backed down on the threats to shut down the dealership shortly after the meeting and after reviewing the legal and financial documentation provided by Muntasser. Muntasser commented to Econoff that he believed al-Hweij's confusion stemmed from the fact that his company is partially financed by investors in the UAE.

BACKGROUND ON GM/CHEVROLET DEALERSHIP IN LIBYA

¶4. (C) The GM/Chevrolet dealership imports vehicles mainly for 15 buyers who resell the vehicles directly to customers. According to Muntasser, most of the vehicles are produced in Korea in former Daewoo factories that were bought out by GM; thus, prices have remained fairly low, and the cars are affordable to the average Libyan citizen. GM will honor warranties on cars sold by Muntasser, even if the cars have been resold. Muntasser emphasized that his business is not a retail business, as he does not offer car loans or payment plans to individual customers due to Libya's complicated financial and banking rules. Muntasser describes his sales as fluctuating due to the relatively small size of the market - whereas he sold 8,000 vehicles in 2007, he sold 21,000 units in 2008. Muntasser has sold 12,000 units thus far in 2009.

FORD DEALERSHIP SHUT DOWN

¶5. (C) Muntasser confirmed local rumors that the Ford dealership in Tripoli closed a few months ago. The dealership was run by a Jordanian company, in contravention of the 100-percent Libyan ownership requirement. Muntasser commented that the business had not been thriving, due to the dealership's excess mark-up on vehicle prices.

¶6. (C) Bio Note: Marwan Muntasser belongs to the elite Muntasser family, which is well-known in business circles and included a prime minister in pre-revolutionary days. He has lived most of his adult life overseas, mainly in Egypt, and returned to Libya about five years ago. Before opening the GM dealership in 2006, he worked in the informal automobile import sector. He commented that he actually preferred his previous job in Libya (in the informal sector), as he could avoid paying taxes, customs, and other official fees.

¶7. (C) Comment: This latest episode with GM/Chevrolet is yet

another example of GOL interference in most aspects of business in Libya. This is especially true of sectors that the government considers to be high-value and profitable, such as the automobile market. Notably, the general manager of

TRIPOLI 00000706 002.2 OF 002

GM/Chevrolet in Libya did not seek the U.S. Embassy's assistance in dealing with the GOL; it may be that Muntasser judged our involvement as possibly counter-productive for political reasons. Muntasser's experience puts into focus the GOL's concern about foreign investors enriching themselves with Libya's wealth. End comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI71

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI71 aka Wikileaks id #189726 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 30 Jan 2009 17:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI71.html
References	08TRIPOLI474 , 08TRIPOLI498 , 08TRIPOLI563 , 08TRIPOLI597 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI563
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9531
OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0071/01 0301716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 301716Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4387
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0820
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0745
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0877
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4911
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000071

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; DEPT PLEASE PASS COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON;
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/30/2019
TAGS: ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 498 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 563 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 597 , E) TRIPOLI 40

TRIPOLI 00000071 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. During a recent video conference with Georgetown University students, Muammar al-Qadhafi suggested that Libya and other oil exporting states could nationalize their oil production in view of sharply plummeting petroleum prices. Several days later, however, a senior MFA official

prices. Several days later, however, a senior MFA official assured the visiting Spanish King's delegation that Libya does not intend to do so. In typical fashion, al-Qadhafi's call for nationalization was ill-defined and left considerable room for interpretation. Industry experts in Washington and Libya have not entirely dismissed the possibility that the GOL could nationalize its oil and gas sector (Libya did so in 1972); however, they do not currently judge it to be a serious threat and are waiting to see whether legislation proposing such an initiative is introduced in advance of the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. Informed contacts view the call for nationalization as a tactical move to: 1) leverage the expected re-negotiation of existing contracts with international oil companies (IOCs'); 2) prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libyan claims compensation fund; 3) establish a context for Libya's potential unilateral cuts in production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC, and; 4) prepare the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, which will be introduced at the General People's Congress session, will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. The GOL is in the midst of a painful recalculation of its 2009 national budget to reflect lower oil revenues. Suggesting nationalization - an idea al-Qadhafi attributed to members of the local-level Basic People's Congresses and can therefore disavow easily - clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut. Al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem comparatively palatable. End summary.

AL-QADHAFI THROWS A CURVEBALL

¶2. (C) During a wide-ranging video conference with Georgetown University students on January 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi raised the topic of oil, saying " ... oil-exporting countries might opt for nationalizations due to the sharp fall in oil prices". His speech was foreshadowed by articles in state-run newspapers, later picked up by Reuters, saying that members of the Basic People's Congresses (the lower part of the pyramid scheme of legislative committees and congresses that form the GOL) had called for nationalization. Noting sharply plummeting oil prices, al-Qadhafi suggested that oil production should be temporarily curtailed or stopped altogether to spur higher prices and suggested that a price point of USD 100/barrel was needed to underwrite Libya's ambitious infrastructure development projects. Libya's former senior representative to OPEC, Abdullah al-Badri, told the press on January 23 that nationalization could be "in the offing" and suggested that events in Gaza may have partly prompted the proposal. At a National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce lunch in Houston on January 27, Libya's Ambassador to Washington, Ali Aujali, said the GOL had not ruled out nationalization and characterized a USD 100/barrel price point as "fair". The NOC directed oil companies producing in Libya to cut production by 270,000 barrels per day in compliance to an output-cutting decision adopted by OPEC.

¶3. (C) During the recent visit to Tripoli of Spanish King Juan Carlos I, al-Qadhafi was quoted as saying that " ... if Libya ends up taking this decision, it will be because we don't have any choice". Despite the public threats, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs (U/S-equivalent) Muhammad Siala told the Spanish delegation that oil production would not be nationalized. In remarks to Spanish daily "El Pais", Spanish energy giant Repsol's President, Antoni Brufau, speculated that al-Qadhafi had been "thinking out loud" (further details septel). A well-connected contact in Tripoli who is a close friend of Libyan National Oil Chairman Shukhri Ghanem told the Ambassador on January 29 that Ghanem had not taken the press reports or

al-Qadhafi's remarks seriously and did not consider nationalization of Libya's oil production as a serious or plausible possibility. Ghanem was "extremely frustrated" that he had not been consulted or informed before al-Qadhafi gave his remarks, and told our contact he was "fed up" and waiting for an opportunity to leave his position at the NOC.

GOL WANTS TO RENEGOTIATE EXISTING PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, INCREASE

ITS SHARE

¶4. (C) Part of the issue may be definitional. Although al-Qadhafi has used the phrase "nationalization", he may in fact be signaling more aggressive efforts by the GOl and NOC to secure greater shares of oil produced under existing contracts. During 2008, the NOC renegotiated four existing production contracts with Italy's ENI, Canada's Petro-Canada, a consortium of U.S. Occidental/ Austrian OMV, and a European consortium of Spanish Repsol/French TOTAL/Austrian OMV/ Norwegian Hydro (reftels A, B, C, D). According to a recently-released NOC report, the renegotiated contracts increased the GOL's earnings by USD 5.4 billion last year; the four companies involved also paid USD 3 billion in front-end bonuses, increasing the GOL's take. The renegotiated terms brought those contracts in line with Libya's preferred exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA) rubric, under which IOC's already producing in Libya have extended their contracts, paid sizeable bonuses and dramatically reduced their production shares to the neighborhood of 10-15 percent. The NOC has repeatedly said it wants to renegotiate its old (i.e., non-EPSA) contracts along EPSA-IV terms, which would allow it to have more than an 80 percentage share.

¶5. (C) The Oasis Group (ConocoPhillips, Marathon, Hess and Occidental), Repsol, Wintershall and Total remain as the foreign producing companies that have not signed the new agreements to align their share percentages with the most recent EPSA-IV configuration. The Oasis Group, whose constituent members' assets and production were nationalized in 1972, agreed in 2005 to pay Libya USD 1.8 billions to return to their previous acreage, which had been held in trust under a "stand fast agreement" for 19 years during the period U.S. sanctions were in effect against Libya. Oasis' contract is for 25 years; the NOC holds a 59.2 percent share, ConocoPhillips and Marathon each have 16.33 percent each, and Hess has an 8.16 percent share. The GOL would like to renegotiate Oasis' contract to increase its share, and has informally signaled that it intends to do so.

¶6. (C) At the same time, industry journals report that the re-negotiated contracts with IOC's will entail investment in exploration and production of some USD 22 billion over the next 5-10 years. Libya would bear up to 50 percent of that financial burden, at a time when it may already have to scale back its infrastructure development projects in light of falling revenues (ref E). The GM of Canada's Verenex (one of the few companies to find new oil under new EPSA's) said nationalization "did not make sense" since the NOC would have to bear bear 100 percent of development and production costs. By way of example, the NOC only bears 50 percent of Verenex's development costs, but gets 87 percent of production revenues.

CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND CONTRIBUTIONS

¶7. (C) In addition to providing leverage for potential renegotiation of existing contracts, the threat to nationalize may in part be an attempt to prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libya claims compensation fund that was implemented in October 2008. Marathon's General Manager (GM) told the Ambassador that the NOC Chairman Shukhri had begun

soliciting IOC's again about two weeks ago for contributions to the fund established to compensate U.S. victims of acts of terrorism authored by Libya. The NOC had previously targeted only companies that were producing oil; however, in its most recent approach it also touched IOC's that are in the exploration phase and have not yet begun producing oil. Representatives of Occidental said the company was concerned about press reports, but not overly so. Oxy has received private assurances from Ghanem that nationalization is not the in the offing, and views al-Qadhafi's remarks as posturing to pressure companies to contribute to the fund. GM's of major IOC's here believe that the first-tier producers, who have so far abided by an informal agreement not to accede to demands for contributions, will continue to hold the line; however, there is concern that second-tier producers and perhaps oilfield supply and services companies may buckle under pressure from the NOC and choose to contribute. A second meeting between IOC GM's and Ghanem that was to have occurred on January 28 has been postponed until February 1 or 2, according to Occidental's GM.

PORTENT OF FURTHER UNILATERAL PRODUCTION CUTS BY LIBYA?

¶8. (C) Remarks by al-Qadhafi and other senior GOL officials may also have been intended to establish a context for potential unilateral cuts in Libyan production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC. Three OPEC production cuts since September,

most recently a 2.2 million barrel per day cut that went into effect January 1, have failed to slow a slide that has left crude oil prices about 70 percent below the mid-July 2008 price of USD 150 per barrel. Libya directed IOC's in Libya to cut their production by 270,000 barrels per day (Libya's total production is 1.7-1.8 million barrels/day), more than it needed to account for its share of the overall OPEC cut. In his Georgetown remarks, al-Qadhafi flatly said that Libya would not adhere to OPEC's quotas " ... because our livelihood depends on oil". He also suggested that further unilateral production cuts or perhaps even a temporary production freeze could be adopted, although either of those options would result in further declines in revenue at a time when the GOL can ill afford it.

CREATING A DIVERSION IN ADVANCE OF THE UPCOMING GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS?

¶9. (C) Finally, al-Qadhafi's remarks may be part of an effort to prepare regime figures and, to a lesser extent, the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, to be introduced at an upcoming session of the General People's Congress (GPC), will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. As reported ref E, the session planned for January was postponed, in part because the GOL has had to re-calculate the national budget to reflect dramatically reduced oil revenues. A senior MFA official told us that al-Qadhafi, unhappy that widely-publicized infrastructure and development projects designed to demonstrate the Jamahiriya system's benefits, tried to secure funds from Libya's newly-constituted Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to cover budget shortfalls and avoid delaying the projects. The President of the Libyan Investment Authority, which administers the SWF, told the Ambassador that a recently-adopted law prohibits such raids on the fund, and al-Qadhafi appears to have been deterred from doing so (at least for now).

¶10. (C) Comment: Famous for saying the unexpected (a favorite local saying is "from Libya comes the new"), al-Qadhafi did not disappoint with his threat to nationalize Libya's oil production. As with similar dramatic, headline-grabbing statements on various other subjects in the past, though, much of what he says and does represents tactical maneuvering rather than a sincere expression of intent. While it is never wise to

rule out the possibility of seemingly irrational decisions by the GOL, we are not inclined to believe that nationalization is being seriously considered. Floating the idea helps leverage the GOL's position with respect to renegotiating existing oil production contracts and (potentially) garnering contributions to the claims compensation fund. More important in the immediate sense, though, is that it clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut at the upcoming session of the GPC. In that regard, al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem palatable by comparison with the specter of what could have been.
Well-connected businessman Husni Bey (strictly protect) told the Ambassador that he doubted that the GOL would "make the same mistake twice" by nationalizing oil production again, and highlighted the fact that al-Qadhafi attributed authorship of the idea to the BPC's, which would make it easier for him to later disown it. Tellingly, MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri told the Ambassador on January 28 that he did not expect nationalization to occur, and had attended a meeting earlier that day in which participants discussed opening a consulate in Houston, in part to better facilitate travel to/from Libya by U.S. oil representatives. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI714

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI714 aka Wikileaks id #224044 ?
Subject	SWISS CHARGE OPTIMISTIC ON RELEASE OF TWO BUSINESSMEN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Sep 2009 13:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI714.html
References	08TRIPOLI592 , 09BERN351 , 09TRIPOLI59
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI763
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 14 Mar 2011 13:31: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO0398
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0714/01 2511349
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 081349Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5222
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0042
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0023
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5767
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000714

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS CHARGE OPTIMISTIC ON RELEASE OF TWO BUSINESSMEN

REF: A. 08 TRIPOLI 592 ; B. TRIPOLI 59 ; C. BERN 351

TRIPOLI 00000714 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto remains optimistic about the release of two Swiss businessmen who have been detained in Libya since July 2008. He said that while the September 1 deadline for their release had passed, the GOL had

September 1 deadline for their release had passed, the GOL had given him positive indications that the release was imminent. Lazarotto outlined for Pol/Econ Chief the August 20 agreement to normalize relations that was concluded between Swiss President Hans-Rudolf Merz and GOL Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. Although the two sides appointed representatives to an arbitration panel to investigate the July 2008 arrest of Hanibal al-Qadhafi, as stipulated by the agreement, Lazarotto said the Swiss would not take further steps to implement the agreement until the two businessmen were released. He also related that the Swiss government planned to nominate him as Ambassador to Libya after the situation with the Swiss businessmen has been resolved. Lazarotto's fatigued appearance betrayed the stress that the conflict has placed on him and Swiss interests in Libya. End Summary.

SWISS BUSINESSMEN STILL UNDER HOUSE ARREST

¶2. (C/NF) Swiss Charge d'Affaires Stefano Lazarotto told Pol/Econ Chief September 3 that he was hopeful that the two Swiss businessmen who have been under house arrest since July 2008 would be released soon. [Note: The Swiss businessmen were placed under arrest and deprived of their passports by Libyan government officials in August 2008 on charges of commercial misdeeds. The businessmen later sought refuge at the Embassy of Switzerland. (refs A, B) End note.] Lazarotto explained that the release of the Swiss businessmen was not included as part of the August 20 agreement to normalize relations between Libya and Switzerland because the GOL denies a connection between the arrest and the July 2008 arrest in Geneva of Hanibal al-Qadhafi and his wife. Nevertheless, Lazarotto noted that the issue had been discussed by Merz and Libyan PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi during their closed meeting. Lazarotto said the GOL had assured Merz that the businessmen would be released prior to September 1. Now that the deadline had passed, Lazarotto explained that he was "constantly" calling his Libyan contacts within the PM's office and MFA to try to obtain the businessmen's passports, which the GOL is still holding. He reasoned that one cause for the delay may have been that Libyan officials had been preoccupied with the September 1 anniversary of Qadhafi's coup and could not move the issue forward.

¶3. (C/NF) Lazarotto declined to comment on rumors that the GOL was demanding a one million Euro payment in exchange for the release of the businessmen. However, he expressed concern about the detailed information the press had managed to obtain and report regarding the businessmen's release. Specifically, he worried that press reports describing his plans to return the two Swiss businessmen to Switzerland on August 31 had contributed to the GOL's delay in resolving the issue, given the optic that the Swiss had been spinning up the situation in the press. Likewise, Lazarotto complained that he was receiving myriad inquiries from Bern regarding who had informed the media about various aspects of the Swiss-Libyan negotiations. He lamented, "I even receive calls in the middle of the night from Bern. They do not understand the kind of pressure I am under. I have lost seven kilos in the past ten days."

¶4. (C/NF) Lazarotto said the Swiss citizens, initially elated about the possibility of returning home by September 1, had grown depressed as the days passed. He said they were living in apartments above the Swiss Embassy and that he and a colleague temporarily assigned from Bern were also staying in the apartments, both for practical reasons (Lazarotto's residence is being renovated) and to maintain morale. Lazarotto explained that none of the four could sleep at night and resorted to playing ping-pong on the front porch to pass the time. They have not left the embassy since August 31, for fear of missing a phone call that could come in by landline.

SWISS-LIBYA AGREEMENT DESIGNED TO PUNISH SWITZERLAND

¶5. (C/NF) Regarding the agreement between Switzerland and Libya

to normalize relations, Lazarotto described a stressful week of middle-of-the-night negotiations at the Corinthia Hotel. He said the GOL had put forward several demands, most of which the Swiss had met. Lazarotto was summoned back to Libya during the third day of his three-week holiday in order to accompany Hans-Rudolf Merz to negotiate the text of the agreement. Lazarotto noted that the round-the-clock negotiations had forced him and his colleague - Director of the Regional Office for

TRIPOLI 00000714 002.2 OF 003

North Africa in Bern - to sleep in their car parked outside the hotel during two nights of the negotiating period. Lazarotto said that the Libyan Prime Minister and his representatives directed the negotiations; MFA A/S-equivalent for European Affairs, Abdulati al-Obeidi, was not involved.

¶6. (C/NF) According to the text of the document, the two sides had agreed to "settle the dispute which resulted from the incident of the arrest of the Libyan diplomat Mr. Hannibal Mumar Al Gaddafi, and of accompanying unjustified and unnecessary measures against him and his family from the authorities of the Canton of Geneva and the Federal Swiss Authorities before, during and after [July 15, 2008]" (ref C). The agreement required an official and public apology for the arrest, which Merz offered on August 20 to al-Mahmoudi during a press conference announcing the settlement. Lazarotto countered media reports that the Swiss government was demanding Merz's resignation due to his decision to apologize to the Libyans. Lazarotto said that the initial, negative sentiment surrounding the settlement had waned and that several members of the Cabinet of Ministers had come around to supporting Merz's decision.

¶7. (C/NF) Additionally, the agreement stipulates that both sides would establish an arbitration tribunal, to which each nation would appoint an arbitrator, to investigate the incident and determine a punishment, if the tribunal determines that the defendants had acted illegally (ref C). Lazarotto noted that the agreement specifies that the appointment of the arbitrator should have been done ten days after the signing of the agreement, but that the GOL took twelve days to appoint its candidate. "I am half Italian," Lazarotto noted, "and I understand time differently than my Swiss-German colleagues in Bern. Those colleagues noticed that the Libyans violated the deadline." Based on the delay in appointing a representative to the arbitration tribunal, Lazarotto held out hope that the Libyans would release the Swiss citizens, even though that deadline had also passed.

¶8. (C/NF) Lazarotto highlighted the sixth section of the seven-part agreement as particularly questionable. That section commits the Swiss government "not to repeat this incident in the future against the Libyan Citizens or Libyan Officials and to improve their treatment and facilitate their procedures." Lazarotto mused, "What are we supposed to do if another Qadhafi son violates the laws of Switzerland - ignore it? Perhaps instead of asking questions, we should just throw him in jail immediately!"

¶9. (C/NF) The last article of the agreement officially normalizes relations between the two countries and states: "They will designate immediately a person from their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs to settle all issues presently affecting their bilateral relationship, amongst others all consular activities to all citizens of both countries, including issuing of exit-entry visa for Swiss and Libyan citizens and officials, trade and commercial relations between the two countries including resumption of air flight between the two countries. The designated persons [should] complete their task within sixty days." Lazarotto clarified that he was the appointed negotiator for the Swiss side and that the GOL had designated MFA Vice Minister Khaled Kaim (U/S-equivalent) as his

designated MFA Vice Minister Khaled Kaim (U/S-equivalent) as his interlocutor. He emphasized that no other bilateral issues would be discussed until the Swiss citizens had been released. Lazarotto explained that the Swiss government intended to upgrade his position to ambassador after restoration of political and business relations has been completed. He expressed concern that his "harassment" of GOL interlocutors over the release of the Swiss citizens could spoil his relations to the extent that the GOL would refuse to accept his ambassadorial credentials.

¶10. (C/NF) Comment: Lazarotto presented an upbeat and positive demeanor during the meeting, but his physical appearance - gaunt and fatigued - betrayed the internal stress that the Swiss-Libyan conflict has forced on him. Although Lazarotto's colleague from Bern has stayed to help him with daily embassy tasks, he is the only Swiss official accredited to Libya. The recent agreement seems to represent a consolidation of earlier attempts by Libya to move the goalposts - both sides had agreed to form a joint arbitral tribunal over a year ago, but the two sides failed to find mutually acceptable language for their final report. Swiss diplomats in Tripoli continue to complain that policymakers in Bern and Geneva fail to understand how to deal with the Qadhafi clan, noting that Bern has now given in to each successive Libyan demand. With nothing more to offer

TRIPOLI 00000714 003.2 OF 003

Libya, the Swiss seem forced to wait until Qadhafi is ready to grant the one concession they need - the release of the two Swiss citizens. Despite the assurances of senior MFA officials, Qadhafi's willingness to stake family reputation over foreign relations makes it difficult to predict when the Swiss businessmen will be allowed to leave. End Comment.
CRETZ

Media

- LeTemps.ch | Dossier Swiss Papers
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI715

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI715 aka Wikileaks id #224049 ?
Subject	AU SUMMIT SERVES AS OPENING ACT FOR QADHAFI'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 8 Sep 2009 14:01 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI715.html
References	09TRIPOLI570
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0421
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0715/01 2511401
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 081401Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5225
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0827
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1155
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5770
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000715

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/FO, NEA/MAG AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/8/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , KSUM *[Summit Meetings]* , UG *[Uganda]* , CG *[Congo (Kinshasa)]* , SU *[Sudan]* , CD *[Chad]* , SO *[Somalia]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AU SUMMIT SERVES AS OPENING ACT FOR QADHAFI'S 40TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATION

REF: TRIPOLI 570

TRIPOLI 00000715 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) The August 31 African Union (AU) Summit Extraordinary Session held in Tripoli produced two documents - the Tripoli Proclamation and the Tripoli Work Plan - aimed at resolving crises on the African continent. Summit attendees adhered to the wishes of the Ethiopian and Eritrean requests to not discuss

their conflict in the context of Sudan. Instead, delegates focused on expanding the mandate of AMISOM to give it authority to patrol Somali airspace and territorial waters. The Tripoli Work Plan addressed relations between Chad and Sudan separate from the situation in Darfur but did not result in any significant progress. The abrupt walk-out of Sudanese President Bashir from his August 30 meeting with Qadhafi appears to have been the only news of note from the session, which most observers believe was scheduled primarily to kick off the September 1 celebration of Qadhafi's coup. End Summary.

SUMMIT WORK SESSIONS: GREAT LAKES, DARFUR, SOMALIA

¶2. (C) The Special Summit of the African Union began with working-level meetings on the three focus areas for the session: the Great Lakes, Darfur, and Somalia. The meetings were supposed to be held concurrently, with the Great Lakes meeting a mile away from the site of the Darfur and Somalia meetings. The Executive Council met only to set the agenda for the Assembly's meeting and made no substantive changes to the Tripoli Declaration or Plan of Work. The final documents calling for resolution of Africa's hot crises were short on specific plans for action and metrics, with most of the text recalling and reiterating previously stated objectives. (Note: Post has only obtained Arabic-language versions of the final documents. End note.)

¶3. (C) Summit attendees mostly adhered to the wishes of the Ethiopian and Eritrean requests not to discuss their conflict in the context of Sudan. Instead, delegates focused on expanding the mandate of AMISOM to give it authority to patrol Somali airspace and territorial waters. The Assembly called for donor nations to stand up three additional battalions by the end of 2009 and for an international conference on the Horn of Africa before the first quarter of 2010. The overall mood was supportive of the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) and to expand participation in the Djibouti Process. Somali PM Sharmarke attended the Summit on behalf of the TFG, and AU Commission Chair Jean Ping chaired the working group session on the 30th.

¶4. (C) The Tripoli Plan of Work addressed relations between Chad and Sudan separate from the situation in Darfur. Delegates highlighted the need for a political resolution between Khartoum and N'Djamena and called for increased peacekeeping forces along the border region. In Darfur, the Assembly expressed pleasure that the security situation was improving and sought to increase cooperation with UN missions in the region. The Assembly also asked the Commission to form election observation teams to deploy to Sudan "before the elections", but with no clear request on their numbers or depth of the mission. Despite rumors that Qadhafi would have Chad and Sudan sign an agreement to ease tension between the two countries, Presidents Bashir and Deby did not have face-to-face meetings. An EU diplomat stationed in Khartoum reported that Bashir walked out of an August 30 meeting with Qadhafi after an hour-long soliloquy by the Leader. However, an Egyptian Poloff thought reports that Bashir was angry due to Qadhafi's earlier remarks on South Sudan's secession were overblown, assessing that Bashir understood that Qadhafi was wont to ramble and that his actions were more important than his words. Rebel unification meetings held separately from the Summit itself will be reported septel.

¶5. (C) On the Great Lakes, delegates spoke of support for stabilization efforts between the DRC, Burundi, and Rwanda but noted that more needed to be done to prevent the Lord's Resistance Army's attempts to thwart further progress. An Arab delegate told us plans for an international conference on development in Congo and Burundi were replaced for a Burundi-centric conference due to simmering problems between the governments. The final Declaration also made short reference to earlier Assembly and PSC statements on internal crises in

Guinea, Madagascar, Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Central African Republic, Comoros, and Western Sahara; though delegates in the closed session reported that little attention was given to the one-sentence statements.

OPENING REMARKS REPEAT PREVIOUS THEMES

TRIPOLI 00000715 002.2 OF 003

¶6. (C) The opening session began three hours late with relatively brief remarks from Muammar al-Qadhafi and AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping. Qadhafi used the theme of solving African crises to promote his broader agenda of swift unification of Africa's political, military, and economic bodies into a United States of Africa. He described two types of conflicts: state-to-state belligerence and internal conflicts such as coups and rebellions. On the former, Qadhafi blamed European colonial powers for drawing arbitrary lines across the continent, noting that abandoning the "artificial" borders in favor of a unified supranational body would instantly eliminate conflicts over borders and crises brought on by political divisions. Qadhafi was more coy on internal conflicts, maintaining that, from a legal standpoint, international bodies and third-party states had no right to interfere in the internal problems of another state. Rather, the role of the AU should be to mediate between opposing factions in an effort to bring peace. However, if internal conflict were intensified by exogenous forces (he provided the example of oil-thirsty foreign governments in Sudan), then the AU had a duty to intervene in a protective capacity.

¶7. (C) Chairperson Ping's remarks were detailed and anodyne. Quoting broadly from his 26-page report issued the week before the Summit, he highlighted the achievements of the Peace and Security Council in its first years of operation. However, with 20 internal conflicts within the past 20 years, 3 million of the world's 10.5 million refugees, and 11.6 million of the 26 million IDPs, Africa still had much work to do. He three times thanked Libya for its work to bring Peace and Security issues to the fore, calling the Summit's work complimentary to the full implementation of the Continental Protocol on Peace and Security, to be completed in 2010. Ping made special note of the symbolic significance that brought the Special Summit into being: the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought Muammar al-Qadhafi to power and the 10th Anniversary of the Sirte Proclamation in which Organization of African Unity heads of state declared their intent to form the African Union.

SUMMIT ATMOSPHERICS: AFRICA KISSES THE RING

¶8. (C) Libya's management of event logistics was less organized than the three-day summit held in July (ref A). A member of the Ugandan delegation told P/E Chief that they were deposited at a dark hotel after being picked up at the airport on August 29 with no information on meeting times or locations. Libyan protocol, which did not provide any information on how to obtain credentials until August 27, faced lengthy backlogs at the Kabir Hotel. Guma Ibrahim Amer, the Libyan Assistant Secretary-equivalent for African Affairs, spent an hour after the Great Lakes work session shuttling high-ranking Africans through the credentialing process. Observers were less lucky. After attending work sessions with badges held over from Sirte, our delegation (and China's) was told no credentials would be coming on August 30 due to Iftar and evening celebrations. Although the promised credentials never were issued, Emboffs were able to attend as observers with other members of the diplomatic corps. The opening ceremony lasted just under an hour. As attendees filed out, Qadhafi invited the assembled to a cultural event later in the evening at Mitiga Air Base. That event (septel), however, focused entirely on the 40th anniversary of the coup that brought Qadhafi to power, marking a

anniversary of the coup that brought Qadhafi to power, making a full transition from the AU Summit to Libya-centric themes.

¶9. (C) As with Sirte, Libyan officials attempted to cover for lack of planning by spending lavishly on food and foreign event planning staff. The president of the Corinthia Hotel told Poloff that five days before the Summit, Libyan Protocol had requested that the Corinthia Group open an expatriate compound still under construction to house Summit attendees. The work was so hurried, that the president himself was installing light bulbs and finishes to the apartments as late as August 29. Similarly, a 333-room Radisson Hotel across from the Summit site was opened two months early to accommodate the influx. Despite these measures, many African contacts grumbled about Libya's handling of the affair -- particularly when they viewed the Summit as little more than a small piece of Qadhafi's celebrations surrounding the September 1 anniversary of the coup that brought him to power. Still, several African delegates acknowledged that they had little choice, with a member of the Ghanaian delegation saying, "we know that nothing will happen [because of decisions taken at the Summit], but no one wants to make the Leader angry."

¶10. (C) Comment: Short on substance and long on platitudes, this

TRIPOLI 00000715 003.2 OF 003

extraordinary summit seemed to serve only as the opening event for Libya's 40th anniversary celebrations. Many observers cynically noted that the Summit likely was called only to ensure an adequate number of heads of state was on-hand for the September 1 celebration. Most attendees nevertheless seemed content to go through the motions to give Qadhafi his day. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI72

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI72 aka Wikileaks id #189727 ?
Subject	AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 30 Jan 2009 17:16 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/01/09TRIPOLI72.html
References	08TRIPOLI474 , 08TRIPOLI498 , 08TRIPOLI563 , 08TRIPOLI597 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI563
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI73 , 09TRIPOLI765 , 09TRIPOLI99
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9534
OO RUEHDE RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0072/01 0301716
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 301716Z JAN 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4390
INFO RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0823
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0748
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0880
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4914
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000072

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; DEPT PLEASE PASS COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON;
ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/30/2019
TAGS: ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: AL-QADHAFI'S FEINT: LIBYAN OIL NATIONALIZATION UNLIKELY

REF: A) 08 TRIPOLI 474 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 498 , C) 08 TRIPOLI 563 , D) 08 TRIPOLI 597 , E) TRIPOLI 40

TRIPOLI 00000072 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy - Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. During a recent video conference with Georgetown University students, Muammar al-Qadhafi suggested that Libya and other oil exporting states could nationalize their oil production in view of sharply plummeting petroleum prices. Several days later, however, a sensior MFA official assured the visiting Spanish King's delegation that Libya does

assured the visiting Spanish King's delegation that Libya does not intend to do so. In typical fashion, al-Qadhafi's call for nationalization was ill-defined and left considerable room for interpretation. Industry experts in Washington and Libya have not entirely dismissed the possibility that the GOL could nationalize its oil and gas sector (Libya did so in 1972); however, they do not currently judge it to be a serious threat and are waiting to see whether legislation proposing such an initiative is introduced in advance of the upcoming session of the General People's Congress. Informed contacts view the call for nationalization as a tactical move to: 1) leverage the expected re-negotiation of existing contracts with international oil companies (IOCs'); 2) prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libyan claims compensation fund; 3) establish a context for Libya's potential unilateral cuts in production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC, and; 4) prepare the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, which will be introduced at the General People's Congress session, will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. The GOL is in the midst of a painful recalculation of its 2009 national budget to reflect lower oil revenues. Suggesting nationalization - an idea al-Qadhafi attributed to members of the local-level Basic People's Congresses and can therefore disavow easily - clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut. Al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem comparatively palatable. End summary.

AL-QADHAFI THROWS A CURVEBALL

¶2. (C) During a wide-ranging video conference with Georgetown University students on January 21, Muammar al-Qadhafi raised the topic of oil, saying " ... oil-exporting countries might opt for nationalizations due to the sharp fall in oil prices". His speech was foreshadowed by articles in state-run newspapers, later picked up by Reuters, saying that members of the Basic People's Congresses (the lower part of the pyramid scheme of legislative committees and congresses that form the GOL) had called for nationalization. Noting sharply plummeting oil prices, al-Qadhafi suggested that oil production should be temporarily curtailed or stopped altogether to spur higher prices and suggested that a price point of USD 100/barrel was needed to underwrite Libya's ambitious infrastructure development projects. Libya's former senior representative to OPEC, Abdullah al-Badri, told the press on January 23 that nationalization could be "in the offing" and suggested that events in Gaza may have partly prompted the proposal. At a National U.S.-Arab Chamber of Commerce lunch in Houston on January 27, Libya's Ambassador to Washington, Ali Aujali, said the GOL had not ruled out nationalization and characterized a USD 100/barrel price point as "fair". The NOC directed oil companies producing in Libya to cut production by 270,000 barrels per day in compliance to an output-cutting decision adopted by OPEC.

¶3. (C) During the recent visit to Tripoli of Spanish King Juan Carlos I, al-Qadhafi was quoted as saying that " ... if Libya ends up taking this decision, it will be because we don't have any choice". Despite the public threats, MFA Secretary for Arab Affairs (U/S-equivalent) Muhammad Siala told the Spanish delegation that oil production would not be nationalized. In remarks to Spanish daily "El Pais", Spanish energy giant Repsol's President, Antoni Brufau, speculated that al-Qadhafi had been "thinking out loud" (further details septel). A well-connected contact in Tripoli who is a close friend of Libyan National Oil Chairman Shukhri Ghanem told the Ambassador on January 29 that Ghanem had not taken the press reports or al-Qadhafi's remarks seriously and did not consider

nationalization of Libya's oil production as a serious or plausible possibility. Ghanem was "extremely frustrated" that he had not been consulted or informed before al-Qadhafi gave his remarks, and told our contact he was "fed up" and waiting for an opportunity to leave his position at the NOC.

GOL WANTS TO RENEGOTIATE EXISTING PRODUCTION CONTRACTS, INCREASE

ITS SHARE

¶4. (C) Part of the issue may be definitional. Although al-Qadhafi has used the phrase "nationalization", he may in fact be signaling more aggressive efforts by the GOl and NOC to secure greater shares of oil produced under existing contracts. During 2008, the NOC renegotiated four existing production contracts with Italy's ENI, Canada's Petro-Canada, a consortium of U.S. Occidental/ Austrian OMV, and a European consortium of Spanish Repsol/French TOTAL/Austrian OMV/ Norwegian Hydro (reftels A, B, C, D). According to a recently-released NOC report, the renegotiated contracts increased the GOL's earnings by USD 5.4 billion last year; the four companies involved also paid USD 3 billion in front-end bonuses, increasing the GOL's take. The renegotiated terms brought those contracts in line with Libya's preferred exploration and production sharing agreement (EPSA) rubric, under which IOC's already producing in Libya have extended their contracts, paid sizeable bonuses and dramatically reduced their production shares to the neighborhood of 10-15 percent. The NOC has repeatedly said it wants to renegotiate its old (i.e., non-EPSA) contracts along EPSA-IV terms, which would allow it to have more than an 80 percentage share.

¶5. (C) The Oasis Group (ConocoPhillips, Marathon, Hess and Occidental), Repsol, Wintershall and Total remain as the foreign producing companies that have not signed the new agreements to align their share percentages with the most recent EPSA-IV configuration. The Oasis Group, whose constituent members' assets and production were nationalized in 1972, agreed in 2005 to pay Libya USD 1.8 billions to return to their previous acreage, which had been held in trust under a "stand fast agreement" for 19 years during the period U.S. sanctions were in effect against Libya. Oasis' contract is for 25 years; the NOC holds a 59.2 percent share, ConocoPhillips and Marathon each have 16.33 percent each, and Hess has an 8.16 percent share. The GOL would like to renegotiate Oasis' contract to increase its share, and has informally signaled that it intends to do so.

¶6. (C) At the same time, industry journals report that the re-negotiated contracts with IOC's will entail investment in exploration and production of some USD 22 billion over the next 5-10 years. Libya would bear up to 50 percent of that financial burden, at a time when it may already have to scale back its infrastructure development projects in light of falling revenues (ref E). The GM of Canada's Verenex (one of the few companies to find new oil under new EPSA's) said nationalization "did not make sense" since the NOC would have to bear bear 100 percent of development and production costs. By way of example, the NOC only bears 50 percent of Verenex's development costs, but gets 87 percent of production revenues.

CLAIMS COMPENSATION FUND CONTRIBUTIONS

¶7. (C) In addition to providing leverage for potential renegotiation of existing contracts, the threat to nationalize may in part be an attempt to prompt IOC's operating in Libya to contribute to the U.S.-Libya claims compensation fund that was implemented in October 2008. Marathon's General Manager (GM) told the Ambassador that the NOC Chairman Shukhri had begun soliciting IOC's again about two weeks ago for contributions to

the fund established to compensate U.S. victims of acts of terrorism authored by Libya. The NOC had previously targeted only companies that were producing oil; however, in its most recent approach it also touched IOC's that are in the exploration phase and have not yet begun producing oil. Representatives of Occidental said the company was concerned about press reports, but not overly so. Oxy has received private assurances from Ghanem that nationalization is not the in the offing, and views al-Qadhafi's remarks as posturing to pressure companies to contribute to the fund. GM's of major IOC's here believe that the first-tier producers, who have so far abided by an informal agreement not to accede to demands for contributions, will continue to hold the line; however, there is concern that second-tier producers and perhaps oilfield supply and services companies may buckle under pressure from the NOC and choose to contribute. A second meeting between IOC GM's and Ghanem that was to have occurred on January 28 has been postponed until February 1 or 2, according to Occidental's GM.

PORTENT OF FURTHER UNILATERAL PRODUCTION CUTS BY LIBYA?

¶8. (C) Remarks by al-Qadhafi and other senior GOL officials may also have been intended to establish a context for potential unilateral cuts in Libyan production of oil below levels dictated by OPEC. Three OPEC production cuts since September,

most recently a 2.2 million barrel per day cut that went into effect January 1, have failed to slow a slide that has left crude oil prices about 70 percent below the mid-July 2008 price of USD 150 per barrel. Libya directed IOC's in Libya to cut their production by 270,000 barrels per day (Libya's total production is 1.7-1.8 million barrels/day), more than it needed to account for its share of the overall OPEC cut. In his Georgetown remarks, al-Qadhafi flatly said that Libya would not adhere to OPEC's quotas " ... because our livelihood depends on oil". He also suggested that further unilateral production cuts or perhaps even a temporary production freeze could be adopted, although either of those options would result in further declines in revenue at a time when the GOL can ill afford it.

CREATING A DIVERSION IN ADVANCE OF THE UPCOMING GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS?

¶9. (C) Finally, al-Qadhafi's remarks may be part of an effort to prepare regime figures and, to a lesser extent, the Libyan people for the fact that this year's GOL budget, to be introduced at an upcoming session of the General People's Congress (GPC), will be adversely impacted by falling oil revenues and the global financial crisis. As reported ref E, the session planned for January was postponed, in part because the GOL has had to re-calculate the national budget to reflect dramatically reduced oil revenues. A senior MFA official told us that al-Qadhafi, unhappy that widely-publicized infrastructure and development projects designed to demonstrate the Jamahiriya system's benefits, tried to secure funds from Libya's newly-constituted Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) to cover budget shortfalls and avoid delaying the projects. The President of the Libyan Investment Authority, which administers the SWF, told the Ambassador that a recently-adopted law prohibits such raids on the fund, and al-Qadhafi appears to have been deterred from doing so (at least for now).

¶10. (C) Comment: Famous for saying the unexpected (a favorite local saying is "from Libya comes the new"), al-Qadhafi did not disappoint with his threat to nationalize Libya's oil production. As with similar dramatic, headline-grabbing statements on various other subjects in the past, though, much of what he says and does represents tactical maneuvering rather than a sincere expression of intent. While it is never wise to rule out the possibility of seemingly irrational decisions by

the GOL, we are not inclined to believe that nationalization is being seriously considered. Floating the idea helps leverage the GOL's position with respect to renegotiating existing oil production contracts and (potentially) garnering contributions to the claims compensation fund. More important in the immediate sense, though, is that it clearly signals the extent to which sagging oil prices and the global financial crisis have hurt oil-dependent economies like Libya's, helping pre-empt criticism from abroad if/when Libya makes further unilateral production cuts below OPEC-dictated levels and from regime elements when big ticket development projects are scaled back or cut at the upcoming session of the GPC. In that regard, al-Qadhafi's real intent may have been to shift the goalposts of debate so that the steps he ultimately takes seem palatable by comparison with the specter of what could have been.

Well-connected businessman Husni Bey (strictly protect) told the Ambassador that he doubted that the GOL would "make the same mistake twice" by nationalizing oil production again, and highlighted the fact that al-Qadhafi attributed authorship of the idea to the BPC's, which would make it easier for him to later disown it. Tellingly, MFA A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri told the Ambassador on January 28 that he did not expect nationalization to occur, and had attended a meeting earlier that day in which participants discussed opening a consulate in Houston, in part to better facilitate travel to/from Libya by U.S. oil representatives. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI73

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI73 aka Wikileaks id #189796 ?
Subject	A KING IN AL-QADHAFI'S COURT: SPAIN'S JUAN CARLOS VISITS LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Feb 2009 10:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI73.html
References	09TRIPOLI72
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0168
PP RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0073/01 0321007
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011007Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4393
INFO RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 0041
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1390
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0751
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0883
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0826
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4917
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000073

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/1/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , LY *[Libya]* , SP *[Spain; Balearic Islands; Canary Islands; Mallorca]*
SUBJECT: A KING IN AL-QADHAFI'S COURT: SPAIN'S JUAN CARLOS VISITS LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 72

TRIPOLI 00000073 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: King Juan Carlos of Spain's visit to Libya served as a platform for the GOL to walk back Muammar al-Qadhafi's announcement that oil production might be nationalized. In the first visit of a Spanish head of state since Libya's independence in 1951, Juan Carlos' delegation managed to secure symbolic compensation for unpaid, decades-old

managed to secure symbolic compensation for unpaid, decades old debts to Spanish companies. Al-Qadhafi, however, remained fixated on Gaza (duly instructing the king on his one-state solution) and bilateral visa deals. The two leaders reportedly got on well and, in an unusual move, al-Qadhafi invited 16 Spanish businessmen to join the king in one of their meetings. The king's business-minded entourage was reportedly heartened by al-Qadhafi's promises to protect their investments in Libya and assurances by senior GOL officials that oil nationalization was not immediately in the offing. End Summary.

AL-QADHAFI ONLY "THINKING OUT LOUD" ON NATIONALIZATION

¶2. (C) In a short but symbolically important visit January 22-23, characterized by all the pomp and goodwill the Libyans are capable of mustering, Spanish King Juan Carlos served as a convenient interlocutor for the GOL to walk back Muammar al-Qadhafi's suggestion in a January 21 video conference with Georgetown University students that Libya might nationalize oil production (reftel). The king - focusing on economic and commercial links between Spain and Libya - brought with him the Foreign Minister, the Minister of State for Trade, and 16 senior business executives, including REPSOL-YPF president Antoni Brufau. The two leaders met three times over the course of the 24-hour visit, once with Brufau and his 15 business companions who heard the leader repeat his statement on nationalization "because [Libya] has no other choice." Saying Libyans enjoyed a close relationship with Spain, he added reassuringly that "Spanish companies have nothing to fear." Senior MFA adviser Mohammed Siala separately told the businessmen that nationalization was "unlikely." After the visit, REPSOL head Brufau told Spanish press that al-Qadhafi's comments on nationalization had been nothing more than "thinking out loud" and that he had no fears that nationalization was imminent.

¶3. (C) Spanish Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos met separately with his Libyan counterpart, Abdulrahman Shalgam, to sign a memorandum of understanding securing compensation for unpaid private debt to Spanish companies dating back to the early 1980s. Under its terms, Libya agreed to pay USD 18 million to settle USD 60-80 million in total claims. Spanish DCM Rafael Reig conceded that the payment was largely symbolic, noting that all of the firms involved had long ago written off the debt, but that payments as large as USD 5 million were akin to "winning the lottery" for the companies involved. In a further gesture to Spanish business, al-Qadhafi highlighted the historic reliability of Spanish dealings with Libya and opened the door for further investment in infrastructure projects and renewable and solar energy. Al-Qadhafi made special mention of REPSOL, which stayed on through most of the sanctions period. REPSOL now produces 300,000 of Libya's estimated 1.8 million barrels per day and renewed its production contract in July 2008 through 2032.

AL-QADHAFI: MY KINGDOM FOR A VISA

¶4. (C) In a post-visit readout to EU chiefs of mission attended by the DCM, the Spanish Ambassador said some progress had been made on two bilateral agreements. Spain expects Libya to ratify a Protection of Investments agreement during the spring session of the General People's Congress (Spain ratified in November) and negotiations toward a double taxation agreement continue. He added that Spain had also signed a memorandum of understanding covering visas. In the course of negotiating an EU Framework Agreement, Libya has been vocal in decrying the 10-day wait time Libyans face in applying for a Schengen visa and is looking to secure bilateral agreements with member countries to drop their security consultation requirements and commit to a 48-hour turnaround time for visas. According to a Spanish Interior Ministry official seconded to the embassy here, Spain agreed to remove itself from the group of 10 countries requiring additional security checks for Libyans and would start talks to exempt diplomats from needing "national" visas.

KING HEARS AL-QADHAFI'S ONE-STATE SOLUTION PLAN

¶5. (C) According to the Spanish Ambassador, al-Qadhafi also briefed Juan Carlos on his one-state "Isratine" solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Saying it was "wrong that

TRIPOLI 00000073 002.2 OF 002

Palestinians don't have weapons and Israel does", al-Qadhafi cited favorably the example of Charles de Gaulle as a leader who had banned arms to both sides of the conflict.

¶6. (C) Comment: Spanish diplomats here are rightly pleased with the outcome of the visit, despite the fact that the deliverables were largely symbolic. Understanding that business is politics in Libya and that al-Qadhafi controls both, Spain will likely benefit commercially from the warm interactions between the king and al-Qadhafi. Other gains will be more difficult, with the Libyan diplomatic apparatus growing increasingly frustrated with the Europeans' collective visa policy. Afterglow from the visit may prove to be brief, though, as the Bulgarian Ambassador, Cassandra-like, reminded his Spanish and EU colleagues that Bulgaria had once enjoyed "the best relations" with Libya, but suddenly became "the most hated country in Libya" after Bulgarian nurses in Benghazi were falsely accused by the GOL of infecting Libyan children with the AIDS virus. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI739

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI739 aka Wikileaks id #224975 ?
Subject	EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Sep 2009 12:45 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI739.html
References	09STATE71325
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4926
OO RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHGI RUEHJS RUEHKUK RUEHLH
RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0739/01 2571245
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 141245Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5257
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5802
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000739

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PPD, AND S/P (GBEHRMAN)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , OEXC *[Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations]* , OSCI *[Science Grants]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , SENV *[Environmental Affairs]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , TNGD *[Engineering Research and Development]* , TSPL *[Science and Technology Policy]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIPOLI'S RESPONSE TO THE PRESIDENT'S CAIRO SPEECH

REF: STATE 71325

TRIPOLI 00000739 001.2 OF 004

¶1. (SBU) Introduction: Following the exchange of Ambassadors in January 2009, the United States and Libya have embarked on a new period of engagement. With the restoration of full diplomatic relations for the first time in more than three decades, we are engaging Libyans on a vast range of public diplomacy and democracy building initiatives, including education and English language, human development, cultural outreach, entrepreneurship, and science and technology programs. These nascent programs are widely viewed by the Libyan public as a sign of the mutual respect and partnership that are developing

sign of the mutual respect and partnership that are developing with the normalized relationship. The President's June 4 speech in Cairo added momentum to this new partnership, and many Libyans welcome the change in rhetoric and policy included in that speech. However, the Libyan Government remains extremely suspicious about some aspects of our public diplomacy and outreach programs and, in the past three years, has blocked some programs that included direct interaction with the local population. There is an influential group who oppose the process of normalization with the United States and make their voices heard in decision-making circles. Although there has been a growth in "charitable organizations" in recent years, true civil society in Libyan is nonexistent. "Non-governmental" organizations require Prime Minister-level approval to operate and retain close ties to the government; many are chaired by close relatives of leading government figures. Both of these factors make it difficult for the Embassy to carry out the far-ranging, consultative process outlined in reftel, yet we seek every opportunity to engage our key partners in a discussion of U.S. policy and initiatives. We are incorporating key aspects of the President's Cairo initiatives in our public diplomacy programming; an outline of our specific ideas follows. We also note that normalization -- within the fullest legal extent possible -- of visa regimes and entry requirements for Libyan citizens is necessary to convey and implement the full extent of respect and partnership laid out in the President's Cairo speech. End introduction.

HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

¶2. (SBU) In the area of Human Development and Rule of Law, Post will assist indigenous non-governmental organizations calling for reform and greater transparency. Through capacity-building exercises and exchanges with U.S. and international non-governmental organizations, Post will help Libyan organizations develop the expertise required to effectively lobby and implement political and economic reforms. More specifically, Post will target its outreach on the development of linkages between Libyan cadre and international professional associations such as the American Bar Association. With MEPI funding, Post was able to establish the U.S. Department of Commerce's Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP) in Libya, working mainly with the General People's Committee for Justice and the General People's Committee for Industry, Economy, and Trade (Ministry of Economy-equivalent). Post has facilitated three assessment and program planning trips for CLDP staff to Libya, as well as a visit by a U.S. Federal Judge. Post will implement follow-up workshops with the judges in Libya, a study tour for the judges to visit the Arbitration Center in Tunisia, and a trip to visit the U.S. Federal Judge at the U.S. Court of International Trade in New York. Proposals for future activities include: Fostering the creation of a Commercial Law Inter-agency Task Force and providing training in safeguarding intellectual property rights of small- and medium-sized businesses. These programs will strengthen judicial independence and help develop a society that comes to respect the rule of law. Finally, Post will undertake specific programs to push Libya to formalize and rationalize its policies regarding labor and migration management. We will focus our engagement on conducting workshops for policy makers to develop migration management, rationalize guest worker programs, increase law enforcement capacity to combat trafficking in persons and smuggling, and regularizing care for at-risk populations. Post also plans to increase its cooperation with the MEPI Regional Office in Tunis to expand programs in the areas of Pediatric HIV/AIDS Care and Treatment programs, media development initiatives, and education system enhancement. We have found that soliciting Libyan government requests and identification of various programs and needs through dialogue ensures better prospects for success.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE PROGRAMS

¶3. (SBU) English Language Outreach has been one of our most successful initiatives in Libya, and the way in which we have reached the most people with the least amount of host government intervention. Post will continue working with English Language Fellows and Specialist Programs and will shift from government institutions to working directly with the ever increasing number

of private language and training centers. Fostering this kind of people-to-people contact is at the heart of the President's Cairo message. We will continue to execute short term (2 to 6 weeks programs) in English language instruction that will focus either on direct English Language Instruction or on Training Future English Language Teachers. It is our goal to expand these programs beyond Tripoli and Benghazi into Southern and Western Libya, while especially targeting underprivileged minority groups.

¶4. (SBU) The ACCESS Micro-Scholarship Program is designed to provide English Language instruction to under-privileged children from 14 to 18 years of age with particular emphasis on underprivileged minority groups. Embassy Tripoli has implemented with tremendous success the ACCESS Micro-Scholarship Program at the Success School in Benghazi. We will expand the program to two schools in Tripoli and at least three schools in southern Libya. Embassy Tripoli would like to double this program over the next four years; with a goal of providing 100 scholarships per year by 2015.

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL OUTREACH

¶5. (SBU) The Embassy continues to work to bridge the substantial gap created by the 24-year break in U.S.-Libyan relations, and the most effective way to do this is to continue to focus on Exchange and Speaker programs. Libyans are slowly returning to the United States for study, tourism, and business; enthusiasm to do so is high, but Libyans have little practical knowledge of U.S. systems and practices, which vary considerably from those present in Libya. Embassy Tripoli hopes to increase the number of participants in the International Visitors Leadership Program, the Fulbright Foreign Student Program, the Fulbright Foreign Language Teaching Assistant Program, the Study of the U.S. Institutes, and the Undergraduate Exchange Program.

¶6. (SBU) With the exception of English Language Specialists, Post has been less successful in programming American speakers and visitors in Libya. Programs have been fully scheduled and then cancelled due to lack of support by the Government of Libya by not issuing visas. Over Fiscal Years 2008 and 2009, Embassy Tripoli had more than 15 American visitors and speakers programs cancelled. Post will actively work to further develop its relationships with Government of Libyan institutions in order to secure the support necessary to execute speaker programming. Post hopes to match the success of English Language Fellows and Specialists in the fields of music, sports, education, archaeology, science, and technology and will leverage regional Speakers and programs planning to visit other posts in the Middle East and North Africa.

EDUCATIONAL ADVISING AND INFORMATIONAL RESOURCE CENTER

¶7. (SBU) Post remains engaged in an active Public Diplomacy program to re-establish a strong relationship between Libyans and Americans, to promote a positive vision of the United States, and to cultivate common interests outlined in the President's Cairo speech. Post is actively engaged in the educational sector, working with the Government of Libya to assist Libyans who wish to pursue studies in the United States and establishing relationships with local universities to conduct targeted workshops on the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the

Language (TOEFL), Graduate Record Examination (GRE), and the college and university application process. Compared to its small population (around 5.5 million), Libya has a large number of students studying overseas (more than 30,000). During the late 1970's and early 1980's there were more than 5,000 Libyan students in the United States. That number was reduced to almost zero during the sanctions period, but fortunately has seen large increases since the reestablishment of full diplomatic relations.

¶8. (SBU) According to the Ministry of Higher Education, there are now nearly 1,700 Libyan students studying at American Colleges and Universities and the Government of Libya intends to increase that number to 6,000 through its own scholarship and grant programs. Due to suspicion on the part of the Government of Libya, Post has had limited access to Libyan students headed to the United States. The absence of appropriate educational advising, cultural advising sessions, and pre-departure orientations has left many Libyan students unprepared for their experience in the United States. In academic year 2008-2009, nearly one-third of all Libyan students studying in the United States returned without having finished the first year of their program. This is a problem of which the Government of Libya and Embassy Tripoli are acutely aware, and through a campaign of sustained outreach to the Government of Libya, Post has slowly gained access to students interested in studying in the United States in the academic year 2009-2010. In addition to

Government of Libya obstacles, the Public Affairs Section currently has no publicly accessible space. By the end of this calendar year, the Public Affairs Section will establish an Information Resource Center which will give us greater access to students. Given the high interest in studying in the United States, Post plans to hire additional staff members to provide regular educational advising sessions within the Embassy's Information Resource Center. In addition to properly outfitting the Information Resource Center, Embassy Tripoli will establish a network of American Corners throughout Libya that will serve as its regional outreach centers. The American Corners will provide Education Advising and information on the United States and will leverage current relationships with regional Libyan institutions.

Entrepreneurship.

¶9. (SBU) Within the area of Entrepreneurship, Post will train Corporate Boards of Directors in Strategic Planning/Roles and Responsibilities to help facilitate the transition from public ownership to private management. Post will implement programs to train board members in free-market principles, business ethics, market strategies, and shareholder rights and responsibilities, all of which are essential to ensure a more transparent system. Post's efforts to couple Libyan organizations with international partners will help to raise awareness of anti-corruption programs and resources.

¶10. (SBU) With MEPI funding, the Financial Services Volunteer Corps (FSVC) conducted three professional workshops from Fall 2008 to the present, at the invitation of the Libyan Central Bank. The workshops covered Banking Supervision, Banking Controls, and IT Systems for Banks. The Director of the Libyan Stock Exchange met with FSVC leadership in New York in 2009, and requested training for his staff, which has been scheduled in Libya but is contingent upon FSVC receiving the required Libyan visas. Post has established a good track record in with entrepreneurial and banking programs in Libya and we are well-poised to expand our training to include consulting in banking and securities regulations, and to assist with Libya's ongoing efforts to privatize its banking sector.

¶11. (SBU) Entrepreneurship programs for women and the expansion

of economic opportunities for women remain two key areas for Post. Libya remains a largely traditional society, with economic activity generally limited to male participation. As Libya's economy modernizes, it is crucial that women seize entrepreneurial opportunities and that frameworks exist by which women have equal access to finance and business-management technical assistance. Current data on the role of women in the commercial sector are incomplete; an assessment will be necessary to determine which programs will be most successful. With MEPI funding, Post will undertake a needs assessment on women economic activity and areas for improvement. Post has identified the Waatasimu Foundation (headed by Aisha al-Qadhafi) and UNDP as potential implementers of this proposed program.

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

¶12. (SBU) As highlighted in the President's Cairo Speech, science and technology presents a unique opportunity for government to government cooperation, citizen exchanges, and capacity-building programs. Post, in combination with the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science has very successfully engaged the Libyan government in the area of science and technology. One of our most exciting and successful programs has been the Libyan Space Camp project where Post and OES combined to send twenty-four Libyan high school students, two Libyan teachers, and a professional Libyan film crew to take part in NASA's Advanced Space Academy in Huntsville, Alabama. The program was carried out under the U.S.-Libya Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, signed in January 2008. At the Academy, the students and teachers learned about the mental, emotional, and physical demands astronauts face and were able to see American science and technology up-close. The Libyan students and teachers represent the first group from North Africa to attend U.S. Space Camp, and only the second group from the Arab world since 1982. A film recording the students' experience at camp will be produced by a Libyan film crew. The film will be shown on Libyan television, in Libyan classrooms, and throughout the region to spark an interest in science and discovery, demonstrate U.S. goodwill, and inspire future participation in science and technology exchanges. Given the success of the program, Post intends to continue the Libyan Space Camp project and in the coming year will specifically target under-represented groups and non-traditional audiences for participation in this program.

¶13. (SBU) Post and other local embassies built a partnership comprising members of the European Union, private companies, the

TRIPOLI 00000739 004.2 OF 004

U.S. Government, and the Government of Libya to improve the quality of care and treatment for victims of AIDS. Expanding these successes to the broader goals of infectious disease prevention and increased public awareness will improve the overall quality of healthcare, and provide much-needed professional employment for Libyans entering the workforce.

VISAS AND ENTRY PROCEDURES

¶14. (SBU) One aspect of the relationship that continues to present a significant obstacle to building full, flourishing people-to-people ties is the current restrictive visa reciprocity schedule and the additional procedures required for Libyans upon entry into the United States by the National Security Entry/Exit Registration System (NSEERS). The lack of multiple-entry long-term visas in addition to the additional security and registration requirements are viewed by Libyans as a symbol of a lingering lack of respect from the difficult days in our bilateral relationship. The current requirements allow little flexibility and result in even U.S. Government-sponsored visitors being subjected to long delays for their travel and arrival. For example, the participants of Space Camp missed an

arrival. For example, the participants of Space Camp missed an entire day of their exchange program due to a missed flight caused by a six hour NSEERS registration process at the Atlanta International Airport. A change in both the visa reciprocity schedule and NSEERS registration process are needed in order to fully realize the President's Cairo goals of mutual respect, peace, advancement, and partnership. We are currently working with the Libyans to establish a bilateral working group to liberalize both the U.S. and Libyan visa schedules.

COMMENT

¶15. (SBU) Libya has made great strides towards rejoining the community of nations by renouncing weapons of mass destruction and international terrorism and is a top partner in combating terrorism. However, years of isolation and stagnation have taken their toll. Libyans must undertake significant political, economic, and civil society reforms, as well as the basic institution-building necessary to allow Libya to make up for decades of underdevelopment. In February 2004, U.S. diplomats arrived back in Tripoli ready to implement a wide range of programs in step with Libyan actions to fulfill its commitments and reopen to the West. The pace of reform has gone slower than expected and the reform process in Libya will be generational. During that span, continued public diplomacy and assistance programming will be necessary to build the trust and cooperation necessary to achieve the objectives laid out by the President in Cairo. Recognizing the extreme sensitivities on the part of the government to the kind of interaction we anticipate, the Embassy will move forward in a deliberate but careful manner to ensure that the scope and intensity of our activities push up against, but do not cross, the red lines that are part and parcel of the political fabric here. The current controversy regarding the return of convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi may impact on the short and near term prospects of Embassy programs to affect the range of activities that we have laid out in this cable. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI740

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI740 aka Wikileaks id #225027 ?
Subject	EMBASSY TRIPOLI RESPONSE: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Sep 2009 15:29 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI740.html
References	09STATE68590
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5115
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0740/01 2571529
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 141529Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5261
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0232
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5806
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000740

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG (KALMBACH), IO/UNP (SUN), AND NEA/RA (CLOUD/VACCARO). DEPT PLEASE PASS TO USUN (DUGAN) AND NSC (BROWN).

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , OTRA *[Travel]* , OVIP *[Visits and Travel of Prominent Individuals and Leaders]* , KSEP, CVIS *[Visas]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]* , USUN, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIPOLI RESPONSE: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY HIGH LEVEL ATTENDANCE AND REQUESTS FOR MEETINGS

REF: STATE 68590

¶1. (SBU) Post submits the following information regarding high level members of Libya's delegation to the 64th UN General Assembly Session.

A. Attendance of the Head of State

-- Name and title: Muammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of al-Fateh Revolution

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York: To arrive

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York: To arrive by chartered flight on September 22nd. Further information not available. Colonel Qadhafi will be present for the General Debate.

-- Whether spouse of the Head of State will travel to New York: Information unavailable.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in a bilateral or multilateral meeting: Yes, Arabic.

B. Attendance of the Head of Government: None.

C. Attendance of the Foreign Minister: Yes.

-- Name and title: Dr. Musa Kusa.

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York: On or about September 20. The Foreign Minister will be present for the General Debate.

-- Whether the spouse of the Foreign Minister (if any) will travel to New York: Information unavailable.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in bilateral or multilateral meetings: Mr. Kusa normally travels with his own interpreter, but a back-up interpreter may be requested for Arabic language.

D. Attendance of other VIP's. (If no plans to attend UNGA, so state.)

¶1. Name and title: Muatassim al-Qadhafi, National Security Advisor

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York: On or about September 20.

-- Whether the spouse of the VIP (if any) will travel to New York: N/A.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in bilateral or multilateral meetings: No.

¶2. Name and title: Tuhami Khaled, Head of Libya's Internal Security Service

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York and whether the VIP will be present for the General Debate: Information not available.

-- Whether the spouse of the VIP (if any) will travel to New York: Information not available.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in bilateral or multilateral meetings: Information not available.

¶3. Name and title: Abuzaid Omar Dorda, Head of Libya's External Security Service

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York and whether

the VIP will be present for the General Debate: Information not available.

TRIPOLI 00000740 002 OF 002

-- Whether the spouse of the VIP (if any) will travel to New York: Information not available.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in bilateral or multilateral meetings: Information not available.

E. Attendance of the Foreign Ministry official responsible for IO affairs.

-- Name and title: Murad Humaima

-- Arrival and departure dates to and from New York and whether the VIP will be present for the General Debate: On or about September 20.

-- Whether the spouse of the VIP (if any) will travel to New York: Information not available.

-- Whether interpretation would be required in bilateral or multilateral meetings: No.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI741

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI741 aka Wikileaks id #225218 ?
Subject	VISA WOES AND LIBYAN BUREAUCRACY: CHINESE COMPANIES FACE SIMILAR ISSUES AS U.S. FIRMS IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 15 Sep 2009 15:06 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI741.html
References	09TRIPOLI517
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6062
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0741/01 2581506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 151506Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5263
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0596
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0439
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0028
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5808
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000741

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; PARIS AND
LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/5/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , LY *[Libya]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , ECPS *[Communications and Postal Systems]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , CH *[China (Mainland)]*
SUBJECT: VISA WOES AND LIBYAN BUREAUCRACY: CHINESE COMPANIES FACE
SIMILAR ISSUES AS U.S. FIRMS IN LIBYA

REF: TRIPOLI 517

TRIPOLI 00000741 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State

U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting, the Chinese Commercial Counselor outlined the main sectors in which Chinese companies work in Libya as well as the challenges these firms face. Twenty Chinese firms are registered with the People's Republic of China Embassy in Libya, working mainly in construction, telecommunications, and oil services. Chinese companies face some of the same challenges as American firms here, i.e. delays in securing visa approvals, dealing with capricious and suddenly-announced commercial laws (like the residency visa regulations), and having to double-track issues through the byzantine Libyan bureaucracy. End summary.

¶2. (C) Econoff met with the commercial section of the Embassy of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which is comprised of a Commercial Counselor (Guo Chang Zhan) and a Second Secretary for Commercial Affairs (Qu Yuan). Zhan has had previous postings in Senegal and Ghana, while Libya is the first overseas posting for Yuan. They outlined the main sectors in which Chinese companies work in Libya, as well as the challenges these firms face. According to Zhan, Chinese companies face some of the same challenges as American firms doing business in Libya, including delays in securing visa approvals, dealing with capricious and suddenly-announced commercial laws (like the residency visa fees), and having to double-track issues through the opaque Libyan bureaucracy.

¶3. (C) Zhan said twenty Chinese firms are registered with the PRC Embassy in Libya, working mainly in construction, telecommunications, and oil services. In accordance with Libyan labor laws, the companies employ Libyan staff in at least 30 percent of their positions. Some Chinese firms are engaged in the trade of goods, including trucks, which are sold via Libyan distributors.

CHINESE FIRMS BUILDING HOUSES, INFRASTRUCTURE, AND RAILROADS...

¶4. (C) In terms of construction, Chinese firms have contracts with the Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB), which are managed by the American company AECOM. [Note: AECOM provides overall program management and consulting to HIB. End Note.] China Railway Construction (CRC) is working on the 172 km stretch of railway between Tripoli and Ras Edjeer and the line between Al-Khums (east of Tripoli) and Sirte. [Note: Russian Railways is working on the 554 km railroad line between Sirte and Benghazi. End note.] CRC is also working on the 800 km railroad line between Misrata, on the Mediterranean Coast, and Sebha, in southern Libya.

...AND ALSO ACTIVE IN TELECOMS

¶5. (C) Chinese firms are also active in Libya's telecommunications sector. In April, the firm Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. won a contract with Libya Telecom and Technology (LTT) to deploy "fiber to the home" networks for households in 800 homes on the Airport Road in Alzohor District in Tripoli in the first phase. The firm plans to expand network coverage to other districts in the project's second phase. In 2008 the Chinese telecommunications equipment supplier ZTE Corporation won a USD 58 million network expansion contract from Libyana, one of two Libyan mobile network operators. The deal enables Libyana to expand its existing network from 1 million to 6.5 million lines. [Note: Libyana is one of two mobile phone operators owned by the General Post and Telecommunications Company (GPTC), the other being Al Madar. GPTC is run by Mohammed al-Qadhafi, the eldest son of Muammar al-Qadhafi. End note.] ZTE also has a contract with LTT to build a WiMAX wireless Internet network, covering eight cities in Libya, and has already begun offering services in Tripoli.

THE CNPC-VERENEX SAGA

¶6. (C) Econoff raised the issue of the pending sale of Canadian oil company Verenex to the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) (reftel). While CNPC has made a play at acquiring Canadian oil firm Verenex - the only successful oil exploration company in Libya thus far - it has not enlisted the help of the PRC Embassy in lobbying the Libyan government on its behalf. Zhan said he heard the proposed deal was "unsuccessful," as he had heard Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) would not approve

TRIPOLI 00000741 002.2 OF 002

the CNPC sale because the NOC desired to purchase Verenex. [Note: The CNPC offer to purchase Verenex expired on August 24, and CNPC did not move to renew that offer. End Note.]

WITH HEADACHES OVER VISAS AND CUMBERSOME LIBYAN BUREAUCRACY

¶7. (C) Zhan commented Chinese firms had complained about "sudden and unreasonable regulations" that caused work delays and related increases in operating costs. For example, the recent new decree requiring foreign workers to pay fees for residency permits (500 Libyan dinars, equivalent to about USD 400) had caused construction firms' costs to sky-rocket. He characterized the Libyan government as "inefficient" and lacking coordination among various entities. On visas, for example, he said approvals had to be obtained not only from immigration officials but also from the Labor Office, and there was little coordination between the two. As a result, companies often have to wait several months for visa approvals for their employees. Additionally, Zhan noted that many Chinese companies have had trouble importing equipment needed for projects due to new "fees" that are suddenly imposed on those imports.

COMMENT

¶8. (C) Comment: Chinese companies have carved out some niches for themselves in the Libyan market, namely in construction and telecommunications. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the Chinese commercial presence in Libya is growing, with scores of Chinese workers thronging flights between Tripoli and Benghazi, and Turkish Air flights regularly sold out with Chinese workers transiting Istanbul en route to Libya. Nevertheless, Chinese companies appear to face some of the same challenges as American firms, most of which seem to originate from Libya's opaque bureaucracy. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI748

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI748 aka Wikileaks id #225581 ?
Subject	HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE REBOUNDS AFTER DIFFICULT START
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 17 Sep 2009 10:49 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI748.html
References	09TRIPOLI677
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7857
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0748/01 2601049
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171049Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5271
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1158
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0830
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0598
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5816
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000748

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, L (BOB HARRIS), DRL (KARI JOHNSTONE). DEPT
PLEASE PASS TO NSC (SCOTT BUSBY) AND OVP (HERRO MUSTAFA).

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/17/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE REBOUNDS AFTER DIFFICULT START

REF: TRIPOLI 677

TRIPOLI 00000748 001.2 OF 005

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: An interagency team led by Acting A/S for DRL
Karen Stewart, and comprised of State, NSC, and OVP
representatives, launched with Libyan counterparts a bilateral
Human Rights Dialogue August 18 in Tripoli. Although a bizarre,
last-minute Libyan delegation and agenda switch nearly scuttled
the talks, FM Musa Kusa intervened to restore the original

delegation and agenda, and personally launched the talks. In his opening remarks, Kusa acknowledged the GOL's need for U.S. technical assistance in a range of areas, including illegal immigration and upgrading the capacity of Libya's detention centers and prisons. Kusa and other GOL officials protested the critical comments about Libya contained within the annual Human Rights Report and noted their interest in setting the record straight on Libya's human rights situation within the context of the Human Rights Dialogue. Kusa stressed that the GOL viewed the human rights dialogue as part of a larger group of bilateral dialogues with the United States on a number of topics, including security, civil-nuclear cooperation, and political-military engagement; his emphasis on this point, coupled with last-minute Libyan changes to the joint statement (which resulted in agreement for no statement) hinted at a deal struck with hardliners to put the talks back on track only if they had a broader -- or no -- public focus. While we will not know how serious the Libyans are about these talks until we receive their feedback on the action plans in mid-October, we are hopeful that they could lead to some positive engagement in the areas of immigration, refugee issues, and prison conditions. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) The U.S. delegation included Acting A/S for DRL Karen Stewart; Scott Busby, Director for Human Rights, National Security Council; Herro Mustafa, Senior Advisor for the Middle East and South Asia, Office of the Vice President; Robert K. Harris, Deputy Legal Advisor; Maggie Nardi, Director, Office of Maghreb Affairs, NEA Bureau; Kari Johnstone, Acting Director, Office of Near East and South Central Asia, DRL; Charge, and Pol/Econ Chief. The Libyan delegation that initiated the dialogue was led by FM Kusa and included Abdussalam al-Tumi, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission at the Ministry of Justice; Dr. Mohamed Salah al-Saghir, Head of the Department of International Law and Agreements at the MFA; Murad Hamim from the MFA's International Organizations Department; Hamid Ahmed Hdhiri, National Security Council; Abulqacem Gargum, Head of Judicial Police Service; Dr. Ramadhan Abdedayem, Head of the Department of Human Rights at the General People's Congress; Nasreddine Ageeli, MFA Legal Consultant on Human Rights; Mohamed el-Mahdi Hajaji, Secretary of the Department of Associations and Non-governmental Activities at the Ministry of Social Affairs; Brigadier Abdelmonem Ettunsi, Director of the Illegal Immigration Office at the Ministry of Public Security; and Dr. Ibrahim Abu Khzam of Al Fatah University. [Note: The MFA sent a diplomatic note August 26 formally listing the GOL delegation that included representatives that were not actually present at the talks, such as Dr. Ali al-Rishi, the Secretary of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs at the MFA (A/S-equivalent), and Mohamed Matari, Director of the Department of American Affairs at the MFA. Likewise, delegates who did attend the meeting were not included in the MFA's official participant list. University professor, Dr. Rajab Boudabbous was also listed as part of the official delegation. End note.]

DIALOGUE BEGINS WITH A FALSE START

¶3. (C) The U.S. interagency team led by Acting A/S for DRL Karen Stewart met with Libyan officials at 1030 local time August 18 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tripoli to initiate a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. While the Libyan side initially responded positively to the concept of the dialogue and provided on August 17 a list of participants and an agenda that paralleled our proposed agenda, the actual GOL team for the morning session was led by a philosophy professor, a judge, and the Foreign Minister's interpreter, none of whom was included among the original delegation. [Note: The GOL told us originally that their delegation would be led by the Justice Minister but told us August 17 that the A/S-equivalent for consular issues would be the lead. End Note.]

¶4. (C) After introducing himself as "a professor, not a

politician," noting that "politics is the art of tricks," philosophy professor Rajab Boudabbous attempted to open the bilateral Human Rights Dialogue with a lecture on human rights and the Libyan concept of democracy -- direct rule by the people or "jamahiriya." The U.S. delegation interrupted Boudabbous' lecture, halted the talks, and sought information about the

TRIPOLI 00000748 002.2 OF 005

whereabouts of the named GOL delegation. Boudabbous refused to clarify what had happened and continued with his lecture as if he had been uninterrupted. The U.S. team withdrew from the lecture, and taking a few moments to regroup, the Charge discussed the situation with MFA Director of the Americas Office, Mohamed Matari. [Note: Charge attempted to contact A/S-equivalent for the Americas Department Ahmed Fituri, who did not answer his phone throughout the morning. End note.] Matari told the Charge that he would inform Foreign Minister Musa Kusa of the U.S. side's objections to the delegation and format of the dialogue. Charge conveyed the importance of the initiation of the dialogue, as previously agreed, to the bilateral relationship and future engagement, including at the upcoming UN General Assembly session.

¶5. (C) As the U.S. delegation was in the process of departing the MFA, FM Kusa arrived but deliberately ignored the Charge's attempt to discuss the issue with him. Shortly thereafter, Matari called to inform the Charge that FM Kusa would lead the dialogue himself at 1830 hours and that he would like to host a dinner for the team at 2100 hours, as previously scheduled. Kusa's staff later revised the schedule to begin at 1730 local time, "to ensure sufficient time for substantive discussions."

TAKE TWO: THE DIALOGUE FINALLY COMMENCES

¶6. (C) At 1730 local time, the U.S. delegation met an appropriate GOL interagency team, led by the Foreign Minister, at Libya's Foreign Ministry. Kusa opened the meeting by stressing the need for bilateral dialogue. He noted that he had heard about the U.S. delegation's response to the professor's viewpoint during the morning meeting, calling it an example of the "bad chemistry" that had plagued the relationship. Kusa portrayed the Libyan government as ready to continue a results-driven human rights dialogue based on mutual respect. He acknowledged that the GOL needs U.S. assistance to improve the human rights situation. Specifically, Kusa requested U.S. assistance to combat illegal immigration and trafficking-in-persons, to upgrade and build capacity in Libyan prisons, and to train police. Kusa said that he had requested EU assistance to tackle the illegal immigration problem, specifying that in a country of six million people, Libya had three million immigrants, most of whom were illegal. However, he said that the European governments did not agree to assist in combating the problem. With borders 6,000 km long, mostly along the desert, and poor neighboring countries, Libya "can do nothing" according to Kusa, to combat illegal immigration unilaterally. He described a dire situation in Libya, with increasing crime, disease, and other problems, as the result of illegal immigration. He said that one human rights organization (not specifying which one) had brought to his attention the existence of a trafficking-in-persons problem in Libya, which Kusa noted could only be identified and combated with foreign assistance.

¶7. (C) Kusa further noted that Libya needed to take advantage of U.S. experience to upgrade Libya's prisons and detention facilities. He said Libya needed training for police officers and wardens on how to deal with prisoners in a way that respects their human rights. Referring to a UK project to upgrade Libyan prisons and train police officers, Kusa explained that the UK had sent experts to work on the issue areas he specified but that Libya needed even more assistance than what the UK was able

that Libya needed even more assistance than what the U.S. was able to provide.

¶8. (C) Kusa went on to discuss the method for evaluating human rights issues on both sides. He asked that the annual State Department Human Rights Report be a subject of discussion within the framework of the dialogue. Kusa referred to "fallacies" in the 2008 Human Rights Report on Libya, specifically recalling a section on the rights of women and the existence of political prisoners. On the first issue, he pointed to various facts proving that women are empowered in Libya - "at least 150 women work in the Foreign Ministry." Regarding political prisoners, he insisted that the "political prisoners" to which the report referred were actually fundamentalists with links to Al Qaeda, whom the GOL was trying to rehabilitate. He explained that the Libyan government was "stretching its hands" and "opening its heart" to dialogue and discussion for the sake of transparency and to correct the wrong information that the USG was reporting on the human rights situation in Libya.

¶9. (C) Acting A/S Stewart thanked Kusa for taking a personal interest in launching the dialogue, noting that the dialogue would be integral to broader bilateral efforts to expand

TRIPOLI 00000748 003.2 OF 005

cooperation across several spheres, including political-military, economic, education, and culture. She noted that the USG was engaged in human rights dialogues with many countries throughout the world, as the U.S. Congress and American people expect, and that the U.S. delegation would welcome the opportunity to address Libya's needs for technical assistance in the areas outlined by Kusa. She explained that the human rights dialogue could be a model for engagement in other subject areas. NEA/MAG Office Director Maggie Nardi suggested that issue-specific working groups be designated to tackle each issue. Kusa expressed his agreement with the suggestions and emphasized the need for direct political dialogue in order to address "significant issues." He highlighted positive bilateral coordination on Darfur with USSES Gration, as well as the security and military engagement, which CODEL McCain had recently discussed with Muatassim and Muammar al-Qadhafi (reftel). Kusa went on to discuss his interest in broadening the framework for U.S.-Libyan relations in a number of areas, including combating fundamentalism. Acting A/S Stewart outlined our proposed framework for the dialogue with twice yearly senior-level meetings and working groups to advance progress in the interim on priority topics, including joint polices and projects involving multilateral institutions, prison conditions and management, migration and refugees, and specific human rights cases as they arise. FM Kusa declared his agreement with this general framework and asked the U.S. delegation to propose a work plan and timetable for discussing agenda items and actively addressing them.

LIBYAN DELEGATION ADDRESSES ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION, PRISONS, U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT

¶10. (C) Turning the floor to his delegation, Kusa said that a group of specialists had been gathered on the Libyan side for the purpose of the dialogue. Stating "I do not even know all of their names," Kusa introduced the delegates he recognized and excused himself from the meeting. During the remaining two hours of discussion, the Libyan delegates would not admit their government needed assistance in the areas outlined by Musa Kusa -- illegal immigration, trafficking in persons, prison upgrades, or police training. Instead they parsed terms and argued over definitions. Arguing that Libyan society and culture is misunderstood by the USG, Abdussalam el-Tumi, Chairman of the Human Rights Commission at the Ministry of Justice, maintained that neither "prisoners" nor "prisons" existed in Libya; rather, Libya has "detention facilities" designed to rehabilitate those

"sons and brothers" who have gone astray. Tumi described a Libya-UK prison program by which the UK provides technical assistance and training to Libyan police officers and prison guards. He said that UK representatives had visited Libya's criminal detention facilities, photographed, and reported that detainees were treated in accordance with international human rights conventions. Tumi described the judicial process by which detainees are tried and sentenced, laws stipulating detainee rights, and the treatment of detainees in detention centers. Tumi eventually admitted that the GOL required assistance in the care of detainees -- specifically in the provision of medical care, vocational training, and social reintegration programs -- as well as in training police officers and upgrading and building capacity of prison facilities.

¶11. (C) Tumi asserted that trafficking-in-persons did not exist in Libya. Regarding the Human Rights Report, Tumi charged that it was not based on facts, was distanced from reality, and contained sections that were "laughable." He said that the Libyan government responded to individual charges of human rights abuse and that the issue areas outlined by Kusa - involving women's empowerment and female circumcision - were misconceived. He insisted that "human rights as a complete concept" does not exist anywhere in the world, and he expressed his hope that the dialogue would continue in order to eliminate all misunderstandings regarding the human rights situation of each nation.

¶12. (C) Dr. Mohamed Salah al-Saghir, Head of the Department of International Law and Agreements at the MFA, also expressed his support for the dialogue and highlighted the international conventions and agreements to which Libya was a party. As Libya was a party to the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Saghir said that the Human Rights Report must be wrong in its assertion that women in Libya face discrimination. He insisted that international conventions have supremacy over local law and are embodied within local laws as soon as the GOL signs them.

TRIPOLI 00000748 004.2 OF 005

¶13. (C) AA/S Stewart assured the Libyan team that the Embassy would work with them to discuss their objections to the Human Rights Report over the next few months. NSC representative Scott Busby encouraged the GOL to become party to the 1951 UN Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol and to sign a Memorandum of Agreement with the UN High Commission on Refugees as important steps to address Libya's illegal immigration problem. Busby outlined areas where the U.S. might be able to provide assistance if Libya would provide assurance that it was complying with the international treaties and conventions it had signed involving refugees. Murad Hamim from Libya's International Organizations Department at the MFA responded that the GOL did not need to sign the 1951 Convention, as it was already a party to the 1969 Organization of African Union (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, which embodies many of the same principles as the 1951 and 1967 Convention and Protocol. He noted the GOL's surprise that the USG is not a party to the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Briefly addressing the issue of prisons, Harris noted that the United States and Libya both had responsibilities under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other treaties to provide proper treatment for persons under detention and that the United States looked forward to working with Libya in the context of the Human Rights Dialogue to share our experiences in efficient and humane management of detention facilities. In the time before the next meeting we looked forward to discussing next steps for progress and cooperation on this issue.

¶14. (C) Hamid Ahmed Hdhiri of Libya's NSC noted that the problem of illegal immigration flows into Libya require dramatic solutions to the root causes of the problem -- solutions that go beyond security. He called for U.S. assistance to combat the flow of illegal immigration from both security and economic perspectives. Hdhiri recognized the value of the 1951 and 1967 UN Refugee Conventions, but he expressed Libya's concern that the treaty could inflict harm on the country by encouraging additional immigrants to flow across the borders. He characterized Libya as a transit, rather than a source country, for illegal immigrants and called it a "burden" to the nation. He said that Libya was providing a humanitarian service by accepting protective responsibility for illegal immigrants who had been returned from European sea ports. Hdhiri noted that Muammar al-Qadhafi had suggested that an international conference convene to address the root causes of immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa, namely poverty and lack of opportunities for economic development.

¶15. (C) Finally, the Libyan delegation asserted that civil society does not exist in Libya because it is unnecessary. Representatives justified their statements by claiming that Libya is a homogenous, unified society in which one group does not dominate the other, and described civil society organizations as designed solely to address the needs of groups which are disadvantaged or discriminated against within a society. In response to the U.S. delegation's concern about the registration process for NGOs, one delegate explained that individuals could form issue-focused "charity groups" to address specific "causes," such as anti-smoking or environmental awareness campaigns. The U.S. delegation tried to explain that "charity groups" might count as "civil society" if only they were unrelated to the government (although currently no charity group can be formed outside of the umbrella of a quasi-governmental organization) and that contacts with similar groups in the United States and elsewhere would represent the kind of international communication and links we hope other civil society groups could enjoy, but the Libyan side did not appear to grasp our understanding of civil society.

¶16. (C) Both sides ended the discussion by agreeing that the U.S. would develop work plans on the agenda items and timelines for addressing them. They agreed that the next session of the dialogue would take place after six months and that the U.S. side would host. Although both sides had agreed before the dialogue began to the wording for a joint press statement announcing that the dialogue had been launched, the Libyan side changed the wording at the last minute to inaccurately describe the discussions as covering also security, military issues, and political issues and downplaying the human rights focus, and was unable to compromise with the U.S. delegation on a mutually-acceptable statement. Likewise the Libyan side reneged on a commitment to state publicly that the dialogue had been initiated, without explanation of its reasoning. Immediately after the meeting, the Libyan side hosted a dinner for the U.S.

TRIPOLI 00000748 005.2 OF 005

delegation, during which substantive issues were not formally discussed. Musa Kusa was unable to attend, although two members of the original delegation identified by the GOL, Dr. Ali al-Rishi, the Secretary of Immigration and Expatriate Affairs at the MFA, and Mohamed Matari, Director of the Department of American Affairs at the MFA, as well as Libyan A/S-equivalent for the Americas Ahmed Fituri, did.

WHAT REALLY HAPPENED?

¶17. (C) On the margins of the dinner, Fituri told us that he had been called to a meeting at 0200 local time the same day, to discuss the Human Rights Dialogue. Rolling his eyes skyward,

Fituri said that "someone" had gotten to the Leader and portrayed the talks as an effort by the U.S. to embarrass Libya. Fituri declined to identify who in the GOL had scuttled the talks, but hinted broadly that a decision had been made at the highest levels to switch the delegation at the last minute. The GOL's last-minute change to the proposed joint statement -- portraying the talks as more general in nature and focused on security and military issues as well as political issues -- likely was the deal struck by FM Kusa to get the talks back on track after our delegation walked out of the morning session. The GOL's readiness to drop the statement on the condition that both sides keep the talks quiet seems to indicate that Kusa and more Western-leaning officials needed to mollify hardliners who were concerned about the public perception of the talks. The GOL has kept its word and never publicized any aspect of the talks, although they had plenty of footage and still pictures from the meeting.

¶18. (C) Comment: In spite of the bizarre, fitful start, FM Kusa made it clear that he personally values the dialogue. His direct, personal involvement will be essential to the dialogue's successful continuation. And while the substance of the dialogue may have exposed some very wide gaps in our two countries' understanding of some key human rights concepts, it also revealed some common ground and seemingly genuine desire for engagement, particularly in the areas of refugees and migration, and prison conditions. We look forward to working with the interagency and the GOL to develop work plans and timelines for meaningful action on the agenda items. End Comment.

NEXT STEPS

¶19. (SBU) As agreed with the Libyan delegation, State DRL will take the lead to draft and clear work plans and suggested action timelines for each of the specific human rights areas identified during the talks for submission to the Libyan MFA by mid-October.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI751

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI751 aka Wikileaks id #225629 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: INVITATION FOR SEPTEMBER 24 UNSC SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 17 Sep 2009 13:29 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI751.html
References	09STATE88798
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7995
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0751 2601329
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 171329Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5278
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0234
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5823
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000751

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , UNSC [UN Security Council] ,
MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , KSUM [Summit Meetings] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: INVITATION FOR SEPTEMBER 24 UNSC SUMMIT

REF: A) STATE 88798 ; B) TRIPOLI 721 (NOTAL)

¶1.  (SBU) NEA A/S Feltman delivered reftel invitation orally
during a September 9 meeting with Foreign Minister-equivalent
Musa Kusa (ref b).  The FM expressed appreciation for POTUS's
invitation and indicated that Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi
would attend the September 24 UNSC summit meeting.  Post
delivered a hard copy of the reftel invitation on September 14
to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¶2.  (U) A/S Feltman did not have the opportunity to review this
message prior to departure.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI754

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI754 aka Wikileaks id #225695 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGING SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1820 FOLLOW-UP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 17 Sep 2009 17:24 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI754.html
References	09STATE96047
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8232
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0754 2601724
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 171724Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5281
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5826
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000754

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KPKO [United Nations Peacekeeping Operations] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREL [External Political Relations] ,
KWWMN, UNSC [UN Security Council] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: URGING SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1820 FOLLOW-UP

REF: STATE 96047

¶1.  (SBU) Post delivered reftel demarche to the General People's
Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation on
September 16.  We will report any substantive response septel.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI755

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI755 aka Wikileaks id #225936 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: UNGA FOOD SECURITY EVENT AUGUST 26
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Fri, 18 Sep 2009 15:27 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI755.html
References	09STATE93894
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9244
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0755 2611527
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 181527Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5282
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5827
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000755

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, EEB/TPP/MTAA/ABT AND C (MPLOWDEN)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID [Foreign Economic Assistance] , ETRD [Foreign Trade] , EAGR [Agriculture and Forestry] , UNGA [UN
General Assembly] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: UNGA FOOD SECURITY EVENT AUGUST 26

REF: STATE 93894

¶1.  (SBU) Post delivered reftel invitation on  September 14 with
no further information from the Government of Libya.  The
Government is closed September 17-September 23 for Eid al-Fitr.
However, Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs has
previously indicated that FM Musa Kusa will depart the United
States on September 24 for Venezuela.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI756

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI756 aka Wikileaks id #226045 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: UNGA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sat, 19 Sep 2009 10:08 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI756.html
References	09STATE90254
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9808
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0756 2621008
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 191008Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5283
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0236
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5828
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000756

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA (VACCARRO), AND IO/UNP (SUN)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: UNGA GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

REF: STATE 90254

(SBU) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche September 16 to
MFA Director of the Americas Department Mohamed Matari.  Matari
took note of U.S. goals for UNGA and confirmed that Libya's top
Africa hand and upcoming President of the 64th UN General
Assembly, Ali Treiki, planned to focus on UN reform, human
development, anti-corruption initiatives, and climate change.
(Note: Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi highlighted UN reform --
including his desire for the Security Council to add a permanent
seat for Africa -- in his July 15 statement at the Non-aligned
Movement conference in Sharm el Sheikh. End Note.)

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI759

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI759 aka Wikileaks id #226503 ?
Subject	JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LIBYAN REGIME AND THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 23 Sep 2009 14:07 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI759.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI602
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2436
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0759/01 2661407
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 231407Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5286
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5831
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000759

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/ELA.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/23/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , JO *[Jordan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LIBYAN REGIME AND THEIR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP

TRIPOLI 00000759 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C/NF) Summary: The Jordanian Embassy's DCM, Nash'at al-Hadid, shared with Pol/Econ Chief September 13 his personal opinions about Libyan regime dynamics and assessed the merits of Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's potential successors - sons Saif al Islam and Muatassim al-Qadhafi. Hadid described Jordan's relationship with Libya as limited and fitful, in spite of the signing of several bilateral commercial agreements during Jordanian PM Dahabi's visit in June. Hadid confirmed that Jordan's King Abdullah stopped in Tripoli for a few hours September 1 to attend the celebration Qadhafi's 40th anniversary

in power, traveling en route to Morocco for a visit to Saudi Prince Sultan. End Summary.

JORDANIAN VIEWS ON REGIME DYNAMICS

¶2. (C/NF) During a September 13 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Embassy of Jordan's DCM, Nash'at al-Hadid, characterized the Libyan regime as opaque and complicated. He shared his personal opinion that Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi is the ultimate decision maker in Libya. He observed that while foreign governments attempt to influence Qadhafi's decisions through MFA and other contacts - naming Protocol Chief and Qadhafi confidante Nuri al-Mismari in particular - the diplomatic community must recognize that the Leader is unpredictable and will ultimately do whatever he wants.

¶3. (C/NF) Addressing local rumors about succession, Hadid confided that the Jordanians viewed Qadhafi's second eldest son, Saif al Islam al-Qadhafi, as his most likely successor. Hadid characterized Saif al Islam as open minded and reformist. Hadid saw Saif's involvement in repatriating convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi as a move to gain popularity after months of remaining outside of the political limelight. He viewed Qadhafi's subsequent meeting with Megrahi as a father's move to push back on his son's overstepping.

¶4. (C/NF) By contrast, Hadid viewed Qadhafi's other potential successor, son Muatassim Bilal al-Qadhafi, as occupying a more powerful position than Saif. He said that Muatassim's official position as National Security Advisor gave him a stronger platform from which to jockey for succession. Hadid saw Muatassim as being more strongly supported by Libya's old guard regime stalwarts than Saif, although Hadid also characterized Muatassim as gradually liberalizing his public views on opening Libya to Western partnerships.

JORDAN-LIBYAN RELATIONS

¶5. (C/NF) Hadid described Jordan's relationship as fitful and complicated. He recalled the brief severing of ties after the 1986 burning of Jordan's embassy in Tripoli and stated that while the current bilateral relationship was limited, it was better than it had been in the past and on the right track. [Note: According to Hadid, the Jordanian Embassy was torched after the U.S. bombing of Libya in 1986 because King Hussein was traveling in the United States at the time of the operation. The embassy was rebuilt approximately six years later. End Note.] Hadid said that Jordan and Libya differed on political issues - namely, Libya's stance on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and a two-state solution - but their commercial relationship was growing. Hadid stated that several bilateral commercial agreements were signed in June during PM Nader Dahabi's visit to Tripoli, however the Jordanians have not been impressed by the pace of Libya's actions to implement the agreements. According to the agreements, Hadid explained, the Government of Libya was supposed to provide more commercial opportunities for Jordanians - in construction, engineering, and consulting - but those opportunities have been slow in coming. He complained about the GOL's tendency (and that of Qadhafi in particular) to sign agreements for the sake of announcing them publicly rather than a commitment to the principles and stipulations of those agreements. Nevertheless, Jordanians enjoy limited commercial investment and employment opportunities in Libya. Hadid said that while low salaries in the service sector turn Jordanians away from employment opportunities in Libya, a relatively small number of Jordanians work in healthcare and education.

KING ABDULLAH'S SHORT VISIT

¶6. (C/NF) Regarding King Abdullah's attendance at Qadhafi's 40th anniversary events in celebration of the latter's 1969 coup,

Hadid explained that the Jordanian monarch only stayed in Tripoli for a few hours on September 1. He arrived around 1700 local time and left before the Iftar meal was served (around 2000-2100 local time). Hadid said that King Abdullah stopped in Tripoli on his way to Morocco to visit Saudi Prince Sultan.

TRIPOLI 00000759 002.2 OF 002

Hadid confirmed that the King did not have a private bilateral meeting with Qadhafi.

¶7. (C/NF) Comment: Jordan is one of a handful of influential Middle Eastern countries that enjoys a substantive relationship with Libya. While the two countries differ on high-profile political issues, namely Middle East peace, Jordan's commercial interests in Libya may be able to establish a foundation for expanded bilateral political engagement. King Abdullah's short stop in Tripoli may have been intended to remind Qadhafi of his commercial commitments to Jordan and will likely further ingratiate Jordan with the Libyan Leader. Jordan's views on regime dynamics and succession agree with those expressed by many Western diplomats in Tripoli. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI76

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI76 aka Wikileaks id #189867 ?
Subject	LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 2 Feb 2009 08:53 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI76.html
References	08TRIPOLI455 , 08TRIPOLI685 , 09TRIPOLI57 , 09TRIPOLI685
History	First published on Tue, 1 Feb 2011 22:37 UTC (original) Modified on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC (diff from original) Modified on Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29 UTC (diff from original)
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0579
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0076/01 0330853
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 020853Z FEB 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4397
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 0885
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4921
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000076

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR S/WCI (RICCI, GOREY), L (SCHWARTZ, POMPER)
AND NEA/MAG (NARDI, JOHNSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/1/2019
TAGS: KBTR, PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* ,
PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PINS *[National Security]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: MEETING WITH RETURNED GTMO DETAINEES
UNDER USG-GOL TRANSFER FRAMEWORK MOU

REF: A) NARDI-GODFREY/POMPER EMAIL 08/22/2008,
B) WILLIAMS-STEVENS EMAIL 08/23/2008, C) 08 TRIPOLI 855,
D) 08 TRIPOLI 685 , E) 08 TRIPOLI 455 , F) TRIPOLI 57

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Post visited two returned Guantanamo
detainees to confirm their welfare and whereabouts and clarify
the status of any pending legal action against them. Trials
against both detainees have, according to their understanding,
been completed. One said he was found guilty of
terrorism-related offenses and sentenced to 25 years

terrorism related offenses and sentenced to 25 years imprisonment, and has appealed that decision. The other said he was found innocent of the terrorism-related charges against him, but remains in detention, possibly on narcotics-related charges that pre-date his alleged terrorist activities. Separately, and contrary to the statements of the two detainees, Post received a diplomatic note from the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) indicating that the two mens' cases had been referred to court, and that no sentences had been pronounced against them as yet. Post is following up to request more current and comprehensive information concerning the status of the legal proceedings against the two returned detainees. End summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Per refs A-C, P/E Chief interviewed separately returned Guantanamo detainee Muhamed Abdallah Mansur al-Rimi (AKA Abdul Salam Abdul Omar Sufrani, ISN 194) and Ben Qumu Abu Sufian Ibrahim Ahmed Hamouda (ISN 557) on January 29. The meeting, which Post had requested via diplomatic note on November 2, took place at a GOL security service facility in Tripoli. A host government security official facilitated the meeting; however, no host government officials participated in the meetings with the two returned detainees. The last visit to the two returned detainees took place on September 1, 2008 (ref D).

ISN 194

¶3. (S/NF) Al-Rimi, who was returned to Libya in December 2006, said he remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison, located in the Tripoli suburbs. (Note: Al-Rimi had been detained at an External Security Organization (ESO) detention facility between his return to Libya in December 2006 and June 2007, when he was transferred to Abu Salim. End note.) Al-Rimi had been alone in his cell until about three weeks ago, when ISN 557 moved into his cell with him. Exercise has improved: al-Rimi is now able to exercise every other day for 45 minutes to an hour. (Note: He told us in September that he was only able to leave his cell for exercise once per week. End note.) He said he is able to leave his cell and interact with other prisoners. He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He has a copy of the Quran, but does not have access to other books, radio or television. He has access to medications and has been visited by a prison doctor on the occasions when he has been ill. Al-Rimi said that his four brothers, who are resident in the eastern city of Benghazi, visited him shortly after our last meeting with him early last September. His last family visit before that was from his sisters, who saw him in July 2008. (Note: Our understanding is that members of his family have visited him on five occasions since his return to Libya - January 2007, May 2007 (ref D), March 2008, July 2008 and September 2008. End note.)

¶4. (S/NF) Asked about the condition of his arm and his teeth, about which he had previously complained (ref E), al-Rimi said both were fine. He said he had no problems with his arm and hand now, and had not had needed to see a physician since our last visit with him.

¶5. (S/NF) Regarding his understanding of the status of legal proceedings against him, al-Rimi reiterated that he heard from other prisoners who were present in the courtroom (al-Rimi was not present when the verdict and sentence were read) that he had been found guilty of some charges (NFI) against him on/about June 16 and had been sentenced to 25 years imprisonment. (Note: Per ref E, al-Rimi's understanding was that he faced four charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda; 3) forging a passport and travel documents and using them to exit the country; and 4) failing to secure permission to exit the country when he left to fight in Afghanistan. It is not clear which of those charges he was convicted of. End note.) Al-Rimi said that he had filed an appeal of his case not long after he was sentenced - he signed a

document given to him by prison officials shortly after his reported sentencing, which he understood to be his application for appeal. He had heard nothing since about the status of his appeal, and had received no information to date from Libyan officials about his trial, verdict or sentence. Al-Rimi said he wanted to request political asylum in Saudi Arabia and asked if

that were possible.

ISN 557

¶6. (S/NF) Hamouda (ISN 557), who was returned to Libya in August 2007, said he also remains in detention at the Abu Salim prison. (Note: He was detained at an ESO detention facility for about three months after his return and was then transferred to the Abu Salim prison. End note.) He confirmed that he had been moved into a cell with al-Rimi about three weeks ago. (Note: His biggest complaint in previous visits had been that he remained in solitary confinement. End note.) He was now able to leave his cell every other day for 45 minutes to an hour to exercise (he had not previously been able to do so). While he was also free to leave his cell to interact with other prisoners, he refrained from doing so because he did not know them and did not want "any complications or problems". He is provided with drinking water, tea and three meals a day. He has a copy of the Quran, but does not have access to books, radio or television. He had not received a family visit since our last meeting with him in September 2008, but noted that his family live in the eastern city of Derna and that it is difficult for them to travel to Tripoli to see him. (Note: Our understanding is that Hamouda has had two visits by members of his family since his return: his wife and six children visited in late December 2007, and his wife and brother-in-law saw him in January 2008. End note.)

¶7. (S/NF) Hamouda has access to medication and was visited last October or November by a prison doctor, who told him he suffered from rheumatism. He complained that he was "tired and sick", and appeared to be unwell. He showed P/E Chief sores in his mouth, which he attributed to his poor condition, and complained that the medication prescribed for his rheumatism was ineffective.

¶8. (S/NF) On his legal status, Hamouda said he had attended a hearing at a state security court session in the Abu Salim prison complex in October 2008 at which the judge had pronounced him innocent of the charges against him. His state-appointed attorney was present at that hearing. He told us previously that he faces three charges: 1) membership in the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group; 2) membership in al-Qaeda, and; 3) that he performed illicit work for a private company in Sudan and Afghanistan. He also faces charges related to a drug trafficking offense for which he was convicted and imprisoned in the early 1990's. He complained that the charges against him are based entirely on hearsay from witnesses whose credibility is suspect, and maintained that he was innocent. (Note: It is not clear whether Hamouda was acquitted of all charges against him, or only those related to his alleged terrorist activities. If the latter, he could still face charges related to his alleged involvement in narcotics trafficking. End note.) Stressing that he had been found innocent - "I love everybody and do not hate anybody" - he expressed frustration that he remained in prison and complained that he was "psychologically exhausted and not sleeping". "I want my rights and I want to be let go", he said. He complained that a gold necklace and USD 2,000 in cash had been confiscated by Pakistani authorities at the time of his detention and asked for help in getting them back.

TIMELINESS OF ACCESS

TIMELINESS OF ACCESS

¶9. (S/NF) After securing access in September 2008 within one week of our request, facilitation of access to the detainees under the revised rubric detailed in ref A was not quick or straightforward in this instance. Post submitted a diplomatic note on November 2 formally requesting access to the detainees. Access was secured only after the request was reiterated several times in MFA and security channels.

LEGAL STATUS

¶10. (C) As reported ref F, Saleh Abdulsalam Saleh, Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation's (QDF) Human Rights Committee passed P/E Chief a copy of a letter from the QDF to the International Committee of the Red Cross requesting help in securing the repatration of Libyan detainees at Guantanamo Bay to Libya. The letter asked that the USG provide information concerning the legal status of Libyan detainees. We reminded Saleh that while we had formally requested information on the status of legal proceedings against two Libyan detainees already returned from GTMO to Libya (diplomatic notes were most recently sent in June, August and November 2008), we had never received a

TRIPOLI 00000076 003 OF 003

response. Saleh agreed to follow up. Post received a brief diplomatic note from the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) on January 25 indicating that Hamouda's case (ISN 557) had been referred to court on April 8, 2008 and that al-Rimi's (ISN 194) case had been referred to court on December 8, 2007 (text of dipnote below). The note claimed that sentences had not been pronounced in either case. The note contradicts al-Rimi's understanding that he was sentenced on/about June 16, 2008 to 25 years' imprisonment, and Hamouda's understanding that he was pronounced innocent in October 2008. Post will follow up with the MFA and in other channels to reiterate the request for more current and comprehensive information concerning the status of the legal proceedings against them.

¶11. (S/NF) (Begin text of diplomatic note dated January 25, 2009) The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Desk) sends its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya and, further to the Embassy's diplomatic note #943 dated November 11, 2008 (sic) regarding news about the judicial proceedings taken against: 1) Sufian Ahmed el-Gomo al-Hassadi (Embassy note: Hamouda/ISN 557), and; 2) Mohamed Aballah Mansur Errimi (Embassy note: al-Rimi/ISN 194), we would like to inform the esteemed Embassy that:

The first defendant was referred to court on April 8, 2008.

The second defendant was referred to court on December 8, 2007.

No sentences were pronounced against them as yet, and as regards visiting them, this is the competence of the judiciary.

(End text of dipnote)
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web

site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI762

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI762 aka Wikileaks id #226769 ?
Subject	"WE ARE HERE": DOMESTIC REACTION TO QADHAFI AT UNGA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:23 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI762.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3626
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0762/01 2671623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 241623Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5290
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0237
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1164
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0603
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0835
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5835
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000762

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/PPD.

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/24/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , UNGA [UN General Assembly] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: "WE ARE HERE": DOMESTIC REACTION TO QADHAFI AT UNGA

TRIPOLI 00000762  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary: Muammar al-Qadhafi's speech at UNGA, and TV
footage of him scribbling "We are here" on a piece of paper
while seated at Libya's chair at an empty UNSC chamber during a
private tour, are on regular repeat in Libyan press today.
Official accounts highlighted the historic importance of
Qadhafi's trip to New York after 40 years in power - and 30 in
isolation. Several contacts, however, worried that the
```

100-minute speech and accompanying theater endangered both his objective (UN reform) and Libya's international stature. Proponents of Libya's re-engagement with the international community were left worrying that the speech would stunt progress with the West. Locals reported that chatter among normal Libyans focused on Qadhafi's antics and his re-asserting his supremacy over Libyan politics after months of succession rumors. End summary.

OFFICIAL REACTION FOCUSED ON HISTORIC MOMENT

¶2. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi's trip to the UN and his September 23 speech at the UN General Assembly General Debate were covered in a media blitz on state-run outlets. All satellite television stations interrupted normal broadcasts to carry the September 23 speeches, starting with UNGA President and veteran Libyan diplomat Ali Treiki, POTUS, and Libyan leader al-Qadhafi's 100-minute speech. All returned to normal programming before Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni took the dais. Twenty-four hours later, excerpts from the speech, along with footage of Qadhafi at Libya's seat at an empty UNSC chamber writing "We are here" on a piece of paper, ran at regular intervals on state-run media, accompanied by commentary highlighting the historic nature of the Libyan Leader's inaugural trip to the United States after 40 years in power. Radio stations have replayed the speech several times, and the official Jamahiriya News Agency has what it purports is the full text of the speech, parsed over 20 different pages of its website.

¶3. (C) Both state-run and quasi-independent media outlets expressed the view that Qadhafi's trip was a milestone in his efforts to achieve a more just international order and applauded the "wisdom" he demonstrated during the unprecedented event. Following the speech, Libyan mobile phone provider Al Madar (owned by Qadhafi's eldest son Muhammed) sent a text message to select subscribers proclaiming "Muammar al-Qadhafi: Conscience of the World." One academic who received the message commented wryly to the DCM that the text was an example of "the son praising the father." Arab-language blogs made reference to Qadhafi's assuming the mantle of Gamal Abdel Nasser due to his candor and comportment while championing the rights of smaller states.

MOST CONTACTS PRIVATELY DISAPPOINTED, EMBARRASED

¶4. (C) For many Libyans, Qadhafi's UNGA address marks the culmination of Libya's decade-long re-engagement with the West. Some ordinary citizens seemed excited and proud that Qadhafi's first visit to the UN and the U.S. would mark Libya's full return to the international community. Others seemed to recognize that New York represented a personal triumph vice a broader Libyan one.

¶5. (C) The Leader's lengthy speech, however, engendered embarrassment and concern among embassy contacts. A lawyer who previously served at Libya's Mission to the UN was horrified by the content, length, and disregard for protocol during the address, asking "What kind of world leader talks for so long? How could he keep them all waiting?" While several contacts supported Qadhafi's argument for UN reform, a self-described "proud nationalist" academic worried that the manner in which the points were delivered would undercut Qadhafi's objectives. Others seemed disappointed at Qadhafi's lost opportunity to start a substantive discussion on what they see as genuine concerns with the UN's structure, and seemed shamed by Qadhafi's antics in New York. One local lamented to Emboffs that Libyans viewed Qadhafi's speech as a joke and an embarrassment to the Libyan people. Several foreign-educated Libyans worried that the speech could have a negative impact on Libya's relationship with the U.S. After making the case for continued bilateral engagement, a professor at al-Fateh University asked hopefully, "The speech wasn't that bad, was it?"

¶6. (C) Diplomatic contacts commented that the performance was vintage Qadhafi and entirely expected. While Qadhafi was more energetic and animated than he has been at recent Summits, he

TRIPOLI 00000762 002.2 OF 002

was clearly tired from travel and "waking up at four in the morning." [Note: Qadhafi prefers evenings and is prone to unpredictable behavior when tired; an Egyptian diplomat wrote-off Qadhafi's recent tiff with Sudan over partition to his lack of sleep around the September 1 holiday. End note.] While Qadhafi employed an improvisational style - clearly speaking beyond the content of the handwritten notes - all of his central themes (and several rhetorical flourishes) had been previewed in remarks over the past several years.

I AM (STILL) HERE: ORDINARY LIBYANS SEE SUCCESSION MESSAGE

¶7. (C) Local contacts report that Qadhafi's speech set Tripoli abuzz with conversation. While many educated Libyans are cynical regarding Qadhafi's leadership, they also appreciate the importance of his role to ensure continued engagement with the outside world. Qadhafi's comments suggesting that the UN headquarters move to China, India, or a "middle hemisphere" and add seats to the Security Council for multinational alliances, such as the Non-aligned Movement and the African Union (of which Qadhafi is the chair), added fuel to a persistent local rumor that, in the near future, the Leader would assume a more international role and hand off authority to his second son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. [Note: Saif's brother and potential rival, National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, along with FM Musa Kusa and Protocol Chief Nuri Mismari, accompanied the Leader to UNGA. End note.] Diplomats and Libyans both commented that Qadhafi's major success in New York was in his mere presence - reminding the world, and specifically the Libyan people, that he was the undisputed leader of his country.

¶8. (C) Comment: The Leader's speech was classic Qadhafi and undoubtedly won him global attention. During the speech, two spelling variants of his name breached the top ten trending items on Twitter at the same time (suggesting he was the most-tweeted topic), and international outlets that had passed on UNSG Ban Ki-Moon's address made a special point to broadcast most of Qadhafi's remarks live. However, his likely extemporaneous remarks and apparent disregard for protocol played into the narratives of critics and foreign media on the most prominent stage Qadhafi has yet graced. While he avoided fanning flames on bilateral topics (mention of the Megrahi affair was notably absent), his performance proves that he has not yet been chastened by international complaints on his Summit pontifications. We expect Qadhafi and his entourage will find a way to be most pleased with what they will surely term the Leader's long-awaited "apotheosis." End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI763

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI763 aka Wikileaks id #226770 ?
Subject	UPDATE ON LIBYAN-SWISS CRISIS: SWISS CITIZENS BACK IN LIBYAN CUSTODY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:23 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI763.html
References	09TRIPOLI714
Referenced by	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI832 , 09TRIPOLI900 , 09TRIPOLI901
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 14 Mar 2011 13:31: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO3629
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0763/01 2671623
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 241623Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5292
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5837
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000763

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/24/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , LY *[Libya]* , SZ *[Switzerland]*
SUBJECT: UPDATE ON LIBYAN-SWISS CRISIS: SWISS CITIZENS BACK IN LIBYAN CUSTODY

REF: A) Tripoli 714 ; B) Bern 387

TRIPOLI 00000763 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto confirmed that the two Swiss citizens - held in Libya for more than a year - had been detained by GOL authorities on September 19 when they reported for medical tests, ostensibly in preparation for their departure. Lazarotto welcomed U.S. intervention in this case, but was entirely unaware of Bern's request for U.S. assistance

but was entirely unaware of Bern's request for U.S. assistance. Despite daily calls to contacts in the MFA and Prime Minister's Office, the Swiss Embassy has received no direct assurances on the health or safety of the citizens. Others in the local diplomatic community have blamed the Swiss for continuing to mishandle the case, including recent vetoes of Schengen visas for key Libyan officials. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) During a September 22 meeting with P/E Chief, Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto expressed surprise that Post was privy to information regarding the detention September 19 of two Swiss citizens who have not been allowed to leave Libya since July 2008 (ref A). Lazarotto claimed to be under strict instructions from Bern not to discuss the case with other members of the diplomatic community and was unaware of the request made in Bern by the Swiss Deputy Foreign Minister for U.S. intervention in the matter (ref B).

¶3. (S/NF) Lazarotto confirmed that the two Swiss businessmen had been called by Libyan authorities to report for medical exams in preparation for their release from the country. However, once they presented themselves to the GOL, they were taken into custody unexpectedly and have not been seen since. Lazarotto said that in spite of daily calls to his contacts in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister's Office, he has not been allowed to visit the Swiss citizens. Nor has he received any positive assurances that the citizens are healthy and safe. He said that he is updating Bern daily with situation reports but that nothing had changed since September 19. Lazarotto has been trying without success to call Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi directly to plead the Swiss case but has only been able to reach lower level officials in Mahmoudi's office.

¶4. (S/NF) Lazarotto noted that the surprise detention of the Swiss citizens stood in marked contrast to recent positive signals, including the dispatch of a team of Libyan officials to Switzerland to negotiate the way forward (ref B) and an agreement to prioritize the release of the Swiss businessmen. While many reasons had been posited for the unexpected detention of the businessmen, Lazarotto thought the rumor that Libya feared Swiss military intervention was laughable. He said that the rumor he had heard was that the GOL was concerned that the Swiss businessmen would try to flee the country without permission. However, even that scenario was impossible, according to Lazarotto, given that his embassy was under 24-hour surveillance by GOL authorities and that the Libyans would not allow them to leave without exit stamps in their passports, which are still being held by the GOL.

¶5. (C/NF) The Swiss Charge welcomed U.S. assistance in urging the Libyans to release the Swiss businessmen. Lazarotto feared his position was precarious and expressed appreciation for continued U.S. interest in the case. He said that the optic of U.S. interest made him feel safe. Lazarotto reported that he was also in contact with the Italian, German, and French Embassies in Tripoli.

¶6. (C/NF) While the Swiss Charge is reaching out across the local diplomatic community for moral support, representatives of some embassies in Tripoli blame the Swiss for continuing to mishandle the case. On September 22, the Ambassador of Portugal (strictly protect) told the Ambassador that the Swiss were continuing to provoke the Libyans. Most recently, the Swiss had reportedly exercised their veto power within the Schengen visa regime to deny Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi a Schengen visa to land in Portugal for a matter of hours en route to New York for the UN General Assembly. The Embassy of Portugal intervened to avoid a public scandal by issuing a national visa to Qadhafi for his transit stay. As a second example of what he called a "continuing pattern of ineptitude" on the part of the Swiss, the Portuguese Ambassador said that the Swiss had also exercised their veto right to deny the son of Libyan Prime Minister

al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi - the Libyan official charged with managing the Swiss case - a Schengen visa for a trip. Once again, the Portuguese intervened to issue a national visa to allow Mahmoudi's son to enter the country. The Portugese expected the PM to be furious if he discovered the Swiss action regarding his son.

¶7. (C/NF) Comment: Discussions with the Swiss Charge revealed a

TRIPOLI 00000763 002.2 OF 002

disconnect between Bern and its embassy in Tripoli. While the Swiss Government seems to be building alliances at the Deputy Foreign Minister level to advocate on its behalf, it is rendering the Swiss Embassy weak and vulnerable by keeping the Charge uninformed. Likewise, the continued Swiss mishandling of visa issues, especially when they involve influential regime figures, will make it that much more difficult for the Swiss to achieve a swift and positive resolution. End Comment.
CRETZ

Media

- LeTemps.ch | Dossier Swiss Papers
- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI764

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI764 aka Wikileaks id #226771 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S AGENCY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM RENEWS REQUESTS FOR AMERICAN EXPERTISE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 24 Sep 2009 16:23 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI764.html
References	08TRIPOLI937 , 09TRIPOLI223 , 09TRIPOLI386
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3630
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0764/01 2671623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241623Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5294
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0441
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0605
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5839
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000764

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; ENERGY FOR GINA
ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; COMMERCE FOR MARC TEJTEL AND
HISHAM ELKOUSTAK OF CLDP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/17/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , ELAB *[Labor Sector Affairs]* ,
EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , KIPR *[Intellectual Property Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , BBSR *[Business Services Reporting]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S AGENCY FOR ECONOMIC REFORM RENEWS REQUESTS FOR
AMERICAN EXPERTISE

REF: A) Tripoli 386 ; B) 08 Tripoli 937 ; C) Tripoli 223

TRIPOLI 00000764 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The staff of Libya's National Economic Development Board briefed Emboffs on Libya's efforts to train the Libyan workforce in support of economic reform plans, and in particular, the NEDB's initiatives to spur private sector growth through the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises. Additionally, the NEDB is developing a "Strategic Management" system to monitor and evaluate Libya's economic development after decades of isolation from international markets. NEDB requested assistance in identifying training opportunities and apprenticeships for NEDB staff in the United States; invited U.S. experts to travel to Libya to conduct training for managers of NEDB's business incubator programs, entrepreneurs, and members of local governments; and expressed renewed interest in working with the Commercial Law Development Program in a MEPI-funded program to foster exchanges between U.S. and Libyan small business development programs. End summary.

NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT BOARD: HELPING LIBYA TO "CATCH UP" ...

¶2. (C) On September 16, P/E Counselor and Econoff met with Said Hoderi, Director of International Cooperation at the National Economic Development Board (NEDB); Faouzi Saleh Elmozogi, Director of Human Institutional Capacity Development at NEDB; and Dr. Fathi Ibrahim, Training Manager of the Small and Medium Enterprise Department at NEDB to discuss the NEDB's work to develop a strategic plan for Libya's economic development. Hoderi, who has been working at the NEDB since its inception, explained that the NEDB was created in 2007 by the General People's Committee (GPC) - equivalent of Prime Minister's cabinet - to implement the recommendations of a report authored by the Monitor Group analyzing Libya's development needs. The report - the result of an initiative spear-headed by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi - recommended that Libya diversify its economy beyond the hydrocarbons sector and move towards a market-based economy.

¶3. (C) Elmozogi described the NEDB as a technical advisory arm that answers directly to Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi; as such, it can cut through the Libyan bureaucracy to implement programs more efficiently than other government agencies. Recognizing that Libya's development stagnated over the past 20 years, Hoderi emphasized that Libya must "speed up" its development spending. The NEDB is at the forefront of Libya's efforts to move from a centrally-planned economy to one in which the private sector would be the driving force (Ref A).

...THROUGH CREATION OF A STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

¶4. (C) One of the NEDB's most ambitious programs entails creating a system to monitor and evaluate the Libyan National Development Program, which encompasses more than 11,000 projects. Through the Strategic Management of the Development Program (SMDP), the NEDB is developing an integrated macro-management system, with the assistance of Ernst and Young and the UN Development Program, to enable the Libyan government to mitigate the potential negative effects of accelerated spending on the economy. The system will also assist with contingency planning by running various scenarios, such as fluctuations in the price of oil, the main source of Libya's revenue. The new system would act as a "dashboard" for policy-makers and indicate which projects should be sped up and which could be slowed down. Hoderi admitted that the first report of the new system was supposed to be completed by July 2009, but the NEDB was not completely satisfied with the product delivered by Ernst and Young. He said he was not aware that another such program existed; therefore, developing a strategic national economic plan specific to Libya's unique development needs had been challenging.

DEVELOPING THE PUBLIC SECTOR, INCLUDING DIPLOMATS

¶5. (C) In addition to developing a strategic plan for managing Libya's economic resources, Hoderi described the NEDB's leadership in improving professional training and education in Libya. Hoderi explained that the NEDB's work in this sector began at the most basic level - through primary education reform. He said that the NEDB was working with experts from Singapore to design a new program for managing the primary

education system and to incorporate a Singaporean model for education reform. Beyond primary education, Elmozogi described several NEDB efforts to improve the quality of professional training in Libya, particularly for public sector employees, including "future leaders," diplomats, judges, and local and municipal government officials. In the first program, the NEDB is cooperating with the UK government and the London School of Economics (Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's alma mater), among other UK institutions, on an exchange program to send 400 "future leaders" of Libya for leadership and management training. Eventually, Elmozogi explained, 250 additional Libyan "future leaders" would also be trained in Libya. Likewise, the NEDB is working with universities in the United States (Michigan State and elsewhere), the UK, and France to manage exchange programs for 90 young Libyan diplomats (30 Libyan diplomats are currently being trained in each country). Hoderi responded positively to Emboffs' suggestions that Libyan diplomats in the United States coordinate a site visit to the National Foreign Affairs Training Center. Elmozogi said that the NEDB had also sent 70 Libyan judges to the UK to study English language and international law. Finally, Hoderi emphasized the NEDB's interest in working with the embassy to design a training and exchange program for members of Libya's local and municipal governments. "I believe Libyans would benefit from seeing how your small towns are run, even if our government system is very different from yours in the United States," he observed.

¶6. (C) As a corollary to training local government officials, Hoderi expressed an interest in studying how U.S. local governments incorporate small businesses into community development plans. He explained that as Libya moves from a public sector-dominated economy to one that is more decentralized, local governments ("shabiyas" in the Libyan system) will need to take responsibility for encouraging small businesses and spurring private sector growth. [Note: This may be an opportunity for a specialized International Visitors Program. End note.] Hoderi also asked if American experts could conduct training of trainer workshops in Libya for the public sector on leadership and management skills, including teamwork and communications. The NEDB has already trained 1,000 local government employees in these topics in Tripoli and would like to expand the program to other cities throughout the country.

REQUEST FOR U.S. ASSISTANCE WITH DEVELOPING SMALL- AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES

¶7. (C) According to Fathi Ibrahim, the NEDB's Small- and Medium-sized Enterprise (SME) program aims to nurture small- and medium-sized businesses by providing advice on business plan formulation, loan guarantees, and access to technology. Whereas SMEs comprise more than 90 percent of economic production worldwide, Hoderi explained that they play only a minor role in Libya's formal economy. By creating "business incubators" that will assist new entrepreneurs, the NEDB hopes to facilitate the growth of SMEs and create new job opportunities, especially in tourism, trade, fishing, Information Technology, construction, and oil services. Ibrahim explained that the NEDB had already opened incubators in Tripoli, Benghazi, and Sebha. He said that the NEDB plans to open specialized incubators in bio-agriculture, Information Technology, and for the physically challenged. Ibrahim requested embassy assistance in designing a

challenged. Ibrahim requested embassy assistance in designing a program to send 10 to 15 managers of business incubators to the U.S. for training for 4-6 weeks at similar U.S. institutions. Ibrahim envisions a hands-on training program covering all aspects of management, including marketing services, setting budgets, and managing staff. Hoderi said that the NEDB was also considering sending the managers to Singapore for such a training program. In addition to training managers, the NEDB plans to train entrepreneurs from throughout Libya on all aspects of starting up a business - topics would include conducting feasibility studies, developing business plans, securing financing, and developing/managing budgets. The NEDB would like to conduct the training in Libya (starting in 2010) and then conduct a session in the United States.

AND RENEWED INTEREST IN THE COMMERCIAL LAW DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

¶8. (SBU) In response to Econoff's inquiry regarding NEDB interest in working with the U.S. Department of Commerce's

TRIPOLI 00000764 003.2 OF 003

Commercial Law Development Program (CLDP), Hoderi and his colleagues confirmed that they wanted to resurrect the study tour idea (Refs B, C). Hoderi agreed to re-establish email communications with CLDP on the latter's recommendations of early 2009 for a study tour of U.S. business incubators.

COMMENT: LIBYANS SEEM VERY RECEPTIVE BUT PROOF WILL BE IN THE PUDDING

¶9. (C) Comment: During this latest meeting with the NEDB, the staff was more welcoming and open to working with the U.S. than in the past. The discussion broadened areas of possible cooperation to include training of NEDB staff, entrepreneurs, public sector employees, and local government leaders. If successful, such cooperation offers the opportunity to influence Libya's reform efforts at local, grassroots levels. However, past experience indicates that program implementation could be difficult. We will follow up with the Commercial Law Development Program and relevant Department offices to explore the possibilities of designing the programs outlined above. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI765

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI765 aka Wikileaks id #227138 ?
Subject	NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION BUSINESS CONTINUES AMID CHAIRMAN'S RESIGNATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 27 Sep 2009 10:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI765.html
References	08TRIPOLI564 , 09TRIPOLI564 , 09TRIPOLI72
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI779 , 09TRIPOLI825
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO5238
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0765/01 2701047
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271047Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5297
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1166
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0837
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0608
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0444
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5842
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000765

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND E; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/27/2019
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]*
SUBJECT: NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION BUSINESS CONTINUES AMID CHAIRMAN'S RESIGNATION

REF: A) Tripoli 72 ; B) 08 Tripoli 564

TRIPOLI 00000765 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Acting Chairman of Libya's National Oil Corporation, Ali Sugheir, insisted that in spite of the resignation of former Chairman Shukri Ghanem, business operations would continue as usual. Sugheir did not know when a new chairman would be appointed but did not expect operations to change at all in the interim, as Sugheir personally had been directing the company's operations as General Director for the last three years. To that end, Sugheir outlined plans to create a new joint venture with ENI to export eight billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas per year, to expand the Greenstream pipeline capacity, and to develop a new Liquefied Natural Gas facility capable of producing five bcms per year. Sugheir also confirmed GOL plans to establish a new General People's Committee (Ministry-equivalent) for Energy, which will take charge of Libya's oil, gas, electricity, nuclear and solar energy, and environmental sectors. End Summary.

AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS, NOC CHIEF SUCCESSFULLY RESIGNS

¶2. (C) During a September 15 meeting with P/E Chief, the Acting Chairman and General Director of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), Ali Sugheir, confirmed that Shukri Ghanem had resigned from his position as Chairman of the NOC - a position Ghanem had held since 2005. Sugheir said he was not at liberty to discuss the reason for Ghanem's resignation, the timing of which was considered unusual by several General Manager's of International Oil Companies (IOC) represented in Tripoli. However, Sugheir insisted that the NOC would continue operating as usual. He said that as General Director of the NOC, he was already in charge of daily operations - even under Ghanem - and that the company's direction would not change simply because the chairman had departed. He explained that his colleague, Azzam Ali al-Mesallati, would also continue in his role as head of investment and joint ventures. [Note: Many observers believe al-Mesallati will be named NOC Chairman in Ghanem's place. End Note.] "We are moving forward with business as usual," Sugheir stated, "you will see no difference in our operations from the outside."

¶3. (C) Numerous explanations surround Shukri Ghanem's August 25 resignation. An August 27 article published by independent foreign-based website "Libya al Youm" reported that Ghanem resigned in protest of policies generated by Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. By contrast, a US-Libyan dual-national business contact, who is strongly tied to the GOL, told P/E Chief August 31 that Ghanem had tendered his resignation to avoid charges of corruption, claiming that Ghanem stood nothing to gain from trying to resist the charges and that Ghanem had in fact forced the resignation of his predecessor using the same tactic. IOC contacts report that Ghanem had attempted to resign from his position a number of times in the past due to his frustration with the Libyan regime and its pressure tactics to extort funds from the IOCs (reftels).

BUSINESS AS USUAL - DEVELOPING LIBYA'S GAS SECTOR

¶4. (C) As an example of moving forward with business as usual, Sugheir discussed his work to develop Libya's gas sector, sharing his long-term vision of transforming Libya into a hub for gas exports, to Europe and across the region. To that end, the NOC is developing a gas network from East Benghazi (650 miles east of Tripoli) to Mellitah (60 miles west of Tripoli) that will eventually transport more than 400 million cubic meters of gas. Additionally the Sirte Oil Company (state-run) is extracting gas from the Marsa al Brega field (from which the Esso company pulled out in 1983) for transport to Benghazi, 480 miles eastward, and further eastward along the coast to the city of al-Khums.

¶5. (C) In the west, Sugheir explained that the Mellitah Oil and Gas B.V. company, a joint venture between the NOC and the

Italian company ENI, is extracting gas from Al Wafah field (60 miles west of Tripoli) and transporting it via its Greenstream pipeline to Mellitah for export and domestic consumption. [Note: The Greenstream pipeline came on-stream in September 2004. End Note.] The joint-venture exports 8 billion cubic meters (bcm) per year across the Mediterranean and supplies 2 bcms per year to the Libyan domestic market. To achieve an

additional transport capacity of 3 bcms per year, Mellitah Oil and Gas B.V. is expanding the Greenstream pipeline. The firm is also constructing a new Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) facility at Mellitah designed to produce 5 bcms per year of LNG to be marketed worldwide. [Note: Mellitah Oil and Gas B.V. also produces 420,000 barrels of oil per day, and ENI is entitled to 12% of produced oil and 40% of natural gas extracted. End note.]

¶6. (C) According to Sugheir, the NOC is also currently working on a project to provide gas to all electric, cement, and steel factories throughout Libya via pipelines that are being developed by the Sirte Oil Company. He said that the NOC had adopted a European model for its gas exploration activities, which he described as a "no-waste" policy. Sugheir estimated that over 25 million cubic meters of gas had been flared (i.e., wasted) over the last twenty years - his new policy was designed to ensure that gas flaring activities were minimized. He said that the NOC was working in coordination with other government bodies to develop an overall strategic gas policy, which would include plans for further development of the sector, as well as gas pricing strategies.

LIBYA STILL INVESTING IN NEW OIL EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES

¶7. (C) To counter criticism that many companies had downsized or closed operations because most new oil exploration activities in Libyan fields had not produced, Sugheir blamed the global economic crisis, claiming that many of the new fields were still in the early stages of development and would not be ready for production for three or four more years. He cited a recent discovery by the Waha Group (a joint-venture that includes U.S. companies Marathon, Amerada-Hess, and Conoco-Phillips) in the Jalo field in the Sirte Basin (400 miles south of Benghazi) as evidence that new exploration activities were worthwhile. [Note: The discovery at Jalo field, which lies on the southern end of the Sirte Basin, was unsurprising given the area's proven reserves. End note.] Sugheir also described a "huge" NOC project to develop an international oil pipeline that would connect the cities of al-Khums, Tripoli, and Mellitah and would eventually be a source for increased exports to Europe. He said that five major sedimentary basins with oil and gas resources had been discovered in Libya and that seismic data suggested that much more remained to be discovered across the country. Most areas in Libya, he stated, were still underexplored. Sugheir insisted that the GOL's goal of producing 3 million barrels of oil per day by 2012 was still feasible.

NEW MINISTRY OF ENERGY TO BE CREATED

¶8. (C) In other energy-related news, Sugheir confirmed that the GOL was in the process of establishing a new General People's Committee (Ministry-equivalent) for Energy, which will direct Libya's oil, gas, electricity, nuclear and solar energy, and environmental sectors. The new ministry will also promote joint ventures between the GOL and private local and foreign companies in the aforementioned sectors. Sugheir claimed that the idea of a Ministry of Energy was not new, and in fact, the ministry would represent the reincarnation of a previous energy structure that had existed in the past. [Note: An informal energy council already exists, comprised of the Ministers for Transport, Manpower, and Economy, NOC representatives, and members of Libya's National Security Council. End note.]

Libya's National Security Council. End note.]

¶9. (C/NF) Bio note: Ali Mohamad Salah Al Sugheir has served as Vice-Chairman and General Director of Libya's National Oil Corporation since 2006. Prior to this, he served as chairman of the Sirte Oil Company, the most important of the NOC's subsidiaries, a position to which he was appointed after a short stint as exploration manager. A graduate of Glasgow University, Sugheir speaks Arabic and fluent English. During the meeting with P/E Chief, he was charismatic, confident, and engaging, and he seemed personally proud of the NOC's initiatives to expand its gas exploration activities. While he accepted a meeting easily by phone with P/E Chief, he emphasized that a meeting with the Ambassador must be requested officially through MFA Protocol. Although the meeting took place during Ramadan - the Islamic holy month during which Muslims are called to fast - Sugheir asked if he could open and begin eating a box of candy that P/E Chief delivered in honor of Eid. He refrained when a

TRIPOLI 00000765 003.2 OF 003

colleague quietly mentioned Ramadan.

¶10. (C) Comment: Ghanem's resignation was not unexpected; throughout the year, he was rumored to be frustrated by the pressure to collect money for the claims compensation fund and pet projects for regime insiders. More recently, Ghanem had been tasked with collecting funds to pay for the lavish celebrations marking the 40th anniversary of Qadhafi's coup. (A manager at Total claims that the NOC has ordered a 100-thousand barrel per day increase to recoup funds for the gala event.) As March and September (General People's Congresses and Revolution Day, respectively) are customary windows for high-level personnel changes, the September 1 window may have been the chance Ghanem was looking for to get out from a job that saw all quarters - including members of the Qadhafi clan - seeking greater personal access to Libya's oil wealth. Regardless of the reason for the resignation, Ali Sugheir - who does not seem as encumbered as Ghanem by reformist ideals - does not intend to waste time wondering who will replace the chairman. Sugheir's plans to move forward with expanding Libya's gas sector are robust, and if successful, could provide the GOL with another large source of income to fill in the gaps for any losses in the oil sector. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI770

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI770 aka Wikileaks id #227300 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S LATEST CONTRETEMPS - WITH CANADA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 28 Sep 2009 17:28 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI770.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI775 , 09TRIPOLI867
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6160
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0770/01 2711728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 281728Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5303
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0027
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1169
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0840
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0611
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5849
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000770

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON.

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/28/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EMIN
[Minerals and Metals] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S LATEST CONTRETEMPS - WITH CANADA

TRIPOLI 00000770  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: The Canadian Ambassador to Libya confirmed
September 28 that the Libyan Government had canceled Libyan
Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's planned stop in Newfoundland in
```

protest of the Canadian Foreign Minister's statement that he would give Qadhafi a "public tongue-lashing" regarding the hero's welcome given Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Bassett al-Megrahi. The contretemps is escalating into a commercial dispute, as the National Oil Company called in the Chairman of PetroCanada September 27 with a threat to nationalize the company's operations in Libya if the Canadian Government did not offer a formal apology. Post recommends supporting the Canadian Embassy if a request is made to intervene with the Libyans on Petrocanada's behalf. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Canadian Ambassador to Libya Sandra McArdle called the Ambassador September 28 to inform him of the escalating contretemps between the Canadian and Libyan governments engendered by Muammar al-Qadhafi's proposed September 29-30 stopover in Newfoundland en route to Seville, Spain. McArdle told us that Canada's minority government, facing tough elections, had initially planned to cancel Qadhafi's one-day stopover in Newfoundland. On instructions from Ottawa, McArdle said that she informed the Libyan Government in mid-September that Qadhafi was not welcome to visit Canada at this time. McArdle, who had just arrived in Libya in late August, had not yet presented her credentials at that time and said that she seriously believed for a few days that she could be PNG'ed or have her agrement revoked.

¶3. (S/NF) Fearful of delivering bad news to Qadhafi, McArdle explained that the notoriously slow Libyan bureaucracy, delayed passing Ottawa's message to the Leader for several days. In the meantime, Canadian companies with business interests in Libya launched a furious lobbying effort and convinced Ottawa to allow the trip to go forward. However, McArdle said that the Canadian Government's precarious domestic situation and upcoming elections pressed the Foreign Minister to go public with his very stern message. As of September 26, McArdle said that she had not yet received any reaction from the Libyan Government regarding her Foreign Minister's statement, although she expected it would not be well-received.

LOGISTICAL DETAILS COMPLICATE LIBYAN STOPOVER REQUEST

¶4. (C/NF) McArdle added that the last-minute nature of the trip had posed serious logistical challenges. The Canadian Government was forced to issue last-minute visas for Qadhafi's 130 delegation members at its consulate in New York. She hinted that the Canadian Government had waived many of its visa requirements and security checks, relying instead on the fact that Qadhafi and his party had undergone extensive U.S. vetting in order to receive their UNGA visas, but later told the Ambassador that the Libyans appeared to have been offended by Canada's visa requirements and procedures.

GOL DEMANDS APOLOGY, THREATENS TO NATIONALIZE PETROCANADA

¶5. (S/NF) On September 27, the Libyans responded strongly to the perceived Canadian snub of Qadhafi. The National Oil Corporation called in the head of PetroCanada abruptly September 27, threatening to nationalize the company if the Government of Canada did not offer a formal apology to Qadhafi for the Canadian FM's statement. The Libyans set a deadline of September 28, which McArdle told the Ambassador would be difficult to meet given that offices in Ottawa would open near close of business Tripoli time and after the Canadian weekend.

¶6. (S/NF) McArdle said she has advocated some kind of public and private statements from the Canadian PM and FM, which would indicate a Canadian welcome for the Libyans and hopefully turn the situation around. Libyans here are frantically calling the Canadian Embassy, concerned that if the issue is not resolved, Qadhafi's trip home will be complicated by lack of a place to stop for necessary refueling.

UK EMBASSY REQUESTS GUIDANCE ON INTERVENTION IN SUPPORT OF PETROCANADA

¶7. (S/NF) British Ambassador Sir Vincent Fein requested to meet the Ambassador on short notice September 28 to say he had queried London to see if the FCO wanted any intervention on the

TRIPOLI 00000770 002.2 OF 002

basis of concern over commercial interests (i.e., that the Libyans should not be doing this type of retaliation as it will spook all investors. The action will heighten concern given that the oil and gas sector has been traditionally protected from whim, except of course when it came to seeking contributions for the compensation fund and the difficult contract negotiations that the Libyans are engaging in with the oil companies). The Ambassador told Fein that he would see if there was any similar interest in Washington to intervene on Petrocanada's behalf.

¶8. (S/NF) Comment: Post believes it would be in the USG's interest to weigh in on the same basis as the British may decide to do: namely, to emphasize that it is not good for Libya to threaten existing and potential investors and violate the sanctity of contracts with such abandon. The situation between the Libyans and Canadians reflects vintage Libyan policy to strike hard at any quarter that insults the Leader publicly. The issue may be a bit more complicated by the fact that Petrocanada's new owner, Suncorps, was reportedly trying to divest itself of Libyan assets anyway (septel). End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI771

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI771 aka Wikileaks id #227491 ?
Subject	A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI'S ECCENTRICITIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 29 Sep 2009 17:21 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI771.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 30 Nov 2010 10:36: First publication, original content redacted • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: Publication withdrawn • Tue, 7 Dec 2010 20:02: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO7114
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0771/01 2721721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 291721Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5305
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0239
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5851
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000771

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND INR.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 9/29/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , PINR *[Intelligence]*
SUBJECT: A GLIMPSE INTO LIBYAN LEADER QADHAFI'S ECCENTRICITIES

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Recent first-hand experiences with Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and his staff, primarily in preparation for his UNGA trip, provided rare insights into Qadhafi's inner circle and personal proclivities. Qadhafi appears to rely heavily on Protocol Chief Nuri al-Mismari, and reportedly cannot travel with his senior Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska. He also appears to have an intense dislike or fear of staying on upper floors, reportedly prefers not to fly over

water, and seems to enjoy horse racing and flamenco dancing. His recent travel may also suggest a diminished dependence on his legendary female guard force, as only one woman bodyguard accompanied him to New York. End Summary.

QADHAFI'S PERSONALITY REFLECTED IN HIS PHOBIAS

¶2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi has been described as both mercurial and eccentric, and our recent first-hand experiences with him and his office, primarily in preparation for his UNGA trip, demonstrated the truth of both characterizations. From the moment Qadhafi's staff began to prepare for his travel to the United States, skillfully managed by his Chief of Protocol, Nuri al-Mismari, who has been at his side for the better part of his 40-year rule, various proclivities and phobias began to reveal themselves in every logistical detail. When applying for Qadhafi's visa, protocol staff asked whether it was necessary for the Leader to submit a portrait of himself that fit consular application regulations, noting that his photo was displayed throughout the city and that anyone of hundreds of billboards could be photographed and shrunken to fit the application's criteria. When the rule was enforced, protocol staff reluctantly conceded to take a portrait of the Leader specifically for the visa application.

¶3. (S/NF) When protocol began to search for proper accommodations for Qadhafi, Mismari informed us that the Leader must stay on the first floor of any facility that was rented for him. (Mismari separately told U.S. officials in Washington that Qadhafi could not climb more than 35 steps.) Mismari cited this requirement as the primary reason that the Libyan residence in New Jersey was selected as the preferred accommodation site rather than the Libyan PermRep's residence in New York City. Mismari also sought to find accommodations with room to pitch Qadhafi's Bedouin tent, Qadhafi's traditional site for receiving visitors and conducting meetings, as it offers him a non-verbal way of communicating that he is a man close to his cultural roots.

¶4. (S/NF) Qadhafi's dislike of long flights and apparent fear of flying over water also caused logistical headaches for his staff. When discussing flight clearances with Emboffs, Mismari explained that the Libyan delegation would arrive from Portugal, as Qadhafi "cannot fly more than eight hours" and would need to overnight in Europe prior to continuing his journey to New York. Mismari also revealed in the same conversation that Qadhafi does not like to fly over water. Presumably for similar reasons, Qadhafi's staff also requested a stop in Newfoundland to break his travel from Venezuela to Libya on September 29. [Note: The Government of Canada recently confirmed that the Libyan delegation canceled plans to stop in Newfoundland. End Note.]

DEPENDENCIES: RELIANCE ON A SELECTIVE GROUP OF INDIVIDUALS

¶5. (S/NF) Qadhafi appears to be almost obsessively dependent on a small core of trusted personnel. This group includes long-time aide Mismari, who had to travel between New York and Libya multiple times to coordinate the logistics of Qadhafi's visit. Mismari balanced the UNGA preparations between equally frenetic preparations for the August 31 African Union (AU) Summit and September 1 celebration of Qadhafi's coup. Mismari's role appears to range from showman-in-chief to close personal aide. At large events such as the August 31 AU Summit and September 1 celebrations, Mismari personally oversaw every last detail of these complex gatherings, ranging from the overall program to the position of the press pool. At UNGA, Mismari personally walked Qadhafi to the podium at the UNGA and carefully collected his papers and props upon the conclusion of the Leader's remarks. Long-time Qadhafi Chief of Staff Bashir Salah appears to play an equally important role in Qadhafi's personal retinue, and talks regularly with Mismari via an old-fashioned green phone on Mismari's desk. It is next to a

old fashioned green phone on Mismari's desk. It is next to a red phone, which presumably connects to Qadhafi himself. We constantly hear that National Security Adviser and son, Muatassim, also plays a key role as his father's confidante and handler during travel abroad. Muatassim also seems to have been tasked with insuring that the Leader's image is well-preserved through the full array of carefully-planned media events.

¶6. (S/NF) Finally, Qadhafi relies heavily on his long-time Ukrainian nurse, Galyna Kolotnytska, who has been described as a "voluptuous blonde." Of the rumored staff of four Ukrainian nurses that cater to the Leader's health and well-being, Libyan protocol staff emphasized to multiple Emboffs that Qadhafi cannot travel without Kolotnytska, as she alone "knows his routine." When Kolotnytska's late visa application resulted in her Security Advisory Opinion being received on the day Qadhafi's party planned to travel to the U.S., the Libyan Government sent a private jet to ferry her from Libya to Portugal to meet up with the Leader during his rest-stop. Some embassy contacts have claimed that Qadhafi and the 38 year-old Kolotnytska have a romantic relationship. While he did not comment on such rumors, a Ukrainian political officer recently confirmed that the Ukrainian nurses "travel everywhere with the Leader."

PREFERENCES - FROM DANCING TO HORSEMAN

¶7. (S/NF) In addition to the personality quirks revealed through Qadhafi's travel to New York, the Qadhafi's preferences for dancing and cultural performances were displayed over the last month. The three-day spectacle of his 40th anniversary in power included performances by dance troupes from Ukraine, Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, and Morocco, as well as musical performances by bands from Mexico, Russia, New Zealand, and a number of other nations. Qadhafi appeared particularly enthralled by Tuareg horse racing during two of the events, clapping and smiling throughout the races. The flamenco dancers that participated in his celebratory events appeared to spark a similar interest, as Qadhafi decided to stop in Seville (for a "personal trip" according to the Spanish Ambassador here) on his way back to Libya from Venezuela specifically to attend a flamenco dance performance. [Note: That stop has reportedly been scrapped for unknown reasons. End note.]

NO NEW YORK PHOTO OPS - QADHAFI LEAVES FEMALE GUARDS AT HOME

¶8. (S/NF) While Qadhafi's reported female guard force has become legendary, it played no role in his travels to New York. Only one female guard was included among the approximately 350-person strong Libyan delegation to New York. This is the same female bodyguard who sticks close to Qadhafi in his domestic and international public appearances and may, in fact, play some sort of formal security role. Observers in Tripoli speculate that the female guard force is beginning to play a diminished role among the Leader's personal security staff.

¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Qadhafi's state visits and appearances at various conferences and summits, both at home and abroad, have revealed greater details about his personality and character. While it is tempting to dismiss his many eccentricities as signs of instability, Qadhafi is a complicated individual who has managed to stay in power for forty years through a skillful balancing of interests and realpolitik methods. Continued engagement with Qadhafi and his inner circle is important not only to learn the motives and interests that drive the world's longest serving dictator, but also to help overcome the misperceptions that inevitably accumulated during Qadhafi's decades of isolation. As Mismari told us, pointing to a larger-than-life portrait of Qadhafi, "When you have been isolated for so long, it is important to communicate." End comment.

CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks cables: Muammar Gaddafi – mercurial, phobic 'King of Culture' | World news | The Guardian
- WikiLeaks Archive — Cables Uncloak U.S. Diplomacy - NYTimes.com
- WikiLeaks cables prompt US to move diplomatic sources | World news | guardian.co.uk
- WikiLeaks cables: A guide to Gaddafi's 'famously fractious' family | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI772

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI772 aka Wikileaks id #227697 ?
Subject	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 30 Sep 2009 15:33 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI772.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8156
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0772/01 2731533
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301533Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5307
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0447
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0613
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5853
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000772

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/KCC, AND NEA/MAG
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD [Fraud Prevention Programs] , CVIS [Visas] , CPAS [Passport and Citizenship] , CMGT [Consular
Administration and Management] , ASEC [Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000772  001.2 OF 003


¶1.T he following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the
full range of American Citizen Services and has been issuing the
full range of non-immigrant visas since March 25, 2009.  Because
of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few "pull" factors from
the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the United States
is very small. As Libya is a relatively wealthy country, "push"
instigators for Libyan citizens are also fairly minimal.
Official Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated and
```

usually handwritten, featuring few, if any, security features. We also have heard reports that genuine documents with false information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the Libyan government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct fraud investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work. Libyan applicants in general are unfamiliar with U.S. laws and processes and have proven susceptible to a number of fraudulent schemes in an effort to obtain visas or American citizen services.

b. NIV FRAUD: Post only began processing visas other than A and G in the past 6 months, and to date we have seen only a few cases of conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. In one such case, an H1B applicant presented documents that were clearly fake and stated that he paid a large sum for them on-line. He believed this to be the process to obtain a work visa in the United States. DHS has reported two Libyan applicants turned back at point of entry and admitting to lying during their interviews. In one case, the applicant mentioned that a known visa-fixing agency in Tripoli had coached him on successful interview techniques and recommended borrowing money to enhance his bank account statement. In addition, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have usually issued the visas in accordance with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. We will continue to monitor such cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes procure false employment letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud thus far.

c. IV FRAUD: Over the past year, Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident American citizens, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not yet seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" rather than separate birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features. We have no exposure to employment-based IV cases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants and other Libyans who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, and have placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of

identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming

TRIPOLI 00000772 002.2 OF 003

presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation. We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident U.S. citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Embassy Tripoli has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case. A pending case involves an American family in France seeking to adopt an illegal TCN immigrant child in Libya; the outcome remains uncertain.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2 million irregular (illegal) migrants are present in-country but live outside mainstream Libyan society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the 6 months we have been processing NIVs, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be involved in smuggling or trafficking. Most TCN applicants are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's RSO served as ARSO/I and FPM in his last assignment while the ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I. Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS with the exception of the H1B fraudster.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to demonstrate relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who

can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only official government document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has indicated that in the future, it plans to assign a single national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this plan, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release in the next few months. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of the new passport.

TRIPOLI 00000772 003.2 OF 003

The Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, has identified several genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls into question the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry has reportedly begun a process of "correcting" the last names of Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. One visa applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. There are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names - more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page.

1. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular section is not permitted by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact is required to be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further

personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The deputy section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation.

POLASCHIK
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI773

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI773 aka Wikileaks id #227698 ?
Subject	FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 30 Sep 2009 15:35 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI773.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8171
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0773/01 2731535
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 301535Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH NH
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5310
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0450
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0616
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5856
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000773

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/FPP, CA/VO/KCC, AND NEA/MAG
POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS
ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KFRD [Fraud Prevention Programs] , CVIS [Visas] , CPAS [Passport and Citizenship] , CMGT [Consular
Administration and Management] , ASEC [Security] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: FRAUD SUMMARY - TRIPOLI - SEPTEMBER 2009

REF: 08 STATE 74840

TRIPOLI 00000773  001.2 OF 003


¶1.T he following responses are keyed to reftel.

a. COUNTRY CONDITIONS: Fraud Level: Low. Tripoli provides the
full range of American Citizen Services and has been issuing the
full range of non-immigrant visas since March 25, 2009.  Because
of Libya's longtime isolation, there are few "pull" factors from
the United States, as the Libyan diaspora in the United States
is very small. As Libya is a relatively wealthy country, "push"
instigators for Libyan citizens are also fairly minimal.
Official Libyan documents are generally unsophisticated and
```

usually handwritten, featuring few, if any, security features. We also have heard reports that genuine documents with false information are obtainable from the authorities, possibly for a fee, but also through family connections. In addition, the Libyan government is extremely reluctant to share or confirm information about its citizens with us, which limits our ability to conduct fraud investigations. Further to this, the GOL requires that all law-enforcement related inquiries proceed through only one designated host government security service point of contact. While RSO at post is extremely supportive, our inability to develop consular law enforcement contacts limits ability to conduct anti-fraud work. Libyan applicants in general are unfamiliar with U.S. laws and processes and have proven susceptible to a number of fraudulent schemes in an effort to obtain visas or American citizen services.

b. NIV FRAUD: Post only began processing visas other than A and G in the past 6 months, and to date we have seen only a few cases of conventional fraud involving presentation of false documents. In one such case, an H1B applicant presented documents that were clearly fake and stated that he paid a large sum for them on-line. He believed this to be the process to obtain a work visa in the United States. DHS has reported two Libyan applicants turned back at point of entry and admitting to lying during their interviews. In one case, the applicant mentioned that a known visa-fixing agency in Tripoli had coached him on successful interview techniques and recommended borrowing money to enhance his bank account statement. In addition, we have seen cases where we suspect applicants of using their personal connections to obtain a genuine diplomatic note to get a visa for personal travel, and avoid fees and interviews. We have confirmed with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in all of these cases that the diplomatic notes are genuine, and have usually issued the visas in accordance with the request. We continue to follow up in these cases to ensure that the applicants in question return to Libya, but have seen no new instances of overstays. We will continue to monitor such cases closely. Post has heard reports from other Embassies that Libyan visa applicants sometimes procure false employment letters from friends who work at prominent international companies. Post has implemented a Business Visa Program which allows member companies to register with us, and provide sample signatures of all employees authorized to sign job letters for visa applicants. All of our employment-based cases so far have involved petitions from international oil companies; we have detected no evidence of any fraud thus far.

c. IV FRAUD: Over the past year, Tripoli began to accept petitions for immigrant visas from resident American citizens, but Tunis continues to interview these cases. We have not yet seen any instances of fraud or questionable relationships. We do note that Libyan applicants often present the "Family Book" rather than separate birth and marriage certificates. While this is a valid civil document, we require a birth and marriage certificate, both of which are available. All three documents are handwritten, and contain no security features. We have no exposure to employment-based IV cases.

d. DV FRAUD: Tripoli does not process DV applications, and has received no inquiries regarding potential DV fraud from other Posts. We have received inquiries from DV applicants and other Libyans who have either seen advertisements or received e-mail from "service providers" offering assistance completing the DV forms, and have placed a general warning about the use of service providers for any visa services on our website.

e. ACS AND U.S. PASSPORT FRAUD: Embassy Tripoli resumed full passport and ACS services in FY-2007. Most claims are from first-time adult passport applicants, and are based upon birth in the United States while a parent was attending university. These cases require more time to review than most, in large part due to reliance upon Libyan documents to establish the identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of

identity of applicants. However, the vast majority of applicants are able to produce both parents' passports from the time of their birth, with visas and entry stamps confirming

TRIPOLI 00000773 002.2 OF 003

presence in the United States, as well as surprisingly vast amounts of supporting documentation. We routinely ask for two forms of identity documents from adult passport applicants because of increasing concerns about the potential vulnerability of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Libya issues a national identity card to its citizens at age 16, and most Libyans also hold a drivers' license. Both of these documents include a photo, but are only in Arabic.

f. ADOPTION FRAUD: Local law does not allow for the adoption of a Libyan child by foreign nationals. Only a resident U.S. citizen who is married to a Libyan national or is a dual-national can adopt in this country. To date, Embassy Tripoli has received only one general inquiry regarding adoption in Libya, and has not seen a case. A pending case involves an American family in France seeking to adopt an illegal TCN immigrant child in Libya; the outcome remains uncertain.

g. USE OF DNA TESTING: Post has not had any cases referred for DNA testing to date.

h. ASYLUM AND OTHER DHS BENEFITS FRAUD: Post receives infrequent reports of a lost/stolen I-551. We have begun to process these cases in close coordination with DHS colleagues in Paris and Rome. We have not detected any efforts at fraud or misrepresentation in this area. We have not processed any VISAS 92/93 cases.

i.ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, TERRORIST TRAVEL: While Libya is a transit and destination country both for economic migrants and victims of trafficking, especially from sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, it is not a center for the production of false documents. Traffickers and smugglers operating in Libya tend to focus on providing boat travel to Europe for migrants, who often seek asylum on arrival. Libya does have vast borders in the Sahara which are extremely difficult to police. Estimates indicate that 1.5-2 million irregular (illegal) migrants are present in-country but live outside mainstream Libyan society. Post knows that European Embassies routinely require a U.S. visa in order to issue a Schengen transit visa for travel to the United States, but has received no inquiries or reports regarding possible imposters or other misuse of U.S. travel documents in order to reach another Western country. In the 6 months we have been processing NIVs, we have not noted any TCN applicants who appear to be involved in smuggling or trafficking. Most TCN applicants are executive-level employees of international oil or construction companies.

j. DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS: Post's RSO served as ARSO/I and FPM in his last assignment while the ARSO's previous assignment was as an RSO-I. Post has an SOP for referring fraud cases to RSO. However, to date, we have not had any cases to refer to DS with the exception of the H1B fraudster.

k. HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY: Libyan passports and civil documents are uniformly handwritten, frequently contain errors, and have few if any security features. None have biometrics or machine-readable features. While both marriage and birth certificates are available, the document in everyday use to demonstrate relationships is the Libyan "Family Book." The book has a blue or green cover, and is issued to men when they get married. A man's family book contains only his photo, and data about his wife and children. Unmarried people are in their father's family book, except in the case of widows, who are the only women who

can have their own book. Libya issues both national identity cards and drivers licenses, handwritten in Arabic only, with a photo. We use these as secondary evidence of identity. Despite how easy it would be to counterfeit Libyan documents, we have not seen or heard of cases where identity is falsified.

The Libyan passport is the only official government document that has an English translation, handwritten on one of the last pages. The GOL has indicated that in the future, it plans to assign a single national ID number which will identify a person from the registration of their birth through their entire life. Under this plan, passport numbers would remain the same for a person's entire life. It is not clear how the GOL would register lost or expired passports under the scheme, or if old passports would remain valid. The GOL is in the process of modernizing its passport; it has provided us with a series of prospective dates for the rollout of a more modern document, some as early as last year. The new passport and identity documents are currently slated for release in the next few months. The GOL has not shared an exemplar of the new passport.

TRIPOLI 00000773 003.2 OF 003

The Maltese Embassy, one of the busiest visa-issuing countries in Libya, has identified several genuine Libyan passports issued with erroneous data. Libyan passports include a note if the passport is a replacement for an older passport. This notation, according to the Maltese, can be "forgotten" if the prior passport would reveal inconvenient truths about the applicant's travel history. This calls into question the integrity of the Libyan passport as an identity document. Post is not aware of any trend in alteration of Libyan passports. The passport agency and civil registry has reportedly begun a process of "correcting" the last names of Libyan citizens, many of whom, as is common in the Arab world, use an ancestor's first name as their last name. One visa applicant told us that this practice was no longer acceptable, and that the GOL was now requiring the use of "family" or clan last names instead. There are routinely four names in the Libyan passport--the applicant's first name, the father's and grandfather's first names, and then the family name. The handwritten English translation of the passport rarely contains a full translation of these four names - more frequently, one or both of the middle names is written as an initial only. When changes are made, no mention of any previous passports issued in another identity is necessarily mentioned. We routinely use the "alias" fields in the consular applications to counteract the potential for use of alternate identities by mala fide applicants. Both Tunis and Tripoli use only the passport number on Libya passports. In September 2008, Tunis detected numerous duplicates in their database. Contact with the Libyan Passport Agency indicates that in addition to the six-digit passport number, three "series" letters are used. The Arabic letters "wow," "ha",and "ya," as well as "no letter" serve to differentiate the passport series. These letters do not appear on the passport data page. Post continues to attempt to find a way to capture these letters in the consular applications without causing problems for visa holders at POE, where inspectors would notice a mismatch between the visa and the passport data page.

1. COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES: While our relationship with Libya is improving, it remains complicated. Many routine requests must be submitted by diplomatic note, and even then, are often ignored. The Consular section is not permitted by the GOL to have any contact with host-country law enforcement, as all such contact is required to be between RSO and a designated GOL liaison. Even with close cooperation with RSO, working through this channel often requires repeated requests for the same information. In addition, the GOL has repeatedly expressed concern about sharing its citizens' personal data with foreign governments, which will further

personal data with foreign governments, which will further complicate efforts to investigate identity fraud.

m. AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN: We are working with other Embassy sections, and with other Embassies in Tripoli to develop our understanding of how applicants here will attempt to overcome 214(b). Early indicators are that few unqualified applicants are presenting themselves for interviews.

n. STAFFING AND TRAINING: The deputy section chief serves as FPM. He has not had any specific Fraud Prevention training in the past five years. There is no dedicated LES fraud prevention position. All local staff is sensitized to fraud issues and understand the importance of both internal controls and our external image in relation to fraud prevention. When translation is needed in visa or passport cases, we use our native Arabic-speaker Consular Associate to avoid the appearance that a Libyan employee has influence into the visa or passport process. All new staff are required to take FPP on-line training courses as part of their orientation.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI775

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI775 aka Wikileaks id #227723 ?
Subject	PETROCANADA FORCED TO CUT PRODUCTION BY FIFTY-PERCENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 30 Sep 2009 16:59 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/09/09TRIPOLI775.html
References	09TRIPOLI770
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI825 , 09TRIPOLI867
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8299
PP RUEHGA RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0775 2731659
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 301659Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0029
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0007
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0453
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0619
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5860
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000775

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/30/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EMIN
[Minerals and Metals] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: PETROCANADA FORCED TO CUT PRODUCTION BY FIFTY-PERCENT

REF: TRIPOLI 770

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  A day after reportedly "settling" its
dispute with Canada (ref),  the Libyan Government issued an
order September 30 forcing PetroCanada and its operator, Libya's
Hrouj company, to cut production by fifty percent.  The move may
be a "cheap" way for the Libyans to punish PetroCanada for
Canada's snub against Muammar al-Qadhafi while stopping short of
nationalizing it, as previously threatened.  Diplomats from
nations with significant foreign investment appeared unsettled
```

nations with significant foreign investment appeared unsettled by the surprise move, which could hurt Libya's own economic interests. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Joe Smargiassi (strictly protect), Commercial Manager (Finance and Economics), for PetroCanada told Econoff September 30 that PetroCanada and its local operator, Hrouj, were told to cut production by fifty percent, no reason given. Neither the National Oil Company nor Hrouj representatives knew the background for the decision, according to Smargiassi, who intimated that the order had come from the highest levels, i.e. Muammar al-Qadhafi himself.

¶3. (S/NF) Smargiassi explained that from a technical standpoint, cutting production by such a large amount would be very difficult and, in fact, that his engineers did not even know how to do that, at least not quickly. Shutting down production lines would take time, Smargiassi said, and teams were working it on it as he spoke. He noted that cutting production by that amount could also be very damaging, particularly to the reservoir. Beyond that, it would be very difficult technically to return to previous production levels if the decision were reversed.

¶4. (S/NF) Libya's surprise move came less than 24 hours after Canadian Ambassador to Libya Sandra McArdle told the Ambassador that Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had "settled the issue." It is unclear what happened in the interim. Diplomats from nations with significant investments in Libya - notably the UK and Italy - appeared unsettled by today's news.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: This move appears to be purely by whim and for political impact, with little thought given to Libya's own economic interests. PetroCanada works in tandem with its Libyan operator, Hrouj, and the majority share-holder, Libya's NOC, both of which will experience a loss in revenue due to the decreased production. The timing is interesting too, since Suncor (which purchased PetroCanada earlier this summer) was reportedly already strongly considering divesting its international assets, including those in Libya and Syria. This latest development will likely only increase the likelihood that PetroCanada will leave Libya. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI777

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI777 aka Wikileaks id #227917 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE RESPONSE: EXISTENCE OF COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 1 Oct 2009 16:08 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI777.html
References	09STATE100153
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9318
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0777 2741608
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 011608Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5315
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0842
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5862
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000777

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/RA (RICHARD NEPHEW)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: IR *[Iran]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , FR *[France; Corsica]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: EXISTENCE OF COVERT URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY IN IRAN

REF: STATE 100153

¶1. (SBU) P/E Chief delivered reftel demarche jointly with the French DCM (at Embassy of France's request) to the Deputy Director of the Libyan MFA's International Organizations Office, Murat Humaima, on September 30. Humaima responded that Libya was unequivocally against nuclear enrichment for military purposes and was supportive of nonproliferation goals. The best evidence of that, he said, was Libya's unilateral decision in 2003 to dismantle its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) programs. Humaima said that while he had not heard from the Iranian side on the issue, he expected the Iranians to reach out to convey an explanation of their activities. After proper review, he said, Libya would be able to take proper action vis-a-vis the Iranians.

¶2. (SBU) Humaima expressed Libya's strong position against the

use of sanctions to address breaches of international obligations; rather, such situations must be resolved through discussion and diplomacy. He said that the October 1 meeting of the P5+1 in Geneva to discuss the issue was the right approach. The GOL believes the matter belongs to the IAEA and should not be addressed within the UN Security Council context. The GOL is, however, supportive of POTUS's initiatives on nonproliferation as articulated during the September 24 UNSC meeting.

¶3. (SBU) UK DCM informed P/E Chief separately September 30 that he had delivered the same demarche the previous day. While the GOL response was largely the same, his interlocutor had not mentioned the GOL position against sanctions.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI778

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI778 aka Wikileaks id #227929 ?
Subject	LIBYAN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND AGREES TO BUY CANADIAN OIL FIRM VERENEX
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 1 Oct 2009 16:46 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI778.html
References	09TRIPOLI148 , 09TRIPOLI517
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI825
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9369
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0778/01 2741646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011646Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5316
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0030
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0008
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0454
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0620
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5863
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000778

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA
WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/1/2019
TAGS: EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , LY [Libya] , CA [Canada] , EFIN
[Financial and Monetary Affairs] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND AGREES TO BUY CANADIAN OIL FIRM
VERENEX

REF: A) TRIPOLI 148 ; B) TRIPOLI 517

TRIPOLI 00000778  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b) , (d)
```

REASON: 1.4 (B), (D)

¶1. (C) Summary: After many months of delay on the part of the Libyan government, Canadian oil exploration firm Verenex has reached a tentative sale agreement with the Libyan Government's sovereign wealth fund. A final agreement should be concluded by October 20. After that, the shareholders of Verenex will have to approve the deal, and how the largest shareholder, Vermillion Resources Ltd (at 45 per cent), will vote is unknown. Verenex has been the most successful oil explorer in Libya since foreign companies started returning five years ago. China's recent effort to purchase Verenex was nixed by the Libyan National Oil Company, and Libyan Government interference resulted in a 30 percent drop in Verenex's sale price. While the Verenex sale is relatively small (approximately $ 300 million US dollars), the Canadian company's experience is an example of Libya's worsening business environment. End summary.

VERENEX SEES 30 PER CENT DROP IN SALE PRICE AS RESULT OF NEW DEAL WITH LIBYAN INVESTMENT AUTHORITY

¶2. (C) Jim McFarland (strictly protect), CEO of Canadian oil exploration firm Verenex, confirmed to Econoff that the Libyan sovereign wealth fund --the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA)-- would purchase Verenex Energy after the Libyan government did not approve a Chinese company's offer to acquire Verenex. The Canadian firm's assets in Libya have yielded the most positive exploration results since Libya welcomed back international oil companies five years ago (Ref A) . The China National Petroleum Company International Ltd (CNPCI) had offered to purchase Verenex in a deal estimated at 400 million U.S. dollars. However, the proposed sale required the approval of Libya's National Oil Company (NOC) under the terms of Verenex's Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement (EPSA) with the NOC, and contained a clause allowing the NOC to pre-empt any bid that had been offered. The CNPC offer would have paid Verenex $ 10.00 Canadian dollars (approximately $ 9 USD) per share in a deal valued at $ 500 million Canadian dollars (400 million USD). In addition, CNPC would have paid the NOC a cash bonus of $ 47 million Canadian dollars. CNPC dropped its proposed offer earlier this month. McFarland's prediction that the GOL aimed to drive down the share price by dragging out the resolution of the sale appears to have come true (Ref B). In this latest development, the LIA will only pay $ 7.09 Canadian dollars ($ 6.57 USD) per share amounting to $ 315 million Canadian dollars. McFarland said the Libyans had set $315 million Canadian dollars as the maximum price they would pay to acquire Verenex. In the end, the LIA deal stands to be about 30 percent less than the Chinese proposal, a loss that has upset some shareholders.

THE DEAL SHOULD CONCLUDE BY OCTOBER 20 BUT SHAREHOLDERS MAY NOT AGREE

¶3. (C) McFarland said Verenex had signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the LIA and that the LIA had hired UK lawyers to assist with the financial and legal due diligence of the company. He said this work should be finished by October ¶20. The next step will be to obtain shareholder approval. The views of Verenex's main shareholder, Vermillion Resources Ltd., which owns about 45 percent of Verenex stock, are not known. However, the only other option for the shareholders would be to force the company to take its case to international arbitration. McFarland commented that arbitration, while always an option, is unlikely as it would take several years to conclude thereby dragging out the process even longer.

WHY IS THE LIBYAN INVESTMENT AUTHORITY (LIA) BUYING VERENEX?

¶4. (C) The Libyan Government's choice of the LIA as the state-owned entity that will buy Verenex is an interesting one. A possible buyer could have been the NOC itself which already owns many oil companies, such as Sirte Oil Company, Zuetina, and Hrouj. (In earlier conversations, McFarland had speculated that the NOC subsidiary, AGOCO, that originally owned Verenex's

assets in Area 47 of the Ghadames Basin, might be trying to get back the area now that oil had been found). Verenex General Manager Don Shepherd (strictly protect) opined that a sale directly to the LIA, instead of the NOC, may enable Libya to more easily sell Verenex to another company. Other industry insiders in Tripoli speculate the LIA will indeed turn around and sell Verenex to another International Oil Company (IOC) and

TRIPOLI 00000778 002.2 OF 002

in effect, "flip it." McFarland hinted to Econoff that this might be a possibility, saying he was not sure of the LIA's "end game" and whether they would sell the company. No specific buyers have yet been identified. The Argentine Ambassador told us that LIA is trying to entice an Argentine company to work with LIA as the operator for Verenex, as LIA does not have the capacity to continue operations on its own.

¶5. (C) Comment: While the Verenex sale to the Libyan government is relatively small (approximately $ 300 million US dollars), the Canadian company's experience is an example of Libya's worsening business environment. Some energy executives have attributed the recent downward trend in the business climate to the growing confidence that has resulted from Libya's increased presence on the international stage. One energy executive explicitly linked Libya's toughening stand vis-`-vis the international oil companies to Libya's assumption of leadership roles in the United Nations and African Union, noting that Libya may feel that it now has the international standing to play hardball with foreign companies. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI779

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI779 aka Wikileaks id #227932 ?
Subject	LIBYA NAMES ALI SUGHEIR NEW CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 1 Oct 2009 17:09 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI779.html
References	09TRIPOLI765
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI825 , 09TRIPOLI862
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9392
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0779 2741709
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011709Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5318
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0032
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0010
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0456
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0622
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0086
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA PRIORITY 0031
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5865
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000779

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD; ENERGY
FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , LY [Libya] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs]
SUBJECT: LIBYA NAMES ALI SUGHEIR NEW CHAIRMAN OF NATIONAL OIL
COMPANY

REF: TRIPOLI 765

¶1.    (SBU)  On September 30, 2009, Libya's National Oil
Corporation (NOC) published on its website a notice that the
Secretary of the General People's Committee (prime
```

Secretary of the General People's Committee (prime minister-equivalent) issued a decree designating Ali Sugheir to assume the functions of the Secretary of NOC Management Committee (also commonly referred to as Chairman) in addition to the functions already entrusted to him as a NOC Director General. Sugheir, who was already Acting Chairman of the NOC (reftel), thereby replaces Shokri Ghanem as the head of the state-owned company.

¶2. (SBU) Biographic Note: Born in Benghazi in 1959, Sugheir has been the Director General of the NOC since 2008. Prior to joining the NOC, he was chairman of Sirte Oil Company, which is considered one of the most important of the NOC's subsidiaries. A graduate of Glasgow University in the UK, Sugheir was promoted to chairman after a stint as exploration manager. He is also a graduate of the University of Garyounis (Benghazi) where he studied Geology.

¶3. (SBU) Comment: The promotion of Sugheir follows the prediction of diplomats in Tripoli that a technocrat would be named to replace Shokri Ghanem, a prominent politician and former prime minister (2003-2005). However, some industry insiders believe that the announcement is not the permanent appointment and is simply a resolution confirming Sugheir as interim Chair. They expect Ghanem, who is reportedly close to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to make a return to politics. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI794

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI794 aka Wikileaks id #228376 ?
Subject	CLOSING IN ON SIGNING THE U.S.-LIBYA HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM TRANSFER AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 5 Oct 2009 15:07 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI794.html
References	09TRIPOLI696
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI870
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1926
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0794 2781507
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051507Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5333
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0074
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0843
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1172
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0623
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0087
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5880
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000794

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA/MAG, ISN/NESS, AND L; DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DOE - M FOR M.
TSIKLAURI

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/5/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , TRGY
[Energy Technology] , IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] , PINR [Intelligence] , TSPL [Science and
Technology Policy] , TPHY [Physical Sciences] , TNGD [Engineering Research and Development] ,
MCAP [Military Capabilities] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: CLOSING IN ON SIGNING THE U.S.-LIBYA HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM
TRANSFER AGREEMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 696

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) Summary: According to a visiting Department of Energy
official, negotiations over the text of the agreement to
```

transfer spent nuclear fuel to Russia are almost complete. The main sticking points concern questions of liability and are expected to be resolved in a few days. Our main interlocutor, Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, is pushing to finalize the agreement. Gashut plans to travel to Russia October 7-9 to sign the parallel Russia-Libya HEU Agreement. Meanwhile, preparations are underway to ship the DOE certified casks to Libya in November in time for the Russians to conduct training on proper loading procedures, and then complete the loading process. The planned shipment date is November 21, 2009. The Libyan Government appears to be making an intense, good-faith effort to meet its obligations regarding the spent nuclear fuel. End summary.

STATUS OF HEU AGREEMENT FINALIZATION AND SIGNING

¶2. (S/NF) Department of Energy (DOE) official Igor Bolshinsky completed his latest mission to Libya on October 1 and said the U.S.-Libya HEU transfer agreement is almost ready to be signed in Tripoli. The main points of contention concern liability issues, but Bolshinsky expects these to be resolved in the next few days once the relevant U.S. government legal counsels confer. (Note: the Libyans had raised the liability text in September 16 meetings on the margins of the IAEA General Congress meeting in Vienna. End note) Dr. Ali Gashut, head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, is pushing to finalize the agreement.

¶3. (S/NF) The Russia-Libya Agreement signing is scheduled for October 8 in Moscow. According to Bolshinsky, the Libyans have agreed that the Russian signing can move forward even before U.S.-Libya Agreement is signed since the text of the latter agreement is nearly finished. Gashut will go to Moscow on October 7 and sign on behalf of Libya, and Director General of Rostom Kirienko will sign for the Russian Federation.

PREPARATIONS UNDERWAY TO SHIP HEU TO RUSSIA

¶4. (S/NF) On November 3, two certified casks will be delivered to Libya, which will enable the Russians to train the Libyans in loading the casks. On November 16, five more casks will be delivered to complete the loading during the week of November 16-20 in time for the shipment on November 21. DOE Officials will return to Libya in mid-November to assist with the shipment preparations. Noting that the Libyan Government continues to work actively on all preparations needed for the shipment, Bolshinsky assessed that his Libyan counterparts are making a good-faith effort to meet their international obligations.

COMMENT

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The Libyan Government appears to have significantly stepped up its efforts on the HEU transfer agreements in recent months. As MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri told us in August, the Libyan Government views completion of these agreements as vital to the continued bilateral relationship (ref). We share Bolshinsky's assessment that the Libyans are making a good-faith effort to meet their international obligations. Although Libya missed the September 30 shipping deadline, all evidence indicates that the spent nuclear fuel will be sent back to Russia before the end of the calendar year. Our DOE colleagues are to be commended for their perseverance and we appreciate their diligent efforts to realize the completion of the HEU repatriation program in Libya. End comment.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI795

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI795 aka Wikileaks id #228385 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION CHIEF DEFENDS EXTENSION REQUEST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 5 Oct 2009 15:40 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI795.html
References	09TRIPOLI490
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI886 , 09TRIPOLI933
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1980
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0795/01 2781540
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 051540Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5334
INFO RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0088
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1173
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0844
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0624
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5881
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000795

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CBC (FERGUSON); NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/5/2019
TAGS: PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental
Affairs] , CWC [Chemical Weapons Convention] , OPCW, LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION CHIEF DEFENDS EXTENSION
REQUEST

REF: A) STATE 100809; B) TRIPOLI 490

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, CDA, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) Summary:  Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, head of Libya's chemical
weapons destruction program, defended Libya's Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) extension request, arguing that a grassroots
environmental campaign and civil defense concerns regarding
possible accidents or leaks required additional time to meet
```

possible accidents or leaks required additional time to meet Libya's obligations to destroy its chemical weapons stockpile and convert Rabta 1 and 2. Except for the alleged grassroots environmental movement, most of Hesnawy's argument seemed plausible. Hesnawy also provided a detailed update on Libya's progress. Plans are in place with the Italian company SIPSA to build the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility in time for destruction to commence November 1, and work is progressing with the company PharmChem on the Rabta conversion project. Hesnawy said he was prepared to deliver a detailed presentation of Libya's progress during the October 12 Executive Council session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). Libya also briefed representatives of the French (jointly with post) and UK (separately) embassies here on its progress. End Summary.

HESNAWY JUSTIFIES EXTENSION REQUEST

¶2. (S) During a September 30 meeting, Pol/Econ Chief jointly delivered ref a demarche with French DCM to the head of the chemical weapons destruction program at Libya's National Chemical Weapons (CW) Authority, Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy. During the meeting, Hesnawy also provided a detailed briefing on his progress toward meeting Libya's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) commitments. Libyan MFA International Organizations Officials Murat Humaima, and Tajouri Shiradi also attended the meeting.

¶3. (S) Hesnawy gave a long explanation of the reasons for the extension request, including resistance from the local community when construction work began at the building site for the Rabta Toxic Chemicals Destruction Facility. He explained that local residents complained about the idea of a CW destruction facility being built in their neighborhood and alerted environmental authorities to their concerns; then "all hell broke loose," he said. Hesnawy said that the "environmental agency" began asking tough questions regarding the emissions that would be released by the facility and requested verification of a number of control standards. Hesnawy bragged that he had successfully answered the questions and had come to an agreement with the agency. [Comment: Given tight Libyan Government controls over national security facilities and programs, we find it hard to believe that a grassroots movement could affect Libyan policy or action on a sensitive program such as the Rabta facility. End comment.]

¶3. (S/NF) Hesnawy then explained that the next problem he confronted was with the "civil defense people," who were concerned about securing the transfer of the chemical weapons and precursor materials from the storage to destruction sites. They demanded that emergency procedures be developed to ensure quick and appropriate response in the event of an accident or leak, which according to Hesnawy, has created additional delays. [Note: The UK DCM, who visited the storage facility earlier this year, told P/E Chief that the containers currently housing the material were in fact leaking when he observed them. End note.]

¶4. (S) On a positive note, Hesnawy reported that the ground at the site has been leveled, fencing and gates have been put in place, and water and energy sources have been built for the facility. A pipeline approximately 250 meters from the site will supply water from the Great Manmade River, and a power station about two kilometers away will support "an 11 kilo volt electricity line" to the facility.

UPDATE ON SIPSA WORK

¶5. (S) Hesnawy said that he had met with Italian company SIPSA September 29 (ref B) and emphasized the necessity of building the structure in an efficient way, to enable Libya to meet its CWC deadlines. By his estimation, since the destruction must commence on November 1, 2010, with the destruction of

one-percent of the Libyan CW stock, the facility must be ready for operations by October 29, 2010. He thought that destruction of one-percent of the CW would take one day to complete. In order to meet those deadlines, Hesnawy and the SIPSA designers agreed that the facility should be composed of 90% steel, which

would provide for faster construction. Furthermore, they had decided that the foundation will consist of a single platform, rather than separate, individual platforms. Hesnawy exuberantly claimed to be "convinced that Libya can meet its deadlines~if there are no other delays." He said that his extension request was for a total of 5-6 months, and he believed that destruction of the precursors would be completed on schedule.

¶6. (S) Hesnawy explained that a Technical Secretariat (TS) team recently visited the sites and inspected the storage of the mustard gas and precursors, and they had agreed with his reasons for requesting the extension and destruction timeline.

RABTA CONVERSION PROGRAM

¶7. (S) Regarding the conversion of Rabta 1 and 2 facilities, he explained that the list of equipment submitted in the amendment request had been dictated by European rules, since the company that was working to convert the facility, PharmChem, was European and was designing the pharmaceutical plant according to EU standards.

REQUEST FOR SUPPORT

¶8. (S) Hesnawy requested U.S. support during the October 12 Executive Council session and in weighing in with European delegations. P/E Chief emphasized that transparency and timely reporting were absolutely essential to U.S. support for Libya's requests. Hesnawy claimed that he agreed and had always been an advocate of transparency and communication on such issues. He said that he would be delivering the explanation of the Libyan requests at the OPCW Executive Council session. The French DCM was silent throughout the briefing and said he would confer with the Elysee on the Libyan request for support.

UK EMBASSY WARNS OF HESNAWY'S CONFIDENCE

¶9. (S) In a separate meeting, UK DCM Mark Matthews (strictly protect) told P/E Chief that while the MFA IO officer Tajouri Shiradi had made the same request for support for Libya's CWC requests, he did not provide as much detail on the progress of the Libyan program. Matthews expressed surprise that Hesnawy had met with us, relating that he was an elusive character who had not wanted to meet with him in the past, even though they had worked together when Matthews had served as part of the UK Delegation to the OPCW. Matthews described Hesnawy as a "wily snake who should not be trusted" and said that while part of the Libyan argument for the destruction deadline extension was credible, the other part was just talk.

¶10. (S/NF) Bio info: Hesnawy is a charismatic and gregarious character, who spoke fluent American English. He used American expressions and slang with ease and was clearly trying to endear himself to P/E Chief. He said that he has been head of Libya's Chemical Weapons Program for the last 12 years and was intimately aware of every technical detail relating to that program. According to Matthews, Hesnawy may be working with National Security Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, on missile purchase requests.

¶11. (S/NF) Comment: The Libyans made an effort to meet with us on short notice and were ready to provide detailed information about the status of their CWC commitments and requests. While

most of the argument for the extension was plausible, certain aspects of Hesnawy's justification (i.e., protests from the local population) do not seem to fit with the Libyan political environment. The fact that we received significantly more access than the UK Embassy seems to indicate that the Libyan Government appreciates the importance of continued WMD progress to our bilateral relationship. End Comment.
POLASCHIKJA

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI805

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities." — "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI805 aka Wikileaks id #228792 ?
Subject	UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT QADHAFI PROMOTES SAIF AL-ISLAM IN "SECRET" MEETING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 7 Oct 2009 16:38 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI805.html
References	09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI812 , 09TRIPOLI860
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4545
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0805/01 2801638
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 071638Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5346
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1518
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0851
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0968
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0911
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0088
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5893
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000805

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/7/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: UNCONFIRMED REPORT THAT QADHAFI PROMOTES SAIF AL-ISLAM IN
"SECRET" MEETING

REF: A. TRIPOLI 64
     B. TRIPOLI 40
     C. TRIPOLI 359

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D
¶1.   (C) Summary: Celebrating the 50th anniversary of the Free
Officers Movement, Libyan officials and various international
delegations gathered October 5-7 in the southern Libyan oasis
town of Sebha.  In nationally televised October 5 comments from
the event, Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi called for an
October 6 "secret" meeting among senior Libyan officials to
discuss "internal matters," an effort perhaps to belie rumored
```

discuss "internal matters," an effort perhaps to belie rumored criticism that, in contrast to previous years, no domestic policy address was delivered during Libya's recent September 1 festivities. Independent website Libya al-Youm, citing contacts who allegedly were in attendance at the October 6 meeting, reported that al-Qadhafi praised his second son Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, and called on the People's Congresses to create a non-term limited governmental role for him. If true, this report -- the only account yet from the closed October 6 meeting -- may signal that, after a rollercoaster year, Saif al-Islam will once again assume the mantle of heir apparent. It remains to be seen whether the creation of a formal governmental role for Saif al-Islam will become a reality, or simply join the long list of other ambitious, much-heralded, and as-yet-unrealized initiatives such as wealth distribution, government restructuring, and major cabinet shake-ups. End Summary.

LIBYA AL-YOUM REPORTS THAT MUAMMAR WANTS SAIF TO GET A FORMAL JOB

¶2. (C) During a televised October 5 speech in Sebha marking the 50th anniversary of the Free Officers Movement, Muammar al-Qadhafi called for a "secret" October 6 meeting among Libyan officials to discuss domestic affairs. While some international press reports mentioned the planned "secret" meeting, the press blackout in Libya has been nearly total, aided by Sebha's remote location approximately 400 miles south of Tripoli. Opposition-leaning news website Libya al-Youm, the only press outlet to yet discuss the event, posted an article October 7 on the meeting. Citing unnamed sources who allegedly were in attendance, the article quotes Qadhafi as lauding his second son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, as a man who is "loyal and loves Libya," and noting that his current lack of a formal position has created "some problems." The Libyan leader then called on the members of the People's Congresses to create a position for Saif al-Islam outside of the General People's Committee (GPC) secretariat. The elder Qadhafi reportedly argued that the usual four-year term of the GPC would not permit his son sufficient time to execute programs "in the interest of the Libya of tomorrow." (Note: It is unlikely that Saif al-Islam was present at the meeting. Russian diplomats reported he was in eastern Russia in early October for a hunting trip and press reports indicate he visited Mongolia on or around October 5. End note).

"SECRET" MEETING ECHOES RUMORS IN DECEMBER...

¶3. (C//NF) Libya al-Youm's unverified reports and Qadhafi's request for a press-free meeting are reminiscent of similar events in December 2008 (ref A). At that time, following a televised speech to key advisors, Qadhafi asked that cameras and recording equipment be shut off and told the assembled that Libya was entering a "new political period" and would hold elections for some key offices "soon". Drafts of a constitution seen then by well-connected UN contacts included a new, non-term limited position with broad executive powers as the head of a 100-person "Senate" that was widely viewed as a vehicle for Saif al-Islam to take a formal role within the government. However, the constitution was subsequently removed from the agenda of March's General People's Congress session (ref B) -- the beginning of a six-month slide in Saif al-Islam's prominence that saw his media group nationalized (ref C) and his younger brother National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi, not Saif al-Islam, accompany his father to the United Nations in September.

~BUT DIPLOMATIC CORPS GIVEN NO DETAILS

¶4. (C) Joining the rest of the diplomatic corps, the CDA was shuttled to Sebha on October 7 to attend the closing of the three-day festival. Senior Libya officials including Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and Director of Military Intelligence Abdulla Sannusi have reportedly been in the oasis town since October 4, and various Arab and African delegations also participated.

Libyan officials demonstrated tell-tale signs that Qadhafi would address the assembled: cell phones were confiscated and hurried

TRIPOLI 00000805 002 OF 002

arrangements were made in the hall where an Extraordinary Session of the General People's Congress had been convened to designate various locations from al-Qadhafi's life as national historic sites. However, Qadhafi never showed up, and other government officials have not yet divulged the content of the October 6 meeting.

COMMENT

¶5. (C) The closed October 6 meeting and Libya al-Youm's report have renewed chatter in Tripoli that Saif al-Islam is once again ascendant and still the heir apparent. Many Libyans expected an announcement in September that Qadhafi pere would take on a more international role and that Saif al-Islam would make a strong return to domestic politics -- a view bolstered by images of Saif al-Islam hugging Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi upon his August 20 arrival in Tripoli. If Libya al-Youm's report is confirmed, it remains to be seen whether the creation of a formal governmental role for Saif al-Islam will become reality, or simply join other ambitious, much-heralded, and as-yet-unrealized initiatives such as wealth distribution, government restructuring, and major cabinet shake-ups.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI812

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI812 aka Wikileaks id #228998 ?
Subject	LIBYAN AIR FORCE JET CRASHES AT AIRSHOW
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 8 Oct 2009 16:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI812.html
References	09TRIPOLI805
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5653
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0812 2811629
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081629Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5354
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0846
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1175
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0090
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0626
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0457
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0001
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5901
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000812

SIPDIS

STATE PLEASE PASS TO NEA/MAG; ENERGY FOR GINA ERICKSON; COMMERCE
FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/8/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN AIR FORCE JET CRASHES AT AIRSHOW

REF: TRIPOLI 805

CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, A/DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) On October 7, a Libyan MiG-23 fighter jet crashed during
a demonstration flight at the third annual Libyan Aviation Expo
(LAVEX). According to a British businessman attending the expo
at Mitiga Airbase (a Libyan military facility, and former U.S.
airbase), the aircraft was performing its maneuvers and then

suddenly plunged to the ground. It was flying so low to the ground that the two pilots had no time to eject. The cause of the crash is unknown but, according to our contacts, the jet was "very old." Some believe it may simply have run out of fuel. After the crash, which occurred in the late morning, all other demonstration flights were cancelled.

¶2. (C) The aircraft crashed into a residential area about two kilometers from observation platforms at LAVEX. The official Libyan press agency reported that three people on the ground were wounded. Highlighting the lack of credibility that governmental news sources have with normal Libyans, rumors are circulating throughout Tripoli that the government is not reporting the true casualities, and that actually, between one to twelve Libyans were killed. A military protocol official told us that the jet hit a house that was under construction, wounding three workers. A cellphone video of the crash scene posted on YouTube, shows a mass of people gathered around a mass of rubble with no apparent emergency personnel on site.

¶3. (C) Comment: At the expo, Libya's aging air force - which is only slowly recovering from years of unreliable maintenance and lack of spare-parts when Libya was under international sanctions - was on full display. The crash of the jet tragically highlighted the weaknesses of Libya's military airfleet. Despite Libya's obvious need to procure new planes internationally, our contacts report that many high-level foreign delegations to LAVEX, including the Chief of Staff of the French Air Force, were unable to secure meetings with senior Libyan officials, presumably since during the expo, most of the government was summoned to the southern oasis town of Sebha for festivities marking the 50th anniversary of the Free Officer Movement (reftel). This is yet another demonstration of how business in Libya is subject to the whims of its unpredictable leader.

POLASCHIKJA

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI816

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI816 aka Wikileaks id #229313 ?
Subject	FM KUSA DEFENDS LIBYAN ACTIONS ON GOLDSTONE REPORT AS "OPENING THE DOOR" FOR DEBATE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 Oct 2009 16:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI816.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7897
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0816 2851611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 121611Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5359
INFO RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0055
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5906
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000816

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , IS *[Israel]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: FM KUSA DEFENDS LIBYAN ACTIONS ON GOLDSTONE REPORT AS "OPENING THE DOOR" FOR DEBATE

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Following an October 8 meeting between Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa and visiting USESS Gration (septel), DCM expressed the United States' strong disappointment with Libya's action on the Goldstone report at the UN Security Council. Clearly surprised by the demarche, Kusa responded that Israeli-Palestinian issues were matters for international fora and that Libya was simply "opening the door" for international debate. Defending Libya's right to raise the issue in the Security Council, Kusa said that Libya "will not have views imposed on us by the U.S." Although Libya was keen to foster its relationship with the U.S., "you have your views and we have ours. This should not be a source of conflict between us."

¶2. (C) DCM responded that the U.S. was not opposed to discussion of the Goldstone report and, in fact, had worked out an arrangement for the report to be discussed in the UN Human Rights Council. Libya's actions had disrupted a carefully coordinated approach. She stressed that the U.S. was particularly disappointed by Libya's lack of consultations prior to raising the issue in the Security Council.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI817

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI817 aka Wikileaks id #229314 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MFA SEEKS PROGRESS ON POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 12 Oct 2009 16:29 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI817.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7914
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0817 2851629
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 121629Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5360
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1520
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5907
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000817

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR PM/WRA - STEPHANIE PICO AND KATHERINE BAKER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/12/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA SEEKS PROGRESS ON POLITICAL-MILITARY ISSUES

REF: A. A) Knoch-McManus email of 10/7/09
B. B) State 102509

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) DCM and DATT met with MFA A/S-equivalent Ahmed Fituri on October 8, at his request, to discuss pending security assistance and mil-mil cooperation issues. Fituri said that he had arranged the meeting at the behest of Libyan National Security Advisor Dr. Muatassim al-Qadhafi, who was eager to move cooperation forward following Muammar al-Qadhafi's visit to the New York for the UN General Assembly. Fituri added that he hoped progress on these pending issues -- including possible Libyan participation in Bright Star exercises -- would lay the groundwork for successful political-military talks later this year.

¶2. (C) Noting that the National Security Advisor had asked for clarification of certain language in the Section 505 Agreement governing end-use of bilateral military assistance, Fituri asked whether the U.S. had any further information. Drawing on ref a, DATT briefed Fituri on Article E of the standard Section 505 language, explaining that the clause was included to cover any possible future bilateral military assistance that could be provided under other legal authorities. DATT emphasized that this language did not in any way convey that the U.S. was promising additional new military assistance. Fituri said that he understood, and would brief the National Security Advisor on the issue.

¶3. (C) Fituri also asked for an update on the list of military equipment requested by Muatassim al-Qadhafi during his April visit to the United States. DATT explained that the United States had briefed the National Security Advisor's officer repeatedly on the regulations governing Foreign Military Sales and the appropriate way forward. Noting that the U.S. was limited to non-lethal sales, the DATT suggested that the Libyan Government sign the pending Letters of Offer and Acceptance before initiating any new requests. Fituri agreed that this approach made sense, and said he hoped this topic could be included in any future political-military dialogue.

¶4. (S) DCM noted that the U.S. also had been looking at topics to include in a future political-military dialogue, and had identified man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) and humanitarian demining as potential areas of cooperation (ref b). A new partnership on eliminating the threat of MANPADS and eliminating Libya's landmine and UXO problem would advance our shared security goals and complement our existing security cooperation. Fituri said he was not familiar with either of these issues, but would brief Foreign Minister Musa Kusa. He asked that we convey ref b points in a diplomatic note, highlighting the possibility of expert-level discussions. DCM agreed to do so.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI825

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI825 aka Wikileaks id #230141 ?
Subject	LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY CHAIR CONFIRMS ACTING STATUS, PLEDGES CONTINUITY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 18 Oct 2009 09:09 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI825.html
References	09TRIPOLI765 , 09TRIPOLI775 , 09TRIPOLI778 , 09TRIPOLI779
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI862 , 09TRIPOLI867
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2862
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0825/01 2910909
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180909Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5368
INFO RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0034
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0011
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0627
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0091
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5915
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000825

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR FOR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON; PARIS AND LONDON FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/18/2019
TAGS: EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya] , EFIN [Financial and
Monetary Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY CHAIR CONFIRMS ACTING STATUS,
PLEDGES CONTINUITY

REF: A) TRIPOLI 779 ; B) TRIPOLI 765 ; C) TRIPOLI 775 ; D) TRIPOLI 778

TRIPOLI 00000825  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.     (C) Summary: Ali Sugheir, the current head of Libya's
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Ali Sugheir, the current head of Libya's National Oil Company, clarified that he was still the Acting Chairman of the NOC; a recent Libyan Government decree simply formalized his acting status. Sugheir plans to follow the policies of his predecessor, Shokri Ghanem, continuing with the conversion of all IOCs' contracts to EPSA IV contracts, and casting a recent decree requiring foreign companies to hire "regional managers" as an attempt to address Libyan unemployment problems. Sugheir dismissed reports that the new Supreme Council for Energy would affect the NOC's operations, stating that it was simply an expansion of a previous council. Sugheir also reaffirmed the NOC's partnership with PetroCanada, stating that recent production cuts were due to OPEC quotas and had also affected Libyan-owned companies. Sugheir stressed, as he had in a previous meeting with emboffs, that the change in leadership would not affect the NOC's daily operations. End summary.

¶2. (C) On October 13, the Ambassador met with Ali Sugheir, the current head of Libya's National Oil Company (NOC). Sugheir clarified that he was still serving as the Acting Chairman of the NOC and had not been officially approved as Shokri Ghanem's permanent replacement; the recent decree on the NOC website simply formalized Sugheir's acting status (Ref A). He had no idea how long he would remain in the position. (Note: Some industry insiders believe the General People's Congress would need to officially approve Sugheir as Chairman, but its next regular meeting is not expected until March 2010. End note). Reiterating a theme he expressed in a recent meeting with PolEcon Chief, Sugheir said, "it's business as usual at the NOC," and that he and his colleagues were working as a team (Ref B). Perhaps as a demonstration of the team approach, Sugheir invited to our meeting several of his colleagues from the NOC Management Committee, including: Azzam Eli Elmesallati, in charge of Investment and Joint Ventures; Ahmed al-Ghabir, Advisor to the Management Committee; Abdelgazem Shanguir, General Manager for Exploration and Production; and Ahmed Taghdi, Director for International Cooperation and Energy Information.

SUPREME COUNCIL FOR ENERGY AFFAIRS

¶3. (C) Sugheir said that the new "Supreme Council for Energy Affairs" headed by PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi was simply an expansion of the previous Supreme Council for Oil and Gas. The new council would have added responsibility for policies governing renewable energy and nuclear energy. Sugheir argued that the new council would not affect the NOC, as the NOC would still fall under the General People's Committee (Cabinet-equivalent). The intent of the new council, he said, was to place all energy-related departments and staff under one structure.

NEW REQUIREMENT FOR FOREIGN FIRMS TO BE HEADED BY LIBYAN MANAGERS

¶4. (C) Sugheir said that a recent decree requiring foreign companies to hire "regional managers" was an attempt to address unemployment in Libya, including many unemployed college graduates. He said the NOC had recently sent a "secret committee" to visit oil operations in the Libyan desert and conduct an employment study. The committee found that 80 percent of young engineers working in the oil industry were not Libyan but were from neighboring countries. However, he commented that, as a practical matter, the NOC was "busy with many other things" and had not focused on enforcing the requirement for a Libyan top manager in the IOCs.

¶5. (C) When asked how decreasing world oil prices would affect Libya's plans, Sugheir said Libya was "always going forward" and did not envision the return of the days of cheap oil. The NOC had just received approval from the GPC for a $12 billion investment plan for the next five years. It would focus on exploration and also include investments in developing fields operated by NOC-owned companies such as African Gulf Oil Company

("AGOCO") and Sirte Oil Company (which Sugheir used to run). While the overall focus would be on the Upstream side of the industry, investments in the "Mid-stream" would improve the pipeline networks. Sugheir noted Libya's goal of reaching a production of 3 million barrels per day by 2013 was still the target, and "maybe more."

TRIPOLI 00000825 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) Turning to the Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSAs), Sugheir said the NOC hoped to align all its foreign partners under EPSA IV agreements. He said almost all partners had done so but that Wintershall (German) and the Waha Group (US firms Marathon, Amerada Hess, and ConocoPhillips) had not converted to EPSA IV contracts. He characterized the EPSA IV system as a "happy medium for a working partnership" that was a "win-win" situation for both the NOC and its partners. He noted the NOC had accomplished moving to EPSA with the other major IOCs, which "created more comfort on our side," alleviating the Libyans' concerns that the IOCs would "take more than they should."

GAS SECTOR IN NEED OF NEW TECHNOLOGY AND INVESTMENTS

¶7. (C) The Ambassador asked whether the NOC was developing a national strategy for gas production, to which Sugheir replied that the GPC had requested the NOC create a policy for the domestic market. Presently, the NOC uses the international pricing model, but it is still under debate in Libya whether to separate the international and domestic markets. Azzam Ali Elmesallati (Investment and Joint Ventures) added that Libya did not yet produce very much gas and most of what it did produce went to the domestic market. He said that, under sanctions in the 1990s, Libya had been unable to upgrade its gas technology, but in the past five years the NOC has invested in new pipelines and revamping the gas sector.

VERENEX AND PETROCANADA: LIBYAN REVENGE ON CANADIAN COMPANIES?

¶8. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of the recent experiences of Canadian oil companies Verenex and PetroCanada, noting that other firms -- including from the U.S., -- were concerned about the apparent inconsistencies in how standard business practices are applied in Libya (Ref C). This has led to the impression that Libya may not be a safe environment for investments. Sugheir replied that one could not compare the cases of Verenex and PetroCanada. Sugheir denied that PetroCanada was singled out and said that other NOC-owned companies also had implemented production cuts in order for Libya to comply with OPEC's quota of 1.3 million barrels/day. For example, AGOCO decreased its production by 60,000 b/d and Sirte Oil Company decreased by 20,000 b/d. Sugheir declared "our relationship with PetroCanada is solid" and "they are our partner." Responding to rumors that expatriate staff of PetroCanada might be deported, he said as a matter of policy, the NOC expected foreign companies to try to recruit Libyans for all positions. He noted that some Libyan university graduates had spent five years looking for work. If a foreign company could not recruit a Libyan for a given position, then it could bring in an expatriate to perform the job. As for Verenex (Ref D), he said the NOC had simply had a disagreement over the sales price that Verenex had proposed.

¶9. (C) Comment: As in his previous meeting with emboffs, Sugheir stressed to the Ambassador that this recent change in leadership would not affect NOC operations. Such assurances may be necessary to calm the nerves of skittish foreign investors, who believe Ghanem's departure was due to political infighting that has yet to be resolved. Many of the energy insiders believe Sugheir is only a placeholder appointment, and that a permanent replacement for Ghanem will be named only when the the

permanent replacement for Ghanem will be named only when the the political dust has settled. Recent news regarding Saif al-Islam Qadhafi's new position as "General Coordinator" likely will add more grist to the rumor mill regarding the NOC's future leadership and direction. As expected, Sugheir refused to acknowledge in any way the "political" dimensions" of the Verenx and Petrocanada situations which has led to general investor discomfort. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI832

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI832 aka Wikileaks id #230295 ?
Subject	SWISS PONDERING TOUGH NEW MEASURES IN LIGHT OF LIBYAN INTRANSIGENCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 19 Oct 2009 16:25 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI832.html
References	09TRIPOLI763
Referenced by	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI900 , 09TRIPOLI901 , 09TRIPOLI910
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3664
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0832/01 2921625
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 191625Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5375
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0036
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5923
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000832

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/19/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS PONDERING TOUGH NEW MEASURES IN LIGHT OF LIBYAN INTRANSIGENCE

REF: TRIPOLI 763

TRIPOLI 00000832 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuhl, in Tripoli for talks on the detained Swiss citizens, met the Ambassador October 19 to brief him on current state-of-play and seek U.S. views on the way forward. Ambuhl, clearly frustrated by the Libyans' unwillingness or inability to articulate a solution to the standoff, stressed that domestic pressures were growing in Switzerland for a tough, new approach to resolving

growing in Switzerland for a tough, new approach to resolving the problem. The Swiss are considering imposing visa restrictions on Qadhafi family members and/or raising the case in UN or international judicial channels, but worry that these approaches could serve only to exacerbate tensions - particularly since the Swiss citizens were taken into custody immediately following a Swiss decision to block a Schengen visa for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Ambuhl confirmed that the Swiss had no information regarding their two citizens' welfare or whereabouts, and asked for U.S. assistance in pressing this humanitarian issue. The Ambassador agreed to raise the issue with Libyan Government officials, and urged the Swiss government to think carefully before resorting to public measures which would embarrass the regime and cause it to become even more intransigent. End summary.

¶2. (C) Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuhl, in Tripoli for talks on the two detained Swiss citizens, met the Ambassador October 19 to brief him on current state-of-play and seek U.S. views on the way forward. Ambuhl was accompanied by Marcel Stutz, head of the Swiss MFA's Africa and Middle East Division; Elisabeth Meyerhans Sarasin, Secretary General of the Federal Finance Department; and Stefano Lazarotto, Swiss Charge d'Affaires in Tripoli. Ambuhl thanked the Ambassador for the U.S. Government's active involvement in this issue, noting that he had met regularly with a variety of senior officials, and that the Swiss Minister of Foreign Affairs had just discussed this issue with the Secretary.

¶3. (C) Although Ambuhl had meetings October 18 with the head of the Libyan normalization committee, Khaled Kaim (MFA A/S-equivalent for International Cooperation), the two sides had not made any progress in resolving the diplomatic standoff. The 60-day normalization period called for in the August 20 agreement with Libyan Prime Minister al-Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi had expired, and the Swiss still had no information on the two citizens' welfare and whereabouts or the Libyan Government's preferred approach to resolving the problem. Ambuhl said the Swiss Government believes the two citizens were taken in custody in direct retribution for Switzerland's decision to veto a Schengen visa for Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. (We understand that the Swiss had intervened to veto other Schengen visas for regime figures with other European nations but did not confirm that with Ambuhl.) The Libyan Government insists that the two businessmen were taken into custody to protect them from a planned Swiss military operation to free them, a claim Ambuhl dismissed as nonsense.

¶4. (C) During his talks with Kaim, Ambuhl proposed a way forward. The Swiss would drop all of their visa restrictions on Qadhafi family members and Libyan Government officials, and establish a joint committee on cooperation in exchange for the Libyans withdrawing all of their complaints against the Swiss citizens and releasing them immediately. Kaim was noncommittal, but promised to give Ambuhl a response today, October 19 - a promise Ambuhl was not sure the Libyans would keep. Khaim also pressed the Swiss to provide information on who had been responsible for the September 4 leak of photos of the Swiss policemen allegedly assaulted by Hannibal al-Qadhafi when he was taken into custody, a demand Ambuhl said the Swiss Government was unlikely to meet. Noting that this case touched directly on Qadhafi family equities, Ambuhl questioned whether Kaim or any MFA official was empowered to resolve the standoff and noted that the Libyans appeared to move the goalpost in every round of talks. Ambuhl was clearly frustrated by the impasse, telling us: "What I can offer, they don't want; what they want, I can't offer."

¶5. (C) In response to growing and intense domestic pressure, Ambuhl said the Swiss Government is considering a "more aggressive" approach to the problem, including visa restrictions "on a bigger circle within the government," a UN campaign to "name and shame" Libyan officials responsible for the crisis,

and/or international judicial measures. Ambuhl said the Swiss Government was concerned about the risks posed by escalation, particularly with respect to the two Swiss citizens' safety. Nevertheless, the Swiss Government felt that it did not have any other leverage to push for a resolution of the crisis. Ambuhl emphasized that domestic politics were affecting the Swiss approach; calls were growing for the Swiss President's resignation following two "humiliating," unsuccessful meetings with Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi on this issue.

TRIPOLI 00000832 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) The Ambassador agreed to raise the issue with Libyan Government officials, stating that he would urge the Libyans to address the humanitarian angle and the impact of this standoff on Libya's broader international engagement goals. He suggested that the Swiss also request ICRC or some other neutral international organization access to the two Swiss citizens to confirm their welfare and whereabouts, an idea the Swiss said they had not yet considered. He urged the Swiss to think carefully before resorting to public measures, noting that any incidents involving the Qadhafi family were highly sensitive for the Libyan Government and were not likely to be addressed in a transparent, rational manner.

¶7. (C) The Ambassador also urged the Swiss to consider reaching out to other international and Libyan players with influence with the Qadhafi family, in hopes of reaching a solution. Ambuhl said the Swiss Government had reached out repeatedly to Qadhafi cousin and confidante Ahmed Qadhafadam, to no avail, and in "May or June," the Swiss Government had enlisted the help of Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, also to no avail. The Ambassador suggested that former British Prime Minister Tony Blair or Egyptian President Hosni Mubarek might be effective interlocutors in this case given their apparent closeness to regime figures.

¶8. (C) Comment: While Ambuhl and his delegation appeared to understand the potential negative ramifications of upping the public pressure on Libya to resolve the case, they also appeared to be at a loss for any alternative measures. Ambuhl was insistent that the Swiss had been humiliated and had reached the end of their tether. We agree with Ambuhl's assessment that MFA officials will be unable to resolve the standoff on their own accord, as any solution will come from one man only - Muammar al-Qadhafi. Given this reality, Switzerland's best bet to resolve the conflict may be to pursue its case via other influential players. Ambuhl despaired of getting any coordinated help from other European nations. The Ambassador is seeking meetings to discuss the case with appropriate Libyan officials, and will urge the Libyans to provide immediate consular access to address the Swiss Government's legitimate humanitarian concerns. Coincidentally, the Canadian Foreign Minister is also visiting Libya to see if he can resolve the problems caused by perceived slights to Qadhafi and his traveling party during and after his visit to New York. The Libyans have taken actions against Petrocanada here and reportedly severely restricted visa renewals for resident Canadians.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI860

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI860 aka Wikileaks id #231340 ?
Subject	WHAT PASSES FOR POLITICAL FERMENT IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 26 Oct 2009 14:30 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI860.html
References	08TRIPOLI819 , 09TRIPOLI805
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sun, 23 Jan 2011 04:16: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0072
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0860 2991430
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 261430Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5403
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1176
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0847
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0630
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5952
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000860

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: WHAT PASSES FOR POLITICAL FERMENT IN LIBYA

REF: A) TRIPOLI 805 ; B) TRIPOLI 819

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: Reform-minded Libyans are "cautiously hopeful" regarding the recent appointment of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi as "General Coordinator." While Saif al-Islam is widely seen as a reformer, embassy contacts note that he will face continued resistance from the Libyan old guard. Some observers believe that the appointment was meant to give the regime a "new lease on life" and counter subtle yet growing voices of opposition, particularly with respect to corruption. Given that Saif al-Islam was out of the country when the appointment was made,

the meaning of his new position will only start to become clear when he returns to Tripoli. End summary.

¶2. (S) Professor of Comparative Politics and Democratization at Garyounis University, Zahi Mogherbi (strictly protect), told Pol/Econ Chief October 22 that he and his academic colleagues were "cautiously hopeful" about Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's October 6 appointment as "General Coordinator of Social and Popular Committees." He said that Saif was widely known to be a reformer within Libya but had often encountered resistance from the old guard Revolutionary Committee (RevComm) leaders when proposing drastic changes to the government structure, such as the drafting of a constitution or calls to scale back RevComm influence on government administration. He will undoubtedly encounter the same resistance in his new role, according to Mogherbi. "He has a lot of good ideas, but he has been too outspoken about them in the past," Mogherbi commented. Echoing the warning of other embassy contacts, Mogherbi noted that Saif's position would only be effective if empowered with the authority to make decisions and act on them.

¶3. (S) While the exact responsibilities of Saif's new position are unclear, Mogherbi asserted that the move provided the Qadhafi regime a "new lease on life" by introducing a person widely considered to be reform minded - both by local and foreign observers - into the system. Mogherbi argued that the regime was stagnating and that voices of opposition were subtly rising across the country, particularly from the poorer, eastern areas. "The people see what the rest of the world has and know that the country is wealthy, but they do not see any of the wealth. They wonder where it goes." A young Libyan businessman and son of old guard RevComm Leader, Mosab Kharoubi, echoed this refrain, telling us that "Brother Saif will solve these problems of corruption."

¶4. (C) Mogherbi stated that the younger generations are particularly frustrated with their country's slow economic development and lack of employment opportunities, estimating unemployment at 30 percent. Mogherbi believes the regime is concerned about this frustration exploding into violence. With Saif at the top, Mogherbi reasoned, Muammar al-Qadhafi thinks he will fool people into believing that real change is taking place. Meanwhile, he still has a few more years to control Libya from behind the scenes. Mogherbi fears that the official role will also constrain Saif, who had been relatively free to act and speak out in favor of reform in his nominally "non-governmental" position as Chairman of the Qadhafi Development Foundation.

¶5. (S) Comment: In true Qadhafi fashion, his latest political move has local observers guessing about what practical effect the announcement will have on the Libyan government and people. Given that Saif al-Islam was out of the country when this appointment was made, the meaning of his new position will likely only start to become clear when he returns to Tripoli. And given the backdrop of political apathy in Libya, ordinary citizens are unlikely to react to the news until they begin to see real change in their daily lives. Many observers here believe that Saif's visible role in the return and welcome given to convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi was one of the necessary steps the Qadhafi clan had to take to enable the Leader to elevate Saif to this new position. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI862

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI862 aka Wikileaks id #231392 ?
Subject	SHOKRI GHANEM RETURNS AS CHAIR OF LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY, LIKELY DUE TO SAIF AL-ISLAM'S POLITICAL ASCENDANCY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 26 Oct 2009 16:26 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI862.html
References	09TRIPOLI779 , 09TRIPOLI825
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI116 , 10TRIPOLI99
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0275
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0862 2991626
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 261626Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5405
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0038
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0013
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0458
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0631
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5954
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000862

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/26/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , LY
[Libya] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs]
SUBJECT: SHOKRI GHANEM RETURNS AS CHAIR OF LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL
COMPANY, LIKELY DUE TO SAIF AL-ISLAM'S POLITICAL ASCENDANCY

REF: A) TRIPOLI 779 ; B) TRIPOLI 825

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) On October 26, international press reported that Shokri
Ghanem had been reinstated as Chairman of Libya's National Oil
Corporation (NOC).  The head of NOC-owned Waha Oil Company, Dr.
Bashir al-Ashhab, confirmed this report to Marathon General
```

Bashir al-Ashhab, confirmed this report to Marathon General Manager, Steve Guidry (strictly protect), with al-Ashhab commenting that Ghanem had "returned from his extended holiday." Informed contacts believe Ghanem's return is directly linked to the recent appointment of his close ally, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, to his new position as "General Coordinator."

¶2. (S) It remains unclear why Ghanem initially resigned. However, an embassy contact close to Ghanem told P/E Chief October 26 that three significant incidents influenced Ghanem's resignation: attempted solicitation of funds by Khamees al-Qadhafi; the three-day abduction of one of Ghanem's former NOC deputies in retaliation of a refusal to extort funds from the NOC; and a clash between Ghanem and PM-equivalent al Baghdadi al Mahmoudi involving the sale of land holding proven oil reserves to the state of Qatar. According to the contact, Ghanem had twice refused offers from the Libyan regime to take over al Baghdadi's position.

¶3. (S) Shortly before international press reported on Ghanem's return to the NOC, the contact predicted that Ghanem would return to political life, due the official appointment of Saif al-Islam, whom he has mentored for many years. However, some oil industry insiders in Tripoli believe that Ghanem and Saif al-Islam may have had a falling out over Ghanem's mishandling of the sale of the Canadian oil firm Verenex and his inability to force international oil companies to contribute to the claims compensation fund.

¶4. (C) Comment: Heads of international oil companies in Libya seem pleased by the return of Ghanem to the NOC. While they describe Ghanem as a shrewd businessman, they view him as more professional and market-oriented than Acting NOC Chairman Ali al-Sugheir, who represented a perspective within the NOC that favors re-nationalizing the oil companies. Ghanem's return may signify that reform-minded individuals will begin to take on significant roles in the Libyan system now that Saif al-Islam has entered the regime. We expect to see further personnel moves in the weeks to come, as Saif al-Islam defines his new role. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI867

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI867 aka Wikileaks id #231499 ?
Subject	PETROCANADA CAUGHT IN QADHAFI'S CROSS-HAIRS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 27 Oct 2009 08:47 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI867.html
References	09TRIPOLI770 , 09TRIPOLI775 , 09TRIPOLI825
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0956
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0867/01 3000847
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 270847Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5413
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0632
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0459
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0014
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0039
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5962
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000867

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS USTR PAUL BURKHEAD;
COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/27/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EMIN *[Minerals and Metals]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]* , CA *[Canada]*
SUBJECT: PETROCANADA CAUGHT IN QADHAFI'S CROSS-HAIRS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 775 ; B) TRIPOLI 770 ; C) TRIPOLI 825

TRIPOLI 00000867 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: According to the General Manager of PetroCanada, Will Duncan (strictly protect), the Libyan

government demanded PetroCanada cut its oil production due to misunderstandings between Libya and Canada over Muammar al-Qadhafi's aborted trip to Canada in late September. Duncan believes that PM-equivalent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi was "calling all the shots" in the ongoing dispute, and Canadian diplomats are hopeful that their Foreign Minister's October 19 meeting with al-Mahmoudi may have laid the groundwork for a solution. The effects of the dispute continue to reverberate throughout Libya, with PetroCanada conducting contingency planning to evacuate its staff, other Canadian citizens fearing expulsion, and still others experiencing visa difficulties. In the past few days, Canadian citizens on a cruise ship were not allowed to disembark in Tripoli, while the other passengers (mainly Europeans) were permitted to leave the ship for the day. Separately, U.S. company Marathon may be benefiting from PetroCanada's woes, as it has been instructed to increase production to make up for PetroCanada's shortfall. End summary.

FROM THE HORSE'S MOUTH: PETROCANADA GM DETAILS RECENT ORDEAL

¶2. (C) Will Duncan (strictly protect), the General Manager of PetroCanada, shared with Econoff his company's recent ordeal in Libya that began with a threat of nationalization, but which was pared down to an order by the National Oil Corporation (NOC) to cut production by 50 percent. He said PetroCanada and Hrouj, its NOC-owned partner, had actually surpassed production quotas for the past six months but the NOC had never asked them to cut back. Although the NOC never gave PetroCanada a clear reason for the production cuts (and may simply have been passing down an order from PM-equivalent al-Mahmoudi), Duncan believed they were linked to the diplomatic row surrounding Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's aborted trip to Canada. Duncan noted that press reports had "spun out of control," alleging that the Canadian FM had planned to see al-Qadhafi on his stop-over in Newfoundland to complain about Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi's "hero's welcome." A Canadian engineer working for Hrouj separately told us he had heard the row stemmed from the issuance of a tourist visa for al-Qadhafi, rather than a diplomatic visa as Head of State.

¶3. (C) Duncan said the Canadian company was suddenly threatened with nationalization during the week of September 27 which was then pared down to the required decrease in production. Duncan said he had received phone-calls from the NOC "every 15 minutes" with new instructions. By the end of the week, Duncan said he was ready to tell the NOC to "do whatever you want with us." He believed the Secretary of the General People's Committee (PM-equivalent) al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi was "calling all the shots," particularly in his role as head of the newly-created Supreme Council for Energy Affairs, now that Shokri Ghanem had resigned from his position as Chair of the NOC. Duncan praised the efforts of Canada's new Ambassador to Libya to help resolve PetroCanada's problems and noted that her gender had played to her advantage, opining that the Libyans would have been "much tougher on a man."

¶4. (C) Duncan confirmed that PetroCanada had prepared contingency plans for repatriating its Canadian staff following reports that the Libyan authorities were planning to "raid" PetroCanada's offices. He noted that before the recent crisis, the company had actually begun a process of regularizing the visa status of its expatriate employees about six weeks ago, by providing the Immigration Office with a list of staff who needed to convert their visas from business visas to resident visas. (Note: It is a common practice for foreign firms to bring in long-term staff on multiple-entry business visas as they are easier to procure, and do not require exit visas for vacations and other trips outside Libya. These visas are not meant to be used by long-term residents. End note). He intimated that PetroCanada perhaps should not have been so forthcoming with their list of expatriate staff with technically irregular visa statuses, and that their efforts to "come clean" had only caused

them more trouble.

¶5. (C) Of PetroCanada's 232 employees in Libya, around 100 are expatriates, mainly from Canada, the UK, and the U.S. Duncan commented that even before this episode, the company had planned to decrease the number of expatriate staff due to the high costs

involved of bringing employees and their families to Libya, and that the firm would vacate at least 56 houses in Tripoli. A British employee of PetroCanada complained that, although the company's management continued to hold regular meetings to update Canadian staff on the situation, other expat employees have been left in the dark.

¶6. (C) In spite of the current dispute, Duncan said PetroCanada still planned to continue with its plans to drill 49 new wells starting in the first quarter of 2010. PetroCanada has also detailed 50 of its staff to work in Hrouj in order to provide on-the-job training and share new technologies such as enhanced oil recovery (EOR) and improved oil recovery (IOR). This has had mixed results. Duncan was skeptical whether the Libyans really wanted their advice, and in particular, the Libyan middle managers of NOC-owned companies projected the attitude that Libya had continued to produce oil during the embargo "just fine" and if need be, could do it again.

OTHER CANADIAN CITIZENS ON EDGE

¶7. (C) The recent diplomatic spat between Libya and Canada has had a ripple effect on Canadians working in other companies who are afraid of being deported. According to the Canadian Commercial Counselor, there are 1,000 Canadians living in Libya (not counting dual national Libyan/Canadians). Many of them have been calling the Canadian Embassy asking whether they will be deported or whether they will be not allowed to enter Libya if they leave. Even long-time residents of Libya are worried. The Canadian principal of the International Martyr's School sent out a text message to Canadian staff warning of possible deportations. (Note: This school, formerly the American Oil Company School, was taken over by the Libyans after the U.S. sanctions were imposed. End note). One Swiss-Canadian teacher (a 15-year Tripoli resident), who received the text message, said she was especially concerned as she had thought her Canadian passport had provided more protection of late than her Swiss one. The heads of several U.S. oil companies have expressed concern that their Canadian employees are having trouble receiving or renewing their visas. According to Duncan, press reports that Libya is no longer no issuing visas to Canadians appear to be due to the recent visit of a cruise-ship to Libya that had European and Canadian tourists onboard. All tourists except the Canadian tourists were allowed to disembark for their day-trip in Tripoli. Duncan believes this incident was picked up by Canadian press.

PETROCANADA'S CUTS MAY HELP OTHER PRODUCERS

¶8. (C) The head of Marathon Oil in Libya, Steve Guidry (strictly protect) said he saw the PetroCanada cuts as a positive development for Marathon and the Waha Group (comprised of the NOC, Marathon, Amerada Hess, and ConocoPhillips). He said the NOC had encouraged Waha to "produce unrestricted" amounts of oil during an annual meeting last week, and he heard other oil companies were told to do the same. (Note: This is a contradiction of statements by Acting NOC Chair Ali Sugheir that even two NOC-owned companies were ordered to cut production according to OPEC quotas; see Ref C. End note) However, he heard the German company Wintershall was told to cut back by 15,000 b/d from its production of 90,000 b/d, an apparent effort by the NOC to try to break through the impasse in renegotiating Wintershall's agreement with the NOC. In his view, the Libyans

Wintershall's agreement with the NOC. In his view, the Libyans are trying to make up for the shortfall from PetroCanada and Wintershall and at the same time, assess the true production capacity of all oil producers in Libya. He said PetroCanada had publicly stated their cuts were due to OPEC-mandated restrictions, but that no one in Tripoli believed this.

CANADIAN FOREIGN MINISTER VISITS TRIPOLI

¶9. (C) According to the newly-arrived Canadian Commercial Counselor, a solution to the recent quarrels between Libya and Canada is in sight after the October 19-20 visit of FM Lawrence Cannon. He noted the FM had met with the "source of the problem," al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. The Canadian Ambassador told us that the meeting with al-Mahmoudi had been "tough" and that it had only gone part-way to resolving the problem. The Libyans had requested that the Canadians prepare a report on the circumstances surrounding Qadhafi's aborted trip to Canada; in exchange for the report, the Libyans would address PetroCanada's

TRIPOLI 00000867 003.2 OF 003

problems. The Canadian Commercial Counselor believes PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi was using the PetroCanada incident to bolster his own position, now that he heads the Supreme Council for Energy, and has gotten rid of Shokri Ghanem.

¶10. (C) Comment: Libya's moves against PetroCanada, set against the backdrop of an escalating conflict with Switzerland, have left the expatriate business community on edge. Libya's willingness to explicitly link commercial contracts to political disputes has only added to the international energy companies' growing frustration with the Libyan business climate. Although most oil industry insiders do not believe the Canadian saga will escalate to the extent of the Swiss-Libya standoff, it is unclear how this dispute ultimately will be resolved. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI868

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI868 aka Wikileaks id #231540 ?
Subject	FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTS INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED U.S. MISTREATMENT OF SENIOR LIBYAN OFFICIAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 27 Oct 2009 12:18 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI868.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1153
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0868/01 3001218
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 271218Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5416
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5965
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0635
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1177
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0848
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0045
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0241
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000868

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , UN *[United Nations]*
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTS INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED U.S.
MISTREATMENT OF SENIOR LIBYAN OFFICIAL

TRIPOLI 00000868 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Foreign Minister Musa Kusa summoned the Ambassador to his office October 26 to convey very strong Libyan anger and disappointment in the treatment of Libyan UN Permanent Representative Abdulrahman Shalgam and his wife by John F. Kennedy Airport security officials upon their recent departure from New York. Kusa emphasized that the Libyan Government considered the situation very serious and that Libyan Leader

Muammar al-Qadhafi was personally angered. Kusa demanded that the USG investigate the incident and respond with a report as soon as practical so that the Libyan side could determine what "measures" it would take in response. Kusa assured the Ambassador that the GOL would not treat AmCit travelers or diplomats in a reciprocal manner at Libyan airports. Libya is considering lodging a formal complaint at the United Nations, during which Shalgam may provide an account of his experience. The Department's guidance and assistance in investigating the situation is requested. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) A visibly angry Musa Kusa summoned the Ambassador (accompanied by P/E Chief) on October 26 to express very strong Libyan anger, including that of the Libyan Leader, regarding the reported treatment UN Permanent Representative Abdulrahman Shalgam had received recently during security processing at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Kusa said Shalgam and his wife were put in a room and subjected to "strip searches and rude behavior as if they were criminals." The trauma had affected Shalgam's wife so deeply that, according to Kusa, she is currently under hospital care.

¶3. (S/NF) Kusa called the incident unjustified and immoral: "Morally speaking, Shalgam is a guest in your country. If he had done something wrong or was a security threat, then that would have been a different story. How would you like it if your diplomats were treated by us in such a manner?" He argued that if a high level diplomat such as Shalgam -- a former foreign minister -- could experience such treatment by U.S. officials, then other Libyan diplomats or average Libyan travelers were probably facing even worse treatment. Kusa stated that the GOL was considering withdrawing Shalgam from his post as a result of the incident.

¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador informed Kusa that the Embassy first heard of the incident via MFA diplomatic note four days prior to the meeting and was working with the Departments of State and Homeland Security to investigate the situation. Kusa believed the State Department should have "known" about the incident immediately. He asserted that news of the incident had spread throughout the leadership and had resurrected intensive questioning as to how Libya could justify this new relationship with the United States, saying "if you do not desire to continue the relationship, then tell us. There is no need to treat Libyan nationals in such a manner."

¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Kusa that Libya should not interpret the reported actions of a few individuals as reflective of an official, anti-Libya position within the USG. He added that both sides understand that, from time to time, problems will occur in the relationship, and that we should find a way to work through them. Kusa said the Libyan Government -- including Muammar al-Qadhafi himself -- wanted a full report from the U.S. explaining why a senior Libyan official had been subject to the alleged mistreatment. He was baffled by the circumstances that could have prompted such action. The Ambassador reiterated his assurances that the USG would review the circumstances surrounding the incident.

¶6. (S/NF) Kusa stated that Libya would not retaliate against U.S. travelers in response to the incident. He insisted on a speedy reply to the GOL's request for a full investigation. "We will consider the case open until we reach an acceptable conclusion. In light of what happens, we will carry out appropriate measures," he warned. Kusa threatened that Libya might be forced to take the issue to the UN General Assembly and that Shalgam may personally relate the events in that forum.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: The incident involving Abdulrahman Shalgam, compounded by Libyan reports of previous incidents involving its diplomats and officials, has elicited attention and anger at the highest levels of the Libyan regime. Embassy requests expeditious Department assistance in investigating the

expeditious Department assistance in investigating the

TRIPOLI 00000868 002.2 OF 002

circumstances surrounding the incident. As recent Swiss and Canadian encounters have shown, Libya takes these issues seriously and we need to provide a reply and find a solution quickly if the matter is not to escalate. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI869

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI869 aka Wikileaks id #231811 ?
Subject	PRIVATIZATION LIBYAN STYLE: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE BENGHAZI TANNERY'S EXPERIENCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 28 Oct 2009 14:43 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI869.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI925
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2484
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0869/01 3011443
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281443Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5418
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0637
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0462
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5967
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000869

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/28/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] ;, PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ;, EFIN [Financial and Monetary
Affairs] ;, LY [Libya] ;, EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas]
SUBJECT: PRIVATIZATION LIBYAN STYLE: AN INSIDER'S VIEW OF THE
BENGHAZI TANNERY'S EXPERIENCE

TRIPOLI 00000869  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (C)  Summary: The head of the Benghazi Tannery Company, one
of Libya's state-owned firms set to be privatized, alleged that
the Libyan authorities in charge of privatizing his firm (and
others) are using the process to sell off state-owned assets at
below market rates, earning kick-backs in the process.  Phone
calls to a few firms already privatized indicate that this could
be true, as General Managers of at least two firms stated freely
that they were members of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi's
```

close circle ("al-rifaq"), hinting that this made them beyond reproach. If the Tannery Manager's allegations are true, they would represent a credible explanation for why information on Libya's fitful privatization project remains hard to come by. And although the Tannery faces liquidity problems and is saddled with debts, it enjoys strong demand from an international client base, making it an attractive target for Libya's powerful elites. End summary.

TANNERY MANAGER SEES CORRUPTION IN PRIVATIZATION

¶2. (C) Khalil Najim, a 28-year veteran of the Benghazi Tannery Company (BTC) in eastern Libya, shared with Econoff his frustrations in running this state-owned company, which is one of many firms that the Libyan government is preparing for privatization. According to Najim, the company is one of the largest tanneries in North Africa, with a good supply of hides from the livestock industry in eastern Libya and a strong demand for leather from an international client base, including Korean leather apparel companies. However, in his view, the Libyan authorities in charge of privatizing his firm (and others) are simply using the process to sell off state-owned assets as expeditiously as possible, and in the process, earning kick-backs for themselves.

¶3. (C) The Benghazi Tannery is one of 15 state-owned companies that are undergoing the process of privatization. According to Najim, the Privatization Board completed a study of the company's assets several months ago and now this information is being "analyzed." Until the assessment is finished, Najim understands that potential investors are not allowed to tour the factory. According to other sources in the Benghazi area, however, the Secretary of Libya's privatization board, the General Board for Ownership Transfer and Investment, Dr. Mahamud al-Ftise, recently brought some foreign businessmen to tour the factory.

¶4. (C) In Najim's view, al-Ftise sees the Tannery as "a problem to be dealt with," either through liquidation or a quick sale. Privately, he told local staff that he believes the reason the assessment of the company has dragged on is that the Privatization Board is planning to assess the value of the company at less than its real market value. The company would then be sold to an "investor" who would pay a bribe to the privatization board (or even al-Ftise himself) in return for receiving a bargain. Najim believes the privatization board may have already contacted foreign investors.

¶5. (C) While it is unclear who the potential Libyan investors might be for the Tannery, Post has contacted other companies on the list of firms to be privatized, and it appears several of the firms are being sold at preferential rates to those loyal to the al-Qadhafi regime, particularly "al-rifaq," or close friends of the Leader since the time of the 1969 coup. In one case the person who answered the telephone said he was the company's general manager, and that he and his partners had bought the company, freely admitting they were all part of the "rifaq." He said foreign investors would be welcome to visit the company and to assess if they wanted to enter into a joint venture. In another instance, when we called another company, the person who answered as the general manager seemed annoyed to even be called and said he did not need to answer to anyone because of his relation to Qadhafi.

BACKGROUND ON THE TANNERY'S BUSINESS OPERATION

¶6. (C) Established in 1980, BTC is located in Benghazi, the largest city in eastern Libya, and includes 13 hectares of land. The company produces four million feet of leather per year, processing hides from cattle, sheep, goats, and even ostriches on a limited scale. Najim noted that the ostrich leather was in demand, although the factory could not produce large quantities

due to a lack of specialized equipment. The factory purchases hides from three slaughterhouses in Benghazi. One of the main expenses is the chemical inputs that are required to process the hides, most of which must be imported from overseas (including

TRIPOLI 00000869 002.2 OF 002

France, Germany, Italy, and Spain). Najim said most of the product was for export to countries such as Korea, Italy, Turkey, and Tunisia. The company has entered into a joint-venture with a small Italian firm. Najim said his company would welcome international partners, including American companies.

¶7. (C) The number of employees has decreased from 400 employees ten years ago, to a mere 100. Najim said he expected the number of staff to further decrease to 60, as employees leave the company for higher-wage jobs. The average monthly salary at BTC is 250 dinars (approximately 210 US dollars). The main problem the company faces is a lack of liquidity. Najim admitted the company owed 400,000 dinars (350,000 US dollars) to the Libyan government in past contributions to the Social Security Fund (which pays pensions for retired workers).

¶8. (C) Comment: Najim's allegation that the Benghazi Tannery is being prepared for a sale to investors who would pay kick-backs to the privatization board appears to ring true. Having spent his whole career at this state-owned factory, Najim took a risk by speaking frankly with officials of the Embassy about the realities of the government's efforts to privatize the company. He pointed out that while he is only 42 years old, his hair is graying and his face is worn, as he has worked tirelessly to keep his company running. At the same time, it is not unlikely that he has also used his management position in the company to benefit from various deals over the years. With the impending sale of the Tannery (in whatever scenario), any "on-the-side" livelihood is in jeopardy.
Information on Libya's process for privatizing its state-owned enterprises is lacking; if the process is linked to political favors and corruption as Najim portrays it, this would offer a credible explanation for why details are so hard to come by.
End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI870

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI870 aka Wikileaks id #231833 ?
Subject	LIBYA & U.S. SIGN HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM TRANSFER AGREEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 28 Oct 2009 15:29 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/10/09TRIPOLI870.html
References	09TRIPOLI794
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI2 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI924 , 09TRIPOLI938
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2547
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0870 3011529
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 281529Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5420
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0075
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0639
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0093
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5969
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000870

NOFORN
SIPDIS

NEA/MAG, ISN/NESS, AND L; DEPT PLEASE PASS TO DOE - M FOR M.
TSIKLAURI

E.O. 12958: DECL:  10/28/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , ENRG [Energy and Power] , TRGY
[Energy Technology] , IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] , PINR [Intelligence] , TSPL [Science and
Technology Policy] , TPHY [Physical Sciences] , TNGD [Engineering Research and Development] ,
MCAP [Military Capabilities] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA & U.S. SIGN HIGHLY-ENRICHED URANIUM TRANSFER
AGREEMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 794

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (S/NF)  On October 28, Libya and the U.S. signed the
bilateral agreement for the transfer from Libya to Russia of
```

bilateral agreement for the transfer from Libya to Russia of Libyan Highly-enriched Uranium (HEU). The Ambassador signed for the U.S., and Dr. Ali Gashut of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment signed on behalf of Libya. No press was in attendance, and there was no public statement made by either side, at the request of the Libyans.

¶2. (S/NF) The Libyans strongly objected to any public profile or press release for the event, stating that the issue of transferring nuclear fuel from Libya was too sensitive to report before it actually took place. As reported reftel, the shipment is planned to take place on November 21, 2009. Based on updates from the DOE experts who have been traveling to Libya to prepare the shipment, we are confident that the shipment will take place as planned. The Ambassador agreed with Gashut to revisit the press issue once the fuel transfer has been completed.

¶3. (S/NF) Comment: The signing of the HEU Agreement is an important step on Libya's part towards fulfilling its commitments to dispose of its WMD. While it would have been a positive story to report, we are more interested in ensuring that the fuel transfer takes place with no problems, rather than to insist on press at this juncture. Embassy Tripoli's Public Affairs Office has been in touch with State and Department of Energy counterparts to request that any public acknowledgement of the agreement signing be embargoed until after the shipment has taken place. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI872

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI872 aka Wikileaks id #232423 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THIRD COMMITTEE, 2009 PRIORITIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Nov 2009 11:53 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI872.html
References	09STATE109397
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5636
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0872 3051153
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011153Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5423
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0243
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5972
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000872

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO/HR (COLLEEN NEVILLE) AND DRL/MLGA (CHRIS SIBILLA)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UN *[United Nations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: 64TH UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY, THIRD COMMITTEE, 2009 PRIORITIES

REF: STATE 109397

(U) Post delivered reftel demarche to the International Organizations Office at Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs on October 26. Post will report any substantive responses via septel.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI873

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI873 aka Wikileaks id #232424 ?
Subject	SE GRATION'S MEETING WITH ABDULLA SANUSSI ON REBEL UNIFICATION EFFORTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Nov 2009 12:58 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI873.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5644
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0873/01 3051258
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011258Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5424
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0165
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0179
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5973
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000873

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SE GRATION'S MEETING WITH ABDULLA SANUSSI ON REBEL UNIFICATION EFFORTS

TRIPOLI 00000873 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Abdulla Sanussi reiterated his support for Special Envoy Scott Gration's initiatives in Sudan in an October 8 meeting and pledged Libya's support for Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) unification talks, including an offer to host talks in Kufra. Sanussi and Gration agreed that unification was critical to creating opportunities for negotiated peace at Doha, and the current political opening would not last long. Sanussi complained that Libya was "fed up" with SLA leaders who refused to unify and seemed to represent no one but themselves. He said Libya would continue to pressure the governments in Khartoum and N'Djamena to cool the tensions between the two states, and debunked Khartoum's recent assertion that the Chadian army had

amassed 286 trucks on the border as unhelpful posturing. Sanussi and Gration agreed to push members of the Tripoli and Addis groups to hold a unification conference in the coming weeks. End Summary.

REBEL UNIFICATION: SAME CUSHION, DIFFERENT DREAMS

¶2. (C) In an October 8 meeting with Special Envoy Gration, Brigadier General Abdulla Sanussi (and close Qadhafi confidant) said Libya had no special agenda or competitive spirit on resolving the Sudan crisis, pledging Libya's continued and unlimited cooperation with the SE's initiatives in Sudan. Sanussi agreed that the international community should continue to entice factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) to seek unification in preparation for negotiations with the Government of Sudan in Doha and expressed appreciation for the USG's attention and seriousness in resolving the Darfur conflict. Sanussi viewed unification efforts as complicated by unreasonable, intractable demands of certain rebel leaders bent on spoiling the process for personal gain. The leaders, he said, reminded him of a Chinese proverb: though the faction leaders all slept on the same cushion, they all had different dreams.

¶3. (C) While the Libyan Government had facilitated travel and visas for members of the "Addis group" of SLA factions to come to Tripoli for unification talks with the "Tripoli group," Sanussi complained that several leaders had no interest in Darfur and knew nothing of the situation on the ground there. Saying Libya's chief concerns were the humanitarian and security situation for IDPs and civilians, he derided rebel leaders who "don't feel [that] pain" after years of being ferried from capital to capital hosted in luxury hotels as various mediators attempted to unify the factions. Sanussi urged Gration to listen to the demands made by the rebels and filter out the unreasonable and impractical ones.

LIBYA "FED UP" WITH REBEL SPOILERS

¶4. (C) Sanussi said Libya was "fed up" after years of attempting to mediate between the various factions, particularly since the "legitimate" factions had few differences between them. In his view, some leaders had vested political interests in maintaining conflict in Darfur. Ahmed Abdel Shafie, for example, held the rank of colonel in the Southern Sudanese army and supported continued fighting in Darfur as it distracted Khartoum from its conflict with Juba. Shafie, he said, carried no weight tribally, militarily, or politically and should be cut out of the unification process to prevent him from becoming a spoiler. Sanussi called Shafie an untrustworthy, unreliable interlocutor who had reneged on every promise he had ever made to Sanussi. Saying, "I have helped him a lot," Sanussi suggested Shafie was the GOSS's problem and not the international community's.

¶5. (C) Sanussi contended that that the South had "paved the way for Darfur", with John Garang having visited Darfur 7-10 times in the early 2000s. Claiming a strong relationship with Garang from 1985 until his death in 2005, Sanussi said "I trained his troops and ferried him his equipment." Sanussi commented that, while Libya thought Southern Sudan was on track to enter the world as a failed state, Libya nevertheless supported the principle of self-determination and would continue to invest in Southern Sudan regardless of which way the vote went.

UNIFICATION CHALLENGES: JEM, SHAFIE, LOCATION

¶6. (C) In Sanussi's view, unification was needed to cool the tensions in Darfur and in the ongoing Chad-Sudan conflict. Khartoum was eager to find excuses to continue fighting, recently claiming Chadian President Idriss Deby had personally overseen the movement of 286 military vehicles to the border -- a claim that both Gration and Sanussi said was debunked by their governments. Gration and Sanussi agreed that Khalil Ibrahim's

governments. Gration and Sanussi agreed that Khalil Ibrahim's Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) was a wildcard in SLA unification efforts, with Gration noting that Khalil's national political agenda could derail SLA unification and the Doha

TRIPOLI 00000873 002.2 OF 002

process.

¶7. (C) Although recent signals from Khartoum and N'Djamena may indicate an opening that would allow for a negotiated peace between the states and the rebels, Gration said that opening would not remain in place long. Rebel unification had a good opportunity for success if it could be effected in October, prior to the resumption of the Doha process. Sanussi suggested that the international community, along with UN/AU Special Mediator Bassole and Qatari Minister of State al-Mahmoud, should tell the SLA factions that only a unified group would be welcome to negotiate in Doha. Gration agreed, but cautioned that mediators needed to take care not to force groups into agreements and alliances that were not supported by Darfuris and commanders in the field. He added that the "Addis group" had agreed to a roadmap whereby a unification conference would take place in the field in Darfur but getting agreement in principle from the Tripoli-based factions would be essential to launching the initiative as soon as possible.

¶8. (C) Sanussi doubted that some of the assembled rebels would agree to a conference in Darfur, saying "it will be easier for Jesus Christ himself to come back than for Abdel Shafie to go to Darfur." Sanussi noted that security concerns and the fact that the true strength of certain supporter-less "movements" would be revealed in a field-based conference made such a conference virtually impossible. Nonetheless, Sanussi said he saw the reason behind the initiative and agreed that it was important to have field commanders, civil society representatives, and faction leaders all in one location. Sanussi offered Kufra -- a Libyan oasis town approximately 600 miles southwest of Benghazi -- as an alternate site that was secure, with facilities to house the various actors, and relatively close to field commanders and civil society leaders. SE Gration thanked Sanussi for the offer and agreed to support a Kufra conference if rebel leaders would accept it as an alternative.

¶9. (U) S/USSES cleared this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI874

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI874 aka Wikileaks id #232426 ?
Subject	SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Nov 2009 13:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI874.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5650
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0874/01 3051308
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 011308Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5426
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0167
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0181
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5975
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000874

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, AF/C, AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SE GRATION AND LIBYAN FM DISCUSS DARFUR

TRIPOLI 00000874 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa expressed pleasure with U.S.-Libyan cooperation on the Darfur crisis and encouraged Special Envoy Gration to apply pressure to dis-unified factions of the Sudan Liberation Army. He cautioned that without increased pressure from international actors, rebel leaders in Addis Ababa, Tripoli, and other capitals would grow comfortable in "five-star hotels" and seek to enhance their personal image at the expense of unification and peace talks. Kusa agreed with SE Gration's assessment that the humanitarian situation and the upcoming national elections added urgency to the resolution of the Darfur issue and that returns and

reconstruction would be impossible without lasting security. Kusa characterized Justice and Equality Movement leader Khalil Ibrahim as a Turabist and pledged Libya's continued support for "capable and competent" nations' -- like the U.S. -- initiatives for peace in Sudan. End Summary.

KUSA ENCOURAGES INCREASED PRESSURE FOR UNIFICATION

¶2. (C) In an October 8 meeting with Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa, SE Gration outlined his overall strategy for Sudan and thanked Kusa for Libya's interventions to find a political resolution to the Chad-Sudan conflict and to unify splintered factions of the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA). He said he appreciated Kusa's assistance in facilitating the travel of Addis Ababa-based SLA leaders to Tripoli in an effort to promote their unification in advance of the re-launch of the Doha process slated for October 28 (Note: This date has since slipped to mid-November as the Joint-Chief Mediator announced that he needed to be present at the African Union's Peace and Security Council Meeting in Abuja, Nigeria schedule for the end of October. End note.). Gration said his purpose in Libya was three-fold: to ensure that Libya and the U.S. presented a united position to the rebels, to work on facilitating the rebels' participation in a unification conference, and to make sure no new factions were created as a byproduct of SLA unification.

¶3. (C) Kusa expressed gratitude for SE Gration's attention to the Darfur issue and his consultations with Libyan officials handling the portfolio. As a neighboring country, Libya "feels the depth" of the suffering caused by the Darfur conflict, and appreciates the seriousness with which the U.S. has approached the crisis. Other international actors, Kusa said, lacked the capacity and the knowledge to achieve results. Kusa encouraged SE Gration to push the "apathetic" faction leaders to quickly resolve the conflict with Khartoum. He said that some, including Ahmed Abdel Shafi, sought international sympathy and attention and were more interested in staying in "five-star hotels" and being shuttled from capital to capital. Unification and peace talks, Kusa said, would end the benefits that some rebel leaders have come to enjoy.

¶4. (C) Kusa expressed concern about the effect of Darfur's lingering IDP and refugee problems on regional security, calling for greater international monitoring and reporting. Without internal security in Darfur, Kusa saw little opportunity for Internally Displaced People (IDPs) and refugees to return to their homes and resume their lives. This, in turn, exacerbated regional security concerns and compounded the challenge of humanitarian relief. Kusa was particularly concerned with the smuggling, arms traffic, and extremism that was fed by the instability in Darfur. Characterizing the the janjaweed as Islamic extremists, Kusa reported that the Libyan External Security Organization had interdicted several smuggling groups with ties to Islamist groups in Algeria.

¶5. (C) SE Gration agreed that more attention needed to be paid to the situation in IDP camps and preparations made for eventual returns and reconstruction. Laying out the timetable of important events -- the renewal of Doha talks and the November start of voter registration in preparation for the national elections in the spring of 2010 -- Gration cautioned that any gains would be fragile. He asked that Libya continue to apply pressure on JEM, Abdul Wahid Nur, and "anyone with technicals and guns" to prevent spoilers from affecting the unification process. Gration argued that the conditions were ripe for quick unification: Sudan seemed increasingly serious about peace talks while Chad President Idriss Deby was growing tired of JEM's tactics. The unique window of opportunity, however, should not lead to a rushed pact between groups that had no roots and would dissolve before serious negotiations with Khartoum could take place.

¶6. (C) Kusa and SE Gration agreed that Khalil Ibrahim had

¶6. (C) Kusa and SE Gration agreed that Khalil Ibrahim had designs of national leadership and would attempt to disrupt any push for unity among SLA factions. Kusa assessed that Khalil had the same mentality as Turabi and was essentially a member of

TRIPOLI 00000874 002.2 OF 002

the Muslim Brotherhood. Calling Khalil "unreliable," he cautioned that he would turn away from any agreement he made with either Khartoum or the International Community. Saying that Libya had to give Khalil some aid to ensure he would continue his relationship with the GOL, he said both Libya and Deby would need to pressure him to cooperate.

¶7. (C) Kusa closed the meeting by reiterating Libya's gratitude for the productive relationship with the U.S. on the Sudan conflict. Kusa said he hoped to establish a broader dialogue with the U.S. on a range of African issues, and would welcome visits from other U.S. officials in this regard.

¶8. (U) SE Gration cleared this message.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI875

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI875 aka Wikileaks id #232430 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUDAN STRATEGY ROLLOUT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Nov 2009 13:51 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI875.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5657
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0875 3051351
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 011351Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5428
INFO RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0094
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0183
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0030
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1521
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 0008
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0036
RUEHKM/AMEMBASSY KAMPALA 0009
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1179
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0094
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0033
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 0012
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0042
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0850
RUEHSA/AMEMBASSY PRETORIA 0014
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0005
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0090
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0244
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0195
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA 0004
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0169
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5977
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000875

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/1/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , SU [Sudan] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: SUDAN STRATEGY ROLLOUT

REF: STATE 109669
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
(C) Poloff delivered reftel demarche October 22 to Mohamed Garsallah, staff member of Abdulla Sanussi. Garsallah indicated Libya's willingness to continue to cooperate to achieve a sustainable solution in Darfur. He asked that SE Gration be in touch directly with Sanussi to coordinate on specific areas where Libya can support S/USSES efforts. Post will also deliver the demarche to the Office of African Affairs at the Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs during the week of November 1. Post will report any other substantive responses via septel.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI876

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI876 aka Wikileaks id #232431 ?
Subject	FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTS INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED U.S. MISTREATMENT OF SENIOR LIBYAN OFFICIAL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 1 Nov 2009 13:57 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI876.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI883
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5663
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0876/01 3051357
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011357Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5429
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0640
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1180
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0851
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0047
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0245
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5978
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000876

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/1/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , UN *[United Nations]*
SUBJECT: FOREIGN MINISTER REQUESTS INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED U.S. MISTREATMENT OF SENIOR LIBYAN OFFICIAL

TRIPOLI 00000876 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Foreign Minister Musa Kusa summoned the Ambassador to his office October 26 to convey very strong Libyan anger and disappointment in the treatment of Libyan UN Permanent

Representative Abdulrahman Shalgam and his wife by John F. Kennedy Airport security officials upon their recent departure from New York. Kusa emphasized that the Libyan Government considered the situation very serious and that Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi was personally angered. Kusa demanded that the USG investigate the incident and respond with a report as soon as practical so that the Libyan side could determine what "measures" it would take in response. Kusa assured the Ambassador that the GOL would not treat AmCit travelers or diplomats in a reciprocal manner at Libyan airports. Libya is considering lodging a formal complaint at the United Nations, during which Shalgam may provide an account of his experience. The Department's guidance and assistance in investigating the situation is requested. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) A visibly angry Musa Kusa summoned the Ambassador (accompanied by P/E Chief) on October 26 to express very strong Libyan anger, including that of the Libyan Leader, regarding the reported treatment UN Permanent Representative Abdulrahman Shalgam had received recently during security processing at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Kusa said Shalgam and his wife were put in a room and subjected to "strip searches and rude behavior as if they were criminals." The trauma had affected Shalgam's wife so deeply that, according to Kusa, she is currently under hospital care.

¶3. (S/NF) Kusa called the incident unjustified and immoral: "Morally speaking, Shalgam is a guest in your country. If he had done something wrong or was a security threat, then that would have been a different story. How would you like it if your diplomats were treated by us in such a manner?" He argued that if a high level diplomat such as Shalgam -- a former foreign minister -- could experience such treatment by U.S. officials, then other Libyan diplomats or average Libyan travelers were probably facing even worse treatment. Kusa stated that the GOL was considering withdrawing Shalgam from his post as a result of the incident.

¶4. (S/NF) The Ambassador informed Kusa that the Embassy first heard of the incident via MFA diplomatic note four days prior to the meeting and was working with the Departments of State and Homeland Security to investigate the situation. Kusa believed the State Department should have "known" about the incident immediately. He asserted that news of the incident had spread throughout the leadership and had resurrected intensive questioning as to how Libya could justify this new relationship with the United States, saying "if you do not desire to continue the relationship, then tell us. There is no need to treat Libyan nationals in such a manner."

¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador told Kusa that Libya should not interpret the reported actions of a few individuals as reflective of an official, anti-Libya position within the USG. He added that both sides understand that, from time to time, problems will occur in the relationship, and that we should find a way to work through them. Kusa said the Libyan Government -- including Muammar al-Qadhafi himself -- wanted a full report from the U.S. explaining why a senior Libyan official had been subject to the alleged mistreatment. He was baffled by the circumstances that could have prompted such action. The Ambassador reiterated his assurances that the USG would review the circumstances surrounding the incident.

¶6. (S/NF) Kusa stated that Libya would not retaliate against U.S. travelers in response to the incident. He insisted on a speedy reply to the GOL's request for a full investigation. "We will consider the case open until we reach an acceptable conclusion. In light of what happens, we will carry out appropriate measures," he warned. Kusa threatened that Libya might be forced to take the issue to the UN General Assembly and that Shalgam may personally relate the events in that forum.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: The incident involving Abdulrahman Shalgam, compounded by Libyan reports of previous incidents involving its diplomats and officials, has elicited attention and anger at the highest levels of the Libyan regime. Embassy requests expeditious Department assistance in investigating the

TRIPOLI 00000876 002.2 OF 002

circumstances surrounding the incident. As recent Swiss and Canadian encounters have shown, Libya takes these issues seriously and we need to provide a reply and find a solution quickly if the matter is not to escalate. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI883

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI883 aka Wikileaks id #232570 ?
Subject	MUATASSEM AL-QADHAFI ASSERTS ANTI-LIBYA BIAS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 2 Nov 2009 15:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI883.html
References	09TRIPOLI876
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI190 , 09TRIPOLI924
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6307
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0883/01 3061508
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 021508Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5437
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1183
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0853
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0643
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5986
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000883

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/2/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MUATASSEM AL-QADHAFI ASSERTS ANTI-LIBYA BIAS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 876 ; B) TRIPOLI 722

TRIPOLI 00000883 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Ambassador reviewed the bilateral engagement agenda during a November 2 meeting with National Security Advisor (and Qadhafi son) Muatassem al-Qadhafi, who

Security Advisor (and Qadhafi son) Muatassem al-Qadhafi, who agreed on the need to overcome past problems in order to push engagement forward. While Muatassem laid out a list of complaints or "negative signals" from the U.S., including not being allowed to pitch a tent in New York for Muammar al-Qadhafi and the negative treatment accorded the party while in New York (media and denial of permission to move about), he expressed renewed interest in setting the stage for a future meeting between the elder Qadhafi and POTUS. The Ambassador emphasized that concrete steps on the ground -- including signing the 505 agreement and launching a political-military dialogue -- must be taken to pave the way for deeper engagement. The sensitive issues of the Swiss detainees and Abdel Basset al-Megrahi are contained septel. End Summary.

A CONFUSION OF MILITARY AGREEMENTS

¶2. (S/NF) During a November 2 meeting with National Security Advisor (NSA) Muatassem al-Qadhafi, the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol/Econ chief, notetaker) reviewed the bilateral agenda, highlighting the clear willingness and intention of the U.S. to move ahead in the relationship. He pointed to the successful, recent signing of the highly-enriched uranium fuel transfer agreement as an example for other areas where we need to see progress, including in the sphere of military engagement. The Ambassador reiterated the need for the GOL to formally approve the 505 agreement in order to unlock training opportunities for the Libyans. Likewise, he explained again the steps that the GOL must take in order to complete five pending Letters of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for C-130 related material and services. While Muatassem did not seem to understand where the 505 agreement stood within the Libyan bureaucracy ("Isn't that with the MFA?" he asked.), he expressed a desire to move forward with it. Nor did Muatassem reflect a clear understanding of the five government-to-government agreements, instead changing the subject to that of military equipment sales. He complained that the Libyans were being forced to purchase equipment from Russia because the USG had not approved the sale of U.S. equipment. While the Ambassador repeatedly separated the issues of the 505 agreement from that of the LOA's from that of the equipment sales, Muatassem seemed to confuse the three. "I do not understand the problem with the sales. We still have to take spare parts for the C-130's from the black market," he insisted.

FORGING AHEAD AND MUATASSEM'S SIX COMPLAINTS

¶3. (S/NF) The NSA insisted that "we want steps on the ground" to prove that the U.S. wanted the relationship to move forward. The Ambassador reminded Muatassem of the requests he made during his April 2009 meeting with the Secretary for the creation of bilateral dialogues on Civil-Nuclear and Political-Military cooperation. He informed the NSA that the USG was prepared to discuss those initiatives but needed word from the GOL expressing its own readiness to do so.

¶4. (S/NF) Muatassem then laid out a series of complaints that he characterized as "negative signals" that the Libyan regime had picked up from the U.S., which in his estimation, seemed to be statements that the U.S. did not want to deepen engagement. First were the "failed opportunities" for a meeting between POTUS and the Libyan Leader on the margins of the July G-8 Summit in Italy and then in September at UNGA. Second, he protested the treatment of UN Permanent Representative Abdulrahman Shalgam by security officials at JFK Airport (Ref A). Third, he informed the Ambassador that he had received complaints from the Libyan Navy that a Libyan oil tanker was inspected under "special procedures" by the U.S. Coast Guard when entering the port of Houston, Texas. He noted that similar incidents had occurred "maybe five times" in the past and that the most recent complaint was registered approximately two weeks ago. He suspected that all Libyan ships raised "red flags" when attempting to dock in U.S. ports and insisted "this should not

be the case."

¶5. (S/NF) The Ambassador assured Muatassem that the highest levels of the Departments of State and Homeland Security were investigating the Shalgam incident, informing him that senior State officials would soon meet with Libya's Ambassador to the U.S. to discuss the incident report and procedures that hopefully would help avoid the repeat of such incidents.

TRIPOLI 00000883 002.2 OF 003

Likewise, he offered to research the charges the NSA raised regarding inspections of Libyan ships at U.S. ports.

¶6. (S/NF) Muatassem went on to complain that POTUS's September meeting with African Heads of State specifically from "Sub-Saharan Africa" was "racist" and particularly discriminatory against Libya. "We see it aimed at us because we are the head of the African Union," he said, insisting that Libya should have been invited to the meeting. The Ambassador argued against the logic of the Libyan charge, reminding Muatassem that "Sub-Saharan Africa" is a term used by the entire international community not only the United States. The logic was lost on Muatassem, who responded, "Africa is not divided; it is a single continent."

¶7. (S/NF) Muatassem's fifth complaint involved his failure to successfully set up a tent for his father's meetings during their September visit to New York and the negative treatment accorded the party while in New York, including negative media and security restrictions on movement. He stated that the Libyans could not believe the U.S. reaction to the tent, as it did not pose any sort of security threat. He claimed that he did not think pitching the tent in New York would be a problem. In fact, he thought he was respecting A/S Feltman's request by not attempting to pitch the tent in New Jersey (Ref B). Finally, Muatassem complained that the Italian Interior Minister had told him that the U.S. Ambassador to Rome had urged Italy not to send planes to participate in the September 1 anniversary of Qadhafi's 40th year in power.

¶8. (S/NF) The Ambassador reminded Muatassem of the trajectory of events leading to Qadhafi's visit to New York -- July and early August were positive, with the handshake between POTUS and the Libyan Leader in Italy and the launching of the Human Rights Dialogue; however, the hero's welcome that Libya extended to convicted Pan Am 103 bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi poisoned the atmosphere by evoking deep American sensitivities. Arguing that Scotland, rather than Libya, should be blamed for Megrahi's release, Muatassem exclaimed, "What should we have done -- thrown him into the sea?!" He claimed that Megrahi's large Megaraha tribe had provided the welcome, not the GOL. He insisted that the issue with Megrahi was over now, since Libya had compensated the U.S. victims and Megrahi had been returned to Libya. "Let us close the shutter on this," he suggested. The Ambassador retorted that the matter was not that simple.

MOVING PAST THE "NEGATIVE SIGNALS"

¶9. (S/NF) The Ambassador emphasized that the USG wanted to move beyond the events of the past to improve the relationship. He urged Muatassem not to buy into conspiracy theories that the USG wants to punish Libya in some way or, beyond that, to subvert the progress already achieved. Muatassem expressed his own commitment to moving the relationship forward. The Ambassador conveyed the need for better and more frequent communication between the Embassy and the NSC in order to maintain a clear picture of the other's intentions and to express comments or complaints that each side might have vis-`-vis the other. Muatassem suggested that a visit by POTUS, or at minimum, a meeting between POTUS and Muammar al-Qadhafi would move engagement forward. He noted that the Leader was expected to

engagement forward. He noted that the Leader was expected to represent the African Union at the upcoming UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) meeting in Rome but that he was unlikely to attend the UN Climate Change ministerial in Copenhagen. The Ambassador insisted that we needed to move ahead with the agreements on the ground and to establish a political-military dialogue as next steps. He also told Muatassem that major progress along the lines of what the NSA was proposing would also have to await the closure of the Megrahi case and a steady period of building trust and confidence.

¶10. (S/NF) Comment: While Muatassem did not seem to be in a listening mode, he did respond positively to the idea of moving forward on the bilateral agenda. His aim during the meeting seemed to be focused on his list of complaints -- particularly the tent issue, perhaps signaling that this was an area where he personally bore the brunt of the blame from his father. His -- as well as others'-- renewed interest in pursuing a meeting between POTUS and the elder Qadhafi reflects a lack of understanding of the current state of the relationship, as well as an apparent refusal to understand the impact on the relationship of Megrahi's return to Libya. It may also reflect Muatassem's goal to "achieve" something significant for his

TRIPOLI 00000883 003.2 OF 003

father in light of the political roiling surrounding Saif al-Islam's apparent moving to the head of the succession line. We will continue to urge the Libyans to complete these action requests and to work with the Libyan NSC and other relevant actors in preparation of the launching of a political-military dialogue. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI886

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI886 aka Wikileaks id #232773 ?
Subject	ISN/CTR VISIT: LIBYA MOVES FORWARD ON SCIENTIST ENGAGEMENT PROGRAMS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Nov 2009 14:38 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI886.html
References	09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI436 , 09TRIPOLI437 , 09TRIPOLI476 , 09TRIPOLI482 , 09TRIPOLI490 , 09TRIPOLI795
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI96
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:37: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7392
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0886/01 3071438
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031438Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5442
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0076
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0646
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5991
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000886

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR K. INSLEY AND DA BROWN; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/3/2019
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya] , IT [Italy]
SUBJECT: ISN/CTR VISIT:  LIBYA MOVES FORWARD ON SCIENTIST ENGAGEMENT
PROGRAMS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 437 , B) TRIPOLI 212 , C) TRIPOLI 436 , D) TRIPOLI 482 , E) TRIPOLI
476 , F) TRIPOLI 490 , G) TRIPOLI 795

TRIPOLI 00000886  001.2 OF 004


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S.
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.     (S/NF)  Summary: The Libyan government warmly greeted the
```

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Libyan government warmly greeted the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation's Office of Cooperative Threat Reduction (ISN/CTR), team leader Kathryn Insley and program manager D.A. Brown, on ISN/CTR's first official trip to Libya since November 2008. This visit was a critical step in re-establishing a strong rapport between ISN/CTR staff and their Libyan interlocutors, and lead GOL contact Dr. Ali Gashut indicated that previous visa problems that had plagued the project had been "solved." ISN/CTR held meetings with officials of the Tripoli Medical Center (TMC) to discuss the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center (NMC) and next steps for developing the Architectural and Engineering (A&E) design and model for the NMC. The Libyan Government agreed to move ahead on this project on a cost-sharing basis, a reversal of the Libyans' previous position. TMC management also reported rooms had been allocated to establish a Telemedicine Center, linking Libyan specialists to their counterparts overseas, and the next step would be to install equipment with the help of experts from Harvard's Center for Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology. ISN/CTR toured the desalination pilot project site at Tajura Nuclear Research Center (TNRC) where equipment will be installed by engineers from Sandia National Laboratory. The Director of TNRC pledged to provide a list to ISN/CTR of current issues and requests for future engagement under the Sister Laboratory/Stack Monitoring Project. Insley and Brown also held meetings at the Italian Embassy to explore possible collaboration in scientist engagement. End summary.

WHO'S WHO? OUR MAIN INTERLOCUTORS ON NUCLEAR AND ALTERNATIVE ENERGY ISSUES

¶2. (C) The USG's primary Libyan interlocutor on all nuclear and alternative energy issues with a strictly research component is Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment (LAEE). As outlined in Ref A, Gashut reports directly to Prime Minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi. The LAEE includes three operational/research divisions: the TNRC (previously known as the Renewable Energies and Water Desalination Research Center --REWDRC-- and Nuclear Research Center) headed by Engineer Ahmed al-Habrush, whose deputy is El Mahdi Ghallab; the Alternative Energy Research Center, headed by Dr. Salem Ghurbal; and Chemical Engineering (including the Petrochemical Institute), headed by Dr. Husein Mansour. As for Ghurbal, he is reportedly not well, perhaps suffering from diabetes, and his deputy, Dr. Mohammed Mussa, may take on a greater role in managing the Alternative Energy Research Center in the future. One of ISN/CTR's main projects, the Desalination Pilot Project, falls under the Desalination and Water Treatment Research Department, headed by Dr. Abdulnaser Ali Alsadawi, who reports to al-Habrush. Another familiar face in Libyan scientific circles is Dr. Mohammed Ennami, who is Gashut's deputy, and who was formerly science advisor to the now-Secretary for Infrastructure Matuq Matuq (after the latter's previous General People's Committee for Manpower was dissolved in March in the government reconfiguration--see Ref B). While Ennami is now technically Gashut's subordinate, due to his close connections to Matuq, a regime insider, we can surmise he may wield more power than Gashut in a de facto sense. Meanwhile, the staff at the TMC is ISN/CTR's primary interlocutor in the development of the NMC. In particular, Dr. Omran Shammam (educated at Ohio State University) has been steadfast in his support and commitment to this project. Dr. Omran Assatel (PhD in Physics, Oregon State University) is also key to the NMC project. Both participated directly in this visit.

¶3. (C) On October 19, in a one-on-one meeting with ISN/CTR, Gashut reiterated the need for all initial communication between the U.S. side and the Libyans to go through him. He said, "otherwise, things get too confusing," especially when it comes to arranging visits and tracking visa approvals through the Libyan bureaucracy. But, Gashut said the visa problem was "solved now." ISN/CTR pressed for more clarity on the visa

issue, and Gashut implied that he now has a system in place whereby he can communicate directly with Libyan protocol on visa issuance.

MOVING FORWARD ON THE REGIONAL NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER

¶4. (C) Gashut accepted moving ahead on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center (NMC) on a bilateral partnership basis (i.e. cost-sharing), in an apparent reversal of his previous stance that ISN/CTR commit to fully funding construction of the NMC,

TRIPOLI 00000886 002.2 OF 004

He agreed to provide a quick-turnaround written concurrence similar to a letter provided by ISN/CTR, which will then pave the way for ISN/CTR's development of the NMC A&E Design. In an October 18 meeting with ISN/CTR, Dr. Omran Shammam offered comments on the draft strategic plan for the NMC, several of which were resolved during the meeting. Shammam would like to meet again with the strategic plan development experts from Harvard/Massachusetts General Hospital concerning the issue of average examination times but overall, he approved the draft strategic plan without further comment. ISN/CTR will follow-up with Dr. Giles Boland (Harvard/Mass General) to schedule a visit to Libya. Shammam also indicated that a site had been selected for the NMC. The site is 10,000 square meters in size, located near the Tripoli International Airport, and will therefore be accessible to travelers from outside of Tripoli as well as from neighboring countries. Shammam offered to show the site to ISN/CTR during a future visit. Shammam emphasized Libya's desire for all staff in the proposed NMC to be trained in the U.S. or by Americans. In addition, Gashut noted the NMC would be more than just a building, but a model of American excellence equipped to the highest American standards. He underscored the need to enforce U.S. labor standards, such as punctuality, clear reporting systems, and accountability -- values which, according to Gashut, are abundantly lacking in the current Libyan healthcare system.

¶5. (C) In addition to the NMC, ISN/CTR is working with TMC to establish a Telemedicine Center that will enable specialists in Libya to consult with their counterparts in the U.S. and other countries around the world. Shammam reported that rooms have been allocated at the TMC for the Telemedicine Center, equipment has been approved for the project, and Shamman is now ready for experts from Harvard's Center for Integration of Medicine and Innovative Technology (CIMIT), funded through ISN/CTR, to begin installation. In terms of more general training needs, Shammam asked for an oncologist and radiotherapist to visit Libya in order to conduct training. During the course of discussions on the NMC, Shammam also provided a tour of TMC's new diagnostic wing which, according to Shammam, had been built in under one year and, along with several other diagnostic rooms, currently houses a state-of-the-art Cyclotron which synthesizes the Fluorine-18 isotope to make fluordeoxyglucose for use in a Positron Emission Tomography (PET-CT) medical imaging device. According to Shamman, TMC's PET-CT, which is equipped with an array of mood, lighting, scenery and music selections to help patients relax during treatment, is only the second of its kind in use worldwide. The new wing measures 1,200 square meters and cost 32 million dinars (approximately $26 million dollars) to construct, of which half was spent on new equipment. When pressed for further details on the budget, Shammam said it was simply a line item that appeared in TMC's budget, and TMC was directed to spend it on this new wing. A Libyan construction firm, al-Akaria Construction Company, was selected to build the wing, and an Italian sub-contractor, Prisma, carried out the specialized medical construction. According to Shammam, the new wing does not yet have dedicated staff. He indicated there is a lack of trained technicians and also expressed interest in additional training from the U.S. side.

EQUIPMENT IN PLACE FOR DESALINATION PILOT PROJECT

¶6. (C) On October 19, ISN/CTR met Dr. Abdulnaser Ali Alsadawi, the Head of the Desalination and Water Treatment Research Department at TNRC. They discussed the Desalination Pilot Project, under which experts from Sandia National Laboratory (SNL) will work with their Libyan counterparts to install desalination equipment at the pilot facility in Tajura. Alsadawi took them on a tour of the pilot project site, which is next to the holding tanks for an existing desalination plant (which provides potable water to TNRC). The equipment for the pilot project is housed in three special shipping containers that are on a raised platform. Alsadawi said some modifications to the platform were needed and these would be completed in the next two weeks. Ideally, two experts from SNL will travel to Libya in early November to begin connecting the equipment, pending visa issuance. [Note: In a separate meeting, Gashut pledged to assist with visa approvals for a two week visit by the SNL experts and DA Brown, the ISN/CTR Libya program manager. End note.] Alsadawi also gave ISN/CTR a tour of the laboratory space at TNRC which will be used as a water quality laboratory to support the desalination pilot project. All the equipment for the new water quality laboratory is still in boxes, but it appears that all equipment has arrived. Perishable reagents appear to be appropriately stored in refrigerators. Alsadawi

noted that one of the incubators that had been unpacked was missing components and essentially, was unusable. [Note: Shipments to Libya of technical equipment, chemicals, and reagents have been plagued with delays and difficult to confirm. Alsadawi stated that Libyan customs officials are not extremely cooperative with TNRC. According to Alsadawi, storage space is very limited at the port and stringent rules apply unilaterally to all shipments, including a requirement to auction all shipments that have not cleared customs within ninety days. Alsadawi said that TNRC had to request very high-level intervention to get a recent equipment shipment released after it had been listed for auction. End note.]

SISTER LABORATORY/STACK MONITORING ACTIVITIES

¶7. (C) In 2005, the International Nuclear Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) signed a "Sister Laboratory" Arrangement with the former National Board of Research and Development (NBRD), which is now TNRC. Under this arrangement, INSEP initiated five Action Sheets, of which three are nearly complete, and further visits are needed to close out or restart those that have stalled. Current plans call for a visit to pursue: Action Sheet 4 - Stack Monitoring System, Action Sheet 2 - Radiation Protection Train-the-trainer capability, Action Sheet 5 - Radioactive Waste Tracking Database, and Action Sheet 1 - Cleanroom Assistance. [Note: A team from NNSA was due to visit Tripoli in mid-June but has not received visas. End note.] The head of TNRC, al-Habrush, said he would send a letter to ISN/CTR, via Gashut, providing a list of current issues and requests for future engagement on the Sister Lab program. His deputy, Ghallab, commented that there had been "good momentum" on the U.S.-Libya science program but that about a year ago, "everything stopped." When ISN/CTR pointed out that several U.S. visitors had tried to come to Libya, but they did not receive visas (until this visit), al-Habrush acknowledged that there had been "some sort of problem with visas," but was unaware of the three prior ISN/CTR attempts to obtain visas. He noted that, "I, myself, was supposed to go to the United Nations in New York, but never got a visa" last April.

WATER RESOURCES MODELING

¶8. (C) Under a program with Lawrence Livermore National

Laboratory (LLNL), U.S. experts will train Libyans in how to use a specialized software program to run various scenarios for water resource management. Gashut asked ISN/CTR for more information about the data necessary from the Great Manmade River Project to implement the water quality monitoring and modeling program. He also had questions on the nondisclosure agreement (NDA) required by LLNL in order to safeguard intellectual property rights. ISN/CTR said they would follow-up with LLNL in order to clarify their needs for real data and to discuss their plans to return to Libya to demonstrate the model. Issues concerning the NDA will also need to be resolved. [Note: In an October 22 meeting, Omar Salem, Chairman of the Libyan General Water Authority, told Econoff that Gashut had written to him to say that the U.S. experts would return to Libya once the data needs were clarified. Salem looked forward to the training, which will involve Libyan specialists from his organization. End note.]

VIRTUAL SCIENCE LIBRARY

¶9. (C) When asked about the status of the proposed Virtual Science Library, Gashut said he had followed up on his discussions on this project during his April meeting with ISN/CTR in Washington, DC, by passing the proposal to the General People's Committee for Education (Ministry of Education-equivalent). He promised to update ISN/CTR as soon as he received a reply from the Education officials.

VIEWPOINT OF THE ITALIAN EMBASSY

¶10. (S/NF) ISN/CTR met with the Deputy Chief of Mission, Lorenzo Kluzer (strictly protect) at the Italian Embassy to explore possible collaboration in Libya, following the example of Iraq, where the Italians are working with us on scientist engagement projects. Kluzer said that Italy had not been involved in the nuclear scientist redirection efforts in Libya but was working with them on converting the former biological weapons factory to a pharmaceutical plant. The plan is for the pharmaceutical plant to produce medicines for treating HIV/AIDS for export to sub-Saharan Africa. He noted the Libyans did not seem very concerned with meeting this goal, but instead thought

Italy and other countries should be pleased that at least the factory was not being used for its former purpose (developing biological weapons). Ensuring Libya lives up to its commitments to destroy the stockpiles of chemical weapons is another concern of Italy, particularly given Libya's geographic proximity. In Kluzer's view, the Libyans are stalling on the destruction of the stockpiles in order to keep this "as a bargaining chip" (Refs F, G). More broadly, in terms of the medical system in Libya, Kluzer noted around 200 Libyan doctors have been trained in Italy, and they had established a good network between the Libyan and Italian medical schools. He thought this might be a good resource for U.S.-based medical trainers to tap into.

¶11. (S/NF) Comment: As the success of many of our programs in Libya hinges on personal relationships, this recent visit was a critical step in establishing a strong rapport between ISN/CTR staff and their Libyan interlocutors. Our main point of contact for Libyan scientist engagement, Dr. Ali Gashut, made a real effort to welcome Kate Insley and DA Brown, as evidenced by his participation in their meetings. He also personally invited them to a traditional Libyan dinner and even brought along his teenage son, transparently underscoring the importance of cultivating interpersonal relationships in Libyan cultural context. It is also important to note that Libya is a relatively small country (population around 6 million), and the cadre of Libya's US-trained scientists is also small. Most of Libya's US-trained scientists were educated in the U.S. before

sanctions, and as they are now in their 50's and 60's and will retire soon, we only have about 5-10 years more to pursue joint projects with this group of people. Due to Libya's isolation during the past few decades as well as a previous ban on teaching English, the current generation of young professionals has had little exposure to Western work-styles and has limited facility in English language. The ISN/CTR programs present an excellent opportunity to address this generation gap. End comment.

¶12. (C) ISN/CTR has cleared this cable.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI887

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI887 aka Wikileaks id #232777 ?
Subject	BLUE LANTERN BROKER INQUIRY CASE NO. K-2651, ABDUROUF I.T. BAKIR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 3 Nov 2009 14:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI887.html
References	09STATE100106
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7407
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0887 3071444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 031444Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5446
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5995
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000887

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE FOR PM/DTCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/3/2019
TAGS: ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , KOMC *[Export Control of Defense Articles and Defense Services]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: BLUE LANTERN BROKER INQUIRY CASE NO. K-2651, ABDUROUF I.T. BAKIR

REF: STATE 100106

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Post met with Abdurouf Bakir, Chairman and Owner of Al-Masar Stock Company for Selling Aircraft Equipment on October 25, 2009. Below are the answers to questions posed in reftel:

--This entity is in the business of brokering defense articles and defense services at the location indicated under its legal name.

--This entity is authorized to conduct such activities in Libya. Post does not have any criminal or derogatory background information on this entity or individual.

--Al-Masar Stock Company will not be handling or storing United

States Munitions List (USML) items on behalf of its clients. The client handles its incoming shipments and takes care of all shipping formalities and storage of goods.

--Al-Masar Stock Company was established in August 2007. It has 10 principal share-holders, of whom four are employees running the company: Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Commercial Manager, and Title Member of the Board Share-holder.

--Al-Masar deals in the Aviation sector, procuring for civilian airlines, and also for the Libyan military (Air Force). Clients include the Libyan government as well as private companies. Bakir estimates 30 to 40 percent of their business is with the Libyan Air Force, working through the Military Procurement Office. All clients are located in Libya and are Libyan. Al-Masar represents several companies in Europe as well as in the U.S. (Rockwell Collins, based in Cedar Rapids, IA, and DIRCO (Milwaukee, WI).

--The company understands the restrictions on USML items.

¶2. (C) Comment: Bakir appears to be a competent broker, with relevant prior experience as an engineer in the Aviation industry. He noted his company is a member of TRACE, International (an organization that promotes transparency and good governance in business), and is the only member of this organization in Libya. Emboff had the impression he works mainly as a consultant as his company has no real physical office. Bakir works out of his residence. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI892

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI892 aka Wikileaks id #233330 ?
Subject	YOUNG LIBYANS SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESS FOR CHANGE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 5 Nov 2009 14:44 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI892.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9985
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0892/01 3091444
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 051444Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5450
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1186
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0856
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0650
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA 0464
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 5999
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000892

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: YOUNG LIBYANS SEEK OPPORTUNITIES TO PRESS FOR CHANGE

TRIPOLI 00000892  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  As opportunities grow for young Libyans to
travel abroad for educational and professional pursuits, the
same group is experiencing frustration upon return.  With great
expectations of using their education and international
experience to effect positive change in their country, young,
Western-educated Libyans are facing the hard reality that
Libya's complex bureaucracy and traditional society are
resistant to change and reluctant to allow the younger
generation to rise to positions of influence and power.
Nevertheless, Embassy contacts suggest that deep changes have
```

taken place in Libyan society since the lifting of international sanctions and express optimism that reform will continue in Libya, although it might be slow. End Summary.

A SOCIETY AFRAID OF CHANGE BUT RELIANT ON PATRONAGE

¶2. (C/NF) A Western-educated young Libyan recently told Pol/Econ Chief that "Libyan society is afraid of change." She complained that the younger generation of Libyans, many of whom have taken advantage of opportunities to travel, study, and work abroad, are met with suspicion when they come back home. "The problem with Libya is that it is very hierarchical," she said, explaining that respect within society and government is merited by age and personal connections rather than experience or ability. She characterized the regime as mistrustful of young people, although in need of the younger generation of Libyans, who have been trained abroad with the skills necessary to manage changes in Libyan society. Instead, the decision-makers in place are mostly academics without the professional experience necessary to make or implement effective policy changes, although they will lean on younger staff members to do the work that they cannot do, particularly when staff members are "well-connected" to the guys at the top. She highlighted the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), run by Mohammed Layas, as one such organization. Describing Layas as largely a figurehead, she said the real work was being done by a Western-educated young Libyan named Mustafa.

¶3. (C/NF) The contact related her own experience to further illustrate that personal connections, rather than expertise, are fundamental to making progress in the current system. During the last year, she leaned on a family connection both to obtain a job at the Housing and Investment Board (HIB) and to make a change to the Board's operations after discovering a flaw in the system. Using her family's connection to the then-HIB head, she was able to gain an audience with him and to present an argument for introducing a procedure that would improve the overall operation. Although she is not sure whether the former HIB chief adopted the change because her argument was convincing or as a personal favor, she is confident that her suggestion made a positive impact on the system.

CAUSE FOR OPTIMISM

¶4. (C) Other young Libyan contacts have reported similar experiences upon returning from long absences abroad: shock at the slow pace of reforms and frustration at the resistance they face when attempting to improve an intractable system. Nevertheless, young Libyans remain optimistic about the future of their society. They describe the changes that have taken place within Libya since the lifting of sanctions as "profound," with more than one contact stating, "I would not have been able to have this conversation with an American a few years ago." Likewise, many young Libyans are pleased about the economic improvements within the country and the increased opportunities for employment at foreign-owned and operated businesses. They are happy that they are able to study English in schools -- an act that was banned throughout the 1980's. And they are grateful that they no longer live in an outcast society.

¶5. (C) Regarding the recent appointment of Saif al-Islam -- who has set himself up as a role-model of sorts for Libyan youth, with his annual youth day conferences and speeches -- young Libyans remain conservative in their judgment. One contact predicts Saif will face the same challenges as other young Libyans and that it will take time for him to build up the authority necessary to make real changes. Although his reform agenda is well-received among Embassy contacts within young Libyan circles, some lament that the people around Saif are starting to reflect the actions of other, corrupt officials, signaling maintenance of the status quo.

¶6. (C) Comment: The very fact that Libya is now sending large

10. (C) Comment: The very fact that Libya is now sending large numbers of young people abroad reflects a profound change in

TRIPOLI 00000892 002.2 OF 002

Libyan society and ultimately will create a momentum and constituency for further reform. As illustrated in the example of the Housing and Investment Board, this new generation's ability to effect real change in the near term likely will be tied to their own personal connections to the Old Guard's entrenched elite. This could change in the longer term, as Libya develops a cadre of well-trained technocrats. We will report more on Libya's new study abroad program septel. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI893

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI893 aka Wikileaks id #233337 ?
Subject	THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A POL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 5 Nov 2009 15:13 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI893.html
Referenced by	10STATE284
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0019
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0893 3091513
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 051513Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5452
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1188
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0858
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0652
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6001
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000893

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA AND PM/RSAT (CHRISTOPHER PETRONE)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/5/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A POL-MIL DIALOGUE WITH
LIBYA

REF: A) State 112900; B) State 43049

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) The USG does not currently have an established security
dialogue with Libya.  However, Libya's National Security
Advisor, Muatassim al-Qadhafi, expressed his interest in
establishing a political-military (pol-mil) dialogue during his
April 2009 meeting with the Secretary in Washington (Ref B).
The Embassy's country team views the establishment of a
bilateral pol-mil dialogue as valuable to enhanced strategic
engagement with Libya and in this geopolitically important
```

region. We aim to achieve the following objectives, among others, within the context of a bilateral pol-mil dialogue:

-- Libya's participation in the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP), in which Libya is currently reluctant to take part;
-- Signing of the Section 505 End-User Agreement;
-- Discussing budget transparency;
-- Addressing Libya's Foreign Military Sales interests;
-- Addressing Libya's concerns about the eight Libyan C-130's in Marietta, Georgia;
-- Libya's acceptance of MANPAD's destruction and humanitarian demining assistance;
-- Libya's fulfillment of its Missile Technology Control Regime (SCUD-B destruction) commitments;
-- Libyan contribution of helicopters to UNAMID;
-- Increased Libyan cooperation with AFRICOM; and
-- Civil-Military training and seminar opportunities (International Military Education and Training, Marshall Center/NESA/Africa Center for Strategic Studies).

¶2. (C) The Embassy envisions the launching of the dialogue by the A/S for Political and Military Affairs and most likely the Libyan National Security Advisor, during the early part of 2010. Recent discussions with senior Libyan officials have made it clear that it will be difficult to make progress on the many disparate elements of our security agenda without an overall framework and single point of contact to marshal Libya's slow-moving and inefficient bureaucracy. Based on previous discussions with the Libyan Government, it appears that NSA Muatassim al-Qadhafi would be that person. We appreciate the Department's assistance in moving forward the bilateral agenda through the launching of a political-military dialogue with Libya.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI896

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI896 aka Wikileaks id #233785 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE RESPONSE: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - SUPPORTING AMCIT NOMINATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Nov 2009 07:48 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI896.html
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI40 , 09TRIPOLI64 , 09TRIPOLI68
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2913
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0896 3130748
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 090748Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5455
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0247
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6004
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000896

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO/MPR (BRIAN G. HACKETT), AND USUN/MR (BRUCE RASHKOW)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: AORC *[International Organizations and Conferences]* , APER *[Personnel]* , KAWC *[Atrocities and War Crimes]* , KJUS *[Administration of Justice]* , KUNR *[UN Reform]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]* , UNGA/C-5 *[UN General Assembly Adm and Budget Committee, UN General Assembly Fifth Committee]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: INTERNATIONAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION - SUPPORTING AMCIT NOMINATION

REF: STATE 109341

¶1. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche to Mehdi al-Mjribi, Director of the International Organizations office at Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs, on November 5. Mjribi said that his office had reviewed Ms. Myers' experience and qualifications and had no problem supporting the nomination. He said that Libya usually casts votes for such positions based on a candidate's experience and would most likely vote for Ms. Myers.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI898

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI898 aka Wikileaks id #233914 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE RESPONSE: LIBYA WILL FOLLOW ARAB GROUP ON GOLDSTONE REPORT RESOLUTION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Nov 2009 16:19 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI898.html
References	09STATE112828
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3538
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0898 3131619
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091619Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5457
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0248
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6006
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000898

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO/HR (PAUL KRUCHOWSKI), IO/UNP (ANDREW MORRISON) AND NEA/IPA (JEFFREY GIAUQUE). USUN NEW YORK FOR ELLEN GERMAIN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , IS *[Israel]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]* , UNGA *[UN General Assembly]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: LIBYA WILL FOLLOW ARAB GROUP ON GOLDSTONE REPORT RESOLUTION

REF: STATE 112828

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche to Mehdi al-Mjribi, Director of the International Organizations Office at Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs, on November 5. In response, Mjribi insisted that Libya did not want to get "in front of the issue" and therefore would not take a stance until formal and informal consultations were completed in New York

among the Arab Group and African Union representatives. Mjribi stated that while Libya respects the U.S. position on Goldstone, the Libyans would ultimately adopt the common position of the Arab Group.

¶2. (C) Mjribi expressed Libya's agreement that Security Council discussion of the Goldstone Report would not be productive, primarily because it would be too difficult to achieve consensus on the matter. He stressed that achieving a simple majority vote in favor of an UNGA resolution on Goldstone would not be difficult. Mjribi stated that he believed a resolution was "inevitable," and that discussion was now focused on the content of the resolution.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI900

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI900 aka Wikileaks id #233918 ?
Subject	GOL RELEASES SWISS - BUT ONLY AS FAR AS THE SWISS EMBASSY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 9 Nov 2009 16:39 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI900.html
References	08TRIPOLI882 , 09TRIPOLI763 , 09TRIPOLI832
Referenced by	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI901 , 09TRIPOLI942
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3559
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0900 3131639
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091639Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5459
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0050
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1189
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0859
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0653
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6008
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000900

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/9/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , LY *[Libya]* , SZ *[Switzerland]*
SUBJECT: GOL RELEASES SWISS - BUT ONLY AS FAR AS THE SWISS EMBASSY

REF: A) Tripoli 832 , B) Tripoli 763 , C) Tripoli 882 (NOTAL)

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) The two Swiss who were taken into Libyan custody in late September were released to the Swiss Embassy on November 9, without explanation. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazzarotto told Pol/Econ Chief that whether the Swiss will be allowed to depart the country is still an open question. They are in good health

the country is still an open question. They are in good health, "as good as can be expected under the circumstances," according to a Swiss Government press statement. Lazzarotto thanked the USG and the Ambassador for urging the GOL to release the individuals.

¶2. (C) Comment: In recent weeks, the Swiss have requested the assistance of a number of third countries, including the USG, the French, and the European Union, to urge the GOL to release the individuals. EU and USG intervention with GOL officials likely contributed to the release. While the news is positive, the situation will not be resolved until the GOL agrees to allow the Swiss to depart. The countries also face the broader question of normalization of relations in the wake of this high-profile and highly sensitive conflict. Post will report further details via septel.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI901

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI901 aka Wikileaks id #234138 ?
Subject	SWISS THANK USG FOR INTERVENTION WITH LIBYA, REQUEST ADDITIONAL SUPPORT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 10 Nov 2009 16:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI901.html
References	09TRIPOLI763 , 09TRIPOLI832 , 09TRIPOLI900
Referenced by	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI910 , 09TRIPOLI942
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4664
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0901 3141608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 101608Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5460
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6009
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000901

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS THANK USG FOR INTERVENTION WITH LIBYA, REQUEST ADDITIONAL SUPPORT

REF: A) TRIPOLI 763 ; B) TRIPOLI 900 ; C) TRIPOLI 832

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 6.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto briefed the Ambassador November 10 on the unexpected November 9 release of the two Swiss citizens detained by the Libyan government since September 19 (ref A). Describing the conditions in which the Swiss were kept since being taken into Libyan custody, Lazarotto

Swiss were kept since being taken into Libyan custody, Lazarotto reported that while most of their needs were met, they were kept in isolation and were denied requests to contact their families and Swiss authorities. Hours before meeting the Ambassador, Lazarotto was contacted by the GOL with a court date for the individuals, as well as a request to arrange a call between Libyan MFA Assistant Secretary-equivalent for International Cooperation, Khaled Kaim, and the Swiss State Secretary, Michael Ambuhl. Lazarotto thanked the USG and Ambassador for their intervention and requested the Ambassador's presence at the upcoming court hearing. End Summary.

¶3. (S/NF) During a November 10 meeting with the Ambassador and Pol/Econ Chief, Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto provided additional details regarding the treatment of the two Swiss citizens who had been detained since September 19. Lazarotto said that the individuals unexpectedly appeared at his embassy on November 9 without prior warning and without any explanation from Libyan authorities (ref B). They reported that they had been well-fed and had all of their needs met while in detention -- including television and I-Pod (loaded with Libyan music) access; however, they were denied their requests to contact their families and the Swiss Embassy. According to Lazarotto, the individuals were transported to a location -- probably in the Tripoli suburb of Suraj -- that they could not identify. Once there, they were kept in isolation and were only allowed to see one another three times, via an exercise room that connected their rooms. They described their rooms as sparse, containing only beds and television sets. A plain-clothes guard force monitored the premises where they were being confined. Lazarotto said that the Libyans had provided them medical care and treatment for high blood pressure, including medicine that the Swiss Embassy provided through the GOL.

¶4. (S/NF) Lazarotto reported that the Deputy Director of the European Affairs Department at the Libyan MFA contacted him on November 10 to say that a court date would be set for the Swiss citizens one week hence, and to remind him of the charges that would be raised in the trial - namely, lack of proper residency permits. The official also requested that a phone call be quickly arranged between Khaled Kaim, MFA A/S-equivalent for International Cooperation, and Swiss State Secretary Michael Ambuhl to discuss a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding on the way forward.

¶5. (S/NF) Lazarotto told the Ambassador that Bern was deliberately keeping the Swiss Embassy, including Lazarotto himself, uninformed on Swiss discussions with third countries regarding the Swiss-Libya situation. However, he relayed that Bern requested that the Ambassador, as well as the Italian, French and other ambassadors to Libya, be present during the court hearing for the Swiss to remind the Libyans that they could not do anything under the "cover of darkness." The Ambassador stated his inclination not to be present given the sensitive nature of his intervention on the issue and desire to stay behind the scenes. The Ambassador said that the Secretary had taken her counterpart's request seriously and had asked the Embassy to raise the issue as a humanitarian concern; however, we were disinclined to issue any public comments on what potential role we might have had. Details of the Ambassador's intervention should remain discreet, which was a key to the success of our efforts. Were those efforts to become public, the GOL may not respond to further interventions in the future. Lazaratto said Bern hoped to convey official appreciation for our efforts in the near future.

¶6. (S/NF) Comment and Action Request: After assessing that international attention led to the recent release, the Swiss now want to proceed with international backing for their dealings with the Libyans -- a step they arguably should have taken much earlier. To respond to the official Swiss request, Post requests a Department decision on whether the Ambassador should be present at the court hearing. Post's inclination is to keep

the Ambassador away from the hearing in order to maintain the discreet nature of our sensitive interventions so as not to provoke the Libyans. End Comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI910

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI910 aka Wikileaks id #234822 ?
Subject	SWISS IN LIBYA: CHARGE REQUESTS EU, US PRESENCE AT COURT HEARING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Nov 2009 09:29 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI910.html
References	09TRIPOLI832 , 09TRIPOLI901
Referenced by	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI942
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8789
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP
RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0910/01 3200929
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 160929Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5471
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6020
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000910

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/16/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SWISS IN LIBYA: CHARGE REQUESTS EU, US PRESENCE AT COURT HEARING

REF: A) TRIPOLI 901 ; B) STATE 117546; C) TRIPOLI 832

TRIPOLI 00000910 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto is making the rounds at EU embassies in Tripoli, in an attempt to garner a quorum of ambassadors to attend the upcoming trial of two Swiss citizens. The Italian, British, and French embassies report

citizens. The Italian, British, and French embassies report that they are waiting on official guidance from their respective capitals before responding to the Swiss request. The Italian Embassy believes the matter will most likely be referred to Brussels for a decision. The trial date has not yet been set, but the Libyans have already indicated that the hearing may be further delayed, insisting that the detained Swiss move out of the Swiss Embassy to another location in Tripoli in order to receive the GOL's official summons. The Swiss Embassy itself has not yet received required GOL permission to attend the trial, whenever it occurs. Post thanks the Department for its quick response to our request for guidance (Refs A, B). Given EU hesitancy and GOL sensitivities, we do not currently plan to send a representative to the initial court hearing. End Summary.

SWISS CHARGE REQUESTS EU, US PRESENCE AT COURT HEARING

¶2. (S/NF) Swiss Charge d'Affaires, Stefano Lazarotto, told Pol/Econ Chief November 15 that he was in the process of calling on EU embassies in Tripoli to request the presence of EU ambassadors at the court hearing of detained Swiss citizens, Max Goeldi and Rachid Hamdani. [Note: Lazarotto requested the Ambassador's attendance during a meeting November 9 (Ref A).] He said that the Spanish and Dutch ambassadors had already pledged to attend (we have not yet been able to confirm this with those two embassies). Although Lazarotto extended the request to the Italian, British, and French ambassadors on November 13, he said that none of them had officially responded yet. According to Lazarotto, the British ambassador said that current political "sensitivities" in the UK-Libyan relationship may prevent a public UK display of support. The French DCM told Pol/Econ Chief November 15 that he was awaiting an official response from Paris, which he did not expect to receive until after the French weekend. "If the hearing takes place before we have a response, then of course, we cannot attend," he stated.

EU AMBASSADORS WILL LIKELY REFER REQUEST TO BRUSSELS

¶3. (S/NF) In a separate November 15 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Italian DCM Lorenzo Kluzer (strictly protect) confirmed that Lazarotto had approached the Italian ambassador with the request that he attend the court hearing. Kluzer noted that he was aware that the Swiss had also approached the Spanish, French, and British ambassadors. He said that while he did not expect any of the ambassadors to attend in their national capacities, he believed they would each recommend that their governments refer the matter to Brussels for a decision. He asserted that the Spanish ambassador could not attend the hearing in Spain's capacity as EU President without an official mandate from Brussels. If the Spanish ambassador were to attend, Kluzer noted, then he would be representing Spain alone. Kluzer said that a decision from Brussels would take some time, hinting that he did not anticipate an EU presence at the hearing.

¶4. (S/NF) Kluzer explained that the EU nations were already experiencing blowback from the Libyans for Switzerland's recent, unilateral vetoes on Schengen visa approvals for high-profile Libyan travelers, such as Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi (Ref C). He said that a number of EU ambassadors, including the Italian, had been summoned to the MFA November 15 for a meeting to discuss the Schengen visa "situation." Kluzer lamented that the GOL continued to "deliberately" misunderstand the Schengen visa approval process, in spite of numerous clarifications from EU embassies here. The Europeans were increasingly concerned and angry by the Swiss use of the veto for political purposes for a system the former claimed was to be based solely on opposition on security grounds. Kluzer said that he expected the MFA to attempt to urge the EU ambassadors to counteract Schengen visa refusals from the Swiss in some way.

GOL FURTHER COMPLICATES SWISS ISSUE

¶5. (S/NF) To further complicate the situation, the GOL announced

publicly November 12 that the detained Swiss must move out of the Swiss Embassy in order to be served a court summons. Lazarotto confirmed that the demand had been made privately as well, causing the detained Swiss deep distress and concern about the consequences of leaving embassy environs. "Of course, the decision is theirs," Lazarotto commented, referring to Goeldi and Hamdani. "The Embassy cannot tell them what to do or advise them not to move out," Lazarotto stated. He suspected that the Libyans would eventually set a court date, irrespective of

TRIPOLI 00000910 002.2 OF 002

whether Goeldi and Hamdani moved away from the Embassy, in order to avoid "losing prestige" or "face" in the international arena. According to his analysis, the latest GOL demand is a pressure tactic designed to intimidate the Swiss. Lazarotto explained that the Swiss citizens were working with a local lawyer and that the GOL could simply deliver the summons to him vice the Swiss Embassy. He said that the MFA had told him to expect a meeting on November 15 to discuss the situation. He believed the GOL would likely argue that the Swiss Embassy should step aside and let the businessmen confront the charges as individuals.

SWISS WAITING ON PERMISSION TO ATTEND TRIAL

¶6. (S/NF) In spite of Lazarotto's efforts to gather a group of ambassadors to attend the court hearing, the Swiss Embassy does not yet, itself, have the required permission to be present. Lazarotto explained that he had only recently asked the MFA to grant him access to the courtroom and said that he "hoped" he would be allowed access. However, he was not optimistic that third-country ambassadors would be permitted into the courtroom -- or even into the courthouse itself (location still to be determined). When asked how he envisioned the scene at the courthouse if the various ambassadors did show up, Lazarotto said that he hoped they could at least stand outside the courthouse, if not inside, in a show of solidarity with the Swiss.

¶7. (S/NF) Lazarotto again thanked the USG for its support and conveyed that he had advised Bern to remain discreet regarding the US role in the GOL's release of the Swiss. Pol/Econ Chief advised him that the Ambassador would not attend the court hearing due to the sensitive nature of our role in the matter. Lazarotto empathized and expressed his confidence that the EU nations would stand in support of the Swiss cause.

¶8. (S/NF) Comment: The Swiss have alienated the very European governments they are now trying to recruit for support, through their initial insistence on managing the situation alone, now compounded by their continued application of the Schengen veto without consultation or communication with European partners (an act that is impacting larger EU interests in Libya). The Italians, French, and British are unlikely to send their ambassadors -- or representation at any level -- to the court hearing, and an EU mandate for the Spanish ambassador to attend as the representative of the EU Presidency may be long in coming. The Swiss in Tripoli, however, are under a different impression. Given EU hesitancy on the matter, Post does not currently plan to send a representative to the court hearing. Post thanks the Department for its quick response to our request. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI911

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI911 aka Wikileaks id #234929 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INTERIM TIP ASSESSMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 16 Nov 2009 15:52 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI911.html
References	09STATE112489
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9334
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0911 3201552
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 161552Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5473
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0970
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0914
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1524
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0853
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6022
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000911

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/RA, AND G/TIP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KTIP *[Trafficking in Persons]* , KCRM *[Criminal Activity]* , KWMN *[Women Issues]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: INTERIM TIP ASSESSMENT

REF: STATE 112489

¶1. (SBU) According to international organizations working in Libya on TIP-related programs, Libya is primarily a transit country for TIP victims. Libya currently has no legal or regulatory framework to separate victims of trafficking from the general migrant population. However, the GOL has taken steps, largely through its work with international organizations, to review the current law to include provisions specifically related to criminalizing all forms of trafficking. A joint program recently conducted by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Libyan Ministry of Justice (MOJ)

included an assessment of the current Libyan legal framework as it relates to irregular migration and TIP in particular. At the end of the program in October 2009, the Libyan participants -- a collection of 60 judges and prosecutors -- produced recommendations to amend national legislation in order to strengthen prosecution sanctions for traffickers and smugglers, as well as to include protection and assistance measures for both trafficked victims and smuggled migrants. The IOM, pending renewed assistance from the Libyan, US, and EU governments, plans to continue its cooperation with the MOJ, with the goal of supporting the actual implementation of a new article in the Libyan criminal code.

¶2. (SBU) During the last year, the GOL has made significant advances in its efforts to combat TIP, to punish human traffickers and smugglers, and to address the needs of TIP victims. The Ministries of Justice and Internal Security have made concerted efforts to respond to and prosecute human traffickers, drawing on elements of Libya's existing criminal code. International organizations note that the GOL views TIP largely as a security issue and has focused on prosecuting traffickers rather than responding to victims. Libya has expanded its support for TIP-related training and awareness-building programs for law enforcement officials, judges, and prosecutors. During the year, in cooperation with the IOM, the Libyan Ministry of Justice supported the training of judges and prosecutors from throughout Libya for the purpose of raising awareness on the main features and characteristics of TIP as a phenomenon distinct from other forms of migration. International organizations report that individual officials are receptive and eager for new information and training, but that Libya lacks an institutional or cultural awareness of trafficking. The IOM cooperation is designed to build capacity within the Libyan Ministries of Justice and Interior and to encourage better communication between those two bodies in order to improve the GOL's ability to respond to TIP.

¶3. (SBU) The GOL has also supported the cooperative work of international organizations with quasi-governmental organizations, such as the World Islamic Call Society (WICS), to provide religious counsel, and medical, legal and psychological support to victims of trafficking. The GOL continues to allow outside groups (international and quasi-governmental associations) to provide targeted assistance for migrants -- including victims of trafficking -- held in detention. GOL officials allow international organizations to have informal access to victims of trafficking held in detention on a case-by-case basis, and to provide some protective services to those individuals.

¶4. (SBU) GOL officials have expressed support for awareness-raising programs through the media and quasi-governmental organizations. The programs would be designed to enlighten the migrant population about the risks linked to irregular migration and underline the inhumane means and methods of criminal organizations involved in this activity.

¶5. (SBU) Continued training is necessary to ensure that both effective and systematic identification procedures of TIP victims are developed and that protective services can be offered on a regular basis. Individual Libyan officials and members of Libyan quasi-governmental organizations have expressed interest in receiving more TIP-related training. The GOL has been supportive of US and EU assistance on such programs and has indicated a willingness to continue its active engagement in this area.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI920

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI920 aka Wikileaks id #235409 ?
Subject	INSIGHT INTO QADHAFI'S LIFE FROM AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 18 Nov 2009 16:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI920.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1627
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0920/01 3221608
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 181608Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5482
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1193
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0863
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0657
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0466
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6031
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000920

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: INSIGHT INTO QADHAFI'S LIFE FROM AN AMERICAN BUSINESSMAN

TRIPOLI 00000920 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Over the last six months, an American investment consultant has managed to connect himself to Muammar al-Qadhafi's exclusive inner-circle through one of Qadhafi's longtime female protocol staffers. Through her, the investor has gained access to Qadhafi on numerous occasions, including during his September visit to New York. During a November 4 meeting with Pol/Econ chief and Econoff, the consultant provided

insight into Qadhafi's living habits and personal relationships, noting that he lives in modest quarters in Tripoli, and is "paranoid" about nearly everyone around him. According to the businessman, Qadhafi was pleased with his own performance at the UN General Assembly and was generally happy with his first-ever visit to the United States. End Summary.

QADHAFI INSIDER KEY TO ACCESS FOR US CONSULTANT

¶2. (S/NF) On November 4, a Las Vegas-based, American citizen, personal investment consultant met with us to share his latest experiences attempting to do business in the Jamahiriya. The consultant said that he had been working since early 2009 to find investment opportunities for clients who were accustomed to doing business internationally, such as in Saudi Arabia and Lebanon. Libya, however, had eluded them -- although the investors had established connections at the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) with the head of the fund, Mohammed Layas, they had not been able to secure a business contract. The consultant explained that his clients had met with Layas during a March visit and had attempted to woo him with their project plans. Layas indicated that a contract would be forthcoming. However, the consultant complained that in late October, the clients received an email from one of the LIA staff members stating that a contract could not be offered at that time. The consultant stated that he planned to object to the unprofessional manner in which his clients were treated during his upcoming meetings with Muammar al-Qadhafi.

¶3. (S/NF) The consultant explained that during his current visit, he was representing a Saudi-American businesswoman, who had access to one of Qadhafi's longtime personal and protocol staff, Mabruka al-Sharef. [Note: Mabruka, who is in her mid-40's, is known to be very close to Qadhafi. She has been described to emboffs as "Qadhafi's left arm, while Nuri al-Mismari is his right arm." End note.] The consultant said that he had met Mabruka during his first visit to Libya in early 2009. Since then, Mabruka had provided him access to Qadhafi on numerous occasions and had even arranged for the two to meet during the Leader's September visit to New York. Since he was invited by the Leader's personal staff, the consultant said that he had no problems securing visas to visit Libya. In fact, during his most recent visits, he had not even needed a visa to enter Libya. The consultant explained that Qadhafi's staff had arranged with the airlines to include a note in his reservation, explaining that he would receive a visa at the airport upon arrival. Indeed, on his last two trips to Libya, upon entry, the Leader's staff took his passport, kept it during his entire stay, and returned it at the airport upon departure.

¶4. (S/NF) According to the consultant and other embassy contacts, Mabruka is part of a team of three female protocol assistants on the Libyan Leader's personal staff, which includes Sanaa Al Ghanoodi (a fluent English speaker in her late-30's) and Hawa al-Tawerghi (born in 1952; previously described to emboffs head of Qadhafi's female security team). Mabruka is the most senior member of the group and has the most access to the Leader. As such, the consultant has been able to meet with Qadhafi on several occasions, although he said that his meetings with other members of the Libyan regime have been limited.

INSIGHTS INTO QADHAFI'S WAY OF LIFE

¶5. (S/NF) The consultant shared several anecdotes about the Libyan leader's way of life -- he lives in modest quarters, with prefabricated walls and floors that creak. The walls are white and do not feature any artwork. Qadhafi's house-staff dress in street clothes rather than uniforms. The consultant said that Qadhafi normally wears jogging suits to meet him. He described Qadhafi as paranoid about those around him, including his interpreters, and said that the Leader usually always conducts meetings with him in English, speaking very slowly and in a low voice. The consultant commented that Qadhafi apparently did not

voice. The consultant commented that Qadhafi apparently did not have his own bank account and lived on modest means.

TRIPOLI 00000920 002 OF 002

QADHAFI'S THOUGHTS ON NEW YORK VISIT

¶6. (S/NF) The consultant also offered some insight into the Libyan leader's thoughts before his trip to New York, characterizing Qadhafi as childlike in his curiosity -- asking "How much of New York do you think I will get to see?" and "Is Washington far from New York? Do you think I might have time to visit?" The consultant viewed Mabruka's role in New York as largely protective of Qadhafi -- she was able to shield him from negative media reports on his visit and from information that would offend or anger him. The consultant said that although Mabruka did not accompany Qadhafi to all of his engagements in New York, the Libyan leader called her frequently for advice on his schedule and movements. The consultant said that Qadhafi was exhausted by his intense itinerary in New York and that he had asked Mabruka to recommend which meetings he could cut from his schedule on certain days.

¶7. (S/NF) According to the consultant, Qadhafi was pleased with his own performance at the UN General Assembly and was happy with his first visit to the United States. The Leader had "kept many things bottled up" for the last thirty years and was finally able to express them on the world stage. Qadhafi felt that he needed to speak his mind and express his frustration with issues that had been weighing on him -- including his thoughts on the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. UNGA gave him the opportunity to do what he had wanted to do for many years -- address the international community with his own position and feelings on world affairs.

ACCESS, BUT WHERE'S THE MONEY?

¶8. (S/NF) In spite of the leadership access that Mabruka had provided, the consultant had not yet managed to secure business contracts for any of his clients. He expected to meet with Qadhafi again soon to pursue the latter's ideas for building a pharmaceutical industry in Libya. The said Qadhafi hoped to create a "Medical City" in Tripoli, with the aim of creating a regional hub for medical care. He expressed his desire to link his investors to a project related to those plans.

¶9. (S/NF) Comment: The American investor's experiences in Libya underline the importance of personal relationships in this opaque system. Although he has not yet secured a business deal with the Libyans, his investment in a relationship with Qadhafi could ultimately pay off, provided he does not make any missteps. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI924

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI924 aka Wikileaks id #235645 ?
Subject	LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS' HIGH WIRE ACT?
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Nov 2009 15:52 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI924.html
References	08TRIPOLI870 , 09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI212 , 09TRIPOLI487 , 09TRIPOLI661 , 09TRIPOLI685 , 09TRIPOLI699 , 09TRIPOLI870 , 09TRIPOLI883
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI960
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5186
OO RUEHWEB
DE RUEHTRO #0924/01 3231552
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 191552Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5487
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6036
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000924

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/19/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PINR [Intelligence] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN SUCCESSION: QADHAFI ORCHESTRATING THE BOYS' HIGH WIRE
ACT?

REF: A) TRIPOLI 883 ; B) TRIPOLI 685 ; C) TRIPOLI 212 ; D) 08 TRIPOLI 699 ; E) TRIP
OLI 487; F) 08 TRIPOLI 870 ; G) STATE 43049; H) TRIPOLI 661 ; I) TRIPOLI 208 ; J)

TRIPOLI 899

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent appointment of
his son Saif al-Islam as "General Coordinator" and attendant
indications of a succession plan have stirred up old rumors of
rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne.  Saif
```

rivalry between seeming frontrunners for the throne, Saif al-Islam and his brother, National Security Advisor, Mutassim al-Qadhafi. Saif al-Islam's return from a 12-month self-imposed absence from Libyan politics and his recent new appointment clearly indicate that his star is on the rise in the constellation of Libyan succession contenders. Qadhafi pere was reportedly disappointed in Mutassim's management of September 1 Revolution Day anniversary events and his late September travel to UNGA. Nevertheless, Mutassim's continued engagement on the U.S. file and continuing efforts to coordinate a meeting between his father and POTUS -- demonstrate that he may see this portfolio as his ticket to continue playing in the succession game (Ref A). Contacts assert that Saif al-Islam may be the "face of reform," due to his high-profile, public status, and the current favorite to succeed his father, but that Mutassim should not be counted out of the succession game, particularly given his backing by conservatives in the regime, such as PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, and his rumored ability as National Security Advisor to access significant military and security elements, including brother Khamis's elite 32nd Brigade force. End Summary.

SAIF'S RETURN FROM THE COLD

¶2. (S/NF) Muammar al-Qadhafi's October 6 speech to Revolutionary Committee members in Sebha marked the peak of a remarkably resurgent six weeks for Saif al-Islam, which began with the latter's high-profile return to Libya on August 20 with convicted Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi (Ref B). Saif has also recently begun to re-engage international media, with profiles in two CNN feature reports on his efforts to "rehabilitate" former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members (septel). He has also been involved in attempting to settle the ongoing contretemps between the GOL and Canada (septel). Saif's reentry onto the public scene signaled the end of his August 2008 self-announced retreat from politics, and comes after some significant setbacks for him over the past year at the hands of regime conservatives. In March, the draft constitution (a Saif-initiative that was to include a position for him as head of a 100-member council of deputies) was dropped from the agenda of the annual General People's Congress (Ref C). During the same meeting, the Congress installed or kept ministers historically opposed to Saif's reform agenda, such as PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi (who kept his position after Muammar al-Qadhafi publicly called him a corrupt thief just six months earlier) (Ref D). Late April witnessed the sudden nationalization of Saif's quasi-independent media company, which included the take over of his al-Libia satellite channel mid-broadcast by the state-run Jamahiriya News Agency (Ref E) on reported grounds that Saif was overreaching in expanding media freedom.

¶3. (S/NF) Saif's slide was juxtaposed with younger brother Mutassim's rise, with the latter completing a state visit to Russia in October 2008 (Ref F), meeting the Secretary of State in Washington in March 2009 (Ref G), accompanying Qadhafi on the historic visit to Italy in June, welcoming CODEL McCain in August (Ref H) , and accompanying his father to New York for the UN General Assembly. Mutassim was very visible at his father's side throughout these high level visits. Additionally, Al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's ability to maintain the PM-equivalent position proved to be positive for Mutassim, who is reportedly close to the conservative PM and, in the past, has orchestrated reactions against Saif's interests through the PM's office (Ref I). Regime insiders also tell us that Mutassim remains the only one who can actually challenge his father.

WHAT SAIF'S RETURN MEANS FOR MUTASSIM

¶4. (S/NF) As Saif's star rises again, local observers are turning their eyes toward Mutassim for a reaction. Mutassim has time and time again evinced his aversion to the spotlight via media encounters or public events. Evidence of the elder

Qadhafi's disappointment in Mutassim's management of September 1 Revolution Day anniversary events, as well as specific missteps in New York (i.e., Mutassim's inability to get necessary permissions for a tent to be pitched for the Libyan leader) have surfaced (Ref A). Saif is rumored to have trumped Mutassim during a recent order for all expatriate residents of the National Oil Company housing compound to vacate their houses. The residents report that while Mutassim originally gave the

TRIPOLI 00000924 002 OF 002

order for everyone to move immediately, Saif intervened to block the demand in order to give the occupants more time to pack up and move. [Note: The reason for the demolition of the housing compound is rumored to be to clear a way for Aisha al-Qadhafi (known to have disagreements with Saif) to build a home adjacent to a park near the location. End note.]

¶5. (S/NF) Simultaneous with Saif's apparent ascendancy, Mutassim has moved in an uncharacteristically quick manner to reengage on the U.S. file. On November 8, he approved the 505 agreement, which had previously languished in his office for nearly six months (Ref J). A few days before, on November 5, he personally engaged the Ambassador on the treatment of Libyan ships at U.S. ports and Libyan diplomtas by U.S. border authorities. Additionally, Mutassim renewed his desire to coordinate a meeting between the Libyan leader and POTUS (Ref A). According to the Egyptian Embassy here, Mutassim was also expected to meet Egypt's Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman during a November visit to Tripoli (septel), and his staff advised us that he will meet the Turkish PM during the latter's historic upcoming visit.

THE SUCCESSION QUESTION - WILL IT BE SAIF OR MUTASSIM?

¶6. (S/NF) Contacts suggest that although Mutassim is not as skilled in public relations as his older brother Saif, he wields significant power from behind the scenes. As National Security Advisor (NSA), Mutassim directs at least some of Libya's national security policy decisions, including purchases of equipment, and he reportedly plays on issues regarding the military purse. Contacts also report that younger brother Khamis al-Qadhafi, Commander of the 32nd "Khamis" Brigade (widely known to be the most well-trained and well-equipped force in the Libyan military), is closer to Mutassim than to Saif. [Note: At least one contact has commented that Khamis could come out as a dark horse in the succession race. End note.] Mutassim's role as NSA and his reported closeness to Khamis would give Mutassim access to some of the most important military and security elements of the regime. Nevertheless, the ultimate authority over the regime's security apparatus remains in question. Independent website Libya al-Youm reported November 4 that the Minister-equivalent of Defense, Major General Abu Baker Younis Jaber, recently called on his officers to swear allegiance to Saif in his new post, making it unclear whether the military establishment will report to Mutassim or Saif -- or both -- in the future. [Note: Muammar al-Qadhafi reportedly mediated a conflict between Mutassim and Younis Jaber earlier this year involving their respective roles in military procurement. (Ref I). End Note.]

COMMENT

¶7. (S/NF) As Libya undergoes this latest round of Qadhafi's political restructuring, without a constitution or clarified succession plan, burgeoning sibling rivalry among Qadhafi's progeny is near inevitable. Qadhafi has placed his sons (daughter Aisha is considered by some shrewder and smarter than her brothers but does not seem to be playing a visible role in the succession struggle) on a succession high wire act, perpetually thrown off balance, in what might be a calculated effort by the aging leader to prevent any one of them from authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to

authoritatively gaining the prize. It is also difficult to precisely gauge Mutassim's depth of ambition for the leadership role since those around him do not freely engage on the topic. The rivalry is likely to play out publicly over the next few months in a continued realignment of political and business interests, as reformists ("Saif backers") and conservatives ("Mutassim backers") continue to vie for the elder Qadhafi's attention. Mutassim appears to believe that progress in the U.S. relationship could prove key to keeping him in the game if he does indeed aspire to play a crucial role in the post-Leader era. Whichever of the Qadhafi children wins the "prize," there is a high level of anxiety among our Libyan contacts, given the potential for chaos in the absence of the traditionally "guiding hand" of the Leader and given the absence of viable state institutions to insure stability. They see a best possible outcome as a division of the spoils, with Saif handling the domestic side of the house and Mutassim handling the security and possible foreign relations part. A second possibility is a "trinity," whereby Saif would be the political face of the regime, Mutassim the national security face, and Khamis the military/security face. End Comm.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI925

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI925 aka Wikileaks id #235649 ?
Subject	110 LIBYAN COMPANIES PRIVATIZED: HEAD OF LIBYAN PRIVATIZATION AUTHORITY REPORTS ON CONTINUED PROGRESS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 19 Nov 2009 16:04 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI925.html
References	09TRIPOLI869
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI136
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2912
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0925/01 3231604
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 191604Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5489
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6038
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000925

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE
MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/19/2019
TAGS: ECON [Economic Conditions] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] ,
EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: 110 LIBYAN COMPANIES PRIVATIZED: HEAD OF LIBYAN
PRIVATIZATION AUTHORITY REPORTS ON CONTINUED PROGRESS

REF: TRIPOLI 869

TRIPOLI 00000925  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Dr. Mahamud Ahmad Al Etisa, head of the
```

¶1. (C) Summary: Dr. Mahamud Ahmed Al-Ftise, head of the Libyan Privatization and Investment Authority, told Econoff November 10 that Libya's efforts to privatize its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are progressing and that 24 companies have been privatized in 2009, resulting in a total of 110 companies privatized in Libya since the process began four years ago. The Authority has also established a "one-stop shop" facility for foreign investors, designed to ease access to government offices ranging from visas to customs. Al-Ftise requested U.S. assistance in providing training to the Authority's Training Department, as well as to the newly privatized Libyan companies. He also invited U.S. firms to bid on any of the companies undergoing privatization. End summary.

¶2. (C) During a November 10 meeting, Dr. Mahamud Ahmed Al-Ftise, Secretary of the Libyan Privatization and Investment Authority, reported that Libya's efforts to privatize its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were moving forward, with 24 companies privatized this year. He said that in total, the Authority had worked to privatize 110 companies since the process began about four years ago. Al-Ftise noted that the Authority's future plans included privatization of oil service companies, which currently make up 49 percent of the companies own by the National Oil Company (NOC). Additionally, 25 industrial plants are slated to be privatized in the next few years, including a steel mill. As an example of how the privatization process functions in Libya, he explained that ten-percent of the shares of the steel mill would be offered on the Libyan Stock Market, and over the long-run, the mill would be completely privatized. He characterized the entire privatization process as completely "transparent." [Note: This contradicts information we have received during separate meetings on the privatization process, as reported reftel. End note.]

¶3. (C) When asked whether foreign companies had purchased any of the newly-privatized Libyan firms, Al-Ftise said that foreign firms had not expressed much interest in the "old factories." He explained that the Authority encourages buyers to purchase not only the assets of formerly state-run companies but also to keep existing employees on the payroll. [Comment: This is often an unattractive prospect for foreign investors, as Libya's state-owned companies are infamous for low productivity and over-staffing due to Libya's generous labor laws. End comment.] In what he termed as a "trade-off," he explained that the Authority would charge a lower price if the buyer accepted a company with its current employees.

¶4. (C) According to Al-Ftise, the Privatization and Investment Authority does not widely advertise which companies will be available for purchase, but rather, it has adopted a more targeted approach towards possible buyers, both Libyan and foreign. He said U.S. investors would be welcome to bid on any of the available companies and he cited a chemical plant as a potentially interesting property (the General Company for Chemical Products at Abe Kamash, near the Tunisian border). He noted this chemical plant would need to transition away from using mercury in its production, and an American firm might have expertise in this particular area. [Comment: Econoff has visited the area near the factory and Libyans living nearby have reported wildlife with genetic abnormalities, even showing photographs of two-headed fish. It is doubtful an American firm would want to take on liabilities associated with using mercury. End comment.]

ONE-STOP SHOP OFFERS GOVERNMENT SERVICES: GREAT IDEA BUT IS ANYONE HOME?

¶5. (C) The staff of the Privatization and Investment Authority took Emboffs on a tour of the new "one-stop shop" for investors seeking information and help in entering the Libyan market. The "shop" features desks for representatives of the various government offices that investors need to contact in order to do

business in Libya, such as tax, electricity, industrial zones, manpower (labor), customs, and immigration (covering visas). During our visit, however, only one desk was occupied (immigration).

U.S. TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE WOULD BE WELCOME

¶6. (C) According to Al-Ftise, the newly-privatized companies may have training needs that the U.S. can help with, including

training for their boards of directors on their roles and responsibilities, as well as the need for technical assistance in areas such as marketing, quality assurance, and operational management. Al-Ftise further requested that the U.S. provide Arabic speaking consultants to provide training and technical assistance to the Authority's ten-person Training Department.

BIO NOTE

¶7. (C) Al-Ftise received a scholarship from the Libyan Government to study in the U.S. and earned his BSc in Industrial Engineering from the University of Toledo (Ohio) in 1981. He then went to Hungary, where he received his PhD in Project Management in 1996. Between his return from Toledo in 1981 and taking up his PhD studies in Hungary in 1996, he worked for the General People's Committee for Industry and Minerals. Al-Ftise is married with five children and has several grandchildren. While in the United States, he and his wife had a daughter, who is a US citizen. She is a dentist and lives in Libya. He speaks English fluently and speaks (but does not read) Hungarian.

COMMENT

¶8. (C) The Privatization Authority appears to be making progress, in terms of transferring 110 state-owned enterprises to private ownership. The Authority now has new offices in downtown Tripoli (as opposed to shabby offices in a former factory in the suburbs) complete with its "one-stop shop" to facilitate foreign investor access to government services. As reported in reftel, however, the privatization process is not readily transparent, and many of the companies are reportedly not being awarded on a competitive basis, with certain beneficiaries appearing to be regime loyalists. We will follow-up with Al-Ftise on his requests for training and technical assistance. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI933

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI933 aka Wikileaks id #236175 ?
Subject	LIBYA RESPONSE: FOLLOW UP ON TRANSPARENCY MEASURES FOR THE ANNUAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CONFERENCE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 23 Nov 2009 15:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI933.html
References	09STATE115619 , 09TRIPOLI795
Referenced by	09THEHAGUE755
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5984
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0933/01 3271511
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 231511Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5497
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6047
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000933

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CB (TOM FERGUSON); STATE PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE (NATE MASON)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2019
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CWC *[Chemical Weapons Convention]* , OPCW, LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA RESPONSE: FOLLOW UP ON TRANSPARENCY MEASURES FOR THE ANNUAL CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION CONFERENCE

REF: A) State 115619 ; B) Tripoli 795

TRIPOLI 00000933 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: Pol/Econ chief delivered ref A demarche to Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, head of Libya's chemical weapons destruction program. November 18. Hesnawy thanked the USG for its support

program, November 18. Hesnawy thanked the USG for its support for Libya's Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) extension and amendment requests during the October 12 Executive Council session of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) (Ref B). He provided an update on Libya's conversion and destruction programs, reporting that he expected completion of the Rabta conversion to be done on schedule, by the end of December. "Off the record," he confided that he was considering offering the Italian SIPSA company, with which he has been in negotiations for over a year, only part of the contract for the design and construction of the destruction facility, with the other part to be awarded to Libyan contractors. Hesnawy insisted that he had no problems answering U.S. and EU calls for program transparency, as he was doing everything possible to fulfill Libya's CWC commitments. Nodding to a portrait of the Libyan leader, he stated that he was under direct orders to "get rid of the bloody stuff" and to "close the file" on the issue. Separately, the Italian DCM (strictly protect) confirmed that the Libyans had not yet signed a contract with SIPSA. He believes the Libyans are deliberately delaying their fulfillment of CWC-related commitments as a form of leverage to attain more "compensation" for their work. End Summary.

¶2. (C) During a November 18 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Dr. Ahmed Hesnawy, head of Libya's chemical weapons destruction program, thanked the USG for its support for Libya's extension and amendment requests on its CWC-related commitments during the October 12 Executive Council session (EC-58) of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW). He requested continued support during the upcoming Conference of the States Parties (CSP). Hesnawy said that he appreciated the U.S. position and the support that came from the UK and EU delegations during EC-58. However, he noted his disappointment with the UK delegation's silence when the EU delegation expressed its reservations about the Libyan extension request. He said that the UK delegation had been briefed from the very beginning on the progress of Libya's program and "was aware of all the factors" that surrounded the two Libyan requests, but had not shared information on Libya's progress with EU counterparts. Hesnawy planned to express his thoughts directly to the UK Embassy in Tripoli.

UPDATE ON DESTRUCTION, CONVERSION PROGRAMS

¶3. (C) Hesnawy shared a brief update on the status of the destruction facility. He expressed his hope that his agency would be able to make a final decision on the process for destroying four chemicals. Regarding the plan for building the actual destruction site, he said that the Libyans had discussed beginning the civil work on the site and the schedule for destruction with the OPCW Secretariat. From a technical point of view, he predicted that progress would be visible around March or April. He said that he had enjoyed a great relationship with members of the Secretariat and that his only objection to the program was that the current members would be replaced with others who may not be as understanding of the many unique issues that Libya is confronting in its attempts to fulfill its CWC-related commitments.

¶4. (C) Hesnawy then gave an update on the status of the Rabta conversion. He said that the conversion of the Rabta facility would be done next month, before December 31. He said that he had sent a letter last week to the Libyan pharmaceutical company that was going to operate the facility, alerting it to the need to be ready for the OPCW inspection by January 1.

LIBYAN PARTICIPATION AT CSP

¶5. (C) Hesnawy related that he would not make a statement at the upcoming CSP, but he expected the Head of the Libyan Committee for the CWC, Mr. Mohammed Rageb El Ghadi, to give an update on Libya's progress. He characterized such statements as

"political" and insisted that he was not a politician but rather a technical specialist and would offer technical updates to all delegations who requested them, including the U.S. and UK teams. Hesnawy stated that he was happy to meet for a preparatory working session in The Hague with the U.S. and UK delegations, but that he could not meet the week before the CSP due to religious (Eid al Kabeer) holidays. He said he would arrive in The Hague on November 29 and could meet anytime after that. Hesnawy stated that it was easy to be upfront and transparent

TRIPOLI 00000933 002.2 OF 002

with information on Libya's progress toward fulfillment of its CWC-related commitments. Nodding to a portrait of Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, he stated, "I have instructions from the highest authority to close the file on this matter, and to get rid of the bloody stuff," referring to Libya's chemical weapons and precursors.

SIPSA CONTRACT STATUS -- LIBYAN AND ITALIAN PERSPECTIVES

¶6. (C) In response to P/E chief's request for an updated on the status of the contract with the Italian firm, SIPSA, to build the chemical destruction facility, Hesnawy stated that he wanted to speak "off the record." He said that he was thinking about awarding part of the contract for design and construction of the facility to a Libyan firm and the other part to the Italian firm. He had not yet informed the Italian company of this development and did not know when he would do so. However, he stated that he wanted the USG to know about his plans, as the Libyan construction firm would probably need to purchase at least one piece of American technology that would require an export license -- an "A-Cam" manufactured by the company "OI Analight."

¶7. (C) In a separate conversion with P/E chief on November 15, Italian DCM Lorenzo Kluzer (strictly protect) expressed his skepticism about Libya's progress toward fulfilling its CWC-related commitments. Kluzer stated that he had spoken on October 8 with the SIPSA representative in charge of negotiating the contract with Hesnawy. At that time, a contract had not been signed for the construction of the facility, nor had Hesnawy asked SIPSA to draw up alternative blueprints, as he indicated in Ref B. SIPSA was ready to commence work as soon as the Libyans signed the contract with them. On the conversion site, Kluzer said that the Italian pharmaceutical company (Pharmachem) had completed its work on the Rabta facilities. However, the Libyans are stalling on completion of the last phase of their contract -- to purchase the actual chemicals necessary for the production of pharmaceuticals. In Kluzer's view, this is just the Libyans' way of maintaining leverage. As long as Libya does not completely fulfill its obligations, it can still hold out for more "compensation."

¶8. (C) Comment: While Hesnawy seemed confident in the progress being made on the conversion program, he did not have much specific information to share on progress toward the building and design of the destruction facility. It is unclear when the Libyans intend to begin chemical destruction if construction of the destruction facility has not yet commenced. Post will follow up with the Italians regarding the subject of the contract for the destruction facility. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI934

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI934 aka Wikileaks id #236193 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE RESPONSE: LIGHT ARMS TRANSFERS INTO GUINEA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 23 Nov 2009 15:57 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI934.html
References	09STATE117224
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6034
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0934 3271557
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 231557Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5499
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6049
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000934

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND AF/W (JIM HUNTER AND SHANNON CAZEAU)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINS *[National Security]* , AU *[Austria]* , GV *[Guinea]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE RESPONSE: LIGHT ARMS TRANSFERS INTO GUINEA

REF: STATE 117224

(SBU) Pol/Econ chief delivered reftel demarche to Mohamed Matari, Director of the Americas Department at Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs, and to Salem Hamza, Advisor to National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi, separately on November 19. Neither Matari nor Hamza were aware of the information contained in reftel. Both said they would research the issues raised. Post will report any substantive responses septel.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI938

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI938 aka Wikileaks id #236724 ?
Subject	LIBYA HALTS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL TRANSFER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Nov 2009 13:59 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI938.html
References	09TRIPOLI870
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1025 , 09TRIPOLI941 , 09TRIPOLI943 , 09TRIPOLI950
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 2 media items

```
VZCZCXRO8570
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA
RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0938/01 3291359
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 251359Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5503
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0095
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0080
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0249
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6053
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000938

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (ANDREW BIENIAWSKI AND KELLY
CUMMINS).

E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/25/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PINS [National Security] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PARM
[Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , KGIC [Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KRAD [Radioactive Contamination of the Environment] ,
ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA HALTS HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL TRANSFER

REF: Tripoli 870
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Following a four-day standoff, the Russian plane scheduled to remove Libya's last remaining HEU spent fuel stores departed Libya without its cargo. Despite bilateral agreements with the U.S. and Russia -- and intensive outreach efforts by the U.S. and Russian Ambassadors -- Libyan officials unexpectedly refused to allow the HEU to leave the country. DOE experts are deeply concerned by the safety and security risks posed by the Libyans' decision. The seven five-ton casks, each closed with two IAEA seals, remain at the lightly-guarded Tajoura Nuclear Facility. DOE experts requested that the GOL disengage the loading crane and provide extra armed guards, but are not confident that the GOL will take the requisite security measures. The DOE experts will brief the IAEA of their concerns, and said the IAEA could provide additional seals appropriate for long-term storage and cameras.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary continued: According to the DOE experts, we have one month to resolve the situation before the safety and security concerns become a crisis. They believe Russia could provide another plane to remove the HEU in late December, at which point the casks must be moved to their next location. If the HEU is not removed from the casks within three months, its rising temperature could cause the casks to crack and to release radioactive nuclear material. If the HEU is not sent to Russia, the Russians would be required to develop entirely new technology to remove the spent fuel from the casks in Libya. Security concerns alone dictate that we must employ all of our resources to find a timely solution to this problem, and to keep any mention of it out of the press. End summary.

GOL UNEXPECTEDLY HALTS HEU FUEL SHIPMENT

¶3. (S/NF) On November 20 the GOL unexpectedly ordered a team of visiting Department of Energy and Russian (from Rostom Kirienko) officials to halt preparations of Libya's 5.2 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) fuel to ship to Russia for treatment and disposal, in spite of the government-to-government agreement signed by Libya and the United States on October 28 and a parallel agreement with the Russian government (reftel). Dr. Ali Gashut, Director of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, sent the instruction by phone through the Director of the Tajoura Nuclear Facility, specifying that Gashut had been "instructed" to delay the arrival of the plane that would transport the fuel to Russia. [Note: At that time, the Libyan engineers at Tajoura indicated to DOE experts that the instruction was coming from PM al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's office. End note.] The plane, a Russian Antonov 124-100, was scheduled to arrive on November 21, with loading to take place during the night of November 21, for shipment on November 22. Although the Russian crew already had official Libyan permission to land on November 21, Gashut told the DOE and Russian teams, via his staff, that the Libyan government did not approve the landing and asked that the plane be delayed. The teams delayed arrival of the plane until November 23. After several days on the ground without a change in the GOL's position, the Russian plane and team from Rostom Kirienko departed early in the morning of November 25 without the shipment.

¶4. (S/NF) Since November 20, the Ambassador and emboffs have engaged Foreign Ministry officials, the National Security Advisor's (NSA) office, the PM's office, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's staff, and Muammar al-Qadhafi's staff, seeking an explanation and reversal of the GOL's last-minute decision to halt the shipment. Foreign Ministry and NSA officials pledged to communicate the problems to Foreign Minister Musa Kusa and National Security Advisor, Mutassim al-Qadhafi, respectively. The Ambassador has also maintained close communication with the

Russian Ambassador on the situation. One official insisted to the Ambassador that the Foreign Ministry had done everything "by the book" to prepare for the fuel transfer to move forward on November 21 and could not imagine what could have gone wrong. He claimed that Musa Kusa was briefed on the situation but that "Gashut reports directly to the PM's office." Salem Hamza, Special Advisor to National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi, also claimed to have briefed his boss on the issue and that he did not know what was holding up the program.

SECURITY CONCERNS

TRIPOLI 00000938 002.2 OF 003

¶5. (S/NF) On November 25, the DOE team briefed the Ambassador and emboffs on their concerns about the security of the HEU in its present state and next steps. The 5.2 kilograms of HEU are stored in seven five-ton casks, which the DOE experts said are "highly transportable." The casks currently are at the lightly-guarded Tajoura Nuclear Facility, closed with two IAEA seals that are adequate only for transportation, not storage. The team asked the Director of the Tajoura facility to disengage the site's loading crane, in order to prevent an intruder from using it to move the casks. They also asked that extra human security be added onsite, stating that the last time they were at Tajoura, on November 24, they only saw one security guard with a gun (although they did not know if it was loaded). The team plans to brief the IAEA about the situation and to express concern about the security of the fuel. They said it was possible that the IAEA would provide additional seals and/or cameras to increase the casks' security.

¶6. (S/NF) According to the DOE experts, we have approximately one month to resolve the situation, before the safety and security concerns posed by the delayed shipment reach the level of a crisis. The casks in which the Libyan HEU is stored must be moved to their next location at the end of December. The DOE experts believe that the Russians could provide another plane to transport that shipment during that timeframe. However, if the Libyans refuse to allow the shipment to go forward, the Russian experts would be required to design new technology to remove the spent fuel from the casks and put it back into the ponds at Tajoura. DOE experts stressed that this would be an unprecedented operation. They also stated that the spent fuel must be either shipped to Russia or removed from the casks in the next three months. At that point, the temperature of the HEU fuel, which is radioactive, could reach such a level to cause cracking on the casks and release of radioactive nuclear material. The team stated that their Russian counterparts are deeply concerned about liability if the radioactive material leaks from the transportation casks.

NEXT STEPS

¶7. (S/NF) If the Libyans can be persuaded to allow the transfer to proceed, the DOE team will work with Russian counterparts to schedule another visit by the Russian plane for transportation of the fuel, which the team estimated could take up to a month (that will require the reissuance of overflight and entry permits for Turkey, Greece, and Libya, as well as cancellation of other transport contracts that the plane already has scheduled). Absent Libya's agreement to allow the shipment to move forward, the DOE and Russian team will resort to designing and manufacturing the technology that would be necessary to unload the fuel casks remotely at the Tajoura facility.

COMMENT

¶8. (S/NF) Security concerns dictate that we must deploy all of our resources to find a solution to this problem. The

Ambassador continues to seek an urgent meeting with the Libyan Foreign Minister and other senior officials to press for a resolution and to obtain information about what instigated the Libyan decision to halt progress on the fuel shipment. The Russian Ambassador has also been trying to meet with any of several high-level officials, but has been ignored. The situation has been complicated by a state visit by the Turkish PM as well as other visits, and the onset of the Eid al-Adha holiday, which began here today and extends for four days. The Russians did manage to convey a letter from Vice FM Sultanov on November 24, urging the GOL to let the shipment take place. If further efforts fail over the next few days, it may be necessary to consider a senior-level official call to Muammar al-Qadhafi to stress the urgency of the situation and the high degree of concern about the possibility of Libya's backtracking on its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Lacking any other information, we have to assume that the Libyan leader is the source of the problem at this point

¶9. (S/NF) Security concerns also dictate that we handle this issue with the utmost discretion. Given the highly transportable nature of the HEU and the shoddy security at

TRIPOLI 00000938 003.2 OF 003

Tajoura, any mention of this issue in the press could pose serious security concerns. We strongly urge that any press inquiries be addressed with a no comment -- or a more general reply along the lines of: The U.S. and the international community continue to work with the Government of Libya to address its WMD commitments. End comment.
CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks Archive - Libya Delayed Nuclear Disposal - NYTimes.com
- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI939

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI939 aka Wikileaks id #236747 ?
Subject	DEADLY DRIVING HABITS: ACCIDENTS THIRD CAUSE OF DEATH IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 25 Nov 2009 14:45 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI939.html
References	09TRIPOLI2
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8595
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0939/01 3291445
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 251445Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5506
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6056
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000939

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2019
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ELTN *[Land Transportation]* , EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , SOCI *[Social Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]*
SUBJECT: DEADLY DRIVING HABITS: ACCIDENTS THIRD CAUSE OF DEATH IN LIBYA

TRIPOLI 00000939 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Traffic accidents are the third-leading cause of death in Libya, according to the World Health Organization. Heavily subsided fuel, readily available cars, poor road conditions, easily obtained licenses, and drug and alcohol abuse contribute to the problem. Some attribute Libyans' atrocious driving habits to the stifling political climate, with limited personal freedoms leading many to drive with little regard for

others. While recent traffic flows in Tripoli appear to be worse than ever, according Taher Mahmoudi, the head of Libya's Traffic Department, traffic fatalities are leveling off and starting to decrease due to a multi-pronged strategy by the Libyan government that involves capacity-building and training of police, educational outreach to students, and infrastructure upgrades. According to Mahmoudi, the way forward requires a coordinated effort among police, infrastructure, justice, and education authorities. Private companies, particularly foreign companies, working in Libya have begun to collaborate with the Libyan government and with Libyans who have been personally affected by road tragedies, to encourage local drivers to abide by traffic and public safety laws and to reform their driving habits. U.S. efforts to support this initiative could also have a positive impact on civic activism. End summary.

NO ONE IS UNTOUCHED BY UNSAFE ROADS IN TRIPOLI

¶2. (SBU) The combination of unsafe driving habits, poor roads, and relatively high car ownership make Libya's roads among the most hazardous in the world. Subsidized petrol costs about 65 cents per gallon, and the government imports thousands of cars every year, which it provides to regime loyalists and civil servants as job (and loyalty) perks, resulting in heavy traffic conditions. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), road traffic injuries are the third-leading cause of death in Libya, following cardiovascular diseases and cancer.

¶3. (SBU) The diplomatic community has experienced several tragedies on the road since foreign embassies and businesses began returning to Libya a few years ago. In 2008, the Malaysian Charge d'Affaires was killed in an accident on the airport highway. In the past year, Embassy Tripoli has lost three Libyan colleagues to traffic accidents: two Embassy guards were killed a year ago while one of them was behind the wheel, en route to his own wedding. Another guard died while driving home after his shift at the Embassy; he was hit head-on by a truck. In 2008, a U.S. diplomat was medically evacuated due to a road accident in which her car was destroyed. The anecdotes do not stop there -- the fiancee of one local employee was hit head-on while driving her car four years ago. She has had to travel to France to have several plastic surgery operations to repair her face, which was unrecognizable after the accident, costing her family thousands of dollars in medical bills. As a result, her wedding has been postponed indefinitely. Several other staff members and their families and friends have been injured in traffic accidents.

"SEAT-BELTS ARE TOO UNCOMFORTABLE TO USE"

¶4. (SBU) Drivers, traffic officials, expatriates and others cite a lack of driver education, loose enforcement of traffic rules, easy access to drivers' licenses, and poor driving conditions as factors contributing to the dangerous Libyan road conditions. A study by a German consulting firm reportedly concluded the problem with traffic in Libya was not due to the roads, but the result of the unsafe habits of most drivers. Even our own Embassy drivers adopt different habits when driving for official versus personal purposes. One Embassy driver, when asked whether he wore a seatbelt while driving his own car said no, since it was "uncomfortable" and hurt his football-related injuries (around the abdomen). He said it was fine to not wear a seatbelt when driving inside the city of Tripoli since heavy urban traffic forced driving speeds to be relatively low. [Note: In May 2009, Libya enacted a seatbelt law mandating use of seatbelts, yet only about one in ten drivers can be seen wearing seatbelts. End note.] Related hazards included the almost total lack of use of car-seats for infants and the requirement that children only sit in the backseats of cars (with seatbelts on). Many parents can be seen holding babies on their laps while driving, while small children routinely romp between the front and back seats as their guardians drive at

high speeds.

TRAFFIC DEPARTMENT DIRECTOR REPORTS SOME PROGRESS

¶5. (C) While recent traffic flows in Tripoli appear to be worse than ever, according to the head of Libya's Traffic Department

TRIPOLI 00000939 002.2 OF 003

(under the General People's Committee for Public Security), Taher Mahmoudi, traffic fatalities are leveling off and starting to decrease due to a multi-pronged effort by the government. He said when he started as the head of the department three years ago, the government was approaching the problem only from a law enforcement perspective. The problem, however, was multi-faceted, and included driving at excessive speeds, disregard for seatbelt laws, and the cultural requirement to frequently visit family, even if they live large distances away. In addition, the rates of car ownership are very high. According to Mahmoudi, the government recently adopted a strategy to target traffic safety, which he described as based on the "four E's" of Engineering, Emergency Services, Education and Environment. In Mahmoudi's view, Libya needs a "pragmatic approach" to traffic safety, led by a "decision-maker" within society. Mahmoudi identified the related problem of lack of coordination among police, the courts, licensing and inspection authorities, and educational bodies as an area that also needed to be addressed.

¶6. (C) Mahmoudi noted that Libya has 30,000 kilometers of roads, but that the state did not differentiate how many of those were "safe" roads. Working with companies, such as Shell, his office has directed resources from Libya's Roads and Bridges Authority to upgrade particularly dangerous stretches of road around the country. Mahmoudi credits himself with the early 2009 addition of clearly visible road signs in Tripoli, including along the heavily traveled "Second Ring Road." According to Mahmoudi, prior to his efforts, over 20 miles of the city's main highway were completely devoid of signage and exit markers. While the signs are currently only written in Arabic (he was refused permission to include English), many of the signs do include pictograms (such as an airplane indicating the airport) and/or internationally-recognized symbols indicating speed limits and non-parking zones. The roads in eastern Libya are especially hazardous due to dangerous passing habits on two-lane highways. Other country-wide problems include: driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (despite an alcohol ban in this Muslim country), pedestrians wandering into traffic, talking or texting on cell phones while driving, corrupt practices in issuing licenses, and the lack of a car inspection regime. Mahmoudi said poor tire quality was also a serious issue, since many people used "cheap, poor-quality, Chinese tires" on their vehicles. In a year and a half, Libya will begin a program to inspect vehicles, which, if implemented, would be an important step towards keeping old, unsafe cars off the roads. Mahmoudi said that a new system for producing professional-quality drivers' licenses (along with mandatory testing) will also be developed. [Note: At present, the Libyan driver's license is a hand-written, laminated card with no picture, which is easily forged. One can reportedly pay a US 50 dollar bribe to a DMV-equivalent office clerk in exchange for a license. End note.]

¶7. (C) Mahmoudi said he was puzzled as to why "seemingly normal people" would become totally different once behind the wheel. He said many people in Libya exhibited "criminal behavior" as soon as they got into their cars. He consulted a psychologist to try to gain insight into this phenomenon; however, he still has not reached any conclusions. Mahmoudi believes the change in mindset vis-a-vis driving safety will be generational. Thus, he has launched an outreach program to educate secondary school students about road safety. He said the students report going

students about road safety. He said the students report going home to their parents to discuss issues such as the need to wear seatbelts and other safety measures after interventions at their schools.

FOREIGN PRIVATE SECTOR CONCERNED

¶8. (SBU) Most international companies have strict policies when it comes to driving, either not allowing their expatriate staff to drive in Libya at all, or only allowing them to drive after completing a road safety course. The American construction firm, AECOM, decided to avoid any potential injuries to expatriate staff (or liability issues if they were to hit someone) by refusing to allow any expatriate staff to drive. Instead, transportation is provided to/from home to work and for other needs. Many oil companies have similar policies and provide cars with drivers to their staff. A few companies allow expatriates to drive, but only after taking a rigorous driver-safety courses. To monitor locally-hired drivers, many companies have outfitted vehicles with USB devices that track speed, breaking patterns, and other factors for each shift; this information is then downloaded and analyzed. The U.S. oil company Amerada Hess has witnessed a dramatic decrease in the

TRIPOLI 00000939 003.2 OF 003

number of dents in its motorpool fleet since the company adopted the USB system. The oil services company, Schlumberger, has a particularly aggressive road safety strategy and employs an accident simulator called "the Convincer" that has participants experience what would happen to a baby (in this case a greased watermelon) in the event of a collision. Shell has taken its program a step further to educate not only its own staff but also the general public about road safety. They have also teamed up with Mahmoudi's department to improve treacherous roads in and around the areas where they are working in eastern Libya.

¶9. (C) Comment: A daily topic of discussion among expatriates and Libyans alike is the appalling manner in which most people here drive. One theory is that Libyans enjoy so few personal freedoms that driving their own cars with little regard for other drivers is something the regime permits as a sort of pressure valve. Most people shun the use of seatbelts, which they deem too constricting and uncomfortable. In a country with no discotheques, theaters, bars, and only one small shopping mall, young people have nowhere to go and nothing to do other than drive around in their parents' cars. As articulated by the head of Libya's traffic office, traffic safety will only be improved through a coordinated effort among various Libyan authorities, including the police and infrastructure, justice, and education ministries. Opportunities to work with private companies exist, particularly with foreign companies, who recognize the need to protect their most precious assets (their people) and also to involve average Libyans who have been touched by road tragedies. Organizations including the Red Crescent Society, the Scouts and youth groups can also be involved in making roads safer. By working together, government, civil society, and the private sector can effect a gradual change in attitudes and behavior among Libyan drivers. In the process, these programs can also have a positive impact on civic activism. Post aims to engage these actors to tackle the third highest killer of Libyans using Economic Support Funds and other resources that may become available. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI941

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI941 aka Wikileaks id #237232 ?
Subject	LIBYANS SEEK RENEWED COMMITMENT FROM U.S. IN RETURN FOR PROGRESS ON HEU SHIPMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 30 Nov 2009 17:19 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/11/09TRIPOLI941.html
References	09TRIPOLI938
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1025 , 09TRIPOLI943 , 09TRIPOLI950 , 09TRIPOLI960
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 21 Mar 2011 21:56: Publication withdrawn • Wed, 23 Mar 2011 01:53: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2918
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0941/01 3341719
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 301719Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5510
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0083
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0098
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6060
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TRIPOLI 000941

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , KGIC *[Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , KRAD *[Radioactive Contamination of the Environment]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* ,
LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYANS SEEK RENEWED COMMITMENT FROM U.S. IN RETURN FOR PROGRESS ON HEU SHIPMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 938

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. This is an action request; see para 13.

¶2. (S/NF) Summary: Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi told the Ambassador November 27 that Libya had halted the shipment of its final HEU stockpiles because it was "fed up" with the slow pace of bilateral engagement. Saif claimed that Libya had not received the "compensation" it was promised in exchange for an end to its WMD programs, including cooperation in the military, security, nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. Libya sought a high-level reaffirmation of the United States' commitment to the bilateral relationship, in the form of a message to Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, in order to move forward on the HEU shipment. Saif al-Islam, who claimed that he was "back" on the U.S. portfolio, said his father did not want to move back to "square one" and wanted to develop a positive relationship with the new U.S. Administration. The Ambassador underscored the gravity of the situation and noted that the Libyan Government had chosen a very dangerous venue to express its pique. He also noted that many of the holdups in the bilateral relationship had been due to Libyan political missteps and bureaucratic bungling. The Ambassador told Saif he would try to get some kind of statement along the lines requested, but the HEU shipment should in no way be held hostage to any specific actions beyond that. Saif assured the Ambassador that once that message was conveyed to Tripoli, he would immediately "fix" the problem. End Summary.

¶3. (S/NF) Once again exhibiting their flair for the dramatic, and after almost one week of stonewalling regarding the decision to not allow the departure of the HEU shipment to Russia, the Libyan leadership authorized a meeting between Saif al-Islam (accompanied by an assistant) and the Ambassador (accompanied by Pol-Econ Counselor) as the Ambassador was departing for the airport to travel to Washington. During the November 27 meeting, the Ambassador expressed his deep concern about Libya's decision to halt shipment of its remaining Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) stockpile to Russia for treatment and disposal. The Ambassador said that Libya's WMD commitments were the cornerstone of the relationship, and the last-minute, unexplained disapproval of the shipment seemed to renege on those commitments. He emphasized that the Libyans must move forward with the shipment as soon as possible, for security reasons and to preserve the bilateral relationship. The Ambassador pressed Saif to explain why the shipment was held up and insisted that the Libyans must improve communication in times of crisis, stating that Libyan officials cannot simply ignore calls from high-level USG officials and refuse to explain their decisions that negatively affect bilateral interests. This was no way to conduct a relationship. The decision to halt the shipment and create this crisis was intensified by the timing and the international context, given the President's focus on non-proliferation and the problems engendered by Iran. By its actions, Libya was jeopardizing its relationship with the whole international community.

¶4. (S/NF) Saif al-Islam explicitly linked Libya's decision to halt the HEU shipment to its dissatisfaction with the U.S. relationship. Saif said the shipment was halted because the regime was "fed up" with the pace of the relationship and what it perceived as a backing-out of commitments to bilateral cooperation. The areas of specific concern were Libya's purchase of military equipment (non-lethal and lethal weapons), an update on what was being done with Libya's centrifuges, movement on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Center, and financial assistance for the chemical weapons destruction program, including construction of the destruction facility. Saif pledged to solve the HEU crisis and to allow the shipment to move forward as early as next week if the USG expressed a renewed commitment to the relationship and to deeper engagement. Saif noted that the message needed to be conveyed to (or addressed to) Libyan Leader Muammar al-Qadhafi.

¶5. (S/NF) Saif continued that prevailing domestic opinion and conservative forces were critical of Libva's decision to

dismantle its nuclear weapons program. Noting that he personally had played an important role in Libya's re-engagement with the West, Saif asserted that "If something goes wrong, people will blame me, whether I am in a certain official position or not." Saif stated that Libya's decision to give up its WMD programs was contingent upon "compensation" from the U.S., including the purchase of conventional weapons and non-conventional military equipment; security cooperation;

military cooperation; civil-nuclear cooperation and assistance, to include the building of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility; and the end of "double taxation" and economic cooperation, such as the signing of a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).

¶6. (S/NF) Saif noted that Libya was a small, rich country, surrounded by large, powerful, poorer neighbors. Yet Libya, the only Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signatory in the region, had given up all of its conventional weapons and could not purchase replacement systems or military equipment from the United States. He highlighted Egypt, a non-MTCR signatory, as an example of a neighboring country that receives millions of dollars in U.S. aid and military assistance but did not have to share Libya's nonproliferation commitments. Relative to such neighbors, Libya's decision to dismantle its nuclear programs had weakened its ability to defend itself. He stated, "We share rich natural resources -- oil and gas -- along the borders, yet we have no capacity to defend that wealth." Saif complained that Libya could not purchase conventional weapons from the United States or even from Sweden or Germany due to U.S. holds on the sale of those weapons to Libya -- "even until now, seven years later, there is an embargo on Libya's purchase of lethal equipment." He specifically mentioned a problem purchasing "Tiger" vehicles outfitted with American-manufactured engines from Jordan, due to a U.S. legal restriction on Libya's purchase of American-equipment.

¶7. (S/NF) Inquiring about the status of the centrifuges Libya gave up as part of its WMD commitments, Saif argued that the U.S. had used the "deal" as a public relations coup for the previous administration. He said that the fact that the centrifuges were sent to the United States and are still there, rather than under IAEA surveillance and control was a "big insult to the Leader." The fact that Libya was never "compensated" for the centrifuges added to the insult. In addition to the centrifuge problem, he complained that Libya had to pay for the destruction of its chemical weapons. Saif insisted that Libya was not able to pay to destroy its chemical weapons stock, noting that the construction of the destruction facility alone was estimated to cost US $25 million. For these and other reasons relating to "non-compensation" for WMD decisions, he stated that certain voices in Libya were pressuring the Leader to withdraw from the MTCR agreement. He lamented that "slowly, slowly, we are moving backward rather than forward." He told the Ambassador that in order for the relationship to progress, the U.S. needed to make a move. "The ball is in your court," Saif urged.

¶8. (S/NF) Continuing his lament, Saif said the U.S.-Libya relationship was "not going well." Since his last visit to the United States in 2008, Saif said that both sides had deviated from the roadmap that had been agreed upon at that time, which specified cooperation in the military, security, nonproliferation, civilian-nuclear, and economic spheres. He asserted that the roadmap had gotten "lost" due to his own "disappearance" from the political scene and "preoccupation with other issues overseas." He acknowledged that he was disconnected for a long time but that he was back on the political scene -- although he was careful to caveat that he had

not yet accepted an official role in the regime.

¶9. (S/NF) Saif raised a few recent incidents that he argued illustrated how things were going wrong. First, he pointed to Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent trip to New York, which in Saif's opinion had not gone well, because of the "tent and residence issues and his [pere Qadhafi's] inability to visit ground zero." He said that all three issues had been complicated by local U.S. authorities and had humiliated the Libyan leader -- "even tourists can see ground zero without permission, but a Head of State cannot?" Secondly, Saif believed that his father's UNGA speech had been misinterpreted by U.S. audiences; he specifically focused on statements involving moving the UN Headquarters outside of the United States and various assassination investigations (JFK, Rafik al-Hariri, etc.). Saif stated that the elder Qadhafi meant no offense by his statements, but was merely trying to "pave the way" for any future decisions that POTUS might make related to those issues. Lastly, Saif noted that the Libyan leader was worried about U.S. intervention in Africa. The elder Qadhafi was also against the linguistic and political division of Africa into "North" and "Sub-Saharan" Africa and wanted countries such as the United States to treat Africa as a single entity rather than two blocs.

TRIPOLI 00000941 003 OF 004

¶10. (S/NF) Saif said that Muammar al-Qadhafi was serious about deepening engagement with the United States and establishing a relationship with the Obama Administration. Saif said that his father did not want to "go back to square one," but wanted to move the bilateral relationship forward. Saif emphasized the Libyan leader's interest in meeting POTUS in a third country if a meeting in the United States was not possible. Such a meeting would help overcome the negative history that our nations shared, would support the rebuilding of trust, and might even help with U.S. Embassy operations and activities in Libya, according to Saif.

¶11. (S/NF) The Ambassador noted that the relationship had seen several advancements and several serious setbacks since Saif's last visit to the United States, including the August 20 hero's welcome accorded to Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi by Saif himself. Megrahi's return had severely offended American sensitivities and renewed tensions that set the relationship back. Until that point, there had been significant progress, with a military-to-military agreement signed in January and the positive April visit of National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi and his meeting with the Secretary. Although the death of Fathi el-Jahmi had been a setback to the relationship, the U.S. and Libya had found a productive way forward through the establishment of a bilateral Human Rights Dialogue. Regarding concerns about U.S. intervention in Africa, the Ambassador reminded Saif that Colonel Qadhafi and General Ward had had what we believed to be a very productive meeting several months ago, which we had hoped would have dispelled any concerns the Libyans had about U.S. intentions in Africa. The Ambassador explained that Americans were hoping for a more forward-leaning statement by Muammar al-Qadhafi in New York but instead heard a series of remarks that were not agreeable to the American public. As a result, the relationship has been placed on a "low-burner" since August.

¶12. (S/NF) In spite of these issues, the Ambassador said the U.S. had managed to keep moving ahead in the areas of security, military, political, civilian-nuclear, and economic cooperation. However, many of the delays in implementation were due to Libya's opaque bureaucracy. The Section 505 end user agreement, for example, had languished in the GOL for months, as had Libya's response on TIFA. Libya's slow-rolling on visa approvals for official American travelers had delayed movement

approvals for official American travelers had delayed movement in areas such as civilian-nuclear cooperation and on the Regional Nuclear Medicine Facility.

¶13. (S/NF) Saif acknowledged that he was disconnected for a long time from the bilateral relationship and recognized that the hero's welcome for Megrahi had set engagement back. He reiterated that he was "back" on the scene and could serve as the "trouble-shooter" for any future problems. He urged the Ambassador to contact his office directly in times of crisis. He also promised to resolve the visa issue, stating that he understood the importance of a transparent and reliable system of issuance. In their one-on-one discussion afterwards, the Ambassador asked Saif to explain his actions when he accompanied Megrahi back to Tripoli. Saif said he knew what the reaction in the West would be, but that it did not constitute an "official" welcome. He had worked on the release for a long time, he was not a public official, and there were no international media like Al Jazeera present. In addition, Saif claimed that the Libyans would someday find a way to show that Megrahi was innocent. The Ambassador reiterated the damage the welcome had done and said no amount of justification could undo that. Saif nodded his understanding. Saif also replied that if he is confirmed in his new position, he was as yet not sure whether he would retain his current position as head of the Qadhafi Development Foundation.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

¶14. (S/NF) The Libyan Government has chosen a very dangerous issue on which to express its apparent pique about perceived problems in the bilateral relationship, a point the Ambassador underscored with Saif al-Islam. If Saif is to be believed, it appears we might have a way forward. If the Department is willing, we would urge a phone call from the Secretary to Musa Kusa with a message for Colonel Qadhafi comprising a general statement of commitment to the relationship, a commitment to work with the Libyans to move the relationship ahead, and a

TRIPOLI 00000941 004 OF 004

strong point insisting that the HEU shipment be allowed to go forward immediately and not be held hostage to any further actions.

BIO NOTE

¶15. (S/NF) Saif met the Ambassdor in an office on the Bab Al-Aziziya compound. The office was filled with books, including a high stack of art and interior design books and several brochures distributed by the Embassy's Public Affairs Section. Saif conducted the meeting in English. He was accompanied by his personal assistant, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed (DOB 07/06/1968), who said that he was born in Alexandria, Egypt, and spent his childhood years traveling abroad with his diplomat father, including in Afghanistan in the late 1970s, where he attended the American School. Ahmed was soft-spoken and spoke fluent English. He asked Pol/Econ chief to provide him with additional information on the status of Libya's military procurement requests and Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA's).
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- WikiLeaks Archive - Libya Delayed Nuclear Disposal - NYTimes.com
- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI942

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI942 aka Wikileaks id #237461 ?
Subject	LIBYAN IMMIGRATION COURT SENTENCES SWISS TO 16 MONTHS IN PRISON
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Dec 2009 17:21 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI942.html
References	09BERN504 , 09TRIPOLI900 , 09TRIPOLI901 , 09TRIPOLI910
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1024 , 09TRIPOLI242 , 09TRIPOLI63
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4316
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0942/01 3351721
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011721Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5514
INFO RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN IMMEDIATE 0054
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6064
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000942

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/1/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN IMMIGRATION COURT SENTENCES SWISS TO 16 MONTHS IN PRISON

REF: A) TRIPOLI 900 , B) TRIPOLI 901 , C) TRIPOLI 910 , D) BERN 504

TRIPOLI 00000942 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The two detained Swiss citizens, now held in Libya for approximately 16 months, were each sentenced to16 months in prison by a Libyan immigration court on November 30. According to Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto, the Swiss citizens, who were sentenced in absentia, most likely will not leave the embassy to attend hearings for tax-related violations, scheduled for December 5 and 6. Concerned that the Libyans might up the

for December 5 and 6. Concerned that the Libyans might up the ante and declare him persona non grata, Lazarotto requested December 1 that the U.S. Embassy provide material assistance to the detained Swiss if/if that were to occur. Lazarotto said he had been instructed by Bern to make the request of our embassy and several EU embassies in Tripoli. Given other sensitive issues currently pending on the bilateral agenda, we believe a visible U.S. role in assisting the Swiss could be highly detrimental to our own interests. Department's guidance is requested. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto expressed his continued concern to Pol/Econ Chief November 30 about the welfare of the two detained Swiss citizens, who have not been allowed to the leave Libya for over 16 months. Earlier the same day, an immigration judge sentenced each of the two men, in absentia, to 16 months in prison. Lazarotto related that the lawyer for the Swiss appeared before the court alone November 30, to request a formal statement of the immigration charges; the judge refused, claiming that the Swiss had appeared before his court shortly after their release from Libyan custody on November 9. The judge said he had heard their arguments at that time and had informed them that he would issue a sentence the following week. According to Lazarotto, the lawyer argued that to sentence the accused without a proper trial and without the presence of legal counsel, was a miscarriage of justice -- an argument that was lost on the judge. The Swiss have asked their lawyer to file an appeal to the decision.

¶3. (C) Lazarotto said that the Swiss were prepared to appear before the court on November 30, but were advised by their lawyer not to go unless they were assured that a proper trial would take place. According to Lazarotto, three representatives of (unspecified) EU embassies were prepared to accompany the detained citizens to the trial. Lazarotto noted that three additional EU embassy officials had been "on standby." [Note: A UK political officer told poloff November 25 that the EU embassies had decided to send lower-level representation, if any, to the Swiss hearings, but that the decision to send a representative would be made by the individual embassies. End note.]

¶4. (C) Given the sentence, the Swiss citizens most likely will not attend hearings before the tax court, scheduled for December 5 and 6, although they have been provided with a copy of the tax-related charges held against them. Lazarotto noted that execution of the sentence would pose a threat to other foreign business interests in Libya, demonstrating that the GOL was willing to exact retribution on businesspeople in response to political disagreements. [Note: A few General Managers of U.S. companies operating in Libya recently expressed similar concerns. End note.]

¶5. (S/NF) In a separate meeting on December 1, Lazarotto informed Pol/Econ Chief that he had been discussing with Bern the various worst-case scenarios that could come now that a sentence has been issued. He expressed his fear that the Libyans could declare him persona non grata if he did not hand the detained Swiss over to Libyan authorities, although he claimed that he had not been threatened in such a way. Lazarotto noted that in a meeting several weeks ago with the MFA, he was told that the GOL would do "anything" to make sure that the detained Swiss completed their sentences once verdicts were reached. Lazarotto was accused in the same meeting of trying to help the Swiss escape. Lazorotto continued that this hypothetical situation would remove the last Swiss diplomat from the country and would effectively force the detained citizens to leave the protection of the embassy premises when their food supply ran out. In order to protect the Swiss citizens, Lazarotto explained that Bern had instructed him to request third-country commitments of assistance to deliver food supplies and to monitor their health and well-being. He confided that he did not expect a single embassy to respond positively to the

request. Pol/Econ Chief undertook to convey the request but did not offer any promises of assistance.

¶6. (C) Lazarotto did not believe the Libyans were interested in moving forward with the bilateral relationship. Instead, Lazarotto surmised that the GOL was now focused on pressuring EU countries not to support the Swiss, rather than achieving a

TRIPOLI 00000942 002.2 OF 002

bilateral resolution. He explained that the EU ambassadors had been convened by the Foreign Minister November 29 to hear his complaints about Switzerland's continued use of its Schengen veto on Libyan visa applicants and how that would negatively affecting larger EU interests.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: The sentencing of the Swiss businessmen without trial underscores the serious shortcomings in Libya's judicial systems and will send a chilling warning to foreign investors. In the wake of this escalating, high-profile dispute, the Swiss-Libyan political relationship continues its downward spiral. The recent Swiss move to ban Libya from the World Economic Forum will not improve matters, and it is not outside of the realm of possibility that the Swiss Charge could be asked to leave the country. If/if the Swiss Charge is in fact PNG'ed, we believe that a direct USG role in providing assistance to the Swiss citizens could be detrimental to our own bilateral interests. Although we appreciate the gravity of the humanitarian situation, we believe a visible U.S. role in assisting the Swiss could undermine our efforts to resolve the outstanding HEU shipment. Department's guidance on the Swiss request for support is requested. End comment.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI943

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI943 aka Wikileaks id #237463 ?
Subject	LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 1 Dec 2009 17:28 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI943.html
References	09TRIPOLI938 , 09TRIPOLI941
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI227
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4320
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0943 3351728
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 011728Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5516
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0102
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0087
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6066
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000943

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.  STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY
(KELLY CUMMINS AND SARAH DICKERSON).

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/1/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] ,
PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , KGIC [Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KRAD [Radioactive Contamination of the Environment] ,
ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN MFA BRIEFED ON HEU SECURITY CONCERNS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 938 , B) TRIPOLI 941

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief met MFA Americas Acting A/S-equivalent
Mohamed Matari December 1 to convey our serious concerns about
the security of the seven HEU-filled casks at the Tajoura
```

Nuclear Facility. Matari dismissed U.S. concerns, stating there was "no one sophisticated enough" in Libya to be able to do anything with the casks and that the chances of anything happening were very low. He mentioned the IAEA seals as evidence that the fuel was protected (Ref A). Pol/Econ Chief underscored that the GOL should be concerned about the situation, as the casks were easily transportable and Tajoura was a poorly protected facility. U.S. DOE specialists had recommended an increased security guard presence -- armed if possible -- around Tajoura and the disengagement of the crane inside the facility. Pol/Econ Chief emphasized that the casks were easily transportable, and advised him not to be too dismissive of the security risks involved in keeping the casks unprotected. Matari said that he would meet with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa today to relay our concerns.

¶2. (S/NF) Pol/Econ Chief also described the environmental disaster that could take place if we did not ship the casks to Russia for disposal within a month. The U.S. needed a decision from the Libyan side as soon as possible on the shipment, as it would take time to reschedule the travel of the specialized Russian plane, including overflight permits, landing permits, and negotiating with the Russian MFA to cancel other scheduled stops. Matari was not aware of how complicated it would be to schedule a return visit of the plane, although he understood that only a few such planes exist in the world. He said he agreed that a decision needed to be passed to us within a few weeks.

¶3. (S/NF) Matari was not aware that Dr. Gashut claimed to have prepared a document for senior regime officials listing all of the environmental dangers associated with holding the shipment back. Matari said that Gashut probably gave the paper to Prime Mininster-equivalent al-Baghdad al-Mahmoudi (Gashut's boss) but did not think it had been passed to the MFA. (Matari may well have been unaware of any communications between Gashut and Kusa on this issue.) Matari promised to call us after he had briefed Kusa.

¶4. (S/NF) We also are seeking a meeting with Saif al-Islam al-Qadhaif's aide Mohamed Ismail Ahmed to relay the same information, in hopes of ensuring that senior Libyan officials understand the grave security and safety risks posed by the halted shipment.

POLASCHIK

Media

- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI946

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	09TRIPOLI946 aka Wikileaks id #237784 ?
Subject	LIBYAN RESPONSE TO POTUS AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN STRATEGY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Dec 2009 08:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI946.html
References	09STATE122731
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6155
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0946 3370841
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 030841Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5519
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0005
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0005
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6069
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000946

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/3/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AF *[Afghanistan]* , PK *[Pakistan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN RESPONSE TO POTUS AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN STRATEGY

REF: State 122731

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Libya, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Pol/Econ chief discussed reftel points with Acting MFA A/S-equivalent Mohamed Matari December 1. Matari complimented the fact that POTUS had taken time to discuss the strategy with several specialists. He expresed his hope that the strategy would succeed. Matari warned, however, that the strategy would face criticism. Unless you have a strong government in Afghanistan, which is free of corruption, it will be difficult to make progress, he asserted. Matari believed that the U.S. needed to engage moderate Taliban groups as part of its strategy. He also said that there must be real development and that the Afghan people must see progress if the Afghan government hopes to win their support.

¶2. (C) Matari said that Libya had noted long ago that Pakistan was going to be the key to success in Afghanistan. He recalled that when Abdul Rahman Shalgam (Libya's current UN PermRep) was Foreign Minister, Shalgam had advised the United States to focus on Pakistan and had warned that failure there would have consequences in Afghanistan.

¶3. (U) We will report media reaction separately.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI948

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI948 aka Wikileaks id #237933 ?
Subject	MGSF01: LIBYA REPORTS FIRST DEATH DUE TO H1N1, WITH 84 CONFIRMED CASES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 3 Dec 2009 16:16 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI948.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6664
PP RUEHAST RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHHM RUEHKUK RUEHLN RUEHMA RUEHPB
RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHTM
DE RUEHTRO #0948/01 3371616
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031616Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5521
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0659
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0468
RUEHPH/CDC ATLANTA GA
RUEAUSA/DEPT OF HHS WASHINGTON DC
RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHZN/ENVIRONMENT SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COLLECTIVE
RUEHRC/USDA FAS WASHDC
RUEHRC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6071
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000948

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; OES/IHA, OES/IHB, CDC ATLANTA FOR CCID

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: SOCI [Social Conditions] , CASC [Assistance to Citizens] , LY [Libya] , KFLU [Avian and Pandemic Influenza
Activities] , AEMR [Emergency Planning and Evacuation] , ASEC [Security] , KFLO [Family Liaison] , TBIO [Biological
and Medical Science] , KSAF [Safety Program] , KPAO [Public Affairs Office] ,
PREL [External Political Relations] , PINR [Intelligence] , AMGT [Management Operations] , MG [Mongolia] , ECON
[Economic Conditions]
SUBJECT: MGSF01: LIBYA REPORTS FIRST DEATH DUE TO H1N1, WITH 84
```

CONFIRMED CASES

REF: STATE 00120578

TRIPOLI 00000948 001.2 OF 002

¶1. (SBU) Summary: According to Libyan state-run media, a pregnant 40-year old Libyan woman recently died in the country's first reported H1N1-related death. The number of H1N1 cases in the country reached 84 as of December 1, a jump from the official figure of 20 provided by the Libyan National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control on November 21. International schools in Tripoli, including the American School, have reported several H1N1 cases among students. To prepare for the expected outbreak of influenza, , including H1N1, Libya's General People's Committee for Health and Environment (Ministry of Health-equivalent) expanded the mandate of an existing avian flu committee to cover various types of pandemic flu, with the aim of preparing the Libyan health establishment to deal with a probable outbreak of flu, including H1N1. The H1N1 vaccine is not yet publicly available in Libya, although a rumor is circulating that the vaccine can be purchased for a fee of USD 1,000. Since May, incoming travelers have been screened for flu symptoms at international ports of entry, including Tripoli International Airport and the Tunisian border. Due to the poor state of the Libyan healthcare network, it is unclear how the state system would respond to a serious health crisis. Post will hold an EAC later today to review and update pandemic tripwires. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) On November 29, Libyan national television announced the country's first H1N1-related death -- that of a 40-year old Libyan woman, who was 25 weeks pregnant. In press reports on November 30, the Secretary of Health (minister-equivalent) Mahmoud Mohamed al-Hijazi stated that the deceased's case had initially been misdiagnosed and that she had been prescribed antibiotics to control her infection, rather than the H1N1 treatment. Her symptoms worsened, requiring hospitalization, at which point she was diagnosed with the H1N1 virus but was too ill to respond to the appropriate treatment. The website of the Libyan National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control (nidcc.gov.ly) announced on December 1 there were 84 confirmed cases of H1N1 in Libya, all of which were being treated and controlled. (Comment: The figure of around 84 cases is a marked increase in a short amount of time, given that 20 cases were reported to be confirmed as of November 21. It is unclear whether surveillance methods are improving or whether authorities realized more accurate figures would need to be provided to the public. End comment.)

¶3. (SBU) On December 2, the website of the General People's Committee for Health and Environment reported that Secretary al-Hijazi convened a meeting of the committee for Pandemic Flu Preparedness to discuss the status of the pandemic in Libya. He confirmed that the figures (of 84 cases) that had been published by the National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control were correct. He explained that although the current situation of the virus is under control, he predicted that the number of cases would increase with the start of the winter season. He also provided a hot-line telephone number that people could call to report flu symptoms and to be referred to treatment centers. (Note: The Embassy called the number on December 2 but the number was out of service. End note). He also cautioned Libyans against taking unnecessary overseas trips, especially to Europe.

¶4. (SBU) Confirmed cases of H1N1 among students at Tripoli's international schools - including three cases at the American School - have been reported. Two cases at the French school were reported the week of November 22, and there were unconfirmed reports of H1N1 cases at the German school during the same week. While there are reports of many cases of seasonal flu and colds among students and teachers at the International School of Tripoli, there are no reported cases of

H1N1. On December 1, the Embassy was informed that a UK diplomat's two children were also diagnosed with H1N1; the UK diplomat also later was diagnosed with a H1N1. In response to the upsurge in H1N1 cases, Post issued a warden message on November 23 referencing the reported cases and reiterating

Department guidance on Pandemic Flu precautions.

¶5. (SBU) In 2005, the Libyan General People's Committee for Health and Environment (Ministry of Health-equivalent) created a committee for Avian Flu Preparedness, headed by the Secretary (Minister-equivalent) of Health and Environment, Mahmoud Mohamed al-Hijazi. In July 2009, the work of the committee was expanded to include H1N1 and the name was changed to Pandemic Flu Preparedness Committee. The goals of the committee are to ensure the country is prepared to deal with the threat of pandemic flu, including swine flu (H1N1), and to coordinate the response of the health establishment, such as clinics, hospitals and the diagnostic laboratories. An official at the Libyan National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control informed Emboff on December 1 that H1N1 vaccines had been ordered and that an initial stock had been used to vaccinate Libyans travelling to Saudi Arabia for the Hajj; numbers of people vaccinated were not available. He reported six million doses had been ordered (which is also the population of Libya) but the entire stock had not yet arrived. According to some private doctors, the Libyan government has stocks of H1N1 vaccine but the strategy for administering the vaccine is unclear. A rumor is circulating around Tripoli that the vaccine is available but only for a fee of U.S. 1,000 dollars and there are no details as to where the vaccine can be procured.

¶6. (SBU) Since May, incoming travelers have been screened for flu symptoms at international ports of entry, including Tripoli International Airport and the Tunisian border. Travelers on international flights and at the land borders must fill out a card that asks if they or family members have been ill with flu-like symptoms (fever, cough) and the passengers must walk in front of an infrared camera, which detects unusually-high body temperatures. Medical personnel are standing by to question any travelers who indicate a positive response on their cards or whose temperatures indicate a fever.

¶7. (SBU) In the past, the Libyan government has been responsive to offers of technical assistance in responding to and preventing infectious diseases, including from the U.S. Government. Through post's scientist engagement program, various Libyan infectious disease specialists have participated in U.S. programs to enhance Libya's capacity in safeguarding public health. The Libyan National Center for Infectious Disease Prevention and Control has been particularly responsive to U.S.-sponsored programs. For example, in October, the Center sent two Libyan laboratory specialists to a training course on diagnosing Avian Influenza and Newcastle Disease sponsored by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The Center has also participated in similar training courses offered by the U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit (NAMRU-3) in Cairo, Egypt.

¶8. (SBU) Comment: Due to the poor state of the Libyan healthcare network, it is unclear how the state system would respond to a serious health crisis. Now that Libya has publicly acknowledged the existence of the H1N1 and a related death, it must place a priority on procurement of H1N1 vaccines given the increasing incidence of the virus. Post is seeking further information from the Libyan equivalent of the ministry of health (General People's Committee for Health and Environment) for further details on Libya's pandemic flu strategy, and to assess if the ministry would be amenable to U.S. assistance to procure H1N1 vaccines or in offering other healthcare assistance. We also will hold an expanded Emergency Action Committee meeting on December 3 to update our tripwires (in response to reftel), and to tap into the extensive resources within the Embassy community, including our Libyan colleagues, to ensure post is

ready to respond to pandemic flu in Libya. We will report the EAC's discussions septel. End comment.
POLASCHIK

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI950

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI950 aka Wikileaks id #238504 ?
Subject	LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT STEPS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 7 Dec 2009 16:14 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI950.html
References	09TRIPOLI938 , 09TRIPOLI941
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI966
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 3 media items

```
VZCZCXRO9590
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0950/01 3411614
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 071614Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5524
INFO RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA IMMEDIATE 0088
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0103
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6074
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000950

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/7/2019
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , RS *[Russia; Wrangel Islands]* , KGIC *[Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , KRAD *[Radioactive Contamination of the Environment]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEU SHIPMENT SECURE; NO DECISION YET REGARDING NEXT STEPS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 938 ; B) TRIPOLI 941

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase the security of the seven casks of HEU, and that the contents -- and IAEA seals -- remained unchanged since the shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not

shipment was halted November 25. The Libyan Government has not yet provided guidance to its nuclear scientists regarding next steps on the shipment, but Libyan scientists are developing contingency plans to remove the HEU from the casks in Libya in the event the casks must be returned empty to Russia. DOE experts estimate that Libyan approval must be received by December 10 in order for the shipment to be completed by the end of December. Separately, a close aide to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi indicated that the Secretary's message to Libyan FM Musa Kusa had been positively received and passed to the "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. The aide also indicated that Kusa would call the Secretary in the "coming days" to assure her that the Libyan Government had approved the shipment. We continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need to resolve this issue. End summary.

HEU CASKS SECURE, UNCHANGED

¶2. (S/NF) Visiting DOE experts confirmed December 6 that the Libyan Government had taken the requisite steps to increase security at the Tajura Nuclear Facility, and that the seven casks of highly enriched uranium (HEU) appeared to have remained unchanged since the planned shipment to Russia was halted on November 25 (ref a). The DOE experts reported a visible increase in the number of armed guards surrounding the facility. They also confirmed that Tajura staff had disengaged the crane within the facility and had assured the team that a new, unassembled crane would not be built until after the shipment had taken place. DOE's measurements of the spent fuel within the casks determined that the content had remained unchanged. Likewise, the IAEA seals on each cask remained in place and uncompromised.

NO DECISIONS

¶3. (S/NF) The DOE team also reported that Libyan technical specialists at Tajura had not yet received guidance from the Libyan Government on next steps regarding the shipment. Dr. Ali Gashut, Head of Libya's Atomic Energy Establishment, confirmed this information in a December 7 telcon with the DOE team. The team also reported that although the Libyan Government had sent the Russian Government a diplomatic note confirming that the GOL would complete its contract to return the casks to Russia by the end of the calendar year, the note did not specify whether the casks would be returned empty or with the HEU spent fuel shipment. The DOE team assessed the diplomatic note as an attempt to mollify Russian demands that the casks be returned.

POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS

¶4. (S/NF) The DOE team estimated that the GOL must give its approval to move forward on the shipment by December 10 in order for the shipment to take place by the end of December. The DOE experts emphasized that significant lead time is required in order set up the necessary logistical arrangements, permits and overflight clearances for the specialized Russian plane to return to Tripoli and transport the HEU to Russia.

¶5. (S/NF) The DOE team reported that Russian engineers had begun to design a remote-controlled grapple to be used in the event that the HEU spent fuel must be off-loaded from the casks in Libya. Tajura staff told the DOE experts that, if GOL approval for the shipment was not forthcoming by December 10, the Tajura staff planned to start training on how to use the grapple to off-load the casks. (According to DOE experts, spent nuclear fuel has never been removed from casks for restorage; the removal of the spent fuel in Libya would be an unprecedented initiative.) DOE experts also commented that the return of the empty casks to Russia, if necessary, would be best done by boat and said they are developing contingency plans for that scenario.

POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE SECRETARY'S CALL

¶6. (S/NF) Separately, emboffs have attempted to seek clarification of the Libyan Government's next steps regarding the HEU shipment. Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, Chief of Staff of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, told Pol/Econ Chief that the Secretary's December 3 call to Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa had expressed the statement of commitment requested by Saif during

TRIPOLI 00000950 002 OF 002

his recent meeting with the Ambassador (ref b), and that Kusa had passed the message to the "highest levels" of the Libyan Government. Ahmed emphasized that Saif had made a "commitment" to the Ambassador to ensure that the HEU shipment would be approved by the Libyan Government, and "Saif will follow-through on that commitment." Ahmed said Kusa intended to call the Secretary within the "coming days" in order to personally assure her that the GOL had approved the shipment. Emboffs also briefed Ahmed and MFA officials on the requisite timeline and lengthy logistical preparations needed to ensure the spent fuel's transfer to Russia by the end of the year.

COMMENT

¶7. (S/NF) Ahmed's comments indicate that the Secretary's message to Kusa was positively received. A flurry of phone calls between DOE and Libyan experts today also indicated that working-level Libyan officials are seeking more time to resolve the issue, as the Libyans successfully convinced the DOE experts to extend the deadline for a Libyan decision by two days, to December 10 (the initial deadline proposed by DOE was December 8). At this point, we are interpreting the Libyan experts' technical preparations for a possible unloading of the casks in Libya as the contingency planning required to address the very real safety and security concerns raised by the halted shipment. We will reassess that view on December 10, and will continue to underscore with Libyan officials the need for a resolution of the issue this week.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks cables show U.S. took softer line toward Libya | McClatchy
- WikiLeaks Archive - Libya Delayed Nuclear Disposal - NYTimes.com
- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI953

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI953 aka Wikileaks id #238790 ?
Subject	LIBYA REQUESTS US SUPPORT FOR POSITION ON UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 9 Dec 2009 08:25 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI953.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1154
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0953 3430825
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 090825Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5528
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0252
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 0026
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6078
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000953

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, IO AND DRL

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: UNGA *[UN General Assembly]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , UNHRC-2 *[UN Human Rights Committee]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA REQUESTS US SUPPORT FOR POSITION ON UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

¶1. (SBU) Post received a diplomatic note from the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (GPCFLIC; MFA-equivalent) on December 2 informing the Embassy of Libya's intention to seek membership on the UN Human Rights Council for the 2010-2013 term. Attached to the note requesting U.S. support for Libya's candidacy was a nine-page document outlining Libya's qualifications and milestones in codifying human rights. The GPCFLIC highlighted the Great Green Charter for Human Rights in the Jamahiriya Era from 1988, Law 20 of 1991 regarding individual human rights, and Libya's accession to various international conventions on human rights. Post has sent scanned originals of the Arabic-language documents, as well as post's informal translation of the same, to NEA/MAG by email.

¶2. (SBU) Embassy translation of the diplomatic note is included below.

BEGIN DIPLOMATIC NOTE

Ref: 3252/7/5/35

The Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya

The General People's Committee For Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations Department), sends its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya, and has the honor to inform the esteemed Embassy that Libya decided to run for membership of the Human Rights Council for the period 2010-2013 during the elections due to be held at the UNGA in New York in May 2010.

While the Great Jamahiriya appreciates the high importance of human rights on both international and national level for human rights that form the basis of all human and international relationships, it attaches herewith an explanatory note regarding its candidacy to this Council's membership. The note states its commitment to promote and protect human rights principles pursuant to the requirements of the UNGA`s resolution 60/251.

Great Jamahiriya hopes that your friendly country could support this candidature.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations' Dept) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed US Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

To: US Embassy- Tripoli

Date: Dec. 1st, 2009

END TEXT OF DIPLOMATIC NOTE

¶3. (SBU) Comment and guidance request. The diplomatic note was not/not a circular and it is unclear whether all embassies resident in Tripoli received the same. Post requests guidance on what, if any, response should be given. End comment and guidance request.

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI955

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	09TRIPOLI955 aka Wikileaks id #238898 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 9 Dec 2009 15:56 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI955.html
References	09TRIPOLI359 , 09TRIPOLI678
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Wed, 29 Jun 2011 16:07: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO1557
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW
RUEHLA RUEHLH RUEHMR RUEHNP RUEHPA RUEHPW RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0955/01 3431556
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 091556Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5530
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6080
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000955

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG.

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/8/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] ,
KISL [Islamic Issues] , PHUM [Human Rights] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ISLAMIC FIGHTING GROUP REVISES JIHADIST IDEOLOGY

REF: A) Tripoli 359 ; B) Tripoli 678

TRIPOLI 00000955  001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  Six leading members of the Libyan Islamic
Fighting Group (LIFG) imprisoned in Libya recently issued a
```

417-page document renouncing the use of violence and establishing a new "code" for jihad. The group includes LIFG's "founding fathers," individuals with ties to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb's (AQIM) senior leadership, including the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure. The recantation claims to represent a clearer understanding of the "ethics" of Islamic shari'a law and jihad and specifically refutes the LIFG's decades-long jihad against Muammar al-Qadhafi. The document is the result of a two-year initiative led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi through his Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), and supported by Libya's internal and external security services. As a result of the initiative, more than 200 jihadists (approximately half of the imprisoned LIGF members) have been released from prison, with more releases expected soon. The initiative has been highlighted by local and international media as a potential model in counter-radicalization and touted by the Libyan government as a "revolutionary new method to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region." While Libya's terrorist rehabilitation program has drawn skepticism from some quarters, who view the recantation as coerced and politically motivated, the work is reportedly being reviewed by foreign governments and has received praise as a positive GOL contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts. While the initiative is significant for Libya's internal politics -- simultaneously shoring up regime stability and Saif al-Islam's credentials -- its long-term effects as a counter-radicalization effort remain to be seen. End summary.

SAIF AL-ISLAM AND LIBYAN SECURITY FORCES FACILITATE CODE, RELEASE OF LIFG

¶2. (SBU) In late September, six leading members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, being held in the Abu Salim prison, issued a document outlining a revised interpretation of their jihadist ideology -- one which renounces violence and claims to adhere to a more sound Islamic theology than that of Al Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. The authors represent the group's historic senior leadership, including Abd al-Hakim Balhaj (aka, Abu Abd Allah al-Sadiq, Emir of the LIFG), Abu al-Munder al-Saidi (Jurisprudence Official of the LIFG/most senior shari'a authority), Abd al-Wahab al-Qayed (the elder brother of Abu Yahya al-Libi, a leading AQIM figure), Khalid al-Sharif, Miftah al-Duwdi, and Mustafa Qanaifid. In the 417-page, Arabic-language document, entitled "Revisionist Studies of the Concepts of Jihad, Verification, and Judgment of People," the authors point to ignorance and a misinterpretation of Islamic jurisprudence as the basis for their formerly violent expression of Islamic jihad. The authors state that "The lack of religious knowledge, whether it was a result of an absence of 'ulama' (religious scholars) or the neglect of people in receiving it and attaining it, or due to the absence of its sources, is the biggest cause of errors and religious violations." They credit a deep evaluation of their lives' experiences, coupled with a closer study of shari'a law for their ideological reform.

¶3. (SBU) The study is characterized as an attempt to recant former LIFG doctrine and to establish a new "code" for jihad for the benefit of the modern Muslim community. In the text, the authors directly challenge Al Qaeda, addressing the recantation to "anyone who we might have once had organizational or brotherly ties with." The document gives detailed interpretations of the "ethics and morals to jihad," which include the rejection of violence as a means to change political situations in Muslim majority countries whose leader is a Muslim and condemns "the killing of women, children, the elderly, monks/priests, wage earners, messengers, merchants and the like." It claims that "The reduction of jihad to fighting with the sword is an error and shortcoming."

¶4. (S/NF) The revised LIFG ideology is the result of a two-year

initiative, led by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi in his capacity as QDF chairman and brokered on behalf of the Libyan government. According to press reports and Libyan officials, Saif worked closely with the UK-based former LIFG leader, Noman Benotman, on the effort to work on a revised ideology with the LIFG in exchange for amnesty. QDF's lead negotiator, Salah Abdelsalam Salah, director of the QDF's Human Rights Committee, (who also heads Saif al-Islam's al-Ghad Media Group, ref A), said that he had met with al-Sadiq "4-5" times in 2007, before reconciliation

discussions began in earnest. At that time, al-Sadiq seemed "ready to reconcile" and had indicated that his cohort shared his serious desire to break with their violent past.

¶5. (S/NF) Salah detailed the two-year negotiation in a meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, sharing several handwritten letters from al-Sadiq to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, requesting assistance. After the initial communication, a series of meetings began, along two tracks: the first involving imprisoned LIFG leadership conversing with their members; the second involving LIFG leadership, the QDF, leading Islamic scholars, and prison officials (from Libya's Internal Security Organization). Libya's External Security Organization reportedly took on a supporting role, coordinating a "reconciliation and rehabilitation" movement among Libyan opposition figures (including LIFG members and others) living abroad. The meetings continued over the course of two years, and al-Sadiq wrote letters to Saif al-Islam throughout that period with updates on the LIFG position. In a letter dated January 16, 2009, al-Sadiq informed Saif of the LIFG's intention to draft the recantation work by August 1, 2009, to announce revisions to its jihadist ideology and to reconcile with the Libyan regime. On February 23, 2009, al-Sadiq issued a press statement on behalf of the LIFG leaders in prison, announcing the continuation of a reconciliation dialogue with the QDF and GOL. Salah refused to comment on international press reports that Saif faced challenges from old guard regime officials who reportedly did not want to pardon the prisoners.

¶6. (S/NF) As reported in ref B, QDF's Executive Director told us in August that the QDF had facilitated consultations between LIFG leadership and leading Islamic scholars, such as Qatar-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qardawi and Sheikh Ali Asalabi. In response to an early-2009 letter from al-Sadiq to Saif requesting by title a list of more than 10 books on Islamic jurisprudence, the QDF provided reading and reference materials for the LIFG to study in prison. On August 1, al-Sadiq informed Saif that the revisionist study was complete and submitted it for review.

¶7. (S/NF) On August 23, to mark the beginning of Ramadan and the Libyan leader's 40th anniversary in power, LIFG leadership issued another press statement, this time apologizing to Muammar al-Qadhafi for their past acts of violence against him. The first of two rounds of prison releases took place shortly after the statement was published, with 91 LIFG prisoners pardoned and released. A second amnesty was announced in mid-October, with another 43 LIFG members reportedly being released. According to Salah, these releases constitute approximately half of the imprisoned LIFG members, all of whom were imprisoned at Abu Salim prison. (Saif al-Islam has publicly stated his intention to demolish the facility, infamous for a 1996 uprising that left 1200 prisoners dead, after the last prisoners have been released.) Salah reported that another round of amnesties would take place in the coming weeks, with Saif's ultimate goal being 100-percent prisoner release. In a separate effort, Salah said that the GOL has released some 62 members of other "jihadist groups" from Abu Salim prison based on their recantations of violent jihad.

¶8. (S/NF) According to Salah, the revisionist study represented the dissolution of the LIFG organization in Libya. Upon release, each former LIFG member becomes a "regular" citizen and is allowed to "do what regular Libyans do," including unrestricted movement and the freedom to travel abroad. Salah vehemently denied the assertion among some analysts that the LIFG leaders reconciled due to lucrative incentive packages offered by the GOL. He claimed that the only benefits given to former LIFG prisoners upon release were "job training and employment assistance, financial support for medical care, if needed, and living expenses until the prisoners are able to find jobs." Some press reports indicate that as a condition of the pardon, former militants are required to pledge not to participate in Libyan politics, although they are able to speak in mosques. [Comment: Even if they wanted to participate in politics, how they would do so is unclear, given that political parties are outlawed in Libya. End comment.]

¶9. (SBU) Saif al-Islam's involvement in the reconciliation effort has received widespread local and international media attention -- state-run print media has published excerpts of the text and praised Saif for his work, and CNN recently broadcast a feature report on the efforts. The CNN report praises the initiative, describing Saif's motivation as not only ending the

violent movement against the regime but also combating Al Qaeda's "growing influence in the region." CNN further claimed that, "In essence the new code for jihad is exactly what the West has been waiting for: a credible challenge from within jihadist ranks to Al Qaeda's ideology." International think-tanks such as the Quilliam Foundation and Jihadica have analyzed the efforts and the LIFG document, with the latter calling it a "very sweeping repudiation not just of Salafi jihadism but of all forms of revolutionary Islamism in general."

¶10. (C) Some observers believe the Libyan counter-radicalization experiment could be used as a model across the region and state that it differs from similar efforts, such as those in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Egypt in its methods and target audience. The September 17 edition of the US-based "Terrorism Monitor" credited the initiative's success to the "full institutional participation of the LIFG and its leadership," in the reform project. By contrast, the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni models, for example, relied on "the conversion of militant individuals who may remain drawn (willingly or otherwise) to their former organizations." In Egypt, the work of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, while renouncing violence, maintained a fairly extreme ideology, propounded primarily by a single leader of the organization.

¶11. (S/NF) The Libyan government proudly explained the efforts to reconcile with LIFG members during a September 6 meeting with NEA A/S Feltman. During the meeting, Director of Military Intelligence and Muammar al-Qadhafi confidante, Abdullah al-Sanussi, described the effort as a "revolutionary new method to combat terrorism and the influence of Al Qaeda in the region," and presented a pre-published copy of the recantation study. UK diplomats have told us that the Libyans have also given them a copy of the work, which they are translating in full and analyzing as a possible model for counter-radicalization efforts. Other diplomats have praised the program as a positive GOL contribution to regional counterterrorism efforts.

¶12. (S/NF) Amidst the positive international attention currently focused on Saif al-Islam's LIFG counter-radicalization program, some observers have expressed skepticism to emboffs about the project. One Western diplomat confided his personal view that the efforts were purely political and that even the Islamic

scholars involved in the effort, such as Yusuf al-Qardawi, had political agendas. A number of private Libyan citizens agreed with the opinions expressed on some foreign-based blogs, that Libya's security organizations forced the LIFG leaders to write the recantation and that some LIFG members -- imprisoned in Abu Salim prison for decades -- were simply motivated by the prospect of pardon and the hope of reuniting with their families.

COMMENT

¶13. (S/NF) While local and international opinions are still being formulated on the initiative, the LIFG's renouncement of violent jihad and extremist ideology, and the document's direct challenge to Al Qaeda, represents a significant achievement for Saif al-Islam in particular and the Libyan government as a whole. The primary motivation for Muammar al-Qadhafi's backing of the initiative was undoubtedly regime security, and for Saif al-Islam, it may also have been political, designed to shore up his credentials both at home and abroad. We suspect that the Libyan Government may well have contributed significant resources in the form of "financial assistance" to help ensure that the newly released fighters maintain their end of the bargain. The GOL's immediate payoff on this investment is significant: the elimination of one of Qadhafi's most staunch opposition groups and a high-profile public relations coup in Libya's ongoing quest to position itself as a leader in the Islamic world. However, the long-term effects of the initiative, particularly with respect to the ideology of jihad and global counter-radicalization efforts, remains to be seen.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Libyan city struggles with history of fighting America | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI960

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI960 aka Wikileaks id #239648 ?
Subject	SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Dec 2009 09:05 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI960.html
References	09TRIPOLI208 , 09TRIPOLI924 , 09TRIPOLI941
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI196 , 09TRIPOLI47 , 09TRIPOLI590 , 10TRIPOLI115
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sun, 23 Jan 2011 04:16: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Publication withdrawn • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5048
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0960/01 3480905
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 140905Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5539
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1195
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6089
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000960

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/14/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PINR [Intelligence] , KACT
[Strategic Arms Control (ACS) Treaties] , MCAP [Military Capabilities] , MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM'S STAFF REACHES OUT ON POL-MIL ISSUES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 941 ; B) TRIPOLI 924 ; C) TRIPOLI 208

TRIPOLI 00000960  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary:  During recent meetings, Saif al-Islam
al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral
```

al-Qadhafi's staff has shown an increased interest in bilateral military and security issues, particularly requests linked to Captain Khamis al-Qadhafi, including purchases of helicopters and "Tiger" vehicle components, and M113 refurbishment. Saif's staff also indicated Libya was interested in purchasing French SCALP cruise missiles to replace its SCUD Bs. This increased attention may be reflective of Saif's broader plans to consolidate military and security issues within his expanding "General Coordinator" portfolio. Saif's staff declined to comment on any future division of responsibility between Saif al-Islam and Mutassim al-Qadhafi in these areas. The clear interest in military sales represented by Saif's staff on behalf of Khamis al-Qadhafi may be indicative of Saif's attempts to curry his youngest brother's favor. End Summary.

SAIF'S AIDE ADVOCATES ON BEHALF OF KHAMIS

¶2. (S/NF) During December 2 and 9 meetings with Pol/Econ Chief and DATT, Mohamed Ismail Ahmed, close aide to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, expressed interest in military equipment sales, particularly purchase requests from Khamis al-Qadhafi's 32nd Brigade. Ahmed labeled "strange" the "broad" list of equipment requests made by National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi to the Department of Defense earlier this year, and focused discussion on Libyan military requests for helicopters and vehicles -- requests that likely derived from the "Khamis Brigade." Ahmed sought an explanation on the USG refusal of the sale of Little Bird helicopters to the Libyan military, and designated for the "Khamis Brigade." Stating that the Libyan military was still very interested in purchasing the aircraft, he suggested the helicopters have all armament removed so they could be categorized as "non-lethal equipment." DATT informed him that the Libyan military was free to purchase a number of other helicopter systems that the Defense Security Cooperation Agency had already cleared for Libyan military purchase. Ahmed insisted that the Libyan military wanted to purchase the Little Bird helicopters.

¶3. (S/NF) Additionally, Ahmed requested an update on the status of the license request by a jointly owned U.S. and Turkish company to refurbish Libya's fleet of M113 vehicles, in which Khamis al-Qadhafi had expressed a personal interest. He asked emboffs to provide him with a written update on the status of the request, which he would then pass to Khamis. Ahmed then reiterated a GOL complaint (which Saif had raised with the Ambassador on November 27, ref A) that a UAE company could not meet the requirements for the sale of a fleet of Jordanian "Tiger" 4x4 vehicles to the Libyan military, as the U.S. manufacturer of the vehicles' engines would not approve the sale. DATT informed Ahmed that, per discussions with the manufacturer, it was that company's policy, not U.S. law, that prohibited the sale of equipment to the Government of Libya. "We have a long way to go," retorted Ahmed. He stated that if the UAE could not outfit the Tiger vehicles with American engines, then the Libyans would purchase engines from Mercedes-Benz. "But we want American engines," he added. DATT extended the possibility that Libyan military procurement provide a Letter of Request to purchase the engines via the Foreign Military Sales process, which Ahmed said he would discuss with the appropriate officials.

SAIF'S AIDE TO FOLLOW UP ON MILITARY ENGAGEMENT OFFERS

¶4. (S/NF) In addition to the three issues raised, DATT educated Ahmed on the five pending Letters of Offer and Assistance (LOA) that have been held up in Libya's military procurement office for several months, all of which focus on C-130 related purchases and refurbishment requests, as well as the full range of military exchange and training opportunities that have been offered to the Libyans over the last year. While Ahmed did not show interest in the C-130 LOAs, he seemed surprised by the number of military exchange and training opportunities on offer and was particularly shocked that most of them had gone

unanswered. "Who did you make these offers to?" he asked. He took particular interest in an offer made for Khamis to travel around the United States to tour U.S. military installations and pledged to follow-up directly with Khamis on that program.

LIBYA POTENTIALLY IDENTIFIES SCUD B REPLACEMENT SYSTEM

¶5. (S/NF) Separating the topic as one that was "political" as well as "military," Ahmed informed emboffs that the Libyans may have found an MTCR-compliant "replacement system" for its stock of SCUD B missiles. He explained that the GOL had discussed,

TRIPOLI 00000960 002.2 OF 002

during a recent high-level French visit, the purchase of the French SCALP Missile (a.k.a. "Storm Shadow") to replace the SCUD B. Ahmed asked whether the USG would consider the equipment MTCR-compliant, and if so, whether the USG would bless the sale. Emboffs offered to pass the information to Washington for guidance. "How soon do you think you will know?" he asked. We told him we would follow-up as soon as we had more information for him. (Note: The SCALP Missile is an air launched cruise-launched missile, fired from Rafale as well as other combat aircraft. From a separate source, DATT learned December 10 that although France is keen to sell Rafale jets to Libya, it is not interested in selling the Libyans the SCALP Missile, which is deemed "too sensitive." End note.)

SECURITY ROLE FOR SAIF?

¶6. (S/NF) When asked whether Saif would be the point person for military and security issues if and when he takes on his new position as "General Coordinator," Ahmed advised -- after a long pause -- that the Embassy should continue to track military-related issues through Mutassim's office and to copy information to Saif's office (Ahmed) from now on.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: The concerted attention that Saif's close advisor devoted to military and security issues during recent meetings with Emboffs suggests that Saif is beginning to insert himself into the political-military and security spheres. The discussion of Khamis' requests in particular may indicate that Saif is trying to curry favor with his little brother. Given the fact that the "Khamis Brigade" is considered the best-equipped and most capable of defending the regime, it seems only natural that anyone intent on assuming power would try to align himself with Khamis. Ahmed's cautious advice to continue to track military and security issues through Mutassim's office seems to indicate that Saif's interest in these issues is still informal and perhaps not fully vetted within the Libyan government. End Comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI961

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI961 aka Wikileaks id #239653 ?
Subject	LIBYAN CHANGE OF EID AL ADHA HOLIDAY PROMPTS RARE PUBLIC GRUMBLING
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 14 Dec 2009 09:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI961.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5066
OO RUEHBC RUEHBZ RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDU RUEHKUK RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0961/01 3480911
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 140911Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5541
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1197
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0865
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0662
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0056
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6091
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000961

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/14/2019
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , KISL [Islamic Issues] , SOCI [Social
Conditions] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN CHANGE OF EID AL ADHA HOLIDAY PROMPTS RARE PUBLIC
GRUMBLING

TRIPOLI 00000961  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (C) Summary:  A recent decision by Muammar al-Qadhafi to
unilaterally change the date of the Eid al-Adha celebration from
November 27 to November 26 -- one day before the full Islamic
pilgrimage rite had been completed in Saudi Arabia -- provoked
```

confusion, resentment, and some outrage among the Libyan community. In a rare display of defiance in this totalitarian system, at least 16 imams led Eid prayers on November 27, in line with the rest of the world. Some observers believe Qadhafi's controversial decision resulted from his ongoing feud with Saudi Arabia's leadership. Others believe it was political theater, designed to allow Saif al-Islam to play the role of hero, coming to the rescue of the angry Libyan masses. End Summary.

QADHAFI'S INTERVENTION GOES TOO FAR

¶2. (C) While the Libyan regime prides itself on promoting moderate forms of Islam and serving as a counterbalance to fundamentalist movements, its unique interpretation of Islam sometimes provokes controversy. The Islamic year in Libya, for example, is measured not from the Hijra but rather from the death of the Prophet Mohammed. The GOL-run Center for Remote Sensing, also charged with Libya's space program, is usually the first authority in the world to observe the lunar phases -- due to Libya's convenient position in the earth's rotation -- that mark traditional Islamic celebrations, creating situations where Libya begins and ends the holy month of Ramadan a full day earlier than other Muslim countries. Some Libyans privately attribute this practice to Libya's perpetual quest to stand out from the crowd, with one local staff member opining that "if you're different, you'll be noticed." Despite the calendar quirks, Libya typically celebrates Youm al-Arafat and Eid al-Adha in line with the rest of the world due to the feast being driven by the events of the Hajj. This year, however, the government announced after the Hajj was underway that the Eid would fall on November 26 -- a day earlier than in Saudi Arabia.

IMAMS PROSECUTED FOR DEFYING LEADER'S ORDER

¶3. (C) Several local contacts privately told us that they were shocked by the Libyan Government's "unprecedented" decision to celebrate the Eid al-Adha before Saudi Arabia, confirming that the decision sparked an unprecedented degree of public grumbling about the regime. A prominent Libyan businessman estimated that only ten percent of the Libyan population celebrated the Eid on November 26. Stressing that Libyans were scandalized by the GOL's decision to mark Eid al-Adha before the full pilgrimage rite had been completed in Saudi Arabia, he said that mosques were largely empty on November 26 but were packed on November ¶27. He said that Libyan intelligence agents were out in full force in the mosques on November 27, "photographing everyone who was there" and later questioning imams who marked the Eid on November 27.

¶4. (C) Foreign-based website Libya al-Youm reported November 27 that the government had removed 16 imams from their posts and were investigating their preaching after they ignored the government's Eid decree. Allegedly in response to public pressure, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Religious Endowments and Zakat, Ibrahim Abdulsalam Ibrahim, made a statement December 2 in the Tripoli daily "Oea" newspaper (part of Saif al-Islam's "Al Ghad" media group) denying that any action had been taken against the imams. Ibrahim emphasized that state-funded mosques are bound by the decisions of his ministry and reserved the right to question imams for non-adherence to official policies. One imam told our business contact that Saif al-Islam later intervened to stop the investigations against the imams. The businessman commented that the religious community viewed Saif al-Islam's efforts on behalf of the imams as a cynical ploy to enhance his political stature. Rolling his eyes upward, the businessman said that "he" (meaning Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi) wants to portray Saif al-Islam as a savior.

THE CRESCENT MOON RISES EARLIER IN LIBYA

¶5. (C) After several days of criticism in blogs and opposition

¶5. (C) After several days of criticism in blogs and opposition websites, Muammar al-Qadhafi made a lengthy public statement defending Libya's decision to observe Eid on November 26 on scientific grounds. During the speech (reminiscent of his description of the effects of jet lag at his address to the UN

General Assembly), al-Qadhafi explained that the time difference between Libya and other countries enabled scientists at the Libyan Center for Remote Sensing to detect the crescent moon marking the feast with greater accuracy than other religious authorities; therefore, Libya should celebrate the feast one day earlier than the rest of the world. The explanation did little to quell the rumor in Tripoli that al-Qadhafi had ordered the date change after Saudi officials denied his request to perform the Hajj with an entourage of 800 and to mark the occasion with a short speech at Mecca. In the view of our business contact, al-Qadhafi "wanted to show the Saudis he's different."

COMMENT

¶6. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi's controversial decision to unilaterally declare the Eid al-Adha celebration one day earlier than the rest of the world can be just as easily attributed to his quirkiness and desire for individuality as to political conspiracy designed to cast his son in a positive light, or yet another episode in his lengthy feud with the Saudis. While the impact of this rare display of public grumbling should not be overstated, Saif al-Islam's quick intervention indicates the Libyan Government recognized the negative effects of its decision to change the date. And Saif al-Islam's intervention may also be interpreted as another sign of his political ascendancy.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI966

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI966 aka Wikileaks id #240011 ?
Subject	LIBYA HEU UPDATE: LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING SHIPMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 15 Dec 2009 16:09 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09TRIPOLI966.html
References	09TRIPOLI950
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI1022 , 09TRIPOLI1025 , 09TRIPOLI32
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6727
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0966 3491609
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 151609Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5548
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0108
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0093
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6098
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000966

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG. STATE PLEASE PASS TO ENERGY (KELLY
CUMMINS).

E.O. 12958: DECL:  12/15/2019
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PARM [Arms Controls and
Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , KGIC [Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear
Terrorism] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KRAD [Radioactive Contamination of the Environment] , ENRG [Energy
and Power] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA HEU UPDATE:  LETTER SENT TO RUSSIANS APPROVING
SHIPMENT

REF: TRIPOLI 950

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.   (S/NF) The Russian Rosatom Agency reported to DOE officials
today that it had received a letter from Libya's Tajoura Nuclear
Research Center informing the Russians that the Libyan side had
received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly
```

received the necessary approval to allow the shipment of Highly Enriched Uranium to proceed for transfer to Russia. The full text of the letter is contained in para 2.

¶2. (S) In a letter dated December 15, 2009, on the letterhead of Libya's Nuclear Energy Establishment, the Libyans wrote: "Dear Mr. Kazakov, FCNRS Director, With reference to your letter dated Dec. 14th, 2009, please be informed that the necessary license required for the shipment of the SNF [spent nuclear fuel] from Libya to Russia has been obtained. Hence, you are kindly asked to send the plane to Mitiga International Airport on the 20th of Dec. 2009 in accordance to the proposed schedule. Yours sincerely, Almhdi Gallab, Acting Director, Tajoura Nuclear Research Center."

¶3. (S/NF) The Russian Embassy reported December 14 that it was processing the landing permits required for the specialized Russian plane to land at Mitiga Airport on December 20. If all proceeds according to the DOE and Rosatom schedule, the shipment should take place on December 21. DOE experts are scheduled to return to Libya on December 18.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment: While the Libyan letter constitutes the first GOL action on this issue since the shipment was halted on November 25, we have not yet received confirmation from senior Libyan policy officials that the necessary approvals have been given. The Ambassador is seeking a meeting with Foreign Minister Musa Kusa to confirm this information.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #09TRIPOLI99

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	09TRIPOLI99 aka Wikileaks id #190316 ?
Subject	GOL RATCHETS UP PRESSURE ON OIL COMPANIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO U.S.-LIBYA CLAIMS FUND
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 4 Feb 2009 10:14 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2009/02/09TRIPOLI99.html
References	08TRIPOLI564 , 09TRIPOLI564 , 09TRIPOLI72
Referenced by	09TRIPOLI110 , 09TRIPOLI133 , 09TRIPOLI413
History	First published on Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24 UTC
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2515
OO RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0099/01 0351014
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 041014Z FEB 09
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4422
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1392
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0753
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 0828
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 0888
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 4946
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000099

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR L (SCHWARTZ, JACOBSON) AND NEA/FO (HUDSON)

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/3/2019
TAGS: ENRG [Energy and Power] , EPET [Petroleum and Natural Gas] , ECON [Economic Conditions] , EINV [Foreign
Investments] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PTER [Terrorists and
Terrorism] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: GOL RATCHETS UP PRESSURE ON OIL COMPANIES TO CONTRIBUTE TO
U.S.-LIBYA CLAIMS FUND

REF: A) TRIPOLI 0072 , B) 08 TRIPOLI 564

TRIPOLI 00000099  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy -
Tripoli, U.S. Dept of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary: The GOL told international oil companies (IOCs)
operating in Libya that they "must" contribute to the U.S.-Libya
comprehensive claims fund by February 28 or suffer serious (but
otherwise ill-defined) consequences.  Major IOCs appear to be
```

otherwise ill-defined) consequences. Major IOCs appear to be inclined to hold the line against contributing; however, they are concerned that lesser players and oil industry service companies may capitulate. Muammar al-Qadhafi's recent musing that Libya could nationalize its oil production may have been partly intended to prompt contributions to the $1.5 billion fund. The timing of the GOL's stepped up effort to collect contributions from the IOCs is probably related to the fact that Libya's parliament -- the General People's Congress -- is scheduled to convene soon to review the government's performance and approve a significantly reduced national budget. Post recommends that for now we maintain close contact with U.S. IOCs, remind GOL interlocutors that we are aware of the most recent demand, reiterate our firm redlines, and reassess if further GOL pressure is brought to bear on the companies in the lead-up to the February 28 deadline. End summary.

OIL COMPANIES MUST CONTRIBUTE ...

¶2. (C/NF) In a meeting with general managers of IOCs on February 1 (list of companies at para 8), Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi and National Oil Corporation Chairman Shukhri Ghanem said IOCs must contribute to the U.S.-Libya Comprehensive Claims Settlement Fund. Al-Mahmoudi said Libya had taken a "loan" to populate the fund for compensation of U.S. victims of terrorism; however, it was "impossible" for the GOL or USG to contribute to it, the loan was coming due and IOCs "must" contribute.
The claims compensation deal would allow Libya to open new business opportunities for foreign companies - "all businesses, of all nationalities would benefit" - and IOCs and the GOL should therefore "work as a team" to solve the problem of financing the fund. No dollar figure for the amount of the loan was given and companies were not told how much they should contribute. Some IOCs in attendance at the February 1 meeting, however, had previously received letters from the National Oil Company (NOC) specifying appropriate contributions levels.

... OR SUFFER CONSEQUENCES

¶3. (C/NF) Ghanem told IOC representatives that he was "in a bind" because expectations by the General People's Congress that IOCs would contribute to the fund had been disappointed. IOCs must contribute by February 28 or the NOC would be compelled to " ... reconsider our relationship with you". Al-Mahmoudi underscored that there would be "serious consequences". The representative for Challenger Drilling, the only IOC representative who spoke, said the company would have legal difficulties if it chose to contribute to the fund. Ghanem and al-Mahmoudi were quick to offer possible mechanisms that would allow IOC's to circumvent such problems. IOC representatives said Ghanem and al-Mahmoudi did not/not mention the possibility that Libya could nationalize oil production, a specter Muammar al-Qadhafi raised in his January 21 DVC with Georgetown University students (ref A).

PRESSURE BECOMES COERCION

¶4. (C/NF) Representatives of U.S. companies Occidental (Oxy), ConocoPhillips and Hess separately told us they interpreted the remarks by al-Mahmoudi and Ghanem as a threat, albeit a bit of an oblique one since the consequences for companies that chose not to pay were not spelled out. Nonetheless, the Hess representative flatly said that "pressure had turned into coercion" on February 1. ConocoPhillips' representative assessed that the major IOCs would continue to hold the line against contributing to the fund, but speculated that smaller operators and service companies might relent and pay. He estimated that the number of companies solicited so far was about 100. U.S. IOC representatives agreed that there were differences of opinion on whether and how to respond (i.e., orally or in writing); they are awaiting instructions from their respective headquarters.

¶5. (C/NF) The Canadian Ambassador, who had been briefed on the meeting by PetroCanada's representative, told the Ambassador on February 3 that it appeared Ghanem and al-Mahmoudi were under "tremendous pressure" from the top (i.e., from Muammar al-Qadhafi) to get contributions. His sense was that the

companies were so far holding ranks and would not break. The Canadian Ambassador offered that the best course of action would be to continue to monitor treatment of the companies and make it clear to the GOL that our governments "have taken note of what is happening and are not indifferent to it." He did not think a formal demarche would be useful at this time. In a possibly related twist, the Canadian Ambassador said Ghanem was offered (and allegedly accepted) Italian citizenship, perhaps signaling that Ghanem is under such intense pressure that he is looking for a way out. (Note: As reported ref B, Ghanem tried to resign last year after National Security Adviser Muatassim al-Qadhafi, son of Muammar al-Qadhafi, solicited him for funds and/or oil lifts that he could sell, allegedly to establish a military/security unit and make unspecified security upgrades. A longtime friend of Ghanem's told us on January 28 that Ghanem was "fed up" with obstacles to reform and GOL infighting, and was "looking for a way out" of his position. End note.)

¶6. (C/NF) French Commercial Counselor Alain Boutebel said he understood from TOTAL's representative that U.S. companies were "upset" that the USG had not done more to protect them. (Comment: We are in frequent contact with the U.S. IOCs in Libya and have not yet heard this complaint. They are aware that the U.S. government, including the Embassy, have repeatedly reminded GOL officials of the U.S. position that U.S. companies were not to be pressured into contributing to the fund. End comment.) His information was that TOTAL had not yet decided how to respond. He expected the solicitation and threat of repercussions for companies who chose not to contribute to be a prominent item on the agenda for the next round of Libya-EU Framework Agreement talks, scheduled for February 10-12.

¶7. (S/NF) Comment: Reporting in sensitive channels suggested that before the claims compensation fund was populated, al-Qadhafi, who prides himself on being a shrewd bargainer, made it clear that he intended to extract contributions from foreign companies to cover the GOL's initial outlay. In that regard, his suggestion at the January 21 Georgetown DVC that Libya could slow or temporarily cease oil production and/or nationalize its oil industry may have been intended to prompt oil executives to contribute to the fund as much as to remind the USG and global markets of Libya's strategic significance as an hydrocarbon producer. With the General People's Congress scheduled to convene soon to review the performance of the cabinet and approve a significantly reduced national budget, al-Mahmoudi and Ghanem are probably feeling increasing pressure to meet the Leader's expectation that the $1.5 billion pay-out to American claimants be fully funded from foreign sources. Post recommends remaining in close contact with U.S. IOCs, noting the February 1 meeting with GOL interlocutors and reminding them of our "no pressure" redline, and reassessing this approach if the GOL brings increased pressure to bear on U.S. companies. End comment.

¶8. (C/NFA) List of companies present at February 1 meeting. The first 10 are producers; the last five are service companies.

Hess
Marathon
ConocoPhillips
Occidental
ENI
TOTAL

TOTAL
Wintershall
PetroCanada
Repsol
StatoilHydro

Schlumberger
Baker
KCA Deutag
Halliburton
Challenger
CRETZ

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10ADDISABABA374

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10ADDISABABA374 aka Wikileaks id #249950 ?
Subject	LIBYAN FM SUPPORTS RELOCATING DOHA PEACE PROCESS TO DARFUR
Origin	Embassy Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)
Cable time	Mon, 22 Feb 2010 13:36 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10ADDISABABA374.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9738
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHDS #0374/01 0531336
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 221336Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7874
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUZEFAA/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEPADJ/CJTF HOA
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ADDIS ABABA 000374

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR SE GRATION, S/USSES, AF A/S CARSON, AF/E, AF/PDPA,
IIP/G/AF, RRU-AF, DRL/RSPRING
NSC FOR MGAVIN
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* ,
ASEC *[Security]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN FM SUPPORTS RELOCATING DOHA PEACE PROCESS
TO DARFUR

Classified By: Classified by CDA John Yates for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

SUMMARY

¶1. (C) During a February 1 meeting with U.S. Special Envoy
to Sudan Gration, Libyan Foreign Minister Musa Kusa said that
Darfur's rebels had been spoiled by media attention and their

plush lifestyles in Qatar. He advocated moving Darfur peace talks from Doha to Darfur, bringing in a specialized team of regional players to observe the process, but making the Government of Sudan interact directly with the parties and shoulder more responsibility. He described Darfur as an Islamic struggle between President Omar el-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi, from which JEM leader Khalil Ibrahim emerging as an ambitious side player worth engaging. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan General J. Scott Gration travelled to Addis Ababa from January 27-February 2, 2010 to attend the AU Summit with the U.S. delegation.

On Darfuri Rebels in Doha: "Money Spoils the Individuals"

¶3. (C) FM Musa began by discussing the reasons why the Darfur peace talks were not succeeding. He said that the Darfuri rebels, having found themselves in five-star hotels and in front of cameras, are using the peace talks as a way to earn a living. In his experience with rebel movements, Musa said, "money spoils the individuals." Abdul Wahid has used Darfur as a personal platform, speaking like an official, holding meetings, appearing on television and al-Jazeera, and building a "larger-than-life personality." When NGOs come into Darfur, Musa said, they side with the Darfuri parties. As a result, Musa believed, the rebels feel they have international support behind them, which increases the ceiling of negotiations. Musa also faulted the Qataris' approach, calling it a "media show."

Moving Darfur Peace Talks to Darfur

¶4. (C) Eschewing Doha, Musa believed there was "no alternative place" to holding Darfur peace talks than in Darfur. He envisioned that a "specialized team" of regional players-including Libya, Egypt, the United States, and the United Nations-who understand the area and the mentality of the people would observe the process. At its core, he believed the Government of Sudan should negotiate directly with the parties because "the Government has responsibility and should shoulder it." Musa also stated that those hurting the cause for peace should be punished, and specifically that Sudanese President Omar el-Bashir and rebels "not contributing to the solution" should be sanctioned. Musa said he told the French that they were contributing to the problem by harboring Abdul Wahid. Finally, he said the Chad-Sudan border agreement of 15 January should be encouraged.

Khalil's Ambitions and Turabi vs. Bashir; Gosh to "Retire Quietly"

¶5. (C) Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) leader Khalil Ibrahim, Musa said, has an Islamist ideology, money, and national agenda propelling his desire to take Bashir's place. Moreover, Musa said, he's not alone; Musa believed that Khalil was part of National Islamic Front leader Hassan al-Turabi's organization. "What happened in Darfur," Musa said, "is a struggle between Bashir and Turabi," and Turabi maneuvered Khalil in Darfur by making it "the other side's battle, not his." Musa said that the Special Envoy could empower himself by talking to Khalil, but that if he talks, the SE should "talk to him strongly."

¶6. (C) Discussing internal Sudanese politics, Musa stated that former Sudanese intelligence chief Salah Gosh played a

disruptive role on the Chad/Sudan border. Gosh, Musa said, was his friend but that his replacement, Mohammad Attah, "was

was his friend but that his replacement, Mohammad Attah, was better." Musa predicted that Gosh would "retire quietly."

Southern Sudan and "the Heart of the African Problem"

¶7. (C) Musa said that the South had inflamed Darfur by coordinating with Kenya to funnel arms into Darfur when problems started there. He said that there is great risk in Southern independence, and that the South will be at the mercy of other nations, such as Kenya, because they lack the resources to make a state. The FM said that Sudan is the border point between "black and white, Islam and other religions," which Musa concluded, is "the heart of the African problem."

Participants in Foreign Minister Musa Kusa Meeting:

¶8. (U) General J, Scott Gration, U.S. special Envoy to Sudan
Cameron Hudson, Director of Operations, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Miriam Estrin, Special Assistant to the Special Envoy, Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan
Kathryn Pongonis, Deputy Political/Economic Counselor, U.S. Embassy Addis Ababa

¶9. (U) SE Gration's Office has cleared on this cable.
YATES

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10BRIDGETOWN35

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10BRIDGETOWN35 aka Wikileaks id #250530 ?
Subject	PM KING: RISING CRIME THREATENS ST. LUCIA'S EXPANDING TOURISM SECTOR
Origin	Embassy Bridgetown (Barbados)
Cable time	Wed, 24 Feb 2010 17:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10BRIDGETOWN35.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXYZ0006
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHWN #0035/01 0551718
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241718Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0551
INFO EC CARICOM COLLECTIVE
RHMCSUU/CDR USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L BRIDGETOWN 000035

SIPDIS
STATE FOR INL - TERRY JOHNS
STATE FOR WHA/CAR - KAREN MCISAAC
STATE FOR NEA/MAG - HEATHER KALMBACH
AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN PASS TO AMEMBASSY GRENADA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2020/02/24
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions] ,
MASS [Military Assistance and Sales] , SNAR [Narcotics] , XL [Caribbean]
SUBJECT: PM King: Rising Crime Threatens St. Lucia's Expanding
Tourism Sector

CLASSIFIED BY: D. Brent Hardt, Charge; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

------------

Summary

------------



¶1.    (C) St. Lucia Prime Minister Stephenson King told the Charge in
a February 10 meeting that his government is struggling to stem the
tide of violent crime that has begun to adversely affect the
country's vital but vulnerable tourism sector.  He is hiring more
police, weeding out corruption in the ranks, and looking to partner
with U.S. local and federal law enforcement agencies in his effort
to reverse the trends.  He was very pleased that St. Lucia will be
the first country in the Eastern Caribbean to receive vessels and
```

communication equipment through SOUTHCOM's Enduring Friendship program. He welcomes the emerging U.S. focus on at-risk youth and entrepreneurship programs, and would like to see them expanded through the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI). St. Lucia's, Minister of Tourism Chastanet outlined his ambitious plans for tourism expansion in St. Lucia and challenges he faces in convincing the government that it needs to do more to support the industry. He proposed an agreement in services between the U.S. and Caribbean to make the Caribbean part of U.S. airspace for travel purposes, with both sides agreeing to reduce air travel taxes, which now account for a sizeable portion of air travel costs in both directions. End Summary.

Struggling to Get a Grip on Crime

¶2. (C) In a February 10 meeting at his official residence in St. Lucia, Prime Minister King lamented to the Charge that the current rise in violent crime on the island that had resulted in 7 fatalities already this year -- on target for a murder record if it continues. Moreover, crime had begun to affect the vulnerable tourist sector as cruise tourists on bus tours to scenic sights had been attacked and robbed in broad daylight. Gang violence had entrenched itself within the capital, Castries, resulting in a "proliferation of small arms, muggings, and robberies." Drug trafficking remained a constant concern, as much of the violence related to interruptions in shipments and struggle for drug turf. To reverse these alarming trends, King said he had already hired 58 new officers, with an additional 65 to be brought on board as soon as the first class graduated. (Comment: This would represent a 15 percent increase in the strength of the force. End Comment). Police Commissioner Regis separately told the Charge that his force is staffed for the demands of St. Lucia's 160,000 citizens, but not for the additional 500,000 visitors the island hosts every year. This point had helped sell the PM on the need to increase the Force's strength, he added.

Corruption, Lack of Leadership in the Ranks

¶3. (C) Prime Minister King was open and direct in addressing problems of corruption within the police ranks, telling the Charge that the country would welcome U.S. assistance in this area. He said the Force is already expanding its vetting efforts, but much more is need. He acknowledged the importance of ensuring that the Coast Guard would be vetted as it takes possession of the new U.S.-provided vessels. The Charge conveyed the U.S. willingness to explore how we might support his vetting efforts. King also acknowledged his government had made a mistake in elevating a British national as commissioner -- part of a UK-funded effort to professionalize the force through an influx of senior level British officers. The displacement of the current commissioner, Ausbert Regis, who had been on extended leave, may have left a bad taste in

his mouth that could affect his level of performance, the PM indicated.

New Strategies Needed

¶4. (C) According to King, new strategies are needed, including better surveillance and intelligence and a more creative way to target the at-risk youth who are failed by the educational system. King supports an expansion of vocational education that can better meet the needs of those students that are not well served by the current academic system. He enthusiastically welcomed the U.S. focus on programs for at-risk youth and appreciated that the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative would seek to address both the cause and consequences of the region's crime. King indicated that his government had decided to launch two major reviews, one on social reform and a second on education. A Council on Social Reform had been established, that would look at some of the factors pulling young people into the capital, and exploring how to create new communities through resettlement or to strengthen existing communities outside the main city. The Education Council would take a hard look at the country's education system, which is not serving a large segment of its population well, according to King. He believed it was time to move past the inherited British academic model and ensure the system was flexible enough to accommodate diverse interests and capabilities.

Libyan Diplomatic Presence

¶5. (C) The Charge asked PM King about reports that Libya had decided to establish a diplomatic presence in St. Lucia, and King responded that the government had discovered this almost by chance. He noted that Libya has been in discussion with members of the OECS for some time (led by St. Vincent Prime Minister Ralph Gonsalves, whose ties to Libya date back decades), and had apparently settled on St. Lucia because it was home to the OECS secretariat. Apparently, however, the Libyan representatives arrived without informing the government of St. Lucia, and only after the government found this out and approached the Libyans about the need to follow protocol, did they begin procedures for establishing their presence. King said St. Lucia did not have any strong feelings about this presence, but said it had been guided by our recent approach to relations with Libya. PM King noted that he understood Libya had also established a bank in St. Kitts/Nevis and another entity relating it investment in Antigua as part of its expanding presence in the region.

Ambitious Plans for Tourism

¶6. (C) In a separate meeting with the Charge, The energetic Minister of Tourism, Allen Chastanet, outlined his ambitious plans for St. Lucia's tourism sector. He believes St. Lucia is poised to be one of the top destinations for U.S. tourists in the Caribbean.

Already, it has surpassed Barbados for number of long stay U.S. visitors, and he sees the potential for 250,000 long stay U.S. visitors within the next three years. He attributed St. Lucia's success in the U.S. market to the expansion in direct U.S. flights, particularly the entry of JetBlue into the market last October and increased flights by Delta, American, and USAir. The increased competition also resulted in a dramatic reduction in the cost of E

roundtrip fares from the U.S. to $500, from almost $1100 last year -- which makes St. Lucia a much more affordable destination. Chastanet reiterated his interest in establishing a U.S. Customs and Border Protection pre-clearance facility at the International Airport, as in Aruba, Nassau and Freeport. He wondered whether there was a minimum number travelers required to secure such a facility, and noted that their airport had been designed to allow for the possibility of a secure U.S. area.

¶7. (C) Chastanet then raised an idea he had been developing to expand air travel between the U.S. and the Caribbean. The goal, he said, would be to reduce airport departure and security taxes both from the U.S. and the Caribbean. He wondered whether the Caribbean could be designated part of U.S. airspace for purposes of air travel. He noted that this would stand in direct contrast with current British actions, as they are in the final steps of increasing dramatically the tax burden for flights to the Caribbean, which will likely result in a reduction in U.K. tourism. Chastanet pointed out that U.S. programs such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative now had a limited influence on the local economy, due to the region's miniscule exports in tangible goods. A reduction in airport taxes would amount to a reduction in a tariff barrier in the services sector that would have much more effect on the region's economies. In cruise tourism, Chastanet said the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative was restricting the potential market of U.S. travelers. Nevertheless, St. Lucia is pushing ahead with plans to open a new pier in Soufriere, the town at the foot of the Pitons, St. Lucia's UNESCO World Heritage Site and top tourist draw. (Note: Chastanet is an unelected Senator, and has selected Soufriere as the constituency he hopes to capture in the next election.)

¶8. (C) Charge asked Chastanet and Minister of National Security Guy Mayers about the recent attacks on cruise ship visitors in the country's interior that resulted in Norwegian Cruise Line's cancellation of port calls in St. Lucia. Chastanet assured the Charge that the government intended to be proactive in heading off such occurrences. He explained that there had been a proliferation of tourist sites in recent years -- remote waterfalls and hiking sites -- and this is where recent problems had taken place. The government had already undertaken an effort to assess and register all these sites with a view to security, and planned to shut down any site that could not guarantee security for visitors. He understood the critical importance of ensuring visitor safety for the future of the country's tourism sector and broader economic viability, and was urging the cabinet to increase police capacity and visibility.

OECS Open to Closer Collaboration

¶9. (C) Charge also met with the Director of the Organisation of

¶9. (C) Charge also met with the Director of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), Len Ishmael, to explore areas of potential U.S. cooperation with the generally effective regional organization. Ishmael noted that the organization's focus has shifted considerably in recent years, with an expanded role in regional diplomatic representation for OECS states, bulk purchasing of medicines, environmental protection, and expansion of its efforts in education and youth entrepreneurship. While the OECS has worked effectively with USAID, she believes there is potential for expanded cooperation. On Libya, she noted that the OECS has encouraged the relationship with Libya as a potential source of investment in the region and is now exploring an OECS mission in Tripoli as has been established in Canada and Brussels.

Comment

¶10. (C) Under Prime Minister King, St. Lucia remains our closest ally in the region, willing to break with CARICOM on UN votes, and still keeping a healthy distance from ALBA despite enticements from Hugo Chavez. King is grateful that St. Lucia was identified as the first recipient in the region of Enduring Friendship assets to combat drug trafficking, and also expressed gratitude for our pier construction projects, which will give the Cost Guard greater range in protecting St. Lucia's extensive shoreline. St. Lucia's economy seems to have survived the worst of the economic downturn, and although a number of projects came to a standstill, others continued and some new investments are about to be launched. The challenge, as Chastanet explained, was to convince the bureaucracy and other members of the cabinet that tourism really was everybody's business, and to orient the government to making this a reality.
HARDT

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10MANAGUA16

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10MANAGUA16 aka Wikileaks id #242649 ?
Subject	NICARAGUA: 2009 COUNTRY REPORT ON TERRORISM
Origin	Embassy Managua (Nicaragua)
Cable time	Wed, 6 Jan 2010 16:13 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10MANAGUA16.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Thu, 28 Jul 2011 12:59: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1843
OO RUEHAO RUEHCD RUEHGD RUEHHO RUEHMC RUEHNG RUEHNL RUEHRD RUEHRS
RUEHTM
DE RUEHMU #0016/01 0061628
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 061613Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0355
INFO WESTERN HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS DIPL POSTS IMMEDIATE
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAGUA 000016

SIPDIS
DEPT FOR S/CT RSHORE
DEPT PASS NCTC

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , ASEC [Security] , EFIN [Financial and Monetary Affairs] , KCRM [Criminal
Activity] , KHLS [Homeland Security] , PINS [National Security] , PREL [External Political Relations] , AEMR
[Emergency Planning and Evacuation] , NU [Nicaragua]
SUBJECT: Nicaragua: 2009 Country Report on Terrorism

REF: A) 09 STATE 122733; B) 09 STATE 109980

General Assessment



¶1.    No acts of international terrorism occurred in Nicaragua in
2009.  Three items from the 2008 report that remained largely
unchanged.  In 2009 Nicaragua made no substantive progress towards
establishing a Financial Intelligence Unit or passing the
```

counterterrorism bill first proposed in 2004. Also, Nicaragua's judicial system remained a vulnerability that could be exploited by international terrorist groups. The judiciary remained highly politicized, corrupt and prone to manipulation by political elites and organized crime. The November 2007 decision by President Ortega granting Iranian and Libyan nationals visa-free entry into Nicaragua remained in effect during 2009. On March 18, 2009 Nicaragua upgraded several countries to visa-free entry status, which included Ecuador and the Palestinian Authority. Sensitive reporting indicates that human traffickers were adjusting their routes accordingly.

¶2. President Daniel Ortega continued to develop close relations with Cuba through official visits and regular, high-level contact with Cuban officials. On September 10, Nicaragua established formal diplomatic relations with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two small breakaway Georgian Republics recognized only by Russia, Venezuela and Nauru. Ortega sustained close relations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) in 2009. On October 12, Nicaragua refused an official extradition request from Ecuador for two suspected FARC operatives who had been granted asylum in 2008 and continued to provide safe haven to one additional known senior FARC commander. During 2009, Nicaragua also gave political asylum to three Peruvian indigenous leaders accused of instigating a confrontation in the Peruvian Amazon that left 33 dead. President Ortega conducted no official state visits to Iran in 2009.

Safe Haven Assessment

¶3. In 2009, President Ortega continued to provide safe haven to Doris Torres Boh????rquez and Martha Perez Guti????rrez, two suspected
FARC operatives and survivors of the March 2008 Colombian military operation against the FARC. Both were granted asylum in Nicaragua and welcomed by President Ortega as survivors of "state-sponsored terrorism by Colombia." On October 12 the GON refused Ecuador's request to extradite Torres and Perez on the grounds that doing so would violate their human rights. Also during 2009, senior FARC official Nubia Calderon de Trujillo continued to enjoy "humanitarian asylum" in Nicaragua. In 2008 the U.S. Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) designated Calderon de Trujillo, along with seven other FARC international representatives, as significant narco-traffickers under the Kingpin Act. During 2009 Calderon, Torres and Perez did not appear publicly in Nicaragua.

¶4. There was no new information in the case of Alberto Bermudez, aka Rene Alberto Gutierrez Pastran, aka "Cojo," the FARC emissary granted a false Nicaraguan identity by Nicaragua's Supreme Electoral Council (CSE). However in December 2009, local media reported that the CSE provided legitimate Nicaraguan identity documents for false identities to several suspected drug traffickers, including Amauri Paul (alias Alberto Ruiz Cano), a Colombian criminal who was involved in an attack against Nicaraguan counter-narcotics forces that killed two Nicaraguan Navy personnel.

MANAGUA 00000016 002 OF 002

¶5. On June 9, 2009, the government granted political asylum to three Peruvian indigenous leaders, Alberto Pizango, Saul Puerta and Cervando Puerta. Pizango and the Puerta brothers received asylum in Nicaragua only days after the Peruvian government accused them of instigating an armed confrontation in the Peruvian Amazon that

of instigating an armed confrontation in the Peruvian Amazon that left 24 police and nine indigenous people dead. On October 13, Saul Puerta and Cervando Puerta returned to Peru after a Peruvian court overturned arrest orders against them. The same court upheld the arrest order for Pizango, who remains in Nicaragua.

Terrorist Organizations

¶6. No known terrorist groups operated openly in Nicaragua; however, as noted above, during 2009 at least three suspected FARC operatives were granted safe haven by the government of Nicaragua and remain in the country. Both the FARC and the ETA (Basque Fatherland and Liberty) have retired or inactive members residing in Nicaragua. Iran, Cuba and Libya maintained embassies in Nicaragua during 2008.

Foreign Government Cooperation

¶7. During 2009, the Embassy had increasing difficulty obtaining information from or access to civilian officials of the GON. In one instance the GON failed to comply with a routine evidence transfer request related to an arms-for-drugs case involving the FARC. Even so, there were several U.S.-Nicaragua military-to-military counterterrorism-related exchanges during the year that improved the Nicaraguan military's counterterrorism capabilities.

¶8. Embassy Point of Contact for this Report is Deputy Political Chief, Jesse Curtis +505-2252-7128 (CurtisJS@state.gov) CALLAHAN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10RABAT5

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10RABAT5 aka Wikileaks id #242408 ?
Subject	GEN. WARD SIGNS CISMOA; DISCUSSES AQIM, ACSA, GUINEA, NARCOTICS AND FUTURE COOPERATION
Origin	Embassy Rabat (Morocco)
Cable time	Mon, 4 Jan 2010 16:58 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10RABAT5.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Mon, 6 Dec 2010 17:21: Publication withdrawn • Fri, 10 Dec 2010 00:47: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0327
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0005/01 0041658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041658Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0136
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0015
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3857
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0456
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 0034
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000005

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR S/CT, PM, AF/W AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2030
TAGS: MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , MOPS [Military Operations] ,
PREL [External Political Relations] , SNAR [Narcotics] , GV [Guinea] , MO [Morocco]
SUBJECT: GEN. WARD SIGNS CISMOA; DISCUSSES AQIM, ACSA,
GUINEA, NARCOTICS AND FUTURE COOPERATION

REF: STATE 130969 (NOTAL)

RABAT 00000005  001.2 OF 003


¶1.    (S) Summary:  General Ward of Africa Command visited
Rabat on December 30 to sign the Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement
(CISMOA) and continued military cooperation.  During meetings
with Inspector General Bennani and other Moroccan general
officers, General Ward and the Ambassador requested
```

overflight clearance for the P-3 (Reftel); asked for an assessment of the threat posed by AQIM; urged Morocco to keep Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara in Morocco a long time; and said he looked forward to returning to sign the ACSA. General Bennani and his senior staff reacted positively to the overflight request and said they would examine it in more detail. They thought Guinean Defense Minister Konate was weak, and, unlike other senior Moroccan officials, they downplayed the importance of narcotics transiting Morocco. End Summary.

¶2. (C/NF) Commander, U.S. Africa Command, General William E. Ward visited Rabat on December 30, 2009 to meet with Inspector General of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (CHOD) General de Corps d,Armee Abdelaziz Bennani for the purpose of signing the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries. Accompanied by Africa Command Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Raymond Brown, General Ward and his party met with the Ambassador and other members of the country team. General Ward reinforced the strong relationship between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries and predicted the agreement would lead to continued and expanded cooperation between the two nations in the future.

Communications Interoperability and Security MOA

¶3. (SBU) General Ward expressed satisfaction with his visit to Morocco, following recent visits to Algeria, Libya and Mali and serving to show equality in dealing with the militaries of a region that does not tend toward regional cooperation. He further expressed admiration and satisfaction with the mission,s work supporting U.S. Africa Command,s goals and objectives, particularly in the areas of security cooperation, international development and economic stimulation. He again explained the purpose of his command as orchestrating security activity on the continent in support of national policy and objectives, and declared his support for all other agencies, work in Africa.

¶4. (C/NF) At the signing ceremony, General Bennani warmly welcomed General Ward,s visit both professionally and personally, expressing his esteem for the vision and progress with U.S. Africa Command. He emphasized that King Mohammed VI had designated him to sign the CISMOA on behalf of Morocco, with the understanding that the agreement was integral to the full utilization of the F-16 by the Moroccan Royal Air Force, but also with a vision to future cooperation for integration of technologies and weapons systems for the navy and army. He further reiterated previous statements that the King wished the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces to be on par with American forces in order to permit full integration and interoperability should the commanders-in-chief of both countries decide to employ their forces in a coalition or combined operation.

¶5. (C/NF) General Ward returned the warm greetings and stated that the agreement was both a symbol of the relationship between the two countries and signal of their commitment to mutual security. He affirmed that the agreement would have broad application across the entirety of the Moroccan military, and would open doors to future technologies and cooperation not yet envisioned in mutually beneficial ways to guarantee stability and peace.

¶6. (C/NF) General Ward explained that teams would visit Morocco in January and February to discuss implementation of the CISMOA and implementation meetings would take place three times per year thereafter. General Ward said that he looked forward to returning to Morocco to sign the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as soon as it has received

Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as soon as it has received the necessary clearances from the Department of Defense, and

General Bennani responded that he looked forward to General Ward,s next visit and to his participation in the next signing ceremony.

AQIM

¶7. (S) Turning to regional issues, General Ward asked General Bennani how he saw the regional threat from Al Qu,aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and narcotics traffickers. Bennani responded that narcotics were not making their way into Morocco. However, AQIM posed a serious threat to countries like Mauritania and Mali that could not counter the terrorists. General Bennani explained that he was intimately familiar with Mauritania,s geography and topography and that the country was not capable of controlling its territory. Brigadier General Abdellah Hamdoun, the Director of Military Intelligence, offered that Mali lacked the means to counter AQIM. General Ward then briefed General Bennani, Air Force Commander Major General Ahmed Boutaleb and other general officers on the U.S. plan to gather intelligence about AQIM in Mali and Mauritania and requested overflight clearance for a U.S. EP-3 aircraft. General Bennani responded positively, saying it was important to box in AQIM. General Boutaleb added that the Air Force and the General Staff would study the overflight request and respond quickly.

Guinea

¶8. (S) General Ward next noted that Morocco was hosting some important guests. General Bennani asked if he was referring to President Sarkozy or former President Chirac. General Ward replied he was referring to Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara and Guinean Minister of National Defense Sekouba Konate, asking about their conditions. Surprisingly, Bennani had no information about either and did not even know that General Konate was in Morocco)- although he had attended the Moroccan military academy and had strong ties to Moroccan leaders. General Ward strongly urged that Morocco keep Dadis Camara as long as possible. General Bennani noted that Camara was in Morocco on humanitarian terms, and responded only that many African leaders come to the Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat for free medical care. General Hamdoun suggested that Konate was weak and might not be fit to serve as head of state for an extended period.

Comment

¶9. (C) General Bennani, who can be very prickly, appeared upbeat throughout the ceremony and related discussions. The CISMOA brings a level of U.S. scrutiny and procedure to the control and dissemination of the cryptographic and keying material associated with U.S. weapons systems that can appear intrusive to a sovereign nation. However, the General seemed thoughtful as he digested the discussion of the upcoming implementation and programmatic activities that would take place in the coming months and years. He and the rest of the senior military leadership seemed totally uninformed about patients at the military hospital. Moreover, General Bennani,s comments about narcotics transiting Morocco were at odds with comments from key civilian leaders who express

significant concern about this matter.

¶10. (C) In sum, General Ward,s visit accomplished the necessary act of signing the document integral to full and timely implementation of the F-16 program in Morocco, and reinforced the already strong relationship between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries. The upcoming year will see a full slate of security cooperation activities between the two militaries, building to the delivery of the first F-16 in July 2011. End Comment.

¶11. (U) General Ward has cleared this message.

¶12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.

RABAT 00000005 003.2 OF 003

****
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
****
KAPLAN

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10ROME208

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10ROME208 aka Wikileaks id #250723 ?
Subject	2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT FOR ITALY PART 2
Origin	Embassy Rome (Italy)
Cable time	Thu, 25 Feb 2010 12:17 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10ROME208.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3043
RR RUEHIK
DE RUEHRO #0208/01 0561217
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 251217Z FEB 10 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY ROME
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3315
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHFL/AMCONSUL FLORENCE 4059
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN 0501
RUEHNP/AMCONSUL NAPLES 4288
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ROME 000208

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KTIP [Trafficking in Persons] , ELAB [Labor Sector Affairs] , KCRM [Criminal Activity] , KFRD [Fraud Prevention
Programs] , KWMN [Women Issues] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , PREF
[Refugees] ,
SMIG [Migration] , KMCA [Millennium Challenge Account] , PREL [External Political Relations] , IT [Italy]
SUBJECT: 2009 TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT FOR ITALY PART 2

REF: SECSTATE 02094

ROME 00000208  001.3 OF 004



Protection of and Assistance to Victims
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
¶28.  A The government protects victims and witnesses. Victims
are enrolled in programs run by NGOs or religious communities
that provide shelter and support.

¶28.  B Article 13 of the Law 228/2003 provides for three to
six months assistance to victims while article 18 of Law
286/1998 guarantees shelter benefits for another twelve
months and reintegration assistance. Moreover, victims
usually obtain temporary residence/work permits that can lead
to permanent residency. In fact adults who are identified as
trafficking victims are granted a six-month residency permit,
```

renewable if the victim finds employment or has enrolled in a training program, and are sheltered in special facilities. Minors receive an automatic residence permit until they are 18, and they are hosted in separate centers. NGOs run these services with funding provided by national, regional and local authorities. According to the Ministry of Equal Opportunity, NGOs and local authorities have been using these methods

¶28. C In 2009, 810 victims obtained temporary residence visas, according to the Ministry of Interior. The government provides legal and medical assistance through NGOs as soon as a victim has been identified. Assistance programs are carried out mainly in larger cities, such as Rome, Milan, Turin, Genoa, Florence and Naples, where the majority of victims are concentrated.

In 2007, under Article 13, more than 400 victims accessed assistance, 10 percent of whom were minors. The top countries of origin were Nigeria (40 percent), China (16 percent), Romania (13 percent), and Morocco (10 percent).

Under Article 18, about 1,100 victims, including about 50 minors and 100 men, entered social protection programs in 2008. Also in 2008, NGOs provided health care (16 percent), legal advice (8 percent), psychological support (10 percent), social counseling (20 percent) and other services (13 percent). Of the victims placed in social protection programs, approximately 50 percent were from Nigeria, 15 percent were from Romania, 5 percent were from China, and another 4 percent were from Moldova. The prospect of obtaining a residence permit had been an effective incentive for Romanian victims who requested assistance until 2007 when Romania entered the EU. More broadly, the significant drop in the total number of victims assisted is the result of the adoption of a more accurate monitoring system which allowed authorities to identify victims by name, avoiding double counting.

The majority of victims were housed in shelters, while others lived independently with support. Other funded projects included reintegration, assisted repatriation, victims' assistance and job training programs. NGOs, with government funding, provided literacy courses for 588 people and vocational training for 313; helped 436 victims find temporary employment and another 907 individuals find permanent jobs.

¶28. D See above. Almost all assisted victims are foreign nationals.

¶28. E. Under article 13 of the Law 228/2003 the Ministry of Equal Opportunity provides three to six months assistance to victims. Under article 18 of Law 286/1998 guarantees shelter benefits for another twelve months and reintegration assistance.

¶28. F. Article 18 provides for the identification and transfer of victims placed under protective custody to NGOs that provide transition, reintegration and/or repatriation services to victims. NGOs that receive victims are registered by the Ministry of Labor and Welfare and monitored by the Ministry for Equal Opportunity.

¶28. G In 2008, 664 obtained residence permits as victims of trafficking, according to the Ministry of Interior. About 300 were enrolled in educational institutions; 150 were enrolled in training courses, and 200 more received job offers.

¶28. H There is no standard mechanism for screening for victims among people involved in the sex trade. OIM has drafted common guidelines on the identification of victims based on best international practices

based on best international practices.

ROME 00000208 002.3 OF 004

The Ministry for Equal Opportunity is implementing a project in cooperation with Portugal, Hungary, and the Czech Republic and funded by the European Union, designed to identify a transnational referral mechanism for victims of trafficking that will be submitted to the European Commission for further action.

¶28. I Victims in Italy usually do not face prosecution for other laws they may have broken if they file a complaint against a trafficker.

¶28. J. The government encourages victims to assist in the investigation and prosecution of trafficking through the offer of a temporary residence permit. Italian law does not allow victims to seek redress or compensation through civil court proceedings. A victim who is a material witness in a court case against a former employer is allowed to obtain other employment. Under a victim restitution program monitored by the International Organization for Migration, 81 victims were repatriated in 2008. These victims were given 500 euro by the Government for repatriation, up to 1,600 euro for resettlement in their home country, and reintegration assistance for six months.

¶28. K. The Ministry of Interior trains police officers in victim identification and victim assistance under various programs, but not in a systematic or comprehensive way. The Ministry of Equal Opportunity promotes training initiatives and an exchange of best practices for experts and social workers every three months. Because Italian citizens generally are not trafficking victims, Italy does not provide training to its embassies and consulates and does not need to provide assistance to repatriated nationals.

¶28. L. Italian nationals generally are not victims of trafficking.

¶28. M. There are over 200 domestic and international NGOs in Italy that work on the trafficking issue. The most notable include:

(a) PARSEC. This is a social research institute that collects the most reliable data on trafficking in Italy. It also operates several mobile assistance units and works closely with local governments.

(b) On The Road Association. Located in the Marche, Abruzzo, and Molise regions, it provides legal, medical, social, and psychological assistance through its mobile units, shelters and safe houses. It also has an employment program that provides victims with jobs and pays them for their work.

(c) CARITAS. This is a large lay Catholic association that works with the needy in numerous shelters throughout Italy. It collects statistics on and works with immigrant communities providing food, shelter and assistance.

(d) ECPAT (End Child Prostitution, Pornography and Trafficking) and Save the Children. Both work with other NGOs to ensure that police treat juvenile sex workers as trafficking victims, not criminals.

(e) Gruppo Abele and IROKO in Turin, the Orlando Association in Bologna, and Progetto Arcobaleno in Florence also have multiple projects to assist trafficking victims.

Prevention

- - - - -

¶29. A The Ministry for Equal Opportunity has the lead in funding public awareness programs. NGOs continue to distribute materials updated on a regular basis, including brochures, posters, bumper stickers and TV/radio ads providing information and assistance to victims. An ad campaign called "Stop Trafficking" continued in 2009 with the support of the Ministry of Interior in cooperation with the Ministry of Equal Opportunity. Equal Opportunity also established a toll-free hot line in 2000 to provide information and assistance to victims. In June 2009, authorites reported that the hotline received almost 15,000 calls in the previous 12 months.

The Ministry for Equal Opportunity identified 14 focal points nationwide to implement public awareness campaigns for informing victims of protection programs and to solicit citizens to report trafficking cases. Social workers started calling sex workers and other potential victims to provide information about assistance programs.

ROME 00000208 003.3 OF 004

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs financed a project implemented by UNICRI in cooperation with UNODC, the Nigerian government and NGOs designed to increase awareness on trafficking in the state of Edo, Nigeria, from where large numbers of minors are smuggled to Italy. the main objective is preventing human trafficking through strategic partnerships aimed at fostering community mobilization and a communication campaign targeted at potential victims and government officials. The activities include visits to schools, meetings held in street markets, and radio programs.

¶29. B With over 2,000 miles of coastline and geographic proximity to both North Africa and Eastern Europe, Italy has become a major frontier for illegal immigration. Large numbers of immigrants arrived after transiting Libya and Tunisia.

In August 2008, the government signed a pact with Libya that provides for patrolling the Libyan coasts by common Italian and Libyan enforcement teams. The agreement allows all immigrants departing from Libya--not only Libyan nationals--to be turned back before they reach Italian territory. In May 2009, under the Italy-Libya agreement, the Italian coast guard escorted 500 immigrants back to Libya; subsequent similar operations produced a dramatic decline in the number of immigrants who reached Italian shores. (see ¶25.D .) Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International criticized the government for its failure to screen foreigners and identify refugees, unaccompanied minors, and victims of trafficking.

¶29. C The Ministry for Equal Opportunity leads an interministerial committee charged with monitoring trafficking and coordinating government activity to combat it. Other members include the Ministries of Interior, Justice, Labor and Social Affairs, and Foreign Affairs, as well as the special anti-Mafia prosecutorial unit. The government works closely with over 200 NGOs involved in anti-trafficking initiatives that offer advice on prevention and enforcement of legislation.

¶29. D Italy does not have a national action plan to combat trafficking. There is a national action plan for assisting victims. The inter-ministerial Committee Against Trafficking, led by the Ministry for Equal Opportunity, is responsible for coordinating policy at the national level. The Ministry

regularly works with NGOs to coordinate and implement anti-TIP initiatives.

¶29. E Authorities of some cities, including Milan, Rome, Verona, Florence and Venice enforced rules which prohibit street prostitution. Between January and November 2009, the city of Milan issued 11,600 fines against sex workers and clients. From September 2008 to May 2009, Rome police fined 3,800 sex workers and 1,200 clients. The 14 regional focal points established by the Ministry of Equal Opportunity (see ¶29.A .) carried out demand-reduction education campaigns at the local level in cooperation with municipalities, police, social services and NGOs. The Ministry of Interior implemented an information campaign, which included television and radio advertisements aimed at informing the public of the possibility that sex workers present in their towns might be victims of slavery. (see 29. A) The initiative was taken in the context of Operation Pentametro, funded by the European Union.

¶29. F See 27. M

¶29. G The Center of Excellence for Stability Policing Units (COESPU), created by the Ministry of Defense, in cooperation with the US Government in 2005, regularly organizes training sessions on human rights and trafficking for civilians and military personnel who serve in international missions.

The armed forces regularly organize training on exploitation of children and sex workers for troops deployed abroad.

Partnership
- - - - - -

¶30. A The Labor Ministry implemented two projects designed to prevent trafficking in unaccompanied minors for labor exploitation, in cooperation with the Egyptian and Albanian governments. The former was funded with national and European resources and implemented with the assistance of IOM. It encompassed television advertisements, posters, media outreach, and the establishment of a vocational training center for minors who aim to find a legal job in Italy or

Egypt.

In Albania, Italian authorities promoted an exchange of best practices and training of social workers who assist vulnerable minors. Another partnership has been proposed to the Moroccan government but has not yet been approved, pending the adoption of a legal framework for the protection of minors.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs sponsored a program implemented by IOM aimed at strengthening capabilities of Nigerian NGOs which prevent trafficking and support victims. It has also funded the program "Preventing and Combating Trafficking of Minors and Young Women from Nigeria to Italy" carried out by UNICRI in cooperation with UNODC, Nigerian institutions and NGOs (See 29. A.)

The Ministry of Interior reached an agreement with Ghana and Niger aimed at reducing flows of smuggled and trafficked immigrants. (See 25. D)

¶30. B The government promotes the exchange of best practices, training of law enforcement officers, international investigations (See 27. G), identification of a common referral mechanism for the identification of victims (see 28. H), and prevention initiatives. (see 30. A)
THORNE

ROME

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10SANTODOMINGO43

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10SANTODOMINGO43 aka Wikileaks id #247092 ?
Subject	DR: ELECTRICITY SECTOR AT A CROSSROADS
Origin	Embassy Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic)
Cable time	Wed, 3 Feb 2010 21:23 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10SANTODOMINGO43.html
References	09SANTODOMINGO515
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Fri, 26 Aug 2011 02:34: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDG #0043/01 0342123
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 032123Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0700
INFO WHA CENTRAL AMERICAN COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/USAID WASHDC 0013
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON
RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE
RUEHSP/AMEMBASSY PORT OF SPAIN
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA 0076
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SANTO DOMINGO 000043

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ENRG *[Energy and Power]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , DR *[Dominican Republic]*
SUBJECT: DR: Electricity Sector at a Crossroads

REF: A) 09 SANTO DOMINGO 515 ; B) 09 SANTO DOMINGO 817

SUMMARY

¶1. (SBU) Six months ago, President Leonel Fernandez shook up the dysfunctional electricity sector by appointing businessman Celso Marranzini - a long-time critic of the status quo - as head of the Dominican Corporation of State-Owned Electricity Companies (CDEEE). Marranzini has since embarked on a comprehensive reform agenda, supported by loans from the international financial institutions

(IFIs). Emboffs recently met with Marranzini, electricity generators, and distributors to obtain their assessments of the sector's current status and future prospects. There is a possibility for a true sea-change in a sector long considered an albatross around the country's neck, but questions remain about precisely how the reforms will be accomplished. END SUMMARY.

MARRANZINI'S APPOINTMENT

¶2. (SBU) Under Marranzini's predecessor, Radhames Segura, a major political operator in the ruling Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), the CDEEE was the subject of numerous allegations of political favoritism and rampant corruption, and was criticized for the absence of a strategy to address the electricity sector's increasing problems (Ref A and B). The CDEEE was in debt to generators for approximately USD 500 million, and up to 40 percent of the generated power was lost or stolen. Blackouts increased in

frequency, and popular discontent with the situation resulted in street protests. With the IFIs conditioning any standby agreement or disbursement of future loans on reform of the sector, and with congressional/municipal elections approaching in May 2010, Fernandez responded dramatically by naming Marranzini, a respected businessman and harsh critic of the Government's handling of the electricity sector, to replace Segura.

IMF STAND-BY AGREEMENT REQUIRES ELECTRICAL SECTOR REFORM

¶3. (U) Meanwhile, as pressure built on Fernandez in the summer of 2009 to take drastic steps to address the problems in the electricity sector, the Dominican Government (GoDR) was facing a crippling lack of funds as revenues plunged due to declines in exports, tourism and remittances brought about by the global economic crisis. After first publicly disavowing another program with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Fernandez administration eventually shifted course and approached the Fund. In November 2009, it signed a USD 1.7 billion Standby Agreement (SBA) , which also freed up USD 450 million worth of funds that had been put on hold by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the World Bank (WB). The SBA Letter of Intent provided for six areas of improvement for the electricity sector:

* Implementation of a flexible tariff system that responds to market fuel prices;

* Elimination of the PRA (blackout reduction subsidy program);

* Reduction of technical losses and improved metering to reduce theft;

* Improved management of distribution companies;

* External audits of CDEEE and distribution companies;

* Development of a plan to invest in new generation and distribution capacity.

MARRANZINI'S PLANS

¶4. (U) Marranzini, lauded for bringing a businessman's approach to management, immediately began addressing core problems. In the first few weeks of his tenure, he fired hundreds of Segura's patronage appointments, worked diligently to pay down the debt owed by the GoDR, and continued to focus on key problems that hinder the sector's long-term prospects. In a January 6, 2010, meeting with Charge and Emboffs, Marranzini outlined the next steps in his reform program. One of the more important goals is to eliminate, by June 2010, the Blackout Reduction Program (PRA), a geographic subsidy scheme that includes everyone within a particular neighborhood regardless of use of services or ability to pay. Program costs are borne by the GoDR (75 percent) and distribution companies (25 percent). There are 474,000 PRA users nationwide, the equivalent of 21 percent of total electricity users, and the program costs USD 120 million annually. Marranzini told Emboffs that he expects the PRA will be replaced with a direct cash transfer designed to provide 829,000 poor families with 100kw of electricity per month at a cost comparable to the PRA. He will be helped in accomplishing this task by the IBD's Fiscal Strengthening Program, approved in October 2009, which includes specific guidelines for addressing the electricity subsidies and the PRA.

¶5. (U) Resolving the PRA is not Marranzini's only IFI-mandated challenge. The SBA also requires the CDEEE to pay, by the end of 2010, any current electricity generation debt that is more than 45 days in arrears. Near the end of 2009, the total current debt was USD 280 million. Thanks to the IFI support, in December 2009, the GoDR paid USD 190 million of the USD 280 million owed in current debt, leaving a balance of USD 90 million. Marranzini said he expects the balance to be paid by the end of January 2010. (NOTE: As of February 2, CDEEE could not confirm the balance had in fact been paid.) However, in addition to the current debt, the GoDR also owes USD 150 million to generators in frozen (older) debt. How the remaining frozen debt will be paid is unclear.

¶6. (SBU) Beyond paying off the debt, Marranzini also has to find a way to stop its accrual. As noted above, before his tenure, the electricity sector experienced losses nearing 40 percent, with almost 30 percent coming from theft and non-payment. This gap between collection and generation was what pushed the CDEEE into debt in the first place, and Marranzini has attacked the problem with gusto. Over the past six months, the CDEEE has reduced monthly losses - reportedly increasing payments from 30 percent of the bill to 90 percent - but continues to operate at a deficit. The CDEEE has increased the monthly tariff by 12 percent and simplified the tariff rate structure for residential customers. However, according to Marranzini, monthly bills from the generators are approximately USD 121 million while monthly collections are only USD 100 million. Marranzini acknowledged that a key component of the increased collections was the need to double the number of meters nationwide. Estimates vary but at least one million new meters will be needed to accurately track usage and properly bill customers. The World Bank intends to help the CDEEE improve metering in a future program.

¶7. (U) At the meeting with Emboffs, Marranzini provided no new information about the prosecution of electricity theft, a key tool in his effort to improve collections. In public fora, he has declared that he would actively seek punishment of businesses and residences with illegal connections. At an American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM) lunch in November 2009, Marranzini's promise to prosecute electricity theft was met with hearty applause by an overwhelmingly Dominican audience.

NEW PRESIDENTIAL DECREE PROVIDES TOOLS TO ADDRESS DISTRIBUTION

PROBLEMS

¶8. (U) The Dominican electricity sector is comprised of five entities: the CDEEE, the generators, and the three distributors -- EdeNorte, EdeSur, and EdeEste (collectively called the "Edes"). As noted above, when Marranzini took his position in August 2009, he fired hundreds of CDEEE employees - a cost-cutting measure widely expected of the former businessman when he arrived at an organization legendary for its patronage positions. Control of the Edes eluded Marranzini, however, until January 5, 2010, when, by Presidential decree, the CDEEE head's powers were expanded to include management of the Edes.

¶9. (SBU) At his meeting with the Charge and Emboffs, Marranzini referred to the Edes as "islands of power." The Edes should not be entities of the state and he set forth a three-year plan to both centralize electricity distribution under one entity and reprivatize the Edes. Marranzini described various tricks used to defraud the Edes of payments, including false electronic payments and electronic roll-backs of metered electricity use. He has set June 2010 as his target date to have SAP software running at CDEEE, forcing the three Edes to better monitor account changes and payments. Staff reductions are also expected at the Edes. Armed now with the sweeping powers given to him by the Presidential decree, Marranzini waxed philosophical, saying a failure on his part now to manage the electricity sector would be a failure for the private sector as well. He is clearly aware that, after leading the criticism for years, he now must prove that private sector-style management can be effective in the Dominican government

A VIEW FROM THE PRIVATE SECTOR

¶10. (SBU) On December 29, 2009, Econoffs met with a representative of AES Dominicana, a U.S.-based company that provides 36 percent of the electricity in the DR. The representative suggested that the GoDR needs to establish a variable billing structure based on market prices, noting that such a system already exists for gasoline and diesel, whose prices at the pump change every Friday based on market prices. (The aforementioned IDB program also seeks to help the CDEEE charge rates reflective of production costs.) His thinking - in line with the IMF's suggestions - is that this system would help equilibrate usage payments with generation costs. In a December 9, 2009, conversation with Pol/Econ Counselor, before Marranzini's powers were extended, the same representative opined that Marranzini was on the right track, but that, unless he gained power over the Edes, his reforms could not be properly implemented. The representative considers the presidential decree and control of the Edes a step in the right direction. To achieve lasting changes in the electricity sector, however, he believes that President Fernandez, the President of the National Energy Commission, the Edes, and the Solicitor General all have to act in unison. With all of those parties participating, he predicted the entire energy sector could be turned around in 36 months.

A VIEW FROM A DISTRIBUTOR

¶11. (SBU) On January 7, 2010, Econoff met with Federico Valera, Manager of Energy Purchasing and Regulation, for EdeSur, one of three state-owned distribution companies, to obtain an assessment

from the electricity distributors regarding the challenges they face. Valera highlighted the Edes' current ignorance regarding exactly who is using electricity and how much each user is taking. Besides the inefficiency inherent in the PRA, electricity is also severely under-metered in the DR. As noted above, roughly 40 percent of all electricity generated is lost, either due to theft (30 percent) or technical inefficiencies (10 percent). It is estimated that one million unmetered users currently receive electricity free of charge. Valera recommended that short- and mid-term investments should be focused on installing meters, rather than constructing new generation facilities. Increased metering, in his opinion, would achieve two goals: (1) it would increase revenue collection and thus reduce or eliminate the monthly deficits and (2) it would reduce electricity demand as users who previously received electricity free of charge would invariably lessen their consumption when faced with an actual electricity bill.

WHAT LIES AHEAD?

¶12. (SBU) The AES representative opined that the GoDR needs a national energy plan to help guide its investments and guarantee future electricity demand is met. When asked about a national energy plan, Marranzini was less enthusiastic. He is focused on the next three years and seems to have a clear vision for the immediate changes that are needed: improved metering, increased revenue collection, elimination of the PRA, and control over (and eventual reprivitization of) the Edes are all changes that will improve the electricity sector.

¶13. (SBU) One of the ironies of the Dominican electricity sector is that the generators have more than enough capacity to meet demand - but only when all systems are on-line. Dominican law requires generators to continue providing energy as long as they have a fuel supply. Since the GoDR was traditionally months in arrears in its payments to the generators, there was less financial incentive for the generators to keep all of their plants on-line. Generator representatives have told Econoffs on more than one occasion that "system repairs" and "scheduled maintenance" are euphemisms for a willing reduction of the energy supply in response to delayed payments.

¶14. (U) That said, demand is expected to outpace total energy availability in 2013. According to AES, USD 2.5 billion in generation investments are needed over the next five years to meet anticipated demands for electricity . Commitments to constructing new electricity generation plants continue to receive the attention of the press. Almost monthly, there are announcements of new proposals to build power stations - many coming from far-flung countries such as Libya and Korea. Most recently, the GoDR announced a German-Emirati group will construct a 600mW natural gas plant near Manzanillo and another 800mW plant will be constructed in an undetermined location by a Canadian firm. Marranzini confirmed the newspaper reports of the 600 and 800 mW plants and seemed confident that they would come on-line as planned.

COMMENT

¶15. (SBU) The changes made under Marranzini's tenure suggest a brighter future for the energy sector. President Fernandez's recent decree regarding the Edes is a strong show of support for

recent decree regarding the EdeS is a strong show of support for the CDEEE director's efforts. If Marranzini is able to pay off debt and eliminate the operating deficit, he will likely win over the support of the generators. However, doing so will likely encounter resistance from the distributors - which are controlled by a number of people who stand to lose from a more efficient sector - and from those consumers, particularly businesses, that have become accustomed to free power through theft or subsidy (particularly the PRA). Many questions remain to be answered. How will one million new meters be installed and incorporated into the billing system? How will electricity theft and failure to pay bills be addressed? How will the distributors and consumers respond to the reforms? Will any of the rumored future power plants actually be constructed? So far, the GoDR and the IFIs have identified the "what" but they are soon going to have to confront the "how." Nor should we expect the more politically unpopular measures to be taken until sometime after the May 2010 mid-term elections. END COMMENT.

¶16. (U) MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
Lambert

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10STATE1187

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10STATE1187 aka Wikileaks id #242680 ?
Subject	ENGAGING ON NEW AIR PASSENGER SCREENING RULES
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Wed, 6 Jan 2010 21:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10STATE1187.html
Referenced by	10ABUJA39 , 10ALGIERS39 , 10BEIRUT21 , 10HAVANA26 , 10ISLAMABAD191
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1994
OO RUEHDH RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #1187/01 0062127
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 062120Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHUJA/AMEMBASSY ABUJA IMMEDIATE 0671
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS IMMEDIATE 4235
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0510
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 2004
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 8476
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD IMMEDIATE 5678
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL IMMEDIATE 5371
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM IMMEDIATE 8865
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4556
RUEHYN/AMEMBASSY SANAA IMMEDIATE 0637
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI IMMEDIATE 1792
RUEHUB/USINT HAVANA IMMEDIATE 7585
INFO RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI PRIORITY 0254
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN PRIORITY 0155
RUEHJI/AMCONSUL JEDDAH PRIORITY 6634
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 7491
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 8584
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE PRIORITY 8726
RUEHMT/AMCONSUL MONTREAL PRIORITY 0085
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 3330
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 9337
RHMFISS/TSA HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMCSUU/FAA NATIONAL HQ WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RULSDMK/TRANSPORTATION DEPT WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY 0832
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 07 STATE 001187

SIPDIS
MONTREAL PLEASE PASS TO U.S. MISSION ICAO (KEHOE)

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/05/2020
TAGS: EAIR *[Civil Aviation]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , ASEC *[Security]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , AF *[Afghanistan]* , AG *[Algeria]* , CU *[Cuba]* , IR *[Iran]* , IZ *[Iraq]* , LE *[Lebanon]* , LY *[Libya]* , NI *[Nigeria]* , PK *[Pakistan]* , SA *[Saudi Arabia]* ,
SO *[Somalia]* , SU *[Sudan]* , SY *[Syria]* , YM *[Yemen]*

SUBJECT: ENGAGING ON NEW AIR PASSENGER SCREENING RULES

Classified By: Deputy Assistant Secretary
John R. Bylerly; Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action cable. Please see paragraph 3.

Summary and Action Request

¶2. (C) The attempted Christmas day bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight resulted in a presidential review and new Transportation Security Administration TSA) screening requirements, initially for all passengers flying to the United States. After interagency consultation, these requirements were modified and focused more directly on people and flights related to 14 countries of interest. Citizens of these countries, as well as all passengers flying to the United States from or through these 14 countries remain subject to the enhanced TSA screening procedures, while others will be subject to random, threat-based screening. Several countries included among the 14 are close and cooperative U.S. partners in the fight against terrorism who have expressed shock and opposition to their inclusion. The list and the related enhanced screening regime are now long-term, though the composition of the list is open to on-going review.

¶3. (C) Drawing on the talking points and Q and A,s in paragraphs 8 and 9 below, posts are asked to engage at the highest appropriate levels within host governments to explain the need for the new screening measures. In the cases of Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia, posts should seek to clarify to host governments that their nation,s inclusion in the list is not an attempt to equate them with state sponsors of terrorism and that the USG values and seeks to deepen our bilateral partnerships, including on counterterrorism. End of summary and action request.

Background

¶4. (C) In the wake of the December 25 attempt by Nigerian national Umar Farooq Abdulmutallab to destroy Northwest flight 253 to Detroit, the President ordered a review of all the facts and the Department of Homeland Security,s (DHS) Transportation Security

Administration (TSA) instituted the immediate, worldwide enhanced screening of all air passengers departing non-stop

to the United States. Officials of DHS, State and TSA met December 30, 2009, to confer on the longer-term application of these enhanced screening procedures, with an eye to better focusing the process and hopefully relieving the extraordinary burden they had placed on airports and airlines. The essence of TSA,s follow-on regime announced on January 3, 2010, is a requirement for sustained 100-percent screening of a reduced pool of persons, combined with random, threat-based screening of all other passengers.

¶5.(C) After discussion, State agreed to a list of 14 countries to be deemed &of interest.8 These included the following: Cuba, Sudan, Syria, Iran, -- these four were drawn from the Department,s State Sponsors of Terrorism list -- Afghanistan, Algeria, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, and Yemen. (Note: Posts may confirm that their host nation is among the 14, but should not/not provide names of other countries on the list. End note.) All persons holding passports issued by any of these 14 countries, or persons who are flying to the United States from or through these countries, regardless of nationality (including U.S. citizens), are subject to enhanced screening procedures. Notice of the requirement for enhanced screening and the clearer designation of which groups are subject to enhanced screening was conveyed to airlines and other stakeholders -- including some host governments -- and became effective January 3. These changes, as well as other steps taken to mitigate the threat seen on December 25, were briefed to and discussed by the President, as posts will have seen in the press.

Countries of Interest: Why Us?

¶6. (C) According to TSA, in drawing up its draft list of countries of interest, its officials referred to the State Department,s list of state sponsors of terrorism and its list of terrorist safe havens. Following the December 30, 2009, discussion of the draft list with State and Department of Homeland Security (DHS), State advised TSA that it had no objection to the final list of 14. The list reflects the combined application of current intelligence and current and historic patterns of terrorist movements and activities. TSA,s new procedures are intended as a &sustainable8 response. They will be subject to continuous review but are likely to be in place until

STATE 00001187 003 OF 007

another, better system can be found to ensure U.S. aviation security. State officials are actively working with DHS to find such a system, a system that is

to find such a system, a system that is not based on country of origin but will ensure all travelers who are higher risk are identified and appropriate security measures are taken.

¶7. (C) Initial reports from addressee posts, as well as general media reports on host government reactions, indicate some confusion, surprise and dismay about the inclusion of some countries among the 14. Although the USG has not released the list, countries are reacting to leaks in the media. Some countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, are key partners in our counterterrorism efforts and have expressed concern about their inclusion. In responding to inquiries from host government officials about their country,s inclusion in the list and the broader policy consequences, posts may draw on the talking points below. These points or accompanying background materials should not be left in any written or electronic form with the host government.

Talking Points

¶8. (SBU) Begin unclassified talking points:

The security of global aviation is the shared responsibility of all countries. Recent events have shown that when an individual enters an airport in one corner of the world, he can threaten countries and the lives of people far in the distance.

The attempted December 25 bombing of a Northwest Airlines flight from Amsterdam to Detroit has been of great concern to the President and required an immediate enhancement of screening protocols for passengers flying to the United States. The institution of these enhanced procedures, including full-body pat-downs of 100 percent of all passengers and physical examinations of all accessible property represented a significant burden on airlines, airports and aviation security authorities worldwide. Increased TSA screening measures have already been successful in disrupting an attempt to repeat the scenario employed by the Christmas bomber.

In an effort to better focus our search for those seeking to attack civil aircraft, the United States has decided to reduce the requirement for 100 percent screening to passengers holding passports from or traveling to the United States from or through only a limited number of countries. The initial list comprises

14 countries, including those designated by the State Department as state sponsors of terrorism. Others were included on the list based on current threat

assessments, coupled with historic patterns of terrorist movements and activities.

All persons traveling to the United States who hold passports issued by any of the 14 countries are subject to enhanced screening. All persons, regardless of their nationality/passport, to include U.S. citizens, who are flying to the United States from one of the 14 countries, or whose itinerary has taken them through one of these countries, are also subject to enhanced screening.

Passengers flying to the United States who 1) do not hold passports from these 14 countries and 2) are not flying from or through any of the 14 countries, are, nonetheless, also subject to enhanced screening procedures, based on a random and threat-based selection. Passengers on U.S. government watch lists may also be subject to enhanced screening.

Air carriers may exempt the following people (as well as their respective spouses and children under 12) from enhanced screening:

- heads of state;
- heads of government;
- government ministers;
- ambassadors to the United States; and
- permanent representatives to the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

(Note: Further information on the enhanced procedures is provided in the Q and A,s in paragraph 9 below. End note.)

On December 25, a terrorist successfully evaded established screening procedures and existing technology to board an aircraft and attempt an attack against the continental United States. That event has required the United States to take further steps to better protect travelers flying to the United States from locations where security circumstances and travel patterns merit heightened screening procedures. Several of the 14 countries affected by the new TSA guidelines enjoy close bilateral relations with the United States and engage with us on a range of issues, including regional stability and counterterrorism cooperation. Unlike state sponsors of terrorism, whose actions facilitate violent extremism, these countries have been proactive in countering terrorist organizations. We will continue to work with our partners

STATE 00001187 005 OF 007

to sustain and deepen our cooperation, including on counterterrorism issues.

This event has underscored the need for closer international cooperation to

closer international cooperation to secure global aviation networks upon which we all depend. In order to provide the security all our citizens deserve, we believe we must collect information, share information, expand the use of technology, and strengthen international standards. The Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security is traveling to several countries the weeks of January 3 and 9 to hear the views of the international community. In the coming weeks and months we will continue and widen this dialogue and we welcome your input to it.

End talking points

Enhanced Screening Q & A,s
---
9 (U) Begin questions and answers
Q: What are the new screening requirements that have been instituted by TSA?
A:
Following the December 25 attempted bombing of an aircraft flying from Amsterdam to Detroit, TSA has implemented enhanced security measures for all international flights to U.S. locations (including both U.S. and international carriers). All international passengers will be subject to enhanced screening, and the majority of passengers will be screened using threat-based or random measures. This includes U.S. citizens.

Until now, most foreign and U.S. carriers and countries only had to meet international security requirements. Now TSA has mandated that all international flights (both U.S. and international carriers) to the United States must add additional measures. These additional measures are sustainable and provide a significant increase in our security posture.

Additionally, TSA is implementing enhanced measures for passengers with passports from or itineraries from or through certain &countries of interest.8 This requirement goes beyond simply looking at passports, focusing as well where passengers are flying from or through prior to departing for the United States.

These are changes that were not widely in place for all carriers or countries on December 24. These are sustainable measures that are a significant enhancement to our national security posture. TSA will continuously review

STATE 00001187 006 OF 007

these measures with our global aviation partners to ensure the highest levels of security.

Q. What are the 14 &countries of

interest?8

A: The 14 include the countries designated by the State Department as &State Sponsors of Terrorism.8 In addition, the U.S. Government has added a number of other countries to which these enhanced screening procedures will apply. The inclusion of these additional countries reflects a careful assessment of various factors, including current counterterrorism intelligence and current and historic patterns of terrorist movements and activities. Air travel in these countries is assessed to be at greater risk of interference by known and potential terrorists targeting American citizens and interests. This list is under regular review and it will be modified as circumstances and our assessment of the risk of attacks warrant.

Q. What are the enhanced screening measures?

A: Full-body pat-downs and physical inspection of accessible property being taken by the passenger onto the aircraft. They may also include advanced explosive detection technology or advanced imaging technology where available.

Q. What can passengers traveling to the United States from airports in the 14 countries of interest expect? What of those who have traveled through one of these countries as part of their itinerary taking them to the United States?

A: All passengers, regardless of nationality, who are departing from one of the 14 countries on the way to the United States are subject to enhanced screening in the form of full-body pat-downs and examination of all their personal property being taken aboard the aircraft. Similarly, passengers departing to the United States from a third country but whose current itinerary has taken them through one of the 14 will be given enhanced screening and their property examined. This includes holders of American passports.

Q. What are the procedures for a person traveling to the United States who holds a passport issued by one of the 14 countries but who is not departing from or transiting through one of the 14?

A: A person holding a passport issued by one of the 14 countries is subject to the same enhanced screening when flying to the United States, regardless of point of origin.

Q. Are there special provisions made for dignitaries?

A: Air carriers may exempt the following people (as well as their respective spouses and children under 12) from enhanced screening:
- heads of state;
- heads of government;
- government ministers;
- ambassadors to the United States; and
- permanent representatives to the United Nations and the Organization of American States.

End of Q and A's.

¶10. (SBU) At each post,s discretion, Embassy may make appropriate assurances to its host government that the United States greatly values its cooperation on counterterrorism efforts, and hopes that such cooperation will continue.

¶11. (SBU) This message coordinated with TSA and DHS. INFO posts, particularly those with significant air travel to the United States, may wish to draw from these points, particularly the final talking point.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10STATE284

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10STATE284 aka Wikileaks id #242410 ?
Subject	ESTABLISHING A DATE FOR THE INAUGURAL POLITICAL MILITARY DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA
Origin	Secretary of State (United States)
Cable time	Mon, 4 Jan 2010 18:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10STATE284.html
References	09TRIPOLI893
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI60
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0379
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHC #0284/01 0041825
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 041820Z JAN 10
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 1742
INFO RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 000284

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2020
TAGS: MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , MOPS *[Military Operations]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]*
SUBJECT: ESTABLISHING A DATE FOR THE INAUGURAL POLITICAL MILITARY DIALOGUE WITH LIBYA

REF: A. TRIPOLI 899
B. TRIPOLI 893

Classified By: PM PDAS Tom Countryman, E.O. 12958, 1.4(b)(d)

¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 5.

¶2. (C) The United States and Libya have an opportunity to strengthen the bilateral relationship by establishing a regular political-military dialogue, especially in light of their recent signing of a 505 agreement (ref a). Furthermore, the Department concurs with Post's suggestion to establish an inaugural pol-mil dialogue in early 2010 (ref b), and supports doing so as early as the January-February 2010 timeframe. These discussions should focus on building trust on issues such as regional security, defense capabilities and needs, end use monitoring, and broader security cooperation issues (proposed agenda themes in para 5). It should be made

issues (proposed agenda themes in para 5). It should be made clear that Libyan participation in this dialogue is not transactional in nature, but the goal is to establish a more effective channel for an effective security-related dialogue between the USG and GOL.

¶3. (C) Given the sensitivity of the bilateral relationship at this time (stemming in particular from the Libyan welcome to Pan Am 103 bomber Abdelbaset al-Megrahi,the human rights case of Fathi al-Jahmi, balking on WMD commitments) and GOL unfamiliarity with the mechanics and intent of pol-mil talks with the USG, the Department proposes that Post engage with the GOL to establish a date for the inaugural pol-mil talks.

¶4. (C) The Department envisions that the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Political-Military Affairs lead the pol-mil talks with appropriate participation by NEA, DOD/OSD, DOD/Joint Staff, AFRICOM, the NSC, and other interagency partners. The timing of inaugural talks will be the subject of close cooperation with Post, NEA, DOD and the NSC. These talks are separate from, and broader in scope than, the military to military "Council of Colonels" discussion (to be held January 11-13).

¶5. (C/REL LIBYA) Action Request: Post is requested to draw upon the U.S.-proposed agenda items below, and elicit GOL proposals to develop the timing and substance of the pol-mil dialogue. Post is also requested to begin discussions on the desired composition of delegations, timing, location, and other related matters. Regarding post's input for agenda items in reftel B, the Department views discussion of Libya's fulfillment of its Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) (SCUD-B destruction) commitments as better suited for established channels with officials from the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. We also consider discussion of the disposition of Libya's efforts to take delivery of the C-130s located in Marietta, Georgia as an "if raised" topic only for this forum, as the USG has told the GOL repeatedly to address any concerns about these aircraft directly with Lockheed Martin.

SECURITY COOPERATION
- USG pol-mil talks globally: history, models and outcomes (U.S.)
- Expanding cooperation in demining and combating MANPADS - (U.S.)
- Requirements for the protection of U.S. military technology - (e.g., the 505 Agreement, a budget transparency waiver, and opportunities available to Libya now that they have signed the 505 Agreement) (U.S.)

DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND COOPERATION
- Resource/security requirements overview - (Libya)
- Strengthening defense trade via Foreign Military Sales - (U.S.)
- Libya's defense procurement status - (U.S.)

REGIONAL SECURITY
- Regional security overview and strategic priorities - (U.S. and Libya)
  a. Identify common goals
  b. Identify common threats (including regional counterterrorism threats)

- Discuss specific regional security issues and Libya's role and contributions thereto, including: (U.S. and Libya)
  a. The AU North Africa Regional Capability;
  b. Counterterrorism and associated issues (AQIM, LIFG,

STATE 00000284 002 OF 002

foreign fighters);

c. Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), and how it can help Libya achieve its regional objectives;
d. Humanitarian demining, and MANPADS removal (Post can note to the GOL that the delegation will come prepared to discuss specific programs, and to offer funds toward a jointly financed pilot program on demining).
e. Migration and illicit networks;
f. Chad
g. Sudan

- Discuss other security issues of mutual interest
a. Update on U.S./Coalition counter-piracy efforts (U.S.)
b. Libyan participation in U.N. peacekeeping missions within Africa. (U.S.)
c. Afghanistan, Iran, and Yemen (U.S. and Libya)

- Opportunities for AFRICOM and Libya to work together on regional and continental security -(U.S.)

- Next steps on increasing cooperation in areas of mutual strategic concern - (U.S. and Libya)

¶6. Request feedback by January 8. PM Bureau Point of contact is Tom Mancinelli, 202 647 9531 or mancinellitj@state.sgov.gov.
CLINTON

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI10

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI10 aka Wikileaks id #243017 ?
Subject	LIBYA: 2009 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 10 Jan 2010 11:21 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI10.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4238
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0010/01 0101121
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 101121Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5653
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6204
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000010

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, INL, SCT, AND EEB; DEPT. OF JUSTICE FOR AFMLS, OIA, AND OPDAT; DEPT OF TREASURY FOR FINCEN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KCRM *[Criminal Activity]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , SNAR *[Narcotics]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: 2009 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT (INCSR) MONEY LAUNDERING AND FINANCIAL CRIMES

REF: STATE 114960

TRIPOLI 00000010 001.2 OF 003

¶1. Libya is not considered to be an important financial sector in the Middle East and northern Africa. The Libyan economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil and gas sector, which constitute practically all export earnings and over 70 percent of GDP. The combination of oil revenues and a small population give Libya one of the highest per capita GDPs in Africa. Libya has a cash-based economy and large underground markets. Libya is a destination and transit point for smuggled goods, particularly alcohol and black market/counterfeit goods

from sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt and China. Contraband smuggling includes narcotics, particularly hashish/cannabis and heroin. Libya is not considered to be a production location for illegal drugs, although its geographic position, porous borders and limited law enforcement capacity make it an attractive transit point for illegal drugs. Libya is a transit and destination country for men and women from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia trafficked for the purposes of forced labor and commercial sexual exploitation. While most foreigners in Libya are economic migrants, some are forced into prostitution, or forced to work as laborers and beggars to pay off their smuggling debts. Hawala and informal value transfer networks are present.

¶2. The Libyan banking system consists of a Central Bank, three state-owned commercial banks, two recently-privatized banks, forty-eight national banks and a handful of privately-owned Libyan banks. Libyan banks suffer from a lack of modern equipment and trained personnel, and substantial investment in both will be required to bring Libyan banks up to international standards. Libyan banks offer little in the way of services for their customers, and most Libyans make little use of the banking system. Libyan Banking Law No. 1 of 2005 allows for the entry of foreign banks into Libya. Libya is not considered to be an offshore financial center. Offshore banks, international business companies and other forms of exempt/shell companies are not licensed by the Libyan government.

¶3. Libya's privatization of its public banks is proceeding as part of the Central Bank's efforts to modernize Libya's banking sector. In 2007, Sahara Bank was privatized and entered into an agreement with the French bank BNP Paribas in which BNP owns nineteen percent and has majority representation on the Board of Directors. The privatized Sahara Bank is embarking on a comprehensive modernization process, including the development of a consolidated information technology system and customer service training. Similarly, another formerly state-owned bank, Wahda Bank was privatized in 2007 in a deal that awarded a nineteen percent stake to Jordan's Arab Bank. Two other state-run banks, Umma Bank and Jamahiriya Bank, were merged in 2008 as part of the government's plans to privatize and consolidate its state-owned banks. The Central Bank continues to formulate a program of banking sector modernization and retains western consulting firms to assist in reforms. Libya is also cooperating with the IMF and World Bank by soliciting their advice and assistance for economic reforms. In general, training and resources are lacking for anti-money laundering awareness and countermeasure implementation. A considerable transition time is anticipated while Libya's banking system is reformed and gradually reintegrated into the international system following the lifting of UN and U.S. sanctions.

¶4. The Central Bank is responsible for the establishment of regulations relevant to combating money laundering and terrorist finance under the terms of Article 57 of Banking Law No. 1 of 2005. Money laundering is illegal in Libya, and terms and penalties are clearly laid out in Banking Law No. 2 of 2005 on Combating Money Laundering. This law does not make specific mention of drug-related money laundering. These crimes are dealt with under Libya's Penal Code, Criminal Procedures Law, and related supplementary laws. Penalties for money laundering under Law No. 2 include imprisonment (for an unspecified duration) and a fine equal to the amount of relevant illegal goods/property. An increased penalty is used if the malefactor participated in the predicate offense, whether as a perpetrator or accomplice. Penalties ranging from 1,000 to 10,000 Libyan dinars (approximately $770 to $7,700) are also imposed on persons withholding information on money laundering offenses, persons warning offenders of an ongoing investigation and persons in violation of foreign currency importation regulations. The offense of falsely accusing others of money laundering offenses is punishable by imprisonment of not less than a year.

¶5. Banking Law No. 2 directed the Central Bank to establish a Financial Information Unit (FIU). It also established a National Committee for Combating Money Laundering chaired by the Governor or Deputy Governor of the Central Bank. The National Committee includes representatives from the Secretariat of the General

includes representatives from the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Finance and Planning, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Justice, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Public Security, the

Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Industry, Economy, and Trade, the Secretariat of the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation, the Customs Authority and the Tax Authority.

¶6. Libyan banks are required to record and report the identity of customers engaged in all transactions. Records of transactions are retained for a considerable (but indeterminate) period, although a lack of computerized records and systems, particularly among Libya's more than forty-eight regional banks and branches in remote areas of the country, preclude reliable record-keeping and data retrieval.

¶7. Libya's Banking Law No.1 forbids "possessing, owning, using, exploiting, disposing of in any manner, transferring, transporting, depositing, or concealing illegal property in order to disguise its unlawful source." The broad scope of the law, and its complimentary relationship to existing criminal law, extends the scope of money laundering controls and penalties to non-banking financial institutions. All entities, either financial or non-financial in nature, are required to report money laundering activity to Libyan authorities under penalty of law. The Central Bank is responsible for supervision of all banks, financial centers and money changing institutions. All banks are required to undergo an annual audit and establish an administrative unit called the "compliance unit" which is directly subordinate to the board of directors. The Central Bank's Banking Supervision Division is also responsible for examining banks to ensure that they are operating in compliance with law.

¶8. Libya established a Financial Information Unit (FIU) under the terms of Banking Law No. 2. The Central Bank is responsible for establishing and housing the Libyan FIU. According to the director of the FIU, the unit now has a staff of 15 and is an independent body that reports directly to the Central Bank Governor, who heads the National Committee for Combating Money Laundering. Libya has welcomed an offer by the U.S. Department of Treasury to provide technical assistance to the FIU and other government entities in 1) Combating money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes; 2) Confronting organized crime and corruption; and 3) reorganizing law enforcement and financial entities to help them detect, investigate and prosecute complex international financial crimes.

¶9. The FIU is tasked to gather all reports on suspicious transactions from all financial and commercial establishments and individual persons. It is authorized by law to exchange information and reports on cases suspected of being linked to money laundering activities with its counterparts in other countries, in accordance with Libya's international commitments. All banks operating in Libya are required by law to establish a "Subsidiary Unit for Information on Combating Money Laundering" responsible for monitoring all activities and transactions suspected of being linked to money laundering activities. The FIU is responsible for reporting this information to the Governor of the Central Bank for appropriate action. However, given the limitations of the Libyan banking sector both in terms of human and technological resources and the lead time necessary to establish new internal mechanisms, these subsidiary units are either non-existent or nonfunctional in most cases. All entities cooperating with the FIU and/or law enforcement entities are granted confidentiality. Furthermore, anyone reporting acts of money laundering before they are discovered by Libyan authorities is exempted from punishment under the law (safe harbor). As in previous years, there is no reliable information on the number of suspicious transaction reports (STRs) issued in 2007, nor information on the scope of prosecutions and convictions on the part of Libyan government authorities.

¶10. It is illegal to transfer funds outside of Libya without the approval of the Central Bank. Cash courier operations are in clear violation of Libyan law. It is estimated that up to ten percent of foreign transfers are made through illegal means (i.e., not through the Central Bank). Libya is seeking foreign assistance to bring tighter control over these transactions; however, fund transfers by migrant workers (mainly from sub-Saharan Africa and Asia) are difficult for the Libyan government to monitor, particularly transfers by criminal organizations. Between 1.5 and 2 million foreigners are thought to live and work in Libya in violation of immigration laws. It is illegal for these workers to take cash out of the country; however, porous borders and limited law enforcement capacity enable some degree of smuggling and illicit transfer of goods and currency.

¶11. Informal hawala money dealers (muhawaleen) exist in Libya, and are often used to facilitate trade and small project finance. Libyan officials have indicated that they intend to require registration of all muhawaleen in the near future. Given the poor quality and limited reach of Libya's banking system, many Libyans and foreigners rely on informal mechanisms for cash

payments and transactions. This is done largely for practical reasons, as Libya's socialist practices and commercial rivalries among regime insiders discourage disclosure of income and business transactions. Until the recent revision of the tax code, rates of up to 80-90 percent encouraged off-the-book transactions.

¶12. Reportedly, there is no evidence of extensive money laundering or terrorist financing taking place in the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) in the city of Misrata. Misrata, 210 kilometers east of Tripoli, is currently Libya's sole operating FTZ. Projects in the free zone enjoy standard "Five Freedoms" privileges, including tax and customs exemptions. At present, the zone occupies 430 hectares, including a portion of the Port of Misrata.

¶13. Libya is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the UN Convention against Corruption. Libya is a party to all 12 of the UN Conventions and Protocols dealing with terrorism, including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. However, Libya has not criminalized terrorist financing. The GOL has demonstrated some willingness to circulate UN and U.S. lists of terrorist entities; however, there are no indications to suggest that the GOL has made any effort to freeze, seize or forfeit assets of suspected terrorists or financiers of terrorism.

¶14. In 2006, the Department of State rescinded Libya's designation as a State Sponsor of Terrorism. The Government of Libya (GOL) should enact counterterrorist financing legislation and adopt anti-money laundering and counterterrorist finance policies and programs that adhere to world standards. Libya has joined the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force and regularly participates in the Task Force's conferences. Libya should continue to modernize its banking sector and adopt full transparency procedures. Tax reform should continue so as to shrink the underground economy. Working with the international community, the Libyan FIU and financial police should avail themselves of training. Appropriate entities should become familiar with money laundering and terrorist finance methodologies. In particular, Libyan law enforcement and customs authorities should examine the underground economy, including smuggling networks, and informal value transfer systems. The GOL should continue measures aimed at combating corruption in government and commerce. The Government should endeavor to provide statistics on the number of money laundering investigations, prosecutions, and convictions.

¶15. The Point of Contact for this report is Allison Lee (LeeAJ2@state.gov).

CRETZ

Media

- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI100

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI100 aka Wikileaks id #247260 ?
Subject	HEAD OF LIBYAN IMMIGRATION: U.S. BUSINESSMEN ARE WELCOME
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Feb 2010 15:29 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI100.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6286
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0100/01 0351529
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 041529Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5766
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 0029
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6322
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000100

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND CA/VO/F/P

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/4/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , CACS, PBTS *[National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: HEAD OF LIBYAN IMMIGRATION: U.S. BUSINESSMEN ARE WELCOME

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 2 meeting with the Ambassador, the director of the Libyan Immigration and Passports Department, Brigadier General Mohamed al Rammali, said that American businesspeople can now "easily get visas to Libya, just like the Europeans" provided that they have an invitation letter from a Libyan company. In response to the Ambassador's urging that Libya also start issuing visas to U.S. tourists, Rammali indicated that the GOL still refuses to do so because of concerns about the safety of Americans: "they are a better target for Al Qaida than the European tourists." Rammali underlined that, due to Libya's being on the list of countries whose citizens require additional TSA screening when traveling to the U.S., the ban on U.S. tourists to Libya is unlikely to be lifted soon. He noted that he will sign the PISCES agreement on behalf of the GOL as soon as the Arabic-English translations

have been compared. The Ambassador also pressed Rammali on a long-standing ACS case. End summary

¶2. (C) Rammali, who had last met with the Embassy in 2006, commented at the outset of the meeting that it was "highly unusual" for him to meet with foreign diplomats, and that all future contact would need to take place through the MFA. In response to the Ambassador's queries, he stressed that "since November 2009, when the regulations changed, American businesspeople coming to Libya are treated just like Europeans." According to Rammali, whose department is responsible for granting visa approvals for foreigners visitors to Libya, American businesspeople simply need a letter of invitation from a Libyan company; the company then files the visa application and letter with the Libyan Immigration and Passports Department, and a visa will subsequently be granted "usually within one week." (Note: For the past year, our business contacts have complained repeatedly about the difficulties they encounter in getting U.S. businesspeople to Libya, including long delays and astronomical fees. End note). To highlight his office's work in granting visas to American businesspeople, Rammali showed the Ambassador a spreadsheet containing the names and passport numbers of 284 U.S. businesspeople to whom he had issued visas in January 2010. He said that the visa fees "are not more than the 178 dinars (equivalent to USD 140) that Libyans are charged for the U.S. visa process," and highlighted that in the past month, he had refused a visa to only one American visa applicant.

¶3. (C) In response to the Ambassador's pressing for an end to the apparent freeze on the issuance of Libyan visas to official USG-related travelers, Rammali noted that he is responsible for "normal" travelers only, not official ones. The Ambassador then urged that the Libyan ban on issuing visas to U.S. tourists be lifted, particularly given the fact the Embassy is now issuing dozens of visas every day to Libyan tourists. Rammali highlighted GOL concerns that American tourists will "attract terrorists" and that they "are at higher risk of getting attacked by Al Qaida when they go out in the desert than Italian or French tourists." He also opined that after the recent announcement that Libyans will be subject to additional TSA screening when traveling to the U.S., "the timing is not right for us to start issuing tourist visas ... you should be encouraging us to do so with positive measures, rather than adding us to lists where our citizens get screened." The Ambassador urged Rammali not to view the breadth of the full range of the bilateral relationship simply through the lens of TSA screening. He encouraged Rammali to advocate within the GOL for the issuance of visas to American tourists, suggesting that as a first step, Libya might issue visas for a few U.S. citizens to join a larger foreign tour group to Libya, and then subsequently build up to issuing more tourist visas. Rammali pledged to discuss the issue within the GOL, but "we need time."

¶4. (C) Rammali flagged that National Security Advisor Muatasim al Qadhafi has asked him to be the Libyan signatory on the PISCES agreement, which would create the framework for enhanced border security cooperation between the U.S. and Libya. Rammali said he needed to compare the Arabic and English translations of the document, and then would send it back to the Embassy through the MFA. Once we had also agreed to the text, the agreement could be signed. The Ambassador urged Rammali to move quickly on the agreement, noting that he hoped to sign it before the end of February.

¶5. (C) The Ambassador raised a long-standing ACS case with Rammali, urging that Mohamed Ghennewa, an American-Libyan citizen and LES Embassy employee, be allowed to depart Libya as soon as possible, in order to assist his ill wife in seeking medical care outside the country. (Note: Ghennewa was previously detained by the GOL, and upon being released from prison, was told his name is on the no-fly list, and that he was barred from leaving the country. We have continuously advocated on his behalf with a range of senior-level interlocutors. End note)

behalf with a range of senior level interlocutors. End note).
Rammali said he knew of the case, and was unsure if Ghennewa was

TRIPOLI 00000100 002 OF 002

still on the no-fly list, although "if he is, the Libyan
government has good reasons for it." He pledged to look into it,
and to give the Ambassador an answer when the PISCES agreement
is signed.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI106

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI106 aka Wikileaks id #247895 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI VISAS VIPER REPORT: JANUARY 2010
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 9 Feb 2010 08:40 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI106.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9500
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0106 0400840
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 090840Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5773
RHMFIUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC
RUEILB/NCTC WASHINGTON DC
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6330
```

Hide header

```
UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000106

VISAS VIPER
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TIPOFF

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS [Visas] , KVPR [Visas VIPER Communications] , PTER [Terrorists and Terrorism] , ASEC [Security] ,
CMGT [Consular Administration and Management] , PINR [Intelligence] , PREL [External Political Relations] , LY
[Libya]
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI VISAS VIPER REPORT: JANUARY 2010

Post's Visas Viper committee met on February 6, 2010.  DCM,
POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.  No new names
were submitted.

CRETZ
```

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI109

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI109 aka Wikileaks id #247976 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI'S CONSULAR LEADERSHIP DAY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 9 Feb 2010 14:47 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI109.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9793
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0109 0401447
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 091447Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5775
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1544
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6333
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000109

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR CA/VO/F/P; CAIRO FOR RCO CHRIS ROWAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CVIS *[Visas]* , CMGMT, PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI'S CONSULAR LEADERSHIP DAY

¶1. Summary: Post's Consular Section spent February 4 in observance of Embassy Tripoli's first-ever Consular Leadership Day, with the theme of "Practicing 360 Degree Diplomacy." Taking the time out from our usual schedule to focus on improving our outreach to the Libyan public and American citizens in Libya, as well as our coordination with other sections and within the Consular section, was a valuable experience. End summary.

¶2. To allow sufficient lead time to clear our schedule for an entire day, we scheduled Consular Leadership Day for February 4 this year. The day began with an hour-long discussion focusing on improving our outreach to the two communities we serve - the Libyan public and American citizens in Libya. Despite our being open for full NIV services for over 10 months, many Libyans are still unaware that they can apply for a U.S. visa in Tripoli. We brainstormed a range of public outreach initiatives that the Embassy could undertake to better get the word out to Libyans about our services. We also discussed a variety of outreach options to Americans in Libya, including instituting a quarterly ACS newsletter to send to all Americans registered with the Embassy, and a Consular Section open house devoted to ACS issues.

¶3. Following the brainstorming session, we spent 30 minutes doing "reverse interviewing," where our LES corrected some of the Arabic phrases the FSO's and EFM use at the NIV and ACS windows, and then the native English-speakers fine-tuned the English phrases the LES regularly use with our clients. That exercise was followed by a fiercely competitive game of "Consular Jeopardy," played on the roof of the Consular Section's new office facility, where all enjoyed the balmy weather and Consular trivia questions.

¶4. The Ambassador and DCM spent an hour sharing a brown-bag lunch with all Consular section staff, discussing the importance of the Embassy's Consular services to the US-Libya bilateral relationship. The Ambassador provided feedback on the outreach initiatives we had come up with earlier in the day, and we will subsequently move forward with several of them. After lunch, we undertook a team-building activity that highlighted the importance of good communication: as one person described a photo, his/her partner had to duplicate the photo, drawing it solely based on the partner's description. This was a useful reminder of the importance of providing detail and clarifying the context when explaining the various situations that regularly arise during our work-day. We then focused on ways to further improve our customer service, and make every client who appears in our section have a positive experience.

¶5. We capped off Consular Leadership Day with an hour-long open house, with colleagues from throughout the Embassy, including the Ambassador and DCM, stopping by to tour our new waiting room, and get guided explanations of the services provided at each window. Overall, our first Consular Leadership Day was a fun, productive experience, and we look forward to moving forward on the various projects we collectively came up with during the day, as well as to being more mindful in the future of the importance of "360 Diplomacy," and our outreach efforts, from daily interactions with our clients to broader initiatives.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI110

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI110 aka Wikileaks id #248075 ?
Subject	MUBARAK AND QADHAFI CONFER ON AL SUMMIT PLANNING, VISAS FOR EGYPTIANS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 Feb 2010 07:59 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI110.html
References	10TRIPOLI53 , 10TRIPOLI95
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI113
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Fri, 28 Jan 2011 08:46: First publication, original content redacted • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Publication withdrawn • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0216
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0110/01 0410759
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 100759Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5776
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1545
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0064
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0083
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 0050
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0883
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1212
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6334
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000110

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/3/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , AL-1 [Arab League] , KPAL [Palestinian Affairs] , KSUM [Summit
Meetings] , EG [Egypt] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: MUBARAK AND QADHAFI CONFER ON AL SUMMIT PLANNING, VISAS FOR
EGYPTIANS

REF: A) TRIPOLI 53 ; B) TRIPOLI 95

TRIPOLI 00000110  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli
```

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak flew to Libya on February 3 for a three-hour meeting with Muammar al-Qadhafi to discuss the upcoming Arab League Summit and growing differences over requirements for Egyptians entering Libya. Qadhafi reportedly also expressed interest in trying to mediate between Egypt and Qatar. Mubarak was expected to counsel Qadhafi that Libya needed to do more to assure Saudi Arabia that the summit would not lead to any new tensions between the two countries. The Egyptian Embassy expects that Iran will be invited to the summit at the ministerial level but noted that several Arab countries -- including Egypt -- would boycott the summit if Mahmoud Ahmadinejad attended. The Egyptian Embassy chalked up recent visits by Hamas Political Chief Khaled Meshaal to "independent" rather than official GOL initiatives to broker a Hamas-Fatah reconciliation in advance of the March 27 summit. Engagement with Qadhafi in the run-up to the Arab League Summit, strongly advocated by the Arab diplomatic community here, could help manage his notorious unpredictability. End Summary.

¶2. (C) Muammar al-Qadhafi held private talks with Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Sirte on February 3 to discuss Libya's upcoming presidency of the Arab League (AL) and continuing differences over entry requirements for Egyptian nationals coming to Libya. Egyptian poloff said the three-hour visit would help the two countries coordinate in advance of the March 28 Arab League Summit scheduled to take place in Tripoli. Mubarak planned to counsel Qadhafi that Libya needed to better assure the Saudis that the Libyan-hosted summit would not serve as a platform to embarrass the royal family but instead move forward in a spirit of reconciliation between the two leaders.

IRAN EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE AT THE FM LEVEL

¶3. (C) The Egyptian poloff expected that Arab-Iranian relations and Palestinian issues would dominate the summit, and he noted that Libya had made recent, high profile contact on both issues. The Egyptian ambassador also told the Ambassador that Sudan and upcoming non-proliferation events in the U.S., as well as Qadhafi's possible proposals to create new high-level political and military positions in the Arab League along the lines of NATO and the EU, would also figure prominently. Arabs, he said, would not tolerate surprises like Libya's management of the July 2009 African Union Summit in Sirte, where Qadhafi's rumored, last-minute invitation of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad had caused Mubarak to cancel his attendance at that summit at the eleventh hour. (Note: While Iranian diplomats were at the venue to advance Ahmadinejad's visit to the AU Summit, his visit was cancelled on the day he was supposed to arrive.) Should Ahmadinejad attend, he said, several heads of state -- including Egypt's -- would boycott the summit. He expected Iranian FM Manuchehr Motaki, who visited Tripoli on January 14, to represent Iran as an observer. The Iranian outreach by Libya is reportedly consistent with Qadhafi's new vision of being able to serve as a bridge between Tehran and the Arab world.

PALESTINIAN UNITY TO FIGURE LARGE ON AGENDA

¶4. (C) Recalling the yet-unfulfilled January 2009 pledge by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait to provide $1.5 billion in reconstruction assistance to Gaza, the Egyptian poloff assessed that Palestinian issues would provide plenty of opportunities to weaken fragile Arab unity and that Arab leaders would be "holding their breath" and hoping to avoid unwelcome surprises by the unpredictable Qadhafi. Although Libya has played host to Hamas' Khaled Meshaal twice in as many months, the Egyptian poloff did not expect any major initiatives by the Libyan government to force Hamas-Fatah resolution before the March 28 summit. In his view, "independent" initiatives like those of Khalid al-Humeidi -- son of long-time Qadhafi insider al-Khweldi al-Humeidi -- would intensify on the outside chance a Libyan

could reach a breakthrough. Humeidi reportedly visited Ramallah and Gaza earlier this year to meet with Mahmoud Abbas and Meshaal and has organized humanitarian assistance to Gaza through his quasi-independent International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief (septel).

¶5. (C) While MFA A/S-equivalent Omran Abu Kraa and Deputy Foreign Minister-equivalent Muhammed Siala have been named to lead Libya's preparations for the summit, the organizing

TRIPOLI 00000110 002.2 OF 002

committee has not communicated with member states on logistics or the agenda. A purpose-built site for the conference is rumored to be under construction on the sprawling grounds of the new Libyan Protocol office, though guest palaces nearer public view at that site appear to require more than seven weeks to complete. The Egyptian poloff commented that Arab leaders would be less forgiving than the African delegations in Sirte -- some of whom slept on the beach as they awaited proper room assignments from their Libyan hosts.

EGYPT SEEKS EASING OF LIBYA VISA REQUIREMENTS

¶6. (C) During his February 3 meeting with Qadhafi, Mubarak was expected to push for resolution of increasingly serious problems regarding Libyan entry requirements for Egyptian nationals. According to the Egyptian poloff, Egyptians are still subject to new requirements for visas or valid work contracts begun earlier this year (ref a) while Algerians and Tunisians have reverted to earlier rules allowing entry without a visa upon demonstrating financial self-sufficiency (in the form of $800 cash). Recent bilateral agreements with countries providing significant labor to Libya, including Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, include 500 dinar (USD 420) commissions for Libyan sponsors of guest workers from those countries. In the Egyptian poloff's view, officials taking advantage of the financial inducements for sponsoring workers from those countries bore part of the blame for Egypt's continued troubles. Libya recently began a crackdown on illegal Egyptian workers. The Egyptian ambassador told the Ambassador that the Libyan crackdown resulted initially from European pressure on Libya to stem illegal traffic to Europe, and intensified after the extensive and embarrassing Egyptian press coverage given to Mutassim al-Qadhafi's New Year's partying in the Caribbean (ref b).

COMMENT

¶7. (C) In the wake of his failed attempt to extend his leadership of the African Union, Qadhafi undoubtedly is looking to the March 27 Arab League summit and beyond as a way to bolster his international standing. His massive ego and notoriously erratic behavior have generated much concern among the Arab diplomatic community here about the summit and its outcomes. The Arabs here have been very insistent that the U.S. has a role to play in influencing the outcome by engaging Qadhafi in the lead-up to the summit.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party JavaScript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI112

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI112 aka Wikileaks id #248080 ?
Subject	PROGRESS IN LIBYA-SWISS CASE: ONE BUSINESSMAN CLEARED OF ALL CHARGES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 Feb 2010 08:15 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI112.html
References	10TRIPOLI91
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI134
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0250
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0112 0410815
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 100815Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5779
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6337
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000112

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]* , SZ *[Switzerland]*
SUBJECT: PROGRESS IN LIBYA-SWISS CASE: ONE BUSINESSMAN CLEARED OF ALL CHARGES

REF: Tripoli 91

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani received a "not guilty" verdict from a Libyan tax court on February 7, officially clearing him of all legal charges levied against him by the GOL. The verdict came a day after Max Goeldi, the other Swiss businessman held in Libya since July 2007, was fined 1000 Libyan Dinar (approximately US$801) for tax violations. Now that all charges against Hamdani have been lifted, the Swiss Embassy and Hamdani's Libyan lawyer are working to determine what other "conditions" must be fulfilled in order for Hamdani to leave the country. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto said that

to leave the country. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto said that as soon as the GOL allows the two Swiss businessmen to depart, Switzerland will be ready to begin issuing visas as a first step in "normalizing" the relationship. End Summary.

¶2. (C) On February 7, a Libyan tax court issued a "not guilty" verdict to Rachid Hamdani, one of two Swiss businessmen detained in Libya since July 2007. Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto confirmed that following Hamdani's successful January 27 appeal in the Immigration Court (reftel), Hamdani is officially cleared of all legal charges the Libyan government has held against him. The Swiss Embassy and Hamdani's Libyan lawyer are working to determine what other "conditions" must be fulfilled in order for Hamdani to leave the country, as the GOL is still holding Hamdani's passport.

¶3. (C) The Hamdani verdict came a day after the same Libyan tax court fined the other Swiss businessman, Max Goeldi, 1000 Libyan Dinar (approximately US$801) for violating Libyan tax laws. Lazarotto said that Goeldi does not intend to appeal that decision. He reported that Goeldi's appeals trial before the immigration court, which was postponed for unclear reasons last week, had been rescheduled for this Thursday, February 11.

¶4. (C) Lazarotto noted that the political track continues to move forward in Bern. According to Lazarotto, the Libyans and Swiss have been in "continuous talks" via Germany over the past few weeks. While they have not yet achieved resolution on all points of disagreement, they are slowly moving toward normalization. One sign of progress is that the Libyans issued the new Swiss Vice Consul a two-year, multiple entry visa and a residency permit. Lazarotto believes that the Libyans want to give Switzerland the capacity to issue visas as soon as normalization is achieved. The first piece of normalization will be the visa policy, and the Swiss are ready to begin issuing Schengen visas as soon as the Swiss businessmen are allowed to leave the country and an agreement is signed. Official and working visas will be their first priority issuances. They expect to begin processing 40 visa applications per day and to gradually increase to the previous average of 70-80 applications per day.

¶5. (C) Comment: Lazarotto's latest comments suggest that the Swiss are anxious to end the Swiss businessmen saga and have directly mapped out a solution for the Libyans -- release the two Swiss and the visa hold will be lifted. The series of positive court rulings over the last few weeks indicate that the Libyans are willing to work within those parameters. Now that the GOL has no legal reason to keep Hamdani in the country, the coming days will tell whether Libya intends to fulfill its end of the bargain. End Comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI113

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI113 aka Wikileaks id #248086 ?
Subject	SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI'S PALESTINIAN ADVENTURISM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 Feb 2010 08:52 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI113.html
References	10TRIPOLI110
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0293
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0113 0410852
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O R 100852Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5780
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6338
```

Hide header

S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000113

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA MAG, SEMEP; NSC FOR AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/10/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , KISL *[Islamic Issues]* , KWBG *[West Bank and Gaza]* , KPAL *[Palestinian Affairs]* , IS *[Israel]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SAIF AL-ISLAM AL-QADHAFI'S PALESTINIAN ADVENTURISM

REF: TRIPOLI 110

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (S/NF) Summary: In a nod to his father's dream to serve as grand regional mediator, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi appears to be increasingly interested in helping to broker reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, possibly in hopes of achieving a compromise prior to the Libyan-hosted Arab League Summit in March. One of Saif's close advisors and confidantes recently told us that Saif believes Libya has the best chance to forge a compromise between the Palestinian parties due to its "neutrality," and because of that, had been approached personally by Khaled Mish'al to intervene. Mish'al has also reportedly asked Saif to serve as a backchannel interlocutor between Hamas and the USG. The advisor confirmed that the

Libyan government was pursuing a second track to influence Palestinian reunification, via the son of one of Muammar al-Qadhafi's fellow "free officers." While Saif has worked in the past to negotiate a compromise between the Israelis and the Palestinians on the release of Gilad Shalit, his current efforts focus exclusively on the Palestinian account. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) Mohamed Ismail, chief of staff to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi recently discussed with P/E chief the latter's involvement in Palestinian reconciliation efforts, which involved two visits by Hamas Political Chief Khaled Mish'al to Tripoli and a meeting in Spain between Saif and Mohammed Dahlan, Fatah Central Committee member and former Security Chief in Gaza. Ismail stressed that his boss was acting strictly in his capacity as head of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), not on behalf of the Libyan government. According to the advisor, Mish'al had approached Saif to work with him to negotiate a compromise with Dahlan, which would possibly involve the USG. He characterized Dahlan as "more reasonable" than PA President Mahmoud Abbas, whom he believed was a "weak figurehead, without authority," and an obstacle to reconciliation efforts.

¶3. (S/NF) While Saif was working toward a compromise in time to announce the achievement at the upcoming Arab League Summit, which Tripoli will host in March (reftel), he was finding the Palestinians "stubborn" and difficult to advise. Ismail opined that Egypt was complicating matters through its ardent support for Fatah and hatred of Hamas. "They'll never allow unity," he remarked. Nevertheless, Saif believes that Libya stands a better chance than other "Arab brothers" to broker reconciliation, given its "neutral" position on matters. Ismail also claimed that Saif had attempted to mediate between Israel and the Palestinians on the release of Gilad Shalit, but he had not achieved much success and had not attempted to engage on that matter since last October. Ismail suggested that Saif serve as a liaison for informal communication between Hamas and the USG, claiming that Mish'al had asked Saif to approach the USG on that issue.

¶4. (S/NF) Ismail refuted a January 24 report in Israel's "Haaretz" claiming that "a group of four or five" Libyans had been denied entry into Ramallah for talks with senior Fatah officials in late December. He said that Khaled al-Humeidi, Head of the quasi-governmental International Organization for Peace, Care, and Relief in Libya and an aide to Muammar al-Qadhafi, had led the delegation, and that Humeidi, son of one of the five "free officers" that led Muammar al-Qadhafi's 1969 coup, and his buddies went to Ramallah and met with the officials. The advisor claimed that Humeidi's efforts were independent of Saif's, potentially at the behest of the Libyan leader. Humeidi's organizations has also reportedly provided aid to Palestinians in Gaza.

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: Saif's adventurism among the Palestinians is not new -- he has made public statements on Israeli-Palestinian issues in the past -- and is reminiscent of his father's attempts to mediate in conflicts across the region and on the continent. His efforts are all the more critical given the need for some Qadhafi family achievement after the AU debacle and in light of the upcoming Arab summit here. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments w idget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Ja vascript files, w hich might be deemed undesirable. Setting w ill

take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI114

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI114 aka Wikileaks id #248185 ?
Subject	GOL FUNDING INCREASING NUMBERS OF STUDENTS IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 10 Feb 2010 15:29 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI114.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0652
RR RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0114/01 0411529
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101529Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5781
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DIR ICE INTEL WASHDC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1547
RHMFISS/AFRICOM
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6339
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000114

SIPDIS

SLUG FOR NEA/MAG, ECA/A/E/NEA, CA/VO, EMBASSY CAIRO ICE & CBP

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , LY *[Libya]* , OEXC *[Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations]*
SUBJECT: GOL FUNDING INCREASING NUMBERS OF STUDENTS IN U.S. UNIVERSITIES

TRIPOLI 00000114 001.2 OF 003

¶1.(SBU) SUMMARY: The Government of Libya (GOL) is continuing to expand its scholarship program funding Libyan students in the United States, focusing primarily on supporting Libyan graduate students. Building on existing relationships with U.S. academia dating from the 1960s and 1970s, in less than four years the GOL has increased the number of Libyans studying on scholarships in America from zero to approximately 1,600 students. From the outset, Libyan students faced a series of unique challenges caused by the nearly thirty-year absence of a bilateral American-Libyan relationship. A lack of knowledge of the U.S. academic system combined with a low-level of basic English instruction led to a large number of Libyan students

returning home disappointed and without a degree. We view this as an opportunity to assist the GOL with a mutually desired program that is fairly independent from the usual GOL political interference. The Public Affairs and Consular Sections have been able to meet with hundreds of potential Libyan students over the last year and provide them with free information on educational opportunities and student visas. The GOL has also made significant improvements in its scholarship program since 2005 including widening its pool of scholarship nominees, creating an electronic database, and hiring a Canadian company to manage placement and student services. Overall, despite complex bureaucracy and internal change, the program continues to succeed in training a new generation of Libyan professionals who will have enduring ties with the United States. End summary.

The GOL Scholarship Program: An Overview

¶2. (U) Since before the 1969 Libyan revolution, the GOL sponsored Libyan students studying abroad, including in the United States. Current Libyan Ambassador to Washington Ali Al-Aujeli recently told journalists that over 6,000 of his countrymen had studied in American institutions in the past. Since the resumption of bilateral relations, over 2,000 U.S. student visas have been issued to Libyans, with the majority being government scholarships. The Libyan Minister of Education-equivalent reportedly ordered his department to focus on sending Libyan students to the United States due to the international reputation and academic superiority of American academic institutions. Scholarship students must agree to return to Libya after graduation and work in their field of study for several years. Many past Libyan graduates of U.S. institutions have gone on to senior positions within their fields of expertise, including government service (Foreign Minister Musa Kusa, for example, is a graduate of Michigan State University).

¶3. (SBU) In most cases, students receive funding for a year of English study prior to beginning academic programs in the United States. (Note: Due to a ban on studying foreign languages during the sanctions years, Libyan students generally have limited English language capabilities. End note). Upon completing the Test of English as a Foreign Language (TOEFL), the students apply to U.S. universities in hopes of gaining acceptance and maintaining their scholarships. Initially, Libyan students faced a series of challenges including low acceptance rates. The GOL estimates that from 2005 to 2008, more than 600 Libyan scholarship students returned to Libya without having completed their degrees. The Libyan Department of Scholarships now estimates that 1,000 Libyan scholarship students have been accepted into academic programs in addition to another 600 currently enrolled in English language programs. Our GOL interlocutors indicate that among the lessons learned from the challenging beginning are to expand the choices of universities they recognize and to focus on hard sciences unless the student has stellar English scores.

¶4. (SBU) The GOL scholarships pay full tuition, books, and insurance as well as providing a stipend for living expenses based on family size. When Libyan students first returned to the United States, both students and institutions complained of poor service, late payments, and ill-run bureaucracy in dealing with the GOL. The GOL demonstrated some commitment to tightening control of scholarship administration when it appointed Dr. Omran al-Geriani as head of the Department of Scholarships in May 2009. The Cultural Attachi at the Libyan People's Bureau in Washington was made responsible for financing and coordinating scholarship activities in the United States. Starting in February 2010, and following a competitive bidding process, the task of coordinating GOL scholarships throughout North America will be assumed by the Canadian Bureau of International Exchange (CBIE). The organization has managed the Canadian portion of the GOL's program since January 2010. A forthcoming delegation of members from the GOL's finance

forthcoming delegation of members from the GOL's finance, education, and cultural wings will seek to iron out final

details including coordination among their department representatives at the Libyan Embassy in Washington.

Scholarship Selection Process

¶5. (SBU) According to Al-Geriani, each major ministry of the government can nominate students for scholarships. All nominations are then routed through the People's Committee for Education (the largest nominating branch in its own right). Applicants usually find their names listed online within a year of application. They must then select where they will study, with the United Kingdom, Germany, Malaysia, Canada, Indonesia, and the United States being popular choices. The UK program has reportedly reached its 4,000-student cap however, and no new GOL scholarships are being offered at present. Unlike in previous decades, the GOL issues scholarships almost exclusively for graduate and post-graduate study, due to the GOL's desire to build its own undergraduate programs. However, a small percentage of the top high school graduates in the country (approximately 85 in 2009) receive scholarships for undergraduate study in the country of their choice. High school graduates who have chosen the United States have been consistently in the engineering and sciences fields.

¶6. (SBU) The Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF), a quasi-governmental institution headed by Muammar al-Qadhafi's son, Saif al-Islam, provides another path to study abroad for those without formal government scholarships. After applying and being selected to received a scholarship, applicants find their names listed online at regular intervals based on the country of choice for study. Unlike the GOL scholarship process, QDF scholarships come with the school pre-designated. The head of the foundation's student affairs program, Dr. Taieb El-Bahloul, himself a graduate of the University of California at Santa Barbara, told Emboffs his greatest concern is the lower qualification level of his program's awardees. Unlike the other nominating bodies, the foundation's students typically have been in the work force for a number of years already and often face challenges in readapting to academia and foreign language acquisition. Libyan students personally funding their studies in the United States can also compete to pick up a government scholarship. Interested students must have already completed half of the coursework for their Masters or PhD program study at an approved university. The GOL has extended this benefit to a number of Libyan-American students in the United States already.

¶7. (SBU) Personal connections lubricate many interactions in Libya, and the awarding of scholarships is no exception. In visa interviews, a few students with government scholarships admitted to having a relative working in the scholarship division or other government body. In one case, an applicant presented paperwork from Georgetown University stating he had a GOL scholarship for six months of English study only, despite being a recent high school graduate. He admitted that his brother-in-law, working at the Libyan embassy in Washington, secured him the scholarship. The applicant's sister had also received a scholarship and is studying in Washington, D.C. as well. Other well-placed Libyans have confirmed to Emboffs that such connections can be a deciding factor in the awarding of GOL scholarships. Despite this, the GOL appears to have placed an emphasis on geographic and gender diversity in its selection process, the results of which we clearly see at the visa window when interviewing the students.

Embassy Outreach Efforts

¶8. (SBU) The Public Affairs and Consular Sections have worked to leverage and enhance the GOL's interest in sponsoring graduate and doctoral study in the United States. In November 2009, we participated in the EducationLibya Fair, the country's largest annual academic trade show. The Embassy booth distributed IIP and EducationUSA-branded material and the Embassy's educational advisor met with students and parents to offer individual counseling and advisory services. The Embassy also organized an "America's Stage" space above the main Expo Floor where Emboffs provided briefings on various topics of interest to Libyan students, including an overview of admissions examinations, the student visa application process, and discussions on the wide variety of academic institutions and programs available to international students. In November 2010, we will organize the first-ever U.S. Educational Fair in collaboration with Linden Educational Services of Alexandria, VA. Al-Fateh University, Libya's premier national university, has indicated preliminary interest in co-sponsoring this fair and using the opportunity to develop academic ties with American institutions. In 2009,

despite repeated efforts by the Embassy, the GOL did not issue entry visas to the State Department's Regional Educational Advising Coordinator (REAC) and Regional English Language Officer (RELO), hampering our ability to offer pre-departure briefings and assist the Ministry of Education in better preparing students for their experiences in the United States. Public Affairs and Consular staff have held meetings within universities and private academic centers across the country to advocate for U.S. study and provide resources and guidance.

Second-Order Effects

¶9. (SBU) The waves of Libyan students in the 1960s through early 1980s resulted in a flood of dual-national citizens, through marriages and births in the United States. Since our reopening of American Citizen Services in 2005, Libyans continue to pour in to the Embassy with tattered birth certificates and supporting documents to apply for first-time U.S. passports. Most speak little English and have not visited the United States since birth. We anticipate that the current increase in Libyan students in the U.S. will have a similar result.

¶10. (SBU) Additionally, a number of private businesses have arisen to meet the growing demand for student visa facilitation, particularly following the opening of U.S. non-immigrant visa issuance in Tripoli in March 2009. The largest of these businesses, Bousfeita Student Services (BSS), boasts several offices in Benghazi and Tripoli. British-Libyan owner Mohamed Ali Bousfeita told Conoff that his organization facilitated the travel of over 800 students to the United States in 2008 alone, the vast majority being GOL-sponsored. He toured 26 states to view schools and institutions to provide options for his clients and claims that study in the United States has quickly overtaken the UK, Australia, and New Zealand in popularity with Libyans since U.S.-Libyan diplomatic relations resumed. In addition, BSS has been designated the sole Kaplan agent for all of North Africa. His company and others charge high fees for filing SEVIS information and fees, completing the online DS-160 U.S. visa application, and scheduling the visa interview appointment. Students from the border city of Tobruq, for example, report paying over $300 for these services. Tobruq's Zogogo Student Services Company provides its clients with a detailed map and step-by-step procedures for the visa application process, including which windows in our Consular section provide which service, and the types of questions asked during the interview.

¶11. (SBU) Comment: In order to support Libya's growing study abroad programs, the Embassy continues to see academic advising and consular outreach as top-tier priorities within the mission. In 2010, we will continue to work with the Ministry of

In 2010, we will continue to work with the Ministry of Education and Libyan universities to encourage Libyan students to select the United States as their place of study. The establishment of an American Center, American Corners, more-accessible Consular and Public Affairs sections, as well as the 2010 American University Fair will all help to promote the wide variety of educational opportunities that are in America and provide free, accurate information about U.S. visas.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI115

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI115 aka Wikileaks id #248425 ?
Subject	LIBYA INSISTS BALL IN U.S. COURT ON SCUD B ALTERNATIVE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 11 Feb 2010 15:54 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI115.html
References	09TRIPOLI960
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI167
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Sat, 4 Dec 2010 12:47: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 21:03: Publication withdrawn • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO1581
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0115/01 0421554
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 111554Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5784
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 1214
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0885
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0118
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0103
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0261
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6342
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000115

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO AND NEA/MAG; NSC FOR AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/11/2020
TAGS: MTCRE [Missile Technology Control Regime] , PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PREL [External Political
Relations] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , ETTC [Trade and Technology Controls] , KSCA [Science Counselors
and Attach&eacute;s] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYA INSISTS BALL IN U.S. COURT ON  SCUD B ALTERNATIVE

REF: A) State 11501; B) 09 Tripoli 753; C) 09 Tripoli 960

TRIPOLI 00000115  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State
```

Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (U) This is an action request; see para 8.

¶2. (S) Summary: In a February 9 meeting with the Ambassador, the head of Libya's Scud B destruction program, General Ahmed Azwai, insisted that the USG was mostly responsible for Libya's delayed fulfillment of Scud B destruction commitments. Azwai blamed the USG for hampering Libyan efforts to find a Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)-compliant alternative weapons system to replace its Scud B stock and refused to discuss a destruction timeline until Libya acquires a replacement system. The Libyans passionately believe that the U.S. committed to assisting in the search for an alternative weapons system, and they want the U.S. to fulfill that commitment. Azwai indicated that Libya still wants to purchase the Russian Iskander missile that Libya originally proposed (ideally at the originally stipulated purchase price), but said that it is up to the U.S. to decide whether that is acceptable -- if not, then he believes the U.S. should find an acceptable alternative. Azwai made no mention of the French Scalp missile or any other proposed alternatives during the meeting, suggesting that the Scalp proposal may have been an independent move by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. Azwai requested U.S. support for Libya's bid for MTCR membership. End Summary.

AZWAI: THE U.S. COMMITED TO FIND AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM FOR LIBYA

¶3. (S) General Ahmed Azwai, head of Libya's Scud B destruction program, met with the Ambassador, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief, on February 9 to reiterate Libya's expectations that the USG identify a suitable alternative to the Scud B system. (Note: The meeting was scheduled in response to a September 2009 Embassy request for a status update on Libya's MTCR-related commitments. End note.) Azwai, joined by Tajuri al-Shiradi of the MFA's International Organizations office, as well as Libya's "Rocket Committee," reviewed the history of U.S.-Libya negotiations on the elimination of Libya's Scud Bs and insisted that the 2004 trilateral agreement included "promises by the U.S. and UK to find a replacement for the Scud B system." Referencing an English language version of the agreement that Azwai provided, the Ambassador explained that the wording did not commit the U.S. or UK to find a replacement system, but noted that we had in fact suggested alternative missile systems in the past, which Libya refused.

¶4. (S) Azwai insisted that the language of the agreement obligates the U.S. and UK to help Libya find a suitable replacement system. Azwai argued that instead of helping Libya fulfill its commitments, the U.S. had thrown obstacles in Libya's way, first by initially rejecting Libya's request to purchase Iskander missiles from Russia and then by delaying the sale by stalling the approval process. Azwai noted that Libya had already signed a contract with Russia to purchase the Iskander missiles when the U.S. objected (he asserted that the UK had assented to the sale). "The process dragged on for two years, and we could not wait that long~and now, we still do not have an acceptable alternative," he said. According to Azwai, the two other systems the U.S. suggested -- one from Ukraine and another from Russia -- were both "unacceptable alternatives" due to the technical and range specifications needed to guarantee Libya's national security. "We must have a replacement system," he stated. "I will not allow 12,000 Libyan soldiers to remain unarmed and vulnerable. If I give up their weapons before I have a replacement, they will turn on me." He argued that Libya had already given up some of its rocket systems and codes and did not intend to give up any more until it could replace its current stock.

ISKANDER STILL BEST ALTERNATIVE TO LIBYAN SCUD B

¶5. (S) While Azwai told the Ambassador that Libya was "actively looking" for an alternative system, he believes that the

Iskander system originally proposed by the Libyan side is still the best alternative to Libya's Scud Bs. However, according to the Rockets Committee, the price of that system has increased by one hundred percent. Azwai expressed Libya's continued desire to purchase the Iskander missile at a lower price than that which the Russians were currently offering, and he sought U.S. approval for such a purchase. "In the beginning," he commented, "we were hoping for a U.S. system, but you said there was none." He continued that "the only friend for Libya is Russia on

TRIPOLI 00000115 002.2 OF 002

weapons sales." (Azwai did not mention the French Scalp system that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's staff raised with Emboffs in November 2009, suggesting that the proposal may have been an independent move by Saif.) Azwai emphasized that he expected the U.S. to suggest viable alternatives, and for those suggestions to be offered either in writing or in the context of another meeting with him.

¶6. (S) The Ambassador asked whether Libya had begun to develop a timeline for the destruction of its Scud B missiles and suggested that a U.S. technical team come to Tripoli to discuss destruction plans. Per reftel guidance, the Ambassador offered that the USG could support Libya's Scud B destruction with technical and financial assistance. Initially Azwai refused to discuss destruction plans until an alternative system has been identified, but as the Ambassador reiterated his points, Azwai asked that the Rocket Committee make note of the U.S. offer. He asked whether the U.S. would fund destruction "one hundred percent," or partially, snidely remarking that "we Libyans need to be careful about what the American offers really mean." He underscored that Libya "will not think about destruction until you [the U.S.] fulfill your commitment." Azwai said that he would not be willing to discuss destruction until after a contract for a replacement system was signed. Furthermore, since the Libyans perceive the delays in meeting Libya's MTCR commitments as rooted in U.S. inaction on the issue, Azwai demanded that Libya receive an extension on its MTCR-commitment deadline.

LIBYA'S BID FOR MTCR MEMBERSHIP

¶7. (S) Azwai further complained that the United States had not supported Libya's recent bids to become a full MTCR member. Members of the Rocket Committee specified that they had requested support from several embassies in Libya, with the exception of the United States, but had also requested support in Paris, at the most recent MTCR meetings. Azwai said that Libya had fulfilled the stipulations the MTCR committee required for membership, including adopting new legislation, but still could not obtain full membership. He inferred that the U.S. was part of the reason Libya's membership was blocked. The Ambassador highlighted that the USG could not act on a request that was not directly raised with us and advised the Rocket Committee to send an official request for U.S. support of Libya's membership in order for it to be considered in Washington. Azwai agreed to do so.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

¶8. (S/NF) This meeting revealed what appears to be a fundamental misunderstanding regarding the terms and obligations of the involved parties of the 2004 trilateral Scud B disposition agreement. Azwai was adamant that the U.S. was obliged to help Libya identify a Scud B replacement system and made it clear that, unless we do, he has no intention of moving forward on destruction. It is unclear whether Azwai's position is based on a concrete Libyan legal interpretation of the 2004 agreement or a purely political assessment that Libya has gotten less than it was promised during the 2003-2004 negotiations regarding its WMD

programs. We have been hearing the latter with increasing frequency from the highest levels of the Libyan government, including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. It is clear that further discussions -- either at the expert or political level -- will be required in order to make progress on the replacement and destruction issues. The Department's guidance on next steps on these issues, as well as Libya's MTCR membership bid, is requested.
CRETZ

Media

- Diplomatic cables: Gaddafi risked nuclear disaster after UN slight | World news | The Guardian
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI116

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI116 aka Wikileaks id #248437 ?
Subject	SHOKRI GHANEM OUTLINES PLANS FOR LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 11 Feb 2010 16:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI116.html
References	09TRIPOLI862
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1618
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0116/01 0421617
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111617Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5786
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0048
RUEHGA/AMCONSUL CALGARY PRIORITY 0017
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0473
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0676
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6344
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000116

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/11/2020
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , LY *[Libya]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]*
SUBJECT: SHOKRI GHANEM OUTLINES PLANS FOR LIBYA'S NATIONAL OIL CORPORATION

REF: 09 TRIPOLI 862

TRIPOLI 00000116 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: In a February 8 meeting with the Ambassador,

the head of Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC), Shokri Ghanem, expressed support for improved Libya-U.S. relations, welcomed the upcoming U.S. Trade Mission, and explained his near-term goals for the NOC, which include plans for increasing oil and gas exploration and production, developing a cadre of Libyan experts to replace the expatriate workforce, and converting all concessions to Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA's). While it appears that after his brief hiatus, Ghanem is firmly back at the helm of the NOC, the rumors circulating around Tripoli are that he is disengaged and not closely involved in the running of the organization. End summary.

A "FUNCTIONAL APPROACH" TO U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS

¶2. (C) In a February 8 meeting with the Ambassador and Econoff, NOC Chairman Shokri Ghanem welcomed the U.S. Trade Mission (February 20-23), saying that "most, if not all people in Libya" wanted closer relations with the United States. However, he said "politics is getting complicated all over the world." He advocated for a "functional approach" that would focus on "where we agree, not on where we disagree." Ghanem understood that America was "nervous" about terrorism, especially as terrorists continue to come up with new ways of attacking the U.S. (citing the Christmas Day airliner attempted bombing), but in his view, national security policies needed to examine the root causes of terrorism rather than simply focusing on someone's appearance or nationality. He lamented that international travel has become so difficult nowadays, and at times even "degrading" due to extensive security precautions.

PRICE FLUCTUATIONS: THE NEED FOR A LONG-TERM VIEW

¶3. (C) According to Ghanem, the recent fluctuations in the price of oil have affected the NOC's investment plans, as well as government spending plans overall. He advocated for a more prudent approach that would include taking a long-term view of oil revenue and government spending. Ghanem rebuked Libyan officials who tended to spend a lot of government funds when oil prices are high, rather than spreading out expenditures more evenly. He said Libya was committed to adhering to OPEC production quotas and thus even though Libya's current capacity is 2 million barrels per day (b/d), it is only producing 1.5 to 1.6 million b/d, as stipulated by OPEC.

SEARCHING FOR THE MOST ECONOMICAL EXPATRIATE WORK-FORCE

¶4. (C) The Ambassador raised the issue of expatriates assigned by foreign firms to their Libyan partner companies (NOC-owned) in order to share their expertise. (Note: Several American companies have expressed concern about this issue. Their agreements with the NOC called for the NOC to fund the costs of expatriate experts who would be "seconded" to the NOC partner company but few placements have been approved thus far, presumably due to the costs involved. End note). Ghanem said he did not have a problem with foreign companies wanting to bring in their own people, who know the company philosophy and approach, to act as senior managers or to sit on joint management committees. But for more technical positions, as well as administrative jobs, he said Libyans should be hired whenever possible. He said that 76 percent of the positions in the oil and gas industry in Libya were occupied by "foreigners." Many of these positions included directors of training or transportation, jobs that Libyans could do, in his view. He conceded that expatriates were needed for other jobs that required experience with new technologies, such as Enhanced Oil Recovery (using CO2 gas injection) or in exploration. Another concern was the cost of expatriate staff. He said if NOC companies could hire an engineer from India or Brazil for 10,000 USD, they would do so. If the American partners insisted on hiring American engineers (costing 100,000 USD), the Americans could pay the difference.

WATER TAX

¶5. (C) Regarding a water fee imposed on production companies, the Ambassador asked if this was a breach of contract since the IOCs' agreements include free access to water. He added that

companies were also concerned because the water fees could not be counted as operating costs, which could be deducted from tax payments. (Note: Reportedly, most IOCs have expressed concern to the NOC over the new requirement that companies must pay for water used in operations for re-injection into the reservoirs; there is a sliding scale according to how brackish the water is, meaning that the freshest water will cost more. According to some IOCs, the new fee is a breach of contract since free access to water is included in the agreements. End note). Ghanem said the water fee was not a breach of contract as regulations regarding the use of fresh water is included in Libya's Petroleum Law. He seemed to intimate that the IOCs were using too much fresh water, which was needed for other uses such as consumption and irrigation. According to Ghanem, some IOCs, such as Spanish Repsol, have paid the water fee (but according to Embassy sources, no foreign companies have paid. One GM reported that the NOC-owned partner companies of some IOCs have paid their water bill, and are expecting the foreign partner to reimburse them).

PLANS FOR GAS

¶6. (C) In a recent press article, Ghanem said Libya would be investing in new gas projects. When the Ambassador asked whether a gas pricing policy had been set, he commented that gas pricing was "very complicated" since in the past, gas was flared, and there was no price. Now, gas for local consumption is subsidized, something that Ghanem was against. He said under the EPSA IV agreements, the price of gas was the international price minus 15 percent of that price.

CONVERTING CONCESSIONS TO EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION SHARING AGREEMENTS: A LONG-TERM GOAL

¶7. (C) As to whether all agreements with IOCs will be converted to EPSA's, Ghanem stated, "Rest assured, the NOC will honor its agreements," but that in the long-run, they would move everyone to the EPSA system. The NOC's only existing contracts outside of EPSA are with Germany's Wintershall, and the U.S. firms included in the Waha Group (Hess, Marathon, ConocoPhillips). According to Ghanem, in any case, Wintershall said it planned to leave Libya in 2016 when its current concession agreement ends. In his view, once all the companies are under EPSA's, it will be more efficient for the NOC to manage accounting and to monitor their contracts. They have invested in training their accountants and others in the EPSA system in order to simplify their operations, similar to an "assembly line" in a factory. As for the Waha Group, he noted the U.S. firms had been absent from Libya for about 15 years, but that now that they were back, he would continue to discuss converting to an EPSA-type agreement, adding there was "more than one way to skin a cat."

WILL THE LIBYAN NOC BECOME AN INTERNATIONAL COMPANY?

¶8. (C) When asked if Libya still planned to convert the NOC to an international company (IOC), he noted that this was still a long-term goal but that it would be difficult to move the NOC "outside of the bureaucracy" given that Libya's economy is dependent on the oil and gas sector. He said he would like the NOC to eventually become a joint stock company that would pay taxes to the government, like the Waha Group. He opined that this would enable the NOC to raise its salaries to a more

this would enable the NOC to raise its salaries to a more competitive level. He noted he had already removed the NOC workforce from the government's civil service employment system, which allowed the NOC more control over its salaries and gave it more power to hire and fire staff.

VERENEX: MEDCO WILL BE THE OPERATOR

¶9. (C) Regarding the recent sale of Canadian-owned oil exploration company Verenex, Ghanem said the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA) had purchased the company and that Medco, Verenex' Indonesian partner, would be the operator. He intimated that the NOC would have exercised its rights to purchase Verenex, (for the same sales price as offered by the Chinese National Petroleum Company) and thus would have honored the agreement with Verenex. However, the GOL's dragging out of the approval of the sale had forced the Verenex share price to decrease by about 30 percent, which in the end, paved the way

TRIPOLI 00000116 003.2 OF 003

for the LIA's discounted purchase.

¶10. (C) Bio Note and Comment: During the meeting, Ghanem counted Islamic prayer beads, yet appeared relaxed, candidly answering the Ambassador's questions. Ghanem attributed his October 2009 hiatus from the NOC to his desire to "catch up on movies, read books, and rest." He voiced a commitment to honoring all of the NOC's current contracts, but said he would continue to pursue the goal of converting all IOC contracts to EPSA's. While it appears that after his brief hiatus, Ghanem is firmly back at the helm of the NOC, the rumors circulating around Tripoli are that he is disengaged and not closely involved in the running of the organization, but rather his deputy, Ali Sgheir,is truly in charge, and taking direction from the top leadership of Libya. Ghanem reportedly returned to the NOC at Saif al-Islam's strong urging, and he may be waiting to see how Saif's future unfolds before making any more personal career decisions. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI133

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI133 aka Wikileaks id #248917 ?
Subject	LIBYA SEEKS U.S. COOPERATION ON ASTRONOMY, SEISMOLOGY AND SATELLITES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Feb 2010 09:33 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI133.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4232
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0133/01 0470933
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 160933Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5805
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0679
RUEHVT/AMEMBASSY VALLETTA PRIORITY 0476
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6363
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000133

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; OES FOR ROBERT SENSENEY AND WILLIAM LAWRENCE;
PM /RSAT FOR TOM MANCINELLI; COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS: TSPA *[Space Activities]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SEEKS U.S. COOPERATION ON ASTRONOMY, SEISMOLOGY AND SATELLITES

TRIPOLI 00000133 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (SBU) This is an action request. Please see para 8.

¶2. (SBU) Summary: The head of Libya's Center for Remote Sensing and Space Science expressed interest in renewing cooperation with the U.S. on astronomy, seismology and satellites. The Center's Director sought Embassy assistance in purchasing a U.S.-origin "mini-satellite" and telescopes for a new National Observatory project. He also expressed interest in joint workshops and training opportunities. This could be useful areas for engagement with the Presidential Science Envoy.

End summary.

¶3. (SBU) On February 3, Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff met with Hadi Gashut, head of Libya's Center for Remote Sensing and Space Science, who had requested the meeting to renew discussions on cooperative projects and to enlist the Embassy's assistance to facilitate Libya's procurement of a "mini-satellite" from the United States. Gashut was joined by two other colleagues, Abdalrahem Aboghofa, Director of Technical Projects, and Sharif M. Sharif, Manager of the Technical Department. Gashut explained the Center's interest in purchasing a "high resolution mini-satellite" -- preferably from the U.S. -- to track the rate of desertification in Libya, monitor the status of the Great Manmade River Project (which pipes water from aquifers in the Sahara to the coastal areas), and observe Libya's borders. He said the Libyan agency had not yet contacted any U.S. Government agencies, such as NASA, or any U.S. companies, and sought guidance from the Embassy on how to locate the appropriate contact. Gashut said that Libya's neighbors had such satellites, noting that Algeria had three satellites, Egypt had two, and Saudi Arabia had a few of its own. Due to the likely need for an export license, Gashut said he wanted to go through the Embassy from the outset in order to follow the proper procedure.

LIBYA HAS 300 CLOUDLESS NIGHTS: PERFECT FOR ASTRONOMY

¶4. (SBU) According to Gashut, Libya has, on average, "300 cloudless nights," and therefore offers an excellent locale for astronomy research. "Whereas other government agencies are interested in the sun and solar energy these days, our concern is for the moon and the stars," he stated. Gashut outlined Libyan plans for a new National Observatory and requested Embassy assistance in identifying a U.S. supplier of 2-4 meter telescopes for the project. Ideally, the telescope would be robotic, and one which astronomers in other countries could remotely access. He said that Libya only had a small, mobile telescope (50 cm). The Libyans have had the specifications for the telescope for five years, and have also discussed the project with the Europeans but, according to Gashut, the Europeans "did not understand the importance" of the project and have not helped identify sources. He said he could send the specifications to any interested companies.

SEISMOLOGY

¶5. (C) Gashut asked if U.S. experts would be interested in participating in workshops on seismology and other related topics. He said Libya had signed a memorandum of understanding with the U.S. Geological Service (USGS) in 2008 and that Libya was "now ready" to move forward on joint projects. One need was for short-term training (2-3 months) for Libyan researchers, for which Libya could cover all transportation if the USGS could help with hotel and food costs. As for whether Libya was ready to join the Global Seismic Network (GSN), a consortium of countries that share seismic data, he intimated it was a non-starter at the moment since the "decision-makers don't understand" the importance of joining the network. Gashut commented that he and his colleagues were "scientists, not involved in sensitive, political issues." Nevertheless, he did not want to let GOL inaction on the GSN impede progress in other areas, such as exchanges and graduate study for Libyans in the U.S. He added that UNESCO had a project to help Libya equip 15 seismology stations with strong motion detection capability. Gashut noted that the project had been stalled, since UNESCO had been working with a Swiss company, Geo-Signal, hinting that ongoing political differences between Libya and Switzerland had derailed the progress.

NASA: LIBYA WELCOMES YOU BACK

¶6. (SBU) Regarding the equipment that NASA had provided to the University of Sebha, Gashut said that the Very Low Frequency

University of Sebha, Gashut said that the very Low Frequency (VLF) equipment was still in place and being used for research. He said the NASA staff, including the project manager Joseph Davila, were welcome to return to Libya for a visit and to renew

TRIPOLI 00000133 002.2 OF 002

collaboration on the project. He recommended Davila contact the University of Sebha to discuss trip dates. Gashut pledged to help facilitate visa approvals for NASA visitors.

BACKGROUND

¶7. (SBU) Gashut noted that his organization falls under the National Authority for Scientific Research, headed by Mohammed Sharif, which is part of the General People's Committee for Higher Education (MOE-equivalent). This is separate from the work of Dr. Ali Gashut (no relation) who is the head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment.

COMMENT AND ACTION REQUEST

¶8. (C) Following the signing of the U.S.-Libya Science and Technology Agreement, no Libyan institutions, with the exception of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, have reached out to follow through on proposed joint projects. Post assumes that while our interlocutors at the working level are keenly interested in working with U.S. experts, approval for direct contact is sometimes blocked at higher levels. The Center for Remote Sensing and Space Science's desire to renew collaboration on a variety of projects is encouraging, and we recommend following-up on its request for training in the U.S. and to conduct joint-workshops with U.S. experts. Dr. Gashut also could be a useful interlocutor for Science Envoy Dr. Zerhouni. We note that the Libyan's request to purchase a U.S.-origin "mini-satellite" could raise export control issues, and request the Department's guidance on whether it is realistic for Libya to pursue the procurement of a U.S.-sourced satellite and a U.S.-sourced telescope at this time. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI134

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI134 aka Wikileaks id #249021 ?
Subject	LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Feb 2010 16:31 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI134.html
References	10TRIPOLI112
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI137
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4762
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0134/01 0471631
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 161631Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5807
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0263
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0120
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 0011
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0085
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6365
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TRIPOLI 000134

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG AND EUR/ERA; NSC FOR S. AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA MAKES GOOD ON THREAT TO DECLARE SCHENGEN VISA WAR

REF: TRIPOLI 112

TRIPOLI 00000134 001.2 OF 003

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Libyan Government unexpectedly followed through February 13 with threats to suspend visa issuance to nationals of Schengen member states (ref), deporting dozens of European nationals in the first 48 hours of the ban and creating

European nationals in the first 48 hours of the ban and creating chaos at Tripoli's airport. Local media reports that the retaliation came in response to the alleged publication of a list of 188 Libyan officials and their families, including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and son Saif al-Islam, who Switzerland barred from Schengen visa issuances. EU diplomats report that they have been unable to verify that the list was in fact published. A close aide to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi hinted that the Libyans had instituted the ban on Schengen travelers in frustration over the problems in the ongoing Swiss-Libyan negotiations. European diplomats have declared the situation a "political crisis," and while some have publicly blamed the Swiss for the current situation, others quietly assess the move as a vintage Libyan attempt to up the ante in Swiss-Libyan negotiations at a moment when the contretemps appeared to be near resolution. Schengen members in Tripoli are debating how to respond to the Libyan move. End Summary.

POLICY IMPLEMENTATION LEADS TO AIRPORT CHAOS

¶2. (C) Late on February 13, the Libyan Government announced that it was halting issuance of visas to nationals of Schengen member countries, making good on its threats to retaliate for the Swiss ban on Schengen visa issuances for Libyan officials and Qadhafi family members. (The Swiss have been vetoing Schengen visas for certain Libyans since mid-2009, as part of their effort to resolve the plight of the two Swiss businessmen detained in Libya since the summer of 2008.) The Libyans began segregating Europeans from other arriving passengers late on February 14, holding them in the airport for several hours before ultimately deporting tens of European nationals, including several with valid residency permits. Although consuls were assured that European nationals with valid Libyan visas would still be granted entry into Libya, on February 14, European nationals on flights arriving in Libya from Rome, Valletta, and Vienna encountered serious difficulties at the airport. The Consul spoke with some Maltese who had arrived in Libya on an Air Malta flight on February 14; they had been detained at the airport for five hours, without food or water, before finally being allowed entry. The Consul also observed a European diplomat having difficulty entering the country, despite his valid diplomatic visa. The Italian Consul, who was at the airport's main arrival hall, was not permitted by the Libyan authorities to enter the rest of the facility to confer with the detained Italians. The Maltese Ambassador was also prohibited from entering the airport. Several flights from Europe and elsewhere arrived throughout the day on February 15, and European diplomatic contacts reported that passengers were stacking up at the airport as the Libyan authorities decided whether to admit them.

¶3. (C) On February 16, the situation seemed to have improved somewhat, with only 20 Schengen nationals deported. An EU diplomat attributed the improvement to several factors. First, Lufthansa and Austrian Air had stopped boarding nationals from Schengen member states, vastly decreasing the number of arrivals in Tripoli. Second, the Italians and other EU members had issued consular travel notices warning citizens of the strong possibility of deportation upon arrival, which led to a decrease in the number of arrival and, the diplomat speculated, also led the Libyans to ease up on the deportations. The diplomat also reported that the February 16 deportations seemed to focus on arriving general managers of foreign companies, rather than short-term visitors.

SAIF'S NEWSPAPER ANNOUNCES THE BAN, GOL JUSTIFIES IT

¶4. (C) The controversial Libyan decision was first announced by the quasi-independent Oea online newspaper (part of Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's Al Ghad media group) on February 14, in a report that quoted an anonymous Libyan official announcing that "Libya has decided to suspend granting visas to all EU nationals." The newspaper asserted that the decision came

"following Switzerland's decision to ban 188 Libyan figures from entering its territories. The Swiss ban includes the Libyan leader [Muammar al-Qadhafi] and his family, including Saif al-Islam."

¶5. (C) In a February 15 conversation with Pol/Econ Chief, a

close aide and advisor to Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi asserted that "the Europeans should not have been surprised" by the measure, as the issue of retaliation against all Schengen states for Switzerland's veto decision had been "raised with them lots of times, and as early as a month ago." Since "none of the EU nations were choosing to pressure the Swiss," the GOL decided to take action. Saif's staff asserted that the visa issue had reached a breaking point, "especially for Saif," who had been included on Switzerland's Schengen visa veto list despite his work to facilitate political reconciliation between the Swiss and Libyans. The aide asserted that Saif's inclusion on the list was "humiliating to him." He blamed the Swiss for stalling progress in the German-mediated political talks, claiming that the Swiss had backed off from a previous agreement to investigate the 2008 arrest in Switzerland of Hannibal al-Qadhafi as part of the normalization package. According to the Russian ambassador, Saif was in Moscow on February 15 following a hunting trip in southern Russia.

¶6. (C) Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa met Schengen Ambassadors late in the day on February 15 to confirm that no further Libyan visas would be issued to Schengen nationals and that even those with valid visas would not be allowed entry, with no exceptions. When pressed by the ambassadors, Kusa agreed that diplomats from Schengen member nations would be permitted entry and, possibly, Schengen nationals with valid residency permits. However, he said that he would need to investigate further the residency issue.

¶7. (C) Kusa said that the Libyan Government had implemented the policy after the Swiss had published the list of 188 Libyan citizens on the Swiss Schengen veto list. Waving a document that he claimed was the published list, Kusa said that Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi viewed the list as a personal insult that Libya could not endure. Although the GOL recognized that the decision to halt visas for Schengen nationals could cause economic loss and complications, Libya would stick to its policy. Kusa said that Libya had been isolated for years and could manage without Europe. "And if we need help, we can turn to the U.S., Japan, Russia, or Syria," he reportedly told the ambassadors.

TRYING TO FIGURE OUT THE BACK STORY

¶8. (C) An Italian diplomat who briefed us on the Kusa meeting said that no one had been able to verify whether the Swiss veto list had in fact been published, and the Swiss have denied doing so. A French diplomat told us that the decision had come after a February 11 meeting chaired by PM-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, the same day the GOL returned the passport of Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani. The French diplomat believed that al-Mahmoudi chose to refer the decision to allow Hamdani to depart Libya to Muammar al-Qadhafi himself, and that the Libyan leader's response was to invoke the retaliatory ban on European nationals. The French diplomat suspected that the move was designed to up the ante in Swiss-Libyan negotiations at a moment when the contretemps appeared to be near resolution

¶9. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto said February 15 that based on readouts that he had received from Bern, the most recent, third round of German-mediated political talks had been positive, contrary to the report given by Saif al-Islam's aide. Lazarotto believes that the GOL was well aware that the Swiss

Lazarotto believes that the GOL was well aware that the Swiss were ready to end the Schengen visa freeze and to begin issuing visas immediately after the two Swiss businessmen had been allowed to leave Libya. He defensively said that the idea of an arbitration council had been off the table since the September 18, 2009, "kidnapping" of the two Swiss businessmen by Libyan officials. After their release, Swiss negotiators agreed to establish an arbitration tribunal to investigate the Hannibal case only if the Libyans agreed to set up a similar tribunal to investigate the circumstances involved in the "kidnapping" of Rachid Hamdani and Max Goeldi; a stipulation the Libyans refused.

¶10. (C) Until February 13, Lazarotto was positive that Hamdani was on track to receive an exit visa and permission to depart the country -- he had already been cleared of all charges and received his passport back from the GOL on Thursday evening, February 11. Also on February 11, the immigration court commuted Max Goeldi's sentence to four, from sixteen, months, and he had agreed to pay the fine sentenced to him by the tax court. Goeldi's lawyer was in the process of requesting a

suspension of the prison sentence, pending Libyan-Swiss political reconciliation. However, the "visa war" against Schengen states that Libya had declared moved the goal posts once again, and according to Lazarotto, was a typical pressure tactic that Libya was using to obtain something more from Switzerland, although he did not venture to guess what that might be. He did not know how Bern would respond to the latest Libyan pressure, but he dejectedly assessed that the only solution left was "to cut diplomatic relations, for the benefit of all." He believed that Bern was also coming to that conclusion.

¶11. (C) The Libyan Government's move unleashed a barrage of attacks and infighting within the Schengen community. The Austrian Ambassador told the Swiss Charge that the visa halt had become a "political crisis." In an interview with Italian media on February 16, the Italian Foreign Minister blamed the Swiss for the current situation, saying that Switzerland's unilateral ban on visas to Libyan officials had effectively held "other countries in the Schengen area hostage." The Ambassador witnessed a spirited debate at a reception on the evening of February 15, with the Dutch ambassador arguing that according to the Schengen Treaty, other countries were entitled to unilaterally act in defiance of the Swiss "hold." Other Europeans believed that was not the case but asserted that Switzerland could choose to release other states of their obligations to prevent issuance of Shengen visas. Interestingly, several of the ambassadors believed they heard Musa Kusa say that that was not a solution; Libya, he reportedly said, would accept no Schengen solution that did not include Switzerland's returning to the status quo ante with regard to complete Schengen issuances by all countries in the treaty. A Schengen Committee meeting is scheduled for February 18 in Brussels, and EU foreign ministers are expected to meet on February 22, to discuss the EU response to the Libyan action.

COMMENT

¶12. (C) Libya's escalation of its bilateral dispute with Switzerland came at an unexpected time. The Swiss and Libyans had been moving forward with the political reconciliation process and were near resolution, indicating that the Libyan leader, or his son Saif al-Islam, may want something more than the Swiss are willing to give. While Libya's pressure on European nations seems to be achieving its goal of dividing the European block through isolation of Switzerland, the full ramifications of the Libyan visa ban remain to be seen in the EU's response to the Libyans. The situation, if it is not

resolved quickly, could evolve into a high-profile crisis over the coming days, with major implications for the ability of foreign companies to operate in Libya, as well as for EU-Libyan relations.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI135

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI135 aka Wikileaks id #249024 ?
Subject	DEMARCHE DELIVERED: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S ENGAGEMENT ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Feb 2010 16:38 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI135.html
References	10STATE9124
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4776
OO RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0135 0471638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 161638Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5810
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0266
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6368
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000135

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO (ELISA CATALANO), ISN/RA (RICHARD NEPHEW), AND
NEA/MAG; NSC FOR AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , IR *[Iran]* , UNSC *[UN Security Council]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DEMARCHE DELIVERED: MOBILIZING PRESSURE TO PERSUADE IRAN'S
ENGAGEMENT ON ITS NUCLEAR PROGRAM

REF: STATE 9124

¶1. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief delivered ref demarche to MFA Director of the International Organizations Department, Mehdi al-Mjribi, on February 10. Mjribi reiterated Libya's support of nuclear non-proliferation initiatives and said that all nations should commit to the principles expressed within the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty. The GOL is in favor of a diplomatic resolution to the situation with Iran and does not believe that sanctions will achieve a positive outcome. The GOL believes that sanctions negatively affect a nation's citizens more than its government and that diplomatic pressure on Iran should continue to be addressed within the context of the P5+1 group. Mjribi emphasized that the GOL and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi recognize the value of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and believe that it is the right of each nation to pursue peaceful nuclear programs.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI136

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI136 aka Wikileaks id #249026 ?
Subject	NEW HEAD OF LIBYAN PRIVATIZATION BOARD WELCOMES U.S. FIRMS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 16 Feb 2010 16:53 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI136.html
References	09TRIPOLI198 , 09TRIPOLI437 , 09TRIPOLI925
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4828
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0136/01 0471653
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 161653Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5811
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DQT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6369
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000136

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, ISN, OES (ROBERT SENSENEY AND WILLIAM
LAWRENCE), H AND MEPI, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON AND
COMMERCIAL LAW DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* ,
PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , ENRG *[Energy and Power]*
SUBJECT: NEW HEAD OF LIBYAN PRIVATIZATION BOARD WELCOMES U.S. FIRMS

REF: A) 09 TRIPOLI 925 ; B) 09 TRIPOLI 198 ; C) 09 TRIPOLI 437

TRIPOLI 00000136 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) Summary: On February 10, the Ambassador briefed Jamal
al-Lamushie, Secretary of the Privatization and Investment Board
(PIB), on the upcoming U.S. Trade Mission and discussed the

status of Libya's privatization efforts thus far. Al-Lamushie and his staff reiterated an interest in technical assistance and training in best practices for privatization. Such a program would further economic ties between the U.S. and Libya, and would provide a view into what is an otherwise opaque and unpredictable process. Al-Lamushie, who also serves as Director of the General Board of Fairs, made a pitch for U.S. participation at the annual Tripoli International Fair. End summary.

¶2. (SBU) The new head of the Libyan Privatization and Investment Board, Jamal al-Lamushie, told the Ambassador (accompanied by econoff) during a February 10 meeting that U.S. companies are welcome in Libya, and to that end, pledged to help arrange meetings for the upcoming U.S. Trade Mission. In al-Lamushie's view, most Libyans are pro-U.S., but, he believes some Americans have negative views of Libya due to the media. He said "we consider you as a friend, and we are all part of one team, to make the trade mission a success." Al-Lamushie, who replaced Mahamud al-Ftise as head of Privatization on December 28, explained that he will also retain his other role, as General Secretary of the General Board of Fairs. (Note: Dr. al-Ftise's new role, if any, is still unclear. According to the Tripoli rumor mill, he is now in charge of the government-owned Steel Factory in Misurata.) Al-Lamushie was accompanied by a new member of his staff, Dr. Abdelkarim Mgeg.

PRIVATIZATION AND INVESTMENT BOARD WELCOMES U.S. COMPANIES

¶3. (C) Al-Lamushie noted that Libya was "speeding up" the process of privatization, in which nearly 20 state-owned enterprises will be either liquidated, sold to employees, or sold to investors. He said foreign investors are now able to partner with Libyan companies, either from the private or public sectors, in joint ventures at up to 60 percent ownership. He thought the remaining larger projects could be of interest to foreign investors, such as the petrochemical plant in Abe Kamash near Qe Tunisian border, the truck factory in Tajura, the Steel Factory in Misurata, and several oil services companies. He noted that 110 companies had been privatized (as reported in ref A) and that almost all were doing well, but admitted that 10-15 were "not doing soQell" and would probably not be of interest to investors.

SAADI AL-QADHAFI'S PET PROJECT: ZWARA ECONOMIC CITY

¶4. (SBU) Addressing recent reports of a new law enacted by the General People's Congress establishing a free-trade zone in Zwara (west of Tripoli), al-Lamushie said further details on the "Economic City" would be announced in two weeks. (One of Muammar al-Qadhafi's sons, Saadi, is in charge of the project to transform the western side of Libya's coastal area into an economic zone, ref B). He clarified the project would not be a "free trade zone" but rather, an "economic city" with a special status. In order to roll out the project, "special seminars" will be held for foreign companies in Libya and overseas. He said such seminars could even take place in the U.S., if there was interest.

FOCUS ON ALTERNATIVE ENERGY: NUCLEAR, SOLAR, WIND

¶5. (SBU) Beyond its role in privatization, al-Lamushie said the PIB was also charged with attracting companies with expertise in new, alternative forms of energy, such as nuclear, solar, and wind power sources. He said that Dr. Abdelkarim Mgeg, a former nuclear scientist, was responsible for reaching out to companies working in alternative energy sources. Mgeg noted that Libya's goal was to diversify its energy mix. (Note: Mgeg is a familiar face to the Embassy, having worked with U.S. scientists when he was the Director of Tajura Nuclear Research Center, and he has stayed in touch with us since leaving that position in late 2008. He had been planning to travel to the

U.S. in January to meet with Solar Energy companies and to attend a conference on this topic, but his trip was postponed for work-related reasons; he hopes to reschedule. End note).

POSSIBLE GREEN ENERGY BRIEFING FOR CODEL GRAYSON

¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador noted that Congressman Alan Grayson would be transiting Tripoli on February 17 for a few hours, and

TRIPOLI 00000136 002.2 OF 002

due to his interest in green technologies, would be interested to receive a briefing on Libya's efforts in this area. Al-Lamushie said that Dr. Mgeg could meet with the Congressman, provided the meeting was approved by the MFA. Post will follow-up.

RENEWED INTEREST IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S.

¶7. (C) PIB staff voiced renewed interest in cooperating with Post on the development of Libya's private sector, via activities such as training and technical assistance for the PIB staff in best practices concerning privatization, as well as training for managers and boards of directors of newly-privatized companies. (Comment: Under al-Ftise's leadership, no one from PIB followed up with the Embassy on this proposed cooperation, but the new leadership may give a new push to bilateral cooperation. End comment).

AND A PLUG FOR THE TRIPOLI INTERNATIONAL FAIR

¶8. (C) Putting on his other hat (as head of the General Board of Fairs), al-Lamushie pointed out that there has been no U.S. booth at the past two Tripoli International Fairs. He encouraged the Ambassador to organize a U.S. booth at the 39th Tripoli International Fair, to be held April 2-12. (Note: Interest in this event has waned on the part of companies after the lifting of sanctions, as there are now many tradeshows that are more useful to companies. The Tripoli International Fair tends to attract Libyan consumers looking for unusual and inexpensive imported goods.)

COMMENT

¶9. (C) Based on his comments and plans, it appears that al-Lamushie may have been brought in to ramp up the pace of revitalizing Libya's commercial sector. Al-Lamushie's warm welcome to U.S. firms and interest in technical assistance and training in best practices for privatization are a welcome change from his predecessor's attitude toward bilateral cooperation. Post recommends following-up on this request as it would further economic ties between the U.S. and Libya, and also would provide a view into what is otherwise an opaque and unpredictable process.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI137

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI137 aka Wikileaks id #249227 ?
Subject	MEETING OF LIBYAN, ITALIAN AND MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTERS LIKELY TO LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF SCHENGEN VISA CRISIS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 17 Feb 2010 16:51 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI137.html
References	10TRIPOLI134
Referenced by	10LONDON450
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5947
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0137/01 0481651
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 171651Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5813
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0267
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0123
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6371
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000137

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG, EUR/CE AND EUR/ERA; NSC FOR S. AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/17/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , IT *[Italy]* , MT *[Malta]*
SUBJECT: MEETING OF LIBYAN, ITALIAN AND MALTESE FOREIGN MINISTERS LIKELY TO LEAD TO RESOLUTION OF SCHENGEN VISA CRISIS

REF: Tripoli 134

TRIPOLI 00000137 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: According to an Italian diplomat, today's

¶1. (C) Summary: According to an Italian diplomat, today's meeting between Libyan FM Musa Kusa and his Italian and Maltese counterparts will lead to a resolution of the current Schengen visa crisis "within days." In his view, the Libyans invoked the visa ban on Schengen states as leverage in their negotiations with the Swiss, a move he deemed successful as it had elicited strong public criticism of Switzerland and exacerbated already tense relations between Switzerland and the EU. Germany is the only country supporting Switzerland in the current situation, as it feels snubbed by Libya's reneging on a commitment to provide Germany with advanced warning of any retaliatory measures in the Swiss case. The situation improved today, with no deportations of Schengen visa holders. End Summary.

¶2. (C) The Italian DCM analyzed the current Libya-EU standoff over visas as near resolution and expected the visa ban to be lifted "within days." He told Pol/Econ Chief February 17 that he believed the Libyan action had achieved its desired goal of provoking public statements from Schengen states, condemning Swiss actions and calling on Switzerland to lift its unilateral ban on Schengen visas for Libyan officials. The diplomat thought that the timing of the Libyan ban coincided with the impending release of one of the Swiss businessmen from Libya, which would have conceded Libya's leverage with Switzerland in the political reconciliation process. The diplomat suspected that the Libyan leader knew that once the Swiss were released, Switzerland would lift its ban on Schengen visas for Libyan diplomats, and then cut virtually all ties with Libya, including abandoning the political reconciliation process. Qadhafi apparently still demands the establishment of an arbitration council to investigate the circumstances surrounding the 2008 arrest of Hannibal al-Qadhafi in Geneva, a demand the Swiss have refused. "Libya needed to maintain its only instrument of power -- the two Swiss -- without them, Libya knew that Switzerland would never compromise on the political issues, " the DCM said.

¶3. (C) According to the Italian diplomat, the only way for the Libyans to delay the release of the businessmen was to publish the alleged Swiss "blacklist" of Libyan officials that it would not allow to receive Schengen visas, and then to make good on threats to retaliate against Europe. The diplomat did not believe Libyan allegations that the Swiss had published the "blacklist," but suspected that the Libyans had drafted the list themselves.

¶4. (C) Thus far the Libyan strategy has been successful -- most European nations have expressed, whether publicly or privately, their frustration with Switzerland's unilateral visa ban on Libyan officials, which has served to exacerbate Switzerland's already negative political standing with the European Union. Germany is the only country that is backing Switzerland in the current situation, as the Germans feel personally affronted that Libya reneged on a commitment to provide Germany with advanced warning of any retaliatory measures it would invoke in the Swiss case. The Germans themselves, according to the Italian diplomat, were frustrated with the reconciliation process and assessed the situation as at a stalemate, with the Swiss unwilling to negotiate until the two businessmen were released. The diplomat did not believe that Switzerland would ever give up its veto right by allowing the other European nations to issue "Schengen minus Switzerland" visas, for the same reason that the Libyans needed to keep the Swiss businessmen in the country -- leverage. He confirmed that European FMs would meet February 18 to discuss the situation.

¶5. (C) The Italian diplomat expected the scheduled February 17 meeting between Libyan Foreign Minister-equivalent Musa Kusa with his Italian and Maltese counterparts in Rome to lead to Libya's easing of its new visa policy. However, he expressed continued Italian concern that new visas may be even more difficult for Europeans to obtain, due to the Libyan leader's possible paranoia about allowing too many European workers into

the country and taste for maintaining control by routinely shifting the balance of favors -- domestically, from one official to another, and internationally, from one country to another. He reported that the Libyans were fulfilling the terms of their visa ban -- namely, that no diplomats or official travelers would be affected. No new deportations took place on February 17 and of the 25 individuals deported since the ban took effect, ten are Italian General Managers resident in Libya and 15 were of other European nationalities. (Note: As reported reftel, it is likely that European consular warnings

TRIPOLI 00000137 002.2 OF 002

advising citizens of the visa ban, as well as airline refusals to board Europeans traveling to Libya, contributed to the lack of deportations. End note.)
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI164

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI164 aka Wikileaks id #250195 ?
Subject	EMBASSY TRIPOLI NOMINATIONS: MEPI STUDENT LEADERS PROGRAM
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 23 Feb 2010 11:57 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI164.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0815
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0164/01 0541157
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 231157Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5849
INFO RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6407
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 TRIPOLI 000164

SIPDIS

NEA/PI FOR ELIZABETH G SULLIVAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: XF *[Middle East]* , LY *[Libya]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]*
SUBJECT: EMBASSY TRIPOLI NOMINATIONS: MEPI STUDENT LEADERS PROGRAM

REF: STATE 1393

¶1. (U) Embassy Tripoli's Public Affairs Section submits seven nominations for the summer 2010 MEPI Student Leaders Program. The candidates are, in rank order by Embassy preference: 1) Mr. Ahmed A A Albibas, 2) Ms. Aram A M Ellafi, 3) Mr. Ataher A Naas, 4) Ms. Mawada M B Elkilani, 5) Mr. Abdalla S Albayoudi, 6) Saleh S A Saad, and 7) Hana M ElBurki.

CANDIDATE BIODATA

¶2. (U) Candidate biodata follows:
a. Albibas
b. Ahmed
c. Alarifi Alagili
d. 12/05/1987
e. Tripoli
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya

i. Male
j. Suliman Kater Street, Janzour
k. +2180214893753
l. rowdy_libya@yahoo.com
m. None
n. Al-Fateh University
o. Mechanical Engineering
p. Ice Cream Factory employee; Salesman (family telephone shop); Engine Maintenance, car mechanic
q. Qaddafi Foundation 2009 Award for Charity and community service
r. Shabab alQemma Charity Group
s. Bee Keeping
t. Soccer, chess, athletics
u. None
v. Telephonic interview
w. Plans to become a professor of engineering
x. Nominee has demonstrated a commitment to community service and social activism. In a country where students rarely work, the nominee has held multiple part time jobs to assist his family while maintaining strong grades throughout high school. He is from a town outside the capital that has not been developed by the Government as thoroughly as Tripoli.
a. As the candidate plans to become a university lecturer, he would benefit tremendously from seeing the U.S. model of education in which students and faculty have a much closer relationship and in which the student is empowered to design his or her own career plans, engage in his or her own social interests and be political and socially active.
b. As a natural leader, he will benefit tremendously from meeting like-minded peers from both within his country and in the region. He will gain confidence in his ability to work for the changes he recognizes the country needs. During the interview, the candidate stated that one of the greatest social problems that he sees is the lack of national pride among his youth peers. He sees dissatisfaction with the government and its effect on national morale as a real impediment to the social development of Libyan students and leaders. He stated that change of this order will originate on the college and university campuses of Libya.
c. The nominee has stated his interest in long-term investment in a U.S. education - Post Public Affairs Office would like to maintain close ties with a young leader like Mr. AlBibas to 'track' his educational development and, ideally, enroll him in further U.S. study programs.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov

a. Ellafi
b. Aram
c. Ali M
d. 12/06/1987
e. Tripoli
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya
i. Female
j. Tripoli
k. +218913808700; +218213605247
l. aroomaa50us@yahoo.com
m. None
n. Al-Fateh University/Economic faculty
o. Electronic commerce Department
p. None
q. completed the Ernst & Young Internship Program in the Business Advisory Services;
r. None
s. Drawing and Swimming
t. Plays the guitar

TRIPOLI 00000164 002 OF 005

u. course completion Certificate (Swandean School of English) Wimbledon, Britain from 06/04/2002 to 09/04/2002.
v. Telephonic interview & test score
w. Plans to become a business woman
x. Ms. Ellafi provided a very strong short essay in which she identified the recently expanded drug crisis in Libya as being a matter of growing concern and a phenomenon that is disproportionately affecting the student population. She proposed a plan to have students on college campuses work to raise awareness of the problem and form peer support groups, a concept familiar to Americans but unheard of on Libyan campuses. She has proven herself to be a leader and a great candidate for the MEPI leadership workshop.
a. The candidate has decided that upon graduating with a degree in economics from Al-Fateh University, she will enter the private sector to establish herself as a businesswoman. In a country where women are largely underrepresented in the business community, strong leaders like Ms. Ellafi are sorely needed.
b. Ms. Ellafi stands to gain considerably from her participation in the MEPI program. As a woman with strong interests and clearly defined career goals, the self-confidence that comes from independent travel across the world will benefit her tremendously.
c. Ms. Ellafi is an ideal candidate for the Fulbright Program upon completion of her undergraduate degree in Economics. Public Affairs Section Tripoli plans to "market" its exchange programs to alumni of the MEPI program to foster a lifelong appreciation of education and U.S. study.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov
a. Naas
b. Ataher
c. Ahmed
d. 12/21/1985
e. Tripoli
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya
i. Male;
j. Tripoli/Sarraj Area nearby Afriqia High school
k. +218926617708; +218217284687
l. durarcpia@gmail.com
m. None
n. Al-Fateh University
o. Medical faculty
p. IT Customer Support at Gold Adler Computer Services Company and IT Customer Support at the Diamond Computer Services company
q. None
r. None
s. Sports
t. Football
u. None
v. Telephonic interview & test score
w. Plans to become a physician with a view to advancing long-term healthcare reform in the country
x. Mr. Naas has written a strong essay in which he identifies how his career plans of becoming a physician will benefit his society. He intends to work with patients directly, but to set a national agenda of health care reform. He rightly identified during a telephone interview that Libya has an advantaged situation of having abundant resources and is largely improving its human capital but suffers from popular apathy toward public health programs. His plans of working to advance health care reform are worthy of fostering.
a. Libya has recently begun to improve its capacity to train qualified doctors. Most, however, focus their sights on establishing private practices or joining the Ministry of Health payroll as doctors in public health facilities. Of the many medical students that Post has seen in various programs, only Mr. Naas has identified changing public attitudes toward health

and reforming national health care administration as a long time personal goal. He will undoubtedly make great contributions to the local dialogue on health care and is someone that the U.S. Government should begin investing in early to see that he is empowered with a solid education and training.
b. This applicant is in a considerable position: his father is the Chief Prosecutor of the Libyan Supreme Court which largely gives him the right to speak frankly on matters where others would fear to let their voice be heard in a country where information is closely monitored and tightly controlled.
c. Because of his clear vision for his career prospects and social agenda, Post believes that Mr. Naas would be a strong candidate for a Fulbright program focusing on health care administration or public administration.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov

a. Elkilani
b. Mawada
c. M. Bushnaf
d. 02/16/1990

TRIPOLI 00000164 003 OF 005

e. Benghazi
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya
i. Female
j. Tripoli
k. +218913685008; +218927270523
l. C_mawada@yahoo.com; Living4zalfota@yahoo.com
m. None
n. Garyounis University
o. Faculty of Information Technology
p. Part time work at the RIHAM photographer Benghazi
q. Golden Medal for sports in primary school in Vienna; Silver Medal in self defense martial arts in 2001 in Slovakia; Honor certificate for a short film Childhood Hazard, certificate awarded for Social Affairs Benghazi 2007; First Award for a symbolic sketch in reply to the Danish sketch against the Prophet Mohammed in 2006; Recognition Certificate for participating in film making "Enough Ignoring Us" concerning disabled women in Libyan society as a participation in the first North African conference of disabled women in Tripoli; certificate of recognition in the competition of the "young Engineer" in the faculty of IT using the programming languages C++.
r. Participation in Establishing the Culture Club at the Al-Fateh Center Benghazi 2006; Supervising the Al-Fateh Center annual children fashion show 2006
s. General reading; watching horror films; keeping pets. Ice-skating, cycling, swimming and beginners, self defense; acting, participated in the horror film "Drops of Horror"; Designing and making clothes and embroidery
t. Writing stories, fiction novels and detective stories; Writing scenario and the plot for a horror film "Drops of Horror" produced by a group of students at the Al-Fatih Center for Gifted Students; Symbolic Drawing and sketching.
u. Primary: Arabic school-Vienna Austria; Preparatory school: Arabic school-Bratislava Slovakia; Secondary school: El-Fateh Center for Gifted students- Benghazi-Libya
v. Telephonic interview & test score
w. None
x. Ms. Elkilani is an exceptional candidate for the MEPI Leaders Program. She is from Benghazi, far from the more developed and opportunity-abundant capital city of the country. Although she spent much of her childhood in Europe, where her father was posted as a Libyan diplomat, she is now back "home" in Libya for the first time. She moved back to Libya with confidence and independence--she has leveraged these traits and qualities on the campus of Garyounis University. She

qualities on the campus of Garyounis University. She participates in campus and private social activities including community service and social activism programs across the city.
a. The candidate has very definite career goals: she plans to enter the (largely) men-only industry of Information Technology in Libya. This program will help her to identify likeminded Arab women who will join her in breaking glass ceilings and becoming leaders in their industry.
b. Ms. Elkilani would be an active participant in on-campus discussions during the MEPI program. She stands to benefit tremendously from exposure to the United States and the messages of women empowerment and entrepreneurialism that the Middle East Partnership present.
c. Embassy Tripoli prioritizes recruitment of women from across the Libyan Jamahiriya in its programming, particularly those from outside the Tripoli Capital Area.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov

a. Albayoudi
b. Abdalla
c. S.
d. 06/05/1991
e. Benghazi
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya
i. Male
j. Benghazi
k. +218925762687
l. albayoudi@yahoo.com
m. None
n. Arab Medical University
o. Medicine
p. None
q. None
r. Alahly Benghazi Club, Benghazi sport centre, and Al Sahab Gym
s. Soccer and Tennis;
t. weight lifting;
u. UK.
v. Telephonic interview
w. Plans to become a sports and orthopedic physician
x. Mr. Albayoudi is a strong student at Arab Medical University in Benghazi. He has excellent grades, speaks strong

TRIPOLI 00000164 004 OF 005

English and is excited to participate in a workshop focusing on leadership.
a. As a promising young physician, Mr. Albayoudi would benefit from hearing from peers about how the role of the physician can be much broader than treating patients.
b. The candidate is from the city of Benghazi in the East of the Libyan Jamahiriyya. Although a large city, it lags behind Tripoli in terms of opportunity and development. The impact of a program on leadership could be profound as Mr. Albayoudi could be among the cadre of doctors that establish a lasting and workable health care system in the East of the country.
c. Post makes great effort to recruit nominees from the economically disadvantaged communities of Libya.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov

a. Saad
b. Saleh
c. Salem A
d. 2/17/1984
e. Bengwad Agdabia
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya

i. Male
j. Tripoli
k. +218914914162, +218913784187
l. salehthegreat2000@yahoo.com
m. None
n. AlFateh University
o. Chemical engineering
p. Waha Co. as Process engineer shift supervisor (2003-present)
q. None
r. Petroleum Institute football team and literature championship
s. Reading and watching documentaries
t. Extracurricular activities;
u. None.
v. Telephonic interview & test score
w. Plans to get PHD in the atomic chemistry engineering
x. The applicant has very precise career plans that involve continuing his education to the doctoral level and then working in scientific research focusing on water treatment and electrical generation. The applicant has also indicated his long term interest in becoming a university professor.
a. Mr. Saad would gain tremendous insight into the U.S. academic world. He also wrote a compelling essay in which he identified public corruption and embezzlement of public funds to be the greatest political and social threat that Libya currently faces. In his essay, he recommends that students play a role in raising awareness and demands for increased accountability within the Libyan system. Participating in a leadership workshop could help him understand how students can play a responsible role and interact with governments.
b. As the nominee is interested in continuing his education toward a PhD, it would be great for him to understand the U.S. educational system so that he may one day qualify for a Fulbright Science and Technology Award.
c. A key Mission Strategic Plan agenda item for Mission Tripoli is encouraging the diversion of sciences in Libya away from weapons research and into areas of beneficial study to include water purification, pharmaceuticals manufacturing and power generation. Our candidate has these interests in mind.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov
a. El Burki
b. Hana
c. M
d. 11/26/1987
e. Benghazi
f. Libya
g. Libya
h. Libya
i. Female
j. Benghazi
k. +218913826577, +218928668553; +218925301009
l. smile_viva_20@yahoo.com; jamaltop-2000@hotmail.com
m. None
n. Arab Medical University
o. Medicine
p. None
q. Trained for one year in a pharmacy to improve her knowledge in drugs
r. Previously participated in exhibitions in drawing on her campus
s. Loves learning languages, already speaks Italian and learning French
t. Swimming, poetry and playing basketball
u. None.
v. Scholastic reports
w. Plans to be a doctor

TRIPOLI 00000164 005 OF 005

x. Ms. Elburki originally applied for a separate program, but PAS recommends her to be considered as an alternate for the MEPI student leaders workshops as she has demonstrated strong leadership, maintained good grades, presents a clear vision for her professional development and as a female from Benghazi represents a key target audience for Mission Libya public diplomacy programming.
a. As a medical student, Post believes that Ms. ElBurki stands to gain much for her participation in the workshop. Post hopes that she will learn about additional roles that physicians can play in shaping the health care environment of their home country.
b. As a woman from a city that lacks the opportunity and development of the nation's capital, Ms. Elburki stands to gain confidence and a sense of independence through her participation in the program.
c. Mission Libya prioritizes applications from candidates outside the national capital area and particularly from women.
y. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, +218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov

---

POINT OF CONTACT

¶3. (U) Embassy Tripoli's point of contact for this program is Mr. Jared Caplan, Cultural Affairs Officer, telephone: 218912203672, CaplanJS@state.gov.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI166

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI166 aka Wikileaks id #250266 ?
Subject	HALF OF LIBYA'S HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE BUDGET STILL UP FOR GRABS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 23 Feb 2010 16:10 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI166.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1053
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0166/01 0541610
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 231610Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5856
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0031
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0010
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6414
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000166

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO, NEA/MAG AND EEB/NEA; NSC FOR S. AGUIRRE; COMMERCE FOR
ITA NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/23/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , ECON [Economic Conditions] ,
ECIN [Economic Integration and Cooperation] , EINV [Foreign Investments] , TNGD [Engineering Research and
Development] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: HALF OF LIBYA'S HOUSING AND INFRASTRUCTURE BUDGET STILL UP
FOR GRABS

TRIPOLI 00000166  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Joan A. Polaschik, Charge d'Affaires, U.S.
Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C) Summary:  The Head of Libya's Housing and Infrastructure
Board Mohamed Abujela al-Mabruk told the Ambassador on February
```

15 that approximately half of Libya's 2008 projected investment of 62 billion Libyan dinars (USD 47 billion) in construction projects had been awarded, primarily to foreign companies. He noted that the projected investment was expected to increase by nearly 10 billion Libyan dinars within the next few years. While China and Turkey had received the most contracts thus far, Mabruk highlighted that there was plenty of room left for U.S. companies to compete, potentially for even larger projects than had been awarded to date. He welcomed the February 20-23 U.S. Trade Mission and expressed an interest in closer bilateral trade engagement. End Summary.

DEVELOPMENT BUDGET LIKELY TO INCREASE

¶2. (C) During a February 15 meeting with the Ambassador, the Head of Libya's Housing and Infrastructure Board (HIB), Mohamed Abujela al-Mabruk, accompanied by Dr. Ibrahim Shukri, HIB's head of the Follow-up Department, explained that Libya's projected investment in infrastructure construction of 62 billion Libyan dinars (USD 47 billion) would probably increase to at least 70 billion LYD (USD 55 billion) over the next few years. The reason for the increase, according to Mabruk was the absence of "a lot of information" from the previous estimate. Whereas the General People's Committee (Ministry-equivalent) for Planning and Finance estimated in 2005 that 420,000 houses would need to be constructed over the next five years to accommodate Libya's growing population, rapid demographic changes -- including hundreds of additional expatriate families -- had led to a current estimate of 500,000 housing units. Although the estimated number of additional construction projects had increased, the investment budget has not yet increased, he explained. He estimated that nearly 25 billion LYD would still be contracted out over the next few years.

¶3. (C) According to Mabruk, the HIB builds to the government's order and does not contribute to determinations of construction figures or the allocation of the housing units. HIB has been charged with building 200,000 housing units throughout Libya and is the only authority in Libya appointed to upgrade existing and new public infrastructure. Over 25 percent of HIB's contracts (more than 10 billion Libyan dinars) have been awarded to Chinese companies, representing the bulk of HIB's contracts. "And they will get more," Mabruk predicted. Turkish firms are the second highest recipient of HIB contracts, worth 3 billion Libyan dinars). In addition to the HIB, Libya's Organization for the Development of Administrative Centers (ODAC) was also tasked with building housing units, as well as large public projects such as schools, universities, and hospitals. Both organizations fall under the authority of the General Board of Public Works, along with three city-specific development agencies, in Tripoli, Benghazi and Ghadames. Outside of this authority, only the Ministry of Transportation manages urban planning projects, specifically for airports, roads, bridges, railways, and ports. Mabruk remarked that the Ministry of Agriculture was also involved in limited, specific development projects.

U.S. COMPANIES WELCOME TO BID ON CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS

¶4. (SBU) The Ambassador highlighted the February 20-23 U.S. Trade Mission and inquired whether there was still room left in the infrastructure construction sector for U.S. companies. Mabruk explained that nearly half of Libya's construction investment budget, or approximately 34 billion Libyan dinars had been awarded in contracts so far. However, he believed that U.S. firms would be highly competitive for future bids, particularly in infrastructure construction projects for small cities, construction supervision, project management, engineering, water treatment and waste management, and architecture and design.

¶5. (SBU) Mabruk explained the process for U.S. firms to bid on HIB projects -- namely that a company must first contact the HIB

HIB projects -- namely that a company must first contact the HIB with a letter of intent and begin negotiations with the agency. He noted that the HIB is willing to initiate negotiations with a company even before the company is legally registered in Libya. If a contract is awarded, the HIB will send the company a letter, which is required for a company to register itself.

Companies that enter into joint venture partnerships with Libyan firms will be given preference by the HIB, and if a foreign company partners with the Economic and Social Development Fund (ESDF), it can be awarded contracts without having to compete with other bids. (Note: Other agencies have informed us of the same preferential treatment to joint-venture firms. End note.) According to Mabruk, the Prime Minister-equivalent has recently moved to allow joint-ventures partnerships to be comprised of less than a 35-percent share for Libyan partners and a 65-percent share or greater for foreign partners. Prior to the change, a foreign partner could not own more than a 65-percent share in a joint-venture. He pointed to the example of a recent HIB contract that was signed on a public works project in the Green Mountains, by which the Libyan government allowed an Italian firm to take a 76-percent stake in the joint-venture project. If the Prime Minister-equivalent approved the contract, Mabruk remarked that it would be precedent for future joint-venture partnerships.

AECOM: A MODEL FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN LIBYA

¶6. (C) Mabruk explained that since 2008, HIB has been working with the American company AECOM as the direct program manager for every HIB contract. After a company approaches the HIB with interest in negotiating a contract, HIB refers the company to AECOM, which prequalifies bidders and refers them back to the HIB according to company size and specialization. After the HIB selects a company and signs a contract, AECOM is responsible for managing the work of that company. Mabruk noted that HIB's partnership with AECOM was the first and largest of its kind in Libya, whereby a foreign company is, for all intents and purposes, managing all of the HIB's work. Mabruk lamented, however, that AECOM was hindered by the GOL bureaucracy. "The problem is that we have not been ready to hand over 100-percent of our projects to them for the last two years," he said, although AECOM is more than capable of managing the task. He said that many infrastructure projects throughout the country were facing problems due to faulty contractors, but that AECOM was limited in the manner in which it could address such issues.

BIO AND COMMENT

¶7. (C) Mohamed Abujela al-Mabruk moved to Seattle in 1977 to study engineering. In 1978, he enrolled in the University of Southern California's Graduate School of Engineering, where he stayed until 1983. He earned a Master's Degree and Doctorate in Engineering from USC. In 1983, he moved back to Tripoli and become a professor at Al Fatah University School of Engineering, where he taught Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi. He remained in that position until 1995, when he was named Chairman of the Industrial Steel Company of Misurata (1995-2005). During the second half of 2005, he was dual-hatted as head of the Authority of Infrastructure and Development, a precursor to the HIB. In 2006 he was named Deputy Head of the HIB, serving under then-chairman Abuzeid Dorda. From 2007-2009 he served as Minister of Transportation, and in 2009, he was appointed head of the HIB.

¶8. (C) Like other GOL interlocutors that we have met in advance of the Trade Mission, the HIB was extremely welcoming of U.S. investment in Libya and was very willing to coordinate meetings between the HIB and the twenty-five companies that will participate in the delegation. His assessment of current and

future investment estimates shows that Libya will continue to be a land of opportunity well into the foreseeable future.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI167

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI167 aka Wikileaks id #250276 ?
Subject	LIBYA REQUESTS USG SUPPORT FOR FULL MTCR MEMBERSHIP
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 23 Feb 2010 16:54 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI167.html
References	10TRIPOLI115
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1131
OO RUEHIK
DE RUEHTRO #0167 0541654
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O R 231654Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5858
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0269
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6416
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000167

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG; NSC FOR S. AGUIRRE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA REQUESTS USG SUPPORT FOR FULL MTCR MEMBERSHIP

REF: TRIPOLI 115

¶1. (SBU) This is an action request; please see para 4.

¶2. (SBU) On February 15, 2010, the Embassy received a diplomatic note from the International Organizations Office at the General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs equivalent), formally requesting U.S. support for Libya's upcoming bid for full Missile Technology Control Regime membership. Full text of the

diplomatic note is included at para 5.

¶3. (SBU) The diplomatic note inaccurately claimed that the Ambassador had already committed to support Libya's candidacy. In response, the Embassy sent a diplomatic note to the MFA on February 23, refuting the statement and explaining that the Embassy would refer the overall matter of USG support for Libya's bid to the Department.

¶4. (SBU) The Embassy requests Department guidance on replying to the GOL on this issue.

¶5. (SBU) Informal Embassy translation of Libyan diplomatic note number 341/38/1/35, which was forwarded by e-mail to NEA/MAG on February 15:

The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations Office) sends its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya.

Further to the meeting held on February 9, 2010 at the Command and Staff School in Libya between the Libyan side represented by the head of the Technical Cooperation Department and the National Committees at the Defense Interim Committee, and the American side represented by H.E. the U.S. Ambassador accredited to Great Jamhiriya, this office would like to note that among the topics referred to was Libya's recurrent request to join MTCR as a member, and H.E. the U.S. Ambassador promised to support Libya to accede to such membership. Therefore, we would like hereby to request your country's support to Libya during the next meeting of the MTCR forum expected to convene this year.

The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (International Organizations Office) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed U.S. Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations.

(Seal of the General People's Secretary for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation)

To: U.S. Embassy - Tripoli

Date: February 14, 2010

POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments w idget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Ja vascript files, w hich might be deemed undesirable. Setting w ill take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI174

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI174 aka Wikileaks id #251264 ?
Subject	TRIPOLI - CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 28 Feb 2010 16:37 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI174.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5354
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0174/01 0591637
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 281637Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5865
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0001
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6423
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000174

SIPDIS

CAIRO FOR RCO CHRIS ROWAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , CASC *[Assistance to Citizens]* , KFRD *[Fraud Prevention Programs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TRIPOLI - CERTIFICATION OF CONSULAR MANAGEMENT CONTROLS

¶1. Embassy Tripoli completed our certification of consular management controls on February 28, 2010. Yael Lempert, A/DCM and Consular Chief (FS-01) has certified the successful completion of this management review.

¶2. The results of the review follow:

A. Inventory Count and Reconciliation of Accountable Consular Items: The Consular Chief and RSO Robert Kimbrough conducted a comprehensive count of the inventory of accountable consular supplies on February 28, 2010. Post is using the AI module to maintain its inventory of accountable consular items, and the physical number of items on hand reconciles with inventory records.

B. Guidance: All consular officers are familiar with and have access to basic consular references and instructions. The consular chief checks classified e-mail daily, and all consular officers have access to classified e-mail.

C. CST Management: Post has reviewed its CST tables and is in

full compliance.

D. Physical Access: Post is in compliance with all Physical Access requirements with the following exception: (#1) Post was allowing LES to arrive and enter the section in the morning 5-10 minutes before any cleared Americans were present. Post has corrected this and now requires a cleared American to arrive first and open up each morning.

E. Access to Personally Identifiable Information: Post is in full compliance.

F. Control/Reconciliation/Destruction of Controlled Items: Post has reviewed procedures and is in full compliance.

G. Cash Accountability: Post has reviewed procedures and files, and is in full compliance.

H. Periodic Comparison of MRV Fees and NIV Applications: Post is in full compliance.

I. Referral System: Post has reviewed procedures and is in full compliance.

J. Training: Post is in full compliance, with the following exception: (#1) ACO has not yet taken PC-400 or PC-417. She will do so immediately.

K. Standards of Employee Conduct: Post has reviewed procedures, and is in full compliance, except for the following: (#1) While all Consular staff recuse themselves from any and all involvement with a case in which there may be a real or perceived conflict of interest, we did not have a written policy on this topic. Upon realizing we needed a written policy, we posted one in the section, and all Consular employees reviewed it.

L. Namecheck and Clearance Reviews: Post is in full compliance.

M. Visa Lookout Accountability: Post is in full compliance.

N. Intake, Review and Screening: Post has reviewed procedures, and is in full compliance.

O. Oversight of Processing: Post is in full compliance, with the following exceptions: (#1) Consular chief has no line of sight view of print stations, due to the physical layout of the section. However, vice-consul has direct line of sight view of the print stations, and (#2) Post has never conducted an unannounced visit to the office of our panel physician. We will do so in the coming months.

P. Biometric Collection: Post has reviewed procedures, and is in full compliance.

Q. Photo Standards: Post is in full compliance.

R. Visa Adjudication Oversight: Post has reviewed procedures, and is in full compliance.

S. Files: Since Post began NIV processing, we have been using the electronic DS-160 application. Thus, we have no NIV files. We do not process IV's. All of our ACS files are managed appropriately, in accordance with regulations.

T. Passports and CRBA's: Post has reviewed procedures, and is in full compliance.

U. Fraud Prevention Programs: Post has a designated Fraud

Prevention Manager. However, as a relatively new section, which only started full NIV issuance in April 2009, we are still developing our anti-fraud procedures and FPU. We currently operate on an ad hoc basis vis-`-vis fraud, dealing with fraud cases as each arises. Our FPM is currently working on developing written criteria for referring cases for investigations and creating a more fulsome FPU.

V. Wilberforce Act: Post is in full compliance.

W. Oversight of Applicant Service Centers: Not applicable, as Tripoli has no ASC's.

X. Consular Agents: Not applicable, as Tripoli has no Consular Agents.
POLASCHIK

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI18

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI18 aka Wikileaks id #243021 ?
Subject	VISAS VIPER REPORT: NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2009
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 10 Jan 2010 15:01 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI18.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4273
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0018/01 0101501
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101501Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/USOFFICE INR/TIPOFF PRIORITY
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5663
INFO RUEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1533
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6214
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000018

VISAS VIPER
NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR CA/VO/L/C AND INR/TIPOFF

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/10/2035
TAGS: CVIS *[Visas]* , KVPR *[Visas VIPER Communications]* , PTER *[Terrorists and Terrorism]* , ASEC *[Security]* , CMGT *[Consular Administration and Management]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: VISAS VIPER REPORT: NOVEMBER AND DECEMBER 2009

CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, Consular Chief, U.S. Embassy Tripoli.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (c)
¶1. (SBU) Visas Viper committee met on January 4, 2010. DCM, POL/ECON, RAO, PAO, DAO, RSO, and CONS attended.

¶2. (S/NF) The following names were submitted. All are Libyan citizens. Derogatory information on the below individuals was submitted to us by the Libyan External Security Organization:

Abd al-Wahab Muftah Abd al-Salam Tahir
DOB: 1978
POB: Dirna, Libya
PPT number: 356364
For further information, see TD-314/038146-09

Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Muhammad Abd-Al Salam Sulayman Al-Shilwi
DOB: 1983
POB: Dirna, Libya
PPT number: W953327
For further information, see TD-314/054705-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Al-Qaqa Abu-Jabal (aka Banani Jamal Muhammad al-Banani)
DOB: 1989
POB: Dirna, Libya
PPT number: 914400
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Al Mansur Abu Musib (aka Ibrahim Jadallah Faraj Ali Azzuz)
DOB: 1984
POB: Dirna
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Abd al-Rahman Abu Jaffar (aka Adil Ashur Ahmidah Abziu)
DOB: 1976
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Ayub Abu Rawa (aka Salim Yunis Masud al-Mansuri)
DOB: 1976
POB: Dirna, Libya
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Muhammad Abu Basir (aka Akram Faraj Ibrahim al-Kilani)
DOB: 1981
POB: Dirna, Libya
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Abd al-Malik Abu Turab (aka Rawad Kamal Abd al-Karim Abdullah al-Hasi)
DOB: 1983
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Hatab Abu Umar (aka Khalfallah Hamd SAlih al-Hisadi)
DOB: 1983
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

Abd al-Fatah Abu Musa (aka Mahmud Abd Al-Alim Umjawier al-Qabaili)
DOB: 1990
POB: Dirna, Libya
For further information, see TD-314/086548-09
Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.

¶3. (S/NF) The following is a Libyan citizen. The source of the information is the Norwegian Police Security Service:

Zakaria Hamadi Aghamosa
DOB: 15 January 1977
For further information, see TD-314/067148-09

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, SEE ID-314/067148-09

TRIPOLI 00000018 002 OF 002

Local check of Consolidated Consular Database indicates no record. Recipients are requested to recheck CCD to verify.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI39

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI39 aka Wikileaks id #243674 ?
Subject	LIBYA: INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 14 Jan 2010 17:32 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI39.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8272
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0039/01 0141732
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 141732Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5683
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6235
```

Hide header

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 TRIPOLI 000039

SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/IFD/OIA AND NEA/MAG; STATE PASS USTR (BURKHEAD);
LONDON AND PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS; USDOC FOR ITA/MAC/ONE (MASON), ADVOCACY CENTER, AND CLDP (TEJTEL, TALAAT); CAIRO FOR TREASURY

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , KTDB *[National Trade Data Bank]* , LY *[Libya]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , OPIC *[Overseas Private Investment Corporation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , USTR *[Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* ,
EINV *[Foreign Investments]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: INVESTMENT CLIMATE STATEMENT

REF: STATE 124006

TRIPOLI 00000039 001.2 OF 010

INDICATORS FOR LIBYA:

¶1. Indicators:
Transparency International: Libya is ranked 130 on the
Corruption Perceptions Index.
Heritage Foundation: Economic Freedom Ranking: 171

World Bank Doing Business: Libya is not ranked
Millennium Challenge Corporation: Libya is not ranked

OPENNESS TO FOREIGN INVESTMENT

¶2. In recent years, Libya has taken a number of steps to encourage foreign direct investment, with its current initiative dating back to the mid-1990s. Since that time, Libya enacted numerous laws and regulations intended to improve the Libyan business climate and increase its attractiveness to foreign investment. This effort has been modestly successful; foreign companies are returning to do business, and Libya has been able to draw substantial interest from foreign investors, particularly since the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003. This has included billions of dollars in investment in Libya's energy sector. Libya has also embarked on vast new development projects, including plans to spend 150 billion Libyan dinar (LD) (approximately US $123.4 billion) on public works, much of it in infrastructure and housing, over the next five years.

¶3. Through Law No. 5 (1997), "Encouragement of Investment Decision," the government attempted to diversify its hydrocarbons-dependent economy, encourage technical training of Libyan nationals and enhance regional development. Sectors targeted under this law include - but are not limited to - agriculture, industry, tourism, services and health. The provisions of Law No. 5 attempt to lower the tax and customs fee burdens on qualifying companies. Under the law, imported machinery, tools, and other capital equipment are exempt from all customs duties and taxes; any equipment, spare parts, or primary materials needed for the project operation are exempt for a period of five years; the affected project is exempt from income tax on its activities for a period of five years from the date of the commencement of production or work; goods directed for export are exempt from excise tax and from the fees and taxes imposed on exports; stamp duty tax on commercial documents are exempt; and finally, profits from a project will enjoy the same exemption if reinvested. A 2006 General People's Congress (GPC) amendment to Law No. 5 lowered a 50 million Libyan dinar (approximately US $41 million) floor on investments qualifying under the law to LD 5 million (approximately US $4.13 million) (LD 2 million if 50% or more of the project is owned by Libyans).

¶4. The Libyan Foreign Investment Board (LFIB) was created as the implementing agency for Law No. 5. The LFIB was replaced in 2009 by a similar organization, known as the Privatization and Investment Board (PIB). This organization's mission is to oversee and regulate foreign investment in Libya's aging and obsolete industrial base, which is characterized by an absence of national industrial planning, obsolete technology, poor management, shoddy maintenance, slow restructuring and over-employment. The function of the PIB is essentially to serve as the screening mechanism for foreign direct investment. While PIB's mandate theoretically includes investment-promotion, its activity is generally limited to processing foreign investment inquiries, except those related to tourism or the Misurata Free Zone. (Note: Applications for investment in those sectors should be directed to the Tourism Committee and the Free Zone Authority, respectively. End note.) This organization aims to be a "one-stop shop," assisting with issues related to customs and immigration, taxes, and labor for those companies entering under Law No. 5. PIB approval is required for a broad array of operational issues for projects undertaken under Law No. 5, including the disposal of imported materials, transfers of investment capital outside of Libya at project completion, and employment of foreigners when qualified Libyans cannot be hired.

¶5. Libyan legal requirements on foreign companies present challenges with respect to operational activities. Non-Libyans cannot, as a rule, own land. (Note: A provision of Law No. 5 does allow for foreign rental and ownership of land for project

work, although this has not been widely observed in practice. End note.) "National Treatment" provisions do not exist for foreign investors. The local content requirement is such that foreign companies must hire a number of Libyans to at least match the number of expatriates on staff. In the oil sector, Libyans put forward for employment with foreign companies often

lack formal qualifications or applicable practical experience, leaving companies to either invest a considerable amount of resources on extensive training and mentoring or to pay employees who do not contribute to the company's productivity.

¶6. The promulgation of Law 443 on November 14, 2006, fundamentally changed the way that foreign businesses in the oil services, construction, industry, electricity, communications, transportation, agribusiness and marine sectors can structure themselves and operate in Libya. Among other measures, new foreign entrants seeking to establish themselves in these sectors of the Libyan market are required to establish joint venture companies with a Libyan entity. Law 443 liberalized the strictures of earlier regulations by allowing foreign companies to retain up to 65% ownership of these entities. The law does not apply to representative offices (which do not have the right to conduct negotiations or enter into contracts), and to entities formed under Law 5 of 1997 or Law 7 of 2004 (governing tourism projects).

¶7. Some political screening of foreign investment takes place, and the political equities significantly influence decisions on government procurement. In 2007, senior Libyan officials made public statements directly linking successful foreign bids on development projects to the health of bilateral political relations. There is also strong evidence that large government and quasi-government tenders are awarded for political reasons, often in tacit exchange for deals perceived to demonstrate Libya's return to the international community. Similarly, large tenders are withheld when political relations are not perceived to be positive. This has a trickle-down effect on private sector business transactions, which can be made more difficult by Libyan government interference. The Committee for Audit and Oversight reviews all contracts involving government funding, and exercises considerable influence over the political vetting of foreign companies seeking to enter the Libyan market.

¶8. Foreign firms are subject to special taxation arrangements, including the Stamp Tax, which places a special tax of 0.5-3 percent on the value of items procured by foreign firms in Libya, and the Jihad Tax, which applies a 4 percent tax on corporate profits. Corporate tax rates are subject to interpretation, and are often a matter of negotiation between the company and Libyan tax authorities, particularly for larger companies/projects. Law No. 5 (1997) does provide some tax benefits for companies conducting work in Libya that falls under its terms, but requirements to receive these benefits are not clearly defined in the law. Furthermore, several standard forms of tax relief are not provided, resulting in high withholdings and income taxes.

¶9. The government began a program of privatizations of 360 state-owned enterprises in 2004, a process that is ongoing. Although foreign entities are allowed to participate, they must do so under local rules, which include employment protections for Libyan workers and divesting shares to a wide number of individual owners (with a preference for Libyans).

CONVERSION AND TRANSFER POLICIES

¶10. From February 1999 to December 2001, Libya maintained a dual exchange rate, with the official rate pegged to a Special Drawing Right (SDR) at the rate of 1LD=.608 SDRs. State import

agencies effected transactions using the official rate. Since 2001, the Libyan Dinar has been unofficially pegged to the U.S. Dollar (allowed to float within a specified band). With a 50% devaluation of the official rate in 2002, the two rates were effectively unified. A further 15% devaluation took place in June of 2003. In June of the same year, Libya agreed to the terms of IMF Article IV consultations, which called for, among other things, advanced import requirements and an end to the 15% exchange tax and subsidy.

¶11. Individuals with residence permits are permitted to hold foreign currency in Libyan accounts. Non-residents working in Libya may open domestic accounts in which to hold earnings. Central Bank approval is required for all other credits to non-resident accounts. Per-transaction withdrawals are limited to 5,000 USD in cash and 10,000 USD in travelers' checks (Note: Traveler's checks are not widely accepted in Libya. End Note).

¶12. The right to open an account in a convertible currency in a Libyan commercial bank is provided for companies entering Libya under Law No. 5. The Libyan Banking Law (Law No. 1 of 2005) allows any Libyan person or entity to retain foreign exchange

and conduct exchanges in that currency. Libyan commercial banks are allowed to open accounts in foreign exchange and conduct cash payments and transfers (including abroad) in foreign currency. Commercial banks operating in Libya may grant credit in foreign exchange and transact in foreign exchange among themselves. Entities engaging in foreign exchange must be licensed by the Central Bank. Foreign exchange facilities are available at most large hotels and airports, and ATMs are becoming more widely available. The importation of currency must be declared at time of entry. It is illegal to import or export Libyan Dinars in any quantity.

¶13. Most firms seeking to receive payment for services/products in Libya operate using Letters of Credit (LOCs) facilitated through foreign banks (often based in Europe). Foreign energy companies remitting large sums often make arrangements for direct transfers to accounts offshore. There have been reports of difficulties arranging LOCs with Libyan entities, owing to a range of institutional inefficiencies that slow the closure of deals, causing them to collapse as prices rise and deadlines slip.

EXPROPRIATION AND COMPENSATION

¶14. The Libyan government has a history of state expropriation of private property, including the assets of foreign companies. These actions were most prevalent during the 1980's, taken largely for ideological reasons, and included the nationalization of whole industries with the stated purpose of greater wealth distribution among the population. These activities appear to have fallen out of practice as a tool of government policy, although regime rhetoric in early 2009 involving the possible nationalization of the oil sector in light of falling world oil prices has brought the issue back to the fore. In recent years, the Libyan government has taken steps to expand the rights of Libyans to operate private enterprises and buy and rent property.

¶15. Several high-profile expropriations made in the energy sector have been resolved through a process of negotiations between the government and the affected companies. With the advent of a series of economic reforms and efforts at greater transparency since 2004, the prospect for government appropriation appears to be in decline. There have been other instances of compensation by the state for expropriated property, but figures related to the terms provided are not

available.

¶16. With the imposition of Law 443 of 2006, local ownership is essentially enforced for most foreign entities seeking to do business in Libya, as well as many established before the law came into effect. While this law boosts the percentage of foreign ownership when compared with previous regulations, it requires that at least 35% of non-Libyan businesses be controlled by Libyan individuals or companies. This law has made competent Libyan partners in all sectors a highly valuable commodity for foreign investors, providing ample fuel for rent-seeking behavior in many sectors of the economy.

DISPUTE SETTLEMENT

¶17. The Libyan court system consists of three levels: the courts of first instance, the courts of appeal (also known as the courts of cassation); and the Supreme Court, which is the final appellate level. The GPC appoints justices to the Supreme Court. Special "revolutionary courts" may operate outside the court system to try political offenses and crimes against the state. "People's courts," another example of extrajudicial authority, were abolished in January 2005. A decree providing for state security courts was propagated in late 2007, and security courts were established in spring 2008. Matters related to personal law in Libya's justice system are nominally based on Sharia law. Other issues, including the commercial code, are largely based on Italian law, much of which dates to the 1950's.

¶18. Libya is not a signatory to the U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (The "New York Convention"). In the case of commercial disputes, most foreign entities currently opt to try cases before the International Chamber of Commerce, the judgments of which Libya has a history of respecting.

¶19. The law governing agencies specifies cases in which a contract may be terminated by either party. Otherwise, local courts will rule on the legality of the termination and/or award

TRIPOLI 00000039 004.2 OF 010

compensation to the injured party. Contracts are only exclusive if thus specified in the agency contract. Some agent-company disputes have reportedly been settled through direct appeal on the part of the foreign company to the General People's Committee of Industry, Economy, and Trade. Given the relative newness of the private sector, little precedent exists in this area.

PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS AND INCENTIVES

¶20. Libya is not a member of the WTO. Libya's application was received by the WTO on June 10, 2004. The General Council established a Working Party on July 27, 2004, and Libya is in the process of preparing its complete file for membership. Many of Libya's key supporting documents are in Arabic; translating these into correct, technically accurate English has been a significant impediment, according to Libyan trade officials.

¶21. Under the terms of Investment Law No. 5 (1997), approved projects receive a 5 year corporate income tax holiday (eligible for possible 3 year extension), exemption from corporate taxes and stamp tax on legal documents, exemption from customs duties and taxes on imports on project materials (5 years), and exemption from excise taxes for exported goods derived from the project. These incentives are only available for projects approved by the PIB for implementation under Law No. 5. They do not apply for projects disapproved by the PIB, or to foreign and domestic investors implementing projects outside of Law No. 5 (joint stock companies, Libyan agents, etc). Foreign firms and individuals generally have a more difficult time than Libyan

individuals generally have a more difficult time than Libyan nationals accessing credit from Libyan banks.

¶22. Offsets are often a part of large foreign investment deals, particularly in the energy sector. "Corporate responsibility" and local staff training programs are common requirements for successful concession bids, and training programs in particular are generally essential to win bids on most Libyan government contracts. These programs can range from the training of a handful of local staff up to multi-year programs exceeding US $50 million for large energy companies. Also, some foreign firms have moved beyond these measures to bankroll much larger development projects. For example, following the October 2007 10-year extension of its holdings in Libya, Italian energy firm ENI Spa announced that it had signed an MOU with the Qadhafi Development Foundation to provide US $150 million for the building of hospitals and schools, and for the preservation of historical sites. Offsets of this type are very likely to remain a part of the business landscape for the foreseeable future.

¶23. Regarding visa matters, current U.S. and Libya visa policies are based on a framework of 'general reciprocity.' U.S. citizens are usually issued single-entry visas, and frequently encounter significant delays and complications in obtaining visas. Visas must be obtained prior to travel to Libya; they require an invitation or sponsor, and can take up to several months to process. Residence permits are often difficult for foreign workers to obtain, and usually require several trips in and out of Libya. U.S. visitors to Libya should expect to wait weeks to months for issuance. Libyan visa practice is subject to change without notice, and can also be influenced by political factors. For example, in November 2007, Libya re-implemented an existing regulation requiring a stamped Arabic translation in all passports. This requirement lacks clarity, is not applied in a uniform fashion and was implemented without prior warning. In December 2008, the Libyan Embassies in London and Paris began to require that visa applicants appear in person and submit a lengthy list of supporting documents. This requirement was also imposed without prior notice, and was imposed worldwide in 2009. In addition, political tensions between Libya and Canada in 2009 resulted in Libya's withholding of visa approvals for Canadian citizens. In the summer of 2008, a member of the Qadhafi family was arrested in Switzerland, and as a result, Libya detained two Swiss businessmen for a year and later charged them with visa violations (as well as tax charges). As of January 2010, they still were not permitted to leave Libya and their cases were going through the Libyan court system. Further information on visas can be found in the Country-Specific Information for Libya at the State Department website:
http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis/ cis_951.html.

RIGHT TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND ESTABLISHMENT

¶24. Laws and regulations on investment and property ownership allow domestic and foreign entities to establish business

TRIPOLI 00000039 005.2 OF 010

enterprises and engage in remunerative activities. However, the regulatory and legal environment is complex, and there is a systemic bias which favors government sector companies and Libyan firms over foreign entities. Foreign companies have several options for operating in Libya, including the establishment of joint ventures/joint stock companies, representative offices or to enter Libya under the terms of Law No. 5. However, foreign investors are increasingly being encouraged to form joint ventures with Libyan entities in accordance with Law 443 of 2006. In practical terms, this has restricted the terms of foreign entry into the market.

¶25. Since 2004, foreign nationals and companies are allowed to

lease property from private Libyan citizens. Rights to land ownership are possible only for foreign companies entering Libya under the terms of Law No. 5. There is considerable ambiguity in both the public and private rental markets; many aspects of these arrangements are left to local officials. Market distortions exist for various supplies related to housing, including industrial and construction supplies, and there is a lack of transparency in the distribution of these materials. The return of foreign companies and investors to Libya in 2003 has fueled a rapid increase in the price of rental housing and office space, and set off a construction boom. This has generated additional pressures on prices and building materials.

PROTECTION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

¶26. Libyan property rights are complicated by past government policy actions and a weak regulatory environment. The Libyan government eliminated all private property rights in March 1978, and eliminated most private businesses later in the same year. The renting of property was declared illegal, and ownership of property was limited to a single dwelling per family, with all other properties being redistributed. Reduced rate "mortgages" were paid directly to the Libyan government, but many Libyans were exempted from these payments based on family income. This process, and the destruction of official property documents that followed several years later, has greatly complicated subsequent efforts to gain clear titles to property throughout Libya.

¶27. Trademark violations are widespread and violators are adept at producing credible fakes. U.S. brands are at the present time extremely vulnerable to such activity, for their presumed high quality and Libya's lack of direct experience with the "real thing." The entry of several U.S. firms (most often through agents) has served to curtail some of the worst abuses related to their product lines. The General Authority for Products Control has established branches in seven Libyan cities, but they are primarily focused on health and safety issues. The Embassy has noted several cases in which foreign firms successfully pursued claims against trademark infringements by local (Libyan) companies.

¶28. While Libya is in the process of applying for entry to the WTO, it is not currently a member, and thus is not a party to the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). The IMF has called upon Libya to bring its IPR regime in line with international best practice, and the General People's Committee for Industy, Economy and Trade is reportedly making a renewed effort to deal with the problem, although clear evidence of progress is not apparent.

TRANSPARENCY OF REGULATORY SYSTEM

¶29. The Libyan regulatory system is not transparent; the function and responsibilities of Libya's myriad government institutions are opaque and often contradictory. Transparency International ranked Libya 130th out of 180 countries ("1" indicating least corrupt) in its 2009 Corruption Perceptions Index. Libya's legal and policy frameworks are similarly difficult to navigate. The issuance of licenses and permits is often delayed for significant periods for unspecified reasons, and such applications often appear to be adjudicated in a subjective fashion. The lack of transparency and clearly delineated lines of decision-making within Libyan institutions have fostered an environment in which graft and rent-seeking behavior are common.

¶30. Accurate, current information on the Libyan market and key commercial regulations is difficult to obtain. There are no non-governmental organizations present in Libya to help facilitate regulatory transparency.

EFFICIENT CAPITAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT

¶31. Libya's banking system is dominated by four banks, which are owned in full or in the majority by the Libyan Central Bank (Jamahiriya Bank, which merged with Umma Bank in 2008, Wahda Bank, Sahara Bank, and the National Commercial Bank). These banks constitute almost ninety percent of Libya's banking sector assets. All of these banks have capital of at least 100 million Libyan Dinars, and two of them (Wahda Bank and Sahara Bank), were recently privatized. France's BNP Paribas acquired 19% of Libya's Sahara Bank in July 2007, and took operational control of the bank. The deal also included an option allowing BNP Paribas to purchase additional shares of up to 51% of Sahara's capital over the next three to five years. In November 2007, five foreign banks were shortlisted for the privatization of Wahda Bank, including French, Italian, Jordanian, Bahraini and Moroccan institutions; the Arab Bank of Jordan was selected. The Arab Bank of Jordan bid on a 19% share of Wahda Bank, with the option to increase their ownership to 51% in three to five years. The Central Bank announced in October 2007 that it would merge Umma Bank and Jamahiriya Bank into a single entity; that process was completed in 2008, although there are still branches open under the banner of each bank. The Central Bank also owns the Libyan Foreign Bank, which operates as an offshore bank, with responsibility for satisfying
Libya's international banking needs (apart from foreign investment). In addition, there are four specialized banks owned by the General People's Committee for Finance: the Agricultural Bank, Real Estate Investment Bank, Development Bank and Reefi Bank. There are also four substantial private banks (Bank of Commerce and Development, Amen Bank, Al-Jimaa al-Arabi Bank and Wafa Bank) and forty-eight smaller regional banks.

¶32. The availability of financing on the local market is weak. Libyan banks offer limited financial products, loans are often made on the basis of personal connections (rather than business plans), and public bank managers lack clear incentives to expand their portfolios. Lack of financing acts as a brake on Libya's development, hampering both the completion of existing projects and the start of new ones. This has been particularly damaging in the housing sector, where particularly small-scale projects often languish for lack of steady funding streams.

¶33. The Libyan banking system is currently undergoing a substantial modernization program to upgrade available services/products, deal with large numbers of non-performing loans, establish a functioning national payments system, facilitate the use of non-cash payment instruments and institute new standards of accounting and training. While foreign banks are technically able to enter the Libyan market under the Banking Law of 2005, the Central Bank has sought to delay their entry until the reform process has taken hold.

COMPETITION FROM STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES

¶34. Private enterprises are allowed to compete with public enterprises under the same terms and conditions with respect to access to markets, credit, and other business operations. However, since approximately 80 percent of the economy consists of public sector entities, most large companies are government-owned and therefore, are the only companies that have the required capital to form joint ventures with foreign partners. SOEs are active in all sectors in Libya and especially in the Energy, Telecommunications, and Construction sectors.

¶35. In terms of corporate governance, most state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have a ten-member board of directors. The company's senior management reports to this board, which in turn reports to a government Minister (called a Secretary in Libya).

In reality, most important decisions are made by the high-level government officials who instruct the senior management.

¶36. Libya has a sovereign wealth fund (SWF), known as the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA), which was established in 2007. The LIA is ultimately overseen by the prime minister, with an 11-member board of trustees. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the LIA invests mostly abroad although some of its investments are being channeled to the domestic Libyan oil sector and to the Libyan Development and Investment Fund (which has holdings of 16 billion Libyan dinars or approximately US $13 billion). This fund was established in March 2009 in partnership with the Central Bank of Libya and the private sector.

¶37. Neither state-owned enterprises (SOEs) nor Libya's sovereign

TRIPOLI 00000039 007.2 OF 010

wealth fund (LIA) are required by law to publish an annual report. The practice, however, is for SOEs to produce financial statements but not to have them independently audited. These companies primarily undergo internal audits and are not reviewed by independent, third-party auditors.

CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

¶38. While the term "Corporate Social Responsibility" is not well-known in Libya, the general concept of companies helping local charities and members of the community in need does exist. For example, one state-owned enterprise provides office space to an organization that assists children in need of cancer treatment. Many foreign companies have programs with communities and officials to address needs in healthcare, road safety, and education. While most firms follow generally accepted CSR principles, the extent to which they follow the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises is unknown. Firms who pursue CSR are viewed favorably by the general public and by officials. As noted above, elements of "Corporate Social Responsibility" and local staff training programs are common requirements for successful bids in the energy and construction sectors.

POLITICAL VIOLENCE

¶39. Libya has experienced political violence. In December 2008, demonstrators threw rocks at the Egyptian Embassy in protest of Egypt's policies in connection with events in the Gaza Strip. The Mauritanian Embassy was also targeted. Protests in the city of Benghazi in response to the publication of cartoons depicting the Prophet Muhammad in a Danish magazine on February 17, 2006, resulted in the deaths of at least ten people and severe damage to the Italian consulate and a number of businesses. U.S. interests in Libya have not been targets of political violence since the reestablishment of diplomatic ties in late 2003. Peaceful demonstrations, small and large, do occur periodically.

¶40. The Government of Libya takes active measures to maintain public security, and to prevent terrorist attacks. Recent worldwide terrorist alerts have stated that extremist groups continue to plan terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in the Middle East region, including Libya. Visitors to Libya should consult the Department of State's latest travel information on Libya and the region at: http://travel.state.gov/travel/cis_pa_tw/cis_ pa_tw_1168.html.

CORRUPTION

¶41. Despite high-profile campaigns designed to draw attention to the issue, corruption remains widespread in Libya. It frequently takes the form of openly solicited or thinly veiled requests for

valueless intermediation (i.e., rent seeking) or outright payoffs. This could include approvals for basic bureaucratic processes, such as required permits and services provided only by the government. Given the state of bureaucratic inefficiency and low salaries for government employees in Libya, these types of transactions are generally viewed as a necessary part of doing business by local operators. Moreover, there is a general public perception that such interventions are essential to ensure the best pricing, service, etc. This tendency serves to reinforce the importance of personal connections and insider knowledge in the conduct of day-to-day business operations.

¶42. While there are quasi-governmental organizations in Libya, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) do not exist in practice. There are no international, regional or NGO "watchdog" organizations present in Libya. Several websites critical of government corruption are operated by Libyan opposition groups located outside of the country. Libya is a signatory to the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), but there has been little evidence of its implementation.

¶43. The government has established the "Administration and Oversight Board" as the responsible Libyan agency for the oversight of government activities for the prevention of corrupt practices. There has also been a public push for transparency on the part of high-ranking government officials. A series of speeches by Muammar al-Qadhafi during late 2006 set out a four-month window for all officials occupying senior government positions to declare all of their earnings and assets or risk unspecified punitive action by the state. In January 2007 this deadline was extended for several months, and there were reports of arrests of leading businessmen on allegations of corrupt practices. Out of 4,600 files of senior government officials

that were reviewed, 150 were suspected of corruption, and out of those, 20 were referred to the courts for judicial action. However, there was no clarity as to whether these actions were directly related to Qadhafi's ultimatum. The Libyan leader and his son, Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, did address corruption in broad terms in a number of other public remarks made in 2007 and 2008, and called for greater accountability.

BILATERAL INVESTMENT AGREEMENTS

¶44. There are no bilateral investment agreements in force between the U.S. and Libya. USTR and Libya are negotiating a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) which is expected to be finalized and signed in 2010. Libya has also stated its interest in concluding a treaty for the avoidance of double taxation with the U.S.

¶45. Libya has concluded a number of bilateral economic cooperation agreements with EU member states, and with Turkey, Tunisia, Kenya, Singapore and others. The terms of these agreements vary, ranging from MOUs with no binding aspects to more substantial agreements that grant "most favored nation" trade benefits, joint investment funds, and the abolishment of visas for Libyans and the other country. Libya has concluded a number of tax treaties, including a new agreement with the UK in late 2007.

¶46. Libya is a member of the 1989 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) linking Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, and Libya. The AMU's stated objectives include the encouragement of free movement of goods and people, revision and simplification of customs regulations, and movement towards a common currency. Nominally, AMU mandates duty-free trade among its members. Disputes between AMU members have prevented significant progress within the group. Libya is also a founding member of the Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD). CEN-SAD's

Secretariat and the CEN-SAD Bank for Investment and Trade are both headquartered in Tripoli. CEN-SAD is dedicated to creating an economic union among its 23 member states, although it has not made great progress toward this goal. Citizens of CEN-SAD member countries are afforded the use of dedicated immigration stalls upon arrival at Libya's major airports.

¶47. Libya is a part of the Greater Arab Free Trade Area (GAFTA, also called PAFTA, Pan Arab Free Trade Agreement) and the Euro-Med Partnership (EMP), also known as the "Barcelona Process," a dialogue between the European Union and 12 Mediterranean countries. The Barcelona Declaration of November 27, 1995 outlined goals of reducing political instability and increasing commercial integration. In 1999, 27 EMP partners agreed to admit Libya contingent on Libya's accepting the Barcelona acquis. In February 2004, Libya announced its intention to join the Barcelona process in full, but no formal Libyan request has been made to date.

OPIC AND OTHER INVESTMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS

¶48. President Bush waived bans on Export-Import Bank activities in Libya on February 28, 2006, and EXIM has conducted two visits to Libya since that time. EXIM offers financing assistance to US export projects with Libyan government-owned entities in three areas: the aviation sector, project finance (requiring predictability and hard revenue streams), and projects backed by the full faith and credit of the Libyan government (i.e., a "sovereign guarantee") for loan repayment.

¶49. OPIC does not as yet offer financing or guarantees for U.S. business activity in Libya. A senior-level OPIC delegation visited Libya in 2005 to discuss with Libyan authorities a proposed bilateral agreement, and the
Deputy Foreign Minister met with OPIC officials in Washington, DC in 2007 to discuss the issue further.

LABOR

¶50. While official figures put the unemployment rate at 13%, unofficial estimates place the real rate at 30 to 40%. Libya's labor force numbers about 1.3 million persons, roughly 31% of whom work in industry, 27% in services, 24% in government and 18% in agriculture. Despite laws prohibiting moonlighting by civil service employees, many government functionaries hold multiple jobs. The majority of Libyan women hold some form of employment outside the home. Libyan labor law stipulates minimum wage, working hours, night shift regulations, dismissal and training. Laws governing dismissal are reasonably strict, and

favor the employee.

¶51. Foreign workers make up a significant percentage of the Libyan labor pool, particularly in the service industries and manual labor jobs. During the 1980's, the Libyan government increased pressure on foreign workers and contractors, which it saw as consuming valuable foreign exchange and contributing to a growing unemployment problem. In 1983, 560,000 foreigners worked in Libya; by 1986, the number dropped to less than 200,000. As oil revenues rebounded in the early 1990's and Libya increased its profile on the African continent, al-Qadhafi announced an "open borders" policy, prompting a massive influx of work-seekers from Chad, Ghana, Niger, and other Sub-Saharan African states. Unable to find work in Libya, many of these immigrants have continued northward and have contributed to the economic migrant problem in Southern Europe. Migrants from Egypt also make up a sizable portion of Libya's informal labor force. With mounting pressure from the EU, and rising unemployment at home, Libya has in the past resorted to deportation. In early

2007, officials announced a series of measures to reduce the presence of illegal workers in Libya. In late 2007, the Egyptian border was temporarily closed to migratory workers. The Secretary of the GPC for Manpower, Employment and Training has called on all Libyan and foreign employers to ensure the legality of their employees under Labor Law No. 58, including the warning that failure to do so will result in punishment ranging from fines, to withdrawal of work permits, to imprisonment.

¶52. Law No. 15, passed in 1981, capped government salaries at between 150 and 500 Libyan Dinars (LD) per month, depending on grade. There had been no cost of living adjustment from that date until 2006, when several changes were instituted to raise minimum salaries in the public and private sectors. GPC Decision No. 277 of 2006 established basic government salaries at the following levels: 130 dinars for persons without dependents, 180 dinars for families with two members, and 220 dinars for a family of three of more members. Additional GPC Decisions during 2007 raised minimum salaries for other categories of employees, including those with advanced degrees and technical skills and corporations not financed by the central government, and removed a pay cap in place for many types of work outside of the public sector. There were also targeted pay raises for, inter alia, Libyan employees of state energy companies, healthcare workers and teachers.

¶53. Independent trade unions and professional associations are illegal in Libya. While workers do not have the right to form unions, they are allowed to participate in an organization called the National Trade Unions' Federation, created in 1972. Collective bargaining does not exist in any meaningful sense, as labor law requires government approval for all related actions.

¶54. Unemployment is a major policy concern for the Libyan government, particularly in light of an expected increase in the pace of privatization, which would inevitably release large numbers of state-salaried employees into the market. In addition, 78,000 students graduate from Libya's state-run universities and enter the labor market each year. Proposals have been discussed for the creation of mechanisms such as an early retirement fund, vast re-tooling/re-training programs, and the creation of some form of social safety net. There have been some government actions to provide shares in public and private companies to "those Libyans deprived of wealth," as well as the announcement by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi of the institution of government-funded savings accounts for Libyans born after August 2007. Also, in January 2007, the GPC coupled its announcement of the liquidation of 400,000 Libyan government positions over a three-year period with news that the incumbents could either draw their regular salary or take a US $43,000 loan designed to finance start-up costs of a small business.

¶55. The government directly intervenes in the hiring practices of foreign companies operating in Libya. For example, a 2006 decree ordered that all foreign oil companies must hire a Libyan national Deputy County Manager and Finance Manager. In August 2009, the government decreed that all foreign branch companies must hire Libyan general managers, but the government has inconsistently applied the rule. The National Oil Corporation also regularly assigns both qualified and unqualified Libyan workers to foreign energy companies. Foreign companies have generally responded to the imposition of unqualified workers in one of two ways: paying these individuals without expecting them to work, or undertaking an extensive training program to bring them up to a basic industry standard. Companies also receive

lists of unemployed workers from the General People's Committee for Manpower and are requested to voluntarily find positions for them

CHERI.

FOREIGN TRADE ZONE/FREE TRADE ZONES

¶56. Misurata, 210 km east of Tripoli, is the location of Libya's sole operating Free Trade Zone (FTZ). Projects in the free zone enjoy standard "Five Freedoms" privileges, including tax and customs exemptions. At present, the zone occupies 430 hectares, including a portion of the Port of Misurata. As of the end of 2008, the infrastructure for the free zone was still under development. Dubai's Jafza International signed an agreement with the Misurata FTZ Authority in October 2007 which commits both sides to explore the possibility of forming a joint venture, or granting Jafza a 30-year concession of over the FTZ. Later in the same month, Libya's General People's Committee announced plans to allocate roughly US $700 million to upgrade the free zone's facilities.

FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT STATISTICS

¶57. Reliable foreign direct investment statistics for Libya are currently unavailable. Foreign energy companies have invested billions of dollars in the Libyan oil and gas sectors since the lifting of UN sanctions in 2003 and U.S. sanctions the following year. Libya has announced vast new development projects, including plans that it would spend 150 billion dinars ($123.4 billion) on public works over the next five years. The Libyan government has embarked on an ambitious plan to upgrade its infrastructure, and construction is underway to build new roads, airports, railroads, and housing.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks documents shed light on US-backed intervention in Libya
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI46

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI46 aka Wikileaks id #244078 ?
Subject	AMBASSADOR DEMARCHES LIBYANS ON PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 19 Jan 2010 09:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI46.html
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI90
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1495
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0046 0190920
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 190920Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5703
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0256
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1207
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0112
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0027
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6255
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000046

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/IO, ISN/MNSA. STATE PASS TO USUN.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/19/2020
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , NPT, LY *[Libya]* , RF, UK *[United Kingdom]*
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR DEMARCHES LIBYANS ON PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY

REF: State 4457

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (U) This is an action request message. See para 6.

¶2. (C) On January 18, per instruction reftel, the Ambassador, accompanied by UK Ambassador Fean and Russian Ambassador Chamov presented a joint demarche on the Libyan proposal to amend the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to Libyan MFA Under Secretary Abdulathi Obeidi, MFA/IO Chief Mehdi al-Mjribi and Dr. Ali Gashut, Head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment. The

Libyans led off by explaining that the genesis of their proposal was the special UN Security Council session on nonproliferation that had been chaired this past fall by President Obama. POTUS' statements and passion on the subject, in conjunction with Libyan (and other Non-Aligned Movement members') long-held sentiment that the NPT had been a discriminatory document monopolized by the nuclear powers, and that there had been a lack of seriousness by those powers to move toward a de-nuclearized world, had compelled the Libyans to act. There was also a continuing concern, said Obeidi, that countries like Pakistan, India, Israel, and Iran, located in volatile regions, were increasingly threatening international security with their nuclear arsenals. Libya, he argued, was best-placed to take this initiative given that it served as a model for those countries that wanted to give up their WMD capability.

¶3. (C) By agreement with his colleagues, the Ambassador read the demarche and clarified the meaning of several points for the Libyans. Our trio reiterated several times that the joint position was not necessarily a rejection of the Libyan ideas; rather, our opposition was to Libya's request to circulate the proposals, which would inevitably open up the NPT to other potentially unhelpful amendments by others. The NPT had withstood any amendment process for 40 years, and its integrity needed to be upheld. We also argued that the upcoming Review Conference would be focusing on difficult issues and the work needed to deal with those issues could be placed in jeopardy if the participants had to be diverted to deal with the issue of amendments. The Libyans asked several times if, despite their opposition, the NPT Depositary States were still willing to circulate the proposal if that is what the Libyans decided. We replied that that was indeed the case.

¶4. (C) After some further discussion, it was clear that the Libyans were intrigued by the point that we would deal seriously with their concerns at the May conference if they agreed to not circulate the current amendment proposal. They were concerned, however, that the agenda had already been set. They could consider withdrawing their proposal if they could receive some ironclad guarantees that the U.S., Russia, and UK could find a mechanism to ensure that their concerns were discussed and take the lead in encouraging such a discussion. The Libyans did not want to be put in a position of yielding on their current initiative and then having their concerns dismissed by technicalities at the conference. If the Depositary States could assure them on this count, they would take the proposal to their leadership.

¶5. (C) We agreed to bring this option to our capitals and to get back to the Libyans when we had a definitive answer.

¶6. (C) Action request: That Department, working with USUN, Moscow and London, prepare a response to the Libyans that would enable them to cease current efforts to circulate proposals to amend the NPT.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI53

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI53 aka Wikileaks id #244285 ?
Subject	NEW VISA RULES FOR BORDERING COUNTRIES LEAD TO EMPTY FLIGHTS, SHORT LINES AT LIBYAN PORTS OF ENTRY
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 Jan 2010 05:27 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI53.html
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI110
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2539
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0053 0200527
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 200527Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5711
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1536
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0171
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0185
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0040
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 0858
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0977
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6263
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000053

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/19/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , SMIG *[Migration]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: NEW VISA RULES FOR BORDERING COUNTRIES LEAD TO EMPTY FLIGHTS, SHORT LINES AT LIBYAN PORTS OF ENTRY

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) This week, Libya reportedly began enforcing legislation from 2009 requiring nationals from bordering states -- Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria, and Tunisia -- to have valid work contracts with a Libyan employer or tourist visas issued at a Libyan diplomatic mission before entering the country. Businessmen must have a letter of invitation from a Libyan partner. Contacts in both the Algerian and Egyptian embassies report that while Libyan authorities instructed airlines of the change as early as January 12, no official notification has yet

been made to diplomatic missions accredited to Tripoli. Travelers arriving by air from neighboring countries were previously allowed to enter the country with a passport and evidence of LYD 1000 ($813) to establish tourist status -- a loophole used by economic migrants to enter Libya without valid work contracts. Egyptian poloff expressed surprise at both the timing of the regulatory change and the lack of official notification. EgyptAir, he said, was notified by fax that the policy began immediately, leading to a normally full flight departing Cairo at 20 per cent capacity. He believed that the southern neighbors were included to allow Libya to claim security grounds as the reason for the new enforcement without embarrassing Egypt and Tunisia, Libya's major overland trade partners, who he viewed the measure's true targets. He suspected that high-level talks between the Egyptian and Libyan governments would have to take place in order for the regulation to be waived, and posited that Tunis would likely develop a similar tack in response to Libya's action.

¶2. (C) Emboffs who visited the Libyan-Tunisian border January 15-17 observed that vehicular lines on both the Tunisian and Libyan side of the main Ras al-Jadiir border crossing, approximately 100 miles west of Tripoli, were significantly shorter than usual . Tunisian-plated vehicles, which normally line the road for several miles on the Libyan side, were notably absent, and lines at filling stations in Zliten -- where vehicles from both countries routinely take heavy loads of $.18/liter petrol before traveling the 10 miles to the Tunisian side, where gas sells for seven times the price -- moved quickly. While entering from Tunisia on January 17, poloff noticed no discernable upgrades to security or changed entry procedures for Tunisians -- though the unusually light traffic on the highway suggests that word of the regulation change had spread quickly and dissuaded travelers without proper documentation from attempting the crossing.

¶3. (C) Comment: Libya's sporadic enforcement of existing immigration laws is sometimes driven by political disagreements with neighboring countries. At other times, short periods of selective enforcement serve to upset the status quo enough to dissuade migrants from setting down firm roots in the Jamahiriya. The current regulations were enacted shortly before Libya hosted the July 2009 African Union Summit in Sirte, but enforcement was delayed after several neighboring countries protested. While the timing of the Libyans' re-implementation of the regulation may have been unexpected, the action itself should come as no surprise. Notably, Libya depends on foreign labor for its multi-billion dollar development sector, but it does not have efficient mechanisms for registering guest workers. Should enforcement of the new regulation continue for an extended period of time, both the Libyan economy and bilateral relationships with labor-providing neighbors are likely to deteriorate. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI56

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI56 aka Wikileaks id #244361 ?
Subject	LIBYA SENDS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO HAITI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 Jan 2010 11:01 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI56.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO2791
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0056 0201101
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 201101Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5714
INFO RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 0001
RUEHME/AMEMBASSY MEXICO PRIORITY 0004
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6266
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000056

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, HAITI TASK FORCE ONE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , HA *[Haiti]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA SENDS HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO HAITI

REF: STATE 4854

¶1. (SBU) Pol/Econ Chief delivered reftel demarche to Waddat Sarrah of the Libyan MFA's Americas Department January 19, expressing appreciation for Libya's generous contribution of medical equipment and supplies, blankets, foodstuffs, and other relief materials, particularly since Libya does not maintain diplomatic relations with Haiti. Sarrah thanked the USG for the message and responded that assisting those in need is a "part of Libyan culture." (Note: In a separate conversation, Foreign Minister Musa Kusa's Chief of Staff clarified to Pol/Econ Chief that Libya routinely provides assistance to other nations, irrespective of whether Libya maintains diplomatic relations with them. End note.) Sarrah noted that two cargo planes of relief supplies had already departed Libya and another was being

prepared. The Libyan provisions included medical equipment, medicine, blankets, tents, and foodstuffs. Sarrah believed that delivery of the supplies was being coordinated through the Libyan Embassy in Mexico.

¶2. (U) According to Libyan press reports, the Qadhafi Development Foundation is leading the relief effort, in conjunction with the Libyan Red Crescent and the Libya Assistance and Development Fund. Oea newspaper, which is part of Saif al-Islam's Al Ghad Media Group, reported January 19 that the "aid will be delivered by a rescue team and a specialized medical team who will offer the medical assistance required for those affected by the quake."

¶3. (U) Post will report additional details on the precise quantities and value of Libya's contributions to the relief effort in Haiti as we receive them.

¶4. Minimize considered.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks en Haiti Liberte: Le déploiement de troupes U.S. lors du Séisme
- WikiLeaks en Haiti Liberté: « Une ruée vers l'or » pour les contrats en Haïti | Ansel Herz & Kim Ives
- WikiLeaks in Haiti Liberté: U.S. Militarization of Post-Quake Aid | Ansel Herz
- WikiLeaks in Haiti Liberté: "Gold Rush" for Haiti Contracts After Quake | Ansel Herz & Kim Ives
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI57

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI57 aka Wikileaks id #244435 ?
Subject	LIBYAN HEAD OF FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE WELCOMES U.S. BUSINESS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 20 Jan 2010 15:17 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI57.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3017
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0057/01 0201517
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 201517Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5715
INFO RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6267
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000057

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, ISN, OES (WILLIAM LAWRENCE). STATE PLEASE PASS TO COMMERCE ITA (NATE MASON).

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/20/2020
TAGS: ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EAGR *[Agriculture and Forestry]* , EPET *[Petroleum and Natural Gas]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYAN HEAD OF FACILITIES AND INFRASTRUCTURE WELCOMES U.S. BUSINESS

TRIPOLI 00000057 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a recent meeting with the Ambassador, the head of the Libyan equivalent to a Ministry of Infrastructure reiterated Libya's past complaints that it had not been properly compensated for giving up Weapons of Mass Destruction and indicated that the "current environment" in the United States put Libya in an "embarrassing position." At the same time, he said that Libya looked to the future and would welcome more

American companies that could share new technologies, particularly in the fields of agriculture, alternative energy and water. Matuq looked forward to the upcoming U.S. Department of Commerce-led Trade Mission next month and said he stood ready to brief them on business opportunities in Libya. With his past experience as a leading figure in Libya's efforts to dismantle its WMD program and former Libyan diplomat, as well as his connections to Muammar al-Qadhafi, Matuq is an example of a Libyan figure whose title on paper does not necessarily reflect his real capacity to get things done in the opaque Jamahiriya system. End summary.

¶2. (C) On January 19, the Ambassador met with the Secretary of the General People's Committee for Facilities and Infrastructure, Matuq Mohammed Matuq, accompanied by Pol/Econ Chief and Econoff. The Ambassador requested the meeting to brief Matuq on the upcoming U.S. Department of Commerce-led Trade Mission to Libya, scheduled for February 20-23. Matuq was cordial and welcoming but quickly launched into the familiar Libyan lament that Libya has not been properly compensated for giving up its Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He said the Libyans felt they had been unfairly treated, and that, "put into the context with what is happening now in the United States," Libya was in "an embarrassing position" (Matuq was presumably referring to Libya's inclusion on the Transportation Security Administration's list of countries of "special interest"). He argued to the Ambassador that "you and your colleagues at [the State Department] know this well and should move to put some things into place on what we agreed to in 2003 and what we have been promised." He continued, "everyone wonders why our (nuclear) equipment did not come back to Libya." Arguing that Libya had paid significant sums of money to develop the nuclear material and equipment that it had agreed to give up, he suggested that the Libyan people were demanding that Libya be compensated. The U.S. could ameliorate the situation by compensating Libya in some way that would benefit the Libyan people. For example, the U.S. could provide full-scholarships for Libyan students to attend U.S. universities. Matuq noted the expensive tuition bills that Libyan students face when studying in the United States and remarked that full-scholarships to Libyans from the USG would be seen as a "positive gesture."

¶3. (C) Addressing Matuq's complaints, the Ambassador highlighted the milestones in the bilateral relationship over the past year, including moving forward in such areas as military cooperation, consular operations (over 3,000 NIV's issued since re-opening the visa section), the start of a human rights dialogue, and high-level engagement and visits on both sides. At the same time, he said, we have not been able to progress as much as both sides wanted and had faced some major stumbling blocks in the last year -- such as Libyan reluctance to transfer highly enriched uranium spent fuel. The Ambassador thanked Matuq for his engagement on that issue -- that challenge had posed a significant threat to the relationship and through cooperation and communication, we were able to solve the problem and move past it. Remarking that the USG had heard the litany of Libyan complaints regarding WMD compensation from the highest levels of the GOL, the Ambassador noted that we were in a good place to move forward in the relationship rather than remain hostages of the past cycle of crisis and strong response.

¶4. (C) Matuq agreed that the present time was ripe for building lasting, binding cooperation in areas of mutual interest and for the benefit of both nations. He characterized Libya as open to U.S. business, particularly in agriculture, water, education, and construction. Highlighting American companies already working in Libya's energy, construction, consulting, and service sectors, he believed that U.S. business was succeeding in Libya. Matuq explained his personal concern for the environment, particularly the degradation of oil fields, spoiling of the desert and the depletion of water resources. He recalled the visits of U.S. delegations in 2004 and 2005 to

recalled the visits of U.S. delegations in 2004 and 2005 to discuss Libya's future water needs and the protection of water as a scarce resource. Matuq had met the delegation in his previous role as Head of the National Committee for Scientific Research. During those visits, the delegations' discussions of

new U.S. technology for pumping fresh water from oil fields had intrigued him, and this continued to be an area in which the Libyan government sought to cooperate with the United States. Likewise, the Libyans were interested in finding out more information about U.S. advances in agriculture. Specifically, Matuq discussed U.S. development of seeds for plants that are able to sustain droughts and to survive in spite of Libya's highly saline soil.

¶5. (C) Matuq was also interested in exploring strategies for creating sustainability within the oil and gas industry. He considered Libya as capable of producing enough energy, through traditional and new, alternative energy sources, to meet its own needs and to export the rest. He also saw opportunities elsewhere in the energy sector including in downstream activities (pipelines, power plants, etc.) and solar energy. He wondered why there were not more American companies in North Africa, given the need for new technologies in energy production.

¶6. (SBU) The Ambassador emphasized that U.S. companies were interested in coming to Libya, as evidenced by the upcoming U.S. Trade Mission to Libya (February 20-23) and the fact that we were in the final stages of negotiating a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA). The Ambassador noted that the Trade Mission would cover nearly all of the priority sectors for Libya mentioned by Matuq: energy, agriculture, water, education, healthcare and construction. He stressed that the delegation would be led by a high level official of the Department of Commerce and would include the representatives of many Fortune 500 companies. A successful trade mission for Libya would have a ripple effect throughout the American business community and would signal that Libya truly welcomed U.S. firms. However, he explained that current visa problems are preventing U.S. businesses and trade officials from coming to Libya. Recent bilateral interactions seemed to indicate an official Libyan policy not to issue visas to Americans, both private citizens and officials. He asked Matuq to help resolve the issue. Matuq replied that all U.S. visitors that he had hosted over the years, either in his current position or previously, had not had any problems securing their visas for Libya. Matuq suggested the Embassy work closely on the visa requests with the Secretary of the Economy (Minister of Economy-equivalent). He said he would welcome the delegation and would help to brief them on doing business in Libya.

¶7. (C) Bio Note and Comment: Matuq is a key figure in the U.S.-Libya bilateral relationship, as he oversaw the internal negotiations that led to the dismantlement of Libya's WMD as head of the National Committee for Scientific Research. Prior to becoming Secretary of the General People's Committee (GPC) for Facilities and Infrastructure in March 2009, he was in charge of the GPC for Manpower, Training and Employment. In this position, he oversaw labor policies that affected many foreign companies. Matuq is known to be well-connected within the Libyan regime, including a connection to Muammar al-Qadhafi. Matuq infamously served as a diplomat to the Libyan Embassy in London at the time of the fatal shooting of British guard Yvonne Fletcher. Matuq's colorful past, rumored relationships, and seeming influence remind us that, in Libya, one's job title does not necessarily reflect one's ability to get things done in the opaque bureaucracy that is the Jamahiriya. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI58

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI58 aka Wikileaks id #244573 ?
Subject	EUROPEAN DCM'S ON LIBYA ISSUES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 21 Jan 2010 08:11 UTC
Classification	SECRET
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI58.html
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI73 , 10TRIPOLI91
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3740
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0058/01 0210811
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 210811Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5717
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 0067
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0257
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1208
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS 0196
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0670
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0875
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0046
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6269
```

Hide header

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000058

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG, EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/21/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , XG *[Europe]* , SZ *[Switzerland]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN DCM'S ON LIBYA ISSUES

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli.

REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: In a January 19 meeting with UK, Italian, and French counterparts, the British DCM told A/DCM that the UK believes that cancer-ridden Lockerbie bomber Abdel Basset al-Megrahi has less than four weeks to live. The UK has reportedly asked the GOL to keep al-Megrahi's funeral "low key," but is not optimistic that it will be. The Italian and French DCM's discussed a brewing visa crisis that the Schengen states are facing with the Libyans - in an effort to get two Swiss

businessmen out of Libya, the Swiss are now blocking all Schengen visas for Libyan government officials, Qadhafi family members, and prominent businesspeople. As a result, most European embassies in Tripoli are issuing bilateral visas for Libyans whose Schengen applications have been blocked. The GOL is not satisfied with such bilateral visas, and has threatened Schengen states with "reciprocity" (presumably the blockage of Libyan visas for their nationals) if the situation is not resolved. On possible coming changes within the GOL, the UK feels that Qadhafi son Saif al-Islam (reportedly now in London for a 2 week trip) is unlikely to accept the "General Coordinator" position at the upcoming General People's Congress, while the French are convinced that he will. UNGA President Ali Abdussalam Treki is in London January 19-20 for meetings with FCO regarding UN reform, and to meet with Quartet Representative and former PM Tony Blair, presumably to discuss peace process issues. End summary.

UK BELIEVES MEGRAHI DEATH IMMINENT

¶2. (S) UK DCM Mark Matthews (protect) noted that the UK Embassy had been told by "a source very close to al-Megrahi's family," that the Lockerbie bomber is in the "final stages" and has "no more than 3-4 weeks to live." This information was provided to the UK Embassy 10 days ago, implying that by now, al-Megrahi has 2-3 weeks left. [Note: This information is speculative, and does not come from a medical professional. End note]. According to Matthews, the UK Embassy has asked GOL to keep the funeral low-key, but is not optimistic that it will be. The UK is particularly concerned about the "high likelihood" of TV cameras filming footage of the funeral to play on Libyan TV, which would then "near inevitably" be picked up by international news outlets.

SWISS UPDATE AND SCHENGEN WOES

¶3. (C) According to the Italian and French DCM's, the Swiss are currently blocking all Schengen visas for Libyan diplomats, military officials, Qadhafi family members, and prominent Libyan businesspeople. To date, "dozens of key visas" have been blocked. Other Europeans are issuing bilateral visas to those Libyans refused Schengens, but the Libyans are not satisfied with that, and have threatened "reciprocal measures" if the other Europeans don't start issuing Schengen visas without Swiss approval (something that is regulatorily impossible for the other Europeans to do). The DCM's said that it is unclear what the threatened reciprocal measures will be, but that the GOL convoked several European diplomats to the MFA last week to inform them of Libyan upset over the situation. While the Europeans are feeling "increasingly inconvenienced" by Swiss blockage of Schengens, all are sympathetic, and none have protested Swiss actions. The Swiss reportedly circulated a diplomatic note in Brussels to all Schengen members a few weeks ago, explaining that they are blocking the visas of all Libyans "connected" to the arrests of the 2 Swiss citizens in Libya. Representatives of all members of the Schengen group may meet in Brussels sometime over the next few weeks to discuss the issue.

¶4. (C) The French and UK DCM's confirmed reports that the Germans are working on negotiating between the Libyans and Swiss to resolve the crisis between the two countries, but noted that the senior German officials involved do not want to come to Tripoli for further meetings unless they are "guaranteed of success," which they have not yet been assured of.

COMING GOL CHANGES?

¶5. (S) Based on conversations with "well-informed Libyans," the

TRIPOLI 00000058 002 OF 002

UK DCM feels it is "unlikely" that Saif al-Islam Qadhafi will accept the General Coordinator job at the upcoming General People's Congress (due to be held in February, although the exact date has not yet been announced). The French have heard exactly the opposite from their sources - Saif will definitely take the job - while the Italians noted that Saif's behaviour and intense apparently leisure travel schedule in recent weeks "has not exactly been that of someone about to assume control of a government." The UK has been told by an "excellent source in MFA" that Mohamed Abulqasim Al Zawi, current Libyan Ambassador to Morocco and the former Libyan Ambassador to the UK (who re-opened the Libyan Embassy in London in 1999), will be appointed the new Secretary of the General People's Congress. All of the DCM's had heard reports that Libyan PM-equivalent Al-Baghdadi Ali Al-Mahmoudi may be replaced by current National Oil Company chairman Shukri Ghanim, but none were sure of the reliability of such information.

LIBYANS ON THE MOVE

¶6. (C) According to the UK DCM, Saif al-Islam is currently in London, and just bought a house in Hampstead. He's likely to be there "for another 2 weeks." UNGA President Treki is in London January 19-20, for meetings with FCO regarding UN reform. He is likely to also meet with Quartet Representative Tony Blair, presumably to discuss peace process issues. According to the Italians, FM Kusa will likely go to Rome next week for a few days of meetings.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI6

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI6 aka Wikileaks id #242506 ?
Subject	LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 5 Jan 2010 16:12 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI6.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO1024
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0006 0051612
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 051612Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5648
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6199
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000006

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/RA; STATE PLEASE PASS TO USTR

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KBCT *[Arab League Boycott]* , ABLD *[Buildings and Grounds]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , AL *[Albania]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , AMGT *[Management Operations]* , ASUP, AFIN *[Financial Management]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA: SECTION 565 WAIVER OF PROHIBITION AGAINST CONTRACTING WITH FIRMS COMPLYING WITH AL BOYCOTT

REF: STATE 128056

¶1. (U) The Government of Libya (GOL) does not maintain diplomatic relations with Israel. Local firms are required by national law to comply with the Arab League (AL) boycott, and would therefore not be able to sign the required U.S. certification without exposing themselves to civil and/or criminal penalties. Post accordingly requests a waiver of the AL boycott certification.

¶2. (SBU) In 2007, the Ministry of Trade and Economy informed Post that the GOL does not enforce the boycott; however, the government continues to use the boycott as a means by which to selectively sanction foreign corporations and boycott language

continues to appear in contracts. Bills of lading and customs declarations for imports cannot indicate trade with Israel, and shippers are legally required to certify that no goods are of Israeli origin. Libya continues to enforce a travel ban for passports containing Israeli visas or entry/exit stamps.

¶3. (SBU) Embassy Tripoli has reviewed the contractor certification requirements and determined that without such a waiver it would be unable to obtain essential supplies and services in-country. This is particularly critical as we re-establish our diplomatic presence in Tripoli, including consolidating Embassy operations in one location.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI60

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI60 aka Wikileaks id #244714 ?
Subject	LIBYA AGREES "IN PRINCIPLE" TO POLITICAL-MILITARY DIALOGUE
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 21 Jan 2010 15:41 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI60.html
References	10STATE284
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO4199
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0060 0211541
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 211541Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5719
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6272
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000060

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, PM/RSAT (TOM MANCINELLI), PM/WRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/21/2020
TAGS: MASS *[Military Assistance and Sales]* , MARR *[Military and Defense Arrangements]* , MCAP *[Military Capabilities]* , MOPS *[Military Operations]* , PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA AGREES "IN PRINCIPLE" TO POLITICAL-MILITARY DIALOGUE

REF: STATE 284

CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, A/DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1. (C) In response to Post's January 5 diplomatic note to Libya's Ministry-equivalent of Foreign Affairs (MFA), soliciting GOL proposals to develop the timing and substance of the inaugural bilateral political-military dialogue (reftel), we received a diplomatic note from the Libyan government on January ¶21. The GOL response recognizes the importance of the dialogue and its role in "sharing and reconciling between regional and international viewpoints." The correspondence further notes

Libyan approval of the political-military dialogue "in principle," and that the MFA's Americas Desk will inform Post of a "suitable date to conduct" the dialogue.

¶2. (C) On January 18, the MFA informed the Ambassador that National Security Advisor (NSA) Mutassim al-Qadhafi's office was reviewing Post's request. Qadhafi's office confirmed to Pol/Econ Chief on January 19 that the NSA was formulating input for the suggested agenda and developing a list of participants for the Libyan side.

¶2. (SBU) Post will report future MFA responses on this issue septel. Full text of the diplomatic note follows:

Begin text: "The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Office) sends its compliments to the U.S. Embassy in the Great Jamahiriya. Further to the esteemed Embassy's dip note number 020/10 dated January 5, [2010] regarding the Political-Military Dialogue; it would like to underline the importance of the dialogue and its role in sharing and reconciling between regional and international viewpoints; and it has the honor to inform the esteemed Embassy of the Libyan side's in-principle approval of this dialogue. Americas Desk will inform the esteemed U.S. Embassy of the suitable date to conduct it. The General People's Committee Secretariat for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (Americas Office) avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the esteemed U.S. Embassy the assurances of its highest considerations." End text.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI62

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI62 aka Wikileaks id #245127 ?
Subject	DARFUR REBEL GROUP MERGER IN KUFRA: MORE FANFARE THAN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 24 Jan 2010 16:11 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI62.html
Referenced by	10ASMARA22
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO6248
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0062 0241611
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241611Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5721
INFO RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM PRIORITY 0172
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA PRIORITY 0186
RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0037
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0877
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 1210
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0672
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6274
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000062

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND S/USSES

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/24/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , CD *[Chad]* , SU *[Sudan]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: DARFUR REBEL GROUP MERGER IN KUFRA: MORE FANFARE THAN

Derived from: DSCG 05-1, B,D
¶1. (C) Libyan officials convoked the diplomatic corps, including France's visiting Special Envoy on Sudan, on three hours' notice on January 17 to announce the merger of six Darfur rebel groups at a conference in Kufra (approximately 1000 miles southeast of Tripoli). Chaired by FM-equivalent Musa Kusa, the Libyans announced that SLA/Field Command; SLA/Unity; SLA/Khamis Abdullah; the National Front for Democracy, Justice, and Development (Note: possibly SLA/Democracy - Ali Karbino. End note.); the National Movement for Reform and Development; and

the United Revolutionary Front had agreed to merge under the common leadership of Tigani Seisei. Seisei reportedly remained in Kufra as of January 18 to continue negotiations between rebel factions and the Government of Libya on the unification project. According to French poloff, Seisei's position would remain provisional until the rebels or Libya could agree to provide compensation commensurate with his current job and salary at the UN. Mahjoub Hussein served as the new group's spokesperson to state media, though it is unclear if he has an official position in the new secretariat or is simply well-known to journalists here due to his long Tripoli residence.

¶2. (C) Comment: Both the unification and the public, Musa Kusa-led announcement of the same recall the short-lived March 2009 "Unity Plus" agreement. The hastily called rollout (delayed an hour to allow for Libyan and Sudanese participants to straggle in) may have been timed to maintain relevance given recent bilateral advances between Khartoum and N'Djamena. Libyan Director of Military Intelligence Abdullah Sanussi was thanked by all parties but was not present at the event, a fact more likely attributed to his desire to keep a low public profile than a metric of his ongoing involvement. Diplomatic observers in Tripoli have so far been dismissive of the Kufra initiative, commenting that uniting minor groups that will have a weak negotiating position in Doha is hardly the "win" Libya was hoping for out of the conference. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI71

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI71 aka Wikileaks id #245328 ?
Subject	WATCHING THE SECRETARY'S INTERNET FREEDOM SPEECH FROM TRIPOLI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 25 Jan 2010 15:58 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI71.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO7145
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0071 0251558
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 251558Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5730
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1537
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0859
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0978
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 0919
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 0032
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6283
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000071

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/PPD (CHERY-MADOR), NEA/MAG; DUBAI FOR MEDIA HUB

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: KDEM *[Democratization]* , KPAO *[Public Affairs Office]* , OIIP *[International Information Programs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: WATCHING THE SECRETARY'S INTERNET FREEDOM SPEECH FROM TRIPOLI

REF: STATE 4203

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Embassy Tripoli assembled 40 prominent Libyan guests on January 21 to watch the Secretary's speech on Internet Freedom live over the Internet. Despite limited bandwidth, participants took part in a lively discussion covering a range of topics, such as government control of the Internet, freedom of expression, America's role in the development of the Internet, and the future of the World Wide Web on Libyan and world culture. The local media did not report on the Secretary's remarks. END SUMMARY

¶2. (SBU) Embassy Tripoli organized a "watch party" at a local hotel, assembling a group of 40 Libyan guests to watch Secretary

Clinton's remarks via the State Department's live streaming web software CO.NX. Guests included prominent print and television journalists, academics, businesspeople, and young scholars. The event began at 9 AM EST with a discussion of the Internet's influences on political, economic, and social discourse in Libya. Low bandwidth ultimately prevented the continuation of the live feed of the speech. Instead, Embassy's PAO continued the discussion, with conversation touching on all of the themes that the Secretary mentioned in her speech. Following the discussion, several guests opined that this was one of the best, most open conversations they had ever enjoyed in Libya. Most guests acknowledged that while the Internet is not censored in Libya -- no pages are blocked -- local security agencies monitor Internet activities. Some guests defended the practices of the government in enforcing the country's moral ethos and Islamic values.

¶3. (SBU) The Public Affairs Section distributed copies of the Secretary's remarks as delivered in English and Arabic and posted the texts on the Embassy's website. A photographer and journalist from Oea newspaper, a daily newspaper owned by Saif al-Islam al-Qaddafi's al-Ghad Company, attended the event, but according to international press, the newspaper's operations were suspended the following day. (Note: A subsequent Libyan press report quoted a local government source as denying the news that the publication was shut-down. We do not believe the possible closure of the paper was related to the reporter's attendance of our event. End note.) The speech was not reported in local media.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI72

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI72 aka Wikileaks id #245332 ?
Subject	LIBYA REQUESTS FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES TO HAITI
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 25 Jan 2010 16:09 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI72.html
References	10STATE6918
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 4 media items

```
VZCZCXRO7161
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0072 0251609
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 251609Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5731
INFO RUEHPU/AMEMBASSY PORT AU PRINCE IMMEDIATE 0002
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0259
RUEHDG/AMEMBASSY SANTO DOMINGO PRIORITY 0008
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RHMCSUU/FAA WASHINGTON ARTCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6284
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000072

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, HAITI EARTHQUAKE TASK FORCE, WHA/CAR (V DE
PIRRO) AND IO/UNP (B NARANJO AND M GARUCKIS)

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PREF *[Refugees]* , EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , HA *[Haiti]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA REQUESTS FLIGHT CLEARANCE FOR RELIEF SUPPLIES TO
HAITI

REF: STATE 6918

¶1. (U) This is an action request; please see para 5.

¶2. (SBU) During a January 25 meeting with Pol/Econ chief, a representative of the Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF) requested immediate assistance to obtain flight clearances for a Libyan Boeing 747 plane, carrying 17 tons of relief supplies, to land at the Port-au-Prince

airport. The full list of supplies on the plane is included in para 3. (Note: The QDF is managing Libya's assistance efforts in coordination with the Libyan government's Agency for Assistance and Relief. End note.) The representative reported that the QDF had already facilitated the delivery of one plane carrying 1000 tents, hygienic supplies, sleeping bags, and medical equipment to Haiti via the Dominican Republic. The QDF had been working with the Dominican Republic's Foreign Ministry but had not been able to ensure that the assistance was distributed in Haiti. The QDF was told by the Dominican MFA that it must turn over all donations to the Red Cross in Santo Domingo for further distribution in Haiti. The QDF was uncomfortable with this arrangement and requested official U.S. assistance to directly deliver the materials in Haiti. The QDF reported having been told by a "chartering company" (NFI) that the earliest possible date the Libyan plane could land in Port-au-Prince was on February 12. The QDF requested permission from poloff instead for the plane to land within the next 1-4 days.

¶3. (SBU) Pol/Econ chief thanked Libya for its contributions and delivered reftel demarche. Per reftel, she underscored that the U.S. civilian agencies and the military are working with the Haitain government and the United Nations to assist in the delivery of humanitarian support on the ground, and assured him that she would pass on his concerns and requests for assistance to Washington and USUN. The QDF representative noted his appreciation for the U.S. role in coordinating relief efforts and said that Libya would offer as much assistance as possible, in terms of medical personnel, supplies and equipment. He requested an update on areas of need, suggesting that Libya could provide portable "Thuraya" telephone booths and a thousand more tents.

¶4. (SBU) The full list of supplies contained on the Libyan plane bound for Haiti is as follows:

-7000 first aid kits (total weight 2 tons);
-1500 sleeping bags (total weight 1 ton);
-3000 plastic mats (total weight 5 tons);
-100 packages of "medicine and surgical equipment" (weighing five tons each);
-1 power generator (total weight 4 tons).

¶5. Post appreciates the Department's guidance for a response to the Libyan request for flight clearance for a Libyan Boeing 747 to land in Port-au-Prince within the next 1-4 days.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks en Haiti Liberte: Le déploiement de troupes U.S. lors du Séisme
- WikiLeaks en Haiti Liberté: « Une ruée vers l'or » pour les contrats en Haïti | Ansel Herz & Kim Ives
- WikiLeaks in Haiti Liberté: U.S. Militarization of Post-Quake Aid | Ansel Herz
- WikiLeaks in Haiti Liberté: "Gold Rush" for Haiti Contracts After Quake | Ansel Herz & Kim Ives
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI73

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI73 aka Wikileaks id #245535 ?
Subject	SWISS-LIBYAN WOES CONTINUE, NO RESOLUTION IN SIGHT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 26 Jan 2010 13:35 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI73.html
References	09TRIPOLI1024 , 10TRIPOLI58
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI91
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO8062
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0073/01 0261335
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261335Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5732
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6285
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000073

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/21/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , CVIS
[Visas] , SZ [Switzerland] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SWISS-LIBYAN WOES CONTINUE, NO RESOLUTION IN SIGHT

REF: A) 09 TRIPOLI 1024 ; B) TRIPOLI 58

TRIPOLI 00000073  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (C/NF) Summary:  In a January 19 meeting, the Swiss Charge
reported no progress in Switzerland's continued efforts -- via
German mediation -- to resolve the situation of the two Swiss
businessmen trapped in Libya, now residing in the Swiss Embassy.
 He believed the recent addition of a French lawyer, Emmanuel
Altit -- who represented the five Bulgarian nurses and
Palestinian doctor during their infamous Libyan trials -- to the
Swiss' legal team could improve the situation.  In response to
Switzerland's continuing veto of numerous Schengen visas for
Libyans, Libya is increasing the pressure on other European
```

Libyans, Libya is increasing the pressure on other European nations to isolate Switzerland and force it to capitulate, threatening to invoke a ban on visas on European travelers from Schengen states if Switzerland's policy does not change. End Summary.

LIBYANS POSTPONE TRIALS UNTIL SWISS APPEAR IN PERSON

¶2. (C/NF) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazzarotto reported no progress on Swiss efforts to resolve the situation of the two Swiss businessmen, Rachid Hamdani and Max Goeldi. According to Lazzarotto, the Libyan immigration court has twice postponed the appeals' trials in both cases, due to the refusal of Hamdani and Goeldi to appear in person at the hearing, as they are frightened of being re-arrested if they leave the premises of the Swiss Embassy. (Note: Hamdani did attend the postponed appeals' trial January 24 and was allowed to return to the Swiss Embassy. Additional details septel. End note.) The judge in the case reportedly does not want to conduct the hearings in absentia due to the stated purpose of wanting to hear from the defendants directly. The tax trials have been postponed for the same reason, with no new court dates set.

¶3. (C/NF) Lazzarotto reported that the businessmen had hired a second, French lawyer, Emmanuel Altit, to intervene. Altit -- who represented the five Bulgarian nurses and Palestinian doctor during their infamous Libyan trials -- met with Hamdani, Goeldi, and various Libyan officials during a recent five-day visit. Lazzarotto believed the addition of the French lawyer would improve the stalled situation, as the Libyan lawyer currently representing Hamdani and Goeldi, who is also the lawyer of Prime Minister-equivalent al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi's family, had come under increasing pressure to abandon the case. Lazzarotto indicated that the Libyan lawyer, due to his relationships and the Libyan environment, "could not be completely trusted."

GERMAN, QDF MEDIATION FOSTERING COMMUNICATION

¶4. (C/NF) The German government continues to mediate with the Libyans on behalf of the Swiss, on both the judicial and political issues. The Swiss Charge characterized German mediation as a "positive development," saying, "at least the Libyans are now communicating with us, even if it is exclusively through the German government." The Germans have mediated two rounds of talks between the Swiss and the Libyans in Berlin, on December 22 and 28. Lazzarotto was hopeful that another round of talks would be scheduled in the near future.

¶5. (C/NF) According to Lazzarotto, Saif al-Islam's Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF) had been instrumental in arranging the first two meetings between the Libyans, Germans, and Swiss. The QDF had also attempted to negotiate a diplomatic solution to the political row, but Lazzarotto argued that the QDF's proposed compromise "included stipulations wherein the Swiss side would give several more things to the Libyans and the Libyans would do nothing." One of the stipulations encompassed charitable projects for Libyans, which Lazzarotto said the Swiss would be happy to do, "if we saw some progress on the Libyan side to settle the situation of our friends [Hamdani and Goeldi]."

¶6. (C/NF) Lazzarotto reported that the investigation tribunal, the formation of which had been stipulated in the August 20, 2009, memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the two nations (ref A), was an abandoned project, as both sides could not agree on the designation of a third party judge to sit on the tribunal. Since the September publication of Hannibal al-Qadhafi's arrest photos in Swiss newspapers, both sides had halted efforts to implement the MOU. The Libyans are still insisting that Switzerland identify and prosecute the source of the leaked photos, while the Swiss government maintains that many people had access to the photos and identification of the particular source of the leak is near impossible.

LIBYAN THREATS TO SCHENGEN STATES FURTHER ISOLATES SWITZERLAND

¶7. (C/NF) Lazzarotto said the Swiss continue to face pressure from other European nations on its unilateral "Schengen veto" policy on Libyans . Switzerland recently broadened the veto

TRIPOLI 00000073 002.2 OF 002

policy beyond Libyan diplomats, officials, and Qadhafi relations to include certain Libyan businesspeople and students seeking to travel to Europe. Lazzarotto explained that Switzerland was in no mood to compromise on its visa policy. "No regular Swiss citizen has been allowed to apply for a visa to Libya since July 2008," he reasoned. "Why should we not apply the same regulations to Libyans?" He further justified Switzerland's position by stating that the Schengen veto is the only way that Switzerland can control Libyan access to Switzerland. "If a Libyan has a Schengen visa, he could easily travel to Switzerland without our permission." Reasoning that the veto is not the end of the world for Libyan travelers to Europe, he pointed to the ability of each Schengen member nation to grant national visas to Libyan citizens; although he acknowledged the Libyan complaint that they have to apply for separate visas for each country in the Schengen zone that they want to visit.

¶8. (C/NF) As reported in ref B, the Libyans have amped up their pressure on EU nations, threatening not to issue visas to Schengen visa states if the Swiss do not change their policy of vetoing Schengen visas for Libyans. Lazzarotto expected European capitals to demarche Bern on the topic and said that he faced constant criticism in Tripoli when meeting with European embassy representatives. However, due to Schengen regulations, he noted that other member states could not force Switzerland to capitulate to Libya's demands.

COMMENT

¶9. (C/NF) In spite of the intervention of Germany, the political contretemps between Switzerland and Libya shows no signs of resolution in the near future. Until the ultimate Libyan decision-maker is satisfied that Switzerland has paid sufficient retribution for embarrassing a member of the Qadhafi clan, the row is likely to continue. Libya's latest threat to freeze visa issuance for Europeans is serving to further intensify the situation, but at this point, is unlikely to affect the Swiss position.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI74

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI74 aka Wikileaks id #245545 ?
Subject	STAFFDEL GROVE EXPLORES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 26 Jan 2010 14:08 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI74.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO8080
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0074/01 0261408
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 261408Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5734
INFO RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6287
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000074

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG, H

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2020
TAGS: OREP *[U.S. Congressional Travel]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: STAFFDEL GROVE EXPLORES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE OPPORTUNITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, US Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: The Executive Director of the Qadhafi Development Foundation (QDF), Yusuf Sawani, told STAFFDEL Grove that the Foundation served as an "umbrella society" for Libya's developing NGO community pushing for humanitarian development, national reconciliation for past human rights violations, and political reforms that enshrined individual rights. The Foundation is registered in Switzerland, and therefore subject to annual, independent review by a Swiss auditor and has an annual operating budget of approximately $3.25 million. While Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi serves as the Foundation's chair, he receives no remuneration and a Board comprised of both Libyan and foreign -- including American -- representatives guide its policy. Sawani told the STAFFDEL that the QDF had served as the facilitator for various international organizations operating in

Libya, including Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and that the Foundation actively promoted the founding of additional Libyan NGOs. In a subsequent lunch with international organizations and major donors, the STAFFDEL was encouraged to "make do with [the organizations] we have in Libya". Noting that would-be civil society leaders were, under the current political reality, able to function only under the QDF banner, the UK Ambassador counseled that the U.S. "should not be frightened by the name Qadhafi" but instead seek opportunities that benefited both Libyan and American interests to build trust and a foundation for political and economic change. End Summary.

QDF: A THINK TANK AND ENGINE FOR DEVELOPMENT

¶2. (C) In a December 8 meeting with the Ambassador and Paul Grove of the Senate Appropriations - Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation (QDF) Executive Director Yusuf Sawani described the QDF's mission as "humanitarian diplomacy" and applying pressure on the Libyan government to implement economic and political reforms. Sawani characterized the Foundation as operating as an "umbrella society" that enables the work of five independent organizations (list them here). Saif al-Islam founded the first of these organizations in 1999 to discourage the use of drugs among Libyan youth and formally established the QDF in Geneva in 2003. Still a registered Swiss NGO, the QDF is audited on an annual basis by Swiss independent auditors and is subject to Swiss law. Sawani reported that the Foundation's annual operational budget remains near 4 million Libyan dinar ($3.25 million) and that Saif al-Islam, the QDF's chairman, receives no remuneration from its activities. According to Sawani, Saif al-Islam also pays for his official travel on QDF-related business with his own personal funds. Sawani confided that should Saif al-Islam take on the official government role as General Coordinator of the Social Committees to which he has been named, he will be required to resign his position as QDF's chairman.

¶3. (C) Describing the QDF's operations as a series of partnerships and pilot initiatives to foster the creation of NGOs and facilitate the work of international NGOs in Libya, Sawani said that some of those partnerships had faced serious resistance from government officials. Most recently, the QDF had facilitated Human Rights Watch's (HRW) research studies in Libya in early 2009 and the December launching of HRW's Libya report from Tripoli. The QDF concurrently released its own human rights report that recounted human rights violations, corruption, lack of transparency, and acts of impunity by security officials. Admitting that the QDF's report was a "pre-emptive strike" intending to take air out of Libyan officials' arguments that the HRW report was designed to undermine the regime, Sawani said that Saif al-Islam considered it to be an important piece of the South African-style national reconciliation he sees as necessary for Libya to move forward on political reforms. Saif's frustration with the pace and scope of political reforms led directly to his August 2008 decision to withdraw from politics, according to Sawani.

¶4. (C) In addition to working closely with HRW, Sawani noted that the QDF had close partnerships with various international organizations including Amnesty International, the Arab Alliance for Human Rights, UNICEF, the World Health Organization, the International Organization for Migration, the International Committee for the Red Cross, and UNESCO, among others. While the independent constituent societies can and do have their own relationships with these organizations, Sawani said that the QDF's status both domestically and internationally often made initial interaction through the Foundation more palatable for Libyan authorities. He cited the Human Rights Society of Libya's five-year project with the UK-based Law Society to prevent torture and promote human rights in Libyan detention centers as an example of a relationship forged with the QDF's

centers as an example of a relationship forged with the QDF's assistance that had since devolved entirely to the subsidiary

group -- a model that the QDF seeks to continue in order to build a more effective and engaged civil society.

¶5. (C) Codifying political reform and increased space for dissent were top recommendations in HRW's December 2009 report, and Sawani reported that both remain top priorities for the QDF. Its premier initiative, according to Sawani, is a five-year project to draft and implement a new constitution. The drafting committee, like the QDF's own board, consists of both Libyans and foreigners -- including several Americans. The QDF is also studying changes to Libya's penal code and, in a consultative capacity, the QDF is promoting legislation currently under review by Libya's General People's Congress that would allow the legal formation of NGOs and other associations. Sawani lamented that the Foundation had a mixed record of helping establish independent NGOs in Libya, noting that the QDF-assisted Center for Democracy and the Libyan Justice Society had its licenses revoked within 96 hours of formation. Nonetheless, Sawani judged that the QDF would continue to play an important role as a "think tank" and civil society incubator for the foreseeable future.

INTERNATIONAL PARTERS: WORK IN LIBYA WITH THE TOOLS AVAILABLE

¶6. (C) In a lunch with representatives from the UN, IOM, European Commission, and UK Embassy, the consensus opinion was that Libya required extensive engagement to be brought up to international standards on development and good governance but lacked the necessary expertise and decision makers to implement those programs. The British Ambassador told Grove, "We need to work with what we have in Libya, and you shouldn't be frightened by the name Qadhafi. It goes with the territory." The UN Resident Coordinator said that even his organization was limited in its reach due to Libya's boycott of UNESCO. (Note: The boycott is due to Libyan sensitivities with UNESCO's Bulgarian leadership. Libya continues to protest Bulgaria's presidential welcome of five Bulgarian nurses, who had been sentenced to death in Libya, on return to Sofia after over seven years in prison. End Note).

¶7. (C) UK Poloff assessed that the QDF stood out as an organization comprised of young, energetic Libyans that would go on to become civil society leaders as political space opens. All agreed that it was important for any engagement with the Libyan government to find a high-level champion for the project -- one who could make the case for implementation, especially within a system run by regime hardliners that are resistant to change. Only through steadily building both trust and capacity could Libyan organizations effectively participate in international cooperation without using groups like the QDF as an intermediary. The British Ambassador opined that "it's our job to deliver what [Libya] can absorb, which means starting engagement on their terms." The UN representative agreed, noting that Libya remained at "stage zero" on some elements of development and that basic support for programs designed to teach young, civic-minded Libyans English language and computer skills would pay dividends as Libya continues to open politically.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- WikiLeaks: Britain secretly advised Libya how to secure release of Lockerbie bomber - Telegraph
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI75

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI75 aka Wikileaks id #245747 ?
Subject	LONG-TIME QADHAFI CONFIDANTE ELECTED HEAD OF GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 27 Jan 2010 12:20 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI75.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9219
OO RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0075 0271220
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 271220Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5736
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6289
```

Hide header

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000075

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/27/2020
TAGS: PINR [Intelligence] , PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LONG-TIME QADHAFI CONFIDANTE ELECTED HEAD OF GENERAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS

CLASSIFIED BY: Yael Lempert, A/DCM, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (SBU) Libya's General People's Congress
(parliament-equivalent) met January 26 in Sirte to open its 2010
session.  Members of the diplomatic corps, including the
Ambassador, were flown by the GOL 400 km east of Tripoli to
witness the opening day proceedings.  Delegates at the Congress
elected Mohammed Bilqassim al-Zway as Secretary-General,
replacing Imbarek al-Shamekh as the body's rough equivalent to
Speaker of the House.  Suliman Shahumi retained his chair of the
Foreign Affairs committee (a position he has held since March
2000).  Mohammed Jbril was named Secretary of Trade Unions,
Hosni Luhichi as Secretary of Legal Affairs, and Salima
Abduljabbar as Secretary of Women's Affairs.

¶2.  (C) Bio note and comment: Al-Zway is thought to be a close,
```

personal friend of Muammar al-Qadhafi. He attended school with Qadhafi in Sebha where the Free Officers' Movement was incubated, and reportedly introduced al-Qadhafi to former PM-equivalent Abdulsalam Jalloud (who, with al-Qadhafi, Khweldi al-Humeidi, and Abu Bakr Jabir, comprise the "Gang of Five" revolutionaries that led the 1969 coup). In addition to recent postings as ambassador to Rabat and London, he served as Libya's Permanent Representative to the UN in the mid-1990s and was part of the contact group (including Abdulati al-Obeidi) charged with negotiating with Western powers on Lockerbie and other incidents. There was no Congress agenda item, and no news emanating from the event, regarding Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi's still-to-be-filled role as "General Coordinator of the People's Social Leadership," indicating that Saif's official acceptance and confirmation may still lie in the future. Taken with the reported bankruptcy and subsequent shuttering of Saif's Oea and Qurina newspapers earlier this week, the installation of Zway -- a friend of old-guard revolutionaries -- may be a signal that Saif will have more limited powers in his new, yet-to-be-accepted position than commentators originally thought. End bio note and comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI77

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI77 aka Wikileaks id #245792 ?
Subject	EXPLORING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HEAD OF LIBYA'S PREMIER THINK TANK
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 27 Jan 2010 14:55 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI77.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO9448
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0077/01 0271455
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271455Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5737
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6291
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000077

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR. COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2020
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , OEXC *[Educational and Cultural Exchange Operations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , SCUL *[Cultural Affairs]* , TSPL *[Science and Technology Policy]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: EXPLORING ENGAGEMENT WITH THE HEAD OF LIBYA'S PREMIER THINK TANK

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Mahmoud Jibril, head of Libya's premier think-tank -- the National Economic Development Board -- told the Ambassador on January 21 that U.S. business enjoys "a competitive edge" in the field of technology in Libya, and argued that now is the time for U.S. business to capitalize on opportunities for trade and investment in Libya. He welcomed a February 20-23 Department of Commerce-led Trade Mission and offered to speak with GOL officials who could help facilitate the visit. Exploring areas for future bilateral cooperation,

Jibril recommended that both countries work together to implement joint projects aimed at "building trust," which would help to erase the historically negative perceptions that each has of the other. He described an idea for a high-level dialogue between U.S. and Libyan policymakers and scholars, to combat such misperceptions, and discussed building connections between U.S. and Libyan academic institutions. End Summary.

NEDB WELCOMES TRADE MISSION, INTERESTED IN INFO TECHNOLOGY

¶2. (C) During a January 21 meeting with Mahmoud Jibril, head of Libya's National Economic Development Board (NEDB) -- Libya's premier think-tank, which reports directly to the Prime Minister's office -- the Ambassador requested support for the upcoming Trade Mission, discussed the state of the bilateral relationship, and confirmed the U.S. commitment to further engagement. Jibril pledged to support the Trade Mission in any way he could, offering to reach out to the Minister of Economy, Industry and Trade, and to the Minister of Facilities and Infrastructure to facilitate the program. He expressed interest in meeting with companies specializing in the sale of technology, particularly those which could meet the needs of the NEDB in the areas of distance learning -- linking universities in the U.S. and Libya -- and increasing the capacity of the NEDB-run business incubators in the information technology field. Jibril believes the United States enjoys "a competitive edge" in the field of technology and that "now is the time" for U.S. business to capitalize on opportunities for trade and investment in Libya.

ERASING THE PAST

¶3. (C) Jibril commended the Ambassador for assuming the challenging position of leading diplomatic re-engagement after decades of isolation. He said that the "inherited political problems" represent a "big hurdle" for the United States -- both diplomatically and commercially -- and were in need of "creative solutions." The Ambassador acknowledged the difficulties, highlighting that the apparent GOL freeze on visa issuance for official American travelers to Libya is currently setting engagement back. Jibril characterized the "visa issues" as something "of the past" and noted "security" is the "overriding concern" influencing GOL policy on visa issuances for Americans. He recommended that both sides work together to implement joint-projects aimed at "building trust," that would help to erase the historically negative images that each side has of the other. He honed in on the negative perception in Libya of U.S. intentions in the region. "Changing the U.S. image among Arabs and in the region will take consistent work by you and your colleagues who have been in the region and understand it," he said. He noted that the "Arabs of the sixties are no longer the Arabs of today," explaining that the leaders and people of the region no longer reject a relationship with the United States simply due to the U.S.-Israel relationship. Libya is one of the countries that wants a relationship with the United States. However, the inclusion of Libya on the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) list of countries of "special interest" has reinforced negative perceptions about the U.S. in Libya. The Ambassador confirmed the U.S. commitment to the bilateral relationship, as evidenced by several points of high level engagement in recent months. He advised Jibril not to react hastily to the TSA list and not to evaluate the entire relationship based on that single measure, but rather to consider the full range of positive steps over the last year.

POLITICAL-ACADEMIC DIALOGUE ON ENGAGEMENT

¶4. (C) To overcome continuing misperceptions that leave the bilateral relationship vulnerable to misunderstanding, Jibril suggested that both sides convene a forum for 2-3 days, composed of 5-6 scholars and policymakers, with the goal of discussing the relationship and mutual needs and concerns, in order to find solutions to political problems and to design an agenda for

solutions to political problems and to design an agenda for pushing engagement forward. He noted that he had not yet sought approval for this idea from GOL decision makers, and commented

TRIPOLI 00000077 002 OF 002

that he would seek Saif al-Islam's approval when he was ready to pitch the idea to the GOL. He thought the group could meet either in Libya, the U.S., or in a third country, isolated from their regular jobs and environments. They would focus on "fixing" areas still "tainted by distortions" on each side. The final product would be a strategic program to create the foundation for a "lasting relationship," as well as the implementation of a "trust building program" to benefit the people of both nations. "This business of politics and distorted images is preventing progress," he concluded.

¶5. (C) The Ambassador explained U.S. efforts to engage with Libya through various, issue-specific dialogues, such as the Human Rights Dialogue, a political-military dialogue, a consular working group, and under the umbrella of the Trade and Investment Framework Agreement, as well as through a multitude of academic and cultural exchange programs. In effect, our response was to tackle the idea piece-by-piece, via a series of dialogues. The Ambassador said he would explore Jibril's dialogue concept on the U.S.-side, and emphasized that the inclusion of decision-makers in each of our areas of proposed dialogue would be key to the success of such groups. (As of January 27, Jibril had not yet had the opportunity to vet his proposal with Libyan officials.)

U.S.-LIBYA UNIVERSITY LINKAGES

¶6. (C) Jibril expressed interest in inviting U.S. higher academic institutions to visit Libya and to establish linkages with local universities, possibly even to offer courses in Libya to local students. He described an agreement that the NEDB recently signed with Liverpool University in the United Kingdom to set up a business school in Libya. The NEDB also has an agreement with Manchester University to establish a branch in Libya and to launch an IBM course for Libyan students. He said that he was ready to finance, provide the infrastructure for, and establish the academic criteria for a U.S university to offer courses in Libya.

GPC AGENDA ITEM: NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLAN

¶7. (C) Switching topics, Jibril noted that his agency's draft "National Economic Development Plan" would be discussed at the upcoming session of the General People's Congress (Libya's parliament-equivalent), scheduled for January 26. He described the current state of Libyan development as in its "second round." The first round had successfully initiated many infrastructure projects throughout the country; the current round would focus on developing the nation's human capacity, by improving education and training for the Libyan people. Jibril estimated that whereas about 70 percent of infrastructure and construction projects had already been awarded, Libyan officials were still determining who would take the lead for the development of human capacity. "The U.S. has the edge here," he stated. "If you don't step in, Singapore, the UK, Germany, and France are ready."

COMMENT

¶8. (C) Jibril seemed to be a very open interlocutor -- willing to engage in back-and-forth conversation and brainstorming together comfortably. His confidence in his own ability to approach Saif al-Islam with a new idea, as well as to raise the Trade Mission with GOL ministers, indicates that he is well-connected within the regime. As the head of a think-tank that reports directly to the Prime Minister-equivalent (who

called him during the meeting), without the burden of an official policymaking role, he may have a unique ability to influence decision-makers without challenging their authority. In response to Jibril's proposals, the Public Affairs Section will reach out to U.S. colleges and universities to explore potential areas for cooperation with Libyan academic institutions.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI78

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI78 aka Wikileaks id #245796 ?
Subject	SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE ACTION IS BEST
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 27 Jan 2010 15:12 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI78.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO9489
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0078/01 0271512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271512Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6293
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000078

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG. COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2020
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , EAID *[Foreign Economic Assistance]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , CVIS *[Visas]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE ACTION IS BEST

TRIPOLI 00000078 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's Justice Minister-equivalent, Mustafa Mohammad Abduljalil, told the Ambassador on January 25 that as Libya opens its economy to other countries, it needs international assistance in developing its private sector and strengthening the commercial legal environment. The Ambassador thanked Abduljalil for his support of the USG-funded Commercial

Law Development Program's (CLDP) work in Libya, including securing visas for the recent second visit to Libya of a U.S. federal judge and the CLDP program manager. Abduljalil said an upcoming February trip to the U.S. of three Libyan judges (at the invitation of CLDP) would provide the Libyans with new ideas and generate proposals for future cooperation. Abduljalil said Libya's reform of its Criminal Code had moved to the General People's Congress (Libya's parliament-equivalent) for discussion. While Abduljalil has given the green light to his staff to work with us, he noted that many Libyans are still "concerned" about the USG's support for Israel, and that terrorism stems from the perception that Europe and the U.S. are "against" Muslims. End Summary.

POSITIVE COOPERATION IN COMMERCIAL LAW PROGRAMS

¶2. (C) On January 25, the Ambassador (accompanied by econoff) met for the first time with Mustafa Mohammad Abduljalil, Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice (Minister of Justice-equivalent). The Ambassador stressed the importance of a sound commercial legal environment to Libya's economic development. He noted that CLDP is an example of the type of bilateral program that can improve the legal environment, and thanked the Secretary for his help in obtaining Libyan visas for the U.S. participants of recent CLDP workshops. Abduljalil expressed his own support for the CLDP programs and bilateral cooperation in general, stating that "less talk and more action is best" when it comes to moving the relationship forward.

¶3. (C) The Ambassador previewed for Abduljalil the upcoming CLDP-sponsored trip to New York and Washington of three Libyan judicial officials. Abduljalil said that as Libya was now opening up its economy and developing a private sector, it needed to strengthen its commercial laws, and that such trips to the U.S. would provide the Libyans with new ideas. This was "essential" as, after many years of sanctions and international isolation, the Libyans know very little about the U.S. system of government. He said they were also interested in discussing a system for prisoner exchange to provide for the repatriation of Libyans imprisoned in the U.S. and for U.S. citizens in Libyan prisons. (Note: We are not aware of any Americans currently in Libyan prisons. End note.) He said Libya had negotiated such agreements with other countries and hoped to do the same with the U.S. He would ask the three officials to write a report after their upcoming trip, including proposals for other areas of cooperation.

STATUS OF LIBYA'S CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT

¶4. (C) Abduljalil said the GOL has been working on reforming Libya's Criminal Code for 4-5 years and that the revised legislation is currently being discussed in the General People's Congress. He noted that Libya is trying to incorporate alternatives to prison sentences for some crimes, including a system for imposing fines instead of jail-time, as well as community service. Ideally, the death penalty would be a sentence reserved only in cases of murder, he explained. Regarding other penalties, such as charges brought against those who speak against the government, Abduljalil maintained that Libyans could "say anything they wanted" in the forum of the General People's Congress. He insisted that journalists were free to write anything they chose, provided they did not make personal accusations against anyone (i.e., slander).

FROM CRIMINALS TO ISRAEL: JUDGE ACCUSES U.S., EUROPE OF BEING AGAINST ISLAM

¶5. (C) In the course of the discussion of the Criminal Code, Abduljalil abruptly changed the subject from freedom of speech to the "Libyan people's concern about the U.S. government's support for Israel." He averred that Libya cares deeply about Muslims everywhere, and about Muslim countries. In his view

Muslims everywhere, and about Muslim countries. In his view, the root cause of terrorism stems from the perception that Europe and the U.S. are against Muslims. He believed that "justice is for everyone," and that if Libya does not uphold that tenet, then terrorists will find a foothold in Libya. The Ambassador replied that the U.S. is committed to a positive

TRIPOLI 00000078 002.2 OF 002

relationship with the Muslim world, referencing the President's 2009 speech in Cairo. He said it is important to continue the discussion of sensitive topics in order to develop a mature relationship between our two countries. Through the Human Rights Dialogue (HRD), the U.S. hopes to continue the discussion with Libya on such topics in a discreet, mutually respectful manner, which Abduljalil appeared to appreciate. The Ambassador gave Abduljalil a copy of the diplomatic note proposing the HRD working groups and invited his input.

BIO NOTE AND COMMENT

¶6. (C) Abduljalil was named Secretary of the General People's Committee for Justice in January 2007. He does not speak English, and spoke only Arabic in our meeting. According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), he has expressed reformist ideas about eliminating corruption within the GOL and bringing security organizations in line with the rule of law. In HRW's assessment, Abduljalil's drive to change the system is driven more by his conservative point of view rather than a reformist agenda. According to his staff and several judges, he is well-regarded and considered to be fair. The Ambassador's initial meeting with Abduljalil was positive and encouraging. Through his staff, including Director of International Cooperation Kamal al-Bahri, Abduljalil has demonstrated an interest in working with us on the Commercial Law Development Program over the past year and a willingness to allow his staff to communicate with emboffs outside of official channels. This was evidenced by his securing visa approvals for visiting CLDP officials. (Note: His organization seems to have a parallel track in securing visa approvals, bypassing Protocol and the MFA, as the Embassy received the approval numbers for the CLDP visitors directly from the GPC for Justice and not through the MFA as usual; in fact, the visas for the two CLDP visitors are among the very few USG visas we have received in the past few months. End note.) The next step will be to continue the discussion of how we can work with the GPC for Justice in other, more sensitive areas, such as the Human Rights Dialogue. We also committed to providing the Minister with U.S. laws and explanations showing how we handled the issues of free association and free speech balanced against the security needs of the nation. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- U.S. diplomats have long seen Libya's Jalil as a reformer | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI79

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI79 aka Wikileaks id #246028 ?
Subject	TECHNOLOGY TO TOURISM: HEAD OF INVESTMENT AUTHORITY DISCUSSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 28 Jan 2010 15:14 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI79.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO0479
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0079/01 0281514
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 281514Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5741
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6295
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000079

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/26/2020
TAGS: CVIS *[Visas]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , ECON *[Economic Conditions]* , EFIN *[Financial and Monetary Affairs]* , ECIN *[Economic Integration and Cooperation]* , EINV *[Foreign Investments]* , EIND *[Industry and Manufacturing]* , ETRD *[Foreign Trade]* , ETTC *[Trade and Technology Controls]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: TECHNOLOGY TO TOURISM: HEAD OF INVESTMENT AUTHORITY DISCUSSES OPPORTUNITIES FOR U.S. BUSINESS IN LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary. During a January 20 meeting with the Ambassador, Mohamed Layas, the Head of the Libyan Investment Authority (LIA, Libya's sovereign wealth fund), welcomed the February 20-23 Department of Commerce-led Trade Mission and highlighted ways that U.S. businesses could thrive in Libya, particularly in the tourism and health services sectors. The Ambassador underlined the need for the Libyan government to eliminate the "visa freeze" for official Americans and to

improve the visa process for other Americans, including allowing American tourists to enter Libya. Layas asserted that the LIA has USD 32 billion in liquidity, and noted that several American banks are each managing USD 300-500 million of the LIA's funds. End Summary.

HOW U.S. BUSINESS CAN THRIVE IN LIBYA: TECHNOLOGY TO TOURISM

¶2. (C) During a January 20 meeting in his prime office-space overlooking the Mediterranean Sea, Layas discussed with the Ambassador (accompanied by the FCS officer and P/E chief) the many ways in which U.S. businesses could thrive in Libya, through investment, trade, and joint ventures. He welcomed the February 20-23 Department of Commerce Trade Mission and offered his thoughts on how to make the program a success -- "The best thing to do is to meet the right people here. You should have 2-3 ministers address the whole group." He explained that the LIA was very interested in attracting more U.S. business to Libya and believed the U.S. could play a "major role" in Libya's development. During a recent visit to Washington, Layas met with a number of American company representatives, as well as the Export-Import Bank (EXIM), to educate them on opportunities to invest in the "unique [Libyan] market," which according to him, unfortunately includes bureaucratic "red tape and corruption." Some of the advantages that Layas saw the U.S. having over European competitors for contracts in Libya are the weakness of the dollar compared to the Euro, as well as U.S. access to more advanced technology. Layas believes U.S. companies can expand on their success in Libya's hydrocarbon market by competing for contracts in the electricity market, health services, and tourism.

¶3. (C) Layas was particularly interested in importation of advanced U.S. medical technology, outlining plans to create a large medical center in Tripoli. He sees opportunities for U.S. firms to enter into joint ventures with Libyan companies to develop such plans. Additionally, he noted that the LIA plans to manage a large tourism development plan, which will involve USD 1 billion projects in Western Libya, Eastern Libya, the Green Mountains, and potentially another city (most likely Tripoli). Layas believes more than half of Libya's projected USD 136 billion development plan budget has been committed in contracts, but implied that some companies may back out of those contracts, as they were "reconsidering the conditions." Layas asked the Ambassador to pass on the message that Libya was still open to development by U.S. companies and that Libya wants to establish "lasting relationships" with major U.S. firms.

IMPROVING BILATERAL RELATIONS THROUGH VISAS

¶4. (C) The Ambassador attested to the interest of Americans -- businesspeople, government officials, and tourists -- in coming to Libya, but underlined the obstacles that Americans face when trying to obtain visas. The current "visa freeze" for official Americans was only the latest in a number of difficulties that Americans faced. The Ambassador highlighted the imbalance in our governments' approaches to the relationship -- whereas the Embassy provided full consular services and had issued over 3,000 visas to Libyans since opening in April 2009, U.S. tourists still could not visit Libya. The situation is affecting Embassy operations, including planning for the Trade Mission, and needs to be addressed. Layas sympathetically commented that he had also faced problems recently in trying to obtain visa approvals for a number of American businessmen that had been invited to visit Libya for business discussions.

LIA'S INVESTMENTS: WEATHERING THE STORM

¶5. (C) The Ambassador stressed the U.S. commitment to the bilateral relationship, including in trade and investment. He inquired about the state of the Libyan economy and the LIA's wealth in particular, given fallen oil prices and the recent

world economic crisis. Layas informed the Ambassador that Libya had "weathered the storm" of the economic crisis. He noted that the LIA operated with "high liquidity," and therefore was not concerned about the volatility of the oil market. "We have USD

TRIPOLI 00000079 002 OF 002

32 billion in liquidity," he stated, "mostly in bank deposits that will give us good long-term returns." He explained that several American banks are each managing USD 300-500 million of LIA's funds, and opined that the LIA was entangled in a legal disagreement with Lehman Brother's due to a major investment that was "mismanaged." He said that the LIA has an office in London and preferred doing business there rather than in the United States, due to the "ease of doing business" in the UK and relatively "uncomplicated tax system." He noted that the LIA's primary investments are in London, in banking and residential and commercial real estate.

¶6. (C) Layas denied press reports that the LIA had invested USD 100 million with the infamous Allen Stanford. He said that he had personally written a letter to the "Financial Times" disputing the information, explaining that Stanford had approached the LIA in the middle of his crisis, offering a 7-8% share in his investment scheme, but Layas had refused. Layas also mentioned having been previously approached by Bernard Madoff about an investment opportunity, "but we did not accept." On the contrary, LIA's recent purchase of the Canadian Verenex oil company -- after much controversy over the manner in which it was purchased and share price -- was considered by Layas a "good deal." LIA plans to operate Verenex jointly with the Libyan Investment and Development Corporation (LIDCO).

¶7. (C) Comment: The LIA controls at least seven subsidiary organizations, and a fund that holds USD 32 billion in liquid assets. The fact that Layas weathered his own storm -- LIA's controversial, reported entanglement with Allen Stanford -- in a regime that has proven to be unforgiving in the face of embarrassment, is surprising, and indicative of his strong ties to powerful protectors within the Libyan regime. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI8

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI8 aka Wikileaks id #242781 ?
Subject	KOREA SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH LIBYA
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 7 Jan 2010 15:16 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI8.html
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2584
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0008 0071516
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 071516Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5651
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0111
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0015
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES PRIORITY 0003
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0874
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0047
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 0020
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0100
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6202
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000008

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN

E.O. 12958: DECL:  1/7/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PINS [National Security] , MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications] , PARM
[Arms Controls and Disarmament] , PINR [Intelligence] , RS [Russia; Wrangel Islands] , KGIC [Global Initiative to
Combat Nuclear Terrorism] , KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , KRAD [Radioactive Contamination of the Environment] ,
ENRG [Energy and Power] ,
LY [Libya] , KS [Korea (South)]
SUBJECT: KOREA SEEKS U.S. VIEWS ON CIVIL NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH
LIBYA

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.    (SBU)  This is an action request; please see para 4.

¶2.    (C)  The Ambassador of the Republic of Korea to Libya, Dong
Hee Chang recently told the Ambassador that his country was
interested in advancing its civil nuclear cooperation with Libya
and wanted to know if the U.S. had any objections.  He said the
```

South Korean Embassy in Washington had broached this topic with U.S. officials in Washington and had not received any reply. (It is unclear which USG agency or office was contacted.) Specifically, South Korea would like to provide nuclear reactors for power generation to Libya. South Korea's Ambassador told the Ambassador that any potential South Korean civil nuclear cooperation with Libya would be fully coordinated with the IAEA.

¶3. (C) Over the last year, Libya has stepped up its civil nuclear programs, signing agreements for similar cooperation with France, Argentina, Canada, Ukraine and Russia. Senior Libyan officials, including Muammar al-Qadhafi, have told us that Libya seeks similar cooperation with the United States.

¶4. (S/NF) Comment and Action Request: We note that further information on this proposal has been provided in other, sensitive reporting. Department's guidance on South Korea's proposed civil nuclear cooperation with Libya is requested.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI82

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI82 aka Wikileaks id #246389 ?
Subject	LIBYA'S DELEGATION TO THE AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Sun, 31 Jan 2010 10:10 UTC
Classification	UNCLASSIFIED
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/01/10TRIPOLI82.html
References	10STATE3353
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, original content redacted • Tue, 23 Aug 2011 23:15: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO2421
OO RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHGI RUEHJO RUEHMA RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN
DE RUEHTRO #0082 0311010
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O P 311010Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5748
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0006
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6302
```

Hide header

UNCLAS TRIPOLI 000082

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL *[External Political Relations]* , AU-1 *[African Union]* , KSUM *[Summit Meetings]* , XA *[Africa]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA'S DELEGATION TO THE AFRICAN UNION SUMMIT

REF: STATE 3353

¶1. (SBU) The General People's Committee for Foreign Liaison and International Cooperation (MFA-equivalent) informed Post on January 27 that its delegation to the African Union summit to be held beginning January 30 in Addis Ababa would consist of:

- Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi, Leader of the Revolution
- Secretary Musa Kusa, Foreign Minister-equivalent
- Dr. Ahmed Fituri, Secretary of the Americas department at the MFA
- Juma Ibrahim Amer, Secretary-designate for African Affairs
- Libya's Ambassador to Addis Ababa

¶2. (SBU) MFA indicated that meetings with members of the Libyan delegation would be available to arrange meetings at the summit, though it did not provide contact information for the traveling delegation.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute

complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI90

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas



Reference id	10TRIPOLI90 aka Wikileaks id #246561 ?
Subject	LIBYA/NPT: FOLLOW-UP TRILATERAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 1 Feb 2010 15:54 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI90.html
References	10TRIPOLI46
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3173
OO RUEHTRO
DE RUEHTRO #0090 0321554
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 011554Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5755
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0260
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 1211
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0117
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0028
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6310
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000090

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/1/2020
TAGS: PARM *[Arms Controls and Disarmament]* , MNUC *[Military Nuclear Applications]* , KNNP *[Nuclear Non-Proliferation]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , NPT, LY *[Libya]* , RFE *[Radio Free Europe]* , UK *[United Kingdom]*
SUBJECT: LIBYA/NPT: FOLLOW-UP TRILATERAL DEMARCHE DELIVERED

REF: A) STATE 7931; B) TRIPOLI 46 ; C) STATE 5942; D) STATE 4457

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
(C) The Ambassador, along with the UK and Russian Ambassadors, orally conveyed the text of the second demarche (reftel) regarding Libya's proposal to amend the NPT. The Libyan team, headed by MFA Under Secretary Abdelati Obedi listened carefully and thanked us for a comprehensive, and clear response to Libya's questions from the first round demarche. Obeidi wanted to know what guarantees the three depositary states could provide that the discussions of Libya's proposals would be part of the formal agenda, given that the agenda was "closed." Libya appreciated the three options we had provided as an alternative to circulating the amendment proposal but questioned how those options insured a full and formal discussion of Libya's ideas. Obeidi noted that any party could do what we were proposing, strongly hinting that he did not see how our response answered Libya's concerns and initiative. He reiterated Libyan appreciation for the response, and said he would take it to Libyan leader Qadhafi, who he claimed had initiated the proposal. The Libyan response was extremely brief after our presentation as it was clear Obeidi had a more pressing commitment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI91

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Reference id	10TRIPOLI91 aka Wikileaks id #246569 ?
Subject	SWISS SCORE IN LIBYA: HAMDANI CLEARED OF IMMIGRATION CHARGES
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Mon, 1 Feb 2010 16:13 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI91.html
References	10TRIPOLI58 , 10TRIPOLI73
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI112
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO3201
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0091 0321613
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 011613Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5756
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6311
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T TRIPOLI 000091

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND EUR/CE

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/1/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PHUM [Human Rights] , CVIS
[Visas] , SZ [Switzerland] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: SWISS SCORE IN LIBYA: HAMDANI CLEARED OF IMMIGRATION
CHARGES

REF: A) TRIPOLI 73 ; B) TRIPOLI 58

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF)  Summary:  In a January 31 ruling, the Libyan
Immigration Court acquitted Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani of
immigration violations and lifted his 16-month prison sentence.
Verdicts are expected in Swiss businessman Max Goeldi's
immigration appeal, as well as the separate tax cases against
the two men, by February 7.  Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto is
"cautiously optimistic" about Hamdani's victory and believes
positive judicial decisions will facilitate progress to repair
```

positive judicial decisions will facilitate progress to repair the Swiss-Libyan political relationship. The German Ambassador confirmed that the Swiss are willing to lift the ban on issuance of Schengen visas for Libyans if the two Swiss businessmen are released. Swiss hardball tactics on Schengen visas and the German-sponsored diplomatic initiative appear to be paying dividends. End Summary.

HAMDANI ACUITTED OF IMMIGRATION CHARGES

¶2. (C) Swiss Charge Stefano Lazarotto confirmed press reports that Swiss businessman Rachid Hamdani had been cleared of all immigration-related charges, and his 16-month prison sentence had been overturned in a January 31 ruling by the appeals court. Lazarotto said that Hamdani had attended the appeals hearing at the immigration court on January 24, accompanied by Lazarotto, the German Ambassador, a UK diplomat, and a Libyan MFA representative. Lazarotto said that Hamdani had been allowed to represent his case and was able to return to the Embassy after the trial. He credited the positive verdict in part to Hamdani's participation in the hearing. Lazarotto believed that with the verdict, the Swiss were "20% there and had 80% of the way to go" toward resolving the issue.

ONE MORE APPEAL AND TWO TAX VERDICTS TO GO

¶3. (C) Lazarotto noted that the second Swiss businessman, Max Goeldi, had attended his appeals trial at the immigration court on January 28 and expected to hear a verdict in that case on February 4. Goeldi was accompanied to his trial by the Swiss Charge, German Ambassador, diplomats from the Austrian, Spanish, and Danish embassies, and a Libyan MFA representative. The trial lasted about 40 minutes, the court provided interpretation, and Goeldi's lawyer was able to present oral and written arguments in his client's defense. Like Hamdani, Goeldi was allowed to return to the Swiss Embassy after the hearing. Although Lazarotto hoped for another positive outcome, he noted that the Swiss were still waiting on two verdicts from the tax court. The hearings for Goeldi and Hamdani on tax-related charges took place on January 30 and 31, respectively, which both men attended. Lazarotto related that they expect to receive verdicts before February 7, at which point "the picture will be much clearer."

FORWARD MOVEMENT ON POLITICAL TRACK

¶4. (S/NF) Resolution of the legal aspects of the Swiss-Libyan contretemps, according to Lazarotto, will facilitate progress toward piecing back together the bilateral political relationship. He said the latest development was "confidence building" and bolstered the Swiss Government's continued cautious optimism. The Germans have mediated two rounds of political talks to amend the situation, and Lazarotto expects a third round to be conducted in the near future. Separately, the German Ambassador also expressed increased optimism that the situation was nearly resolved. He told the Ambassador on January 26 that the German mediator, Ambassador Born, who has been designated by the Swiss as the negotiator with the Libyans, indicated that during his last visit here, Born was empowered to lift the visa freeze immediately if the Libyans would hand over the two Swiss businessmen and permit them to leave. The Libyans for "technical" reasons were not prepared to do that, but Born has been charged with returning to Libya with the same proposal. That trade would then set off a set of agreements leading to a return to normalization. The German Ambassador was not sure whether this potential resolution had yet been properly blessed by the Qadhafi family.

¶5. (S/NF) Comment: The German-sponsored diplomatic initiative, coupled with Swiss hardball tactics on Schengen visas for Libyan officials, appears to be paying dividends. If the legal rulings continue in a positive direction, they set the stage for an overall political solution to this 18-month drama. The recent

legal rulings in favor of the two Swiss citizens could indicate that the necessary approvals from the Qadhafi family have been obtained. We will continue to monitor the situation. End comment.

CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI95

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate



Reference id	10TRIPOLI95 aka Wikileaks id #246765 ?
Subject	QADHAFI CHILDREN SCANDALS SPILLING OVER INTO POLITICS
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Tue, 2 Feb 2010 14:08 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI95.html
Referenced by	10TRIPOLI110
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Wed, 8 Dec 2010 14:14: First publication, original content redacted • Fri, 21 Jan 2011 20:36: Publication withdrawn • Sun, 23 Jan 2011 04:16: Re-published, original content redacted • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, original content redacted • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO4197
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL
DE RUEHTRO #0095/01 0331408
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 021408Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5759
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6315
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000095

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG AND INR/NESA

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/2/2020
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , PINR [Intelligence] , PHUM [Human
Rights] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: QADHAFI CHILDREN SCANDALS SPILLING OVER INTO POLITICS

TRIPOLI 00000095  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary.  According to a local political observer with
access to the Qadhafi regime's inner circle, the family has been
in a tailspin lately, trying to put a stop to one rumor or
another, in the name of defending the family's honor.  From
Mutassim al-Qadhafi's headline-grabbing St. Bart's New Year's
```

Eve bash to Hannibal's latest violent outburst, the Qadhafi family has provided local observers with enough dirt for a Libyan soap opera. Meanwhile, as his brothers, sister, and mother scurry to cover-up scandals, Saif al-Islam seems to be strategically disengaged, traveling in New Zealand and Algeria, and focusing on Haiti relief efforts. The widening contrast between the respectable, cultured image that Saif has taken on and the spoiled, boorish image his siblings project has local audiences rallying behind Saif as the next heir to the Qadhafi throne. End Summary.

¶2. (S/NF) A local political observer with close contacts to the Libyan regime and Muammar al-Qadhafi's inner circle told us that the Qadhafi family has been consumed in recent weeks by efforts to control the damage from Mutassim and Hannibal's recent headline-grabbing behavior. National Security Advisor Mutassim al-Qadhafi kicked off 2010 in the same way he spent 2009 -- with a New Year's Eve trip to St. Bart's -- reportedly featuring copious amounts of alcohol and a million-dollar personal concert courtesy of Beyonce, Usher, and other musicians. Mutassim seemed to be surprised by the fact that his party was photographed and the focus of international media attention. According to our contact, his carousing and extravagance angered some locals, who viewed his activities as impious and embarrassing to the nation. Others took the events and rumors surrounding it as further argument that Mutassim -- often considered to be a rival of brother Saif al-Islam to succeed his father -- is not fit to be the next leader of the country. The Egyptian ambassador recently told the Ambassador that the Egyptians had been bracing for retribution after an Egyptian newspaper published the report of Mutassim's carousing.

¶3. (S/NF) Days before Mutassim's extravagant display, international press reported that his brother Hannibal had physically abused his wife, Aline, in a London hotel room over Christmas. Our contact told us that Aline had threatened to leave Hannibal a few weeks before the incident and had fled to London. When Safiya, Hannibal's mother, heard the news, she pleaded with Aline by phone to return to Tripoli, promising to give her "whatever she desired," in exchange. Hannibal pursued Aline in London, and the encounter ended in assault. When Safiya and Hannibal's sister, Ayesha al-Qadhafi (at that time many months' pregnant), heard the news, Ayesha traveled to London to intervene. Both Qadhafi women -- Safiya by phone and Ayesha in person -- advised Aline to report to the police that she had been hurt in an "accident," and not to mention anything about abuse. London press reported that Hannibal was allowed to leave the UK discreetly, on diplomatic immunity.

¶4. (S/NF) In the meantime, heir-apparent Saif al-Islam has been opportunely disengaged from local affairs. According to his staff and press reports, Saif celebrated the New Year far away from Tripoli in a small New Zealand town of 8,000 people, on a hunting trip. He spent a week in mid-January hunting as well, in Western Algeria, according to Algerian press. Saif's Qadhafi International Charity and Development Foundation has recently been active in the Haiti relief effort, sending hundreds of tons of supplies. Saif al-Islam's inner circle has been officially dismissive of any reports that he may accept the "General Coordinator" position to which he was appointed by his father in early October. One contact working with the National Economic Development Board told us that Saif did not want to be "tainted" by the current political environment.

¶5. (C) Young Libyan contacts have repeated over the last few weeks that Saif al-Islam is the "hope" of "Libya al-Ghad" (Libya of tomorrow), with men in their twenties saying that they aspire to be like Saif and think he is the right person to run the country. They describe him as educated, cultured, and someone who wants a better future for Libya. By comparison, when asked about the prospects of Mutassim, Hannibal, or the other brothers as leaders of country, young contacts shake their heads and

point to their famously irresponsible behavior as more reason to hope that Saif will succeed his father.

¶6. (S/NF) Comment: Amidst the Qadhafi family antics, Saif al-Islam has wisely distanced himself from the local drama. While no stranger to the playboy lifestyle himself, Saif has managed to keep international press coverage of his activities benign. Saif seems to be making progress in casting himself as a humanitarian, philanthropist, and reformer. In so doing,

TRIPOLI 00000095 002.2 OF 002

Libyans cannot help but to contrast his brothers' spoiled behavior with the mature, respectable image that Saif projects. If Saif al-Islam does intend to accept an official role in the near future, domestic audiences -- particularly among Libya's swelling ranks of young adults -- may welcome him as Libya's knight in shining armor. End comment.
CRETZ

Media

- WikiLeaks Cables Detail Qaddafi Family's Exploits - NYTimes.com
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI96

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI96 aka Wikileaks id #247048 ?
Subject	LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY HEAD ELABORATES ON FUNDING REQUEST FOR NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Wed, 3 Feb 2010 15:59 UTC
Classification	SECRET//NOFORN
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI96.html
References	09TRIPOLI886
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments

```
VZCZCXRO5355
PP RUEHBC RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHTRO #0096/01 0341600
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 031559Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5761
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA PRIORITY 0101
RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 0673
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6317
```

Hide header

```
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000096

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND ISN/CTR K. INSLEY AND DA BROWN; LONDON AND
PARIS FOR NEA WATCHERS

E.O. 12958: DECL:  2/3/2020
TAGS: KNNP [Nuclear Non-Proliferation] , AORC [International Organizations and Conferences] , IAEA [International
Atomic Energy Agency] , PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs] , LY [Libya]
SUBJECT: LIBYAN ATOMIC ENERGY HEAD ELABORATES ON FUNDING REQUEST FOR
NUCLEAR MEDICINE CENTER

REF: 09 TRIPOLI 886

TRIPOLI 00000096  001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Gene Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli,
U.S. Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)
¶1.  (S/NF) Summary: During a January 27 meeting with the
Ambassador, Dr. Ali Gashut, Head of the Libyan Atomic Energy
Establishment, reiterated the GOL's keen interest in seeing the
regional Nuclear Medicine Center (NMC) project completed.
```

Recognizing the Department's funding constraints and acknowledging the GOL's long-standing commitment to cost-sharing, Gashut agreed to provide a letter quantifying GOL contributions to the project to-date. Gashut emphasized the progress on the NMC was important to the bilateral relationship, stating that that the Libyan Cabinet, MFA, and other government bodies were focused on the project and wanted to see it come to fruition as a model of bilateral engagement, a point we have heard repeatedly from senior officials, including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi. Progress on the NMC could help jumpstart the relationship after months of crises. We urge the Department to consider alternative USG funding sources for the construction phase. End summary.

¶2. (C) On January 27, the Ambassador (accompanied by ISN/CTR Katherine Insley, P/E chief and econoff) met with Dr. Ali Gashut, Head of the Libyan Atomic Energy Establishment, who was accompanied by his deputy, Dr. Mohamed Ennami, to discuss bilateral engagement on scientist redirection programs and the establishment of a Regional Nuclear Medicine Center. At the outset, Gashut, the Embassy's primary point of contact on scientist engagement activities, said the Libyans were not happy with the lack of progress on the regional Nuclear Medicine Center (NMC), a project that he and his staff had been working on for the last five years. However, he sensed that the Ambassador and the USG were acting in goodwill to move the project forward and characterized the NMC as the "fruit of the good work we have been doing together for the last five years," beginning with the signing of the "Sister Lab" agreement in 2006. Gashut stated that in working together "as one team," we can overcome the problem of funding that was standing in the way of progress, and pledged, "We will find a way to help you come up with the money necessary to begin to implement the project."

¶3. (C) The Ambassador told Gashut that in order for the USG to authorize the USG-funded Architecture and Engineering (A&E) design work to begin, a letter from the Libyan side was necessary, outlining Libya's commitment to work in partnership on the NMC and quantifying the Libyan contributions to the project. He said that the letter Gashut sent to ISN/CTR in December 2009, which reiterated Libya's expectation that the U.S. would fully fund the NMC as a "reward" for Libya's decision to give ups its WMD program had been unhelpful and only served to stall progress on the project. Gashut said he understood the U.S. position and indicated that the language was included for "political" reasons.

¶4. (C) Referring to his meeting the previous day with ISN/CTR visiting officials (septel), Gashut recognized ISN's funding limitations and indicated Libya would agree to a cost-sharing approach, which took into account the monetary value of the contributions that Libya had already made to the project. Gashut said that "It's always been understood that we have a part to play; we want to show the Libyan people and the international community that we have benefited from this WMD decision by completing this program." He agreed to provide a letter reiterating Libya's commitment to work in partnership with the United States to build the NMC and to quantify in that letter the in-kind contributions that Libya had already invested in the project, such as the costs of land, staff salaries, office space and the conversion of lab facilities for NMC functions. Gashut noted that the GOL had designated 1.5 hectares of land (approximately 5 acres) in a prime location, close to the Tripoli International Airport, for the NMC site.

¶5. (C) Gashut characterized the Libyan side as "extremely energetic" about completing the project, stating that "everyone in the Cabinet, MFA and government" were committed to moving forward on the NMC in partnership with the U.S. Gashut emphasized that the Libyan leadership was very focused on the NMC. He said that, "The MFA sees this project as an opportunity

to open new doors of cooperation. The Cabinet feels this project will show real intent and will on the U.S.-side to move forward with cooperation." The NMC would also serve as a model for other countries, which were still hesitant about giving up their WMD programs. It would be a convincing tool to promote nuclear nonproliferation and the spread of civilian nuclear programs.

TRIPOLI 00000096 002.2 OF 002

¶6. (C) In Gashut's view, some progress on building the NMC -- such as beginning A&E design work -- will make a huge, positive impact on the bilateral relationship and will change for the better the approach that Libyan leadership has had toward us. He noted that many government officials were arguing for deeper engagement with the U.S., and they wanted the NMC project to be a foundation for their argument to win out over the views of the skeptics: "In Libya at least 4,000 people have graduated from U.S. universities, and many of them are in influential positions. This is a big plus for bilateral relations."

¶7. (S/NF) The Ambassador reaffirmed the U.S. desire to increase engagement in all areas of the bilateral relationship, including moving forward on the NMC project. Acknowledging that we have had problems over the last year that set back the relationship -- including the GOL's unexpected delay on shipment of Libya's highly enriched uranium spent nuclear fuel, in which Gashut had been involved -- the Ambassador expressed his intention to devote the second year of his tenure developing stronger relationships with Libyan leadership, so that when crises arise, both sides could work together to move past them. He listed the current freeze on visas for official U.S. travelers among the crises that we were currently facing, which must be resolved in order to put the bilateral relationship back on a steady path. By contrast, the Ambassador highlighted the positive momentum of the NMC project, which offered an opportunity to jumpstart the normalization process with Libya.

¶8. (C) In addition to the NMC project, Gashut expressed GOL interest in signing a bilateral cooperative agreement on the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. He reviewed two approaches the Libyans had made to the USG on this proposal, first in 2008 prior to the visit of then-Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, and then during National Security Advisor Muatassim al-Qadhafi's April 2009 visit to Washington, when the Libyan Embassy submitted a draft agreement to the Department. Gashut said that Libya sought U.S. support for its plans to build the first nuclear power plant in the country: "We need your assistance so that both sides can benefit from these developments."

¶9. (S/NF) Comment: Post sees great value in moving ahead quickly on the Nuclear Medicine Center project. Senior Libyan officials -- including Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi and Foreign Minister Musa Kusa -- have repeatedly raised the issue, hinting that the perceived lack of progress has threatened continued normalization of the bilateral relationship. From the Libyans' perspective, progress on the project -- including new USG funding arrangements that go beyond the initial A&E design phase -- would be a tangible sign of the U.S. commitment to bilateral engagement that could help jumpstart the relationship after several months of crisis. The GOL will not give Gashut's team the funds to pay for construction of the NMC. We strongly urge the Department to explore alternative USG funding sources to support those construction costs. End comment.
CRETZ

MEDIA

- Add media item for this cable...

COMMENTS

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.

CABLE REFERENCE ID: #10TRIPOLI99

"All of them, those in power, and those who want the power, would pamper us, if we agreed to overlook their crookedness by wilfully restricting our activities."
— "Refus Global" , Paul-Émile Borduas

Main • Full-text search • Private cart • Browse tags • Overview • History • Media • Crowdsource Central • Manning's alleged chat logs diff • Donate

Reference id	10TRIPOLI99 aka Wikileaks id #247252 ?
Subject	MINISTER OF JUSTICE TRIES, AND FAILS, TO RESIGN
Origin	Embassy Tripoli (Libya)
Cable time	Thu, 4 Feb 2010 15:18 UTC
Classification	CONFIDENTIAL
Source	http://wikileaks.org/cable/2010/02/10TRIPOLI99.html
References	09TRIPOLI1021 , 09TRIPOLI862
History	• *Time unknown*: Original unredacted version, leaked to Wikileaks • Mon, 31 Jan 2011 22:06: First publication, unredacted, however non-text content differs • Thu, 1 Sep 2011 23:24: Re-published, unredacted, however non-text content differs • **Thu, 8 Sep 2011 13:29: Original unredacted version published, with HTML goodies**
Extras	? Comments , 1 media item

```
VZCZCXRO6275
OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0099 0351518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 041518Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5765
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6321
```

Hide header

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 000099

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/4/2020
TAGS: PGOV *[Internal Governmental Affairs]* , PREL *[External Political Relations]* , PHUM *[Human Rights]* , PINR *[Intelligence]* , LY *[Libya]*
SUBJECT: MINISTER OF JUSTICE TRIES, AND FAILS, TO RESIGN

REF: A) 09 TRIPOLI 1021 ; B) 09 TRIPOLI 862

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Following his dramatic resignation before the General People's Congress on January 28, Minister of Justice Mustafa Abduljalil appears to remain on the job. Sources in the Ministry of Justice said the resignation was not accepted and that plans are proceeding for Abduljalil's official trip to Turkey in mid-February. Some observers believe that Muammar al-Qadhafi -- who publicly rebuked Abduljalil -- prefers to fire him on his own terms, while others believe Abduljalil's backer Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi will not let him resign. Abduljalil's attempted resignation took place against the backdrop of a

roiling political environment and could have implications for Libya's criminal code reform efforts. End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Libyan press reported January 28 that Minister of Justice Mustafa Abduljalil had submitted his resignation to the General People's Congress (GPC, parliament-equivalent) due to his "inability to overcome the difficulties facing the judicial sector." He cited the injustice of the Libyan government's decision to keep 300 citizens in prisons, in spite of judicial rulings overturning previous convictions, while the GOL released convicted prisoners on death-row without informing the families of their victims, as required by Shari'a law.

¶3. (C) Initial local reaction to the news was mixed. Libyan leader Muammar al-Qadhafi, in his closing remarks to the annual GPC session answered Abduljalil's accusations, stating that most of the 300 prisoners "are al Qaeda members, who killed Libyans," and proclaiming that "security is above all considerations." He declared Abduljalil's statements to be out of place, proclaiming, "The Minister of Justice had the right to say what he said, but he should not have said it here." Libyan observers speculated that Abduljalil's resignation would not be accepted by the Libyan regime, which prefers to dismiss officials on its own terms. Human Rights Watch representatives, who praised Abduljalil for his work on Libya's criminal code reform, worried that his departure would be a step backward for the justice system (Ref A). The Embassy's local staff reports that citizens in Eastern Libya, particularly in Benghazi (a historically disenfranchised part of the country under the Qadhafi regime), where most of the families of the victims of the1986 Abu Salim prison riots reside, were proud of Abduljalil for standing up to an unjust regime. These families reportedly protest regularly in the name of innocent prisoners still held at Abu Salim and other prisons that are controlled by the Libyan Internal Security Organization, outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Justice (MOJ).

¶4. (C) MOJ officials who have close working relationships with the Embassy refused to answer their phones from January 28 through February 1. On February 2, the MOJ Head of International Cooperation told Econoff that Abduljalil's resignation was not accepted and that he remains in place. In fact, the Minister had been planning an official trip to Turkey in mid-February, and plans are moving ahead for that trip.

¶5. (C) One Libyan contact reported that Abduljalil, who is considered to be a fair-minded technocrat, was put in his position by Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi and would not be able to leave the position without Saif's blessing. The contact stated that "nobody, not Baghdadi (al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, PM-equivalent) or Zwai (Mohamed Zwai, Secretary General of the GPC) can remove him from his position if Saif put him there." He believed that only Saif or his father held the power to decide Abduljalil's fate and that if they did want him to leave his position, the announcement would be made when the timing was best for them, such as after they had identified an acceptable alternative for the position. Pointing to National Oil Company Chairman Shukri Ghanem's attempted resignation last October (Ref B), this contact said, "In Libya, he who puts you in has to take you out."

¶6. (C) Comment: Abduljalil's attempted resignation took place against the backdrop of political turmoil that has followed the October 2009 announcement of Muammar al-Qadhafi's plans to appoint Saif al-Islam Qadhafi as "General Coordinator." The complete absence of any discussion of the General Coordinator position at the January GPC furthered the growing uncertainty surrounding the Libyan political structure. This is likely not the final installment in Abduljalil's political drama, and his attempted resignation could have implications for Libya's criminal code reform efforts. End Comment.

CRETZ

Media

- U.S. diplomats have long seen Libya's Jalil as a reformer | McClatchy
- Add media item for this cable...

Comments

Do not load Disqus comments widget (Disqus loads and executes third-party Javascript files, which might be deemed undesirable. Setting will take effect next time a page is loaded.)

User-supplied contents reflect the views of their respective authors, and not necessarily the views of the owner and/or moderator(s) of this web site. Posts with embedded links will have to be approved by a moderator. Only links to external web pages which appear to contribute complementary information to specifics in the cable will be allowed. Links to external web pages should not be construed as a statement of support of the external web sites by the owner and/or moderator(s) of cablegatesearch.net.



Currently released so far...
251287 / 251,287

Articles

Brazil
Sri Lanka
United Kingdom
Sweden
Global
United States
Latin America
Egypt
Jordan
Yemen
Thailand

Browse latest releases

2011/08

Browse by creation date

66 72 73 75 78 79 85 86
87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I
J K L M N O P Q
R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H
I J K L M N O P
Q R S T U V W X
Y Z

Browse by classification

CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
SECRET

Viewing cable 10TRIPOLI78, SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE AC
TRIPOLI 00000078 001.2 OF 002

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes in about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subj to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the r of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSc reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#10TRIPOLI78**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origi
10TRIPOLI78	2010-01-27 15:12	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Emba

Appears in these articles:
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/08/22/121614/us-diplomats-have-long-seen-libyas.html

```
VZCZCXRO9489
OO RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDH RUEHFL RUEHKUK RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV
RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHTRO #0078/01 0271512
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O R 271512Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5739
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI 6293
```

```
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TRIPOLI 000078

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG. COMMERCE FOR NATE MASON.

E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/27/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM EAID ECON CVIS PINR LY
```

SECRET//NOFORN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Community resources

Follow us on Twitter
Check our Reddit
Twitter this
Digg this page
Contact us on IRC

courage is contagious

SUBJECT: SENIOR LIBYAN JUSTICE OFFICIAL: LESS TALK, MORE ACTION IS BEST
00000078 001.2 OF 002

CLASSIFIED BY: Gene A. Cretz, Ambassador, U.S. Embassy Tripoli, Departm
State. REASON: 1.4 (b), (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: Libya's Justice Minister-equivalent, Mustafa Mohammad
Abduljalil, told the Ambassador on January 25 that as Libya opens its e
other countries, it needs international assistance in developing its pr
sector and strengthening the commercial legal environment. The Ambassad
thanked Abduljalil for his support of the USG-funded Commercial Law Dev
Program's (CLDP) work in Libya, including securing visas for the recent
visit to Libya of a U.S. federal judge and the CLDP program manager. Ab
said an upcoming February trip to the U.S. of three Libyan judges (at t
invitation of CLDP) would provide the Libyans with new ideas and genera
proposals for future cooperation. Abduljalil said Libya's reform of its
Code had moved to the General People's Congress (Libya's parliament-equ
for discussion. While Abduljalil has given the green light to his staff
with us, he noted that many Libyans are still "concerned" about the USG
support for Israel, and that terrorism stems from the perception that E
the U.S. are "against" Muslims. End Summary.

POSITIVE COOPERATION IN COMMERCIAL LAW PROGRAMS

¶2. (C) On January 25, the Ambassador (accompanied by econoff) met for
time with Mustafa Mohammad Abduljalil, Secretary of the General People'
Committee for Justice (Minister of Justice-equivalent). The Ambassador
the importance of a sound commercial legal environment to Libya's econo
development. He noted that CLDP is an example of the type of bilateral
that can improve the legal environment, and thanked the Secretary for h
in obtaining Libyan visas for the U.S. participants of recent CLDP work
Abduljalil expressed his own support for the CLDP programs and bilatera
cooperation in general, stating that "less talk and more action is best
comes to moving the relationship forward.

¶3. (C) The Ambassador previewed for Abduljalil the upcoming CLDP-spons
to New York and Washington of three Libyan judicial officials. Abduljal
that as Libya was now opening up its economy and developing a private s
needed to strengthen its commercial laws, and that such trips to the U.
provide the Libyans with new ideas. This was "essential" as, after many
sanctions and international isolation, the Libyans know very little abo
U.S. system of government. He said they were also interested in discuss
system for prisoner exchange to provide for the repatriation of Libyans
imprisoned in the U.S. and for U.S. citizens in Libyan prisons. (Note:
not aware of any Americans currently in Libyan prisons. End note.) He s
had negotiated such agreements with other countries and hoped to do the
with the U.S. He would ask the three officials to write a report after
upcoming trip, including proposals for other areas of cooperation.

STATUS OF LIBYA'S CRIMINAL LAW REFORM PROJECT

¶4. (C) Abduljalil said the GOL has been working on reforming Libya's C
Code for 4-5 years and that the revised legislation is currently being
in the General People's Congress. He noted that Libya is trying to inco
alternatives to prison sentences for some crimes, including a system fo
imposing fines instead of jail-time, as well as community service. Idea
death penalty would be a sentence reserved only in cases of murder, he
explained. Regarding other penalties, such as charges brought against t
speak against the government, Abduljalil maintained that Libyans could
anything they wanted" in the forum of the General People's Congress. He
that journalists were free to write anything they chose, provided they
make personal accusations against anyone (i.e., slander).

FROM CRIMINALS TO ISRAEL: JUDGE ACCUSES U.S., EUROPE OF BEING AGAINST I

¶5. (C) In the course of the discussion of the Criminal Code, Abduljali
abruptly changed the subject from freedom of speech to the "Libyan peop
concern about the U.S. government's support for Israel." He averred tha
cares deeply about Muslims everywhere, and about Muslim countries. In h
the root cause of terrorism stems from the perception that Europe and t
are against Muslims. He believed that "justice is for everyone," and th
Libya does not uphold that tenet, then terrorists will find a foothold
The Ambassador replied that the U.S. is committed to a positive TRIPOLI
002.2 OF 002 relationship with the Muslim world, referencing the Presid
2009 speech in Cairo. He said it is important to continue the discussio
sensitive topics in order to develop a mature relationship between our
countries. Through the Human Rights Dialogue (HRD), the U.S. hopes to c
the discussion with Libya on such topics in a discreet, mutually respec

manner, which Abduljalil appeared to appreciate. The Ambassador gave Ab
a copy of the diplomatic note proposing the HRD working groups and invi
input.

BIO NOTE AND COMMENT

¶6. (C) Abduljalil was named Secretary of the General People's Committe
Justice in January 2007. He does not speak English, and spoke only Arab
meeting. According to a recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), he h
expressed reformist ideas about eliminating corruption within the GOL a
bringing security organizations in line with the rule of law. In HRW's
assessment, Abduljalil's drive to change the system is driven more by h
conservative point of view rather than a reformist agenda. According to
staff and several judges, he is well-regarded and considered to be fair
Ambassador's initial meeting with Abduljalil was positive and encouragi
Through his staff, including Director of International Cooperation Kama
Bahri, Abduljalil has demonstrated an interest in working with us on th
Commercial Law Development Program over the past year and a willingness
his staff to communicate with emboffs outside of official channels. Thi
evidenced by his securing visa approvals for visiting CLDP officials. (
organization seems to have a parallel track in securing visa approvals,
bypassing Protocol and the MFA, as the Embassy received the approval nu
the CLDP visitors directly from the GPC for Justice and not through the
usual; in fact, the visas for the two CLDP visitors are among the very
visas we have received in the past few months. End note.) The next step
to continue the discussion of how we can work with the GPC for Justice
more sensitive areas, such as the Human Rights Dialogue. We also commit
providing the Minister with U.S. laws and explanations showing how we h
the issues of free association and free speech balanced against the sec
needs of the nation. End comment. CRETZ